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## THE RESERVES AND NATIONAL GUARD: THEIR CHANGING ROLE IN NATIONAL DEFENSE

*The military Reserves have recently been redesignated by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird as "the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces." While this has been the traditional role of the Reserves in the national defense structure, expanded draft calls to meet the requirements of the Vietnam war in effect vitiated the Reserves' raison d'etre. The Reserves, because of their unique position halfway between the civilian population and the professional military, are particularly well suited to serving in the dual capacity of enlisting popular support for national defense while simultaneously providing a necessary check against potential overextension of our military forces abroad. They can only effectively play this role, however, when they actually are considered to be the primary source of military manpower beyond the regular standing forces themselves.*

A paper

by

Professor John R. Probert

In July 1965 the Johnson administration made the fateful decision of relying on the draft rather than calling up the Reserves to augment U.S. forces in Vietnam. By virtue of this action the traditional role of the Reserves was abandoned to the eventual detriment of the politicians who made the decision and to the military services themselves. By examining the role of Reserve forces in America's civil-military relations, as they have evolved to the present day, we may be able to appreciate better the significance of the Reserves not only to the military, but to our political system and American society as a whole.

The minutemen who made their stand at Lexington and Concord were not the first citizen-soldiers of American history. The concept, in fact, was much older, the roots of which go back as far as the feudal relationships in England

between a serf and his lord. The serf and later the freeman had the dual responsibility of tilling the fields as well as standing ready to serve with his lord in the defense of his lands. In the New World the threat of Indians, French, and Spanish similarly imposed the concurrent roles of worker and warrior on the American settlers. The musket hung over the mantle when it was not closer at hand, for while security was often the individual responsibility of the frontiersman, it was frequently a joint one with

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his fellow homesteaders and colonists if they were not to be overrun nor simultaneously to starve.

In early England a system had been developed establishing trained bands for quelling civil disturbances or dealing with invasion. Incorporated in the common law, the concept and the arrangements served as the basis for the colonial militias, some of which were precursors of today's Army National Guard units.

After the Revolution the United States provided by law for the National Guard, placing the responsibility for command and authority with the States. The right to set up uniform standards of training and equipment remained with the National Government, although exercised only occasionally and to a limited extent. Federal Government financial support of the militias was also limited.

From its early establishment by Federal law in 1792 until the War of 1812, the National Guard, or militia, played a central role in the defense of the Nation. Our Regular forces were almost nonexistent. In fact, the State militias comprised the principal defensive forces of the Nation in the War of 1812, but as the outcome of that war indicated, they were generally ineffective. Later, by the time of the Mexican War, the Regular Army had expanded to the point where State militias were used only to a very limited extent. This continued to hold true through the Civil War. Only with the coming of the First and Second World Wars, the Korean conflict, and the Berlin and Cuban crises did the National Guard and the various reserves of the Armed Forces come to play substantial roles in our defense.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, since the first day of their existence, the militia or National Guard, and later the various Reserves, were without exception conceived of as constituting the initial and primary sources for augmentation of the active forces in an emergency. While it is true

that we as a Nation have frequently resorted to the draft in addition to activating Reserve units to meet wartime manpower requirements, only in the case of Vietnam has there been no Reserve callup of any substance. Vietnam is, furthermore, an exception difficult to square with the rationale of precedent. Our Reserves were substantial and by any standard of previously attained levels, well-trained. They were also comparatively well-equipped. Furthermore, the conflict in Vietnam was far away, slow developing, limited in scope, and against a small and comparatively weak foe, thus affording the Nation the time necessary to mobilize the Reserves.

Major reliance on the citizen-soldier in our national defense posture was not, however, founded on precedent alone. As the foregoing account of its development has indicated, the economic burden of maintaining an adequate national defense down through the years has predisposed us to allotting a principal role to the Reserves. An underdeveloped society could ill afford the tremendous expense of large standing forces. Furthermore, the need for defense forces was not continuous, except in the early days of the frontier. Militias seemed best suited to repelling Indian attacks, quelling domestic disturbances, or dealing on a long-term basis with threats whose nature was frequently indiscernible in the distant future. In fact, with great ocean barriers, the balance of power in Europe, and reasonably secure borders to the north and south, the United States spent little time worrying about external threats, either immediate or in the distant future, and consequently appropriated little money for meeting them. Militias suffice in circumstances such as these, and militias, particularly neglected militias, are cheap.

