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## Current Strategic Theories

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*As we enter an era of "U.S. military sufficiency," both the student and practitioner of national security affairs would be well advised to rigorously reexamine heretofore widely accepted concepts underlying current strategic theories. In this article the author reviews the existing international system and discusses contemporary strategies of force—deterrence, limited war, and revolutionary war—as they have evolved.*

## **CURRENT STRATEGIC THEORIES**

**A lecture delivered at the Naval War College**

**by**

**Lieutenant Commander Benjamin M. Simpson III, U.S. Navy**

**Introduction.** Any discussion of the theories of strategy in the modern world can bog down in a morass of details and equivocations. Particular care must be taken to identify the major themes or structural members of this complex subject. With this in mind, the theories of strategy discussed here relate only to the use of force in the modern world. In other words, this examination is limited only to theories having a military application.

Force is only one item in a vast armory of possible tools and weapons a state may use to achieve its goals in the international arena. This realization is fundamental to an understanding of the role of strategy and of the theory of strategy, as well as specific concepts themselves.

Conflict involving the use or the threatened use of force is not new. What

is new is the more or less easily distinguished categories into which the use or threatened use of force may be placed. There are three main categories.

The first is deterrence. This applies mainly to the Soviet Union on the one hand and to the United States and our allies on the other hand. It is a reflection of the state of technology which has produced thermonuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems. Hopefully, the forces represented in this category of conflict will never be used.

The second category is limited war. This concept was developed in the 1950's specifically to examine the possibilities of a low-level, limited, but nonnuclear armed conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. It also includes all forms of conflict between the superpowers on the one hand and lesser powers on the other, as well

as conflicts involving the lesser powers alone. The Korean conflict, the Soviet intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the India-Pakistan war are examples.

The third category is revolutionary war. Generally speaking, this form of conflict takes place mainly within the victim state. It may or may not be aided and abetted by outside states. Nevertheless, it is a form of conflict particularly suited to states having weak or undeveloped political institutions.

The concept of a theory of strategy and specific strategies themselves do not exist in a vacuum. While they are essentially abstract concepts, they are nevertheless meaningful only in a political context; that is, in the relationships that exist between one state and another. They are part and parcel of the broader concept of international relations. They concern the use of force or the utility of military operations by one state against another.

Strategy has meaning only in the relationship of one nation to another, in a particular context of time, circumstances, and technology. For this reason it is necessary first to define very briefly the international system. Then it will be necessary to identify the most salient features of the international system since 1945. These features clearly distinguish the international system today from that which we had previously known. Only then will we be ready to proceed to an examination of the various concepts of strategy as they apply today.

**The International System.** The international system can be distinguished from other forms of political association by the fact that states are not generally subordinate to any higher authority. They exercise the rights of sovereignty. This is in contrast to the citizens of a state who are subordinate to the authority of that state. As individuals—both corporate and human—we often

pursue goals that are contrary to those of other individuals, and those goals frequently conflict. The state has reserved to itself the right and has assumed the duty of resolving these differences through a political or judicial process. Not so within the international system.

Even though states may join international organizations and sign treaties, as a rule they are not subject to any authority to which they have not previously agreed. Indeed, states can and do denounce treaties and withdraw from various organizations at will.

Raymond Aron has accurately pointed out that a state is the final arbiter of its own fate. Each state has reserved to itself the right to fight. The right of individual or collective self-defense is recognized in the U.N. Charter, and this right has historically been cited as the justification for a state going to war. Even Adolf Hitler staged a fake border incident to justify his attack on Poland.

The conclusion to be drawn is that so long as no authority exists to which states have subordinated themselves and from which they cannot withdraw at will, the international system will remain essentially in a state of nature. Therefore, the possibility of war exists. Politics may make the possibility of war extremely remote, such as war between the United States and the United Kingdom. On the other hand, because of politics, war between the Soviet Union and China cannot be said to be as remote. Politics makes all the difference, which has nothing to do with the nature of the international system itself.

The possibility of war is not just a logical conclusion based on abstractions. Experience tells us that it is very real. The reason that it is very real is simply that there is no institutional means by which conflicts between nations must be resolved, and there is likewise no executive agency to enforce the resolution of the conflicts. There is no sure-

fire means of preventing a state from going to war, once it has made up its mind to do so. Any restraints that exist within the international system are those of wisdom, moderation, and, most important, power politics.

