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The Future Course of World Politics 1972-1987

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Inasmuch as war has been described as a political instrument or as a continuation of political relations carried out by the same or different means, an appraisal of the broad political forces most likely to be operative in the world over the next 15 years is essential to the strategic planning process. The United States, as a great economic, political, and military power in the world will necessarily become involved in a variety of international situations having conflict potential in the next few years. Only by planning and acting from a base of understanding and not ignorance can we play an effective part in safeguarding world peace.

THE FUTURE COURSE OF WORLD POLITICS 1972-1987

A paper

by

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It is vital . . . to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.

Mao Tse-tung: *On
Guerrilla Warfare*, 1937

INTRODUCTION

If military plans, policies, and programs are to be wisely formulated, an appreciation of the course that world politics will likely follow is first necessary. This paper attempts to predict the international political atmosphere in which U.S. military forces will operate during the next 15 years. In undertaking such a task we hope that an analysis of this nature may prove to be of value to those military officers engaged in making decisions having long-range implications.

While politics and military affairs remain inextricably intertwined, limitations of time and space require that the military ramifications of political forecasts presented here be largely omitted. Such specifics as strategic planning, force structuring, and weapons development must be left to those actually involved in these endeavors.

The bipolar cold war political environment which followed World War II is now rapidly giving way to a new political environment of multipolarity. The recent shift in American policy toward the People's Republic of China is a dramatic step which reflects the passing of the bipolar era. Today the international system is in a period of readjustment in reaction to that major political act. However, the shift in American policy had been foreseen for several years by many observers and came as a result of observable trends reflected by a series of less dramatic

actions by the various international actors. President Nixon may have speeded the process away from bipolarity and toward multipolarity, but the shift would have eventually been made by an American President. The Nixon Doctrine, with all that it connotes, is similarly based on political, military, and economic realities and will therefore survive the Nixon administration.

No political act occurs in a vacuum. The shift in American policy toward a multipolar environment was a rational reaction to various political, military, and economic acts and trends. In turn, the major readjustments within the international system to the new triangular relationships between the Soviet Union, the United States, and the People's Republic of China are already occurring. These adjustments can be analyzed, the various trends can be conceptualized, and projections for the political environment covering the next 15 years can be made.

It must be remembered, however, that nothing is really inevitable in world politics since human beings, with all of their unpredictableness, can and do shape and cause the events of history. Political trends are often broken by the unanticipated actions of men. Contrary to Marxian determinism, the course of history is not predetermined. We cannot predict the course of history or analyze current policies in terms of any exact science such as that claimed by communism. The realm of world politics is inexact, and the projection of political analyses into the future is even more inexact. With these limitations in mind, the following projection of the future course of world politics is presented.

The most likely international environment that will evolve over the next 15 years is one characterized by multipolarity or polycentrism. Multipolarity implies a movement away from the bipolar world of the 1950's with its two power centers and rigid alliance systems

to an environment with several power centers and more flexibility of alignments. This will result from a continuation of political trends already clearly observable.

There will be a continuation of, but a decreasing interest in, competitive co-existence and *détente*. This implies the existence of forces tending to promote cooperation and mutual toleration as well as those leaning toward confrontation and conflict. If the latter should become dominant, the situation will deteriorate to one of open conflict, while a clear superiority of the former will lead to cooperation and ultimately entente. The ever-present possibility that the forces tending toward confrontation and conflict will become predominant, however, distinguishes co-existence from cooperation. Thus, when the cohesive and divisive forces are of relatively equal strength, an equilibrium state of "coexistence and peaceful competition" occurs. The existence of such a state is forecast with a continuing diminution of the tension between those forces tending to unite and those tending to separate.¹

Nations will continue to be the principal actors on the international scene. Increasing social, economic, and even military interdependence may prompt independent countries to form regional or functional organizations, but in the nation-state system which we have today and will continue to have at least until the end of the century, world affairs will be carried out on a state-to-state level.

There is little reason to believe that world government will become a reality prior to 1987. Governments, reflecting the will of their subjects, generally are not prepared to renounce a significant portion of their sovereignty in favor of a supranational organization.

The major power centers will be the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Western Europe, and possibly Japan. The relative position of China and

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Western Europe with respect to the other power centers will depend on the pragmatism with which the former charts her course in the international arena and the latter's success in achieving an increasing degree of economic integration.

The possibility of a large-scale confrontation between the major power centers would appear to be low. Even this low likelihood, however, should not be ignored since the danger of miscalculation of intentions or objectives could lead to a rapid rise in tensions or even an outbreak of hostilities at any time.

Barring a completely unpredictable technological breakthrough, it is unlikely that any one of the power centers will develop a preponderant first-strike capability vis-a-vis the other three. Although the balance of terror will continue to exist, the number of nuclear and conventional weapons in the Soviet arsenal will be larger than the number available to any of the other major powers. Thus, should another Cuban missile crisis occur, it most probably will not be the Soviet Government that will be forced to back down.

The international system will not be without motion; it will be constantly evolving as the role of some countries increases while that of others decreases. Because of differing and competing ideologies, national cultural heritages, and national objectives, low-level military conflict will occur between one power center and a lesser power or between two lesser powers. Political, economic, and psychological conflict will occur, even between competing power centers, as nations seek to achieve significant advantages over other nations in order to advance their own power, prestige, and ideology.

Overt military intervention of large countries into the internal affairs of smaller nations within their sphere of influence will occur less frequently than in the past because of the rise of

nationalism and the ability of countries to "migrate" politically to other power centers. Covert assistance in revolutionary wars will continue.

Nationalism will continue to exert a powerful influence on the conduct of world affairs. The forces of nationalism may weaken somewhat in the more developed Western countries but will become increasingly strong in the developing countries as they undertake the tasks of political unification and economic development. In the long term, nationalism will impede the spread of communism by both the Soviet Union and China, as well as diminish the cohesiveness of major blocs and alignments.

The gap in the standard of living between the citizens of the "have" and "have-not" nations will continue to grow as will the discontent of the inhabitants of the poorer countries. Until the recent past, the people of the less developed countries (LDC's) were not fully aware of the relative affluence of their richer neighbors. Modern communications has shown peasants living in the LDC's that not everyone lives the way they do, and the revolution of rising expectations has affected and will continue to affect political and economic decisions in the developing nations. This influence will occur at precisely the time when the governments of these countries are attempting to limit consumption in order to invest in the capital goods necessary for industrialization. This dichotomy between the demand for consumption goods and the need for capital goods will lead to increasing political instability and revolution in the countries of the Third World.