To this day, economics works to favor Reserve forces. To quote Secretary Laird,

... in many instances the lower

peacetime sustaining costs of reserve force units, compared to similar active units, can result in a larger total for a given budget or the same size force for a lesser budget. In addition, attention will be given to the fact that Guard and Reserve Forces can perform peacetime missions as a by-product or adjunct of training with significant manpower and monetary savings.<sup>2</sup>

In addition to cost, the sentiments of the Founding Fathers, particularly Washington, and the constitutional arrangements they wrought favored the Reserves. The framers were aware of the perils of the garrison state. They were also aware of the need to be prepared militarily if peace was to be maintained. General Washington, as early as 1783, maintained that

the only probable means of preventing hostility for any length of time and from being exempted from the consequent calamities of War, is to put the National Militia in such a condition that they may appear respectable in the Eyes of our Friends and formidable to those who would otherwise become our enemies.<sup>3</sup>

It may well be that Washington considered no alternatives to the national militia. After all, the Revolutionary War had been fought successfully upon the basis of such armed forces, and the fledgling Nation could afford little else. It is also obvious that he was particularly concerned with the militia as a defense force for repelling external aggression, more especially as a deterrent to war, in the terms of today.

The Founding Fathers did not consider a ready and competent defense force as an unmixed blessing however. They saw in the military a potential threat to our democratic institution as is evident from the phrases of the Constitution, *The Federalist*, and other publi-

cations of the time. In *The Federalist*, numbers 24 through 29 for example, an extensive discussion of the dangers of a standing army and the advantages of a militia as an alternative are discussed at length by Hamilton. He acknowledged the possible need for a standing army on occasion, but asserted that a well-run and regulated militia would make a large military establishment less necessary and less of a threat to democratic liberties. Similarly, the provisions giving Congress the power to raise armies and to provide for their financing with a 2-year limitation on military appropriations is an index of the circumspection with which the framers of the Constitution viewed standing armies. They had, after all, experienced the evils of armies over which they had no control operating in their midst.

Yet they knew that armies, or forces in lieu of them, are inevitably essential. The predicament of their day is the predicament of today, that is, how can we best maintain our military strength while safeguarding our democratic liberties. They saw the reconciling answer in a "well regulated militia" officered by the States and subject to call by the Federal Government.

Washington and the framers were preoccupied with the militia not only because the militia provided comparatively inexpensive security against invasion, domestic insurrection, and Indians, but also because it appeared to insure the continuance of our democratic form of government against militarism. Down through the years reliance on the militia continued as a foundation of American national security policy until eventually, as Hamilton had predicted in *The Federalist*, number 28, we came to feel the need for large standing forces. But even then, Hamilton continued, the additional safeguard of civilian forces should be retained.

As Hamilton put it in *The Federalist*, number 26,

It is not easy to conceive a possibility that dangers so formidable can assail the whole Union, as to demand a force considerable enough to place our liberties in the least jeopardy, especially if we take in our view the aid to be derived from the militia, which ought always to be counted upon as a valuable and powerful auxiliary.

Implicit in these arguments is the belief that the citizen-soldier can and will provide effective deterrence to military domination and/or military or politico-military adventurism. When we stopped counting upon the Reserves—as a valuable and powerful auxiliary for augmentation of the active forces—in 1965, did we encourage our ill-fated overextension in Vietnam? Without the citizen-soldiers as part of our military forces in a time of large-scale military operations, are we losing some of the pluralism at the level of military execution which a democracy ought always to possess? And will this be missing in an all-volunteer Army unless we keep it small and continue to rely (as we are now once again doing under the Nixon administration) upon the Reserves for initial and primary augmentation in emergencies?

Among other justifications supporting the concept of giving Reserve forces a major role in our defense are the circumstances which a surging military technology has imposed upon defense requirements. Closely related to the cost argument, Washington—if he were alive today—would have found the essence of his pronouncement on the militia echoed in the following rationale. The capacity of an industrialized nation with modern arms to strike devastating blows over long distances and in a variety of ways requires a highly trained Reserve as a credible deterrent.