So far I have described what is essentially a state of nature in which the resort to force is a rational alternative for a state in the pursuit of its goals or objectives, whatever they may be. This being so, the use of force is therefore part and parcel of the political act involved in the pursuit of those goals or in the defense of the interests of a state.

Military operations, therefore, must always be related to the political objectives of the state employing force. If this is not the case and if military operations become an end in themselves, they become at best pointless and at the worst the product of a madman.

**The International System Since 1945.** Prior to 1945 a description of the international system would have ended here. Since then, nuclear weapons have come into the arsenals of the major powers. It should be clearly remembered that the political relations among states are still a function of power politics, as they always have been, and the international system is still in a state of nature. However, the existence of nuclear weapons and their associated delivery systems has wrought a fundamental change in the conditions under which force may be threatened and actually carried out because of the exceptional dangers of engaging in nuclear warfare.

There are three main reasons for this change. They are all related to the extraordinary advances of technology.

First, the magnitude of the destructive potential of thermonuclear weapons is so great that it staggers the imagination. We are not talking simply of a degree of magnitude. We are talking about several magnitudes. Analytical

discussions refer to megadeaths and blithely describe 80 million deaths. The fact is the Soviet Union and the United States now have the power to destroy—quite literally—each other.

The second reason is related to the first; the permanence and instantaneous nature of the danger. The time of flight of missiles over the poles or out of the depths of the sea is measured in only a few minutes, thus leaving very little time for reflection or reaction. The permanence of the destruction that could be wrought is a function of the magnitude of the destruction.

The third reason is that it is no longer necessary to disarm a country before annihilating it. The classic example of one country annihilating another is the punishment Rome visited upon Carthage. Before the Romans were able to cut down the Carthaginian orchards and to sow salt in the fields, they first had to defeat the Carthaginian Army and thus disarm the Carthaginian state. Today, with the technological advances of nuclear weapons and their missile delivery systems, the Soviet Union and the United States could annihilate each other without first disarming one another.

Technology, therefore, has modified forever for the possessors of nuclear weapons the conditions under which force may be threatened and used. This modification has brought about several notable strategic effects. One of the informal rules of the cold war has been that the United States and the Soviet Union avoid direct confrontations or showdowns whenever possible. The most recent and conspicuous examples are the Soviet backdown over Cuba in 1962 and the United States reluctance to bomb or to mine the harbor at Haiphong. While the immediate stakes to be gained were significant, the risky nature of precipitating a showdown, the ultimate result of which was not predictable, so greatly outweighed any possible advantages that in both cases

the superpowers desisted.

Certainly the major nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, have not hesitated to employ their armed forces when they considered it necessary. The Red army was used in Czechoslovakia to keep the Communist regime there orthodox. Our own experience in Vietnam is illustrative of a nuclear power engaging in extensive operations in an underdeveloped area against a nonnuclear power. In this respect, both the superpowers have not hesitated to use or to threaten the use of force in areas and in situations where they believed their interests were threatened and where the other superpower was not directly involved.

It is somewhat ironic that both the superpowers have experienced varying degrees of difficulty in translating their overwhelming military power into effective political power. The Soviet Union has experienced significant difficulties in the Communist bloc. Our own difficulties in Southeast Asia need no great elaboration.

The reason that explains the difficulties of the superpowers to translate military power into effective political power is very simply the modified conditions under which they can threaten and use force effectively. The unavoidable conclusion is that the dangers involved in the use of nuclear weapons have raised the level of acceptable tactical defeat several notches higher than it was before.

**Deterrence.**<sup>1</sup> The word "deterrence" conjures up images of massed Polaris, Poseidon, or Minuteman missiles aimed toward the Soviet Union in response to their deployment of SS9's or other ICBM's. This image is perfectly correct as far as it goes. However, the sole function of these weapons is to produce deterrence. That is to say, to persuade the country at which they are aimed not to attack the deterrer. These weapons have been created to make sure they

will never be used. Thus, the function of these weapons is negative—to insure their nonuse. In the present state of technology, deterrence is mutual. At least we hope it is.

