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Armed Forces of the World, a Reference Handbook

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and routine of naval business." (p. 71) Not that the story is not a good one, for it is.

The antagonist is the deposed Catholic King of England, the self-styled James II. The protagonist is the Protestant Prince of Orange, proclaimed by Parliament to be William II, the rightful King of England, France, and Ireland. Fleeing from the nation he once ruled, James turned to the Catholic King of France, Louis XIV, for protection. Louis, however, was not disposed to boarding houseguests unless they could prove to be useful. He therefore arranged for James to be sent to Ireland to lead a rebellion of the discontented Irish-Catholic majority against their British rulers.

This was the origin of the Naval War of 1688-89, and perhaps more significantly in our own view, it was also the origin of the bitter Catholic-Protestant antagonisms that scourge Northern Ireland today. It was a fierce struggle characterized by determined and courageous fighting on both sides. The siege of Protestant-held Londonderry by the Irish Army of James II rivals the heroic resistance of Leningrad in our own century. The story ends abruptly on the eve of the crucial Battle of Beachy Head in 1689 for the authors unfortunate death cut short the peroration to his work. But in any case, Beachy Head was not the end of the Anglo-French naval wars; the end came in 1805 with Admiral Nelson's victory at Trafalgar.

In *The Age of Nelson*, Mr. Marcus, like Mr. Powley, tells a good story, but, quite frankly, a story that has been told before. The author's assertion that "... the naval side of the War of 1793-1815 has never been fully and comprehensively treated," is simply not valid. (p. 11) Literally scores of works have been published during the past century dealing with the naval aspects of the Napoleonic Wars, of which A.T. Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and*

Empire (1892) is the most conspicuous.

This latest work is for the most part well written, but offers little new material. The main contribution of the book is the narration it provides of the years of "lame duck" warfare which followed Trafalgar. During this period, the French Fleet remained continuously in port while the battleships of the Royal Navy beat back and forth across the harbor entrances in tedious blockade duty.

Both books were written primarily for history buffs, but Nelson will doubtless have some general readership because of the nature of the subject. They are, however, worthwhile reading, and in their pages the origins of our naval heritage can be rediscovered.

CRAIG L. SYMONDS
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Sellers, Robert C., ed., *Armed Forces of the World, a Reference Handbook*, 3d ed. New York: Praeger, 1971. 296p.

This reference handbook provides a summary of the armed forces of the world in terms of size, composition, major weapons systems and items of equipment, defense budgets, defense spending as a percent of gross national product, and other information of use in estimating the nature of the defense activities of a given country. The handbook provides no qualitative judgments as to the effectiveness or utility of these forces. A reader knowledgeable in current weapons systems and major items of equipment will find enough information to make some generalizations as to the modernity of the forces under consideration. There are a number of useful appendices dealing with key defense agreements and treaties, munition production capabilities, nuclear weapons potential (and interestingly here the editor includes Israel with the present five nuclear powers as having an immediate nuclear capability), capability

to use space to launch a nuclear attack, and, lastly, should one want to write for more information, the addresses of the national defense headquarters. The handbook is very similar in format to the *Military Balance*, published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London.

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Sheehan, Neil. *The Arnheiter Affair*. New York: Random House, 1971. 304p.

Neil Sheehan has made a penetrating inquiry into an affair involving people, an institution, and a deeply revered Navy concept—command at sea. While on first reflection Arnheiter's command may conjure up memories of *The Caine Mutiny*, the entire episode is really more akin to a Greek tragedy with the leading characters committing professional suicide. Torn between the divine right of the sovereign—command authority at sea—and the need to maintain the integrity of Vance's crew as well as their own psychic balance, the ship's officers tried to deal, within their own individual limits, with a situation which was nearly intolerable. However, the shenanigans and conflicts aboard Vance are not the prime concern of the interested reader. The issues are the reaction of the press to Arnheiter's being relieved as Commanding Officer of Vance, and how did the "system" allow him to gain command.

Once the Arnheiter episode became public knowledge, the Navy was quickly attacked by conservative and liberal alike. The American public, as evidenced by the *Pueblo* affair, is suspicious of any institution which might protect itself at the expense of the individual. Recognizing this, members of the press and some public officials (plus some senior retired officers, but for a different reason) were quick to make the

affair a public controversy. Besides being plagued by instant communication, this affair was to suffer from instant analysis. As the author points out, members of the press—the author admitting he being one—were quick to report and comment on Arnheiter's dismissal without having conducted even the minimum research into the case's background. Mr. Sheehan's work is, therefore, instructive for the press and the Navy in the field of managing and reporting of adversary relationships between men and institutions, especially those instances involving individuals as aggressive and freewheeling as Arnheiter.

Both the naval officer and the layman will find the puzzle of how Arnheiter got command an intriguing one. Mr. Sheehan does his best to answer this knotty problem but admits that he is not fully satisfied with his research into Arnheiter's assignment to command. Captain Alexander's sponsorship of Arnheiter in the command selection process and some apparent irregularities (bypassing checks in the system) in his assignment to Vance do shed some pertinent insights into Alexander's later actions in which he supported Arnheiter. Alexander was warned by friends that the case was fraught with danger and would ruin his career, but he acknowledged "I was in trouble up to my neck . . . I guess I rationalized it [siding with the Arnheiter forces] as the best way to get out of hot water."

For the crew of the Vance, Arnheiter was prophetic when in departing the ship he said, "You will never forget me." Indeed they will not, nor will his seniors up to and including the Chief of Naval Personnel. And what of Marcus Aurelius Arnheiter? The reader must draw his own conclusions as to the man and his style.

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