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The phrase "the military-industrial complex" and the misgivings that it has engendered have given rise to the all too popularly held belief that America is moving gradually toward becoming a militarist state. While the size and influence of the military in the United States today is far greater than anything experienced prior to World War II, recent trends both in the United States and advanced West European societies seem to indicate a more highly restricted future role for the military. In the absence of anything less than the most hostile of Soviet or Chinese threats, the militarization of American society would appear to be a remote possibility indeed. (An adaptation of a paper that first appeared in the Seaford House Papers: 1970, Great Britain)

AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE 1980'S

Colonel Richard F. Rosser, U.S. Air Force

Introduction. A common concern in the United States is the supposed drift of American society toward militarism. Observers claim to see persuasive evidence of a foreign policy dominated by military considerations; of the Armed Forces of the United States essentially beyond the control of the people, Congress, and even the executive branch; of a major segment of American industry dependent upon the "war machine." The result of this "military-industrial complex" is a complete distortion of American priorities at a time when America's internal problems cry out for immediate attention.¹

My theme is that such a view of civil-military relations in the United States is wrong. The drift, I will maintain, is away from militarism. It will be argued that the United States is experiencing a trend already common in other advanced nations of the West.

The factors which probably will affect American civil-military relations in the 1980's can be arbitrarily grouped under three headings: a restricted role for the military, the primacy of domestic politics, and amilitarism among the young. These factors obviously are interrelated and interdependent. For purposes of analysis, I will examine them separately.

A Restricted Role for the Military. The American soldier before World War II served mainly in the continental United States. American society considered the Armed Forces a haven for misfits and frowned on interchange between civilian and military society. Isolated on posts in the Southern and Western United States, the military turned inward.

After World War II, however, life for the American military changed dramati-

cally. The United States helped occupy the defeated Axis Powers and attempted to preserve the stability of Europe and Asia with the goal in mind of containing communism. This fundamental revolution in peacetime American defense policy brought major changes in the mission of the American Armed Forces. Most postwar soldiers could expect to serve half or more of their careers abroad. Moreover, American society respected the American serviceman. It believed that the military performed a vital function in protecting the "free world" from communism.

The Nixon Doctrine indicates that the mission of the American military may again change. Vietnam surely has been a major factor in forcing the Nation's leaders to reexamine both the limits of America's ability to influence the course of events overseas and the nature and extent of standing U.S. defense commitments abroad. Nevertheless, a reduced role for the American Armed Forces probably would have come about in any case because of certain long-range trends.

Today's threat to American security is wholly different from that perceived in the 1950's. There is no apparent danger today from monolithic communism. The Soviets and the Chinese can agree on very little, certainly not on any coordinated thrust against the West. The Soviets, moreover, are changing their tactics. They finally appear to have learned the folly of attempting to engineer revolution from afar. The Kremlin continues to aid some revolutionary groups because it competes with the Chinese People's Republic, but the U.S.S.R. obviously prefers to help anti-Western governments already in power. Indeed, the most potentially explosive conflicts today are not between the West and the Communist states, but between the two major Communist powers, Russia and China, and between Israel and the Arab world. The least likely conflict of all, provided each side

respects the vital interests of the other, is a general war between the West and the Communist world.

There is danger, however, in assuming that neither the Soviet Union nor China pose any threat whatsoever, and there are signs that precisely this assumption could become an article of faith among Western political elites and electorates by the next decade. Most influential and informed West Europeans already are said to believe that the Soviets are not interested in military aggression. A sudden thrust from Russia against the United States seems even more remote. We must look to military planners, who have to assume the worst possible case, to find any serious concern over a surprise attack from the Warsaw Pact powers. Western specialists on China also claim to see little danger from the Chinese People's Republic, noting her generally restrained and defensive approach to international politics over the past several decades.

What the layman tends to forget is the cause and effect relationship between military preparedness and national security. Europe, for example, must at least partially derive her security from the very existence of NATO. Yet such an elementary fact appears to be poorly understood. A polling organization in West Germany recently found that only 7 percent of a sample group of young people could explain that NATO is an alliance which links America and Western Europe in defense against the Soviet Union. Twenty-four percent knew that NATO had something to do with defense; 52 percent had no idea what NATO was; 17 percent indulged in bizarre guesses as to its meaning.²

Not only the threat has changed; America's allies no longer seem to need U.S. military aid to the degree once necessary. Although Western Europe may still be several decades from political unity, the economic growth engendered by the Common Market has

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already transformed Western Europe into an economic superpower of sorts. Japan, with the third largest gross national product (GNP) in the world and one of the smallest defense expenditures in relation to GNP (0.8 percent in 1969), clearly could carry a greater share of her defense burden.

As America's allies grow stronger, an understandable aversion to continued reliance on the American nuclear umbrella can easily arise. General de Gaulle was the first to carry this to its logical extreme—the development of a truly independent nuclear deterrent. It is too soon to determine whether a more closely integrated Europe or a more independent Japan will follow the same path.

Barring some dramatic reversal of Soviet or Chinese policy, American public opinion may dictate a greatly reduced American presence in Europe and Asia by the 1980's and inadvertently spur the development of independent nuclear deterrents. A Louis Harris poll commissioned by *Time* magazine in 1969 could not find a majority of Americans who would use nuclear weapons to defend any other country. The high runner was Canada, but only 17 percent would risk the use of America's nuclear armory to defend that intimate neighbor. In the case of Italy, a staunch NATO ally, 27 percent would opt for the use of American military (not nuclear) force, and 15 percent would offer help short of force. Thirty-seven percent would refuse to aid Italy at all, while 21 percent were not sure.³

The utility of conventional forces inevitably is being questioned. Perhaps the sharpest test will come if the American ground troop contribution to NATO is reduced in the next few years. Conventional forces in NATO already are officially declared to be at a minimum. Western European NATO Defense Ministers reportedly have agreed in principle on strengthening the European pillar within NATO to try to stave off or reduce the prospective American

troop withdrawal. The implementation of this agreement, however, will not be easy. The West Germans have refused for political reasons even to consider increasing their NATO forces, preferring to raise their financial contribution. Britain, according to official sources in London, could supply one or two extra battalions at the most to her army on the Rhine.⁴

If it is difficult to find enthusiasm in Europe for maintaining conventional forces in 1970, it may be even more difficult in the United States by 1980. The utility of ground forces for the protection of North America will seem even less relevant than their utility in Western Europe. NATO forces in that area at least have faced Communist armies along a tangible border.

