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

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FOREWORD The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College. The forthright and candid views of the lecturers and authors are presented for the professional education of its readers.

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

CHALLENGE !

Since its establishment in 1884, the U.S. Naval War College has provided advanced education in the science of naval warfare and related subjects to hundreds of senior naval officers, enhancing their professional competence for higher command responsibilities. Over the years new teaching techniques and innovations in curricula have kept pace with the increasingly complex demands thrust on today's naval professional. Perhaps the greatest of these innovations have come in the field of war gaming.

Since 1894 when the first serious war games were conducted in Newport, the Naval War College has been in the forefront of devising ever-more valuable war gaming exercises. In 1934 when the initial war games were conducted on the newly constructed deck of what is now the Pringle Hall coffee mess, those simple facilities were described as the most advanced in the world. In the decade before the Second World War, the games played on that deck led to the development of tactical innovations, including the first circular formations used by our task forces. Operating aircraft carriers in the exercises gave future task group commanders the unique opportunity of gaining experience in the deployment of carrier task groups before the ships which they would later command even existed.

In 1958 the War College began operating the Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator (NEWS)—at that time the most modern and complete war gaming facility in the world. Since then the NEWS equipment has been steadily updated.

The NEWS facilities, located in the Naval War College's Center for War Gaming, are staffed by officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians under the command of Capt. Frank N. Quinn, USN. The individuals who operate and maintain NEWS possess skills encompassing all aspects of naval warfare and computer technology. The War College has also recently established a faculty Chair for Gaming and Research Techniques to be filled at a later date.

The gaming facilities of the Naval War College are regularly utilized for a variety of one- and two-sided games in support of and complementary to the respective curricula of the resident colleges. These include Political-Military, Fleet Planning, and War-at-Sea games for the College of Naval Warfare; and Escort-of-Convoy, and Joint and Combined Operations games for the Naval Command College. The students and staff of the College of Naval Command and Staff have participated in Carrier Striking Force, Joint Amphibious Operations, and Antisubmarine games. The NEWS has also been used to present demonstrations of such historical naval battles as Midway, as well as dynamically illustrating the modern aspects of antiair, antisubmarine, amphibious, and mine warfare. Additionally, the Center for War Gaming fills the recognized need of maintaining and improving the mobilization readiness of the Naval Reserve by conducting ten 2-week courses annually in war gaming for reservists. During the past 2 years, over 1,000 Reserve officers have attended.

In late 1968 I was privileged to participate in "Establish Contact I," a NATO oriented war gaming exercise designed to test the contingency plans of NATO's Striking Fleet Atlantic. I was impressed by the unique opportunity provided by NEWS to test all of the plans then on the shelf for the Atlantic Fleet and Allied Command Atlantic. That initial utilization of the NEWS by NATO has developed into a regular annual exercise, the most recent of which was held in December 1971, entitled "Establish Contact IV."

As in the past, we seek to continue to expand the scope of gaming, improve its techniques, and update its facilities. Perhaps the most significant new improvement is the phased installation over the next few years of digital computers to replace the older, larger, and less efficient analog computers. The digital computer system will allow the games to proceed at a faster pace, particularly with regard to damage assessment. The new computer system will also make possible a greater utilization of the war gaming facilities since the time required to reset the machinery and prepare for an exercise will be significantly reduced. With the analog computer system, each variable has to be reset by hand; the digital system will allow this to be done by magnetic tape almost instantaneously. The digital system is also capable of more realistically reproducing the effects of the sea environment itself. Some of the factors which determine the outcome of a battle, including the condition of the sea, visibility, weather, and other intangibles, can now be taken into account.

These new war gaming facilities have a new title: Warfare Analysis and Research System (WARS), and their final installation will guarantee that the Naval War College houses the most modern and complete war gaming facilities in the coming years.

B. J. SEMMES, JR.
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

In recent years Robert McNamara and the revolutionary methods he brought with him to DOD have been the focus of considerable dissatisfaction voiced by military men as well as civilian critics of the Defense Establishment. Perhaps this is nowhere more evident than in Mr. McNamara's methods of analyzing and passing judgment on alternative weapons systems. By reexamining the now familiar arguments of both the former Defense Secretary and his critics in the context of a relatively unpublicized issue—the selection of conventional vice nuclear power for CVA-67—a better appreciation of the roles played by both the institutions and individuals involved may emerge. In this particular issue, the findings take exception to two basic tenets of the McNamara philosophy—the implied doctrine that the military did not know what was best for itself and the doctrine of sufficiency, which in effect states that second best is good enough.

CONVENTIONAL VERSUS NUCLEAR POWER FOR CVA-67:

A STUDY OF DEFENSE MANAGEMENT

A research paper prepared

by

Professor Allan A. Spitz

Introduction. The foundations of a nuclear-powered navy were laid in 1946, shortly after the Second World War, when a number of naval personnel led by Capt. Hyman G. Rickover were assigned to study applications of atomic energy at Oak Ridge, Tenn. Following this initial effort, a joint Navy-Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) organization was formed, which in 1948 was assigned the task of building the first reactor suitable for naval propulsion.[1] The first fruit of this effort was the submarine *Nautilus*, which joined the fleet in 1954.

Under the guidance of Rickover, the reactor program and *Nautilus* proved successful; however, the Navy and the Defense Department, perhaps reflecting the "innate conservatism of the military,"[2] were slow to take advantage of nuclear propulsion. Congress played a significant, perhaps decisive, role in overcoming the military's reluctance and prodding the administration into building a nuclear submarine fleet.[3]

Even before the battle on submarines was resolved, the effort to apply nuclear power to surface ships had begun with a program to build reactors for an aircraft carrier. The early progress of this program was unsteady. It was canceled once, in 1953, only to be reinstated in 1954;[4] and in the last half of the 1950's, with the submarine program progressing, the Navy and the Department of Defense requested and were granted funds to construct three nuclear submarine prototypes, a guided missile cruiser *(Long Beach)*, an aircraft carrier *(Enterprise)*, and a guided missile frigate

(Bainbridge)[5]. During the same time period, 32 conventionally powered warships of destroyer size or larger were also funded.

The next 2 years brought a hiatus in nuclear surface ship construction approval, but funds were provided in a supplement to the 1958 budget to begin the guided missile *Polaris* submarine fleet, which was to become a mainstay of American strategic retaliation. Another conventional aircraft carrier was also funded; sources differ on whether the Navy wanted atomic power for this ship, but, at any rate, the Department of Defense ruled that the ship would be oil powered.[6]

In the 1963 Defense budget, the first "McNamara" budget, another aircraft carrier, designated CVA-67, was proposed. Once again the Navy requested, though perhaps with some ambivalence,[7] that the ship be atomic powered, and again the Department of Defense refused. The proposal for a conventionally run carrier was sent to Congress, and although some thought this move a mistake, the matter did not become a major issue since neither the Navy, which lacked experience in the operation of nuclear surface vessels, nor Congress was prepared to fight for nuclear power at this time. By early 1963, however, congressional and naval apathy on this issue disappeared, and pressures increased to change the 1963 authorization to nuclear power. Who brought those pressures to bear, for what reasons, and with what results is the subject of this paper.

CVA-67 and the Nuclear Carriers: The Actors. The key elements of the pronuclear coalition formed around the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) of the U.S. Congress; a committee established following World War II, and given authority to oversee all aspects of nuclear energy, including all military applications.[8] The structure of this committee was somewhat atypical in that it was composed of both Senators and Representatives, with the chairmanship rotating on a year-to-year basis between the senior Senate and House Member. In the period that concerns us here, the alternating chairmen were Representative Chet Holifield of California and Senator John Pastore of Rhode Island, the latter being chairman in 1963. Another important member of this committee was Senator Henry Jackson of Washington, who headed the military applications subcommittee, and who had served on the committee as both a Representative and a Senator. Several other legislators of note served, including Richard Russell, but none of their roles is significant enough to be covered here, since members of the minority party played a negligible part in the nuclear controversy.

It appears that the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was responsible for the promotion of atomic propulsion for submarines. In 1962 its interests in nuclear propulsion grew, and it began an investigation of surface ships, with an inspection of the newly commissioned *Enterprise* (CVAN-65), from which a recommendation that the use of nuclear power be considered for all future warships resulted.[9] When opposition to the decision to make CVA-67 carrier conventionally fueled surfaced early in 1963, Senator Pastore, in a letter to McNamara, expressed the committee's stand favoring nuclear power[10] and requested that McNamara keep the committee fully informed of developments in the case.

While the Joint Committee was the focus of the nuclear propulsion lobby, nuclear power for the Navy received support from other groups and organizations as well. In the 1963 controversy the most important of these groups was the Navy itself. The commanders of the nuclear-powered ships already in operation extolled the virtues of nuclear propulsion and spoke of how difficult it would be to tell their crews that their

ships in the future would be "less than the best." Allied with these officers was Admiral Rickover, head of the naval nuclear reactor program. Rickover's status within the Navy hierarchy is unclear. Twice, while involved in the early reactor program, he was passed over for promotion,[11] and his reappointments to his present position have been delayed on several occasions for no apparent reason[12] (approval following only after strong congressional pressure). These delays have been explained as establishment prejudice toward Rickover's Jewish heritage. It seems equally likely, however, that his stubborness and abrasiveness concerning Navy affairs—especially regarding the nuclear issue—made him unpopular with some fellow officers. His position with Congress, on the other hand, has been enviable. In conjunction with Congress he fathered the atomic submarine forces, and he remains popular with congressional advocates of nuclear power. His testimony before congressional panels continues to be received with respect and attentiveness.

Another powerful person in the Navy was the Department Secretary Fred Korth, who had replaced John Connally. Korth's stand on nuclear power changed greatly during his term of office. He was initially allied with the McNamara elements of the Defense Department and was not merely an "admirals' errand boy."[13] In 1962, while testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee, he mentioned the advantages of atomic power in naval vessels, but said that lack of experience and higher cost presently ruled it out (he estimated the cost of an atomic ship to be one-third to one-half higher than conventionally powered vessels).[14] By early 1963, however, continued study and experience with the *Enterprise* had convinced him of the benefits of nuclear power; he requested that the Secretary of Defense approve the conversion of CVA-67 to atomic power.[15] Later in the controversy, Korth openly criticized McNamara's decision to keep CVA-67 conventionally powered and his rejection of several Korth-sponsored studies which recommended nuclear power.

A less powerful organization than the Navy in the controversy was the Atomic Energy Commission. It had worked to develop the reactors, and it recommended through its Chairman, Glenn Seaborg, an increased application of nuclear propulsion. The dominant motive of the Commission quite likely was a sincere belief that atomic power was right for the job. The AEC was not terribly active in the controversy, but it should be noted that Rickover was its employee, as well as the Navy's, so perhaps the Commission felt it had adequate representation. In addition, the battle soon shifted to issues not related to the Commission's sphere of competence.

One man, Robert McNamara, was opposed to these supporters of nuclear power. McNamara's role is vitally important because, in the controversy on CVA-67, he was victorious. It is important to understand why.

McNamara came to the Defense Department with the Kennedy administration. His goal was essentially to make Defense more efficient and to reassert civilian control of the military. The heart of his approach has been termed "cost-benefit" or "cost-effectiveness" analysis. There are two important assumptions underlying the McNamara method. The first is that there exists a scarcity of resources; thus, we cannot afford to build all the systems that are available, but must choose only those systems that can best accomplish the most necessary goals.[16] The second is that decisions on weapons systems should be made "rationally, not emotionally"[17] and that this rational analysis is neutral (i.e. not political or ideological in nature). Some have disputed the wisdom of such neutrality,[18] since decisions on weapons must be made

according to different assumptions of strategic requirements, and under the McNamara system these decisions of strategy are isolated from the weapons decisions in such a way as to lose sight of them.

Besides featuring a strong emphasis on methodology, McNamara's system was highly centralized. The individual heads of the component Departments (Army, Navy, etc.) were no longer representatives of the individual department interests, but rather administrators representing the final decisions of McNamara and his analysts. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were also controlled. Their power to reflect the individual viewpoints of their services was restricted, and they were required, more or less, to be spokesmen for the McNamara "line."[19] Thus, the battle over CVA-67 was not fought solely over the merits of atomic energy, but also over the assumptions and methods of the decisionmaking process itself.

CVA-67 and the Nuclear Carriers: The Issues. The surface issue in the 1963 dispute was the issue of the CVA-67 itself, its cost, and military effectiveness. Underlying this question were several more basic concerns: first, the methods by which comparative costs were computed and the question of whether the Navy's ships should be the best or merely sufficient; second, the question of the future strategic role of this particular carrier and, beyond that, of the Navy in general; finally, the merits of cost-effectiveness decisionmaking and its application to national defense. Each of these topics deserves considerable discussion.

The most important issue in the CVA-67 controversy was the relative military value and cost of the proposed nuclear carrier. Much of the battle was fought over whether atomic power was worth the extra cost, and indeed, over exactly how much extra cost was involved. Everyone, including McNamara, spoke of the *Enterprise* and the other nuclear vessels as far superior to conventional ones.[20] A nuclear-powered ship could sail long distances at top speeds without refueling and so would not be dependent on oil tankers[21] (a conventional carrier was limited to 3 days sailing at top speed before requiring fuel, while the *Enterprise* could sail 180,000 miles from a single fueling); in addition, it would be able to carry 50 percent more fuel and ammunition for its planes.[22]

Balanced against these advantages was the cost differential. However, there was no agreement as to exactly what it amounted to. Early in 1962, when the choice of conventional power was not yet controversial, Secretary Korth had estimated that the cost of atomic power would be one-half to one-third higher than conventional fuel. One Navy estimate was that at $440 million the *Enterprise* had cost $80 million more than a comparable conventional ship. McNamara, on the basis of some questionable accounting, saw a nuclear carrier costing $160 million more than a conventional carrier.[23] Later estimates released by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy showed that over the projected 25- to 30- year lifetime of a nuclear ship, extra costs might be as little as 3 percent more.[24] It is difficult to determine which of the estimates was most correct, but the approach leading to some of the lower figures seems to be more valid. The determination of relative cost is complicated by the fact that each of the nuclear ships contained innovations in addition to atomic energy; however, there are indications that McNamara's cost calculations were exaggerated.

McNamara apparently based his estimation of relative costs on the cost of construction of a nuclear carrier versus a conventional one. Upon inspection, the flaws in this method are obvious. First, the construction costs of a nuclear ship

include the initial fuel for its atomic reactor.[25] In the early ships this amounted to fuel adequate for 4 or 5 years of operation; newer atomic ships may run up to 13 years on their original uranium. Estimates of conventional ship costs, on the other hand, include no estimate of oil costs or the cost of tankers required to transport this oil or the escort ships which might be needed to protect the tankers in wartime.

McNamara also added to the projected costs of the nuclear carrier the cost of the additional warplanes it would be able to carry, even though the Navy had stated that it had no intention of asking for these planes, and even though, had this been the intention of the Navy, this cost (which was estimated as one-third the differential of the cost) could not reasonably be charged to nuclear power.[26]

Even if McNamara's accounting had not been defective, his total analysis remained faulty. While admitting in general terms the superiority of nuclear power, he declared that this superiority was not worth the additional costs, without systematically totaling up advantages to balance the extra expense or attempting to express these advantages in concrete economic terms. Several years after the controversy, another Secretary of the Navy expressed anguish over the failure of cost-effectiveness analysis to consider the real advantages of atomic energy in this case.[27]

Beyond the bickering over the actual costs lay different conceptions of the kind of quality required. McNamara seemed to have a "big war" fixation; he thought the carrier added little to our power against a direct *Soviet* threat and said that because of America's overall naval superiority, she did not need the extra strength.[28] Our conventional power might be second rate, but it was sufficient. Further, McNamara stated that America would be foolish to buy the most technologically advanced weapons—that was not the policy of his department.[29] This idea was sharply challenged by many, especially in the Navy. The commanders of the three present atomic ships wanted the best for their men, and as Rickover said several years later, the Navy should always build the best.[30] In fact, the Navy expressed its willingness to make do with fewer ships, if the remaining ones began to use atomic energy for propulsion[31] (the Navy claimed that five nuclear task forces were as effective as six conventional ones[32]—apparently without citing any facts, McNamara replied that he was "absolutely sure" that this was not correct).[33]

The second area of contention was strategic doctrine. One thing that became clear in the course of the controversy was that McNamara conceived of the aircraft carrier largely in terms of its direct strategic capability against the Soviet Union,[34] and he seemed to have serious questions about the ability of the carrier to effectively perform this role. In truth, the aircraft carrier was not at its best, strategically, in the narrow European waters near the Soviet Union, and much of its capability would be wasted as a launching platform for massive nuclear bombing missions—it could hardly compete in this mission against ICBM's. The carrier's advantage was not to be found in idling around the edges of a fixed target area, but rather in its ability to respond with overwhelming force in widely separated areas in the tactical terms of limited warfare.[35] McNamara's fixation with weapons useful only in strategic situations is difficult to square with his supposed introduction of the doctrine of flexible response into the Defense Department.

During the late 1950's and 1960's, the strategic role became less appropriate while at the same time, limited war doctrine was being developed slowly.[36] The Defense Department was giving serious consideration to reducing the number of attack carriers[37] and, in fact,

the advantages of nuclear power were not so salient in a strategic context. Much of the discussion of the fate of CVA-67 was carried on under these influences. There was, however, a recognition of the importance of some limited warfare roles, such as air support in a war like Vietnam, but McNamara did not seem to consider these possibilities at all, viewing carriers only as inefficient equivalents of intercontinental rockets.

Rickover thought that one possible reason for McNamara's decision for a nonnuclear carrier was a desire to reduce the future role of the Navy.[38] A related decision which reduced the Navy's future role was handed down at approximately the same time as the final carrier decision. The Navy had bid for a greater role in the Indian Ocean, where only a few minor ships were stationed from time to time. Nuclear-fueled ships would have enabled the Navy to operate in this arena without the necessity of an elaborate series of bases. The Navy's request was denied, and two Army officers were given responsibility for this region.[39]

The final issue considered was the validity of cost-effectiveness methodology to military decisionmaking. Some of the flaws of the system as McNamara applied it to this case have been mentioned (the accounting practices and the failure to consider the operational advantages associated with atomic propulsion). In truth, these were not so much failures of the basic analysis idea as they were flaws in its execution. However, where the system did break down, the scientific aura that surrounded it prevented some due criticism. Beyond these weaknesses there was a belief among some critics that the military should have the right, within reason, to decide what kind of weapons they wanted.[40] Even more basic was the belief that vital national defense could not be judged by economic criteria and that the defense needs of the country were in fact being sacrificed to penny-pinching.[41] Of course, Secretary of Defense McNamara denied this, but after his testimony before the Joint Commission on Atomic Energy, late in 1963, many people simply did not believe him.

The Decision Is Made. The struggle to convert CVA-67 to atomic propulsion was joined early in 1963. It is hard to determine the precise catalyst in the controversy, but the role of the Navy was probably most important. Originally, the Navy had justified not requesting that its new carrier use nuclear propulsion because of its lack of operating experience with the *Enterprise*.[42] By the late autumn of 1962 it could no longer make that claim. *Enterprise* had been a part of the task force participating in the Cuba blockade, and according to the task force commander, Admiral Hayward, had performed superbly—even uniquely, as the admiral expressed in a letter to Secretary Korth.[43] As a result of this information, together with letters from the Naval Research Advisory Council and the Atomic Energy Commission Chairman, plus some mysterious internal politicking, Mr. Korth reversed his decision and in February asked Secretary McNamara to reconsider the issue, which McNamara agreed to do, pending further study.[44]

In agreeing to review the matter, McNamara included the requirement that the studies submitted to him focus on the issue of whether the nuclear carrier would provide equal defense for the same expenditure as conventional ships and on the question of future applications of nuclear power to naval goals.[45] The Navy prepared two studies for Korth, which were forwarded to McNamara. The first, in April, was rejected for not conforming to the Defense Secretary's required methodology. The second, in September, was more comprehensive and focused specifically on cost differentials, but it was

not accepted either.[46] It would not be surprising to find out that the Navy never did understand what the substance of their studies should be. At any rate, the character of McNamara's testimony later gives rise to serious doubts that the Navy could have done anything to change his mind. The Navy's September report had taken a hard line in favor of the application of atomic power to all major future vessels, so there was no evidence that it was backing down,[47] but with the rejection of this report, the issue was settled to McNamara's satisfaction. On 9 October, 1963 he directed Korth to proceed with the construction of a conventional carrier.[48]

In a letter dated that same day, the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Senator Pastore (who was annoyed at the failure of the Defense Department to keep the committee informed on the deliberations on the nuclear propulsion issue), inquired about published reports that the decision against nuclear power had already been made.[49] Pastore had written McNamara earlier in the year, expressing his committee's interest in and support of nuclear power for the CVA-67, and reminding the Department of Defense of his committee's legitimate interest in the matter. In response to Pastore's letter was a letter from Roswell Gilpatric on 11 October, denying that the final decision had been made.[50] That same day Navy Secretary Korth personally requested that McNamara withdraw his decision. McNamara declined to do so; a "violent" shouting match was reported by *The New York Times* to have taken place between the two men.[51] Korth's resignation was submitted the same day.[52]

The actual reasons for Korth's resignation are not entirely clear, and there should be caution against ascribing the move solely with the carrier issue alone. Korth had been involved in conflict of interest charges in connection with the TFX case, and he may have become a political liability. The official reason (accepted by the *Times*, at least) for his resignation was misuse of official Navy stationery,[53] but not directly in the context of the TFX involvement (for which his resignation was supposedly requested). Korth's letter itself pleaded "pressing personal matters," and he denied being asked to quit, which was not refuted.[54] Mollenhoff supports the conflict of interest explanation,[55] but the coincidence of the reported argument over the nuclear issue is, at the very least, suggestive. It appears no definite conclusion can be reached.

In his letter Pastore had informed McNamara that hearings would be held on the nuclear propulsion controversy beginning 30 October. Just 5 days before the scheduled opening date, McNamara again ordered lame-duck Secretary Korth to proceed with construction of a conventional carrier. Understandably, this move angered the Joint Committee of Atomic Energy members, who felt that they were being deprived of their rightful advisory role and also that Gilpatric's former letter to them had been a lie.

Three days of hearings were held in late October and early November. Most of the witnesses, including Korth and Rickover, criticized McNamara's decision sharply. The only firm stand against nuclear propulsion was taken by McNamara himself. He repeated that the benefits of atomic power were not sufficient to offset the high costs, which he claimed were excessive. Almost every statement he made on the issue was challenged. He mentioned several names of persons who, he said, supported his position, but who, in fact, supported atomic propulsion in their own statements.[56] Finally his backers were reduced to one nonnaval officer, who recommended that no carrier be built at all.[57]

McNamara's performance at the hearings was judged below par by observers. In previous appearances before congres-

sional panels, he had been well prepared and self-assured and was able to back up his statements with much statistical evidence. There was little of that now. His analysis was challenged, his positions rebuked, and in the end it seemed obvious that the decision, if not made solely on his personal whim, at least was not really justified by the evidence. He left convinced that he was right, his opponents equally convinced that he was wrong.

In December the committee reported—unanimously—that the Defense Department's decision was a mistake. McNamara's arguments were called "incorrect," "illogical," "misleading," "misinformed," and "not realistic."[58] The evidence he cited from individuals and studies was rejected, and the committee reported that it still "does not know of any qualified technical person or group who recommended to the Defense Department that nuclear propulsion not be installed in the new aircraft carrier."[59] Nuclear propulsion was seen as possessing significant military advantages, with extra costs that were minor. The recommendation was that all future first-line warships, beginning with CVA-67, should have nuclear power[60] and that research and development in the field should continue. In spite of this report, McNamara's decision was allowed to stand. Early in November McNamara had convinced Kennedy that he was correct; some claim that McNamara did not tell Kennedy the whole story. Interestingly enough, one of the arguments that Kennedy would use to justify McNamara's position was that if more nuclear carriers were built, they would require additional nuclear escorts[61] (but that's another story!). No further action was taken on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy report at this time. The appropriations bill of 1964, which would have had to be amended to add the extra funds for the nuclearization of CVA-67, was not modified, "lacking a request from the Defense Department."[62] The contracts for the ship, having been delayed a year, were carried forward with unusual rapidity—some suggest this was to avoid the chance of the decision being reversed.

Of the men recommending nuclear power, both Pastore and Holifield were politically proadministration. They had no partisan ax to grind. Though McNamara claimed at the hearings that he would not feel justified going back to Congress for the needed additional funds, there is little evidence that Congress would have denied his request. Nongovernmental opinion, too, was critical of the decision. Hanson Baldwin, respected military analyst of the *Times*, thought it was a mistake,[63] and the *Times* editorial page backed him up.[64] *U.S. News & World Report* declared that the CVA-67 (eventually named the *John F. Kennedy*) was obsolete before it was built.[65] But built it was. McNamara was willing and able to force the decision through on his own, and Congress did not seem to know how to go about stopping him. When faced with Defense Department reluctance on future naval power issues, Congress was later to prove more aggressive, and successful.

Evaluation of the Decision. If the CVA-67 decision is taken as a good example of cost-effectiveness in action, then there was something seriously wrong with the system. The original decision in 1962 to use conventional power for the ship, though made against the Navy's weak protest, was perhaps not blatently mistaken, on the part of the Defense Department. The Navy, on the other hand, wasted, by its lack of direction and indecisiveness, a real opportunity to put the project into proper perspective; it was apathetic toward an idea that it eventually supported strongly. If the original authorization for nuclear power had been intensively supported by the Navy in

1962, it would have at least aroused more controversy in Congress. By 1963-64, when the Navy was ready to back atomic energy unequivocally, the time was late, and the delay had already provided the Department of Defense with an excuse to cancel another ship.[66] By this time any proposal to change the ship would have necessitated starting from scratch, and congressional inertia seemed to forestall this course of action. But even if Congress had solved its problem, the final decision of conventional power for CVA-67 would probably not have been different. As Congress discovered during a related controversy several years later (the issue of nuclear escort ships), it is difficult for the legislative branch to force action on the executive departments.