In 1961 the Kennedy administration undertook to develop a military capacity to deal with all manner of threats to the national security. The idea of relying on massive retaliation alone was discarded. As massive World War II-type mobilizations dependent upon long lead times to train forces prior to their deployment were no longer feasible, the new policy of flexible response required the maintenance of a variety of military forces, all in high states of readiness and designed to cope with any of a number of circumstances.

Graduated deterrence, as the strategy came to be called, put tremendous requirements on the military establishment in men, training, and equipment. To meet them all through standing forces not only would have entailed exorbitant expenditures, but it would likely have been less credible as a deterrent. The Berlin crisis is a case in point. The substantial callup at the time of Khrushchev's threats to Berlin underscored, as no poised standing military could, the resolve and determination of the Nation. Large standing forces on one side beget large standing forces on the other. The capacity to put into the scales well-trained Reserves not only signifies the resolve of the leadership of a nation, but also an awareness upon the part of the population of what is in the balance and their acceptance of the burden of the risk. There were objections to the Berlin callup from some of the reservists themselves as well as various individuals and groups in the general population. However, they did not conceal the fact that the Reserves, 150,000 strong, were mobilized and positioned with efficiency and dispatch and that they and the Nation, by and large, accepted the strategy and its risks.

Though the Berlin callup of 1961 was carried through with the desired effect upon Khrushchev, as George F. Eliot so clearly demonstrates in his book on the subject,<sup>4</sup> there were outcries of complaint and even opposition

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from the Reserves and civilians. The complaints concerned mainly administrative shortcomings which are probably inevitable in any callup. The opposition to the strategy itself was minimal.

This may not always be the case, however, as the callup of the Reserves in association with the *Pueblo* incident in 1968 illustrates. Correspondence files in the Pentagon and the newspapers of the day reveal that there were reservists, as well as civilians, who objected to the limited 15,000 man mobilization on the grounds that our national security was not involved, that the Vietnam war was a civil war, and that if the Reserves were committed, there would be a loss of flexibility to meet potential aggression from another quarter, and there would be no forces at home to deal with civil disturbances. Law suits were also filed by reservists to prohibit the callup. Every level of officialdom was besieged with letters, telegrams, and telephone calls as those involved, their relatives and friends, but also other reservists and their relatives, friends, and sympathizers attempted to reverse the decision or, at least, prevent any additional callup.

Here we have a manifestation of a capacity for good or evil accruing from the Reserves. They are made up of individuals established in the community. They are concerned, especially about foreign policy which is likely to affect them directly. They are organized, particularly the officers, although the enlisted personnel are also—especially the noncommissioned officers and specialist groups.<sup>5</sup> While it is true that they have used their political weight most frequently on those issues where they seek immediate benefits such as a larger Reserve, retirement pay, hospitalization, or PX privileges, they have access to decisionmaking centers in their hometowns and in Washington where military policy can be affected. They can and have used their political power for just such purposes.

Reservists with roots in civilian

communities across the land and reason for a continuing interest in foreign policy can exert strong influence for preparedness. They have exerted such influence, as the record of past activities of the Reserve Officers Association or the National Guard Association will show. They could, though perhaps not as easily because of their predisposition to military discipline and stated policy, exert a restraining influence on possible military or politico-military adventurism or error. Their interest is strong and immediate, and the record shows that they can and will voice opposition.

As part of a military organization which is basically authoritarian, the individual reservist may be more constrained in expressing criticism than a civilian. But the reservist is only a part-time soldier. Furthermore, the great variety of Reserve units and the diverse education, training, and occupational backgrounds represented in them almost assure that there will be no one "Reserve" point of view. All levels of society, economically and educationally, all geographic areas, all ages from 18 to 60 are to be found in our Reserve structure.<sup>6</sup> While the old "society troops" of the pre-World War II years are not quite as representative of the highly influential segments of society as they once were, there are still many business and professional men, both officer and enlisted, in the Reserves. Of particular significance, however, are the substantial numbers of Federal, State, and local government employees serving as both officers and enlisted men. In our pluralistic society a sizable Reserve structure is likely to be both representative of that society and concerned with making its views known and its desires felt.<sup>7</sup> These views could conceivably be as constraining on military action as encouraging. Such views should serve a salutary purpose in a society such as ours.