Deterrence is not an external, physical attribute in the sense of a demonstrated ability to deny an objective to an enemy or even to achieve an objective for oneself. Deterrence exists only in the mind of the person who is deterred.

If an aggressor forbears action, because of something the deterrer has said or done for the purpose of achieving such forbearance, then the aggressor has been deterred and deterrence exists. Thus, a contest conducted in terms of deterrence is essentially a contest of wills. From this it follows that whatever affects the will of either the aggressor or the deterrer directly affects the existence of deterrence.

Being a contest of wills, deterrence from the standpoint of the deterrer is concerned with how to persuade, convince, or cajole the opponent to forbear doing something. More precisely and more simply, the question is: deterring whom from what? In the context of relations between the United States and Soviet Union, the United States seeks to deter the Soviet Union from initiating military action. This includes everything from a major nuclear strike to low-level ground or sea operations against the United States or our allies. Deterrence works at the lower levels as well because of the dangers of escalation: events at the lower level could get out of hand with unforeseeable results.

Logically, deterrence works against the United States as well, although it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the United States or our allies would initiate military action against the Soviet Union.

Many esoteric concepts of deterrence were well known to Robert McNamara and his whiz kids when they took over the Pentagon in the 1960's. The prob-

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lem was relating them to reality and devising a military policy suitable for the real world at that time.

McNamara established the policy that our general nuclear war forces should have two capabilities: (1) an assured destruction capability, and (2) a damage limiting capability. This is another way of saying they should have an offensive and a defensive capability. An assured destruction capability is the ability

to deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States and its Allies by maintaining continuously a highly reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or combination of aggressors, at any time during the course of a strategic nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a surprise first strike.<sup>2</sup>

The weapons that are needed for this task are the ICBM, SLBM's, and manned bombers.

The damage limiting capability is the ability "in the event such a war nevertheless occurred, to limit damage to our population and industrial capability."<sup>3</sup> The weapons needed to perform this task are: manned interceptors, anti-bomber surface-to-air missiles, and anti-ballistic-missile missiles. Their function is to intercept successfully and then to destroy the enemy's offensive weapons before they reach our offensive forces on their bases and launch sites.

McNamara was careful to point out that it is "our ability to destroy an attacker as a viable 20th Century nation that provides the deterrent, not our ability to partially limit damage to ourselves."<sup>4</sup> Thus, to assure an enemy that he will be destroyed if he attacks us, we must have a second-strike capability: "a . . . force of such size and character that it can survive a large scale nuclear surprise attack in sufficient strength to destroy the attacker."<sup>5</sup> In other words, no matter how hard we are

hit, second-strike capability will give us the capacity to hit back just as hard, if not harder, than we were hit. A second-strike capability means a retaliatory force will survive a strike by an aggressor.

On the other hand, a first-strike capability means an aggressor can strike first and eliminate the deterrent's retaliatory or second-strike forces. For example, if the Soviet Union were to achieve a first-strike capability, it would mean that they could launch a strike against the United States and destroy our capacity to retaliate. In such a situation we would be at the mercy of the Soviet Union. We would lack the capacity to deter a Soviet attack, assuming of course the Soviets are deterred only by our second-strike capability.

McNamara maintained that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has a "first strike capability, because both have built up a second strike capability to such an extent that a first strike capability is unattainable."<sup>6</sup> The attainability that McNamara is talking about here depends on the state of technology more than it does on any theoretical considerations of deterrence or even on political factors. For example, even if the Soviet Union could blast a hole 21 feet deep in the United States from coast to coast and from Mexico to Canada, the Soviets would not have a first-strike capability unless they were able to prevent submarine-launched missiles from hitting their targets.

Nuclear weapons and their associated delivery systems have produced between the Soviet Union and the United States what is known as the balance of terror. The degree of relative invulnerability of the respective second-strike capabilities or even the creation of a first-strike capability, which would mean the possessor could destroy his victim's retaliatory capability, are both products of technology.

It is clear that given a stable balance to start with, advances in technology on one side can very easily place the other side at a disadvantage. This is the reason the balance of terror is delicate.

At this point it is quite proper to ask: What happens if deterrence fails? We know that deterrence precedes action and affects the opponent's intentions. However, if the opponent acts anyway, the victim is faced with a choice between acquiescence and military opposition. If his weapons inventory consists solely of nuclear weapons for deterrence, his choice is between surrender and incineration.