In the final action taken, the role of the Defense Department was decisive. The position it took under the McNamara "whiz kids" is difficult to justify. The strategic assumption that the only eventuality for which to prepare was a direct threat from the Soviet Union and that, consequently, naval forces might well be reduced in the future, was somehow at odds with the doctrine of flexible, limited response to provocation (in fact, McNamara later backed down from his attempt to directly reduce naval force levels,[67] though his reluctance to request funds for new ship construction certainly aged the Navy and reduced its effective power). The evidence points to the conclusion that the cost-accounting methods used by the Department of Defense to compare nuclear-powered and conventionally powered carriers were generally invalid; it appears that no attempt was made to calculate systematically the military benefits of atomic energy, which should be at the heart of defense strategy. Exception may also be taken to two other tenets of the McNamara philosophy, especially the implied doctrine that the military did not know what was best for itself, and the doctrine of sufficiency, which states that, in weaponry, second best is good enough.

The military should know best its needs, and, in the case explored here, the Navy was certainly cautious and conservative in its behavior. Its role throughout the whole nuclear naval period was skeptical, beginning with the *Nautilus* in the early fifties; it did not rush to spend the taxpayers' money on nuclear trinkets. Thus, when after much thought the Navy embraced the idea of nuclear propulsion for surface vessels, it should have been evident that this was not a whim, but a well-thought-out decision. When the Navy offered to trim its appropriations in other areas, in order to offset the costs of nuclear power, it was told that this was unacceptable. The Navy was not even considered qualified to judge the relative merits of its own weapons systems and the percentage of total allocation which should go to them.

The sufficiency doctrine is another point of contention. In principle, it is difficult to disagree completely with this concept. Certainly, defense expenditures are not justifiable in themselves; certainly, defense must be gauged to the capabilities of the expected opposition. But this is probably more applicable to total budget levels than to individual weapons. Besides, it is difficult to predict what margin of superiority will be sufficient. The best weapons of today are often not equal to tomorrow's challenges, and what is merely obsolescence today may soon be criminal negligence.

On the whole, the actions of the Defense Department left much to be desired. Besides the doubtful assumptions and the shoddy accounting practices, the Department failed in its duty to keep the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy up to date on its plans. Then, when the decision to reject nuclear power was made in October, the Defense Department was not candid about the decision. Finally, there is a

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strong suspicion that the Department of Defense acted purposely to avoid the will of the Congress,[68] and did not even feel constrained to offer a serious justification of its decision.

The Joint Committee's actions were generally commendable. It had, in the past, more or less forced the development of nuclear submarines. With its report on the *Enterprise* tour, it had established its position early and set out some respectable evidence on the significance of nuclear propulsion, sounding the opening gun in the CVA-67 battle. In 1962, two of its members, while serving on the House Armed Services Committee, had attempted unsuccessfully to add nuclear propulsion to this ship,[69] and Pastore's letter of early 1963 repeated the Joint Committee's unanimous position to Secretary McNamara. The hearing held in the fall of 1963 examined McNamara's case, found it wanting, and explained why. The hearing of that year, together with those in 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970 served as valuable forums, and their reports were important ammunition for pronuclear advocates. But in 1963 the Joint Committee could do no more when the Appropriations Committee and the Congress as a whole declined to take action, and so this battle was over.

Epilog. CVA-67 was eventually completed as a conventionally powered warship, in accordance with the Defense Secretary McNamara's dictum. It was to be the last of its kind. A certain low-key attack was kept up over the general issue of future use of nuclear propulsion for warships, but for the next 2 years the Department of Defense, perhaps chastened by its experience at the hands of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, sought to avoid the issue by failing to request funds for construction of any major surface ships.[70] Though no nuclear ships were authorized, research and development continued, with the result that a two reactor propulsion system was perfected. *Enterprise* had used eight reactors, and a nuclear CVA-67 would have required four; reducing the number of reactors led to a substantial saving. The *Enterprise, Long Beach,* and *Bainbridge* continued to earn accolades for their performances. In addition, McNamara was finally dissuaded from his attempt to reduce major carrier strength. To say which of these events was the most important to actions subsequently taken is not possible, but some authors stress the role of the fight waged by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1963[71] as the most significant.

For whatever reason, McNamara eventually reversed his stand. His budget for 1967 requested funds to start a second atom-powered carrier,[72] the first of three projected over a 5-year period. Even before the battle on nuclear carriers was won, the field of battle shifted to the question of atomic propulsion for escort vessels, with this controversy continuing, in some sense, up to the present. With the escort issue were introduced new technical and strategic concerns and a new actor, Repre-

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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sentative L. Mendel Rivers of South Carolina. His actions in the 1963 debate were not particularly notable, but several years later, having assumed the Chairmanship of the House Armed Services Committee, he prodded Congress into several direct challenges to the Executive on this issue[73] and was eventually victorious, at least in part. This second round of the nuclear surface vessel construction controversy is in many ways more interesting than the first, but its exploration must necessarily await a later study.

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. . . the problem of nuclear propulsion for surface warships affects the whole future strength of our Navy and the defense of our Nation. It could affect our survival.

VADM Hyman Rickover, USN, House Appropriations Hearing FY 1967

While domestic action is not a new concept for the American Armed Forces, recent experience in working with local communities both here and abroad suggests that perhaps the Department of Defense's resources are not as readily adaptable to domestic action tasks as some would believe. Undoubtedly the struggle to overcome America's social problems will be long and costly. The military can and should play a role in this enterprise, but its contribution should only be made after thoroughly studying the socio-political problems to be confronted as well as frankly appraising both the assets and the liabilities inherent in military participation in local community self-help efforts.

TOWARD A CONCEPT OF MILITARY DOMESTIC ACTION

An article prepared

by

Dr. William R. Corson

These are not happy times for the American Military Establishment. Vietnam Veterans Against the War are in the streets. Wars are unfashionable. There have been serious racial and drug abuse problems in each of the services, antiwar dissent in the ranks, a weakening of the chain of command, and, finally, a serious questioning within the officer corps of the premises and values on which its professional life is based—the concepts of duty, honor, and country. Some have reacted to all this with bitterness and self-pity. However, the Department of Defense has rejected these symptoms of anomie and, in its statement of Human Goals,[1] has chosen to reemphasize the role of the military in its contributions to the improvement of our society through domestic action.

This is a heady idea. The cynical might contend it is one born out of the political necessity to change the military's image rather than one based on a genuine concern in the military with the social problems and conditions in America. Regardless of individual points of view, all agree that something must be done to erase the crisis of confidence in America's military occasioned by the bleeding, "no-win" war in Vietnam, the shame of the mad minutes at My Lai, colossal mismanagement of defense contracts, the inglorious *Pueblo* episode, and the public disaffection of the intellectual community and the upper middle class with the judgment displayed by America's military and political leaders in recent years. The outcome of the present drift in public attitudes and the attitudes of those in the military services, if unchecked, is unthinkable, namely, a Nation incapable or unwilling to defend itself. "Today,"

Brig. Gen. Theodore Mataxis wrote in one of the military journals, "the services are facing the signs of disruption of discipline which could lead to anarchy and defeat on the battlefield." Whether the adoption of a domestic action mission will lead to a new role or a revitalization of the military services in the seventies and thereby reverse the signs described by General Mataxis is not certain; however, what is certain is that the military services must act in a positive manner to convince the American public that it is and will remain an extension of civilian society. Domestic action is a way, although not the only way, to accomplish the "Americanization" of our Nation's military forces, and more importantly, it may prove to be an effective means in the difficult, costly battle to solve America's social problems.

The idea of using the military within the United States in nation building or domestic action tasks is not a new notion. Historically the military services have long played a significant, but largely unpublicized, role in implementing domestic policies and improving our society. In addition to fighting the Indian wars, the U.S. Army played a valuable role in opening the frontier by helping local communities plant and harvest their crops and managing three out of the four western railroads built by 1900. Military medical efforts provide an even more impressive testimonial to the constructive potential of the armed services, as opposed to their rather more publicized traditional destructive capacity. In 1900 there were 350,000 cases of typhoid fever in the United States, of which 35,000 resulted in death. An Army Medical Board team headed by Maj. Walter Reed eliminated this health problem, and other teams led by other less well-known Army officers developed methods for controlling yellow fever, beri-beri, and malaria.

The economic development of the United States was promoted by the work of the Army's Corps of Engineers which, in addition to their well-publicized flood and disaster relief work, has completed 3,600 major engineering and/or construction projects, built or improved more than 300 harbors, and constructed and maintained more than 30,000 miles of coastal and inland waterways.

In more recent times the military's ability to carry out domestic action projects was evidenced by the role played by the Army in the organization and administration of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). The CCC, as one of the New Deal welfare "workfare" programs, was organized in 1933 to provide employment in the field of conservation for 250,000 single men between the ages of 18 and 25. Initially, responsibility for the CCC was to be shared between the Departments of Interior and Agriculture. Spokesmen from these departments were particularly opposed to giving the Army a role in the CCC program. Many in the Army itself did not want such a role. However, shortly after the legislation establishing the CCC was passed, it became obvious to those concerned that Interior and Agriculture were incapable of running the program. As a result, the Chief Forester, who had been one of the most vocal opponents to Army participation in the CCC program, formally requested the Army to take over the major responsibility for administering and setting up the program. The Chief Forester's request was honored, and Congress subsequently amended the CCC legislation to give the Army almost complete responsibility for the CCC. The results speak for themselves: within 80 days after the Army was given the responsibility for the CCC, 1,315 conservation camps were in operation staffed by 3,640 Regular and 1,774 Reserve officers. In less than 8 years 3,500,000 young men had participated successfully in the program, many million acres of denuded land had been reforested, and a

major social tragedy had possibly been averted.

Nonetheless, in spite of these historical precedents, the case supporting the use of America's military forces in a domestic/civic action role[2] to help solve current domestic social problems remains essentially unproven. There are those, both in and out of the military, who argue that efforts spent on domestic action programs would detract from military preparedness. This is certainly a valid consideration; however, it is not equally applicable in each of the military services at all times. For instance, there is no way a Polaris submarine crew on patrol could undertake and carry out a domestic action task. Yet, in certain other situations, military commitments can be restructured in such a way that those commitments are matched against social and domestic action priorities without any diminution in a unit's combat readiness or state of preparedness. Further in this regard, one might contend that a unit's actual combat readiness may be enhanced because of the diversity of experience gained in carrying out a domestic action task. For example, time spent in aiding local authorities to initiate and carry out a drug abuse education and treatment program *may* help commanders at all levels to understand more about the problem of drug abuse in their own units; the point being, of course, that many of America's social problems are not and cannot be confined to any sector of civilian society. There is no way to immunize the military against the process of rapid social change underway in America. But old ideas die hard, particularly the one that combat readiness is a precise finite function of strictly defined "military" variables, including time spent on ceremonial functions as well as on the rifle range. To wit: for a division to be stamped and certified as combat ready it must conduct a division-sized parade, an activity which consumes some 135,000 man-hours. Aside from the fact that combat readiness requires a broader view to be a useful concept now and in the future, however, there is no assurance that it will be enhanced by a domestic action program.

There are those who argue that the individual soldier, sailor, airman, or marine's morale is improved as a result of his participation in domestic action projects and, therefore, they are, in turn more amenable to pursuing their military requirements with greater interest. There is some evidence in support of this view. Nevertheless, the results to date from domestic action programs indicate that such activities court disaster if less than the best-trained, motivated, and prideful men are used to carry out the effort.

Project Nation Building, which began in January 1971, is a good case in point. It was a very tentative experiment, essentially a pilot project, conceived by Lt. Gen. John J. Tolson to use the civic action skills of Special Forces teams in two extremely poor North Carolina counties adjacent to Fort Bragg. The counties were Hoke and Anson. The Special Forces teams sent to these counties worked at a variety of different tasks—clearing out clogged drainage ditches, repairing public buildings, and teaching physical fitness in the local schools. In addition, the medics in each of the teams assisted the Public Health nurses in taking and reading blood tests, immunizations, urinalyses, and paperwork. Dr. Riley Jordan, one Hoke County's two private physicians, in commenting on the value of the Special Forces in such a role said, "They are serving a tremendous local need. A lot of people are being seen who wouldn't otherwise be seen."[3] The Special Forces efforts in Hoke and Anson Counties as well as those in Glenn Springs, S.C., and at Lame Deer on the Tongue River Indian Reservation, home of the Northern Cheyenne, in Montana, clearly demonstrated that organization's

capacity to carry out military domestic action projects. However, their performance does not guarantee similar results could be achieved by other Army units, let alone the other military services. At the present time Department of Defense opinion is divided over whether the experimental efforts of the Special Forces in military domestic action should be expanded to a nationwide program with participation by each of the military services or not. Admittedly much of the concern of those opposed to such a move is based upon the unpredictable reaction of special interest groups such as the American Medical Association, labor unions, and other existing centers of political power, to the military doing what they have either failed to do or have done badly.

Aside from these considerations, the issue involved in giving the military an expanded domestic action mission should also properly take account of the possible negative feedback on the military such a mission might engender. That is, the military might alleviate one problem and be blamed for the two created in its place. Further in this regard, the fundamental problem relative to using the military in a domestic action role is whether its inputs can predictably influence events. As a corollary to this problem, can the military design a methodology for solving problems which could be effectively transposed and replicated in the local environment, and can the local authorities—officials—leaders be encouraged to understand and implement the design effectively and efficiently? A basic consideration in this context is the recognition that the military itself does not initiate or conduct domestic action on its own; it only supports local activities. *This often overlooked gap between conceiving a program and then having someone else do it as you envisage is critical to the ultimate effectiveness of military domestic action.* Approaches conceived in the Department of Defense, or in similar levels in the executive branch of the Government, may not be administratively feasible in what may be called America's poverty structure and its underlying value system. This is likely to be the greatest single handicap to the military in carrying out an expanded domestic action program; that is, determining what is really relevant and what really can be made to work.

Proponents for an expanded domestic action mission for the military also tend to justify such a mission in terms of America's history of cooperation with other nations to help solve their domestic problems. They ask, "If U.S. military forces can be used to assist foreign populations, why cannot a similar effort by our military services be directed at helping disadvantaged people in this Nation?" Without attempting to evaluate either the quantity or the quality of assistance our military has provided the *plain people* of other nations, there is an important barrier to effective domestic action which parallels our experience abroad. Namely, the basic problem standing in the way of the successful application of external (nonlocal) assistance is the inability of the status quo powers to deal pragmatically with the political issues and bring about the changes needed to encourage local development.

In light of the vast array of social problems confronting us, clearly it is inappropriate to speak of "a" military domestic role. Rather, we must think in terms of many Federal Government domestic action roles. For the military the refinement of these roles further relates to the broader considerations of national policy which, of course, identifies the overall purpose or objectives in carrying out a domestic action program. It should be borne in mind that the military enjoys certain capacities that constitute special areas of competence or strength in relation to carrying out an integrated program of domestic action.

For example, the Department of Defense operates the largest educational establishment in the world, controls the largest pool of specialists in the Nation, and buys more goods and services than any other public or private organization in the United States. By virtue of its size alone, the Department of Defense can make a more rapid and profound impact on American society than any other single institution. It has been calculated that if each member of the Department of Defense spent 1 hour a month on a socially productive project, this amount of time would exceed that provided by all volunteer welfare agencies in 1 year. Too much should not be made from such statistics. The size and strengths of the military are, of course, useful in a military sense, but those listed below have particular relevance to the problem of domestic action. These strengths represent flexibility and should exert a strong guiding influence over determining the logical and appropriate military domestic action role. They include the military's:

- Planning capacity—integrated programing, comprehensive view
- Resources capacity—materials, equipment, and funds
- Evaluation capacity—monitoring, assessment, and reporting on development processes
- Technical expertise—industrial, military, and administrative.

Other considerations should be noted. Not all military domestic action roles in support of a local community will be logical or fully rational. For example, Department of Defense policy decisions may simply result in a determination to aid community X regardless of what any careful preassessment of the conditions might reveal and prescribe as a logical military domestic action role. Such a Department decision could be in response to important political factors, a threatened breakdown in social services, or an imminent disaster. Further, it is readily apparent from America's recent history of domestic turbulence that most local governments are unable to undertake the realignments or reforms that are desirable or necessary to remove the social-political causes of their problems; nor are they going to conceptualize domestic action in the same light or perspective that the military will view it. Thus, the political exigencies, both at the national and local level, are likely to be the primary determinants of the overall military domestic action role. Such a politicization of the military is not without hazard. Nevertheless, if military domestic action is adopted as a national policy, the individual military commander will be required to do the best possible with the means available to him. It is important, therefore, that the military commander charged with a domestic action mission be equipped properly to do the things he can do well. In order to do this the military commander must be able to measure each domestic action program or subprogram against criteria which will ascertain its relevance and potential effectiveness in helping the local community to solve a specific problem. These criteria include:

- Analysis of the problem's causes(s)
- Analysis of the anatomy and nature of the problem
- Analysis of the degree and extent of the problem
- Establishment of policy objectives or milestones for rendering new or more assistance
- The nature of support options that exist within the policy framework
- The local environment and particularly the social and political context in which the military assistance will be given
- Analyses of resources and operational capacities of the local government
- Examination of the local government's conceptualization of the problem

- Department of Defense and/or national administration and local political determinants
- Department of Defense and/or national administration interest, limitations, and available tools
- Analysis of the local opposition's strategy

Using the above criteria, the military domestic action role can evolve in two ways: (1) it can be the outcome of a careful preassessment resulting in an integrated program design indicating what the military can or cannot do in a given situation; or (2) it can be the result of a policy decision to simply render assistance to a local community regardless of what such a preassessment might determine. In either case, it will be the role of the military commander to render the best possible assistance from the inputs decided upon. This is the point where the conceptualization of social problems and domestic action is so important. It is important because the task after the decision has been made to render assistance is primarily a matter of skillfully applying the various military domestic action tools within the framework of the local government's approach to social problems, that is, within the given environment. Let us look at the tools and see how and where they can be used effectively in the local government framework.

First, what are the military domestic action tools? Let us establish these clearly in mind before describing their areas of applicability and limitations. They are:

- Personnel—advisory, operational, supportive, and instructional
- Materiel—equipment, installations, raw materials, food, et cetera
- Funds—appropriated and nonappropriated
- Training—of local government officials in military facilities or in the local environment
- Analysis—evaluation of performance

These tools can be applied in the form of programs. The most important factor relating to these tools is their relevance in application, i.e., in directing their unique capacities towards specific objectives. It is appropriate, for example, for a military domestic action program to provide medical assistance tools if the objective is to get results in the health area. An example of improper tool relevance, however, would be to provide medical tools and assistance on the assumption that they can address or relate to the resolution of a problem such as job discrimination due to a person's race. This illustrates the importance of a proper conceptualization of the capacities of the various tools that can be used. Proper conceptualization becomes absolutely critical, for it is the only means by which perspective can be maintained between and among problems and which can relate various tools to their precise area of appropriate applicability and maximum effectiveness. Further, it must be recognized that, notwithstanding the political aspects of a domestic action program, the military, by the very act of rendering support to a local government, is, by definition, taking part in a social-change process in the area. This makes the use of military domestic action tools an even more delicate matter—to ensure that they are properly conceived and appropriately integrated into the local government's overall effort, as well as with those items or programs carried out by other elements of the Federal Government.

As indicated earlier, the military's domestic action tools are often assumed to be useful because they have generally been useful, or at least reasonably well accepted, in the foreign assistance environment. Still we must ask: Are they truly relevant to America's poverty culture and its value system? Are they even useful in a local government's social-political environment? It may be well to question their use in any form.

Advisers, for example, are considered to be an effective domestic action tool; however, there is ample evidence to question whether their presence at certain administrative levels is either needed or useful. Our foreign assistance experience with advisers, as well as the results from the so-called "War on Poverty," indicates that expertise *per se* is not enough. Too often the adviser dampens local initiative and short circuits or tends to circumvent the existing local administrative structure. In the case of domestic action, it should be remembered that the military adviser, as opposed to supportive and operational personnel, is a unique individual with certain qualities which are assets in a military environment, but these same qualities may become deficiencies or handicaps to the outsider when he is injected into the environment of local government officials and employees who are not necessarily "mission oriented" or impressed with the chain of command. If advisers are to be made a part of an expanded military domestic action program, there is the added requirement that they guard against holding the view that whatever they offer in the way of ideas is valuable since it derives from a more "efficient" system that gets more "results." In this sense, even if the adviser curbs his natural hubris—an assumption of superiority combined with arrogance and ego—and practices humility and works to develop empathy with local officials and employees as well as the plain people, there is a danger to the domestic action program if those in charge of the adviser fail to recognize that the primary role of an adviser is very undramatic and colorless. That is, advisers in a military domestic action program cannot be evaluated in normal efficiency report terms such as force, command presence, courage, et cetera. They must be rewarded, or at least not be dammed with faint praise, for their performance in helping a local official to see the need to undertake or alter a given course of action. This is a slow drab process which may vitiate the use of military advisers in a domestic action program at the local level. Also, the view held by those who support an expanded military domestic action program that almost any reasonably well-educated soldier, sailor, marine, or airman who is recruited for the task and given ample preparation can effect social change in a local environment overlooks the differences in values and requirements between the military and local environment. These considerations signal the necessity to go slow.

As the role of the adviser in a domestic action mission can be questioned, so also can the other tools—materials, funds, training, and evaluation. Are materials and equipment provided by a military domestic action program, without an appropriate local government to absorb and maintain them, relevant and effective as support inputs? Is the provision of funds by the military, either directly from their appropriations or indirectly from other Federal agencies, a relevant and effective act if it precludes the need for the local government to implement tax reforms? Does the military even have the proper understanding of local American social-political-economic problems to provide training that will truly assist local government officials and employees in dealing with their situation? Does the military have the understanding to monitor, assess, or evaluate a social problem in a local American environment? The answer to these questions at the present time, with the exception of specially organized and specially selected personnel, is invariably no. In plain terms the U.S. military has more problems of a social nature than solutions to those problems within its own house. Yet, in spite of this condition, there is considerable truth and value in the contention that by applying existing military resources

and skills to help solve America's social problems, the military might acquire the compassion and understanding required to solve its own internal problems. However, for our purposes, the answer to these questions in the future should depend less on the military's current spate of troubles and more on the military's ability to use specific domestic action tools in specific situations. These questions are only raised here in response to those who simplistically advocate an expanded domestic action role for the military, automatically assuming its tools have relevancy in the local social problem environment and that the military's conceptualization of those problems will be accurate and adequate.

Now this is not to reject out of hand the idea of an expanded domestic action mission, but rather to set forth some of the real, practical, and conceptual difficulties which must be faced before such a mission is adopted. Failure to deal objectively with these difficulties, for any reason, is inexcusable. America's military men and the people they may set out to help cannot and must not be allowed to become anyone's or any group's political guinea pig or stalking horse. Quite obviously, pressures are bound to mount to use the power, sheer size, and capacity of the military for more than nonproductive repetitive training and flag showing. As we have suggested, the problem of restructuring military activities, with the goal in mind of developing the capacity to address social ills while maintaining combat readiness, is well within the realm of current feasibility in many cases. For example, without interfering in the activities of committed *active* contingent units, a Naval *Reserve* Construction Battalion (Seabees) of approximately 1,000 men could be directed to spend its annual 2 weeks of active duty in constructing and refurbishing schools, hospitals, and living quarters on an Indian reservation. The same is true for a Reserve Army Field Hospital Unit which could be ordered to a hard-core poverty area in Appalachia to provide needed medical and dental assistance to the people. The point is, of course, that not only can these kinds of activities be done by the military, and done exceedingly well, but also that they are likely to remain undone if left strictly to other agencies of the Federal Government and local government bodies. While no one will deny the merit of these kinds of activities, however, they are far from being apolitical in nature. There is a political reality to domestic action, and the difficulties described above are *real* and must be surmounted if counterproductive disruptive end results are to be avoided.

The fact, promise, and hazard of military domestic action are well illustrated by the Special Forces experience in Anson County in early 1971. In his after-action report,[4] the Commanding Officer of the 5th Special Forces, Col. Jay B. Durst, noted:

> The Command and Control (C & C) Headquarters in Wadesboro, provided the central focus for consolidation and reconciling project planning and execution. The rapport established between the C&C element and the elected officials and influential citizens of Anson County largely contributed to the success of the operation. The experience received by the members of this headquarters element was undoubtedly the closest peacetime training vehicle for stability operations training. This exposure provided the officers and senior NCOs of the command section with a sobering example of the complexity of communications with local power and interest groups, even when there is no language barrier. The C&C Group rapidly learned that caution, tact, and sophistication are more than more generalized

concepts. The rapid adjustment and resultant ability of the C&C to influence local action, through the medium of the local government and social structure, speaks for itself. The training given to the young soldier, from the time of pre-deployment orientation to post-Anson County brief backs, was excellently received and near perfectly executed. The opportunity for the young soldier to contribute to solving the problems of underprivileged citizens provided strong motivation and enhanced morale. The training for stability operations and implementation of the "Nixon Doctrine" of people helping people help themselves cannot be better achieved in a peacetime environment. Well over half of the troops involved in Anson County volunteered for additional similar field exercises. This type of mission has appeal to the young, idealistic, intelligent soldier occupying the Special Forces ranks today.

Colonel Durst does not overstate what his men were able to do and learn; however, their performance does not justify a massive servicewide commitment to domestic action projects. Both Colonel Durst and the men directly involved and selected for duty in Anson County were, and are, exceptional by any standards. Certainly they should be able to carry out such a mission, but before less skilled and experienced units and leaders are given such a responsibility, the military in general needs to understand much more about the process of domestic action.

Care must be taken to recognize that domestic action is not a formula process. What we have suggested herein is that for a military domestic action program to have a reasonable chance for success the problem under attack must be continually reassessed, and the program methods themselves must be sufficiently flexible in order to keep abreast of changing conditions as well as emerging new problems. That is, although military domestic action may be directed at what appears to be intransigent longstanding social, physical, or environmental problems, the process of application is necessarily fluid. An indirect approach may be the best. The planning and evaluation criteria we set forth above are applicable at any time, but the overall domestic action framework and the military's efforts to cope with social problems in a local indigenous situation require a set of basic principles—a benchmark—on which a sound program can be built.