One factor may mitigate against the trend to reduce the conventional ground forces in the advanced countries of the West—the appearance of domestic violence on a large scale and the use of armies for internal security. Most armies have done similar duty sometime in their history. Nevertheless the continued need for such domestic policing actions by the army is viewed with considerable despair in advanced societies which supposedly had progressed to a state of internal harmony where even this military function might eventually be reduced.

Internal security duty may be a normal military duty in the advanced countries by the 1980's. When announcing the French Government's 1971-75 program for defense spending, President Pompidou singled out the gendarmerie for special praise—the army branch which acts as a police force in the country and includes mobile units for riot control. He indicated that there would be especially high expenditures on the gendarmerie because of “the multiplication of the burdens which are imposed on it.”⁵ In the United States, a Directorate of Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations now functions in

the Pentagon. In Britain, only a rash man would predict when troops could be withdrawn from Northern Ireland.

The Western military, in short, will still exist in the 1980's. The question will be their size and effectiveness. There does not seem to be any particular minimum force level for national defense in an era of declining missions.

The Primacy of Domestic Politics. A second major factor affecting civil-military relations in the United States in the 1980's probably will be the primacy of internal political, economic, and social issues in the minds of the public and the relative lack of interest in international problems. One could argue that such is the natural tendency in the political process of a democracy. The individual understandably feels strongest about those things which directly affect him: the cost of living, wages, taxes, social services, law and order. This natural tendency in politics is interrupted by war, which focuses attention on the external threat to the Nation. It also is interrupted by international crises, such as the Cuban missile confrontation in 1962.

With the end of the dramatic encounters characteristic of the cold war years, it probably was inevitable that people in the West again should think primarily about their personal well-being. In turn, this factor made the Vietnam conflict seem such an anachronism to many in the United States and Europe. They could not see a grave danger to the West of a coalition or even a Communist government in South Vietnam. The domino effect of an all-Communist Vietnam seemed an even more remote threat.

Factors other than the popularly perceived end of cold war tensions, however, impose additional urgency to the solution of domestic problems, particularly in the United States. The relatively prosperous Western nations now have the economic means to eliminate

poverty in their societies. The contradiction between the economically possible and the political and social reality is becoming increasingly obvious.

Affluent democratic societies also are especially vulnerable targets for minority group grievances. In the absence of threats to national security or of internal economic crises, such groups see no reason to hold back claims on the majority for equality of political, economic, and social rights and benefits.

Elections in the Western nations are a particularly significant indicator of public concentration on domestic issues. In the British election of June 1970, the question of continuing the pullback "East of Suez" was hardly mentioned. Even the Common Market issue was ignored. This was partly because all major party leaders had agreed that Britain should join EEC. If debate had broken out on this question, it probably would have centered on the kind of impact Britain's entry into EEC would have on local food prices. The longer range political implications of joining EEC, clearly seen by political leaders, would have received little attention.

The foreign policy issue of Vietnam did play a major role in the U.S. presidential and congressional elections of 1968 but even differences over this question centered on the preferred manner of withdrawing from Vietnam—immediately or with varying degrees of "honor." No presidential aspirant suggested that this was the kind of war Americans might have to fight again in some other distant country.⁶ In contrast, the question of the adequacy of the defense budget—the supposed missile gap—had played an important part in the 1960 presidential election.

The most suggestive evidence of the increasing primacy of domestic concerns in the Western democracies is found in the relative share of their national resources allocated to defense and in the manner by which they allocate that share. Because the budget and the

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budgetary process are so significant, I will discuss them in some detail. I also will need to distinguish among the countries of Europe and North America in this respect because the various Western democracies are at different stages in shifting priorities from international issues to domestic issues.

Defense budgets in Western Europe appear to be determined primarily by domestic political considerations. The critical criterion is what the legislature and public will stand, not strategic need. The common yardstick is a given percentage of the gross national product. A high official of the British Ministry of Defence, for example, remarked recently that 5½ percent of the GNP of the United Kingdom was a "reasonable" figure for annual defense expenditures.⁷

This was not always so in Europe. During the two World Wars, no one in the Western democracies worried about the percentage of the GNP spent on defense. The only limit on military spending was the national capability to produce weapons. Even in the Korean war, defense expenditures in Britain rose from 7 to 10 percent of the GNP over a 2-year period.

As the memory of World War II faded and the visible threat from Soviet Russia appeared to decrease, Western European nations seemed to reach a point where domestic concerns began to take priority over military needs. Naturally political leaders were reluctant to admit that the defense of the state might have been compromised by another budget cut. They carefully assured legislators and electors that the nation was still secure. They were most convincing when a dramatic reduction in national commitments could be shown to justify an arms cut.

The primacy of internal considerations was put bluntly by Prime Minister Wilson to the House of Commons in January 1968:

There is no military strength, whether for Britain or for our

alliances, except on the basis of economic strength; and it is on this basis that we best insure the security of this country. We, therefore, intend to make to the alliances of which we are members a contribution related to our economic capability. . . .

British Defence Minister Denis Healey was especially candid about the reason for the defense cuts when he stated before the House of Commons in March 1969 that Britain had to rely on the nuclear deterrent for defense because the cost of conventional forces was too great, bringing conscription, controls on trade, catastrophe for social services, and continued economic difficulties for the whole nation. This line of thinking, however, had begun much earlier in Britain. The 1957 Defence white paper of Duncan Sandys initiated the series of defense cuts justified on the basis that Britain's economic health had to come first. That paper envisaged that the British Army would be reduced by 1962 to 165,000 men. The figure reportedly was set according to the number of men who could be recruited, given the level of pay the Treasury would support.