Yet the military Reserve, while able to exert some political influence, is not

likely to be overpowering. Although certain segments of the Reserve, including the Civil Affairs units in the Army Reserve and their association, the Civil Affairs Association, were vocal in support of a role in Vietnam, they were not called.<sup>8</sup> One would assume that a strongly hawkish sentiment would exist in the more influential levels of our Reserve structure. The Reserve Officers and National Guard Association journals attest to this. Working closely with Armed Forces committees in House and Senate, the Reserve Officers Association and the National Guard Association have time and again been instrumental in persuading Congress to maintain a strong Reserve. Nevertheless, the Reserve has not always achieved all it desired, as the merger of the National Guard and the Army Reserve by McNamara suggests. Though the total merger was forestalled, a substantial portion of what Secretary of Defense McNamara sought to accomplish was achieved by abolishing hundreds of Reserve units.<sup>9</sup>

Furthermore, the potential political effectiveness of the Reserves' hawkish bias is countered by the fact that many influential and articulate reservists and guardsmen alike prefer to remain in Reserve rather than active status. Active duty, particularly for prolonged periods, is disadvantageous to career, family, life, educational pursuits, and more especially the pocketbook. Thus, reservists have reason to be critical of callups which, in some cases, might be considered to be byproducts of adventurism overseas. The response of those in the Reserve status to the callups in the Pueblo incident is germane here. In sum, the Reserve is uniquely constituted, situated, and motivated to play a dual role of supporting national security policy while simultaneously acting as a potential restraint upon possible excesses in this area. No other segment of our society is in a similar situation, certainly not the active military forces.

However, unless the Reserve is considered the *initial and primary* augmentation for the active forces in a *rapid and substantial expansion*, it probably will not be inspired to play its role fully. Only when reservists are liable to be called will they be likely to react in the critical and evaluative way beneficial to our policymaking processes.

In discussing an earlier advantage of reliance on the citizen-soldier under a strategy of deterrence, the attribute of flexibility inherent in the Reserves was considered by implication only. The very concept of Reserves entails a flexibility derived from the individual reservist's ability to assume quickly an active role. Today, however, the reservist concept has been elaborated to the point where the flexibility of the Reserves in meeting a variety of changing conditions is much enhanced.

A series of Department of Defense directives, refined over the years to incorporate lessons learned in previous emergencies and mobilizations, provides the administrative basis for a modern Reserve system that is capable of being adapted to a wide range of situations.<sup>10</sup> The Selected Reserve Force category, developed several years ago to utilize Reserves in important roles in contingency plans by increasing the number of annual drill periods, is a good example of one way in which Reserve proficiency can be raised. More recently, Secretary of Defense Laird, in his statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 1972 defense budget, outlined progress achieved in equipping the Reserves and in advancing their state of readiness. By the end of fiscal year 1972, 10 Reserve brigades will have full equipment allowances. Improved equipment and increased allowances will markedly advance the materiel status of Reserve units. In addition, some Reserve units will train with active duty units, and others will actually be integrated with active duty units so that if contingency plans are put into effect, these

Reserve units will deploy immediately with the parent active units.<sup>11</sup> Currently, there exist specific Reserve units that have the same high priority in contingency plans as active units.

Thus it is evident that the Reserve forces can be administered in such a way as to develop the necessary readiness consistent with the resources available. Units and individual personnel, whose capacities must be available on short notice, can be brought to and maintained in a high state of readiness. Others whose services are not as urgently needed would be available in an on-call category where, with concentrated training when called to active duty, they would be brought up to a high state of readiness. The various combinations of drills, active duty, equipment levels, and training in conjunction with the active forces, where possible, make available means to ensure great flexibility in Reserve response.

It would appear, then, that while Reserve readiness has been measurably improved, the full potential of the Reserves has not been realized. While some observers maintain that individual Reserve units range in effectiveness anywhere from 50 percent or less to 100 percent of active forces equivalents, depending upon weapons systems and degree of readiness required, it is apparent the Reserve units have the potential to be versatile on the readiness score while remaining basically in a Reserve status.

