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The Double Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945

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were himself and his visualization of leadership in future battle. Neither does Blumenson attempt to describe the world in which Patton lived. The reader is presumed to be familiar with that world; and as a consequence, only those who either remember or have studied the early decades of our century well enough to place *The Patton Papers* in context with the times will find the effort truly meaningful. It would have been helpful if Blumenson had sketched a broader framework for each of the chapters and thus enhanced their relevance for the average military reader.

The collection of Patton's memorabilia has been placed in the Library of Congress and will be available to the public in 1975. Other military scholars may then select new sets of material from the filing cabinets and perceive a somewhat different Patton. Until then, however, *The Patton Papers* will stand as a unique, thoroughly enjoyable, and first-rate character study about one of the most controversial figures in American military history. Martin Blumenson has whetted the appetite in anticipation of the forthcoming volume covering World War II and the opportunity to compare the "Old Blood and Guts" of the news headlines with the introspective Patton as seen by himself.

LAWRENCE W. JACKLEY
Colonel, U.S. Army

Masterman, John C., *The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972. 203p.

In perhaps the ablest treatise of its kind known to this reviewer, Christopher Felix's *A Short Course in the Secret War* (1963), deception is described as "one of secret operations' most vital and complex activities. . . ." The little volume here under appraisal may well become a standard assessment of such activity. The work of the English mystery novelist and former

vice provost of Oxford University, Sir John Cecil Masterman was composed in mid-1945, shortly after the cessation of hostilities, as a manual for future use by M.I. 5, the British internal security organization (comparable with our FBI) to which Masterman had been assigned. It has recently been published with official sanction, however, to offset some of the damaging publicity British Intelligence has been enduring in recent years from the revelations emerging at Communist spy trials.

In the intelligence field, one of the best channels for the practice of deception is by the proper manipulation of the "double agent," i.e., a spy working for two hostile nations concurrently but, in fact, owing allegiance to one only. The Double-Cross System, which got under way in the early summer of 1942 and functioned uninterruptedly until May 1945, had as its goal the identification, apprehension, and then "turning" of all Axis operatives at large in the United Kingdom. Despite inevitable occasional setbacks—usually the result of that traditional nemesis, lack of coordination (see pages 82, 103-104)—the game went so well that Masterman can make the flat claim that "by means of the double agent system we actively ran and controlled the German espionage system in this country" (page 3).

After a succinct statement of the goals set for Double-Cross (pages 8-9, 58), the author devotes the bulk of his book to what might be termed the care and feeding of a very *rara avis*. Cautioning that "a double agent is a tricky customer, and needs the most careful supervision, not only on the material but on the psychological side" (pages 51-52), Sir John then elaborates upon the 12 principles of D/A management which, under the exigencies of war, gradually shaped themselves into such (pages 17-33). He takes passing note of the rarity of a spy "who could plausibly meet persons in any social stratum"