In France, President de Gaulle was attempting the costly luxury of going it alone by financing his nuclear deterrent at the expense of the conventional forces. The French Government never had permitted military expenditure to jeopardize investment in the social and educational field. Indeed, the deployment of the deterrent force itself was delayed after the French economic crisis of 1968. Public spending for industrial and educational reform demanded first priority. In July 1970 President Pompidou announced a 5-year program (1971-1975) for defense expenditure, promising more drastic cuts. For the first time, the French Government will spend more annually on education than on defense. By 1975 the French defense budget will be reduced to 3 percent of

the French GNP (from 5.6 percent in 1965).⁸

Perhaps the most dramatic shift in national priorities has come in Canada. Prime Minister Trudeau revealed on 3 April 1969 that his Government would withdraw all of the 10,000 Canadian troops stationed in Europe. First priority would be given to the protection of Canadian sovereignty, second to the joint defense of the North American Continent; NATO and United Nations commitments were well down the list. The defense budget would be frozen at \$1.8 billion. Trudeau's decision to withdraw all Canadian troops from NATO subsequently was softened, but there was little doubt about his intention to forge ahead with the plan to cut the Canadian Armed Forces by some 15 percent in the next several years.⁹

All this is not to condemn the political leaders of the Western nations for having neglected the defense needs of their countries. On the contrary, these leaders are merely reacting to public opinion as they interpret it. Naturally, political leaders play a very important role in forming the public's image of the threat, but any Western politician who attempts to increase defense expenditures today, let alone merely maintain them at their present level, faces major roadblocks. He has great difficulty in convincing the public of a possible frontal attack by the Warsaw Pact powers on NATO. The real dangers are more subtle and thus more difficult to explain: the complexities of escalatory politics or nebulous future confrontations in the Third World.

The Western politician has a further problem. NATO has come to rely increasingly on the American nuclear deterrent for Europe's defense. Even the credibility of the French force de frappe depends, in the last analysis, on the American deterrent. How will a Western political leader in the coming decade justify even a "reasonable" percentage of his country's GNP for defense needs,

particularly if these funds are to pay for conventional forces which seem to the public to be increasingly irrelevant for the defense of Europe or the North American Continent? A given percentage of a GNP for defense expenditure is hardly sacrosanct. Indeed, France is not the only NATO country which is gradually decreasing the percentage of its GNP spent on defense.¹⁰

The ratio between defense expenditure and GNP, of course, is hardly an exact guide. The actual amount spent on defense can increase although the percentage of GNP declines where an economy is experiencing high economic growth. Western Germany in 1963 spent almost 22 billion deutschemarks (DM) on defense, 6.7 percent of her GNP; in 1969 defense expenditures rose to almost 24 billion DM, 4.7 percent of GNP.¹¹ Nevertheless, there would seem to be a danger in the increasing tendency to think of defense expenditure primarily in terms of a percentage of a nation's GNP. An appropriate defense effort can be soundly constructed only if it is based on a fairly realistic assessment of present and future threats to national security.

The defense budget in the United States is not yet subordinated to domestic political or economic considerations, but there are signs that this may come about long before 1980. Such a development has been retarded by a number of factors: the great economic wealth of the United States and the relatively light strain on the U.S. economy of defense expenditures during the postwar years; the leading role of the United States in the non-Communist world and the dependence of this sector on the American deterrent; the preoccupation of leading American political figures in the executive branch and Congress with the Communist threat or international politics (witness John F. Kennedy's lack of action on civil rights until militant Blacks forced the issue); and finally, the

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involvement in Vietnam in the latter part of the 1960's.

The military, on the other hand, hardly were given a blank check. The growing costs of weapon systems in the 1950's, especially systems for nuclear deterrence, meant that some limit had to be placed on defense spending. This need was buttressed by the philosophical political principles of the new Republican administration in 1952—pledged to reduce expenditures, lower taxes, and balance the budget.¹²

Secretary of Defense McNamara introduced the major revolution in defense budgeting in the early 1960's. For the first time, the services had to relate their force structures to specific foreign policy objectives. The capabilities of Polaris submarines were compared directly with land-based ICBM's and bomber aircraft. The Secretary of Defense then selected those systems which were politically and economically feasible.¹³

Yet the new budgetary approach did not lead to lower defense expenditures. President Kennedy found that the Eisenhower administration had continued to place all of its eggs in the nuclear basket: the basic defense plans rested on the assumption of total nuclear war. Conventional weapons and ground forces were at a dangerously low level. Kennedy was told a few weeks after his inauguration that 10,000 men dispatched to Southeast Asia would deplete the strategic reserve. His administration went to Congress in March 1961 with a request to raise the defense budget. "Flexible response" was to replace "massive retaliation."¹⁴

The defense budget and the Armed Forces expanded greatly after 1965 to meet the costs of the Vietnam war (from 8 percent of the GNP in 1965 to 9.2 percent in 1968). This expansion of the military budget to pay for probably the most unpopular war in American history triggered the first serious debate in the United States since World War II

about foreign and domestic priorities. Fuel was thrown on the fire with the signs of a new and extremely costly escalation of the strategic arms race, specifically the proposal to install an ABM system. America's internal problems with her cities, her Black minority, poverty, crime, and education also appeared to be reaching a crisis stage. These pressures coincided with President Nixon's election in 1968.

The Nixon administration seems to have abandoned McNamara's search for a "rational" calculation of the proper level of defense spending. The defense budget ceiling is now determined by calculating the expected revenue and subtracting the money needed for necessary domestic programs. This resulted in a planned \$5 billion reduction in defense expenditures for 1971, primarily by cutting manpower and weapons for the conventional forces. Contingency planning in the Pentagon will be based on maintaining a capability to fight one and one-half wars at any given moment, rather than two and one-half wars (McNamara's famous planning figure). The goal for the deterrent forces will be nuclear sufficiency rather than parity or superiority.

Defense planning also runs up against stubborn domestic problems such as inflation and the pressure to end the draft. The President's target for 1972 appeared to be a \$70 billion defense budget, 7 billion less than the estimate for 1970, and 10 billion less than the Vietnam high. When the budget actually went to Congress, it was around 75 billion. Eight hundred million was added to the 7 billion research and development budget for new weapons, but most of the increase went for soaring manpower costs, while the general decline continued in the number of ships, planes, and men in the Armed Forces.

Pentagon sources expect the Armed Forces to be cut further to 2.4 million men by the end of this fiscal year, over

1 million below the 1969 strength of 3.45 million. This probably would involve the deactivation of as many as six Army divisions—the quickest way to save \$½ billion a year is to retire a division. The deactivation in turn would require the pullout of at least one division from South Korea and two or more from Europe.¹⁵ The Navy could lose three of its aircraft carriers, the Air Force some of its B-52 bombers and at least a third of its tactical aircraft. Scores of overseas bases would be closed. The overall force levels would be 250,000 men below the pre-Vietnam strength; in effect, the force levels at the end of the Eisenhower administration. To offset cuts in general purpose forces, President Nixon is expected to propose modest additions to the strategic deterrent—presently costing about \$9 billion a year. A Pentagon budget expert has estimated that this austere cutback in the Armed Forces nevertheless would result in a “rockbottom” defense budget of \$61 billion. He suggested that the actual cost by 1975 would be about 70 billion, given current inflationary pressures.¹⁶

A major reduction of this scale in defense spending, however, may not satisfy the growing group of congressional critics of the military and of the “military-industrial complex.” This group is a new phenomenon in postwar American politics and probably will play a highly significant role in American defense policy in the next decade. As such, it is important to investigate its origins.