Rapid population growth, particularly in the LDC's, will continue to be a matter of great concern. Population increases now consume more than half of the economic growth of the developing countries, and by 1987 the situation will be even more critical. Food produc-

tion and education may not be able to keep pace with the rising populations. While widespread famine will be unlikely because of surplus agricultural production in the developed countries, many nations of the underdeveloped world will continue to experience inadequate levels of caloric intake.

The period under study will be characterized by continual international economic growth. This growth will essentially occur in countries accounting for approximately 50 percent of the world's population. China, other Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, et cetera, black Africa, and certain areas of Latin America will not fully share in this economic prosperity. However, even in these regions, some advancement will be experienced.

The position of the United States as the dominant economic power will diminish as Japan continues her rapid economic development, as Europe becomes more economically integrated, and as other lesser, but still important, economic powers emerge on the international scene. This diminution of America's relative economic position will be mitigated somewhat by U.S.-owned multinational corporations (MNC's) which will account for a significant portion of the growth in other countries. The MNC may well become the dynamic instrument in this growing international economy.

By 1987 many of today's economic powers will have advanced to a post-industrial society, that is, one in which the service sector of the economy contributes more to the GNP than the industrial sector. The decline in industrial growth in these countries will be matched by greater industrial output by Eastern and Southern Europe, some Latin American countries, and the Pacific area of Asia, with the exception of Japan.

Although the dollar will remain the most widely used national currency in international transactions, its position

and prestige will continue to decline. International monetary crises will develop which probably will lead most industrial countries to press for greater flexibility of exchange rates. It is likely that by 1987 a great deal more flexibility will have been achieved in international monetary affairs.

As populations continue to increase, the worldwide demand for energy will rise rapidly. Nuclear plants, particularly of the "breeder-reactor" type, which produce more fuel than they use, will be required to provide increasing amounts of power for domestic consumption. Greater amounts of petroleum and natural gas will be demanded. Particularly in the case of the former, this increased demand could lead to unrest and instability in the petroleum producing countries of the Middle East, which could ultimately involve intervention by one or more of the major power centers.

The search for additional sources of energy, as well as food, will cause more emphasis to be placed on exploitation of seabed resources. Problems of legality, jurisdiction, ecology, and methods of extraction will have to be solved in order to avoid possibilities of conflict as many nations vie for this rich source of scarce materials.

During the next 15 years many of the alliances and power alignments that have evolved since World War II will undergo a notable transformation as nations perceive either a changing or diminishing threat to their security. The current and discernible trend toward multipolarity, as well as continuing technological and sociological innovation, will cause some present-day alliances to weaken or to dissolve, while other trends may reinforce and strengthen existing groupings. However, the *raison d'être* of most alliances and international organizations will continue to lie in their usefulness in enhancing the security and economic development of their members.

Of the current major alliances, the

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fate of the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) are equally bleak, and both may well disappear prior to 1987. CENTO's demise will be hastened by Turkey's emphasis on NATO for her defense and by Pakistan's growing friendliness toward China and her perception of India and not the Soviet Union as her primary security threat. For these reasons, plus her desire for more international independence, Pakistan's interest in SEATO will continue to diminish.

The collapse of SEATO will also be aided by the French desire to pursue a more independent policy and by British military withdrawal from the area. Moreover, the ANZUS countries, the Philippines, and Thailand consider SEATO somewhat redundant since they have other security arrangements with the United States.

Both the Warsaw Pact and NATO will evolve into somewhat less rigid and less firmly structured systems than they presently are. Each will realize that an attack by the other is less likely, and thus the main emphasis of each will be on political rather than military solutions to the European security problem. The Soviet Union and the United States will continue to dominate militarily their respective systems, but American political influence within NATO will diminish.

The political and social dimensions of NATO will come to dominate NATO's work during the next 15 years. NATO's Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society is already working on studies concerning sea and air pollution, automobile and road safety, and disaster assistance. Even the NATO military committees will come to devote much of their time and effort to practical matters of common concern which may or may not have a military connection.

Unfortunately, the United Nations will not improve its ability to carry out

effectively two of its primary roles, i.e., peacekeeping and the settlement of international disputes. The Security Council will invariably become deadlocked in any crisis involving one of the big powers or an ally or friend of one of the big powers. As illustrated in the recent Indo-Pakistan war, the General Assembly will be unable to do more than make recommendations to the concerned parties, who will in most cases completely ignore such recommendations.

However, the United Nations will continue to play several important roles on the international political scene. It will still provide a public forum where any member state can air its grievances, and it will facilitate private discussion between disputants in any crisis situation. The specialized agencies of the United Nations will, in the next 15 years, play an even more important role in attempting to solve economic and social problems throughout the world. This mission is one which many of the underdeveloped countries see as the organization's most vital.

A recent trend that will continue to grow in importance is the increasing multilateralization of economic assistance from the industrial nations channeled through international organizations to the developing countries. The role of the United Nations in this regard will increase significantly over the next decade. This system has the obvious advantages that the aid recipients are not required to give *quid pro quos* for the assistance received, and the organization can effectively supervise the use to which aid funds are put.

The number and importance of regional organizations will continue to increase during the period under study. The world as a whole has become more aware of the important contribution regional cooperation can make to economic and social development. Most Third World countries simply do not have sufficient numbers of skilled per-

sonnel, capital, nor the access to large markets necessary to their development. Through regional arrangements designed to provide for the pooling of these limited resources and the expansion of markets from a country to a regional basis, these developing nations can realize some measure of success in the difficult task of economic modernization.

Membership in the European Economic Community, or the Common Market, will increase over the next several years, but it is unlikely that a common currency or foreign policy will evolve. With the addition of Britain, Iceland, Norway, and Denmark, which will probably occur by mid-1972 when their governments ratify their entrance, the EEC will be second only to the United States in terms of gross production. Membership in future years may be expanded to Greece, Spain, Portugal, and even Israel. Although very unlikely, the membership of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and other Warsaw Pact members cannot be completely discounted. The Common Market will continue to provide stiff economic competition to the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan.

The Organization of American States and the Organization of African Unity will continue as viable institutions. The former in particular will play an increasingly important role in resolving regional economic and social problems. Smaller regional economic groupings will be formed in Asia, Africa, and Latin America patterned after the Central American Common Market and the East African Economic Community. An exception to this pattern will be found in the Arab States where the need for economic cooperation exists, but where mutual suspicion and animosity will preclude such action. The recent federation of Egypt, Syria, and Libya will disappear long before 1987.