The following are essentially a "first cut" at the set of basic principles that should guide local officials, local government employees, and civilian volunteers in initiating, carrying out, or deciding upon domestic action programs which require or rely upon military assistance. They may also serve as a tentative guide for military personnel and their organizations in providing human and organizational resources in such assistance programs. The listing is fairly comprehensive, but should not be considered exhaustive of all guiding principles—or an attempt to cast a unified field theory for military intervention in domestic social conflict.

For local government officials, employees, and civilian volunteers:

1. The local government should have a definable political objective that is attuned to the traditional value systems of the population.

2. The local government should establish an organizational mechanism for maintaining focus on the problem selected for action and for planning local and military inputs. The organizational mechanism must balance all of the local area's interests in considering their response to the problem.

3. The local government must assess with great care the causes of the

problem, the nature of the problem, and other key related elements in order to determine if military assistance will be relevant to help resolve it or to determine if the problem primarily constitutes an institutional-resource contest, i.e., one not resolvable by remedial military domestic action and/or assistance. As a corollary to this principle we note that the causes of social problems are fluid and must be constantly assessed to determine if changes have taken place which can alter the nature of the problem and hence the tools that can be used to combat it.

4. The local government should establish, or reestablish, an effective communication channel with the objects of the domestic action program (the people of the community afflicted with the problem) in order to exploit possibilities of compromise within its program. That is, all things are not possible at once, or simultaneously. Priority ordering, to be effective, requires political give and take between the people and their government.

5. The local government should maintain its organization and managerial integrity. Special or bypassing systems that prevent their structure from functioning in a normal way while simultaneously handling the program should be avoided lest the effort collapse once the military contribution is terminated.

6. The local government can approach resolving the recognized problem through either the causal route (social change) or through the resource route (mobilization-stabilization). Inequities and/or lack of appropriate resources comprise the two basic elements of any social problem, and by not approaching resolution through these two channels, government action condemns itself to merely dealing with the effects of a problem.

7. The local government must recognize the separate strategic areas of national policy (regional redevelopment, successive "wars on poverty," Federal manpower training programs, et cetera) as involving an attempt to achieve broad social change and realignments of power, wealth, and opportunity. Under the broad national policy a range of options or compromise possibilities exist which can be used to help address social problems and their causes in their local areas. That is, regardless of a local area's racial bias or orientation, programs such as preventive first aid or improved hygiene may be received as plus for all citizens.

8. In the same vein, local government should recognize that their substrategies may be structured in such a way as to represent specific and selective fragments of sector and/or regional activities that can contribute to overall national efforts or policy and, as such, may enable the local government to qualify for Federal assistance they otherwise would be ineligible to receive.

9. The local government should recognize that the key to the solution of any social problem is the reaction of the people affected by that problem, indirectly and directly. Thus, popular cooperation with the government in identifying and pursuing goals is paramount.

10. The local government should organize a public information and education effort that is able to combine features of its domestic action objectives with those of private, fraternal, and social organizations in order to elicit the widest possible support for its objectives.

For military personnel and their organizations:

1. The military personnel responsible for planning and executing domestic action programs must first assess the social problems in the specific local area to determine their precise nature. Based on this information, the military personnel are then in a position to best utilize their organization in its proper support role. The first assessment should be

conducted consistent with the criteria described previously and be in accord with overall national policy. Such an assessment should include an examination of the possible tools that can be provided and their suitability in the local environment.

2. The military domestic action inputs should be selected so that they help the local organization energize its local governmental structure as well as supplement performance requirements.

3. The military domestic action inputs should be divorced as much as possible from identification with local political parties. They should be devised so as to contribute to the long-term interests of the people and not alone represent short-term aid to sustain one political group or another in power.

4. As a corollary to the above point, the military domestic action inputs should not stand in the way of natural local forces that can bring about needed changes in the socio-politico environment. This is probably the most difficult principle of all to apply because, by its very nature, the participation of the military is likely to inhibit – at least temporarily – those persons seeking social change who are outside the existing power structure.

5. The military domestic action assistance efforts should be geared to allow institutions to develop within the local area which are responsive to local patterns of behavior, to the particular needs and values of the people, and not be prescribed in the abstract by persons at the national level.

6. Military domestic action should be orchestrated under a central "coordinator" who can harmonize the contributions of each military service in a unified effort.

7. In a local environment, military domestic action assistance must be organized so that the design of the central "coordinator" (national policy) is consistently preserved and implemented by individual military commanders and their organizations.

8. Military domestic action inputs should be kept in proportion and perspective to maintain the fact that not only must the local government actually strive to implement those inputs, but the activities carried out must be geared to the future resource base that the local government can maintain on its own. The military inputs should avoid sophistication that is not consistent with the local government's managerial, resource, and maintenance capability.

9. Military domestic action inputs should generally be supportive in nature, except in those rare cases when the President determines that a social problem (not a natural disaster or riot) directly threatens the national interest and therefore directs the military to assume an active operational role.

10. The military should recognize the inherent limitations of some of its tools for domestic action purposes–

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



William R. Corson has received the B.B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees and has held fellowships and scholarships at the University of Chicago, the University of Miami, and the University of Wisconsin. Dr. Corson is a retired Marine lieutenant colonel who was head of the Marines' "Combined Action" pacification program in Vietnam in 1966 and 1967 and whose book on the Vietnam war, *The Betrayal,* was published in July 1968 at the time of his retirement after 25 years of service. Subsequent to his retirement, he has served as a Professorial Lecturer in Economics at Howard University in Washington, D.C., and as vice-president and director of the Urban Systems Division of Operations Research Inc. in Silver Springs, Md. He recently published a book entitled *Promise or Peril,* an analysis of the problems of the black college student in America, and is currently completing work on a book entitled *Consequences of Failure.*

personnel, materials, funds, and training capacity/ability—and work to modify these tools to overcome their limitations.

This paper, of course, is not offered as the final word on military domestic action. The best assembled findings and data would be open to discussion and modification as time goes on and additional experience is gained by the military services. This paper, however, does provide a more logical, practical way of examining and evaluating an expanded domestic action program by developing a new conceptual scheme. It provides a nucleus of the fundamentals required to understand the subject in current situations and environments and to develop genuine expertise in the activity. It is a beginning.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Commander's Digest,* 1 November 1969. "to contribute to the improvement of our society, including its disadvantaged members, by greater utilization of our human and physical resources while maintaining full effectiveness in the performance of our primary mission."

2. U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Department of Defense Directive* 5030.37 of April 1971 defines these terms in the following manner: *Domestic Action*—Military civic action and community relations activities designed to assist the civilian leadership in solving their community problems; *Civic Action*—Military civic action is the use of military forces in cooperation with civil authorities, agencies or groups, on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, public works, health, sanitation, and others contributing to the economic and social development which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population; *Community Relations*—The relationship between military and civilian communities, including such actions as cooperation with local government officials and community leaders; participation of military personnel and dependents in activities of local schools, churches, fraternal, social, and civic organizations; sports and recreation programs; conducting tours and "open houses"; participation in public events; liaison and cooperation with local associations and organizations; people-to-people programs; and humanitarian acts.

3. "Nation-Mending at Home," *Time Magazine,* 21 June 1971.

4. 6th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, "After Action Report-Anson County (ORBIT WINGS VII)," Fort Bragg, N.C., April 1971.

Ψ

You cannot do the things that need to be done, as I call it to wage the peace, merely with arms. You have got to have the human understanding of human wants, and you have got to make it possible to achieve something in satisfying those wants if we are going to wage peace successfully.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, News Conference, 23 January 1957; Public Papers . . . Eisenhower, 1957

The insufficiency in which the 1907 Hague Peace Conference was able to deal with the problem of placing some international controls on mine warfare at sea is amply demonstrated in the mining campaigns of both World Wars. The numerous unsuccessful attempts to draft a more comprehensive and effective code covering the conduct of mine warfare bears out a simple truism—the outlawing or control of successful weapons systems by international action has hardly ever been successful.

MINE WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

A lecture delivered at the Naval War College

by

Professor Howard S. Levie

Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law

> . . . As they were slowly passing the *Brooklyn*, her Captain reported "a heavy line of torpedoes [mines] across the channel."
>
> "Damn the torpedoes!" was the emphatic reply of Farragut. "Jouett, full speed! Four bells, Captain Drayton."
>
> Parker, the *Battle of Mobile Bay*, p. 29 (1878)

Some naval historians trace the invention of the mine (or, as it was once called, the torpedo) back to 1585 with Gianibelli's attempt to destroy the bridge which the Spanish had constructed across the Scheldt, blocking Antwerp from access to the sea.[1] Others may more accurately place this event with the American Revolution when a direct forbear of the mine, devised by David Bushnell, was used against the British. It was then called the "American Turtle"[2] and was apparently just about as effective an instrument of war as its namesake. Fulton improved the mine and attempted, without much success, to interest first France and then England in its manufacture and use in the war in which those two countries were then engaged.[3] The Earl of St. Vincent, First Sea Lord during that particular period of the Napoleonic Wars, is said to have criticized Pitt, the Prime Minister, for displaying interest in the potentialities of the mine, with these words: "Pitt is the greatest fool that ever existed, to encourage a mode of war which they who commanded the seas did not want, and which, if successful, would deprive them of it."[4] As we shall see, Lord St. Vincent's position was that of the British Government when the question of placing international restrictions on the use of mines arose a century later.

Naval War College Review, Vol. 25 [1972], No. 4, Art. 1

The first really effective use of mines in warfare occurred during the American Civil War when the Confederacy demonstrated the value of this form of warfare in fighting an opponent with a far superior navy.[5] They were next used extensively in the Spanish-American War (1898).[6] In this conflict, where Dewey disregarded the mines at Manila but Sampson permitted them to curtail his operations at Santiago, one of the first of the major legal problems arising out of the use of mines occurred—the question of the purposes for which they might be used. Early in the war the rumor spread that the United States proposed to lay mines all along the blockaded coast of Cuba. Neutral nations considered that this would be a violation of the international law of blockade,[7] as set forth in the Declaration of Paris of 1856.[8] Whether or not it had intended to do so, the United States did not lay mines along the Cuban coast. The complete destruction of the Spanish Fleet on 3 July 1898, at the Battle of Santiago, made any such action unnecessary.

During the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), mines were used extensively by both sides, and this usage created a situation which gave rise to another legal problem, the question of the types of mines which might be used. Many of the mines used were either unanchored or easily broke loose from their moorings and remained armed—floating down the coast and out to sea where they played havoc with neutral shipping,[9] particularly that of the Chinese,[10] long after the hostilities had ceased.

Experiences in the Russo-Japanese War had thus demonstrated that mines were dangerous not only to the enemy against whom they were used, but also to neutrals and, not infrequently, to the minelayer itself! Accordingly, the proposed agenda circulated by the Russian Government prior to the 1907 Hague Peace Conference included an item entitled, "the laying of torpedoes."[11] The search for a solution to the problem of mine warfare was referred by the Conference to its Third Commission which, in turn, referred the problem to a Committee of Examination. The report of that committee is quite illuminating. It said, in part:

> . . . [W]e must take into account the incontestable fact that submarine mines are a means of warfare the absolute prohibition of which can neither be hoped for nor perhaps desired even in the interest of peace; they are, above all, a means of defence, not costly but very effective, extremely useful to protect extended coasts, and adapted to saving the considerable expense that the maintenance of great navies requires. . . . Now to ask an absolute prohibition of this weapon would consequently be demanding the impossible; it is necessary to confine ourselves to regulating its use.[12]

The controversies with respect to mine warfare which arose during the Conference in the course of the drafting of the convention, which was destined to become 1907 Hague VIII,[13] clearly revealed the wide differences of opinion which existed between the major naval powers of the world of that day. At the risk of over-simplification, it may be said that the problems to be solved with respect to mine warfare fell into three general categories: (1) the types of mines which might lawfully be used; (2) the purposes for which mines might lawfully be used; and (3) the places where mines might lawfully be used.[14] It is of interest to examine the nature of each of these problems and the manner in which they were solved, or purportedly solved.

With respect to types of mines, it is important to recall that at the time that the Conference met in The Hague in 1907 there were only two categories of

mines in existence, and it is apparent that little thought was given to the possibility of improved technology and development of new types of mines.[15] The two types then in existence were the electrically controlled and the automatic submarine contact mines.[16] The former were used for close-in protection of bays, harbors, river mouths, etcetera. They were directly controlled from a shore facility, being detonated from the controlling station when enemy vessels were detected within the minefields. This type of mine was comparatively noncontroversial. The automatic submarine contact mine, on the other hand, was out of the control of the minelayer as soon as it was laid. It detonated on contact, and was either unanchored or, if anchored, could easily break loose from its moorings and was then equally dangerous to the minelayer, to the enemy, and to neutrals. It is this type of mine which had caused such widespread destruction after the Russo-Japanese War, a conflict which ended just 2 years before the 1907 Conference met.

Early in the Conference the British Delegation tabled a complete proposal in which the first two paragraphs would have flatly prohibited the use of unanchored automatic submarine contact mines, as well as prohibiting such mines when anchored unless they were so made as to become harmless if they broke loose from their moorings.[17] The U. S. Delegation expressed general concurrence in this portion of the British proposal,[18] but the majority of the nations represented at the Conference did not entirely agree with it. The relevant provisions of article 1 of the Convention, as ultimately adopted by the Conference, prohibited the laying of "unanchored automatic contact mines, except when they are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after the person who laid them ceases to control them."[19] (This exception was made because the German Delegation wished to preserve the right of a war vessel which was being pursued to drop off free mines in order to delay or destroy its pursuers.) There was, however, agreement on the British proposal to prohibit "anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings."[20]

It will readily be noted that in each quoted provision of article 1 of the 1907 Convention the language used is "automatic contact mines." It is for this reason that the thesis has been advanced that the Convention does not apply to the subsequently developed magnetic and acoustic mines.[21] Strangely enough, it does not appear that this argument was made by any of the belligerents in the disputes with respect to the use of mines which occurred during both world wars.

Apart from the possibly limiting factor introduced by the totally unnecessary use of the restrictive term "automatic contact mines,"[22] the agreement reached on article 1 was a fairly successful step forward as it eliminated the basic causes of the disasters which had occurred after the Russo-Japanese War—unanchored mines and mines which remained armed after they had broken loose from their moorings. But at this point, sad to relate, we have all but completed a review of the effective provisions of the Convention.[23]

The next problem attacked by the conferees was concerned with the purposes for which mines could be used. The British proposal would have flatly prohibited the use of mines to establish or maintain a commercial blockade.[24] This proposal was unacceptable to the Conference as a whole, which finally agreed on an article which prohibited the laying of "automatic contact mines off the coasts or ports of the enemy, *with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping.*"[25] (Emphasis added.) This wording was strongly, but unsuccessfully, opposed for two

reasons. First, it introduced "a subjective element . . . which would give rise to difficulties in application."[26] Thus, a belligerent had only to claim that its act of minelaying off the enemy's coast was not *solely* for the purpose of intercepting commercial shipping, thereby avoiding the prohibition of the Convention.[27] Second, it created new questions with respect to blockades.

The venerable Declaration of Paris of 1856 had stated that a blockade to be effective must be "maintained by a force sufficient to really prevent access to the coast of the enemy."[28] Did Hague VIII mean that if blockade was not the belligerent's *sole* purpose, in effect, it could blockade by mine without using any surface forces? The American Delegation, in its report, said that under article 2 of the Hague Convention "a blockade may not be established and maintained by the sole use of submarine mines."[29] Some writers go even further and take the position that not only does article 2 not affect the Declaration of Paris, but that mines may not even be used to supplement a blockading surface force;[30] while others would permit the use of mines for this purpose as long as the belligerent effecting the blockade also uses ships, submarines, or planes.[31] One writer criticizes article 2 because, he says, "the difficulty is rather adjourned than met."[32] This has proven to be a valid criticism.

To summarize, article 2 of the 1907 Hague Convention no. VIII is ambiguous, introduces a subjective determination into the problem, and can be construed as being in conflict with the Declaration of Paris regarding blockades. In this latter respect, it is interesting to note that 2 years after the Hague Conference, in 1909, a number of the same nations drafted the Declaration of London which specifically repeated the provisions of the earlier Declaration of Paris with respect to blockades.[33] Did this mean that those nations were demonstrating that Hague VIII was not intended to affect the Declaration of Paris? Or did it mean that they felt the need to revalidate that Declaration?

The third, and perhaps most difficult, problem which confronted the conferees at The Hague was that relating to the places where mines might lawfully be used. The British proposal would have permitted the use of mines in territorial waters only (defensively in one's own territorial waters and offensively in the enemy's) with the sole exception that the protection of fortified ports mining for a distance of up to 10 miles would have been allowed.[34] In substance, the British wished to prohibit substantially all use of mines on the high seas. Here they met the determined opposition of the Germans who wanted to be able to use mines wherever naval operations were taking place, even on the high seas.[35]

In the discussions which took place in the Committee of Examination, proposed articles 2 and 3 were drafted prohibiting the laying of mines beyond a distance of 3 nautical miles from low-water mark, and extending that distance to 10 nautical miles off military ports.[36] (This latter provision was included in order to permit the defense to keep warships far enough out to sea to prevent naval bombardments of military ports.) The Committee's report specifically stated that it had held to the distinction between coastal (territorial) waters and the high seas.[37]

Both of these two proposed articles related to the use of mines for defensive purposes. Proposed article 4 made the same limits applicable when mines were used for offensive purposes by laying them in the enemy's territorial waters.[38] And, finally, proposed article 5 provided that mines might be laid outside the limits of territorial waters when that action was taken within the sphere of the belligerents' immediate activity; but in such a case the mines

had to be of the type which would render themselves harmless after 2 hours at most.[39] Thus, in this respect, the German proposal was adopted, rather than that of the British, but with the 2-hour limitation.

When the report of the Committee of Examination reached the Third Commission, that body took such action which would seem to be incomprehensible in today's world. The Commission struck out all four proposed articles dealing with the subject of the places where mines might be lawfully laid and left the draft convention with no provisions whatsoever relating to this subject; and it was in this form that the Convention was ultimately adopted. In this area, the deliberations of the Conference were, indeed, an exercise in futility.[40] The statement has been made that "belligerents may, it would appear, use mines anywhere upon the high seas."[41] On the other hand, it is argued that when the principles of the freedom of the seas and the rights of belligerents come into conflict, the former prevails.[42] Unfortunately, this has not been the practice of states.

Hague Convention No. VIII was drafted in 1907, was ratified by many of the participating nations during the next few years, and had its first major application with the onset of World War I in August 1914. It was very quickly demonstrated that the criticisms directed against it were completely valid. As early as 11 August 1914, Great Britain advised the United States that the "Germans are scattering mines indiscriminately about the North Sea in the open sea" and that it reserved the right to do likewise.[43] Efforts by the United States to obtain an *ad hoc* agreement between these two belligerents under which they would not lay mines on the high seas, except for defensive purposes within cannon range of harbors, were unsuccessful.[44] Several hundred vessels, British and neutral, were lost[45] and in November 1914 Great Britain retaliated by declaring the entire North Sea to be a "military area." Thereupon, Germany retaliated by declaring the waters around the British Isles to be a "military area."[46] Within these "military areas" (or "war zones") enemy ships were subject to being sunk on sight, and neutral ships entered at their own risk. As the declarations were primarily enforced by mining, the areas or zones constituted a substantial interference with the freedom of navigation and safety of neutral shipping.[47] Most experts in the law of naval warfare have found these declarations to have been in violation of international law.[48] Nevertheless, World War II saw a repetition of the problem, magnified by the development of the magnetic and acoustic mines and by the use of aircraft as minelayers.[49] The fears concerning the ambiguity of the provision of article 2 of the Hague Convention, which prohibited the laying of mines "with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping," proved justified. Germany claimed that as long as commercial vessels moved in convoy with warships present, the laying of mines was permissible as it was directed against the warships, and not solely against commercial shipping.[50] And toward the end of World War II the United States undertook, through the use of mines dropped by bombers, the complete blockade of the home islands of Japan—Operation *Starvation*.[51] It is difficult to make this action jibe with the statement made in the report by the American Delegates to the 1907 Hague Conference in which they had said that under article 2 of the Convention "a blockade may not be established and maintained by the sole use of submarine mines."[52]

There have been, since 1907, numerous unofficial attempts to draft a more comprehensive and effective code covering the conduct of mine warfare.[53] However, governments have indicated no interest in such a project. In the light of their comparatively un-

inhibited activities in the field of mine warfare during two major conflicts, their attitude is, perhaps, understandable.

It might be argued that article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas[54] restricts the use of mines on the open sea because the first sentence of that article states: "The high seas being open to all nations, no state may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty." Certainly the mining of the North Sea and of the seas around the British Isles and the home islands of Japan were actions which, at least temporarily, denied freedom of navigation – one of the attributes of the freedom of the seas – to neutrals. But the very next sentence of that article provides: "Freedom of the seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles *and by other rules of international law.*" (Emphasis added.) It will undoubtedly be contended by any belligerent desiring to lay mines on the high seas that the right to bring the war to your enemy wherever you find him, including on the high seas, is one of the "other rules of international law" referred to in the 1958 High Seas Convention.

There has been considerable fear expressed that the nuclear powers would use the seabed and the ocean floor as a platform for the emplacement of nuclear weapons. Recognizing this problem, on 7 October 1969, the United States and the Soviet Union jointly tabled at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in Geneva, a *Draft Treaty Banning the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Seabed.* Article 1(1) of that Treaty, as finally approved, prohibits the emplacing beyond the outer limits of the contiguous zone (the 12-mile limit) of: "... any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons."[55]

At that time the U.S. representative indicated that the term "other weapons of mass destruction" referred to weapons "such as chemical or biological weapons." He also stated that the treaty would prohibit nuclear mines that were anchored to or emplaced on the seabed.[56] Certainly, conventional explosives, no matter how potent, would not fall within the concept of weapons of mass destruction so there is no reason to believe that any nonnuclear mine would fall within the restrictions of the treaty. Such a weapon could be emplaced on the seabed or ocean floor – provided that it meets the requirements of article 1 of the 1907 Hague Convention of becoming harmless if it breaks loose from its moorings.

The Draft Treaty was approved by

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Professor Howard S. Levie did his undergraduate work at Cornell University, earned his J. D. at Cornell Law School, attended the Academy of International Law at the Hague, and earned his LL.M. from The George Washington University. He was a practicing attorney in New York City from 1931 to 1942, at which time he volunteered for Army service and subsequently held numerous positions in the Judge Advocate General's Department. Some of these positions included: Staff Officer with the United Nations Command Armistice Delegation, Korean Armistice Negotiations; Chief, International Affairs Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army; Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Verona, Italy; and Legal Advisor, U.S. European Command, Paris, France. Retiring from the U.S. Army in 1963, Professor Levie joined the faculty of the School of Law, Saint Louis University, and is currently occupying the Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law at the Naval War College.

the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and on 7 December 1970 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending the treaty to states.[57] It was opened for signature on 11 February 1971 but is not in force as it has not yet received the required 22 ratifications, including those of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.

In Conclusion. It has been said that successful weapons are never outlawed by international action. On this basis we would certainly have to find that the much maligned mine is a successful weapon. The meaningful international controls which have been placed on it are minimal--the requirements that, if unanchored, it must disarm itself within 1 hour; and that, if anchored, it must disarm itself should it break loose from its moorings. Obviously, these provisions were to the advantage of all concerned, and hence agreement could be reached on them. Where proposals were considered to be contrary to the war plans of nations, they were either watered down to a meaningless state or were eliminated completely. It is obvious that the international community has neither been effective nor looked its best in the legislation of rational controls for mine warfare.

FOOTNOTES

1. Arnold S. Lott, *Most Dangerous Sea* (Annapolis, Md.: U. S. Naval Institute, 1959), p. 5; *Project NIMROD: The Present and Future Role of the Mine in Naval Warfare* v. II, at 15 n., 1970.

2. F. E. Smith and N. W. Sibley, *International Law as Interpreted During the Russo-Japanese War* (Boston: Boston Books, 1905), p. 93. Excellent histories of the use of mines in naval warfare may be found in Andrew Patterson, Jr., "Mining: a Naval Strategy," *Naval War College Review,* May 1971, p. 52, and in *Project NIMROD,* at 15.

3. Patterson, p. 52-53.

4. Lott, p. 8

5. C. H. Stockton, "The Use of Submarine Mines and Torpedoes in Time of War," *The American Journal of International Law,* April 1908, p. 276, 277. Soviet sources ascribe the first combat use of mines to the Russian Navy off Kronstadt in 1855. John Chomeau, "Soviet Mine Warfare," *Naval War College Review,* December 1971, p. 94.

6. Coleman Phillipson, *International Law and the Great War* (New York: Dutton, 1916), p. 372. The author there refers to mines as "unseen, treacherous instruments of war."

7. Elbert J. Benton, *International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-American War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1908), p. 139.

8. "The Declaration of Paris," *Supplement to the American Journal of International Law,* April 1907, p. 89. The blockade provisions of the Declaration of Paris are undoubtedly a part of customary international law.

9. Amos S. Hershey, *The International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War* (New York: Macmillan, 1906), p. 124-125; Alexander P. Higgins, *The Hague Peace Conferences* (Cambridge: University Press, 1909) p. 328-29.

10. James B. Scott, ed., *The Reports to the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917), p. 657.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 188, 189.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 657.

13. U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., *United States Statutes at Large,* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1911), v. XXXVI, pt. 2, p. 2332; U.S. Treaties, etc., "Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines (Hague VIII)," *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968), v. I, p. 669; Foreign Office, *British and Foreign State Papers* (H.M. Stationery Office, 1911), v. C, p. 389.

14. The Convention does contain provisions with respect to other problems, dealing, for example, with the notification to neutrals of mine area (art. 3); the laying of mines by neutrals (art. 4); the removal of mines after the war (art. 5); et cetera. However, these were comparatively noncontroversial.