The executive branch initiated budgetary cuts for the Armed Forces in the first two decades after World War II. There was no significant congressional pressure for lowering the military budget and no critical scrutiny of weapons programs. Legislators considered such questions highly technical, and national security seemed clearly at stake.

The rise of serious congressional criticism of the defense budget in the

later 1960's resulted from a number of factors, including the attempt to re-define America's role in the world as a result of the frustration of Vietnam as well as certain long-range trends—i.e., the economic growth of Western Europe and Japan, the increasing severity of America's internal problems and an awareness of their existence. There have been additional factors which have not been as widely recognized. The Vietnam war, for example, severely tarnished the prestige of the American military. They were charged with inefficiency, indecisiveness, “body count” psychology, brutality, and heavyhanded methods in dealing with conscientious objectors and dissenters within the services.¹⁷

The military was even challenged on questions of tactics, a subject on which they should be the recognized experts. Some observers, basically sympathetic to the military, claimed that the Armed Forces did not understand the essential nature of the Vietnam war itself.¹⁸ Other recent events have not helped the military image: a congressional report characterized the North Korean capture of the *Pueblo* as the product of a bureaucratic structure that had grown so vast and complex that it was unable to respond swiftly to a major crisis.

Criticism of the military extended to the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense. Former Secretary of Defense McNamara's overly optimistic judgments in the middle 1960's on the probable course of the Vietnam war were ridiculed, as was his managerial streamlining of the Department of Defense. Forty-five Congressmen published a report in 1969 demanding that Congress reassert control over the “military bureaucracy” and blaming McNamara's rationalization of the defense structure in part for what they consider the undue influence of the military in American society. The former Secretary declared that he had lost only 2 percent of his battles with the military-industrial complex, but antimilitarists saw only

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that the Armed Forces were far stronger and better financed than they had been in 1960.¹⁹

Equally damaging to the image of all military and civilian members of the Department of Defense and of the defense industries have been investigations into contracting and procurement practices. Senator Proxmire's subcommittee on "Economy in Government" charged that the C-5A was costing some \$2 billion more than originally estimated. Proxmire claimed that it was a normal practice for most major weapons systems to cost at least twice their original estimate.²⁰

It is hard to escape the conclusion that American defense expenditures increasingly will be determined by general economic considerations and will come into competition with what are thought to be equally compelling, if not overriding, domestic needs. The American military is entering an era experienced by the military of other Western nations for a decade or more.

There is a final development which underlies all that I have been saying about the primacy of domestic politics and which may have profound implications for the future conduct of foreign and defense policy by the Western democracies. For the first time in recorded history, the essential monopoly of the elites on the formulation of foreign and defense policy is being seriously challenged. The mature industrial states were democratized in theory during the 19th and early 20th centuries; today they are being democratized in fact. Populations are becoming mobilized politically as a result of mass education, universal and rapid communication, leisure to consider political questions, and, most of all, a feeling of competence to handle such questions.

The elites of the past, largely through their control of the socialization process, were able to indoctrinate young and old with the desired foreign and defense policy goals. The careful attention now

given by the American Presidency and Congress to public rumblings regarding Vietnam shows dramatically that the attempts of the policymaking elites to form public opinion face increasing difficulty. The British Government of 1956 perhaps had a taste of the new phenomenon of an aroused public over Suez; the French Government faced the phenomenon over Algeria. Today, the lack of the credibility of the Soviet threat in the eyes of Western Europeans certainly has an impact on the ability of Western European leaders to maintain their NATO contributions.²¹

We are not yet at the point where every voter has an intelligent and informed opinion about all issues. There are also exceedingly difficult mechanical problems in translating public opinion into any kind of useful and accurate guide for policymakers. Nevertheless, the impact of a potentially concerned and mobilized public on policy implementation should be carefully considered by a Western statesman before he commits his nation in the future to a foreign venture which might prove unpopular. He almost certainly will be more selective about the use of military power, at home as well as abroad. He will be particularly wary of expensive weapons systems, which tend to multiply in cost with every technological generation. The danger is that mobilized public opinion may frustrate foreign and defense policy decisions which, though unpopular, are important to national security. Increased interest by an informed public may not always be in the public interest. De Tocqueville wrote long ago about the American experiment: "Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient."²²

Amilitarism among the Young. The third major factor which will affect

civil-military relations in the United States in the 1980's is the attitude of contemporary youth toward the military in general, the military as a profession, the concept of military service, the use of force in international relations, in effect, toward those concepts summarized in the West Point code of behavior—"Duty, honor, country." I will crudely characterize the predominant attitude of American youth toward the military in the next decade as amilitarism, which I define as an apathetic view of the military and all things connected with it.

The current attitude of many American young people toward the military is not usually described as amilitaristic. We generally see the phrase antimilitarism used in conjunction with the student movement, and there is no doubt this attitude exists. The young men who have made the headlines by burning draft cards, storming the Pentagon, and distributing underground newspapers on Army posts are not indifferent to the military.

Because antimilitarism has occurred earlier in this century, the older generation in America tends to brush it off as transitory. This is largely true. Antimilitarism is never static. It seems to vary directly in the West with a high rate of technological advance and sociological upheaval; the unpopularity of functions performed by the Armed Forces externally and internally; and the size and expense of the Military Establishment. Starting from these assumptions, the United States qualifies as the society experiencing the greatest degree of antimilitarism today.

But the vital question is what replaces antimilitarism when the above variables change, when antimilitarism is defused as it probably will be in the United States after Vietnam. Here we must draw on the experiences of the other advanced Western nations. They appear to be over the hump as far as violent antimilitarism is concerned.

They largely avoided or defused it earlier by reducing their armed forces, by opting for a volunteer army in Britain and Canada, and by eliminating unpopular foreign commitments. Increasing use of armies for internal security may counteract this earlier achievement. Moreover, these societies have not yet caught up with the United States in regard to the state of social and technological change. Yet that antimilitarism which did exist seems to have been replaced by amilitarism among the youth.