Functional organizations will make important contributions toward a

lessening of world tension. International cooperation in such fields as ecology, space technology, et cetera, may help to achieve world peace through functionalism.

Despite the fact that the Soviet Union, the United States, and many other countries have spoken out in favor of arms control, disarmament, and elimination of arms races, it is unlikely that any major agreement limiting either conventional or nuclear weapons will be signed prior to 1987. The current world movement toward multipolarity makes the possibility of such an understanding even more dim.

Before significant arms limitation accords can be negotiated, progress will have to be made in two vital areas which have in the past precluded agreement on any major disarmament issues and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. The first and most important problem is in the political arena where a lessening of world tensions must precede serious arms control bargaining. Nations increase their armaments because they feel insecure; therefore, before they will agree to disarm or control arms production, the causes of their insecurity must be removed. To date, only the most minute progress has been achieved in this area.

The second major impediment to success in arms limitation discussions is the issue of international inspection and verification. The Soviet Union has fiercely opposed the idea of an inspection of her facilities by foreign nationals. Notwithstanding the mutual advantages of nuclear disarmament, it is unlikely that meaningful advances will be made prior to an agreement providing for reliable verification and control procedures.

Another factor impeding significant progress in nuclear disarmament is China's determination to develop a credible second-strike capability. China certainly will not agree to any curtailment of her nuclear buildup until she

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has achieved this capability which, in her opinion, will give her an adequate strategic defense and the full sovereignty she seeks.

Arms control and disarmament negotiations will continue to take place between the major power centers for any of several reasons. Such negotiations may be deemed useful by national leaders for relaxing tensions or for their propaganda value or as a stalling tactic to permit a unilateral arms buildup. The success of such discussions will be limited however. Attempts will be made by the nuclear powers to legislate nuclear-free zones in the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, but only in the latter will their efforts be truly successful. By 1987 such countries as Israel, Japan, India, West Germany, and Brazil may very well possess some type of nuclear armament.²

The few arms control agreements that have been negotiated are not of major importance and have been weakened by the unwillingness of all nuclear powers to adhere to them. Additionally, these accords can be unilaterally renounced. For example, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty have not been ratified by China and France. Moreover, they both contain the unilateral withdrawal provision which declares that any party to the convention may "in exercising its national sovereignty" unilaterally renounce its provisions if an "extraordinary" event occurs.

In general, any major strategic force limitation agreement will follow, but not precede, a reduction in tensions between the major power centers. It is also possible that once world tension has been reduced, arms limitations will not be negotiated but will be announced unilaterally by nations under increasing pressure from their citizens for a reduction in defense expenditures and for a greater commitment to internal reforms.

THE UNITED STATES

The United States will retain world leadership in terms of gross national product, standard of living, and production skills. However, the United States will slip into a definite second place relative to the Soviet Union in terms of strategic and general purpose forces. The American people will have to be made aware that the American Navy, while not "second-rate," no longer holds the dominant position it has enjoyed since the end of World War II.

Since foreign policy goals and military capabilities must be synchronized to avoid a national incapacity to implement policy objectives, it will be necessary to continue to trim the scope of American foreign policy goals. The Nixon Doctrine and the "Total Force Concept" are steps in this direction. The United States will not be able to act as the "policeman" of the world. Clearly the Nixon Doctrine, with its recognition that the United States cannot carry the total burden for the defense of the free world, will survive the Nixon administration.

In the Secretary of State's foreign policy report to the Congress, on 26 March 1971, the following statement was made:

The President has stressed that the Administration's foreign policy is guided by three principles: partnership, strength, and a willingness to negotiate, within this context, the Nixon Doctrine proposes an adjustment in both the security role and the responsibilities that the United States expects to assume in the years immediately ahead. What we seek is a reduction in U.S. military presence in certain areas, while at the same time helping our partners to develop their own self-defense capabilities. The two parts of the Nixon Doctrine are inter-

dependent: as allies improve their defense posture, the threshold at which U.S. forces are likely to be called upon for support under existing treaty commitments will be correspondingly raised.³

This policy is based on realities and will therefore survive the Nixon administration. The United States will attempt to maintain, in conjunction with its allies, military forces capable of supporting a flexible response strategy. However, even with heavy reliance on her allies, the American Government will be hard pressed to maintain a credible flexible response strategy which calls for adequate forces to meet any level of conflict without resorting to escalation. There will be gaps on the conflict scale (ranging from counter-insurgency to nuclear war) which will not be adequately covered. Agile diplomacy will have to replace military capability in certain levels of confrontation and in certain geographic areas.

The Nixon Doctrine requires a large increase in American foreign military assistance. However, it is unlikely that Congress will substantially increase these programs.

The United States is not likely to intervene unilaterally with military force in most situations over the next 15 years. National attention, barring any future Cuban missile-type crisis, will continue to be primarily focused on domestic issues such as the economy, minority problems, ecological problems, and so forth. The antimilitary and anti-interventionist attitudes resulting from the Southeast Asian war experience will continue to exert pressure on the American Government. Public opinion—and foreign governmental opinion—will not favor unilateral interventions on the part of the United States. Probable exceptions calling for direct American intervention will be Mexico, Canada (French-Canadian problem), the Caribbean area, and possibly Israel.

Covert operations or multilateral

operations under the auspices of the United Nations or the Organization of American States may and probably will occur. The emphasis of America's involvement in any future conflict will be on supporting her allies with materiel and training, but without the use of American combat personnel unless the country threatened is one of those exceptions listed in the preceding paragraph or, as indicated by the Nixon Doctrine, is an ally who is a victim of obvious aggression by a nuclear power.

The United States will continue to play the Soviet Union and China against each other in attempts to gain concessions and to avoid any big-power confrontation. The flexibility of the multipolar power situation will be to the United States advantage, especially since American military forces will no longer be superior to the Soviets'. More reliance will be placed upon the ability to maneuver diplomatically about this triangular relationship than upon military force.

It is not inconceivable that the next 15 years will see occasions where the military forces of the United States will operate in coordination with those of either the Soviet Union or China in the protection of common interests. For example, if Chinese ships were to have evacuated Pakistani troops from East Pakistan (Bangladesh) during the recent Indo-Pakistani war, an American naval task force might very well have provided political and military support for the evacuation by escorting the Chinese ships to West Pakistan. Perhaps, at some future date, the Soviet Union and the United States may find it in their common interest to have a joint task force operate in a third country's nuclear weapon testing area in order to retard nuclear proliferation or to pressure that country into signing the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. These examples are merely speculations, but the political trends point to such joint operations as a distinct possibility.