A strategy of defense is needed if deterrence fails. The use of the full retaliatory force is unsuited to deny a specific limited military objective to an enemy. That is to say, the weapons which are the most useful for deterrence would not be the best suited for defense. Therefore, the strategies appropriate for defense and for deterrence must be different.

If deterrence fails, the military problem then becomes one of defense, which works on the opponent's capabilities. To avoid an automatic recourse to nuclear war, the victim must have a military organization capable of conducting a wide variety of military operations on a lower level.

The revolution in weapons technology has emphasized the need to distinguish strategies appropriate to defense from those appropriate to deterrence. Prior to this development the same weapons more or less embodied the primary functions of a military force: to punish the enemy, to deny him territory (or to take it away from him), and to mitigate damage to oneself. As a general rule, a strategy based on the employment of the full retaliatory striking force is hardly appropriate to accomplish these objectives. A different strategy is required.

This was the background against which McNamara's concept of gradu-

ated or flexible response was developed. Thus, a response to an initial act by the Soviet Union would be on approximately the same level. Flexible response seeks to avoid the dilemma of surrender or incineration by stating that not every Soviet military move against the United States or our West European allies would necessarily result in an automatic full-scale nuclear response.

Flexible response recognizes the paradox that escalation of a conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States and our allies is a danger that must be met. Also, this danger should not necessarily and certainly cannot be avoided. Thus the danger of nuclear war tends to stabilize relations, if only because of the grave dangers involved.

Flexible response acknowledges stability on the highest level of the use of nuclear weapons, while also making allowances for its failure. It seeks to avoid the impossible dilemma of surrender or incineration. This dilemma is posed by a reliance solely on the nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

Limited War. Stability at the upper end of the spectrum of conflict has been brought about primarily because of the tremendous advances in weapons technology. However, politics continues to play its role. The international system is still in a state of nature, with a multiplicity of sovereign states reserving the right to fight or not to fight as they so determine. Relations among states continue to be a function of power politics, as they always have been. But, stability at the upper end of the spectrum is matched by a certain measure of instability at the lower end of the spectrum.

Technology is only part of the reason. Politics is the other part. Politics in its broadest sense produces the forces that tend towards instability: great power rivalry, which cannot be manifested rationally in nuclear warfare and therefore must take other forms, not

necessarily involving force; nationalism and chauvinism generally, but particularly by the newer states; poverty, the pressure of expanding population, social change, and the inability of some political institutions to cope successfully with these problems; finally, dedicated and ruthless revolutionaries bent on obtaining power for personal or ideological reasons. All these elements make for an unstable world polity.

Against this background the theoreticians have developed a concept of limited war. When these concepts were first brought forth in the 1950's and later on in the first part of the 1960's, the theoreticians were not so concerned with instability in the Third World and the possibility of superpower involvement in that area. They were primarily interested in whether a conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States would necessarily escalate to all-out war. The theoreticians did not necessarily advocate the use of force against the Soviet Union, or vice versa, because they recognized the riskiness of such a venture. However, they realized that, politics being what it is, hostilities of some sort might very well ensue.

They grappled with the basic problem of the relationship between military power and national policy. This relationship is expressed in terms of national strategy, which is the equivalent of policy shaped in accordance with whatever means are available. This is another way of saying that the goals of a state, as they affect other states in the international system, must be sought pursuant to a specific strategy.

They defined limited war as one limited both in scope and in objectives. The first limiting factor, scope, implies possibly a geographic limitation and a conscious limitation by the belligerents to use only a fraction of their forces.

By limiting objectives, they rejected General MacArthur's dictum that "In war there is no substitute for victory" in favor of certain well-defined and well-

established goals. Once these goals were achieved, then the limited war has succeeded. A recurrent theme running through the literature on this point is that the goal sought is really to change the will of the opponent, not to crush him.

The theoreticians were not concerned so much with the process by which the goals of limited war are identified and then achieved as they were with the problem of how to keep the war limited. They were very much alive to the dangers of escalation, and they went to great lengths to avoid those dangers.