Amilitarism among young people, of course, makes it particularly difficult to recruit for the armed forces. If a nation has universal military training or selective service, it will find sufficient young men, but at the same time it may induct into its ranks amilitarism, which can quickly change to antimilitarism under the proper circumstances. On the other hand, if the same nation opts for a volunteer armed force, amilitarism may make a successful recruiting campaign difficult, if not impossible.

There still is too little known about the attitudes toward the military of the various social, educational, and racial groupings among American youth to determine whether antimilitarism is being displaced by amilitarism. We are dealing with a complex phenomenon in a complex society. Strains of antimilitarism, amilitarism, and promilitarism exist side by side among White and Black youth, college-educated men and high school dropouts, sons of middle-class parents and of "hard-hats." Despite these uncertainties, I suggest that amilitarism will become dominant by the next decade in the United States for several reasons.

The most fundamental long-range trend in the West, as a whole, affecting the attitudes of contemporary youth toward the military is the extraordinary rate of change in the 20th century. Any major change in a society—war, revolution, economic depression—places a

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great strain on traditional customs and mores, and no century has witnessed such upheavals as our own. These social changes have been compounded by the unprecedented developments in technology and their impact on the economic system, the political structure, and all aspects of society.

The cumulative effect of these changes is potentially revolutionary for they challenge the very nature of authority and the "establishment." The leaders of political, religious, educational, and economic institutions are under pressure not just to make changes, but to explain why their rule should be considered legitimate. The armed forces, as the ultimate protector of the established order in the advanced West, inevitably is called into question. How could it have been otherwise? The American Armed Forces, as noted earlier, are now labeled unnecessary, brutal, inhuman, irresponsible, wasteful, and, at the very least, inefficient.

The leaders of the fight for social change in the United States come from all strata and age groups, but most of all from the college youth.²³ Their generation is the first to have felt the full impact of accumulated change in the postindustrial society. They are affluent students, supported by affluent parents or state scholarships, with time to think and demonstrate; they have learned how to dramatize their cause. Columbia University's president-elect William J. McGill testified before the President's Commission on Campus Unrest in August 1970 that as many as 50 percent of all collegians now belong to an "alienated culture, hostile to science and technology, which is growing at a very rapid pace."²⁴ Most of the alienated students, incidentally, appear to be studying in the liberal arts.

While America's college population does not represent all American youth, a higher percentage of young people go to college in the United States than in any other country. Perhaps 40 percent

of those of college age, some 7 million, enter institutions of higher learning. Almost all future political and business leaders will have gone to a university, and, by requirement of the Armed Forces, most officers. (The military academies, 4-year degree granting institutions, must be counted as universities in this respect.)

It has been suggested that the students pressing for change are largely the children of left or liberal parents.²⁵ Yet a significant number of the young people who now question the system and, in particular, the Vietnam war and its relationship to the system come from impeccable WASP establishment backgrounds. After talking with his children, conservative Secretary of the Interior Walter J. Hickel wrote a famous letter to President Nixon pleading for more understanding of the antiwar attitudes of the young. Ohio Republican Senator William B. Saxbe viewed most antiwar dissenters as "crazies" until he received a jolting letter in June 1970 from his "most conservative" son, a Marine lieutenant, asking his father to help end "a war that is contrary to everything I've been taught to believe about America."²⁶

The actual number of true radicals in the college population espousing violent change is very small, perhaps no more than 1 or 2 percent of college students. The striking thing, however, is the large number of students opting for a withdrawal from Vietnam, a reordering of national priorities, and a change in life style.

Much has been made in the last few months, of course, about the relative quiet on college campuses. However, this calm should not be misinterpreted. While there has been a massive reaction against the use of violence to effect change, recent opinion polls suggest that students are even more uneasy and worried about society in 1971 than in 1970. More believe we have a sick America on our hands; only a handful

believe our national policies will lead to peace or economic well-being.

Of special interest to this study, students are even more concerned about Vietnam, still the number one indication in their minds that the American political system is not working properly. As a result, students are becoming increasingly pacifistic in their outlook; there is a marked trend toward rejecting force as an instrument of policy for almost any reason. Understandably, patriotism as a personal value is decreasing.

We have yet to discuss the students concentrated in the engineering sciences, medicine, agriculture, and other technical fields who are not "turned off" by the establishment. This group, together with the blue-collar children who go straight from high school to work or to the service, makes up some 80 percent of their generation. This majority tends to follow parental politics. Yet it is hardly quiescent, joining the disaffected college group in diverging from parental guidelines on hair, dress, and drugs.

Here we turn to the central problem of this section: what will be the impact of young people's attitude toward the military on Armed Forces recruiting in the 1980's? I will examine this question with the assumption that the present system of selective military service (the "draft") will be phased out sometime in the 1970's. The Armed Forces then will rely completely on volunteers.

Establishment college youth may provide a sufficient reservoir of officer manpower. Military recruiters seem to think so, balancing the loss of Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) units at prestigious Ivy League universities with the establishment of new ROTC units at other schools and the recent increase in the number of scholarships being offered to attract more young men into the program. The critical imponderable is what happens to this major source of

officer recruitment if a volunteer army becomes a reality.

Young men appear to join ROTC primarily so that they may avoid the draft and finish college and later serve as officers rather than as enlisted men. This motivation is graphically demonstrated by the small percentage of ROTC graduates who continue in the service after their initial obligation.²⁷ A somewhat higher percentage of officers from the various officer candidate schools, the second most important commissioning source, remain in the service. A majority of academy graduates remain, but even that percentage may be declining. Moreover, the academies provided less than 5 percent of the new officers entering the services in 1970 (2,300 out of 58,000).

There is a further question, rarely asked, about officer recruiting in the absence of the draft: what kind of young men will volunteer for the officer ranks? Certainly there would not be the broad spectrum now in the service. We just have noted the loss of ROTC units at Ivy League schools and the disaffection of the liberal arts students from the establishment. In short, there is the prospect of an officer corps increasingly unrepresentative of society as a whole. I am not concerned, however, with the supposed danger of an isolated "military caste" backed by an out-of-control military-industrial-complex.²⁸ The problem is that a modern armed force needs highly intelligent officers with training in all the disciplines. Moreover, the military would seem to have much more sympathetic support for its needs if it is broadly representative of society.