15. *Project NIMROD*, p. 28. The text of that study erroneously states the "[S] ome of the participating nations, including the United States, did not ratify the convention." Russia and Italy did not. All of the other major maritime nations, including the United States, did ratify it.

16. Phillipson, p. 372. The latter are awesome-looking, large, round, black objects which, Medusa-like, seem to sprout the so-called "Hertz Horns" by the dozen in movies dealing with naval warfare.

17. Scott, *Reports*, annex 4, p. 681.

18. *Ibid.*, annex 11, p. 684.

19. U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., art. 1(1).

20. *Ibid.*, art. 1(2).

21. Julius Stone, *Legal Controls of International Conflict* (New York: Rinehart, 1954), p. 584.

22. This term is used throughout the Convention.

23. It is for this reason that the Convention has been variously described as "emasculated," John Westlake, *International Law* (Cambridge: Union Press, 1907), pt. 2, p. 323; "never a very satisfactory convention," J. M. Spaight, *Air Power and War Rights*, 3d ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1947), p. 494; "worthless," U.S. Naval War College, *International Law Studies 1955—The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1957), p. 303; and "exceedingly unsatisfactory" and "of little use," Robert D. Powers, Jr., "International Law and Open-Ocean Mining," *JAG Journal*, June 1961, p. 55, 56.

24. Scott, *Reports*, annex 4, p. 681.

25. U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., art. 2.

26. Scott, *Reports*, p. 651, quoting a statement made by Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, the Chief German Delegate. While Norway was still a neutral during World War II and was being adversely affected by the mining programs of the belligerents, its Foreign Minister admitted that "it is practically impossible to prove that the mines have no military objective." Marjorie M. Whiteman, *Digest of International Law* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968), v. X, p. 681.

27. Stone, p. 583-84; Stockton, p. 283. The latter apparently found this criticism to have little real merit, and Scott terms article 2 "as acceptable as it is reasonable." Scott, *The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907*, p. 581-82. He does criticize it on another ground.

28. American Society of International Law, v. I, p. 89, para. 4.

29. James B. Scott, ed. *Instructions to the American Delegates to the Hague Peace Conference and Their Official Report* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1916), p. 111.

30. U.S. Naval War College, *International Law Studies, 1955*, p. 298, n. 38.

31. "Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War," *Research in International Law, Supplement to the American Journal of International Law* (Concord, N.H.: Rumford Press, 1939), v. XXXI, p. 175, 714.

32. Scott, *Hague Peace Conferences*, p. 582.

33. "1909 Declaration of London," *Supplement to the American Journal of International Law*, July 1909, p. 179, 191. This declaration never became effective.

34. Scott, *Reports*, p. 681, 682.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 670, and annex 10, p. 684.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 664 and 666, respectively.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 665.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 667.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 669.

40. It was for this reason that the British made the following reservation to the Convention: "In affixing their signatures to the above Convention the British plenipotentiaries declare that the mere fact that this Convention does not prohibit a particular act or proceeding must not be held to debar His Britannic Majesty's Government from contesting its legitimacy." U.S. Treaties, etc., v. I, p. 679.

41. Scott, *Hague Peace Conferences*, p. 583. See also Stone, p. 584.

42. Hershey, p. 128; powers, p. 55. This was the substance of the forceful final statement made by Sir Ernest Satow of the British Delegation. Scott, annex 22, p. 691.

43. "Diplomatic Correspondence Between the United States and Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Commerce," *Supplement to the American Journal of International Law*, October 1917, p. 4.

44. *Ibid.*; "Official Documents," *Supplement to the American Journal of International Law*, January 1915, p. 97, *et seq.* It should not be surprising to find that Germany adhered to the position it had taken at The Hague in 1907, opposing restrictions on the use of mines for offensive purposes, even on the high seas.

45. John C. Colombos, *The International Law of the Sea* (London: Longmans, 1967), p. 533.

46. Lassa F. L. Oppenheim, *International Law*, 7th ed., H. Lauterpacht, ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1952), p. 681-682.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 680.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 682; U.S. Naval War College, *International Law Studies, 1955*, p. 305. The latter would permit this practice "when taken in response to the persistent misconduct of the enemy." This position raises the question as to whether, and why, a belligerent should be allowed a retaliatory action which is to the detriment of neutrals.

49. Colombos, p. 534.

50. Powers, p. 57.

51. James H. Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns," *Naval War College Review*, June 1967, p. 75; *Project NIMROD*, v. II, p. 59.

52. See text in connection with note 29.

53. E. James B. Scott, *Resolutions of the Institute of International Law* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1916), p. 167; "Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War."

54. U.S. Treaties, etc., *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1963), v. XIII, pt. 2, p. 2312; United Nations, "Convention on the High Seas," *Treaty Series* (New York: 1964), v. CDL, p. 11, 82; U.S. Naval War College, *International Law Studies 1959-1960—The Law at Sea: Some Recent Developments* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1961), p. 203.

55. "Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof," *International Legal Materials*, January 1971, p. 146-147.

56. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Documents on Disarmament* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969), p. 478; "U.S. and U.S.S.R. Agree on Draft Treaty Banning Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Seabed," *The Department of State Bulletin*, 3 November 1969, p. 365.

57. United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 2669 (XXV), 7 December 1970. The vote was 104-2 (El Salvador and Peru)-2 (Ecuador and France).

The mine issues no official communiques.

ADM William V. Pratt, USN: In "Newsweek" magazine
5 October 1942

The relationship between the military and civilian sectors of American society and more particularly the role played by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington's policy formulation and execution became the focus of strident debate in the 1960's. The conflict surrounding the role of the JCS during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations can perhaps best be appreciated by first examining the military's own view of its proper function and then comparing this prescription with actual practice. While no formal definition of the JCS's proper function may satisfy everyone, effective strategic planning and coordinated use of power in support of political objectives cannot be achieved in the absence of some agreement between the President and his military advisers over the latter's position.

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

A research paper prepared
by
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Introduction. Today the United States finds itself withdrawing its military forces from Indochina despite the fact that the outcome of the conflict in that region is still in doubt. This has never happened before in American history. It will be years before historians will be able to judge the correctness of the policies pursued by the United States in Southeast Asia, and, undoubtedly, that judgment will be tempered by the relative success of the venture. Even at this point in time, however, certain aspects of the war are already being debated. Inevitably some of the questions being raised center around the conduct of the war as a possible explanation for its excessive cost and duration. Was military force inappropriate to attain the national goals in this instance? Was force improperly used? Was our strategy correct? Were our tactics sound?

By law " . . . the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense."[1] Did the JCS provide sound or unsound advice? Did the President listen to their advice?

The answer to the last two questions will be a long time coming. More Presidential papers will have to be made available, volumes of documents will have to be declassified, and a number of books and memoirs will have to be written before the answers can be found; however, it is possible to examine the environment in which the JCS operated during the Kennedy and

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Johnson administrations in order to assess their collective influence upon the formulation of policy involving the use of the Armed Forces.

Before initiating an inquiry of this sort, a normative model describing the relationship between a Commander in Chief and the leaders of his Armed Forces must first be established in order to set a standard by which actual interactions between past Presidents and their military advisers can be measured.

The choice of a proper model is not difficult when so few exist. In this case the selection is small because whatever the differences between individual American military services over the years, they have uniformly supported the concept of civil control over the military. However, support of civil control was not held to mean that the military would give up its advisory function in the policymaking process.

While the literature in this area is uniform, it is also scarce. It is not clear whether this paucity is the result of oversight or the general unanimity of opinion in this regard.

The model chosen comes from a book first published by the U.S. Naval War College in 1936 called *Sound Military Decision*. The book was used for years to enlarge the viewpoint and broaden the basis of the professional judgment of officers. Based on an enormous body of literature which included all available and pertinent military writings, *Sound Military Decision* became a "bible" to students at the Naval War College prior to Pearl Harbor and throughout World War II.

What influence the following passage from *Sound Military Decision* had upon the drafters of the Act of Congress making the Joint Chiefs of Staff "the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense"[2] is unknown, but given its general acceptance among the military services, as well as the fact that it predates the National Security Act of 1947, we may safely accept it as the model relationship.

The Advisory Function

> Understanding between the civil representatives of the State and the leaders of the Armed Forces is manifestly essential to the coordination of national policy with the power to enforce it. Therefore, if serious omissions and the adoption of ill-advised measures are to be avoided, it is necessary that wise professional counsel be available to the State. While military strategy may determine whether the aims of policy are possible of attainment, policy may, beforehand, determine largely the success or failure of military strategy. It behooves policy to ensure not only that military strategy pursue appropriate aims, but that the work of strategy be allotted adequate means and be undertaken under the most favorable conditions.[3]

Looking at the last decade (and particularly at the war in Southeast Asia) in light of the model relationship described above, one is moved to ask: What measure of understanding existed between the civil representatives of the State and the leaders of the Armed Forces? Was wise professional council available to the State? Were the policy aims of the United States such as to enhance the chance of success of the military strategy? Conversely, was the military strategy the correct one to accomplish the aims of policy? Were adequate means allotted to support the strategy, and was the strategy undertaken under favorable conditions?

While the temptation to address all these questions is strong, such an effort lies beyond the more limited constraints of time and space available here. Rather, the task of this paper is to examine only the degree of understanding or misunderstanding which existed between

the Commander in Chief and the JCS during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

* * * * * * *

John Fitzgerald Kennedy became the 35th President of the United States on 20 January 1961. He brought to the Nation his considerable talents, certain preconceptions about the military, and his brilliant and aggressive Secretary of Defense, Robert Strange McNamara. Before the first 100 days of his administration were over, President Kennedy came to rely upon Mr. McNamara for military advice and profoundly changed the relationship between the office of the Commander in Chief and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.*

John F. Kennedy was raised in a home which placed high value on public service. There can be no doubt that Kennedy was proud of his own military service. He was also proud of his oldest brother, Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., who was killed in a tragic military accident during World War II.

Theodore Sorensen, President Kennedy's close friend and biographer, recounts the loss of the President's brother:

> Joe volunteered for an experimental mission—flying a Liberator bomber loaded with explosives from which he would bail out once a control plane had directed it on target. With an earth-shaking blast that was never explained, his plane disintegrated in the air while still over England.[4]

Obviously something had gone wrong, and it would be difficult to escape the conclusion that those who planned the experiment had miscalculated. What effect this tragedy might have had upon John Kennedy's later attitudes about the military in general cannot be known, but one would have to be extremely charitable not to form at least a subconscious association between military bungling and the loss of a loved one.

His own experiences as a naval officer left him unawed by generals and admirals. In 1944, while he was recovering from the injuries he received during his courageous exploit as the skipper of PT 109, he wrote to a friend about the

> . . . super-human ability of the Navy to screw up everything they touch . . . Even the simple delivery of a letter frequently overburdens this heaving puffing war machine of ours. God save this country of ours from those patriots whose war cry is, "what this country needs is to be run with military efficiency."[5]

Kennedy's personal view of the Military Establishment did not lessen his interest in military affairs, however. Once he indicated to Ted Sorensen that if he (Kennedy) were ever to be a Cabinet officer, the only two posts which he would consider were Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense.[6] Later, as President, he took great interest in his role as the Commander in Chief, frequently inspecting the Armed Forces, examining military equipment, and discussing concepts such as "flexible response" and "counterinsurgency."

One of the major thrusts of Kennedy's presidential campaign was that we were falling behind the Russians in usable military power and that our basic strategy of reliance upon "massive retaliation" was unrealistic, leaving the United States only two options: "world devastation or submission."[7] Underscoring his concern for the state of national defense, he conducted an extensive talent hunt to find a man who would be a strong Secretary of Defense —a man who could unify the efforts of

*See Lawrence J. Korb, "The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Conflict in the Budgetary Process, 1947-1971," *Naval War College Review*, December 1971, p. 30-34.

the separate services and put an end to the bickering among the JCS. The search led to the newly elected president of the Ford Motor Company, Robert S. McNamara. Characterized by the military as a "civilian on horseback," McNamara's approach with the JCS was one of "divide and conquer."

Losing no time, the President-elect directed Mr. McNamara to conduct a survey of the Defense Establishment and to report his findings. Shortly after Kennedy's inauguration, Mr. McNamara reported to the President that he had found in the Pentagon:

> . . . A strategic nuclear force vulnerable to surprise missile attack, a nonnuclear force weak in combat-ready divisions, in airlift capacity and in tactical air support, a counterinsurgency force for all practical purposes nonexistent, and a weapons inventory completely lacking in certain major elements but far oversupplied in others. . . . Too many automatic decisions made in advance instead of in the light of an actual emergency, and too few Pentagon-wide plans for each kind of emergency. The Army was relying on airlift the Air Force could not supply. The Air Force was stockpiling supplies for a war lasting a few days while the Army stockpiles assumed a war of two years.[8]

President Kennedy's worst suspicions were confirmed. Even if the new President stopped to consider that the JCS had been merely carrying out the Eisenhower-Dulles strategy, making do with a budget ceiling imposed by a Republican administration, it is doubtful that he was favorably impressed with those aspects of Mr. McNamara's report which evidenced a lack of coordination and cooperation between the military services.

Surveying the shakeup of the JCS, President Kennedy regarded them as individuals "inherited" from the Eisenhower administration.[9] The Chiefs, however, had an apolitical institutional history and were equally loyal to Republicans and Democrats.* Nevertheless, Kennedy longed to have his own appointees make up the JCS saying, "Any President should have the right to choose carefully his own military advisers."[10]

Prior to the Bay of Pigs, the President appeared content to allow normal attrition to change the membership of the JCS because he had already arranged an interim solution by the appointment of former U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor as his personal adviser on military affairs until the time came when he could make him Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[11]

While it is not within the scope of this paper to recount all of the events surrounding the Bay of Pigs, this unfortunate event was a turning point in the newly developing relationship between the President and his chief military advisers. Having lost further confidence in the Chiefs as a consequence of the Cuban disaster, President Kennedy chose to substitute Secretary McNamara and a number of *ad hoc* advisers in place of the JCS. A common pattern of poor communications between the President and the JCS was evident before, during, and after the Bay of Pigs and played a significant part in the deterioration of civil-military relations at the highest levels.**

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*President Eisenhower, according to a report in *The New York Times* of 12 January 1961, was satisfied with the performance of the JCS.

**In this examination a degree of reliance is placed on Mr. Schlesinger's and Mr. Sorensen's accounts as they shed some light upon President Kennedy's thoughts about the JCS; however, it should be kept in mind that Mr. Sorensen, and especially Mr. Schlesinger, are not generally regarded as objective reporters of events concerning President Kennedy and his administration.

From the early stages, the JCS were not happy about the CIA conducting large-scale military operations. The military Chiefs held the project at arm's length, only providing their comments on the military feasibility of the plan when required to do so. Accordingly, in January the JCS commented in writing that the CIA plan to land at Trinidad had a chance of initial military success and "... that ultimate success would depend upon either a sizable uprising inside the island or sizable support from outside."[12]

Mr. Schlesinger criticized the JCS for the indecisive stance they took in the early preinvasion deliberations. He noted that the JCS paper "without restating the alternative conditions for victory, ... concluded that the existing plan, if executed in time, stood a 'fair' chance of ultimate success."[13]

By March, however, the JCS noted that "... Cuban resistance was indispensable to success. They could see no other way short of United States intervention—by which an invasion force of a thousand Cubans, no matter how well trained and equipped nor how stout their morale, could conceivably overcome the 200,000 men of Castro's army and militia."[14]

As time went on, President Kennedy insisted that changes be made in the plan to reduce evidence of U.S. involvement. As a consequence, new landing sites were sought. The Joint Chiefs were asked to comment upon the Zapata area, the Bay of Pigs, and one other area. "The Joint Chiefs ... on 14 March, agreed that Zapata seemed the best ... but *added softly* that they still preferred Trinidad."[15] (Emphasis added.) On the other hand, Mr. Sorensen reports that the JCS failed to tell the President that they still preferred Trinidad.[16]*

While the White House and the JCS felt that a revolt of the Cuban people was essential to the success of the operation, the CIA operatives in charge of the operation were prepared to go ahead without an uprising. Here was a communications breakdown between the CIA and the rest of the administration. "... the invasion plan, as understood by the President and the Joint Chiefs, ... assume(d) that the successful *occupation* of an enlarged beachhead area would rather soon incite *organized* uprisings by *armed* members of the Cuban resistance."[17] But, after the disaster, Allen W. Dulles, the former CIA Director, stated in his book, *The Craft of Intelligence,* that "... I know of no estimate that a spontaneous uprising of the unarmed population of Cuba would be touched off by the landing."[18]

Unfortunately, the preparations for the operation moved inexorably onward as if the project possessed a life of its own. As Mr. Schlesinger describes it:

> Our meetings were taking place in a curious atmosphere of *assumed* consensus. The CIA representatives dominated the discussion. The Joint Chiefs *seemed* to be going contentedly along. They met four times as a body after March 15th to review the Bay of Pigs project as it evolved; and while their preference for Trinidad was on the record and they never formally approved the new plan, they at no time opposed it. Their collaboration with the CIA in refining the scheme gave the White House the *impression* of their wholehearted support. (Emphasis added.)[19]

It is terrifying to think that a government could proceed on such a hazardous course on the basis of an assumed consensus or that the President could

*Mr. Schlesinger's hearing may have been better than Mr. Sorensen's. In any event, the actual landing site was later changed to the Bay of Pigs which was evidently the third choice of the JCS. It should be remembered that there was no uprising nor was any direct U.S. military support provided.

undertake to make such an important decision on the basis of an impression that his military advisers supported the plan and seemed to be content with it when the JCS had repeatedly gone on record stating their preconditions for success. The point at issue is not whether the JCS should be blamed or not for the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, rather the question which must be answered is how such a state of affairs could come to pass. Could this situation have occurred if the National Security Council (NSC) machinery had been used as it was by President Eisenhower?

Research in this area has been hampered by an unwillingness of the military participants in this decision to openly discuss the subject.* The Joint Chiefs side of the story can only be left to speculation. How could a group of dedicated and distinguished military officers and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces so misread the intentions of the other? The President was convinced that the JCS would not let him plunge into an unwise military adventure, and yet he seemed deaf to their warnings that to succeed the plan would have to be bold and its execution forceful.[20] Perhaps the JCS became convinced that it was the President who kept pushing the CIA's "covert" invasion project since it would not die a decent bureaucratic death even after all the preconditions and reservations raised by the Joint Chiefs. Or perhaps the JCS wanted to show the new President that they could get along with the CIA and were not just parochial nitpickers.

The CIA planners were so secretive in their approach that the JCS had to rely upon a patchwork of briefings "about" the invasion plans rather than receiving a formal operations plan which could have been subjected to minute scrutiny and to which the JCS could have appended formal comments. The changes urged by Kennedy's civilian advisers which canceled 40 of 48 planned airstrikes were unknown to the Joint Chiefs until the last moment. Attempts by the CIA and the military to restore the strikes were to no avail.[21] Dr. Mario Lazo, former leader of the anti-Castro underground inside Cuba, stated in his article, "Decision for Disaster," which appeared in the September 1964 issue of *The Reader's Digest*, that the plan which the JCS approved was changed at the insistence of President Kennedy's advisers without the knowledge of the JCS. "These changes doomed the invasion to disaster before it even got underway."

Lyman Kirkpatrick, former Deputy Director of the CIA and at the time of the Bay of Pigs episode the Inspector General of the CIA, found no fault with the JCS in his postmortem of the entire affair:

> Throughout the rest of Washington, after the Bay of Pigs there was a general effort to try and move out of the hot seat and put somebody else in it. There were those that tried unjustly to blame the Defense Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose participation had been limited.[22]

When it was all over and the President and the Nation had been humiliated, it was clear to the President that many mistakes had been made, and many people shared in the blame. Publicly, he took all of the blame upon his own shoulders. Privately, he expressed to his intimates great disappointment in the performance of his advisers and then slowly began to replace those whom he felt had failed him. For political reasons he could not move too fast, but even-

*In February 1971, almost 10 years after the Bay of Pigs, the author, in a discussion with General Lemnitzer, tried to open the subject but was courteously refused any information other than the fact that the members of the JCS had great respect for President Kennedy's courage and, in keeping with their oath of office, the Chiefs had remained silent.

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tually the errant (or thought to be errant) individuals were removed and/or their functions replaced by organs of his own design.

Despite President Kennedy's acceptance of responsibility for the invasion's failure, the controversy surrounding this ill-starred venture was just starting. Congress was the first to attack. Senator Gore wanted the JCS dismissed.[23] Senator Long wanted General Lemnitzer removed.[24] Secretary McNamara was painfully slow to defend the JCS, but President Kennedy had them pose with him in the rose garden for an official photograph which was accomplished with more than normal publicity.[25] Finally, in June, former President Eisenhower came to their defense,[26] for the most part ending the attacks coming from outside the administration.

Although the President made no public denunciation of his military and civilian advisers, he did, according to Schlesinger and Sorensen, make a number of comments about the JCS.* The comments he allegedly made about the Joint Chiefs and the military bear repeating because they reflect an attitude that was to carry on throughout his administration. Schlesinger speaks for the President:

> The President reserved his innermost thoughts and, in the end, blamed only himself. But he was a human being and not totally free of resentment. He would say at times, "My God, the bunch of advisers we inherited. . . . can you imagine being President and leaving behind someone like all those people there?" My impression is that, among these advisers, the Joint Chiefs had disappointed him most for their cursory review of the military plans.[27]
>
> He felt that he now knew certain soft spots in his administration especially the CIA and the Joint Chiefs. He would never be overawed by professional military advice again.[28]
>
> [But with the exception of General Shoup] the President was convinced after the Bay of Pigs that he needed military advice that neither Bundy's civilian staff nor the holdover Chiefs of Staff were able to give.[29]

A year and a half later, Mr. Sorensen reports the President as saying, "The advice of every member of the Executive Branch that was brought into advise was unanimous—and the advice was wrong." Then Mr. Sorensen goes on to say:

> In fact, the advice was not so unanimous or so well considered as it seemed. The Chiefs of Staff, whose endorsement of the military feasibility of the plan particularly embittered him, gave it only limited piecemeal study as a body, and individually differed in their understanding of its features. Inasmuch as it was the responsibility of another agency and did not directly depend on their forces, they were not as close or critical in their examination as they might otherwise have been, and depended on the CIA's estimates of Castro's military and political strength. Moreover, they had originally approved the plan when it called for a landing at the city of Trinidad at the foot of the Escambray Mountains, and when Trinidad was ruled out as too conspicuous, they selected the Bay of Pigs as the best of the alternative sites offered without informing either Kennedy or

*The author's investigations reveal a most cordial and respectful relationship between the President and the JCS. Whether President Kennedy actually said or believed the things which Schlesinger and Sorensen say that he said about the Joint Chiefs is open to debate. Either way, the impact of such thoughts within the administration served to undermine the prestige and influence of the JCS.

McNamara that they still thought Trinidad preferable.[30]*

The President and the White House staff felt that they had indeed learned some hard lessons and, according to Mr. Schlesinger the JCS learned also: "The Chiefs had their own way of reacting to the Cuban fiasco. It soon began to look to the White House as if they were taking care to build a record which would permit them to say that, whatever the President did, he acted against their advice."[31]

When the question of intervention in Laos came up later, Mr. Schlesinger had this opinion, "... the Joint Chiefs, chastened by the Bay of Pigs, declined to guarantee the success of the military operations. ..."[32]**

Thus, if understanding, mutual trust, and respect are essential to achieving the proper relationship between a President and his military advisers, the JCS as an institution was now defunct for all intents and purposes. Under such circumstances the Chiefs could hardly perform their proper advisory role as this last quote from Mr. Sorensen suggests:

> ... the Bay of Pigs fiasco had its influence. That operation had been recommended principally by the same set of advisers who favored intervention in Laos. But now the President was far more skeptical of the experts, their reputations, their recommendations, their promises, premises and facts. ... "Thank God the Bay of Pigs happened when it did," he would say to me [Sorensen] in September, as we chatted about foreign policy in his New York hotel room. ... "Otherwise, we'd be in Laos by now—and that would be a hundred times worse."[33]

Obviously the President of the United States cannot carry out his duties as Commander in Chief without professional military advice. President Kennedy recognized this. Having dismissed the advice of the JCS as unreliable, the President felt it necessary to search elsewhere for military counsel.

The President had long been an admirer of Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor. Taylor's credentials were impeccable. He had a fine combat record. He was urbane, sophisticated, skilled in languages, and was regarded by many as an intellectual.

Under President Eisenhower, General Taylor was unhappy with the Army's diminished role in the framework of the massive retaliation doctrine and hence retired as Army Chief of Staff to write a book called *The Uncertain Trumpet* which expounded the virtues of flexible response. Kennedy had been impressed by Taylor's thinking and even before the Bay of Pigs brought Taylor to the White House as his personal military adviser.[34]

This solution was only partially satisfactory because the President felt that he could effect the changes he wanted in the Defense Establishment faster if his own man was the Chairman of the JCS. Further, General Taylor had good relations with the Congress. Clearly, bringing General Taylor out of retirement, although unprecedented, would satisfy both the Congress and the Chief Executive.

In January 1961, Khrushchev made a speech which made a significant impact upon President Kennedy. In an 8-hour oration, Khrushchev outlined three kinds of conflict between East and West: nuclear wars, conventional wars, and wars of national liberation. Dis-

*Mr. Schlesinger's account differs in that he says that the JCS "added softly" that they still preferred Trinidad. See footnote on page 40.

**Ironically a political failure in Cuba, which was an area of vital interest to the United States, would later serve to undermine the credibility of the JCS which had consistently carried Indochina much further down on its list of priorities than Cuba and which was generally opposed to going ashore in Asia.

missing nuclear war as too dangerous and the second type as possibly leading to nuclear war, he said that he saw wars of national liberation as an acceptable means of pursuing world communism. Kennedy immediately began to assess the capability of the United States to counter this type of warfare.