There was recognition that the scope and the method of the initial attack will tend to define the minimum limits of the ensuing conflict and the means to control it. The decisive limitation was seen as the specifically limited objectives. They advised to do only what might be necessary to achieve the objectives and no more. A reduction in the pace of military activities would provide a pause to reflect or to calculate. This pause is particularly important, because the object of the entire operation is to affect the will of the opponent.

These concepts were developed at a time when it was necessary to negative the assumption that wars are fought to victory. The theoreticians saw that this was not only risky in the extreme in the nuclear era, but that a policy of fighting on to unconditional surrender would only encourage the losing side to fight on to the last man. Therefore, a prerequisite to engaging in a limited war is an ability to generate pressures other than a threat of all-out war and to create a climate in which it is clearly seen by both sides that survival is not at stake. The respective governments must be able to convince their populations of this, and this conviction must be based on a conception of acceptable limitations.

Military strategy has therefore become in the words of Thomas Schelling,



a diplomacy of violence.<sup>7</sup> The use of military force is part of an extensive bargaining process in an environment which is essentially political. In this bargaining process the communication of intentions and of acceptable limitations is of paramount importance.

The theoreticians have been concerned with the concepts of limited war as they apply at the very highest levels of government. They have not dealt with the actual conception, planning, and conduct of the military operations incident to fighting a limited war. In fact, they appear to be blissfully ignorant of the intellectual activity which must be exercised by the professional military officer incidental to the waging of limited war, as well as being unaware of the complexities of a military organization. This ignorance may be one explanation of the unfortunate tendency toward overcentralization in the control of military operations.

This highly developed conceptual framework of the theoreticians is by no means without flaws. There is only a fleeting recognition of the hierarchy of concepts inherent in and fundamental to a theory of strategy. These concepts are necessary to the conduct of military operations in a limited war. They are policy, grand strategy, strategy, and tactics. Policy is concerned with the statement and pursuit of broad national goals. Grand strategy is the coordination and direction of national resources to achieve these goals. Strategy is the comprehensive direction of power to establish control over areas and situations in order to achieve specific objectives to further the goals of policy. This is the element of the hierarchy that particularly concerns us as military professionals. Tactics, which is the immediate employment of military forces pursuant to strategy, should be wholly within our professional ken.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the rigorous mental analysis that must go into the formulation of stra-

tegic concepts is directly applicable to the concept of limited war, which seeks limited and specific goals by a limited military action.

The first requirement for a limited war is a conception of the goals or objectives to be achieved. The second requirement is an awareness of the acceptable price, in terms of the extent of military operations (and casualties) and their possible adverse political effects. The third is an honest appraisal of the forces at our disposal and what we can reasonably expect them to accomplish. This is another way of saying that we must analyze objectives, challenge assumptions, and appraise expectations.

In a limited war, "victory" is an elusive concept, if it is applicable at all. It certainly does not mean unconditional surrender in the World War II sense. It may not even have anything to do with bending the enemy's will. Our objective may be only to deny the enemy something by taking it away from him or by keeping it ourselves; only if we want to compel an enemy to do something or to acquiesce in something must we seek to affect his will.

The main point about a limited war is that it is essentially a political war, in which political considerations take precedence over military (including tactical) considerations. This is not to say that such political considerations should ignore the requirements of military operations. Far from it. Limited wars are not military exercises to be fought to "victory," but rather they should achieve well-defined political objectives. Otherwise they would be pointless and absurd.

The relationship of the elements of the hierarchy of a theory of strategy is fundamental to conducting any military operations and particularly to waging a limited war. In this respect, war is far too important to be left solely to the politicians. Both the civilian and uniformed officers must understand that military operations pursuant to strategy

must be conducted to gain the goals as they have been established by policy. The military operations themselves must pass the tests of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability.

The ultimate purpose of going to war has always been a political question. Technology has not changed this fundamental politicalization of the use of military forces, which is really war by another name. Nuclear weapons have only changed the conditions under which military force or power has any valid utility.

**Revolutionary War.**<sup>8</sup> The third broad category into which the use of force can be put in the modern world is that of revolutionary war. This is a new form of warfare, at least in its intellectual conception, because it is part of a protracted struggle in which the revolutionary has limited resources and a broad freedom of action.