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Utilizing the maneuverability of the multipolar situation, the United States will continue to press for international agreements which tend to reduce the level of tensions in the world. Various arms control measures will be attempted, and political accommodations will be reached over certain nonvital national interest areas and issues.

The number of overseas bases will continue to decrease, and the level of American troops in Europe will be drastically reduced over the next 15 years. The United States will not revert to a "fortress America" strategy except in terms of the location of its military forces, but neither will it revert to a "forward" strategy. The emphasis will be on diplomacy, economics, and strategic mobility involving forces based on American territory.

THE SOVIET UNION

During this 15-year period the Soviet Union will clearly pass the United States in terms of general purpose forces. She will develop a capability to project her power overseas and may possibly get mired down in some attempt to intervene militarily in an unfavorable environment. In other words, the Soviet Union may actually follow the United States in learning the limits of military intervention in the modern world. The 20,000 Soviet troops in the Middle East may be harbingers of future involvements of Soviet personnel in overseas conflicts.

The Soviets will eventually learn, either the easy way or the hard way, that external intervention by overt conventional forces will more than likely be unsuccessful because of the rise of nationalism, the accessibility to alternate sources of economic, diplomatic, and military aid, and the increasing ability of nations to resist external overt intervention.

The Soviets will continue to diversify their general purpose forces, possibly

acquiring aircraft carriers. Their naval strategy will be one enabling them to have a flexible strategy supporting global economic and diplomatic interests. The strategy of interposition of Soviet forces between a crisis area and the American Fleet will continue to be followed and refined.

The Soviets will continue to stress the maintenance of a credible deterrent to a nuclear attack. They will not be able to achieve a first-strike capability vis-a-vis the United States, but they will definitely maintain an assured second-strike capability. Additionally, they will maintain a significant surplus strategic capability in terms of numbers of missiles in order to maintain a relative superiority over the United States for prestige and psychological purposes. These strategic forces will also be qualitatively and quantitatively superior to those of China.

Economically, the Soviets will continue to stress basic industrial and military developments, but will also be able to increase the output of consumer goods at a modest rate from an overall increase in gross national product. They will be able to have their guns while modestly increasing the amount of butter that the consumer receives. While being very careful to avoid dependence on foreign trade, the Soviets will continue to expand trade with the non-Communist world. Even though their merchant marine will grow tremendously in size, as will their transoceanic trade, the Soviet Union will remain a continental power. This lack of dependence on sea lanes of communication is a tremendous military advantage to the Soviets compared to the non-Communist world and they intend to maintain it.

Politically the Soviet leaders will continue to give lipservice to the idea that communism will eventually spread to all countries of the world. However, no Soviet leader feels that this stage will be reached in his lifetime. In this

respect, the Soviet leaders have returned to the Marxian concept of an unhurried progression of stages along the path to communism as opposed to the concept espoused by Lenin and Trotsky of an elite party being able to accelerate the growth of world communism. When Stalin decided to develop socialism (and then communism) in one country (Russia) first, the concept of the nation-state took precedence over the concept of ideology and subverted the ideology. Today no Soviet leader would consider risking the national interests of the Soviet state in order to advance the Communist ideology. Caution will be all the more necessary because of a hostile China along an extensive common border. The Soviet leaders will be cautious in their outlook and will continue to condemn adventurism.

However, the Soviets will be quick to take advantage of a weak or conciliatory opponent when circumstances are favorable. They will continue to strive, albeit cautiously, for influence throughout the world, particularly in the Middle East and in South Asia. They will place heavy emphasis on an attempt to encircle and contain China. The Soviet Union will agree to political accommodations with the West only when such agreements do not place her at a disadvantage. However, the Kremlin leaders will also be pressed to make certain accommodations with the West because of the Chinese threat. Therefore, from the viewpoint of Soviet interests, these accommodations, while not disadvantageous, may not be advantageous.

Because of the Chinese threat and the ability of the United States to maneuver between the Soviets and the Chinese, it is probable that the Soviet Union will come to some degree of accommodation with respect to Europe (mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR), Berlin accords, East-West trade, increased autonomy for the East European states, et cetera) in an effort

to relax tensions on her western front.

CHINA

It is generally conceded that one of the principal determinants of power is population and that none of the major powers of the world have a population of less than 50 million. Using this analysis, many political scientists predict that China will inevitably become the most powerful nation in the world.⁴ If population were the only determinant of power, that analysis would certainly be true since China's population today is between 700-800 million and is increasing at such a rate that every 15 years the number of her citizens increases by an amount equal to the present population of the United States.

However, such an enormous population is not always advantageous to an underdeveloped country such as China. Increases in the gross national product are quickly consumed in providing only the barest of necessities to the rapidly expanding citizenry. Resources which should be used to augment the supply of capital goods are used to feed, clothe, and provide the rudiments of education to the masses. While this immense population may in the distant future provide the basis for China's rise to the position of the world's most powerful nation, nobody who is alive today will live to see it. By 1987 China will only have begun to develop the political, economic, and social structure necessary to carry her into the ranks of the superpowers.

China's post-Maoist leadership will adopt policies realistic in a polycentric world. As she recovers from the Cultural Revolution and plays a more active international role, China will increase her influence throughout Southeast Asia, especially with respect to those countries with whom she shares a common border. Such Asian nations as Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines will jealously guard their

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sovereignty but will improve their relations with Peking. Japan will also increase her contacts with China and may even assist the latter in solving some of her economic problems. China will increase her prestige throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America by using her recently won United Nations seat to champion the cause of the Third World and attempt to diminish the influence of the United States and the Soviet Union in those areas.

The basic causes of the Sino-Soviet rift will continue to exist, and the residual animosity felt by these two power centers will color all of their international policies. As China will avoid a serious military conflict with the Soviet Union, Chinese irredentist claims to Outer Mongolia and other areas along the Soviet border which were lost through "unequal treaties" will not be realized. While a major showdown between these two powers is not likely in the next 15 years, the Chinese Government has publicly stated that there are "irreconcilable differences" between China and the Soviet Union which will preclude a rapprochement in the foreseeable future.

One of China's driving ambitions will continue to be the development of a credible second-strike nuclear capability. China's leaders believe that only such a capability will give them the necessary latitude in their dealings with the other power centers. By 1987 it is quite probable that China will have developed this capability.

The vision of China sending mass armies far from her frontier is unrealistic for it ignores the tremendous logistical constraints faced by China.⁵ She has neither the capability to project her forces a long distance from her border nor the ability to support them. Thus, for the foreseeable future, China's military posture will be purely defensive with the exception of her ability and proven willingness to send conventional forces into neighboring states when she

feels her security is threatened. During the period under study, China will not attempt to recover Taiwan by military means.