> He asked Rostow to check into what the Army was, in fact, doing about counterguerrilla training. He was soon informed that the Special Forces at Fort Bragg consisted of fewer than a thousand men. Looking at the field manuals and training literature, he tossed them aside as "meager" and inadequate. Reading Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara himself on the subject, he told the Army to do likewise.[35]

After examining the available training literature and the field equipment available to the Army for counterguerrilla operations, President Kennedy decided that a major effort should be made to increase the Army's capability in this area.[36] The President called in the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. George H. Decker, and told him to expand the Special Forces and to change their mission from one of training to foster insurgencies behind enemy lines to one of putting down insurgencies within countries whose governments were friendly to the United States. Kennedy was convinced that counterinsurgency was the mirror image of insurgency, and since the Special Forces knew how to be insurgents by simply applying their expertise upside down and backwards, they should be best suited to lead the way to counterinsurgency.

There were those in the Army who were reluctant to see the mission and capabilities of Special Forces altered. They preferred to see the Army *in general* develop a counterinsurgency capability, leaving the Special Forces to practice its arcane skills unmolested. This faction felt that an expansion of the Special Forces on the scale proposed by the President would soon degrade its proficiency—a fact which special headgear (like the Green Beret) would be unable to mask.

Some in the Army questioned the entire idea of counterinsurgency. Did the United States, the greatest revolutionary country in the world, really wish to line up on the side of the status quo and be classed by the Third World as the supporter of colonialism and imperialism?[37] Nevertheless, if the Commander in Chief felt he needed a counterinsurgency capability to support national policy, the Army would provide it. General Decker, in order to give the President's idea emphasis, appointed a rising general officer to oversee the expansion of the Special Forces.

General Decker was delighted with President Kennedy's interest in the Army and the President's desire to increase the strength and capabilities of the Special Forces, but when the end of General Decker's first 2-year tour as the Army Chief of Staff came on 30 September 1962, General Decker made known his wish to retire. He was 60 years old, had served for 38 years, and his office was weighing upon the general and his family. General Decker's desires were accepted by the President who was, at the time, opposing pending legislation which would have established the terms of the Chiefs at 4 years.[38]

On 30 September 1962 General Decker retired. On that same day General Lemnitzer turned over the Chairmanship of the JCS to General Taylor and departed for Europe and NATO.

Now the President's own man was the Chairman of the JCS. Of the Chiefs inherited from Eisenhower, only Kennedy's favorite, General Shoup, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, remained.[39*] With the Eisenhower Chiefs

*General White retired on 30 June 1961 after serving two terms. Admiral Burke retired on 1 August 1961, having served three terms on the JCS.

gone, President Kennedy now had his own team of military advisers.

Gen. Curtis E. LeMay became the USAF Chief of Staff in June 1961. Adm. George W. Anderson, Jr., took over as Chief of Naval Operations in August 1961. Although neither of these officers was inherited from Eisenhower nor were they on the JCS during the Bay of Pigs, both of them were soon to run into trouble with Secretary McNamara.

With a slate of officers appointed by the incumbent President, the relationship between the Commander in Chief and principal military advisers would hopefully more closely approach the model set forth at the outset. Unfortunately, the events of the Cuban missile crisis did little, if anything, to improve the stature of the JCS.

The literature about the Cuban missile crisis is rich, for as President Kennedy later said, "Success has many fathers. . . ."[40] But even with the euphoria that one finds in this literature, the Joint Chiefs do not come out unscathed.

Early in his administration, President Kennedy admonished the JCS to ". . . base their advice not on narrow military considerations alone but on broad-gauged political and economic factors as well."[41] While our model recognizes the relationship between policy aims and military strategy, it does not license the military to attempt to determine national policy. Consequently, if the President were to ask the JCS about the propriety of the United States using force to accomplish its aims in Cuba, it would be improper for the military to answer.

Given the parameters of the model, the only questions the military chiefs could legitimately respond to would be: What military means does the United States have to terminate the missile threat? What military courses of action does the United States have? Which course of action will have the greatest chance of success? What will each course of action cost in terms of lives and equipment? What military steps can be taken if the Russians intervene?

Perhaps the President's dictum to offer "broad-gauged" advice should not have been taken literally by the JCS. At the Bay of Pigs the JCS was condemned for not looking hard enough at, or not being vocal enough about, the pitfalls in the CIA plan, and later the JCS was criticized after the Cuban missile crisis for not considering the implications of their recommendations.

It is interesting to note the impressions made by the Joint Chiefs on those who have written "inside" stories about what took place during the high-level deliberations. First the President's brother, Robert, recalls:

> [The President] . . . was distressed with the [military] representatives with whom he met, with the notable exception of General Taylor, seemed to give so little considerations to the implications of steps they suggested. . . . President Kennedy was disturbed by this inability to look beyond the limited military field. When we talked about this later, he said we had to remember that they were trained to fight and to wage war—that was their life. . . . It was for these reasons, and many more, that President Kennedy regarded Secretary McNamara as the most valuable public servant in his Administration. . . .[42]

Mr. Schlesinger quotes the President as saying ". . . an invasion would have been a mistake—a wrong use of our power. But the military are mad. They wanted to do this. It's lucky for us that we have McNamara over there."[43] Mr. Sorensen recounts a conversation with the President on 19 October 1962 as follows: "The President called me in, a bit disgusted. He had just met with the

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Joint Chiefs, who preferred an air strike or invasion. . . . "[44]

Historians will know someday whether or not it was correct to guarantee Cuba against invasion as the *quid pro quo* for the removal of the missiles.* The possible existence of a Soviet missile submarine base at Cienfuegos in 1970 argues against the President's 1962 decision. Would an invasion have led to a nuclear exchange? Doubtful, but in all probability, it will never be known.

None of those who were there and who have written about the high-level conferences seemed disappointed with the performance of General Taylor who had just assumed the Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs. Neither Robert Kennedy, Mr. Schlesinger, nor Mr. Sorensen reveal what General Taylor had to say, but, whatever it was, it satisfied the President. Most dramatic events must have villains as well as heroes. The press took Ambassador Stevenson to task for some of his conciliatory recommendations, but Robert Kennedy and Sorensen defended him. In a neat balance, the Joint Chiefs, except the Chairman, were criticized for being too belligerent.

The Chiefs were praised for the manner in which the quarantine was conducted and the rapid response of all ground and air forces. Ironically, it was during the conduct of the naval blockade by Admiral Anderson that he had an encounter with Secretary McNamara which was, to some degree at least, to lead to Anderson's premature retirement.

When Adm. George W. Anderson joined the JCS on 1 August 1961, he was the "new boy." Generals Lemnitzer, Decker, White, and Shoup had been on board for some time, with General LeMay coming to the JCS at the end of June 1961. Capable, energetic, and outspoken, he developed a number of concerns which he wanted to discuss with Mr. McNamara and the JCS in executive session. The older members of the JCS had been having their problems with Mr. McNamara for some time, and they were quite content to let the newcomer "bell the cat." Clearing these subjects with the other Chiefs, as it was protocol to do, he was encouraged by them to speak out.

Admiral Anderson made an issue of three individuals on the staff of the Secretary of Defense who were apparently hostile to the uniformed services either in approach or attitude, or evidenced a lack of understanding. One of these civilians had boasted that he could make or break any general or flag officer in the Pentagon. To Secretary McNamara's astonishment, Admiral Anderson asked him if this was so. Turning to one of his advisers, Mr. McNamara asked if such a thing could be true. To which the adviser is reported to have said, "No, he's too smart to be caught saying anything like that."

Admiral Anderson found it difficult to disguise his lack of enthusiasm for "whiz kids" and other nonprofessional military advisers in the Pentagon, and his willingness to bring up the subject of civilian officials allegedly throwing their weight around served notice on the fast-growing Office of the Secretary of Defense that Admiral Anderson would bear watching.

As time went on it became clear that the basic problem between the Secretary and the Chief of Naval Operations was a personality clash. They were both able and strong-willed men, and neither one was intimidated by the other. Admiral Anderson did not hesitate to dissent when he felt it proper. Clearly the law stated that Mr. McNamara was Admiral Anderson's superior, and if the President had to choose between the two of them there could be little doubt as to which of them would have to seek other employment.

*It should be noted that no physical inspection was ever made to insure that the missiles had actually been removed.

Admiral Anderson lasted two years, and his experience in the Cuban crisis of 1962 was perhaps the outstanding illustration of the low regard in which the Service Chiefs were held. First there was an incident on October 6. The Defense officials decided they wanted to send a squadron of Navy [carrier] fighters from Oceana, Virginia to Key West, Florida, and to put the squadron temporarily under Air Force control. Deputy Defense Secretary Gilpatric, without going through channels, ignored the Chief of Naval Operations, and called directly to Admiral Robert L. Dennison, the Commander in Chief, Atlantic, at Norfolk, Virginia, to give him the order. . . .

As the crisis grew worse, the United States undertook a naval quarantine of Cuba. Secretary McNamara began spending time in the Navy's Flag Plot, or operations center. This room, under Marine Guard, contains visual materials locating the position of every ship. It also has communications links with ship commanders. McNamara insisted upon making decisions on the spot. He wanted to call ship commanders directly on the voice-scrambling, single-side-band radios. Admiral Anderson tried to dissuade the civilian official. The Navy uses formal, stylized voice communications with coded names going through the chain of command. McNamara was inclined to ignore or belittle those techniques. He pointed to a symbol for one ship at sea and demanded of Admiral Anderson, "What's that ship doing there?" The Chief of Naval Operations replied, "I don't know, but I have faith in my officers."[45]

In fact, Admiral Anderson did know what the ship was doing in that location. The ship, a U.S. destroyer, was sitting on top of a Russian submarine which had been detected by a highly classified means of detection. Present with Secretary McNamara were some of his civilian staff and with Admiral Anderson some of his own officers who were not cleared for this particular piece of highly sensitive information. Later, the CNO was able to get Mr. McNamara aside and explain the situation. This calmed the Secretary, but as Mr. McNamara and his entourage departed the Flag Plot, Admiral Anderson said jokingly, "Don't worry Mr. Secretary, we know what we are doing down here." Apparently, Mr. McNamara took no offense at the remark at the time but later chose to conclude that it meant that the CNO did not need any civilian help and had little time to answer questions—even from the Secretary of Defense.

The final break took place when Admiral Anderson refused to endorse the TFX project after McNamara insisted that he support the all-service fighter plane.* Anderson may have been right, but he had crossed the Secretary too often as Mr. Sorensen relates:

> Anderson had overstepped the bounds of dissent with Kennedy and McNamara on more than one issue, and the meaning of his departure was not lost on his fellow brass; but his many backers in the Congress were unable to make out a case of martyrdom when Kennedy put his considerable talents to use by naming him Ambassador to Portugal.[46]

Rocky as the relationship between Admiral Anderson and Secretary McNamara was, there is no evidence that Admiral Anderson and President Ken-

*The TFX is now the ill-fated F-111 fighter which the Navy could not use on carriers and which the Air Force found was better suited for use as a low-level SAC bomber.

nedy were ever at odds. Their relationship was always cordial and mutually respectful. Anderson never criticized President Kennedy and loyally carried out his wishes. The President and Admiral Anderson liked each other, but both were caught in a situation where the admiral had to do what he thought was right for his service and for the Armed Forces while the President had to back up his civilian secretary. And so Admiral Anderson became the second member of the JCS to retire after only one term. Later, President Kennedy would indicate his displeasure with General LeMay by extending him for only 1 year after his first 2-year term instead of the normal 2 years.[47] At the time of President Kennedy's assassination, only General Shoup of the original group of Chiefs remained as a member of the JCS.

When Lyndon Johnson became the 36th President of the United States, his mental baggage included preconceptions of his own about the military. During the Johnson administration the JCS would be kept busy training and equipping troops and transporting them to Southeast Asia, but they would not be called upon to act as the President's principal military advisers. They would be called upon to carry out military and political decisions reached in the White House between the President and a small group of trusted civilian advisers.

Hugh Sidey, who covers the White House for *Time-Life*, provides insight into Johnson's ideas about military men in general in his book, *A Very Personal Presidency:*

> His deep suspicions of the military went back to his first days in the Congress . . . he was given a seat on Carl Vinson's powerful Naval Affairs Committee. There he watched the high brass parade, and he was disturbed. He found that too many military men grew arrogant behind the ribbons they wore on their chests. He found them contemptuous of new ideas, mean and thoughtless in dealing with those below them. He detected an alarming amount of sheer stupidity which was self-perpetuating because of the academy caste system. He found no companionship with military men. . . . In fact, the general level of competence which Johnson found among the admirals who came before the Naval Affairs Committee convinced him that the nation could not put its complete trust in the military in such hazardous times. How America met the threat had to be planned in detail, in Johnson's view, by the politicians.
>
> This lack of confidence in the officer corps never really left Johnson . . . he felt that the military men almost always were too narrow in their appraisals of a given problem, often ignoring the political implications in the United States or the reaction abroad . . . Johnson could be merciless when he told about the generals. None got harsher treatment than the old bomber pilot Curt LeMay, chief of the Air Force under Kennedy and Johnson. LeMay was credited with having offered the advice for the air war in North Vietnam. "We ought to bomb them back into the stone age." . . . Johnson subscribed heartily to an axiom that Kennedy propounded before his death. One night in his office with friends, JFK said, "Once you decide to send the bombers, you want men like LeMay flying them. But you can't let them decide if they should go or not."[48]

Johnson's own military experience was limited to one tour as a lieutenant commander in the Navy during World War II.

> . . . going into uniform as a Navy Lieutenant Commander on December 14, 1941. He had a desk job in San Francisco from then until May 6, [1942] when he went into the Pacific as President Roosevelt's personal emissary. He arrived in the war sector on May 14. One month and four days later his tour of duty was over; a fever kept him in Australia a few more days but he was back in the States and out of uniform by July 16, 1942.[49]

As President Johnson assumed office, he inherited a foreign policy formulating structure modified to meet the needs and desires of a predecessor keenly interested in foreign affairs and impatient with bureaucracy.

> President Kennedy, acting on the advice of McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow, scrapped the entire structure of the National Security Council and chose to rely on small groups of flexible composition that were given responsibility for both policy formulation and execution with respect to particular countries, regions, or functional problems.[50]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had similarly been written off by President Kennedy and eclipsed by the rising power of Secretary McNamara. This was a meager legacy for a new President who was passionately interested in domestic affairs and who had little interest in foreign and military affairs. As Townsend Hoopes points out:

> President Johnson, a man of little background and much uncertainty in foreign affairs, had inherited an organization for their conduct that had been made deliberately loose and flexible by President Kennedy, a man of broad knowledge, intuitive grasp, and determined initiative in that field. This inheritance, which adversely affected both the scope of deliberations on Vietnam policy and the quality of President Johnson's decisions from the fall of 1964 onwards, showed itself in the structural weakness of the National Security Council and in inadequate attention to longer-range policy planning. The principal results were fragmented debate, loose coordination, and an excessive concentration on problems of the moment.[51]

Early in his administration, Johnson could have conceivably changed U.S. policy in Vietnam. His administration was new, and in Vietnam President Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were dead.* During the next 18 months, 10 other South Vietnamese Governments were to rise and fall.

It was a time of great instability. Many speculate as to what President Kennedy would have done about Vietnam had he lived. Some think that he would have replaced Rusk and Rostow.[53] But given Johnson's lack of expertise in foreign affairs, he chose to keep Rusk and Rostow, with Rostow eventually replacing McGeorge Bundy in 1966 as the President's National Security Affairs adviser. Given the same set of advisers and his own uncertainty, there was not much chance that Johnson would set a different course in Vietnam. "Understandably, President Johnson's opening policy theme was "Let us continue"; and just as he inherited the Kennedy Policies, so also the presidential elections still loomed

*President Diem and his brother were deposed largely as the result of an uncoordinated message which President Kennedy released because he thought that Rusk and McNamara concurred with it. The message let it be known in South Vietnam that U.S. aid would continue even if President Diem were removed from office.[52] The death of Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu was not intended by the Vietnamese generals. They were killed by a South Vietnamese Army major who had a personal grudge against them.

> rapidly would, at the very least, have materially impeded Hanoi's aid to the Vietcong and might have shaken the North Vietnamese hierarchy.[61]

Undoubtedly the bombing as conducted by President Johnson made life more difficult for the North Vietnamese,[62] but it had little effect on the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam.[63] The long and drawn-out bombing episode provoked criticism of the United States both at home and abroad and was to prove to be a stumbling block rather than an inducement to negotiations.

The frustrations of the military became known to the Congress who tried to intercede with the President:

> During a bombing pause [President Johnson] received a call from an influential Senator who offered some pointed military advice. "Mr. President," said the caller, "you've got to win this thing now. You've got to go for the jugular. I urge you to turn this war over to your military commanders. They are the men who know how to wage war, and they will win it." Johnson did not hesitate in his answer. "Not as long as I am President. As long as I sit here, the control will stay with the Commander-in-Chief." The Senator persisted: "We've got to win it.... That's why Roosevelt and Truman were so great. They let their military leaders do the job." Again Johnson had an answer. "I was around in those days," he said. "There were not many decisions made that Roosevelt did not know about. And Harry Truman watched everything closely.... I'm not going to let the hounds loose."[64]

Paradoxically, while the President exercised minute control over the bombing, he was generally content to allow his commander in the field, Gen. William C. Westmoreland and later Gen. Creighton Abrams to conduct operations in South Vietnam without interference.[65] Unfortunately Johnson's strategy of "gradualism" was not compatible with the strategy of "attrition" being pursued by the U.S. Saigon Command.

Returning to the model relationship, it cautions:

> ... While military strategy may determine whether the aims of policy are possible of attainment, *policy may, beforehand, determine largely the success or failure of military strategy.* It behooves policy to ensure not only that military strategy pursue appropriate aims, but that the work of strategy be alloted adequate means and *be undertaken under the most favorable conditions.* (Emphasis added.)[66]

Apparently, Johnson had great admiration for his top commanders in Vietnam.[67] He was willing to provide them with almost anything that they wanted in terms of troops, material, and funds.[68] But he was not willing, despite repeated pleas by the JCS, to call up the Reserves whose combat support and combat service support units were badly needed. As a result, the support structure for the war came "out of the hide" of the active forces. The mobilization of the Reserves might have gotten the Nation involved in the war and perhaps behind the war effort, but Johnson's rule was "guns *and* butter." Thus the war was fought by a small professional cadre of officers and noncommissioned officers leading a force of conscripts who, as time went on, became increasingly aware of the inequity of the Nation's being involved in a major war while it was business as usual on Main Street. Johnson was willing to provide free mail service, ice cream, post exchanges—anything to make life in Southeast Asia more bearable—but he did not provide what was really needed

—a war policy which would permit his commanders to achieve the national aims.

Having dwelt upon Presidents Kennedy and Johnson up to this point in our discussion of civil-military relations in the Government, we now turn to the role played by Robert S. McNamara who, as the eighth Secretary of Defense, served longer in this capacity than any other man in history. During his tenure the military power of the United States rose to its highest point since World War II while the influence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sank to an all-time low.

Mr. McNamara, prior to his brief stint in the military during World War II, spent most of his adult life in school either as a teacher or a student. After World War II he went to the Ford Motor Company and in 14 years worked his way up to the presidency.[69]

Although McNamara's energy, dedication, and methods were impressive enough to result in his selection as the first non-Ford-family president in the history of the company, his reliance on numbers and measures sometimes led him astray.

> . . . Many Ford men became dubious of the whole statistical analysis approach when the company halted production of an Edsel automobile. "It was killed," insisted one executive, "not because of its repulsive front grill or because we were slow building a strong sales team but because McNamara's charts showed there was no more market for a medium-priced car—something General Motors promptly disproved. "Those charts," the executive dryly noted, "give you funny answers sometimes."[70]

While Mr. McNamara was working his way to the top of the Ford Motor Company, a number of changes were being made in the Pentagon which would someday allow Mr. McNamara to dominate the JCS just as he had his staff at the Ford Motor Company.

Paradoxically, the high-water mark of JCS influence occurred during World War II when the JCS did not officially exist. President Roosevelt reposed such trust and confidence in the Chiefs that " . . . he refused to issue a formal definition of JCS duties and functions, arguing that a written charter might hamper the Joint Chiefs of Staff in extending their activities as necessary to meet the requirements of the war."[71]

Beginning with the National Security Act of 1947, the role of the JCS began to be prescribed and circumscribed. As the threat posed by the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union grew, there were serious and honest disagreements among the armed services over the best method of containing the threat. This controversy was naturally reflected in the JCS as the Chiefs attempted to define the best military strategy. Fairly or unfairly, these deep concerns earned a bad image for the JCS, and it was said around Washington that " . . . The Congress debates, the Supreme Court deliberates but the Joint Chiefs bicker." In an effort to minimize the effect of this bickering on defense policy, the Congress and the Executive took a number of actions which greatly increased the authority and control of the Secretary of Defense over the service components.

In 1953 the JCS were taken out of the chain of command so that it ran from the President to the Secretary of Defense through the civilian service secretaries to the commanders in the field. In 1958 the service secretaries were taken out of the chain of command, and the JCS were given operational *responsibility* for the unified and specified commands but were specifically forbidden any executive *authority*. The scope of the Chairman's duties was increased, giving him more influence over his fellow members, but at the same time a formal restraint was placed on easy communication between the JCS and the Congress. Free communi-

cation with the President was, of course, inhibited by the chain of command.[72]

By 1960 the stage was set for Robert McNamara. Seizing the initiative and armed with the requisite legal authority and the unqualified backing of President Kennedy, Secretary McNamara began to bring all activities in the Defense Department under his own control. Central to this effort was Mr. McNamara's conviction that, ". . . the direction of the Department of Defense demands not only a strong, responsible civilian control, but a Secretary's role that consists of active, imaginative and decisive leadership of the establishment at large, and not the passive practice of simply refereeing the disputes of traditional and partisan factions."[73]

The first step was to change the rules by which decisions about military strategy and procurement were made. To do this McNamara brought into his office a staff of systems analysts. McNamara and his staff felt that the generals and admirals relied too much on their judgment and experience as a basis for decisions. The generals and admirals felt that some things just could not be quantified and had to be decided on the basis of judgment and experience. Over the McNamara years the battle centered on just where this fine line lay.

The outcome of this struggle was vital to the future roles the generals and admirals were to play. For the systems analysts the contest was not as crucial. Systems analysis had proven itself to be a useful management tool, and its future was assured. The future was not so certain for senior military officers because if almost everything could be quantified and rationalized mathematically, then generals and admirals were simply anachronisms in every regard except for holding command in the field. If intuitive judgment and professional experience were to be relegated to a minor role in the decisionmaking process, then general and flag officers are not needed anymore at the highest levels of the Defense Establishment because it is primarily for their judgment and experience that they hold positions in the defense staff.

Traumatic as the McNamara experience was, it was certainly not without benefit to the military. ". . . Probably McNamara's most significant contribution to military strength," said one veteran, was that "he forced the Services to get at the heart of their own basic logic on why they want things."[74]

It took the military services a while to adapt to the new rules in the Pentagon, and a number of new faces were brought in to cope with McNamara's "whiz kids." It was not long before each military service formed its own staff of systems analysts who were just as knowledgeable and bright as the ones from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The benefit of subjecting service originated plans and proposals to systems analysis had become obvious. At the same time the services learned that by using certain assumptions one could make the answer come out most any way that was desired.[75] The manipulation of these assumptions became, in fact, the basis for the fundamental disagreement between OSD and the services. Reports of this practice on the part of OSD began to circulate, and McNamara's honeymoon with the ever-watchful Congress began to end. Nowhere was this and the struggle for existence by the generals and admirals more clearly demonstrated than in the controversy over the TFX.

Both the Navy and the Air Force were badly in need of a new attack aircraft, a new air-superiority aircraft, a new interceptor, and new reconnaissance aircraft. It seemed logical to McNamara that one airplane could be built to do all or most of these missions and that one airplane could be made suitable for use by both services. However, there were three obstacles to prevent the accomplishment of this

worthy goal. First, the Navy and the Air Force operated from entirely different environments. The Navy airplane would have to be launched by catapult from the deck of an aircraft carrier and recovered by slamming into the carrier's deck and catching its tailhook on a wire. The Air Force aircraft would have to operate from the ground and be subjected to dust and debris not found at sea. Secondly, the state of the art was not such to permit the combination of all the desired capabilities into one airframe that anyone could maintain. Third, and perhaps most serious, no Secretary of Defense had ever before told the services that they must combine everything into one airplane, told them how it was to be used, told them that they must all use the same aircraft, and told them just which aircraft manufacturer was going to produce it.

Before it was all over, the TFX issue became complicated by charges of intellectual corruption on the part of the analysts in OSD as well as under political manipulation of the procedure whereby the contract was awarded to General Dynamics over Boeing. In the final analysis, however, the military view was vindicated when it turned out that the TFX could not do what OSD and General Dynamics said that it would do and when it cost more than twice what OSD said that it would.[76] The Navy found that the TFX (or F-111 as it came to be called) was too heavy to land on carrier decks. The Air Force Tactical Air Command found that the F-111's performance was no match for what was known about Russian fighters already in mass production. Ironically, it was the Air Force Strategic Air Command that was made to take the F-111 as the FB-111 and put it in the inventory for a role not originally envisioned by McNamara—as a low-level nuclear bomber.[77]

If the TFX issue was a microcosm of the struggle for supremacy in the Pentagon, then its failure was an example of the consequences of ignoring the advice of the professional military. There was little solace in the TFX episode for anyone, and if it was a victory for the JCS it was clearly Pyrrhic.

McNamara and the JCS would continue to struggle, but in almost every case the Secretary would be the winner as long as he enjoyed the strong backing of the President. "Never before had a Defense Secretary enjoyed such rapport with and unqualified backing from the White House. 'I couldn't accomplish anything over here without Presidential support,' he had once said. 'It is absolutely fundamental. I wouldn't and couldn't stay here one minute without it.'"[78]

When White House aides pointed the finger at the JCS after the Bay of Pigs, McNamara waited a week before he bothered to issue a halfhearted rebuttal. When General Lemnitzer pointed out that OSD had not given the JCS time to consider McNamara's directive on how developments in space would be pursued, he was ignored.[79] When McNamara and Admiral Anderson clashed, Anderson was sent to Portugal.