The recruiting situation where enlisted men are concerned is even less encouraging. Draftees comprise only 20 percent to 25 percent of the Army's strength, but Pentagon studies show that 38 percent of the enlistees in all the services would not have volunteered without the pressure of the draft. The Air Force, for example, admits that it

has had young men with high IQ's waiting in line to volunteer in order to avoid the Army.^{2 9}

How then do we man the Armed Forces and procure the right kind of personnel? The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, the Gates Commission, believes the primary answer to be better pay, especially for first-term officers and enlisted men. However, there is considerable doubt as to whether a mere pay raise is sufficient inducement to procure the required numbers of men with the proper skills and to keep them in the service after their initial commitment. For in the coming decade the United States will see the further development of trends which will make even the young man who is essentially promilitary think twice before joining the Armed Forces, regardless of pay.

I described one of these trends in the first section of this paper—the declining world role for the American military. The American Armed Forces have yet to enter the era of a drastically altered mission. Yet we can gain some idea of the impact of the change in the nature and scope of an Armed Forces' mission or recruiting by noting the British experience.

Young British gentlemen in former years joined the army or its colonial offshoots for travel, excitement, leisure, sport, congenial companionship. Many thought that this was the only way of life, coming from families where military service was hereditary.^{3 0} The lure of adventure in distant lands was a powerful motivation for enlistment—not service in Britain. Even the enlisted ranks, largely composed of Irish peasants and urban poor, must have been attempting to escape a confining environment at home.^{3 1}

Life for a British soldier today is quite different. He probably will spend most of his career in Europe, primarily in his home country. Unfortunately, the densely populated areas of Europe are

not conducive to active soldiering. Moreover, the standard of living in Britain of the Officer corps in particular is considerably below that which had been typical of imperial postings. The British soldier is part of a deterrent force which we all hope will never be used, but what happens to armies when they never fight? The populace begins to question whether they are really necessary, and a young man inevitably asks whether service in the armed forces is worthwhile. He may see "combat" but only in performing internal security duty, but there is no more distasteful and frustrating assignment for a military man in Western society. This is not the enemy he expected.^{3 2}

The changing role of the armed forces in major Western industrial societies such as Britain undoubtedly is having an effect on recruiting. Boys who once joined the British Army to see the Middle East, says one British schoolmaster, now go into middle management. They believe that they can see more of the world with an oil company than with the army. Others suspect that the recruiting problem has deeper roots. A public schoolteacher who has been closely associated with the British military academy at Sandhurst and officer recruiting in general comments:

There is a general failing among boys to appreciate why we need an army, a feeling that "the army is not for me." They are searching for something which they feel is more purposeful, rather than what seems to many to be a negative, unproductive policing job at the present time.^{3 3}

There is a second trend which will make the services less attractive. I refer to the increasing contrast between life in the military and life as a civilian in the mature industrial state. A man can be patriotic, satisfied with the pay, and still not enlist or extend because of the relative hardship of life in the military

compared with a similar job in the civilian economy.

Polaris nuclear submarine officers are a case in point. They are handpicked, highly trained, and motivated seamen. Yet such men are leaving the service in increasing numbers.³⁴ In the U.S. Navy they spend 60 days underwater, then 90 days in port—60 of these 90 days involve intensive training. Many officers have been assigned to submarine sea duty for up to 17 years. If they leave the Navy and join private industry, they earn more money, spend every night with their families, and still are doing a task which is considered a service to the community.

The contrast between other jobs in the civilian and military communities may not be as great, but it is there, for there are relatively few jobs left in a modern military organization which are completely unskilled or lack a civilian equivalent. The services need computer programmers, missile repairmen, electronic technicians, jet engine mechanics, pilots—the list of skilled occupations is almost endless. Advanced societies have an equal need for such valuable skills and soon will probably offer 35-hour working weeks with considerably higher pay for almost exactly the same kind of work. The former enlisted man is particularly relieved to be through with the “Mickey Mouse” annoyances of KP, reveille, barracks life, and inspections.³⁵

A third trend militating against recruiting for the enlisted ranks is hard to quantify, but definitely exists. Societal values are shifting in the United States toward increased individualism, equality, and cultural and educational uniformity. The average young recruit entering the service today is likely to be at least a high school graduate, expecting to earn \$600 to \$800 a month and have his own car in civilian life; a decade ago he rarely would have graduated from high school, and his earning expectations were much more modest. Yet this young man still goes through the tradi-

tional derogatory and harsh recruit indoctrination procedures.³⁶

The significance of the egalitarian ethic for the enlisted man does not necessarily diminish after basic training. Indeed, it may grow as he comes into closer contact with the officer ranks. Based on personal experience, I can testify that a considerable number of enlisted men no longer accept the Armed Forces' definition of an officer. They do not believe a college education is a sufficient distinction, since many enlisted men have or gain a college education while in service. (Enlisted men who enter the service with college degrees are primarily draftees.) Air Force enlisted men, moreover, do not believe that a pilot is automatically qualified to be an officer. It may be that in many service specialties the traditional distinction between officer and enlisted man is no longer relevant and, indeed, is a needless irritant. Discipline and rank certainly must be maintained, but there could be equal opportunity for all to advance through the ranks. Police forces have operated on this principle for decades.³⁷

The officer structure itself is no longer free from the egalitarian trend in American society. The “Concerned Officers' Movement,” consisting of active duty junior officers mainly educated in northeastern schools, has made national headlines by speaking out against the war in Vietnam. The leaders of this movement initially were considered to be excellent young naval officers with impeccable academic and military records in ROTC or officers candidate school. One of these men commented, “The Navy has no questioning, and I'd just spent four years questioning things.” Establishment youth cannot totally escape wondering about the “system” while at a university. What is more natural than to question the first organization they join—the military.³⁸

A fourth trend in the advanced societies, the nature of the individual's

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commitment to the organization, similarly has a major impact on both the officer and enlisted ranks. In mature Western societies an individual with a skill is highly mobile. He does not feel the same degree of loyalty as did his father to a given company, industrial concern, or educational institution. The professional man supposedly is loyal to at least his profession, but even this may be breaking down. Medical doctors, for example, are charged with having forgotten their Hippocratic oath; professors, their students.