EUROPE AND CANADA

Most probably the countries of Europe will benefit from the growing accommodation of interests between the United States and the Soviet Union in the area. This accommodation will be forced upon the Soviets by the ability of the United States to maneuver about the triangular relationships between the two superpowers and China. Faced with the Chinese on their eastern front, the Soviets will attempt to decrease the tensions in Europe.

As a result of the general lessening of Soviet-American tensions in the area, it is likely that the Western European nations will shift perceptively away from a strict alignment with the United States. This shift will also be encouraged by the fact that the American commitment to NATO will decrease in credibility as the Soviet nuclear and conventional capability increases. The current NATO strategy of flexible response and forward defense will become less realistic as American troops are withdrawn from Europe, except for token forces left behind to act as a "hostage" or tripwire force theoretically designed to assure an American commitment to Europe's defense.

The degree to which Western Europe will play an independent and important role in international politics will depend on the degree to which it integrates economically. It is unlikely that the European Community will spill over into the political area, but there will be political overtones to the Common Market, including possible regional security arrangements. The Western European states will definitely retain their national identities.

Germany will remain divided. This fact will continue to be the major

impediment to complete East-West reconciliation in Europe. The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) will continue to strive for some recognition of one German nation comprised of two German states. There is some possibility that she may eventually be successful in that endeavor. There is also the strong possibility that the two Germanys will become members of the United Nations. West Germany may acquire a nuclear weapon capability in order to gain some independence from NATO so as to be able to pursue her reunification goal on a bilateral basis rather than within the NATO framework.

France will continue her independent military and political course while remaining generally aligned with the other Western democracies on crucial East-West issues. The French will continue to play the role of balancer and moderator in the European balance of power equation. The Soviets will continue to support France in this role in order to provide a counterbalance to West Germany and to bolster French resistance to American influence.

If France and West Germany do, in fact, go their separate ways, the chances for a regional military force arrangement to support an independent Western Europe on the political scene will be dim.

The United Kingdom will continue to draw down her military forces, particularly her navy. Her "special relationship" with the United States will undergo some strains as a result of her entry into the Common Market, but it will continue to exist in some modified form. The United Kingdom will probably act as the bridge between the United States and the Western European Community as a result of this modified special relationship.

The states of Eastern Europe will rapidly increase their connections with the West. They will, however, be mindful of the practical limits imposed on their autonomy by the Soviet Union.

Trade relations, cultural relations, and even political relations between East and West Europe will flourish. West Germany will provide tremendous amounts of investment capital in the Eastern European states. Tourist travel will flow steadily back and forth across the Iron Curtain; in fact, the term "Iron Curtain" will become a misnomer.

A possible destabilizing factor in this area could be the breakup of Yugoslavia after the death of Tito. Recent signs indicate that ancient rivalries and hostilities between the nationality groups comprising the Yugoslav state have not yet been eliminated. Should Tito's death be followed by internal chaos, there is a likelihood that Bulgaria will attempt to realize her irredentist claims to parts of Yugoslav territory (Macedonia). Moreover, following Tito's death, the Soviet Union might even resort to force in an attempt to draw Yugoslavia into her sphere of influence.

The Cyprus crisis will continue indefinitely into the future, barring an unlikely relocation of one of the ethnic groups on the island. Cyprus will therefore continue to be a major impediment to full cooperation between two NATO members, Greece and Turkey.

Canada will continue to attempt to solve "the complex problem of living distinct from but in harmony with the world's most powerful and dynamic nation."⁶ In an attempt to assert her distinctiveness, she will often take slightly divergent positions from the United States on international issues, but this should be of no concern to the United States. Canada's major problem will continue to be her French-Canadian nationality issue. There is a distinct possibility that Canada will experience a political (perhaps violent) upheaval leading to a loosening of the political connection between Quebec and the rest of Canada.

EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

Except for Southeast Asia, this area

shows great promise in terms of political stability with steady economic growth. The United States will continue to withdraw her military personnel from overseas bases in the area. This withdrawal should not create any serious degree of instability except in Southeast Asia.

Indonesia, comprising about half the area and population of Southeast Asia, is the bright spot of the region. She should continue to develop and perhaps may reach the status of a medium power during the period under examination.

It is difficult to predict the political future of the states now engaged in active combat on the mainland of Southeast Asia. From the U.S. viewpoint, the worst possible outcome would be the subjugation of the Republic of Vietnam by the Hanoi regime. Hopefully, such an outright Communist victory would not occur immediately after the final American withdrawal. If South Vietnam falls, any Laotian Government taking a line independent of Hanoi will not survive for long. Cambodia would remain a political entity but would be like a Finland at best and like Bulgaria at worst in relation to North Vietnam. Thailand, in such circumstances, would probably make some accommodation with North Vietnam and China and plot a neutralist course. Hopefully, Burma would be able to remain on her neutralist course, and Malaysia and Singapore would be able to effectively resist any pressures from the north.

The most optimistic outcome for Washington would be the creation of a strong anti-Communist Republic of Vietnam acting as an effective buffer for the rest of Southeast Asia. In this case, Laos would probably continue as a scene of low-level conflict while Cambodia and Thailand would remain firmly in the anti-Communist camp.

The possibility of an effective anti-Chinese style Communist coalition or

regional alliance among the nations of Southeast Asia is not overly bright. Local national enmities, together with their comparative economic weakness, preclude the nations of Southeast Asia from effectively making a common cause against the expansion of Chinese influence without massive outside assistance. However, a possibility exists that the Soviet Union or Japan might provide such assistance in the face of American unwillingness to play such a role.

The bright side of the coin is that the North Vietnamese and the Chinese will not have the capability to support prolonged insurgencies in areas separated from the mainland by water. Thus, the island nations of the region will have some sort of buffer against Communist expansion, although the threat will still exist as witnessed by past insurgencies in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

Singapore and Malaysia will continue their postures of nonalignment while maintaining anti-Communist policies. They will increase trade with Communist countries, and Singapore will service Soviet warships. Singapore will remain vital to the United States because of its shipyards and facilities as well as its strategic location in relationship to the Straits of Malacca. The Soviet Union and the United States will gradually become more and more aware of their common interest in containing China in the region.

Australia and New Zealand will continue to be dependable allies of the United States and will provide some measure of assistance to other countries of Southeast Asia. Hopefully, Australia will increase her military manpower as American military power in the region decreases.