Despite difficulties, disagreements, and almost open warfare between the OSD staff and the JCS and service staffs, Mr. McNamara continued to meet with the JCS at almost every Monday afternoon meeting. As time went on the discussions became less and the silences grew longer until, toward the end of McNamara's reign, Mr. McNamara and the Chiefs just sat around the table and looked at each other across a silent chasm that had grown too wide for any of them to bridge.

Mr. McNamara was and is a sincere and dedicated patriot. Much of what he did for the Defense Establishment was beneficial, but the reality is that his abrupt managerial methods, his lack of understanding of the values prized so highly by his military subordinates, and his chilling personality prevented him from accomplishing all that he could

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have, and thus many of his changes failed to outlive his own tenure.

The lack of "understanding between the civil representatives of the State and the leaders of the Armed Forces" was manifestly evident from 1961 to 1968. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, though different in many ways, shared a certain distrust of the views offered by the JCS. The McNamara secretaryship challenged the military on their home ground and placed them on the defensive.

Unfortunately this serious internal conflict took place at a time when decisions were made that pitted the might and prestige of the United States in a new and, in many ways, frustrating environment. While the intentions of the men involved were clearly the best, the result of the adversorial relationship which developed between the civilian and military leaderships of this country (particularly when viewed in light of the Vietnam experience) has had a most grievous effect on national security.

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If genuine civil control over the military is the ideal, as most observers suggest, then the President and the Congress not only are obliged to define the role of the military, but also to protect the role of the military. The military can defend the Nation, but it may not be able to defend itself.

The military will most likely play whatever role is allotted to it by civil authority regardless of how it sees its own role; however, when invited to enter the political arena, it becomes difficult for senior military officers to resist the siren call to become "soldier-statesmen."

There is little in the background of the average American President to prepare him for the awesome task of becoming the Nation's grand strategist. The wise President seeks the counsel of his military leaders. He is not compelled to accept their advice, but it would seem that wisdom would dictate that he at least listen, and, further, wisdom would dictate that he insist that the military observe the precepts of their profession and offer "purely" military advice.

The civil-military environment in which the JCS operated during the Kennedy-Johnson era was marked by degrees of prejudice, pride, arrogance, and dillettantism. The attitudes and actions of both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were affected by their prejudices regarding the military. The frictions that grew between Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs found their roots in the seedbed of McNamara's enormous pride and intellectual arrogance. Dilettantism was practiced by all three men.

In the end it is the President and the Congress who should determine the role of force in each situation, but the military can best define the capability of that force to achieve the given policy objective. If it is the duty of the civil authorities not to misapply military power, then it is the duty of the

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Lt. Col. William A. Hamilton, U.S. Army, did his undergraduate work at the University of Oklahoma in government, attended the School of Law at Oklahoma, and has earned a master's degree in international affairs from The George Washington University. His primary operational experience has been with infantry where in Vietnam he served as G-3 Operations Officer for the Headquarters of the 1st Air Cavalry Division and held the similar position with the 2d Battalion of the 5th Cavalry. Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton is a graduate of the College of Naval Command and Staff and is currently serving as Commanding Officer of the 2d Battalion of the 509th Infantry.

military not to overstate the capabilities of its forces and to make it abundantly clear in a given situation just what the forces can and cannot be expected to accomplish.

Unfortunately, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations saw neither the need for, nor the virtue of independent, *professional* military advice on policy matters which were fundamentally military in nature.

There are exceptions to all rules, and there are times when it is better to operate outside the proven and traditional parameters; however, improvisation over the long term will eventually exact its price, and the price in the 1960's might well be called—Vietnam.

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I suggest that great care be exercised lest the Office of the Secretary of Defense, instead of being a small and efficient unit which determines the policies of the Military Establishment and controls and directs the Departments, feeding on its own growth, becomes a separate empire.

Ferdinant Eberstadt: To the Senate Armed Services Committee, 1949

THE CHALLENGE OF LOGISTICS:

AN OPEN LETTER

by

Captain Clarence O. Fiske, U.S. Navy

In conversation, a longtime friend of the Navy suggested to me the need to upgrade logistics so as to make it more attractive to line officers. He thought it worthwhile to highlight the recent increase of the rank levels of the Chief of Naval Material and the Vice Chief to four-star and three-star ranks, respectively, and felt the next logical step would be to upgrade the Service Force Commanders' job to three stars. He analyzed the general material condition of our naval forces and concluded that logistics performance would continue to hamper future combat effectiveness, especially sustained operations.

I, for one, would support his general thesis. Daily, from the mass of information that I read in the Directorate for Logistics in the Joint Staff and in the College of Naval Warfare, I have become increasingly aware that the combat readiness and effectiveness of our major operational commands is hampered by real logistical restraints.

The post-Southeast Asia era of evaluation is here, as evidenced by the Long-Range Logistics Manpower Policy Board, the Blue Ribbon Panel, and the Joint Logistics Review Board. These high-level efforts to focus on the problems of logistics and personnel are quite normal and represent the usual after-the-fact analysis that is paid to our management of major conflict situations. I believe it is an opportune time to provide something in this field that is constructive for the Navy.

The military services are highly sensitive to the role of logistics in both peace and wartime environments and are all endeavoring to encourage some of their best officers to pursue duty in the field. The Long-Range Logistics Manpower Policy Board saw fit to concern itself with the image of logistics. Most "top drawer" line naval officers of junior, middle, and senior ranks fully understand the virtue of command at sea, but view the assignment to duty in logistic billets anywhere as "Endsville." This low opinion of logistics is fairly pervasive throughout the Navy and has evolved over many years. Any change to this attitude will have to be generational and evolutionary in nature.

Fortunately for the Navy, the general lack of interest by line officers to seek challenging jobs in logistics, per se, has not seriously jeopardized overall Navy logistical support. In fact, naval support of combat operations in Southeast Asia has been quite excellent. Moreover, with a variety of forces, all having intrinsic mobility, the Navy enjoys an inherent logistic capability which continues to be appreciatively admired by the other services and our allies. Nevertheless, this valuable Navy characteristic does not seem to generate suitable pride of participation within our officer corps, particularly in line officers.

Moreover, this attitude of the line officer is inconsistent with the real world at sea. Every combatant commanding officer actually expends a good

part of every working day on logistic matters. It is seldom that the commanding officer of a ship or an aircraft squadron does not concern himself for the better part of each working day with such things as the best opportunity for replenishment or maintenance availability or tracing the progress of a vital spare part or estimating the credibility he can put into the operating effectiveness of the 3M program. In achieving these and other real logistic objectives, line officers tend to think of the commanding officer's logistic efforts as some unknown, unnamed, vague, and otherwise something else. There is a great habitual lack of identification between the word *logistics* and the many varied command actions which fall within its definition.*

It is my impression that there is a widespread superficial thought among naval officers that logistic problems are resolved in some obscure and distant staff, by supply officers, bureaucrats, or people at some unnamed support activity—all remote from line and command functions. In general, naval officers tend to view logistics as synonymous with supply, a staff function, and nothing could be further from the truth. Instead of seeking to remedy this state of affairs, we have retrogressed in identifying Navy logistic functions factually. In the past, the now defunct Fleet Logistic Air Wings were a constant semantic reminder of naval logistic presence and mobility, as were the old bureaus, although they did not use logistics in their titles. It seems that we in the Navy have never used the word properly. Years ago the line engineering officer at sea thought of the Bureau of Engineering as his technical "papa san." He particularly noted that the Chief of the Bureau was an unrestricted line officer and that some outstanding officers did take the Operating Engineering PG course (like Adm. U.S.G. Sharp). Even in those days, logistics functions within the Engineering, Ordnance, and Aeronautic Bureaus were not so named. In time, the Chief's job became engineering duty only (EDO): the Bureau title disappeared, the career attractiveness to line officers atrophied, the supporting postgraduate school course disappeared, there was less direct Bureau interest and attention to operating than in building new ships—fleet maintenance seemed to suffer—and now today, competent operating engineering officers are in critical supply.

Such an evolution, taking place in all seagoing departments (and the addition of many new postgraduate courses since 1945) has camouflaged and confused sea-shore-sea subspecialty patterns for the younger officers, especially at that critical time in their careers when they must "elect" a subspecialty. Nonweapons or platform-type fields such as foreign relations, systems and operations analysis, and management are the postgraduate fields that portray attractive careers with glitter, glamour, and publicity. Against these, logistics does not appear very interesting. Yet, no future navy can do without it. Year by year logistics becomes more technical, more complex, and more necessary, quantitatively. All these aspects further complicate the "need-satisfaction" equation offered to young officers in

*JCS Pub. 1 defines logistics as:

> The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services.

(For a more comprehensive description of logistics, see *Naval War College Review*, December 1970, "Evolution of the Concept of Logistics," by Lt. Col. G.W. Rider, USAF.)

relation to their decision to seek logistic experience. Many a naval officer has yet to learn a fundamental logistic principle: Logistics planning must be conducted on a concurrent, coordinated, and integrated basis with operations planning.

The logistics discipline needs more visibility, and more realism should be attached to it in our day-to-day operations. We should give logistics its due by elevating the term to the level of such prominent shipboard terms as operations, readiness, and administration. Ashore it must compete against programing, budgeting, or plans and policy. If the term logistics and its meaning were to be accepted realistically in the minds of all naval officers as a visible and major function of at-sea command in the Navy, then more promising officers would come to feel at home, competent, and would achieve career satisfaction with logistic billets afloat and ashore.

In this connection it is gratifying to note that the Chief of Naval Material affords logistics a prominent place in his organization. There is a Fleet Maintenance and Logistics Support Directorate in the Naval Ship Systems Command, an Assistant Commander for Logistics Fleet Support and an International Logistics Office in the Naval Air Systems Command, and a Deputy Chief of Naval Material for Logistic Support. While this is a step in the right direction, the generalist versus specialist syndrome that exists will still deter middle-grade officers from seeking duty in logistics-related jobs. This attitude would be dispelled as soon as a significant number of the early selectees for lieutenant commander through flag rank come from this type of background. The recent move to designate certain model desks or project managers as "major command" equivalents is also a step in the right direction. Clearly it is time for action, and this brings me to my final point before I get down to some suggestions for improvement.

We must get away from the idea that necessary forces and assets will always be available to support an operation or plan. Greater emphasis must be placed on *capabilities* planning in the future. This is *requirements* planning, and our failure to plan around available assets is indicative of the weakness in so many of our current plans. We need good analysts—capabilities planners—who can look at what is available and then advise their commander on the prospects for the attainment of specified goals within existing logistical limitations. (This opens the door to another way to derive strategy, but that subject is best left to another paper.)

These are some of the things we can do now:

- *Realistic use of the word "logistics"*

—Retitle appropriate fleet commands and billets. Rename the present Service Forces "Logistic Forces."

—Identify logistic billets in major fleet and type commander staffs and designate them with "Logistic" in the new titles.

—Centralize supply, maintenance, medical, transportation, and construction functions under a Fleet or Force Logistics Officer. Despite our new Naval Training Command, we might even throw in relevant aspects of training!

- *Broaden the scope and utilization of our present logisticians*

From time to time, we should detail highly qualified line officers to detached tours within industries related to logistic management. This would provide a nucleus of talent for such industry-related jobs in the Navy as container operations, port and terminal operation, petroleum, transporation, construction industries, or public utilities and communications. Use of such a procedure would give the Navy a group of high performing officers, knowledgeable and proficient in broad logistical matters. From their ranks could be

drawn selected individuals for further training and assignment to joint or combined duty in logistic billets and assignments as faculty members at the senior service colleges or in secretarial offices in DOD.

• *Highlight all commanding officer duties into the broad areas of activity such as operations, logistics, and administration*

Consider revising chapter 7 of Navy Regulations to identify current command tasks or responsibilities as logistic functions of the commander. Inclusion of such a paragraph in Navy Regulations would place logistic management and planning in a realistic context. It would ameliorate the erroneous conception that logistics is more a function of the supply specialty and Shore Establishment than a line seagoing management tool or task.

• *Seek more formal investment in acquiring experience in logistics*

Increase the opportunity for line officers and those with appropriate specialty designators to attend advanced management schools at Monterey and Harvard, or other comparable institutions such as logistic schools of the other services and our allies. This latter thought is right in line with CNO's latest Z-gram (Z-100), the PEP Program.

Develop a correspondence or reading list course based on joint logistic planning documents such as Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) (JCS Pub. 2), Joint Logistics and Personnel Policy Guidance (JCS Pub. 3), Organization and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS Pub. 4), and the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS); the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and Joint Reporting System (JRS); and a selected bibliography of leading works by both military and civilian authors, such as those by Eccles and Dyer, and include pertinent DOD and Navy directives. For example, while every officer should thoroughly understand DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, few have ever heard of it. Both the Regular and Reserve Navy would benefit from a better understanding of joint logistic planning in the environment of the unified command.

• *Accentuate using logistic expertise*

Assign a larger number of our graduates from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces to logistic management and planning billets within the Department of Defense and the Navy.

• *Reexamination of a logistic subspecialty, formal or informal*

Officers serving in supply, procurement, munitions, maintenance, and construction management positions are actively involved in building an equity in a logistic subspecialty. The Army formally certificates an officer as "Logistician of the Army" once certain training and duty assignments have been fulfilled. Perhaps we need a similar program in the Navy.

It may be worthwhile for our experts to look into the DOD Intelligence Career Development Program (DOD Directive 5010.10) to determine

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Capt. Clarence O. Fiske, U.S. Navy, has an extensive background in logistics and strategic planning. A naval aviator, he has served in the Fleet Logistics Air Wing (VR-2); the Military Airlift Command, the Capabilities Branch of the Logistics Directorate J-4(JCS), as Special Project Officer to Commander, Military Sealift Transportation Service, special consultant for five polar operations involving advance base construction, and on the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Atlantic Command. He holds a master's degree in political science, is a graduate of the General Line School and the College of Naval Warfare and at present he is the Head of the Military Strategy Study in the latter college.

whether there would be utility in a similar program for a logistics career pattern. It may well be that we could use an assured input of officers dedicated to a line logistics specialty career.

The net effect of these actions would be to reinforce the learning process of individual officers and substantiate a new emphasis on enhanced career advancement through duty assignments in logistic-related billets. In February 1969 Admiral Clarey stated, "... we have permitted, in recent years, hardware acquisitions to preoccupy our decision process at some real sufferance to the professional preparation of our people, upon whom our Navy's success is singularly dependent as measured by its performance." It may well be that the best approach to our *people problem* related to logistics—as one career path—would be to order a few of the most promising officers and top performers from lieutenant commanders to captain to billets specifically identified as logistic in nature. The future progress of such officers by promotion and assignment to command is the best means of advertisement, readily understood by all, and should do much to destroy the "gut feeling" that duty in logistics is bad for a line career. I, for one, believe it can be both a *challenging* and *rewarding* career.

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... Logistics considerations belong not only in the highest echelons of military planning during the process of preparation for war and for specific wartime operations, but may well become the controlling element with relation to timing and successful operation.

ADM Oscar C. Badger, USN, "Principles of Command and Logistics," U.S. Naval War College Information Service for Officers, December 1951

Naval War College Review, Vol. 25 [1972], No. 4, Art. 1

Nowhere else are the elements of strategy and tactics essential to military success more dramatically etched than in the accounts of past military disasters. Although U.S. forces have logged an impressive record in the field of amphibious operations in recent history, this has not always been the case. Turning back to the War of American Independence, we have, in the following account of the ill-fated colonial expedition to Penobscot Bay, an object lesson in the fundamentals of any military operation which in this case were observed in the breach.

THE AMERICAN NAVAL EXPEDITION TO PENOBSCOT, 1779

An article prepared

by

Ensign Craig L. Symonds, U.S. Naval Reserve

In the summer of 1779, while the major land battles of the American Revolutionary War were being fought in the Carolinas, one of the first American amphibious operations in history was being prepared in New England against a British base which dominated the harbor at Penobscot Bay. The attacking American Fleet consisted of 19 warships armed with 345 guns in all. Opposing this armada was a British squadron of only three ships, mounting but 56 guns. Yet, for some reason, the American Fleet lay anchored in Penobscot Bay for 3 weeks, unable or unwilling to come to grips with the much smaller fleet of the British Navy. Likewise the American Militia, after a successful landing, merely entrenched itself in fortifications without ever seriously challenging the British troops for possession of the port.

Despite its dramatic failure, this expedition demonstrated that a combined naval-infantry operation might be feasible if led by a responsible and courageous commander. Unfortunately, that description can hardly be applied to Commodore Dudley Saltonstall, who must accept responsibility for the Penobscot fiasco. By examining this early American amphibious operation, one may gain a greater appreciation of the dangers and pitfalls inherent in any amphibious operation, regardless of sophistication of weapons and tactics employed.

In mid-June 1779, some 800 British regular troops and Scottish Highlanders, under orders from Whitehall, were transported to the coast of Maine near the city of Castine. Castine was not a vital strategic point in the war of the American Revolution, but its large and well-protected harbor in Penobscot Bay provided an excellent location for a shipping base. Maine at that time was

still a part of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the patriotic citizens of that State were angered by the thought that a British base lay within their territory. "When the news of the British occupation reached Boston, the general court was in session, and it was soon determined to drive out the enemy if possible, before he had time to strengthen his position."[1]

In Boston Harbor an expedition was readied with unusual speed. The small navy of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was to lead the fleet, while privateers were encouraged to join with the promise that the government would make good any losses suffered as a result of their participation. Twelve privately owned vessels finally agreed to accompany the expedition under these conditions. The Massachusetts Navy consisted of three brigs: the *Hazard*, the *Active*, and the *Tyrannicide*—each of which was armed with 14 guns. The privateers were, in several cases, more powerfully gunned than the navy ships. Four of the privately owned ships carried 20 guns each, four carried 18, while the remaining four carried from eight to 16. In addition to these 15 ships, the armada also included the *Hampton*, a New Hampshire Navy ship of 20 guns.

The preparation of this formidable fleet for sea was quickly completed, but before it could set sail, it was reinforced even further by the arrival in Boston Harbor of a squadron of Continental Navy ships under the command of Commodore Dudley Saltonstall. The command of the proposed expedition was immediately offered to the distinguished Saltonstall, and he promptly accepted. The addition of the Continental Navy vessels brought to 19 the total number of warships and greatly increased the overall firepower of the fleet. Saltonstall's flagship was the 32-gun frigate *Warren*, designed by Joshua Humphreys especially to serve in the Continental Navy and one of the most beautiful ships in the service of the Americans. The other ships of his squadron were the 14-gun brig *Diligent*, under the command of Captain Brown, and the sloop *Providence* with its 12 guns, under Captain Hacker. The latter ship was another famous vessel, having once been commanded by John Paul Jones.

This formidable fleet of armed vessels was to accompany an even larger fleet of transport vessels on which were embarked the landing forces of the expedition under the command of Brig. Gen. Soloman Lovell of the Massachusetts Militia. Generals Cushing and Thompson, who were the commanders of the militia of Lincoln and Cumberland Counties, respectively, had been ordered to furnish 600 men each, while Brigadier General Frost of York County was ordered to provide 300 men. Despite the fact that 1,500 men had been ordered to Boston for the expedition, just over 1,000 actually reported.

Although most of the men supplied their own arms, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts provided an additional 500 muskets for the expedition. Even more importantly, the Massachusetts troops were also well supplied with powder and ammunition, for loaded on board the transports were 50,000 musket cartridges, an equal number of balls, and six barrels of powder. Other supplies included six fieldpieces, 200 artillery rounds, and all "the necessary supplies and camp furniture."[2]

On Monday, the 19th of July, the initial group of 16 warships and 20 transport vessels put out from Nantasket Roads. Two days later, on the 21st, the fleet arrived at the small seaport village of Townsend where the militia and the rest of the naval fleet were waiting. Two more days were spent in getting these troops ready to embark and in planning the strategy of this, the largest American naval expedition ever assembled. Finally, on Friday the 23d, the militia embarked amid much confusion. The next morning the

fleet left Townsend and "favored by a pleasant N.W. gale, arrived at Penobscot Bay. . . ."[3]

Prelude to Battle. The bay at Penobscot is a widemouthed and very deep harbor dotted with dozens of large and small islands. The entrance to the protected inner portion of the bay is divided by a narrow strip of land appropriately called Long Island. The British fort was located just beyond this island on a peninsula jutting out into the bay and commanding the principal passage into the inner harbor (see map). Having sighted the entrance to Penobscot Bay, the American Fleet took the rest of the day to tack up the inlet and draw within sight of their ultimate objective. About 2 o'clock the following afternoon, the fleet anchored off Magebagiduce Harbor wherein lay the three British sloops of war that had escorted the British soldiers to Castine.



Source: Gardner W. Allen, *A Naval History of the American Revolution* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), v. II, p. 425.

The British ships were the *North*, of 20 guns; the *Albany* of 18 guns; and the *Nautilus*, also of 18 guns. On the peninsula itself an enormous British flag flew above the hastily erected dirt fort which enclosed the redcoated soldiers of His Majesty's Army. According to a witness on board the privateer ship *Hunter*, "the whole made a very formidable appearance."[4]

While the sailors in the American Fleet thought the defensive works prepared by the British looked rather formidable, they were in reality improvised dirt walls never higher than 4 feet anywhere along the length of the fort. "The fort at this time was ill prepared to resist an enemy."[5] On the northern face of the fort the walls were only 4 feet in height, and the sides were merely gentle slopes topped by a low stone fence. From the rear the fort was completely undefended, there being only a slight depression in the ground to mark the edge of the fort. There was a moat or ditch around the walls, but it was nowhere over 3 feet deep. "So low were the walls that a soldier was heard to say that he could jump over them with a musket in each hand."[6] What was even more remarkable was the fact that not a single piece of artillery had been mounted anywhere in the fort. The platforms for the cannon had not even been prepared.

The British commander at the fort, General McLean, had intended to prepare a permanent fortress on the peninsula, but he received word of the impending American expedition in July and immediately set his men to work preparing emergency fortifications. "His troops were kept vigorously at work by night and day," so that when the American Fleet was sighted rounding Nautilus Island in the center of the bay, the British "fort" consisted of a U-shaped dirt wall surrounded by a shallow ditch.[7] The very day that the American Fleet anchored just out of range of the fort, the British managed to

mount a few cannon on shore, but it was not until the next day, the 26th, that the fort was actually inhabited by the British troops.

It was fortunate for the British defenders that the American forces were not disposed to act immediately. The afternoon of the 25th, the American warships sailed up to within range and fired a few broadsides at the fort and then retreated back up the bay. The fort answered the American cannonade by firing their few hastily emplaced cannon, but according to one observer, the shots were fired "with little annoyance" to either side.[8]

Faced by an overwhelming enemy fleet, the three British sloops shifted their anchorage to a point farther back in the bay, where they would be protected by the guns of the fort. Their withdrawal gave the Americans the first opportunity to land troops. Heretofore they had been afraid that the British ships would be used to harass the landing, but their new anchorage, away from the prospective landing site, obviated such fears.

The first goal of any landing party necessarily was the British battery on Nautilus Island, for so long as the British commanded both the island and the mainland, the Americans would be subject to a crossfire. Consequently, at about 6 o'clock in the evening of 26 July, some 200 militia landed on an unprotected shore of Nautilus Island. Since the British post was manned by less than 20 marines, the Americans were easily able to overrun the post and capture the battery. But the main landing of troops on the peninsula was delayed until the following day.

The next morning, Commodore Saltonstall convened a council of war on board his flagship, the *Warren*. The consensus of the ship captains at this meeting was that the marines on the Navy ships should join the militia in making a mass landing on the western edge of the peninsula. The new location of the British warships precluded a landing on the southern or eastern sides, but those ships would be unable to interfere at all with a landing on the western shore. It was agreed that two of the larger privateers would cover the landing which would be made that evening under cover of darkness.

At about 2 o'clock on the morning of the 28th, the privateers *Hunter* and *Sky-Rocket* preceded the transport vessels in approaching the landing site. At 4 o'clock the two ships opened fire while the militia clambered into their landing boats. The beach in front of them was a very narrow strip of sand, and directly behind it was "a very high hill full of trees, brush, and craggy rocks, where two or three hundred Highlanders and some Britons lay in ambush."[9]

The 200 marines and 200 militia piled ashore and picked their way up the stony beach in the darkness. Their landing had been preceded by a half-hour bombardment of the land behind the beach, but that cannonade did not succeed in driving off the British troops. As soon as the Americans landed, the Britons on the high ground behind the beach began to fire upon them with musketry. In the first few minutes, 16 men were killed and as many wounded. Nevertheless, the Americans "returned the fire, ascended the most impassible [sic] precipice, routed them and took possession of the hill. . . ."[10] It should be noted that the party of Americans who ascended the hill and forced the British from their strong position were nearly all marines; a contemporary stated that the militia stayed behind hugging the beach and taking cover behind the large boulders that lined the water's edge. Consequently, it was the marines that suffered the most in the battle. Their commander, a captain of marines from the *Warren*, was killed in the assault along with 29 others.

General Lovell expressed great optimism after this successful assault despite the loss of 30 men. "We are

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within 100 rods of the enemies [sic] main fort, on a commanding piece of ground," he reported. "I hope soon to have the satisfaction of informing you of the capture of the whole army."[11] Future events, however, failed to confirm the general's bold prophecy.

The Land Battle. The remainder of Thursday as well as all day Friday and Saturday found the American militia constructing their own fortifications on the peninsula. By the evening of Friday, the 30th of July, the peninsula projecting into Penobscot Bay held two forts, about half a mile apart, about equal in strength, and nearly equally manned. While the American militia built its fort, the British regulars continued to improve their own fortifications, and neither side demonstrated any desire to dislodge or interfere with the other.

On 31 July, Commodore Saltonstall called another council of war. His new plan was to disrupt the communications between the British fort and their small fleet of warships lying anchored in the tiny bay behind the fort. The plan that evolved at this council was for about 200 marines to go ashore at midnight and, in conjunction with the troops from the American fort, to attack the breastworks guarding the point of land closest to the British ships. By capturing this position Saltonstall hoped the British would be unable to coordinate defense plans, and the Americans would be able to deal with each part of the British forces piecemeal.