With one foot in the military camp and the other in the civilian community, reservists can do much to counter the existing antimilitarist mood in the country today. Reserve forces are increasingly active in community public service projects of all kinds. Along these lines a Pentagon news release of 28 April 1971 cited 30 units of the Guard and Reserves for continuing efforts in support of community projects and domestic actions. These activities ranged from work in public health in areas of

poverty and unemployment by an Army Station Hospital in Puerto Rico to assistance to the mentally retarded by an Air National Guard unit in Steelton, Pa., and seminars on drug abuse to the youth of the Greater Chicago area by the Reserves at the Naval Air Station, Glenview, Ill.<sup>12</sup>

A brief look at the possible results of reliance on the Reserves in Vietnam would appear a relevant and worthwhile case study. As a result of the *Pueblo* incident, 15,000 Reserves were called to active duty, but few of these were ordered to Vietnam. However, in May 1968, some additional units were mobilized to bring the total to some 37,000,<sup>13</sup> not a very sizable number when considering that Ready Reserve forces numbered approximately 2 million as of January 1968.<sup>14</sup> By contrast, we mobilized 26,000 National Guard and Reserve personnel in the Post Office emergency of 23 March 1970.<sup>15</sup> In further contrast, we mobilized over 630,000 of the Guard and Reserves in the first year of the Korean conflict. By statute, the President has the authority to order to active duty for 24 months, 1 million of the Ready Reserves simply upon declaration of national emergency.<sup>16</sup>

In 1965, when the administration made the initial decision to expand the active forces via the draft rather than call the Reserves, civil disturbances were at a minimum. If in 1965 the administration was trying to minimize popular disapproval of sending American boys to Vietnam, it could just as easily have called up the Reserves on a gradual basis as increase draft calls. If, on the other hand, President Johnson sought to make both a domestic and international impact, he could have resorted to activation of the Reserves on a massive scale. Certainly the callup of the Reserves could have been accomplished more quickly and probably more cheaply than expansion of the active forces by means of the draft. While the adminis-



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tration did not react to the Tonkin Gulf episode with large-scale military support for South Vietnam until 6 months later, the point is that the attitude of the country, cost, requisite flexibility, even readiness did not preclude use of a Reserve callup to aid South Vietnam.

Other advantages which might have accrued to the military from the use of the Reserves in Vietnam arise from the Reserves experience factor. While the Ready Reserves were then and are now overwhelmingly comprised of young enlistees, 20 to 30 percent of them are career reservists—officers and men who are longtime voluntary participants in the Reserve program and veterans of previous wars. Presumably, as trained personnel, more experienced and possessed of more varied and developed skills, these career reservists could have gone to work immediately and with ingenuity and resourcefulness.

The administration, of course, did not immediately seek a large-scale expansion of our forces in reaction to the Tonkin Gulf incident. It was some 10 months before the buildup began in earnest. By then the administration may have wanted to avoid the appearance of conducting an all-out effort in Vietnam without the necessary declaration of national emergency. But if the declaration of a national emergency had come in the atmosphere of Tonkin Gulf, there probably would have been less fear of overreaction in Moscow and Peking and the President would then have been free to call up the Reserves rapidly or slowly as circumstances dictated.

Of course he did not have to make a basic decision on Reserves versus draft in August 1964. The crunch did not come until July 1965 when the strategic Reserve began to become thin and the uncertainty about the size of the commitment we would have to make in Vietnam to become obvious. But even at this late stage, calling the Reserves with a played-down declaration of emergency could have been effected. Such a

call might have provoked an outcry by reservists and civilians alike. Certainly there would have been more discussion of the whole involvement in Vietnam, especially in the now wider circles of those immediately affected; but in this rests the basic argument of this case study.

No matter what ensued in response to such a hypothetical callup, it appears in retrospect that it would have rebounded to the advantage of the country. If sufficient public outcry did arise, an agonizing reappraisal by the administration might have followed, possibly leading to a change in policy. Conversely, the debate might have strengthened public support, gained a solid consensus, and resulted in more resolute and determined prosecution of the war.

If we had used the Reserves in Vietnam as we have traditionally, it is unlikely that we would have slipped so easily into the quagmire of Southeast Asia. Vietnam was a politico-military misadventure, and as such might have been avoided. The Reserves and their families, friends, and business associates constitute another independent power center in our pluralistic society. Their interested, knowledgeable, influential, and inevitably critical focus on Vietnam

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### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Professor John R. Probert did his undergraduate work at Lafayette College and received his Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. He served in the U.S. Army in World War II and with the U.S.