This trend finds its inevitable reflection in the service. Older officers cannot understand why younger officers are not philosophically and psychologically committed to a 30-year career when they receive their commission. In part, military professionalism, like professionalism in other areas, is weakening. Why should an officer make sacrifices for an ideal, a young captain asks, when few others in society are prepared to forego the good life?^{3 9}

Perhaps the biggest challenge to the concept of military professionalism is the need for specialization in all ranks. Young men in the service increasingly think of themselves as meteorologists, economists, electrical engineers, political scientists, nuclear physicists. If they have a commitment, it is primarily to their particular profession or discipline and secondarily to the military profession.^{4 0}

The officer today with a professional skill may be most concerned about his opportunities to practice his particular specialty and to advance in that specialty. He will stay in the service if he considers that his opportunities in this regard are equal or better than in the civilian community. To put it bluntly, his basic question is what can the organization offer him, not what can he offer the organization.^{4 1}

The American soldier is much better off today in regard to pay, training, and living conditions than his predecessors,

but the attractiveness of his job always is relative to what the greater society offers. The Armed Forces demand a degree of commitment, professionalism, sacrifice, and hardship which increasingly diverges from that demanded by other sectors of an advanced democratic society. Above all, he will be asked in the coming decades to accomplish tasks which probably will be both more difficult and less popular.

Conclusion. The dangers of prediction are well known, especially when forecasting political and social trends in society. Alfred Vagts wrote some years ago that we all would soon live in militarist societies; Harold Lasswell foresaw that we would move toward the garrison state. I am attempting to demonstrate that this has not happened and will be even less probable in the advanced democratic societies of the West, specifically the United States, by the next decade. Instead of militarism, these states may be entering an era of "civilianism."^{4 2}

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Col. Richard F. Rosser, U.S. Air Force, did his undergraduate work at Ohio Wesleyan University, earned a master's degree and doctorate in political science from Syracuse University, and is a graduate of the British Imperial Defence College. He has been a member of the Department of Political Science at the U.S. Air Force Academy since 1959, and before his appointment as Head of the Department (1967), he served as Chairman of Instruction for courses in political theory and as Director of the Graduate Program in international affairs. Colonel Rosser has lectured at numerous U.S. and foreign service colleges, has published widely on subjects dealing with Soviet foreign policy and U.S. security matters, and is currently preparing a book on Soviet involvement in Southeast Asia.

I may be wrong. Certain of the trends I describe could be reversed or modified. For example, changes in leadership in the Soviet Union or China could lead to much more bellicose policies against the West. If the threat were clear, the worst days of the cold war might be repeated. There also could be changes in the internal political climate in the United States. The so-called "silent majority" might find its voice. On the other hand, I am not sure exactly what it would say. An emphasis on law and order internally would not necessarily lead to more money for the Armed Forces.

If "civilianism" does come to prevail, I will not quarrel with such a state provided the timing is right. Like most professional soldiers, I hope that the military eventually will become an anachronism. My concern is that Western societies may downgrade the necessity of having to rely on force before such action is warranted. For there is no indication yet that national security in

the last analysis can depend on other than national defense forces and solidly constructed alliances.

Once a society begins to downgrade its armed forces, a descending spiral seems to take hold. As the military falls more and more into disfavor, it is only natural that fewer good men will enter the service. The fewer good men in the military, the more derogatory the opinion of the public about the armed forces, and the less money appropriated. At some point the spiral will stop. Few in the West are ready for unilateral disarmament. The unanswerable question is whether the resulting armed force will be sufficient to support a society's foreign and defense policy. For it is doubtful whether any general war in the future between the major powers will permit leisurely mobilization. Even minor crises between major powers require forces in being, and an armed force once torn asunder is not easily or quickly rebuilt in the last decades of the 20th century.

FOOTNOTES

1. The term "militarism" is used with considerable imprecision today, partly because it has meanings on a variety of levels—regarding foreign policy, societal value systems, style of life, an elevated status for certain occupational groups. I will use it to mean primarily the predominance of military over civilian factors in the internal and external relations of a society.

2. *The Baltimore Sun*, 30 August 1970.

3. "The Limits of Commitment," *Time*, 2 May 1969. It could be argued that Senator Mansfield's resolution to withdraw part of the American troops in Europe reflects an optimistic view of the commitment to defend Europe felt by the American people.

4. *The Daily Telegraph*, 2 October 1970.

5. "French Put Education Before Defence," *The Times* (London), 30 July 1970, p. 4:1.

6. Forty percent of the electorate cited Vietnam as the most important problem facing the Government on the eve of the presidential election. Black voters when taken alone, however, cited civil rights as the paramount issue. The other major issues for the white majority were "the racial crisis" and "law and order." Philip E. Converse, et al., "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," *The American Political Science Review*, December 1969, p. 1086-1090.

7. The Labour government had announced its intention to reduce this to 5 percent by 1972-73. Mr. Healey, speaking in the House of Commons, March 1969, "British Defense Eggs Go in Nuclear Basket," *Christian Science Monitor*, 8 March 1969, p. 11:1.

8. "French Put Education Before Defence."

9. Hilary Brigstocke, "New Minister Seeks to Allay Doubts on Canadian Defence," *The Times* (London), 29 September 1970, p. 8:1.

10. From 1965 to 1969 Britain decreased her defense expenditures from 6.3 to 5.1; West Germany from 4.4 to 3.5; Italy from 3.4 to 2.9; Canada from 3.2 to 2.5. See Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1969-1970* (London: 1969); and Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1970-1971* (London: 1970).