This attack was finally carried out at about 2 o'clock in the morning, Sunday, "with great vigour and resolution. . . ."[12] The American marines carried the breastworks, but no sooner had they dislodged the British troops than the British ships began a bombardment of the position so recently occupied by their own land forces. The fire from the ships drove the Americans out of the breastworks, and it was reoccupied by the British.

Foiled in his plan to divide the enemy, Saltonstall wasted the next 2 days cannonading the fort from long range. From the 2d of August until the 6th, the Americans and the British passively confronted each other with meager results. Each day of delay worked to the advantage of the British, however, in that they were expecting reinforcements from Halifax, while the Americans had failed to make provision for additional reinforcements. The position of the American Fleet, anchored deep within the bay at Penobscot, was a very dangerous one should any enemy vessels arrive at the bay entrance. Indeed, the entire American Fleet could easily be trapped between British forces already in the bay and newly arrived reinforcements.

On 6 August the commodore again displayed the flag signal for "all Captains," and another war council was held on board the *Warren*. This time the commodore's plan was for the militia and the marines to attack the fort while the navy attacked the British ships behind the fort. But this plan was not accepted by General Lovell who claimed that his men could not assault the fort unless supported by naval gunfire. He claimed that since his army was composed primarily of militia, untrained and inexperienced, they could not be trusted to attack entrenched regular troops. Finally the council concluded that the American forces should continue to entrench themselves in their positions while further reinforcements were sought from the authorities in Boston. This being decided, a message was sent off to Boston in a whaleboat, asking for additional troops, and the war council broke up.

During the period of waiting that followed, the American position became more untenable with each passing day. Having lost the momentum of their original assault on the beaches, the American land forces committed several

irresponsible acts, including the burning of many of the houses and barns of local inhabitants who were citizens of the State of Massachusetts and therefore the very people the Massachusetts Militia had been sent to protect. A witness on board the *Hunter* wrote: "The procedure [of burning the houses and barns] was judged to be conducted with great imprudence, as it would only have a tendency to distress the poor inhabitants. . . ."[13]

This policy of delay continued until the 9th of August when again there appeared the familiar signal of "all Captains" above the *Warren*. At this conference, the captains urged that the naval fleet be used to attack the British ships, but the commodore "judged . . . that the attack would be attended with great risque and danger of having our ships much injured."[14] The fact that a commodore who commanded 19 ships of war mounting nearly 350 guns should fear to attack three sloops at anchor was the most remarkable of Saltonstall's many injudicious decisions throughout the campaign. The commodore rejected this proposed attack, and once again the decision of the council was to do nothing. An observer on board the *Hunter* noted at this time that "A general uneasiness is discovered through the fleet at being detained so long, many desert from the ships every night."[15]

On Tuesday, 10 August, another conference was held on board the *Warren*, and this time a positive decision was made to attack the British fort and the ships simultaneously. The attack would commence the next day when General Lovell would lead the militia and the marines against the fort, while Saltonstall would lead the American Fleet against the British ships.

The following morning General Lovell led some 750 men out onto the plain between the British and American forts, and they shuffled about in confusion while the general tried to put them in some military order. The plan of the militia attack was for a small detachment of about 250 to parade in front of the British fort just out of musket range in order to tempt the British to sally forth: the small detachment would then lead the British into the jaws of the larger group of militia across the plain. It was a simple plan, almost naive, but it proved to be remarkably successful in its primary goal.

The detached party of 250 proceeded across the plain toward the British fort. The ensuing activities were described in the journal of the ship *Hunter:*

> . . . a detached party of 250 proceeded to the small battery near the S.E. point to excite the British troops to attack them from their citadel; after they had paraded themselves in the battery, about fifty-five regular troops sallied from the citadel, and advancing with resolution and intrepidity, put the whole party to flight, without discharging a gun; they pursued them to the main body, and then discharging a volley, drove the whole seven hundred and fifty into the fort, in the greatest confusion imaginable—the officers damning their soldiers, and the soldiers their officers for cowardice, many losing their implements of war, &c.[16]

The captains of the American Fleet were in excellent position to watch the rout of their land troops, and Commodore Saltonstall called off the proposed attack on the ships. That night the American commander called another council of war. General Lovell claimed, with understandable anger and disgust, that his troops were not capable of opposing British regulars "on account of their inexpertness and want of courage." The general felt that since the American soldiery was inadequate and since no reinforcements were imminent, it would be best to raise the siege. But

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the captains of the fleet voted to continue the siege despite the fact that they felt themselves unable to launch a full-scale attack on the British fortifications. The next day their lack of sound judgment and foresight would be clearly demonstrated.

The Battle at Sea. Friday, 13 August 1779, began as a rather warm, but foggy day. The writer on board the *Hunter* wrote that "very great uneasiness appears throughout the fleet at being thus detained at the risk of British reinforcements arriving, and the prospect of reducing the place, either by sea or land, was so dubious." It is safe to assume that his disgust was general throughout the fleet. The attitude of the invading force was now radically changed. Rather than planning action against the land forces, the eyes of the fleet captains looked regularly toward the entrance to the bay, fearing the arrival of British warships. The journal on board the *Hunter* eloquently stated the situation:

> Three weeks have now elapsed since our siege began, and little or nothing is affected to our advantage. In the meantime our opponents are fortifying, and have completed a very formidable citadel, where they are secure against us; which at our arrival was only a breastwork, containing five or six pounders, which then, in all probability, we could have reduced very easily. . . . in the course of which time thirteen or fourteen councils of war have been held, resolving one day to attack, and the next reversing their schemes. The Commodore complaining that the General is backward, and the General that the fault is in the Commodore; the people censuring both, and are determined, unless something is directly done . . . that they would leave the ships, and not risk an attack by a superior force which was daily expected.[17]

With the American Fleet thus resting at anchor, the officers undecided as to the proper course of action, and the troops demoralized, a lookout on board the *Warren* sighted the topsails of a ship-rigged vessel standing into Penobscot Bay; it was followed by another, then another, and the alarm spread from ship to ship as seven British men-of-war rounded the headlands of the bay and bore down on the American vessels. The last entry in the journal of the *Hunter* reads:

> . . . five or six British ships hove in sight, making a formidable appearance, which has thrown our fleet and army into great consternation, the ships are all heaving up, the land forces embarking on board the transports, waiting to see what force this consists of, and consulting how to escape if the force should be superior, concluding to attempt an escape by the west side of Long Island, or run the ships ashore and betake ourselves to the woods.[18]

Commodore Saltonstall now planned to slow up the advancing British as much as possible in order to allow the transports to escape. He formed his ships in a rough crescent across the bay and waited there for the advance of the British Fleet. The advancing squadron consisted of one 64-gun razee, the *Raisonable*, three small frigates, and three sloops. All together, the British Fleet mounted some 210 guns to the Americans' 345, but the larger British ships were capable of throwing a heavier weight of metal. There was no thought of battle in the American commodore's mind. As soon as the lead British ship, a small 20-gun frigate, approached the massed American Fleet, the entire mass turned and made all sail to escape. The British ships advanced according to the speed of each individual vessel, with the smaller frigates and sloops reaching the

American Fleet first. Clearly, their position would have been dangerous had the Americans decided to make a fight of it, but the Americans were already on the run and the British hurried their retreat by firing their bow chasers.

Two of the American vessels tried to escape by sailing up the narrow passage on the far side of Long Island, but they were cut off by a British frigate and they ran themselves aground. The rest of the fleet fled upriver. Eventually all of the American vessels were burned or blown up to prevent their capture. The loss of the *Warren* was a serious blow to the infant American Navy—she was one of the few regularly commissioned warships in service in 1779, and she was virtually irreplaceable. The only warlike action on the part of the American forces that day was a halfhearted attempt to send a fireboat downriver against the British ships. But the British ships easily towed the burning sloop to shore, and the battle at sea came to an ignominious end for the American armada.

Conclusions. The preponderance of blame for the spectacular failure of the American forces in the Penobscot expedition of 1779 must go to its commanding officer, Commodore Dudley Saltonstall. His appointment to command had been political in the first place, and he repeatedly demonstrated his military incompetence throughout the course of the 3-week siege of Penobscot Bay.

Two weeks after the fiasco of Penobscot Bay, Commodore Saltonstall was tried by court-martial on board the frigate *Deane* in Boston Harbor. The court found that Saltonstall should be peremptorily dismissed from the Navy. His conviction by that court was all the more damning in that the charge against him was one of "cowardice." Certainly Saltonstall erred badly when he refused to attack the three British sloops on first arriving at Penobscot Bay. He erred even further in refusing to fight the first advance ships of the British relief force on the final day of the siege, but his greatest error was in waiting 3 weeks between these two events and refusing to take any action at all. Gardner W. Allen's conclusion: "The whole affair is a record of blunders and lack of foresight"[19] could hardly be more warranted.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Ens. Craig L. Symonds, U.S. Naval Reserve, did his undergraduate work at the University of California at Los Angeles and earned his master's degree in American history from the University of Florida where he was a National Defense Education Act fellow. After teaching 2 years in the Florida public school system, he entered the Navy and received his basic training at NTC Orlando. A distinguished graduate of the Naval Officer Candidate School at Newport, Ensign Symonds is currently serving as Research Assistant to the President of the Naval War College.

FOOTNOTES

1. Gardner W. Allen, *A Naval History of the American Revolution* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), v. II, p. 420.
2. "Operations in Maine in 1779, Journal Found on Board the Hunter, Continental Ship, of Eighteen Guns," *The Historical Magazine,* February 1864, p. 51.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
4. *Ibid.*
5. George A. Wheeler, *Castine Past and Present* (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1896), p. 30.

6. Wheeler, p. 29.
7. *Ibid.*
8. "Operations in Maine . . . ," p. 53.
9. *Ibid.*
10. "Operations in Maine . . . ," p. 53.
11. *Boston Gazette*, 9 August 1779.
12. "Operations in Maine . . . ," p. 53.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.*, p. 53-54.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Allen, p. 436.

Ψ

. . . an officer may be highly successful and even brilliant, in all grades up to the responsible positions of high command, and then find his mind almost wholly unprepared to perform its vitally important functions in time of war.

RADM William S. Sims, USN, Address to Naval War College, December 1919

THE BAROMETER

(Writers' comments on Lieutenant Commander Coye's article "The Restricted Unrestricted Line Officer: the Status of the Navy's Woman Line Officer" which appeared in the March issue.)

Lieutenant Commander Coye's article on the place of women in the Navy has been written at a most appropriate time, for with the women's movement gaining momentum in the civilian community, it is time for the military services to reevaluate their women's programs. One of the attractions of the military for women in the past has been that women did have greater opportunity for equal rights in the military than could be found in civilian occupations. Now the bars are being lowered in the civilian market not only with respect to equal rights, but also with respect to equal opportunity. Consequently, it behooves the military to take a hard look at their women's programs. If they are to be continued, they must be competitive or at least in the case of the Navy, it will not attract the talent that it has been able to expect in its women officers.

Miss Coye claims in the introduction to her article that the senior women officers are slow to work for new policies. I believe that our senior women officers realize the necessity of the development of a career pattern and the need to consider the desires and goals of our junior women officers if we are to continue to have women in the Navy. They have always been available on call to the "quasi-chain of command" and fully realize that the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Women (AC/P(W)) cannot accomplish the changes single-handedly. She needs the help of the senior male officers in the Navy who are in the positions of authority over all our personnel, male and female. While she does have support at the policy level, the managerial level is not yet completely ready to institute the needed changes.

It is my understanding that re-evaluation of the career development of women officers is part of an appraisal study being conducted of the total officer structure. Opening to women of the country area regional specialist (CARS/CARSO) program and new opportunities through the operational/managerial route are part of this re-evaluation. These developments have evolved since the writing of Miss Coye's article--which in some respects has been overtaken by events--but, nevertheless, the young woman officer needs guidance today regarding what is important for her to consider in the development of her career.

It will take time to evolve all new career development patterns for women now being studied by the Bureau. While they are in the process of being developed, it might be well for an interim pattern to be published to assist any of the women officers who are at that stage of their careers that they may find need of same.

As for my personal philosophy, I would like to see women assigned initially as generalists, deterring the formal commitment to a specialty until selection for postgraduate school or for lieutenant commander, whichever

comes first. At the point where the woman goes to postgraduate school or is selected for lieutenant commander, she should be expected to be assigned progressively to more responsible jobs in a single field. She and her detailer would need to collaborate on what this field should be. It should be based on motivation, experience, education, and training. Service school and training in management should be part of the package for all women officers who demonstrate superior performance.

One of the biggest dilemmas in this scheme is how to insure that women will get progressively more responsible jobs. At present the Bureau of Naval Personnel can order a woman to an activity for duty fully intending her to be utilized in a challenging assignment. However, the commanding officer may have already determined that an officer already on board will be moved into that slot, and this could be prejudicial to the woman in gaining an acceptable and fulfilling job. Instances such as these demand some sort of centralized control to insure their prevention in situations of discrimination.

I would like to see the records of all women above the rank of lieutenant moved to the appropriate rank desks as quickly as possible, starting with the rank of commander and subsequently including the ranks of lieutenant commander and lieutenant. Monitoring of their assignments might be necessary, until such time as de facto discrimination no longer exists. Such monitoring should rest with the administrative staff in Pers B1.

One of the most serious defects in the women's program in the past has been the reluctance to assign women to jobs where they would be in supervision of a male staff. This is being overcome, but is also an area where monitoring is advisable. Key middle management jobs are essential steps to 0-6 and flag rank. I hope the day has passed when a command is permitted to refuse to take a woman officer because it "already has its quota."

In the past, women have had a definite advantage over the men with respect to the opportunity for postgraduate education. Four years' experience as a member of the PG Board gave evidence that the percentage of women before the board who are selected each year is larger than the percentage of men. This possibly reflects their superior educational qualifications and also the advantage that continual shore assignments give to the woman who is interested in preparing herself for selection through off-duty education. Opportunities for command, for service schools, and key middle management jobs have begun to be made available to women, but we need the continuing help of the Navy male leadership to insure proper utilization of womanpower. Upper management positions and selection to flag rank are still on the back burner, but I am optimistic enough to think that this will also be a reality in the not too distant future.

I believe that a review of the women's program, as Miss Coye recommends, would reveal that changes are overdue in the way in which we manage our womanpower, a fact that is already known by Navy policymakers. The author's basic study has accumulated many references and reviewed much sociological background which might be of value to people involved in the utilization of women personnel. Perhaps Miss Coye's article could assist the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Women in her efforts to provide the senior male officers in the Bureau of Naval Personnel with proof that womanpower is vocal, is interested in a challenge, and is eager for equal opportunity and the responsibilities that go with it.

Anne L. Ducey
Captain, U.S. Navy
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Having read the article dealing with discriminatory Navy policy toward women officers by Lt. Comdr. Beth F. Coye (March 1972), I take this opportunity to comment on her thesis. Not only has she brought to the reader's attention many of the problems facing the woman officer today, but she has also provided practical solutions which may be employed by the Navy as corrective measures.

Lieutenant Commander Coye pointed out that, generally speaking, Navy personnel consider the feminist movement ridiculous or amusing, which is unfortunate. Hopefully, this will not remain the case. If so, the Navy is sure to continue losing many talented individuals because of this apathetic attitude. And, going one step further, some may not feel threatened by this loss, as they see no need for women in the military. However, clarification of the necessity of the female naval officer is irrelevant, and even the imposition of such a question is insulting. Women should not have to feel apologetic about their sex nor give reason for their utilization. However, our present society has yet to fully realize the capabilities of its female members. Therefore, the Navy must offer education on this subject to its personnel, as Lieutenant Commander Coye suggested.

One of the primary restrictions placed on the woman line officer is the lack of opportunity provided by the Navy. When I joined the service 2 years ago, I did so having no idea that I would, in all probability, enjoy a career of administrative work. Presently I am serving as a Public Affairs Officer and Educational Services Officer and have worked in Enlisted Personnel. Even though I have absorbed valuable knowledge from these billets, and for the most part enjoyed them, I shudder at the thought of spending years in this type of work. I am certain most junior officers agree. However, Navy policy dictates that I have no other course to follow as an unrestricted line officer, except for an occasional tour in communications, intelligence, or data processing.

And what about the enlisted women? The Director of the Waves has called the problem of retention of enlisted women "disastrous." Many of the junior enlisted personnel are dissatisfied with Navy policy and consequently are leaving the service. They too experience very limited opportunity because being born female they must bear the "burden" as such.

Even though there is much to be overcome, I am optimistic about the future of the Navy woman. The Navy in recent years has proven itself to be the leader of the armed services in meeting and rectifying various social ills declared so by our modern society.

A need for change in Navy policy toward women having been established, I support Lieutenant Commander Coye's proposition that a study be conducted by the Bureau of Naval Personnel, encompassing the objectives she stated. And, of the three policy options she proposed, I feel that "Policy # 2: Different but Equal Opportunity" is the most practical. If an individual is qualified and interested in a particular billet, she should not be rejected as a potential incumbent by the Navy on the basis of sex.

Lillian A. Williams
Lieutenant (junior grade) U.S. Navy
VA-127, NAS LeMoore

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

RESEARCH IN THE MAHAN LIBRARY

THE ARCHIVES OF THE CONFERENCES OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGES OF THE AMERICAS

by

Captain C.O. Fiske, USN

Captain Fiske was involved in the planning for the establishment of the First Conference of the Naval War Colleges of the Americas. He was Secretary for the Sixth Conference and served as Permanent Coordinating Secretary from 1969-1971. At present, he is the Head of the Military Strategy Study in the College of Naval Warfare.

As a result of agreement reached at the Second Inter-American Naval Conference in Key West in June 1960, Adm. Arleigh Burke, then Chief of Naval Operations, undertook a series of events designed to further a common and better understanding of the naval profession among the inter-American Navies. That program culminated in what is today a series of seven specialized Conferences, all under the aegis of the Inter-American Naval Conference, attended by all of the Chiefs of Naval Operations of the inter-American Navies. These are: (1) Conferences of Naval Communications Chiefs, (2) Conferences of Naval War College Presidents, (3) Conferences of Directors of Naval Intelligence, (4) Conferences of Naval Academy Superintendents, (5) Conferences of Naval Surgeon Generals, (6) Conferences of Naval Research Chiefs, (7) Conferences of Oceanographers of the Navies.

One of the first of these activities to get underway was the Conference of the Naval War Colleges of the Americas, also referred to in Latin America as the "Directors Conference." A meeting of college presidents was convened at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 9-11 April 1962. It was followed by another in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 29 July-1 August 1963, and a third in Lima, Peru, 19-23 October 1964. At Lima it was decided that future meetings would be held every other year. Accordingly, the Fourth Conference met in Newport, 4-6 October 1966, and the Fifth Conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina, 9-12 September 1968. In recent years the delegates voted to hold all even-numbered Conferences in the United States and odd numbered Conferences in other member nations. In keeping with the new schedule, the Seventh Conference is scheduled to take place in Valparaiso, Chile in September of this year.

Currently, membership consists of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela. Observer delegations include Canada, Dominican Republic, the Inter-

American Defense College, and the Pan American Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-613B).

Over the years the Conference has evolved a series of rules relating to parliamentary procedure, membership status, logistic and financial support, voting, provision of escorts, and similar matters. At the Sixth Conference held in Newport, 5-9 October 1970, the Conferees formally adopted a "Preamble to the Rules" which reads in part: ". . . With our efforts we hope to improve the professional competence of our students for assumption of higher responsibilities of naval leadership and also to qualify them in enlightening public opinion on the profound influence of maritime power in the development and security of our countries . . . "

Over the years this Conference series has addressed and reached agreement on such matters as the exchange and translation of course materials and books, the exchange of lecture teams, development and play of an inter-American war game, exchange of video and magnetic tapes and slides, and a general philosophy on the goals and objectives of professional education for naval officers. It is gratifying to realize that the accomplishments in these areas have led to similar series conducted by the other services.

The nature of other business ranges from the propriety of the study of counterinsurgency, standards for selection, admission and grading of officer students, the value of a War College education relative to the future command and promotion potential of the individual officer, development of common tactics and doctrines, and the need for a joint dictionary of military terminology similar to the U.S. Joint Dictionary (JCS Pub. 1).*

At the conclusion of each Conference, a *Record of Proceedings* is published which contains a list of the delegates in attendance; the agenda and current rules; discussions, either verbatim or abridged; a country-by-country analysis of progress reached on past agreements; a status report of the current activities, plans, and programs of each country; and a summary of the nonplenary and social activities.

At the Fourth Conference (Newport, 1966), the U.S. Naval War College was elected to serve as the Permanent Coordinating Secretariat to maintain records, provide continuity and information during the 2 years between meetings, and to coordinate matters of mutual interest to all members. The archives of the Naval War Colleges of the Americas, which are housed in the Naval Historical Collection of the college, consist of documents, reports, and photographs associated with the planning, management, and post-Conference work of the six Conferences. Of particular value are tapes, transcripts, and translations of the Fourth and Sixth Conferences which were held at Newport and holograph transcripts and translations of the three Conferences held in Latin America. Also important are exchanges of official and personal correspondence. To the student concerned with professional education of naval officers, the archives can be a valuable source. Since each *Record of Proceedings* is thoroughly indexed, it is quite easy to determine the scope of the subjects upon which information is available.

Coupled with the post-Conference reports of the Inter-American Naval Conference series and the independent International Seapower Symposia, the researcher can expect to gain a unique insight into the roles, missions, functions, and operations of smaller navies quite unlike the more conventional views held by and in the larger navies. Surely the problem that exists between the United States and its smaller navy allies will be quite similar to those one

*The Inter-American Defense College is developing such a document.

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could expect as the Soviet Union broadens its contacts with the smaller nation navies of Africa and the Middle East. Considering the current expansion of Soviet naval power, the value of such information to both planner and student is evident.

Those interested in planning or conducting international conferences would find a cornucopia of details on agenda development, planning, logistics and finance, protocol, parliamentary procedures, translation and interpretation, international travel, customs and port clearance, and similar details. The photographic coverage available is that usual to such a conference but when coupled with the correspondence files could well yield excellent visual support for biographic research on a particular individual. The files in general are not classified, although some specific discussions and presentations are and have been placed in the classified section of Mahan Library. By use of cross-reference pages, continuity of the complete file is preserved.

A final note addresses the parent Conference—the Inter-American Naval Conference series. As a result of the sixth such Conference, hosted by Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, USN, in Newport, R.I., (19-23 April 1971), the Chiefs of the Inter-American Navies lent their strong support to continuation of the seven specialized Conferences. As a consequence, it can be expected that the Naval War Colleges of the Americas Conference files will grow in both volume and enhanced value to researchers and scholars. It is quite likely that some video tapes will be added in the future.

GIFTS AND ACQUISITIONS

Capt. Harry H. Caldwell, Commanding Officer, Fleet Training Center, Newport Naval Base, has presented a copy of a journal of cruises of the U.S.S. *Concord*, steam gunboat, in east coast and South American waters for the period June 1891-June 1893. The journal was written by Captain Caldwell's father, Harry H. Caldwell, Sr., who at the time was serving aboard the *Concord* as a naval cadet apprentice. The senior Caldwell graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1893. In addition to a lengthy narrative of events and observations, the volume contains pictures of foreign naval vessels which were encountered on the cruise and clippings from contemporary newspapers relating to the U.S.S. *Concord*. The gift was presented to the college through the Naval War College Foundation.

Ψ

For books are not altogether dead things, but do contain a progeny of life in them to be as active as that soul was whose progeny they are.

John Milton: Areopagitica: 1644



PROFESSIONAL READING

Barber, Stephan. *America in Retreat*. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1971. 19p.

America's will to lead has eroded. As a result, America is on the verge of turning right and inward. The meaning for Britain and Europe is clear: they had better be prepared to stand on their own. This is Stephan Barber's central thesis.

The arguments supporting the thesis are simple: The thousand days of Camelot under President Kennedy were a kind of Alexandrine flowering of American *esprit*. But, alas, the bubble burst, and the mystique was more high-flown rhetoric than anything else. As a result we blundered into Vietnam, which produced disenchantment and gave rise to radical nihilistic leaders. The possibility of an economic recession, the returning embittered soldiers (who are seen as the equivalent of the French Army in the 1950's), and the intractability of the race problem hopelessly compound America's problems.

The author sees Middle America turning inwards and to the right as a result of the problems of the 1960's. He also sees no solution to the race problem. To him American politics and government are irretrievably corrupt. To him the American spirit (whatever that is) is dead and America is doomed.

These gloomy predictions are made in overstatements, such as the 1960's saw American "spirits crack under the burdens of world leadership" (p. 41). The reader is told "The nation's leader class is on the verge of a nervous breakdown of alarming proportions" (p. 182).

Such crude journalistic hyperbole is accompanied by several glaring factual errors. Woodstock, of Rock Festival fame, is placed in Connecticut and not in New York (p. 150). Amherst is a "private New England School" and not a college (p. 151). The Communist forces in Korea were insurgent forces and not North Korean (p. 101). The author implied General MacArthur crossed the 38th parallel on his own initiative (p. 101). As chief of London's *Daily Telegraph* Washington Bureau, Mr. Barber could at least have checked his facts, as any good reporter should.

Mr. Barber strains credulity by stating with religious certainty that Vice President Agnew has "subtly curtailed freedom of comment in America's leading newspapers." This may be dogma at the Washington Press Club, but it is hardly accepted a *priori* outside certain liberal, intellectual circles. *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* can hardly be called tame and compliant.

America in Retreat seeks to address itself seriously to several profound problems. Unfortunately, the author relies extensively upon his own observations and experience to substantiate his conclusions, which have only a limited validity. The conclusions are superficial and simplistic, not only because they are based on limited data and generalizations, but also because the author lacks an understanding of American Government, the American people, and America generally. For example, the

author does not explain how the National Government can be cumbersome and "a great creaking engine," while at the same time placing "incredible executive power" in the hands of the President.

This is such a bad book that it should be an embarrassment to the author. One would hope that other foreign correspondents are more careful with their facts and are more perceptive in writing about America. Our problems are too complex to be addressed with only sarcasm and generalizations.