While revolutionary war may involve many of the same tactics as found in classic guerrilla wars, the two are clearly distinguishable. First of all, a guerrilla seeks to harass and to divert his enemy so that a final military victory can be achieved by regular forces. In a revolutionary war, on the other hand, the revolutionary seeks to emerge victorious as a result of his own endeavors (which may have outside assistance) and not in conjunction with other forces.

A revolutionary war is a means by which a small, dedicated, and ruthless group can acquire political power by undermining and then toppling an established government. The fact that most revolutionary wars have occurred in underdeveloped areas emphasizes that it is indeed a revolution against an established regime in a country in which political institutions may not be strong, well-developed, and do not enjoy broad popular support. The single most important fact about a revolutionary war is that the aim of the revolutionary is always political. The aim never changes,

although the tactics may change.

The concept of revolutionary war has many intellectual forbears. To Marx it owes the original concept of struggle; to Lenin, party organization; to Mao an application to a peasant society; to Lin Piao, application to world revolution; to Giap, refinement in execution in Vietnam; to Che, a spiritual appeal to the youth of the West. The most significant unifying thread in the concept of revolutionary war is that of organization, without which the struggle would be lost.

There are three main phases to a revolutionary war. The first is the defensive phase, during which the revolutionary husband his strength and builds his organization. The second phase is that of guerrilla operations in which he harasses and weakens his opponent, while being careful not to jeopardize his forces and particularly his organization to expected reprisals. The third phase is the offensive phase, in which the revolutionary conducts open operations against his opponent and which culminates in the ultimate victory for the revolutionary. It is indeed possible to move back and forth from one phase to another as the fortunes of the struggle necessitate.

The most striking characteristic of a revolutionary war is that it is essentially a political war in which normal battlelines and other more conventional indicators of success are notably absent. It is a war fought for the body politic of a country and not specifically for territory or other tangible objectives. Because it is a war for the body politic, correcting the ills and shortcomings of the victim society and creating a healthy polity are part and parcel of the process of combating the revolutionary. Thus, such ameliorative and corrective measures are something that must be done before the revolutionary is defeated, and not afterwards. Indeed, such measures are a condition for defeating the revolutionary.

**Conclusions.** Any discussion of the theories of strategy ought to end where it started, with a realization that force has a certain utility in an imperfect world in which war is always a possibility. This is the reason nations spend huge sums and devote extraordinary amounts of energy to maintain sizable military establishments. Yet force has a limited utility. The strategist, and particularly the military professional, must know how and why force is of a limited utility, as well as knowing precisely how and under what conditions it can be used.

Technology has given us nuclear weapons. We are now confronted with a set of circumstances unique in history. The great powers remain in conflict with each other because of politics, but to avoid annihilation they must exercise a high degree of caution and restraint. This is what deterrence is all about. The international system is still in a state of nature, and states still reserve the right to fight. Politics being what it is, the great powers will still be drawn in some degree into the quarrels of the lesser powers. Many of these conflicts will fall into the category of limited wars. Fi-

nally, because of vast and ill-defined currents of change coupled with political instability, we can expect continuing use of the technique of revolutionary war. In this way, theories of strategy are closely related to the real but very imperfect world.

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### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Lt. Comdr. Benjamin M. Simpson III, U.S. Navy, did his undergraduate work at Colgate University in international relations, has been awarded an LL.B. from Pennsylvania University, and has earned a master's degree and doctorate from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. His primary and most recent operational experience has been in destroyers, and following his graduation from Destroyer School at Newport, he subsequently served as Operations Officer of the U.S.S. *Willis A. Lee* and as Executive Officer of the U.S.S. *Perry*. Lieutenant Commander Simpson is currently serving as Research Programs Officer in the College of Naval Command and Staff.

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### FOOTNOTES

1. Most of the abstract concepts of deterrence used here are derived from Glenn Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). His concepts are particularly useful in understanding how deterrence works.

2. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Years 1968-1972 Defense Program and the 1968 Defense Budget*, 23 January 1967 (Department of Defense News Release, 26 January 1967), p. 38.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

6. Robert S. McNamara, *The Essence of Security*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 55.

7. See Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

8. The background for the discussion of revolutionary war is derived almost entirely from Sir Robert Thompson, *Revolutionary War in World Strategy (1945-1969)* (New York: Taplinger, 1970).