Although many Chinese Nationalist leaders, the majority of whom were born on the mainland, still aspire to return to their homeland, the prospects of such a forceful reentry are indeed

dim. There is a likelihood of instability, possibly even insurgency, as the indigenous Taiwanese who make up the majority of the island's population struggle to achieve political control of the island. Recent official U.S. statements recognizing Taiwan as part of China will probably work to the detriment of any Taiwanese independence movement however.

The Philippines will maintain general harmony with the United States in political and military affairs. However, internal pressures will require that the United States reduce her military presence in the country and maintain a low profile economically and politically. Just as in the case of Canada, the Philippines will be attempting to assert her distinctness. She will probably initiate relations with various Communist nations and frequently take slightly divergent positions from the United States on international issues. The United States should realize that the Philippines have a need to feel completely independent from the United States. One trouble spot that will more than likely flare up at some point over the next 15 years is the territorial dispute with Indonesia over Sabah.

South Korea should continue to advance economically, barring an outbreak of hostilities with North Korea. South Korean military personnel may become extensively engaged in military assistance advisory roles throughout Southeast Asia. Their anti-infiltration expertise and modern army techniques should prove valuable to other nations in the general area. For the United States the assumption of such a role by the South Koreans would be beneficial in terms of having Asians train and assist each other, maintaining a low American military profile in the area, and resisting Communist infiltration and insurgency operations. North Korea will continue to stress the reunification of Korea under Communist rule and will become more and more frustrated over the issue.

It is unlikely that a major war in Korea will occur over the next 15 years because of the strength of South Korea, the continuing American commitment to the government in Seoul, and the disinclination of China to see an outbreak of hostilities so close to her border. China is satisfied with the status quo on the Korean peninsula and will make that fact known to North Korea. North Korea will continue to play China against the Soviet Union in order to maintain a slight degree of independence and mobility, but her freedom of action will remain extremely limited.

Japan is already the third largest economic power in the world. During the next 15 years Japanese goods will flood the South Asian and Southeast Asian regions. The major question for Japan is the future direction of her military policy. At some point she will have to make a choice as to whether to maintain a "purely self-defensive" force limited to an anti-invasion, anti-infiltration coastal guard force or to build a navy capable of defending Japan from direct and indirect aggression on the sea.⁷

Currently Japan relies on the American strategic deterrent. However, the credibility of the American commitment will be increasingly questioned, just as in Europe, as the Soviets gain clear superiority in strategic and conventional forces. Additionally, Japan will want to move toward greater assertiveness and pragmatism in her international relations. Intentionally or unintentionally, Japan will find herself thrust into the role of political, military, and economic counterweight to China in Asia. Therefore, it is considered very likely that Japan will opt for the broader definition of "self-defense" and build a navy capable of defending the sealanes north of Australia and east of Singapore. Additionally, she will opt to build a Polaris-type strategic missile submarine force, limited in size but armed with nuclear missiles. This will

place her in the same relative position as France, possessing a *force de frappe* capable of ensuring that Washington does not sacrifice Tokyo in order to avoid destruction of American cities.

Just as with France and West Germany, Japan will remain basically tied to the West in terms of economics, international politics, and representative democracy. Japan may engage in an active effort to organize a regional power grouping of the non-Communist nations in East and Southeast Asia. The success of such a venture is unlikely, however, during the next 15 years because of the diverse goals of the nations in the region and their differing stages of stability and development.

The Trust Territory of the Pacific (Micronesia) will have achieved a new political status. The United States will no longer administer Micronesia as a strategic trusteeship. The actual political status of Micronesia is under active negotiation at this time. It is predicted that the Micronesians will gain complete internal self-government, with the United States being responsible only for Micronesia's foreign affairs and defense. Reasonably we might expect that the American Government will obtain long-term base rights in the islands, perhaps in return for guaranteed economic assistance levels and other political concessions.

The only other remaining trusteeship, New Guinea (which will include the former Australian territory of Papua), will become independent during the period under examination. The scattered islands of the South Pacific will continue to remain non-Communist and will continue to increase their mutual relationships and cooperation via the South Pacific Commission.

NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Many startling political changes— and dangers—will occur in this diverse area over the next 15 years. The Soviet

Union will be attempting to extend her influence throughout this area in order to encircle the Chinese. The economic problems of the area are critical. The political situation in many of the area's countries is volatile.

In the Middle or Near East the Arab-Israeli conflict will continue indefinitely. On occasions an uneasy toleration of Israel will appear to have emerged in the Arab States, only to have the level of tensions dramatically increase once again. The Soviet Union seems at this juncture to be over-committed to the Arab cause, and this predicament may result in a drain on Soviet resources and manpower comparable to the American experience in Southeast Asia. If the Soviet Union realizes that this is occurring, she may combine with the major powers in some agreement to limit arms support to the area. Unfortunately, the participants in the conflict will not agree to an imposed big-power political solution. If one is attempted, it will only sow the seeds for a future conflict in the area. The Arab-Israeli conflict will continue to be the most dangerous focal point for a potential direct Soviet-American confrontation. If American and Soviet leaders act reasonably and intelligently, such a superpower confrontation should not occur. However, men do not always act reasonably, and events could get out of hand.

Most likely Israel already has or soon will have the components for a nuclear warhead for her short-range missile. It seems logical that Israel would not hesitate to use it on Cairo and other Arab cities if she were losing a war and in serious danger of being eliminated as an independent state, for Israel cannot afford to lose a war with the Arabs.

Fortunately for world peace, the Arab States will not be able to accommodate their differences (boundary disputes, personal rivalries, and ideological differences) during the period under examination. Lacking the necessary

unity, the Arabs will continue to be unable to defeat Israel.

Political instability will continue in the Arab monarchical states along the Persian Gulf because the economic benefits of the oil exploitation will not be equitably distributed among the people. The political situation in the Arab States will continue to be extremely fluid with the Soviet Union, Iran, the United States, and China maneuvering, each in its own way, for influence in the area. Iran will attempt to fill the vacuum created by the departure of the British from the Persian Gulf and will oppose politically, but not militarily, the entrance of any of the big powers into the area.

India will continue to be beset with problems. She may well find that the dismemberment of Pakistan proves to be counterproductive in that the leftist, separatist Bengalis of West Bengal (Calcutta) may attempt to separate and join Bangladesh. However, India's nationality problems do not end with the Bengalis. There are deep ethnic rifts that continually endanger Indian unity. The Chinese could very easily encourage such dissension, especially among the Nagas in eastern India.