B.M. SIMPSON, III
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Freidman, Wolfgang. *The Future of the Oceans.* New York: George Braziller, 1971. 132 p. Index

Hood, Donald, ed. *Impingement of Man on the Ocean.* New York: Wiley Interscience, 1971. 698p. Index

A topic of increasing impact upon the naval community is the use of the sea—ecologically and legally. Injunctions against the military commander's right to use a beach for maneuvers are an additional preoperational factor, as evidenced by the recent proceedings in the Bay of Maine. A rash of 200-mile territorial sea proclamations has dictated a revision of sea routes of innocent passage and establishment of new fishing areas.

The Future of the Oceans is a well organized primer addressing the question of international ownership of the oceans and the land underlying it. Of the more than 130 national states comprising the international community, 29 have no seacoast and only 24 have the present technological facilities to exploit the medium to a depth of even 200 meters. What rights does an advanced country such as Switzerland, with no seacoast but many rivers draining to the ocean, have? What rights does a nation such as the Somali Republic, poor economically and technologically, and with a negligible continental shelf, but strategically located, have? Dr. Freidman argues the necessity of an able and strong international management of the ocean floor and the waters above it. Unlike much of international law and regulations, which correspond to and are often diluted by previous national postures, much of "Law of the Seabed" is unimpaired by precedent. This book is an excellent discussion of the problem, and is current and easy to read sans prior background.

Impingement of Man on the Oceans, by contrast, is an outstanding reference for anyone concerned with the oceanic environment. Donald Hood has compiled a series of papers dealing with subjects ranging from oceanic influences on the atmosphere to long-range pollution effects of petroleum products on oceanic biology. Every paper is current, the contributors are authorities in their fields, and the interrelation of the subject matter is logical. The pendulum swing, precipitated by the ecological concern over our lakes and rivers, has passed into the realm of hysteria occasionally, often without facts to justify it. Here one can find his subject of interest covered in detail, admittedly with some bias but not hysterical, allowing the reader to develop the attitudes and understanding necessary to discuss and deal intelligently with the subjects of pollution control and efficient control of the oceanic resources. This compendium is a logical element of the professional reading for everyone concerned with the sea and the world he lives in.

Both books complement each other well. The reader who reads *Future of the Oceans* and those parts of *Impingement of Man upon the Oceans* which further his particular interests will be well oriented, regardless of previous exposure.

H. DIXON STURR, JR.
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

The Institute for Strategic Studies. *Problems of Modern Strategy*, Foreword by Alastair Buchan. Studies in International Security: 14. New York: Praeger, 1970, 219p.

The Institute for Strategic Studies was founded in London in 1958 to provide an international forum for thinkers and authors in the field of strategic studies. *Problems of Modern Strategy* is a collection of nine essays written as papers for the Institute's 1968 annual conference and revised as a result of the discussions held.* The essayists were set the task, each in his area of specialization, of analyzing the development of strategic ideas over the past 15 to 20 years. The book thus constitutes something of a retrospective state-of-the-art show for strategic studies but is much more than a contribution to the history of strategy. The essayists identify the problems confronting today's theorists and practitioners, and several of them suggest possible paths toward their solution.

It is impressive to read in Alastair Buchan's foreword that the mold of traditional strategic thinking shaped by writers such as Clausewitz, Mahan, and Douhet was broken in the 15 to 20 years leading to 1968. Its breaking was occasioned by the development of nuclear weaponry in a time when the ideological conflict between the Great Powers of the world was inhibiting their communication with each other, empires were throwing off or losing their colonies, and strategies of revolutionary warfare were succeeding. It was a time to intensify and expand the study of strategy and to apply hitherto unused disciplines in the effort. Scholars throughout the world responded and produced a virtual renaissance in strategic thinking. The nine essays in this book are an appraisal of the effort.

Raymond Aron, the French member, in "The Evolution of Modern Strategic Thought," leads off with the thesis

> . . . that the partial neutralization of nuclear arms, and the provisional absence of armed conflict between the nuclear states serve to focus our attention once more on traditional problems of a strict military nature, while strategic thought, on the other hand, extends its scope to include all the various permutations of relations between states in peace or war.

He returns again and again to the theme that the entity of strategic thought embraces far more than those elements of a situation which can be managed by systematic analysis of physical or economic aspects. Aron categorically asserts that "strategic thought is never separate from political thought." And: "At the highest level, strategy is virtually identical with the conduct of a state's external affairs." He relegates the systems analysts' scientific attempts to quantify decisions to a niche in history when he asserts that, after theory had illuminated the implications of nuclear weapons, strategic thought seems to have "finished absorbing innovation" and to have returned to the traditional historical analysis approach only partly modified by the contributions of the analysts.

In "The Classical Strategists," Michael Howard surveys the strategic problems, controversies, domestic and international, and the work of the theorists who aided the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations in the development of massive retaliation concepts, in NATO defense policies, and in their transition to flexible response. Howard outlines the French contributions to modern strategy, their doctrines of nuclear multipolarity, revolutionary war, and indirect strategy. Questioning the assumptions underlying

*For an excellent review from a different perspective see Noel F. Parrish, "The Civilian Analysts, in Their Pride and Their Fall," *Air University Review*, July-August 1971, p. 3-13.

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Andre Beaufre's concept of indirect strategy, he argues "that it is not simply a theory of strategy but also a theory of international relations." Yet in criticizing Beaufre, Howard seems to support him, for he himself goes on to a discussion of strategy's dependency on technological competence when attempting to solve problems in deterrence and on political, economic, and sociological competence when addressing limited war, revolutionary war, and indirect strategy. "Increasingly the fields overlap," he says, and questions at the end whether "classical strategy," as a self-sufficient study, has no longer a valid claim to exist.

Kenneth Boulding's "Social Systems Analysis and the Study of International Conflict" attacks the "national security" school of strategic thought represented by the concepts discussed in the two preceding essays. Boulding explains the two major branches of sociology's attack on strategy: the social systems approach and the peace research approach. The social systems advocates accuse the international nation-state system of epistemological blindness, lack of ability for radical self-criticism, and insistence on the application of sterile literary, philosophical, and historical research methods to the problem of war. The peace researchers see the institution of war as the prime enemy. "The major human conflict is seen as between the world war industry and the civilian population . . . rather than between national states." Boulding concludes that since the world population has achieved social self-consciousness, and is learning how to refuse the dictates of "history," we face "a crisis and a revolution of an intensity with which traditional studies are quite unable to cope." He says, "The social systems approach may not be able to cope with it either, but at least it seems to have a better chance."

"The Reappraisal of Limited War," Robert Osgood's essay, examines the efforts since the advent of nuclear weapons to "bring force under control as a rational instrument of policy." Osgood regards America's experiences in Korea and Vietnam and the Russians' buildup of limited war capabilities as constraints on future American intervention in local wars. While limited war theory is well developed, little of it has been tested and none conclusively; nor will we see the comprehensive perfection of limited war theory and practice. Osgood credits both the limited war strategists and the nuclear age itself with having instilled a respect for "the deliberate control and limitation of warfare." "That respect," he says at the very end, "is a more significant and enduring achievement of limited-war strategists than any of their strategies."

"The Ethical Problem of Modern Strategy," according to Carl Friedrich Freiherr von Weizsaecker, stems from the fear of nuclear weapons effects which has driven us to elaborate lesser means of resolving conflicts by force. We should, instead, be seeking ways to change the assumedly implacable wills driving the conflicts, by means other than force. Von Weizsaecker acknowledges the present need to preserve the balance of terror and pays great respect to the strategists and statesmen who have managed to do it. Somehow we "have to learn not to impose our will, but to change our will," and he apologizes for not providing the formula. However, having been asked to write the essay, his position is that debating war *means* instead of political *ends* amounts to nothing more than a casuistic second-best approach to world problems which will be self-destructive in the long run.

"Arms Control; a Stocktaking and Prospectus" is Hedley Bull's criticism of the assumptions underlying arms control. While he credits the "new thinking" of 1960 with having "brought arms control out of the realms of cynical propaganda and scholastic irrelevance

and into that of serious international politics," Bull argues that the results so far are disappointing. Like von Weizsaecker, Bull questions the premise that the balance of terror is the guiding principle of international security and that the preservation of that balance is the chief aim of arms control efforts.

Bernard Brodie on "Technology, Politics, and Strategy" asserts that technology and systems analysis have been overrated because they neglect political considerations and fall short as a substitute for "the name of the game which is strategy."* The Swiss contributor, Urs Schwarz, produced in his "Great Power Intervention in the Modern World" a conclusion that Great Powers can no longer intervene successfully in the affairs of smaller nations. His arguments complement Boulding's social systems arguments and to von Weizsaecker's ethical logic.

In the "Strategic Uses of Revolutionary War," Brian Crozier writes that "it is impossible to say, with sweeping finality, either that revolutionary war is invincible or that the techniques of counterinsurgency have been mastered once and for all." The evidence indicates that revolutionary wars will continue to be a problem, especially if South Vietnam goes under.

Some of the essayists argue among themselves. Does Aron believe, for example, that the mold of traditional strategic thought has been broken as Buchan asserts in his foreword? Are new approaches to strategy at hand? Robert Osgood senses the end of an era in military affairs but confesses to having little idea of what lies ahead. He places strategic imagination on "a rather flat plateau." Aron believes that strategic thought is no longer absorbing innovation and is reverting to earlier methods. Schwarz dismisses Great Powers intervention as a no longer useful concept, and Michael Howard questions the assumptions of Beaufre's indirect strategy, but Crozier leaves both revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency open to further development. Kenneth Boulding, with support from von Weizsaecker and Schwarz, argues that the social systems school offers better paths toward conflict resolution than the discredited route traveled by the national security strategists. Aron and Michael Howard seem to agree that strategy as a generic concept has expanded to embrace new disciplines. Strategy, in its new form, has considerable influence on international politics.

The lasting impression is the agreement among the essayists that strategy is an art rather than a science. The strategist is an artist, and his aim today is world stability. He strives to achieve structure, harmony, truth, and universality and is frustrated by conflicts, contradictions, and failures. Yet, the few successes give hope for the future. Therefore, one is inclined to disagree with Michael Howard when he cites Voltaire's description of strategy as "murderous and conjectural." The ancient art is, perhaps, closer to Bach and his *Well Tempered Clavichord* than that.

CHARLES A. BYRNE
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

*For new views on this subject see Stephan T. Possony and J.E. Pournelle, *The Strategy of Technology, Winning the Decisive War*, (Cambridge, Mass.: University Press Dunellen, 1970), 189p.



ANNOUNCEMENT

In a continuing effort to provide the Naval War College correspondence student with courses that are both relevant and manageable, the Center for Continuing Education will shortly offer four new courses. These include three in the subject area of Seapower and an objective response version (multiple choice) of Course 14-1, National Security Organization, designated Course 14-1x.

In light of the rapidly changing balance of power with an expanding Soviet Navy and the reduction in size and continuing obsolescence of the U.S. Navy, the three Seapower courses will offer the student a unique opportunity to study all aspects of seapower. They will also provide him with a vehicle to convey original creative thinking based on his studies and practical experience.

For those students striving to achieve a Naval War College diploma, the Seapower courses will be restricted to Naval Warfare students (commanders and captains). However, for the nondiploma student the course will be available to lieutenants and above.

In response to the many students who, because of the press of duties, could not afford ample time to complete comprehensive subjective courses, Course 14-1x, an open book, multiple-choice response type course was developed. This course is far more manageable for the busy naval officer while still meeting the objectives of the prior course. It will also serve as a pilot program to determine the feasibility of using the objective format in the other Naval War College correspondence courses.

The above new courses will be available in the late spring or early summer of 1972. Additionally, revised correspondence courses in the Military Management subject area will be available in April 1972. This subject area has been revised to include current management philosophies both within and outside the Department of Defense. Added emphasis has been placed upon systems analysis and economic analysis. The revised Military Management courses should provide a sound background in current academic, business enterprise, and DOD management techniques and tools.

For those students pursuing a Naval War College diploma by correspondence, a system of course electives will be promulgated so as not to increase the number of courses required to earn a diploma.

CORRESPONDENCE COURSE INFORMATION—1972

The President of the Naval War College extends the benefits of the College by offering appropriate correspondence courses. These courses are constantly reviewed and updated to keep them in consonance with the resident courses.

ELIGIBILITY AND APPLICATIONS. Naval War College correspondence courses are available to all officers of the U.S. military services of the grade of Navy lieutenant (or equivalent) and above in active service or in the Inactive Reserve. Selected Government employees of the grade GS-10 (or equivalent) and above may also enroll. The waiver of rank or grade may be granted for qualified individuals in lower grades. Applications from active duty officers should be by letter via Commanding Officer or by the application card provided in the *Naval War College Review* and in brochures. Applications from inactive duty naval officers should be by letter via Commandant, Naval District, or by letter or card via command maintaining record.

Request for more information may be sent to:

Director, Center for Continuing Education
Naval War College
Newport, R.I. 02840

LEVEL OF STUDY. Courses are on a graduate level, are subjective in nature in that there are no "school solutions" to the exercises and problems posed, and require creative work. Students who enroll should plan to spend at least five hours a week in study and to press forward consistently, to sustain the benefit of each study session.

The Naval War College Correspondence Course Program Design—and Awards. The program is designed so that a student may select the single courses of particular interest to him or may work towards a SUBJECT AREA certificate or a diploma.

Enrollment is in one course at a time, in any case. Students who indicate the *intent* to take an entire SUBJECT AREA will receive material for subsequent courses in that AREA with less delay between courses. Students may change their intentions, of course. They must request to be enrolled in any subsequent course before enrollment will become effective.

Order of listing SUBJECT AREAS is *not* indicative of a required or even a recommended sequence.

Order of courses within a SUBJECT AREA *is* a logical sequence and *is* recommended, but is *not* required unless a prerequisite is indicated.

Letters of completion are issued upon successful completion of each course; copies are sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel or other appropriate authority for the student's selection jacket.

Certificates are issued upon successful completion of all courses in a SUBJECT AREA.

Diplomas are awarded to those students completing selected groups of SUBJECT AREAS which closely parallel the levels of studies offered in the Naval War College resident programs of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Warfare. Requirements are:

The Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff. Graduation from this program indicates successful completion (no waivers) of all required courses in

five SUBJECT AREAS: National and International Security Organization, Military Planning, Naval Operations, Command Logistics, and Military Management.

The Correspondence Course of Naval Warfare. Graduation from this program indicates successful completion of the Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff plus all courses (no waivers) in the four additional SUBJECT AREAS: International Relations, Counterinsurgency, International Law, and Strategic Planning.

COURSE DESCRIPTIONS

The following subject areas and single-installment courses are offered:

Snbject Area 14. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION.

Course 14-1—National Security Organization. Provides an understanding of our national security structure with special emphasis on the problems of the seventies. Components studied include: the Presidency; his Executive Office; Congress; Secretaries of Defense and State; Military Departments; Joint Chiefs of Staff; Unified, Specified, and Joint Commands.

Course 14-1x—National Security Organization. An abbreviated version of Course 14-1, National Security Organization, designed for the officer who desires a basic understanding of the subject but who does not have the time for more intensive study. Covers the Presidency, the Executive Office, including the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, Congress, and the Departments of State and Defense. The latter includes the Military Departments, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Commands. Examination is open-book and consists of 40 multiple-choice questions.

Course 14-2—International Security Organization. Provides a further understanding of our national security structure with respect to the United Nations, Collective Defense Treaties, and Foreign Assistance. Emphasis is placed upon NATO and its Combined Commands, SEATO, the concept of alliances in general, and changes that are likely during the next decade.

Subject Area 15. COMMAND LOGISTICS.

Course 15-1—Basic Logistics. Introduces the major Armed Forces logistics organizations, and examines logistics discipline and interrelations of strategy, tactics and logistics.

Course 15-2—Logistic Planning. Provides logistic planning procedures and tools; and requires calculation of commodity requirements.

Course 15-3—Operational Logistics Problem. Poses an operational problem situation designed to develop the student's ability to apply logistic considerations in planning, utilizing the military planning process. (Prerequisite: 15-2)

Subject Area 16. INTERNATIONAL LAW.

Course 16-1—Foundations of International Law. Provides a general background in the basic concepts of international law. Includes the sources and nature of international law and the obligations of a U.S. Naval officer toward international law, problems of statehood, belligerency, insurgency, recognition, functions of diplomatic agents, dispute settlement and international agreements.

Course 16-2—Jurisdictional Concepts in International Law. Focuses on the determination, acquisition and exercise of jurisdiction over persons, ships, territory, marginal seas and inland waters, and air and space in time of peace. Includes the consideration of Status of Forces situations and the exercise of jurisdiction over nonnationals. (Prerequisite 16-1)

Course 16-3—Rights and Duties of States Beyond the Limits of National Territory. Considers the jurisdictional rights of a state outside the limits of national territory, the abuse of territory (Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) and the use of force (self-help, reprisals, intervention and invitation). (Prerequisite: 16-1)

Course 16-4—Principles of the Laws of War and the Rules of Land Warfare. Introduces the basic principles underlying the laws of war (war crimes, reprisals, and prohibited weapons and acts), the rules of land warfare (military necessity and reasonable proportionality, actions within occupied territory and permissible weapons and tactics) and international humanitarian conventions. (Prerequisite: 16-1)

Course 16-5—Rules of Naval and Air Warfare. Undertakes a study of the basic principles of naval warfare (weapons and tactics, blockade and control of shipping) and the basic principles of air warfare (medical aircraft, aerial blockade and aerial bombardment). (Prerequisite: 16-1)

Course 16-6—Neutrality and the Termination of War. Examines the rights and duties of neutral states, warships in neutral ports, overflight of neutral territory, interference with neutral commerce and problems incident to the termination of war and peace treaties. (Prerequisite: 16-1)

Subject Area 17. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

Course 17-1—Basic Principles and Concepts of International Relations. Analyzes the characteristics of a nation and the nation-state system including consideration of sovereignty, national interests, national power and diplomacy.

Course 17-2—Relationships of National Power and Interests. Studies the dynamic forces between nations including international economics, armaments and balance of power systems. Considers the problems of international trade and finance, war and arms control. (Prerequisite: 17-1)

Course 17-3—World Order. Considers the nature and functions of regional and international organization; the role of law, including the Soviet and Western views, in relations among nations. Examines the legal aspects of several recent international incidents. (Prerequisite: 17-1)

Course 17-4—Comparative Foreign Policy I (Major Western Powers). Studies foreign policy structures and processes of Britain, Germany, France and the United States. Examines principal policy objectives of these nations and the issues and goals of Japan's foreign policy. (Prerequisite: 17-1)

Course 17-5—Comparative Foreign Policy II (Soviet and Chinese). Considers the role of communist ideology on foreign policies of the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China; examines the nature and functions of foreign aid, and alliance systems such as the Warsaw Pact and NATO. (Prerequisite: 17-1)

Course 17-6—Politics of the Third World and U.S. Foreign Policy. Studies the political, social and economic aspects of developing nations; internal and external forces affecting the Middle East; and long-term goals and challenges to U.S. foreign policy. (Prerequisite: 17-1)

Subject Area 18. MILITARY PLANNING.

Course 18-1—Basic Military Planning. Studies the systematic techniques of logical analysis as applied to military planning and the development of a Commanders Estimate of the Situation based on a given problem situation.

Course 18-2—The Staff Study and the Naval Directive. Studies the Naval Staff, its organization and functions; requires preparation of a Staff Study and a Development of the Plan based on the previously completed Commanders Estimate in Course 18-1. (Prerequisite: 18-1)

Subject Area 19. NAVAL OPERATIONS.

Course 19-1—Submarine Operations. Studies the concepts, doctrine and characteristics of submarine operations and the development of an antishipping plan and directive utilizing the Military Planning Process. (Prerequisites: 18-1 and 18-2)

Course 19-2—Antisubmarine Operations. Studies the concepts, doctrine and characteristics of ASW operations and the development of a plan and directive utilizing the Military Planning Process. (Prerequisites: 18-1 and 18-2)

Course 19-3—Attack Carrier Striking Force Operations. Studies the concepts, doctrine and characteristics of ACSF operations and the development of a plan and directive utilizing the Military Planning Process. (Prerequisites: 18-1 and 18-2)

Course 19-4—Amphibious Operations. Studies the concepts, doctrine and characteristics of amphibious operations and the development of a plan and directive utilizing the Military Planning Process. (Prerequisites: 18-1 and 18-2)

Subject Area 20. STRATEGIC PLANNING.

Course 20-1—National Strategy. Examines military, economic, social, scientific, and political factors involved in the development of a national strategy paper at the Executive level. (Prerequisites: 14-1, 17-1, and any one of the other courses in Subject Area 17)

Course 20-2—Military Strategy. Studies the factors and procedures for joint strategic planning at the JCS level and the considerations vested in the formulation of a military strategy, utilizing the student-prepared National Strategy Paper in Course 20-1. (Prerequisite: 20-1)

Subject Area 21. COUNTERINSURGENCY.

Course 21-1—Elements and Aspects of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. Provides a historical evolution of insurgencies illustrating basic causes for and tactics used to combat insurgencies.

Course 21-2—Communist Insurgency Methods. Studies the development of communist ideology and doctrines with respect to wars of national liberation and the developing world.

Course 21-3—U.S. Roles in Modernizing Traditional Societies. Gives background of U.S. national objectives relating to internal defense and the U.S. foreign policy in the 1970's as they relate to the developing nations.

Course 21-4—U.S. Planning to Counter a Hypothetical Insurgency. Outlines the U.S. national security mechanism, concentrating on its role in combating insurgencies; casts the student in various roles for planning and implementing the developed hypothetical plan. (Prerequisites: 21-2 and 21-3)

Subject Area 22. MILITARY MANAGEMENT.

Course 22-1—Foundations of Management. Studies basic management theories, principles, processes, and concepts in military and modern business enterprise environments. Highlights the relationship of management to similar fields of activity and study, and compares the application of sound management through specific examples of military and business enterprise procedures.

Course 22-2—Applications of Military Management. Reviews the interdependence between the Department of Defense's decisionmaking process and the Planning-Programing-Budgeting and Resources Management Systems. Considers resource allocations in the light of present day and future requirements and problems.

Course 22-3—Explorations in Management. Explores the scientific and economic tools available to the military manager. Considers future military manager educational requirements, use of computer systems and the application of system analysis and economic analysis in determining Department of Defense resource requirements.

Subject Area 23. SEAPOWER.

Course 23-1—Seapower: General Concepts. Considers the meaning of seapower as a concept, the sources of seapower, and the military and nonmilitary elements that give seapower substance. Studies the challenges facing the U.S. Navy in the next decade (i.e., Soviet maritime capabilities and strategies) as well as major seapower issues and explores the ocean, as both an operational constraint and national resource.

Course 23-2—Seapower: Employment of Forces. Examines the Navy's missions (Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control, Projection of Power, and Overseas Presence) in terms of employment of forces, dealing with the conceptual and actual employment and deployment of naval forces. Designed for strategic level of thinking, not tactical. (Prerequisite: 23-1)

Course 23-3—Seapower: Major Issues of Naval Strategy. Considers the nature of future naval confrontations and the role U.S. naval forces might assume therein. Studies major controversial issues U.S. naval planners will be meeting in the next decade. Examines new concepts and future developments that will influence U.S. naval strategies. (Prerequisite: 23-2)

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE CORRESPONDENCE COURSES ORGANIZED INTO SUBJECT AREAS

NWC #	SUBJECT AREAS Courses	Prerequisites (Note 1)	Study Hours	Reserve Points
14	**NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION**			
14-1	National Security Organization		48	16
14-1x	National Security Organization		24	8 (Note 2)
14-2	International Security Organization	14-1	48	16
15	**COMMAND LOGISTICS**			
15-1	Basic Logistics		45	15
15-2	Logistic Planning		45	15
15-3	Operational Logistics Problem	15-2	45	15
16	**INTERNATIONAL LAW**			
16-1	Foundations of International Law		63	21
16-2	Jurisdictional Concepts in International Law	16-1	63	21
16-3	Rights and Duties of States beyond the Limits of National Territory	16-1	63	21
16-4	Principles of the Laws of War and the Rules of Land Warfare	16-1	63	21
16-5	Rules of Naval and Air Warfare	16-1	63	21
16-6	Neutrality and the Termination of War	16-1	63	21
17	**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**			
17-1	Basic Principles and Concepts of International Relations		54	18
17-2	Relationships of National Power and Interests	17-1	54	18
17-3	World Order	17-1	54	18
17-4	Comparative Foreign Policy I (Major Western Powers)	17-1	54	18
17-5	Comperative Foreign Policy II (Soviet and Chinese)	17-1	54	18
17-6	Politics of the Third World and U.S. Foreign Policy	17-1	54	18
18	**MILITARY PLANNING**			
18-1	Basic Military Planning		54	18
18-2	The Staff Study and the Naval Directive	18-1	54	18
19	**NAVAL OPERATIONS (Only two courses needed for Subject Area credit)**	18		
19-1	Submarine Operations	Select	72	24
19-2	Antisubmarine Operations	2	72	24
19-3	Attack Carrier Striking Force Operations	but not	72	24
19-4	Amphibious Operations	#1 & #2 Combined	72	24
20	**STRATEGIC PLANNING**	(Note 3)		
20-1	National Strategy		54	18
20-2	Military Strategy	20-1	54	18
21	**COUNTERINSURGENCY**			
21-1	Elements and Aspects of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency		48	16
21-2	Communist Insurgency Methods		48	16
21-3	U.S. Roles in Modernizing Traditional Societies		48	16
21-4	U.S. Planning to Counter a Hypothetical Insurgency	21-2 & 3	48	16
22	**MILITARY MANAGEMENT**			
22-1	Foundations of Management		60	20
22-2	Applications of Military Management		60	20
22-3	Explorations in Management		60	20
23	**SEAPOWER**			
23-1	General Concepts	(Note 2)	30	10
23-2	Employment of Forces		30	10
23-3	Major Issues of Naval Strategy		30	10

NOTES: 1—Prerequisites may be waived on submission of specific experiencu or education.
2—Tentative pedning final evaluation.
3—Prerequisites are 14-1, 17-1, and one other coursu in Subject Area 17.