Army Reserve until his recent retirement, where as a specialist in public administration he specialized in civil affairs. Professor Probert has been active as a consultant in national security policy and administration and as a member of the political science faculty at the Naval Academy since 1947 where he is currently serving as chairman.

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was not prompted as it should have been. If it had been, it is very likely that the Nation would have changed course earlier. The course of the Johnson administration might have been aborted. Quite possibly even the military strategy in the field might have been altered. But it is difficult to believe that the utilization of the Reserve in its traditional capacity would have resulted in a more

disastrous outcome in Vietnam than we are currently experiencing.

In sum, reliance on the Reserves early in any emergency would appear consistent with the maintenance of the health of our democratic state. In our complex, pluralistic, and diversified society, we should not overlook or disregard the potentially vital role of this historic institution.

### FOOTNOTES

1. For a brief history of the Reserves, see W.F. Levantrosser, *Management of the Reserve Forces* (Washington: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1967) from which most of this résumé comes. For a more extensive history of the National Guard especially, see W.H. Riker, *Soldiers of the States* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957).

2. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, "Support for Guard and Reserve Forces," Washington: 21 August 1970, p. 1.

3. George Washington, quoted in G.F. Eliot, *Reserve Forces and the Kennedy Strategy* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1962), p. 2.

4. *Ibid.*

5. For example, the Reserve Officers Association, the National Guard Association, the Air Force Association, the Fleet Reserve and Naval Reserve Associations, and the Air Force Sergeants Association, to mention only a few.

6. One particularly, done by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) in the Pentagon in 1969, gives a good view of some significant characteristics of personnel in the Ready Reserve.

7. Prior to the determination last year of some of our prestige institutions of higher education to discontinue ROTC, the Regular military and the Reserves also could expect an input of officers from the upper economic strata, the professions, and the higher levels of intelligence. The certainty of this input is now reduced, although by no means precluded. To the extent that our Reserves become composed primarily of the lower economic strata, the less influential vocations, and the less intelligent members of our society, it may become less of a restraining factor in national military policy formulation.

8. See issues of the association's journal, until the May-June 1971 issue *Military Government Journal and Newsletter*, now the *Civil Affairs Journal and Newsletter*, particularly the issue of June-July 1970.

9. Levantrosser gives the complete account of the Reserve-National Guard merger struggle.

10. See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense, "Screening the Ready Reserve," DOD Directive 1200.7, Washington: 2 July 1970; "Enlistment, Appointment and Assignment of Individuals in Reserve Components (M&RA)," DOD Directive 1205.14, Washington: 13 March 1970; "Participation in Reserve Training Programs (M&RA)," DOD Directive 1215.5, Washington: 25 August 1969; "Uniform Training Categories and Pay Groups Within the Reserve Components (M&RA)," DOD Directive 1215.6, Washington: 25 August 1969; "Involuntary Order to Active Duty of Ready Reservists for Unsatisfactory Performance of Obligation (M&RA)," DOD Directive 1215.13, Washington: 9 January 1969; "New and/or Old Combat Serviceable Equipment for Reserve Forces (M&RA)," DOD Directive 1225.6, Washington: 18 April 1970; "Management and Mobilization of Standby Reserve (M)," DOD Directive 1235.9, Washington: 13 September 1967; "Administration and Management During Mobilization of Ready Reserves," DOD Directive 1235.10, Washington: 27 October 1970.

11. U.S. Department of Defense, *Toward a National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence* (Washington: 1 March 1971), p. 102-103.

12. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Release #371-71, 28 April 1971.

13. U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense on Reserve Forces, Fiscal Year 1969* (Washington: 1970), p. i.

14. *Ibid.*, p. D-4.

15. U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense on Reserve Forces, Fiscal Year 1970* (Washington: 1970), p. 5.

16. "Ready Reserve," U.S. Code, Title 10, sec. 673 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965).



In the first place it is fundamental to realize that the more heavily your regular forces are committed—the thinner they are stretched—the more essential it is that one has a ready and effective Reserve.

*RADM D.C. Lyndon, USN, Commander Naval Reserve Training Command, to the 13th National Conference of the Naval Reserve Association, Denver, Colo., 7 October 1966*