The caste system, even though it is officially outlawed, will continue to haunt India's economic and social modernization. Various social and religious customs will have to be overcome prior to any significant success in modernization. The population problem will not be solved within the span of 15 years. Famine will, however, be avoided with imported food, but malnutrition will exist.

The Kashmir situation, as well as the bitterness of Pakistan over the results of the recent war, will continue to maintain tension along the Indo-Pakistan border. Thus the resources of both countries, already inadequate for their development needs, will be spread even thinner to maintain military preparedness. In its external affairs, India will

side more and more with the Soviet Union as the *quid pro quo* for the Soviets' support vis-a-vis Pakistan and China. The Soviets will probably acquire naval bases on Indian territory and possibly may become mired in a counterinsurgency effort among the ethnic groups in India.

If India does not feel assured of Soviet nuclear protection against China, she may develop her own nuclear capability. She may also develop such a capability in order to remain independent of the Soviet Union. The Indo-Chinese border will continue to remain a tension point.

LATIN AMERICA

When discussing Latin America it is dangerous to generalize, since each country of the region is separate and distinct from every other. Despite this pitfall, however, we must in a study of this sort oversimplify the existing situation and speak in some instances as if Latin America were a homogeneous grouping of similar countries rather than a heterogeneous amalgam of differing peoples.

In general, during the next 15 years the Latin American nations will remain friendly toward and within the sphere of the United States (Cuba excluded) but will continue to exhibit signs of greater independence from their neighbor to the north. While a prolonged war between major nations of the region is not forecast, minor irritations may lead to limited struggles between adjacent countries. These differences will preclude complete intraregional cooperation.

The United States will continue to be particularly concerned with the stability of Mexico, Central America, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and the Caribbean. Should a friendly government in this area be seriously threatened by internal chaos or subversion, the United States will not hesitate to intervene unilaterally.

ally if indigenous government forces are unable to meet the challenge. It is unlikely that a major military threat to the United States will arise in this area since the other power centers will not challenge American hegemony in the region. Should a problem arise south of the Caribbean area, a solution will be attempted utilizing the machinery of the Organization of American States, which will also be called on to arbitrate boundary disputes and other intra-regional problems.

Negotiations between the United States and Panama have thus far been unsuccessful in reaching an agreement on a new canal treaty. It is likely that prior to 1987 Panama will press even harder for a solution to the canal problem. The feeling of nationalism in Panama is very intense, and unless the United States is willing to make several concessions in the treaty negotiations, ill will and perhaps violence could erupt. Panama may seek to improve her relations with other nonhemisphere powers in order to gain political support for her position on the canal issue. Although not predictable, the United States may find it necessary to send additional troops to the Canal Zone to insure continued operation of the canal.

Revolution and violent changes of government will continue to be a way of life in several countries of the region, especially in those in which the economic and social training received by the military makes it, at least temporarily, the only stabilizing force in an otherwise chaotic environment. However, there will be exceptions. Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica will continue their well-established traditions of democratic and free elections. Chile will tire of her socialist experiment and return to the more customary Christian Democratic rule. Brazil and Argentina, where military rule is hardly a tradition, will opt for civilian governments during the period being studied, but should the elected officials prove unresponsive to

the popular demands for economic development, the military will again intervene. Peru and Ecuador may follow this path also, but it is likewise possible that they will become enamored with their leftist leaning military regimes and decide to retain that system of government. Venezuela and Colombia appear well on their way to permanent democratic rule; however, the possibility of military takeover cannot be discounted. Bolivia, Paraguay, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Cuba, and the Central American countries, less Costa Rica, show little indication of rejecting their military systems. Mexico's one party democracy will endure for the foreseeable future.

It is quite probable that by the 1980's several countries of the Americas, including the United States, will have resumed diplomatic relations with Cuba and that the latter will have reoccupied her seat at the Organization of American States. This does not imply that Cuba will sever her close ties with the Soviet Union whose warships will continue to visit Cuban ports. Although there is little evidence that Fidel Castro will be overthrown or voluntarily relinquish control of the island, he seems to have reached the conclusion that each country of the hemisphere must find its own path to socialism, and he will probably cease his attempts to export the Cuban revolution to his neighbors.

Economic development will remain the number one priority for all the countries of the region. During the decade of the 1960's the gross national product of the region as a whole increased annually by more than 4 percent, but a population growth during the same period of 2.8 percent per annum, the highest rate in the world, has served to diminish the increase in per capita GNP to an annual average of 1-2 percent.⁸ This small increase is hardly of the magnitude demanded by the Latin American people.

In an effort to raise their standards

of living, the Latin Americans will enter into a number of regional economic agreements more encompassing than the Central American Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Association; however, none of their attempts at economic cooperation will approach the sophistication of the European Common Market. Although by 1987 the region as a whole will still be considered underdeveloped, Argentina and Brazil may develop to such a degree as to be considered medium powers. Such countries as Haiti, with an illiteracy rate of 90 percent and a per capita income of \$70, and Bolivia, with 68 percent illiterate and a \$90 per capita income, show no signs of escaping from their economic stagnation.⁹

Economic and military assistance will be received from many sources, primarily from the United States and Europe. By 1987 most developmental assistance will be channeled through multilateral organizations requiring no political or military *quid pro quo* in return.

The military will continue to be the most important power center in the majority of the Latin American countries, and the army will be the dominant military service. The material used by the military will be, by U.S. standards, generally obsolete. Brazil and Argentina will continue to have the largest and most powerful military forces in the region. Because of the intense nationalism prevalent in Latin America, there will be no serious movement toward a regional defense force.

AFRICA

Africa, as a whole, encompasses a region, ethnic groupings, tribal customs, and modernization problems so diverse and complex that they defy summary analysis. One of the few general statements that can be made concerning the continent as a whole (and this may not be true of South Africa) is that it will

continue to be an area of chronic instability for many years to come. While a few countries of the region, e.g., Tunisia, the Ivory Coast, and Liberia will show signs of political development, they will be overshadowed by the backwardness and lack of progress of the remainder of the continent. Advancement in the nation building process will be retarded by the inability to devise political institutions that survive individual rulers, the proclivity of the military to intervene in the political process, and tribal and ethnic behavior which impedes modernization. Violent changes of government are likely to continue to take place in such countries as Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, and Zaire (the Congo-Kinshasa) where periods of tranquil and progressive rule will be fleeting.