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11. "White Paper 1970 on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and on the State of the German Federal Armed Forces," Federal Minister of Defence, p. 188.
12. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., talks about the "antique fiscal views" of President Eisenhower's Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey. See Schlesinger's *A Thousand Days* (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 317.
13. See Charles J. Hitch, *Decision-Making for Defense* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965) for a comparison of the new methods with the old.
14. Schlesinger, p. 315-316. Critics, of course, had pointed out much earlier the difficulty of applying "massive retaliation" and thus of making it credible.
15. Vice President Agnew reportedly warned South Korea's President Park in August 1970 that all U.S. forces would be withdrawn from South Korea when that country's modernization of its armed forces had been completed—possibly within 5 years. An Associated Press story in the *Stars and Stripes*, 27 August 1970.
16. See Lloyd Norman, "The Quiet Tiger," *Army Magazine*, March 1970, for an excellent analysis of the Nixon administration's defense planning for the next several years. It should be noted that the above planning figures include no allowance for military pay reforms, mandatory if the proposal for the all-volunteer army is to be implemented.
17. Compare these charges with similar criticisms leveled against the French Army for its conduct of the war in Indochina, and especially Algeria.
18. See Herman Kahn, et al., *Can We Win in Vietnam?* (New York: Praeger, 1968). Also, Robert Thompson, "What Went Wrong? The Failure of American Strategy in Vietnam," *Interplay*, April 1969.
19. Anthony Hartley, "Anti-militarism Can Be Too Much of a Good Thing," *The New York Times Magazine*, 19 October 1969, p. 137.
20. See William Proxmire, *Report from Wasteland* (New York: Praeger, 1970).
21. On the process of democratization in the mature industrial states, see Karl de Schweinitz, Jr., "Growth, Development, and Political Modernization," *World Politics*, July 1970, p. 518-540.
22. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Knopf, 1960), v. I, p. 234.
23. James A. Johnson notes, for example, that the greatest number of isolationists today in the United States are in the under-30 generation. Although in no sense xenophobic and unsympathetic to the problems of foreign countries, they believe the United States would be better off tending to its more immediate domestic problems. See his article, "The New Generation of Isolationists," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1970, p. 137-146.
24. Quoted in "When the Young Teach and the Old Learn," *Time*, 17 August 1970.
25. Seymour M. Lipset, "American Student Activism," P3893 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, July 1968).
26. Quoted in "When the Young Teach and the Old Learn," p. 36.
27. Only 11 percent of the Army ROTC-source officers extended beyond their minimum obligation in 1970; 27 percent of Regular Navy ROTC-source officers; 38 percent of Air Force ROTC-source officers. Moreover, the retention rate for each service appears to be steadily declining. In 1961 the Army retained 32 percent of a comparable group, in 1965, 21 percent. Brooks Nihart, "Why Junior Officers Get Out," *Armed Forces Journal*, 3 August 1970, p. 22-24, 30.
28. This disturbing possibility is argued in an article by Blair Clark (Senator Eugene McCarthy's national campaign manager in 1968), "The Question Is What Kind of Army?" *Harper's*, September 1969, p. 80-83.
29. "Can 'Volunteer Army' End the Draft?" *U.S. News & World Report*, 9 March 1970, p. 43.
30. See C.B. Otley, "Militarism and the Social Affiliations of the British Army Elite," Jacques Van Doorn, ed., *Armed Forces and Society* (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), p. 105. Cf. Correlli Barnett, *Britain and Her Army* (London: Penguin Press, 1970), p. 343-346 and 410-413.
31. Barnett, p. 240-242, 280-282, 429.
32. The desire of most career military men to be doing what they are trained for is a motivation often unappreciated. British recruiters have found, for example, that one variable which seems to have an immediate and beneficial impact on recruiting is for the British forces to be in action. Moreover, any kind of action ups the recruiting numbers—even duty in Ulster. Canadian officers have told me that a considerable number of young men who in other times would have joined the Canadian Army have enlisted in the U.S. Army to see battle in Vietnam.
33. Henry Stanhope, "Shortfall in Sandhurst Recruiting," *The Times* (London) 21 September 1970, p. 2:4.

34. The retention goal for nuclear submarine officers is 62 percent. The rate has fallen from 75 percent in 1966 to a projected figure for 1980 of 36 percent. The seriousness of this problem is demonstrated by the unprecedented bonus of \$15,000 the Navy gives promising Polaris officers with 8 years of service who volunteer to remain on duty for an additional 4-year period.

35. See, in particular, the excellent study by Harold Wool, *The Military Specialist* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968). By 1974 only 10 percent of the enlisted men in the U.S. Armed Forces will be in ground combat jobs; significantly, 11 percent will be in electronics; 17 percent in other technical jobs; 18 percent in administration; 24 percent will be mechanics; 7 percent will be craftsmen, et cetera. Data from the Gates Commission Report, p. 44, based in turn on Wool's study.

36. See the critique by Samuel H. Hays, "What Is Wrong with Induction Procedures," *Military Review*, May 1970, p. 3-7. It should be noted that the U.S. Army is now carefully reviewing its basic training program in respect to such criticisms.

37. Shortly after World War II, the so-called Doolittle Committee (headed by Air Force Gen. James Doolittle) attempted to narrow the differences between officer and enlisted man in the U.S. Armed Forces. The postwar British Labour government, philosophically committed to egalitarianism, made a serious—but unsuccessful—effort to establish a "one-ladder" system of promotion. Philip Abrams, "Democracy, Technology, and the Retired British Officer," Samuel P. Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 154.

38. See Robert B. Rigg, "How the Navy Radicalized Three Young Officers," *Washington Post*, 13 September 1970.

39. I recognize that this hypothesis conflicts with a study done in the early 1960's which suggested that U.S. Air officers had a stronger commitment to their organization than did a comparable group of business executives to their firm. The difference was thought to be in the underlying professional attitudes of the Air Force officers. See Oscar Grusky, "The Effects of Succession: a Comparative Study of Military and Business Organization," Morris Janowitz, ed., *The New Military* (New York: Norton, 1964), p. 83-108.

40. A decade ago Morris Janowitz noted the inherent tension in the military between the "heroic leader" and the "manager." The tension I am referring to is the conflict between the specialty the young officer has studied at his university and both of the types Janowitz describes. He also referred to a third type—the military technologist. There appears to be less tension between academic training and service position in this third category as long as the man is properly assigned. See Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960), p. 21.

41. Recent surveys indicate this trend. A motivation survey of 400 junior officers in the U.S. Air Force this year indicated that job dissatisfaction, the promotion system, and family separation were listed as the prime deterrents to an Air Force career. Pay and living conditions were the last of their concerns. *The Air Force Times*, 21 October 1970.

42. Harold Lasswell defines "civilianism" as "the absorption of the military by the multivalued orientation of a society in which violent coercion is deglamorized as an end in itself and is perceived as a regrettable concession to the persistence of variables whose magnitudes we have not been able to control without paying what appears to be an excessive cost in terms of such autonomy as is possible under the cloud of chronic peril." See his essay "The Garrison-State Hypothesis Today," Samuel P. Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1962), p. 65.



The peace we seek, founded upon decent trust and co-operative effort among nations, can be fortified, not by weapons of war but by wheat and by cotton, by milk and by wool, by meat and by timber and by rice. These are words that translate into every language on earth. These are needs that challenge this world in arms.

*Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address to American Society of
Newspaper Editors, 16 April 1953*