Boundary disputes, internal rebellions, and intraregional power struggles will lead to military conflicts among neighboring states. These conflicts will be at a low level and of short duration since the countries of the area do not have the resources to support a prolonged struggle. Attempts will be made to settle these disputes utilizing the machinery provided by the Organization of African Unity. It is unlikely that any of the major power centers will militarily intervene in a conflict among African States, nor is it likely that any countries of the region will become actively involved in non-African wars.

The Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia will remain politically distinct from black Africa. Despite a great deal of pressure from the United Nations and adverse world public opinion, neither will renounce its apartheid practices prior to 1987 nor will South Africa relinquish its control over South-West Africa (Namibia). The policies of these two countries will foster a great deal of irritation among other African States, but while covert subversion will continue, it is unlikely that overt military force will be used against either Rhodesia or South Africa.

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The Portuguese can be expected to resist by all means available the pressure for the granting of outright independence to Mozambique and Angola. While extremely difficult to predict, Portugal, despite the countless United Nations resolutions favoring self-determination for all people, probably will not grant complete independence to her African colonies in the foreseeable future.

Although the need for foreign economic assistance in Africa can hardly be overstressed, the industrial nations have reduced their bilateral aid to the region as a whole, and this trend will probably continue. The United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and Belgium have all reduced their assistance programs on the African Continent. Only China, in an attempt to substantiate her claim as champion of the Third World has increased her aid to the region. Africa, therefore, with one-third of the entire United Nations membership, will attempt to hasten the move toward multilateralization of aid through the world organization.

The African States have begun to follow the example of other areas of the world and have entered into regional economic organizations in an attempt to solve their developmental problems. The South African working arrangements, formulated by such diverse countries as South Africa, South-West Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, and Malawi, were designed to promote cooperation in commerce and economic development and indicate a willingness to disregard political differences in the interest of common improvement. During the next several years many more cooperative arrangements along similar lines will be entered into by states from this region.

An intense wave of nationalism will continue to sweep the continent for the foreseeable future. Each country, no matter how small, will strive mightily to maintain its independence vis-a-vis its

neighbors and the competing major power centers. It is unlikely that any nation will enter into any agreement that will derogate from its sovereignty. Despite their efforts, none of the power centers will be able to acquire military bases in sub-Saharan Africa.

Africa is the only major area of the world that will remain free of nuclear weapons at least through 1987. Although every nation on the continent aspires to have a modern military force, none will reach their goal before the turn of the century. Militarily, South Africa will continue to be the most powerful state in the region, but she will refrain from using force against her neighbors unless provoked into doing so by countries supporting subversive activities within her borders in an effort to end her apartheid policy.

CONCLUSIONS

The factor which will determine the overall degree of hostility and confrontation existing in the world over the next 15 years will be the degree to which the political goals of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China are in harmony or in conflict. If the vital national interests of these three nations were in complete harmony, the international system would be evolving toward world peace. On the other hand, if their vital national interests were diametrically opposed, the international political environment would be characterized by confrontations, possibly even active hostilities, between the major powers.

However, neither of these situations actually exists nor are they likely to exist during the next 15 years. The latter condition will probably not occur due to the terrible destruction which all nations would suffer in the event of major hostilities. While the fear of nuclear war will hopefully continue to force these three nations to perceive their vital national interests in such a manner as to avoid an open military

clash, it is improbable that their vital national interests can be brought into complete harmony. For example, the Sino-Soviet differences probably will not be resolved regardless of who succeeds Mao Tse-tung. Total accommodation is precluded by Chinese irredentist tendencies and the natural conflict of national interests between two great powers having an extensive common border. These factors will exist regardless of their ideological positions. In fact, their ideological differences only exacerbate the tensions already arising from their differing national interests. While the ideological positions of these two antagonists have been flexible over the years, their national interests and consequently their national policies have remained competitive.

Similarly, it is improbable that Soviet-American or Sino-American vital national interests will be brought totally into harmony because of basic economic and political differences.

Within these two extremes lies the most plausible set of relations between the three major power centers. While continuing to vie for influence among the other members of the international community, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States will make every

effort to avoid direct hostilities. Moreover, when their national interests are actually compatible, cooperative ventures may be jointly undertaken.

The idea is sometimes put forward that the United States would benefit if the Soviet Union and China became engaged in a major war or if either would disintegrate as a result of internal pressures. While the Soviet Union and China do in fact have tremendous internal problems, e.g., the minority nationalities resident within their borders and lack of any peaceful tradition or method for transferring state power from one generation to the next, it is unlikely that a major Sino-Soviet war or internal political disintegration will occur.

Moreover, such a turn of events would be extremely dangerous to world peace and thus not in the interest of the United States. Outside powers might be tempted to take advantage of the situation. Military intervention could take place. A power vacuum involving hundreds of millions of people could occur. A threatened regime or faction might well strike out with nuclear weapons at an opposing major power, at an internal enemy, or at a third party such as the United States. Even if a stable bipolar

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situation did arise from the initial explosive circumstances, the political flexibility of the multipolar world would have been lost.

Many other factors will contribute to the direction which the world political environment takes. These could include a technological breakthrough allowing one superpower to achieve a credible first-strike capability, the increasing economic gap between the "haves" and the

"have-nots," the future of nuclear weapon proliferation, and the future political courses of Western Europe and Japan. However, the determining factor will likely lie in the interactions of the national interests of the two superpowers and mainland China. The triangular relationships of these three nations are, and will continue to be, the critical determinant of tomorrow's world order.

 FOOTNOTES

1. Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, *The Year 2000* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 224.
2. For a more detailed discussion of the proliferation of nuclear arms, see Kahn and Wiener, p. 242-246.
3. U.S. Dept. of State, *United States Foreign Policy 1969-1970: a Report of the Secretary of State*, Dept. of State Pub. 8575 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971), p. 167.
4. A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1968), p. 486-487. Also see Kahn and Wiener, p. 230-231 for an opposing view of the effects of a large population on modernization.
5. Kahn and Wiener, p. 230-231.
6. Canadian Government White Paper, mid-1970, quoted in U.S. Dept. of State, p. 23.
7. James E. Auer, "Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force: an Appropriate Maritime Strategy?" *Naval War College Review*, December 1971, p. 3-20.
8. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, *New Directions for the 1970's: Toward a Strategy of Inter-American Development*, Report (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969), p. 2-6.
9. *The Boston Globe*, 5 December 1971.

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Peace is not solely a military or technical problem—it is primarily a problem of politics and people. And unless man can match his strides in weaponry and technology with equal strides in social and political development, our great strength, like that of the dinosaur, will become incapable of proper control—and man, like the dinosaur, will decline and disappear.

*John F. Kennedy, Address to the United Nations
General Assembly, 25 September 1961*