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CHINESE NATIONAL CULTURE

One's comprehension of the Chinese People's Republic can be strengthened by an understanding of four fundamental perceptions—Chinese perception of superiority, concepts of authority and obedience, the nature and power of people, and concepts of time. Of these the Westerner, especially Americans, will find the Chinese concept of time the most alien. In the words of Mao Tse-tung, "In one hundred years, it will be even more difficult to ignore China. No, we are not in any hurry. Time is our good ally."

A lecture delivered at the Naval War College

by

Professor Clyde B. Sargent

Introduction. In this lecture I shall focus on four selected Chinese attitudes that I feel are significant influences on Chinese behavior and that affect China's foreign policy and international relations. Politically, these attitudes are essentially neutral. Their validity and reality are not determined by the nature of China's political system. Being essentially apolitical and relevant to all circumstances, they qualify as aspects of "Chinese National Culture." National culture includes values deeply ingrained in the Chinese character and significantly influential without reference to time or place or political system. I do not judge them; I do endeavor to understand their significance. The four fundamental perceptions and values that I deal with in this discussion relate significantly to interpretation of goals, programs, and actions of the Chinese People's Republic. They are:

- Chinese perception of superiority
- Concepts of authority and obedience
- The nature and power of people
- Concepts of time

The Chinese People's Republic—like its predecessors for 2,000 years has undertaken to organize the Chinese people as a society able to attain China's primary desires for unity, security, prosperity, and dignity. The system to which China's present endeavor is affiliated is increasingly becoming a Communist-oriented Chinese system conceptualized by Mao Tse-tung and his associates of many years.

The concepts of this Chinese system and their application reflect many forces and influences—some out of China's intellectual, political, and social past; some out of Mao's and his associates' long experience in understanding and organizing the Chinese

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people; and some borrowed from alien social concepts. A wedding of historic and current values and concepts is normal. The Chinese People's Republic, in a sense, may be characterized by our description of a bride's costume—something old, something new, something borrowed, and a Chinese hue. The offspring of this wedding is the Chinese People's Republic today—and whatever it may be tomorrow.

Inevitably present are attitudes, perceptions, and values that are *Chinese*—that have been conceived, accepted, and reinforced through many centuries and that are not uniquely related to any sociopolitical system, but that may be incorporated into various systems. Some of these perceptions and values have dominated every political system of China—empire, the Republic of China, and now the Chinese People's Republic. These historically created elements are the Chinese cultural warp interwoven with the currently dominant Communist political woof. These perceptions and values constitute aspects of Chinese national culture. Identification and assessment of these characteristically Chinese elements can facilitate our understanding of any Chinese political system—including that of the Chinese People's Republic.

My aim is to seek for ourselves insights of Chinese perceptions that will contribute sophistication to our consideration of China.

Chinese Perception of Superiority.

The Chinese concept of superiority is an often noted characteristic. To acquire some feeling for it and its significance, we might ask—and try to answer—four questions:

- Is it real—historically and currently?
- What is its scope?
- How did it develop?
- What is the significance today?

Strange as it may seem to all other peoples of the world who regard

themselves as superior (and most peoples do), the Chinese concept of Chinese superiority is very real. Conceived in the first millennium B.C., the concept has been constant for 2,500 years. It is real today. And, note, this is a *Chinese* concept—not nationalist, not Communist. It may be shaken by terminal political malaise, decline, and demise or by military misfortunes of governments, but it is not conquered. It is a reality that must be considered in interpreting China.

The concept of superiority rests on China's vast cultural achievements and on its repeatedly demonstrated ability to organize society and conduct governmental administration, optimizing Chinese concepts of harmonious society and cultural opulence. The concept is more cultural than political. "Culture" includes more than material and intellectual attributes—it includes the totality of human and social attributes, including character. Even China's periods of political distress have not blighted the concept; for superiority was evaluated culturally more than politically. In fact, political and military distress (as of the 19th and 20th centuries) have even provided the stage for validation of Chinese confidence of superiority. Even in calamity, did not the Chinese rout the foreign Manchus in 1911, in their view the Japanese in 1945, and Westerners in 1949?

Traditionally, superiority was not measured in terms of military power; but there is belief today that superiority must be reinforced by military power, even though superiority is understood to be basically cultural. The Chinese People's Republic has not denied China's cultural greatness and retains regard for its cultural heritage. This regard for China's cultural heritage is an aspect of current belief in superiority.

The concept of superiority was an inevitable, normal, and natural development of China's foreign relations for 2,500 years. With their own criteria for

supremacy, social refinements of human relations, and material opulence of the elite bearers and beneficiaries of culture, the Chinese saw on all sides—from antiquity to the present—barbarians uncultivated in the ways of culture—barbarians who were predatory, uncouth, inhumane, and barbaric. Moreover, through the centuries, people of many lands respectfully sought the privilege of life in China, and kings of all the world known to the Chinese expressed homage to and reverence for the Emperor. Some enlightened barbarians transplanted Chinese culture, institutions, and thought to their native lands, most notably the Japanese who took language, philosophy, religion, art, city planning, dress, and almost everything except, unfortunately, Chinese cuisine! The Chinese had no alternative to conviction of their superiority.

The significance of this attitude is manifold. China's perception of superiority contains both assets and liabilities for China—sources of strength and elements that create problems for China in the modern world. I shall touch only a few of both assets and liabilities.

With no crisis of identity, the Chinese have no uncertainty about who they are. Conviction of past and inherent superiority provides the Chinese today with a clear goal—to make evident the reality of perceived superiority. The result of this concept of superiority is China's determination and confidence of its capacity to acquire what Chou En-lai calls "China's rightful place in the world." Additionally, confidence is a significant element of the conviction of superiority. The concept of superiority also has permitted a historic Chinese role as a benevolent imperialistic power in which it was able to elude under its cultural umbrella the kings of the world who demonstrated respect for and awe of Chinese culture. The modern counterpart of this aspect of perceived superiority expressed in Communist terms is

reflected in such statements as Chou En-lai's remark in January 1970, "The entire world awaits Chinese leadership for the revolution."

In spite of strengths for China derived from this concept, the undebatable conviction of superiority can do China significant disservice as China seeks a place in the world community. On this negative side of the ledger, two entries stand out. First, China's capacity for realistic self-assessment is anesthetized by the conviction of her superiority; and similarly her ability to assess other nations is decreased as she stands on the pinnacle of prejudice and perceives distorted images of the rest of the world. The result may be a large degree of self-deception. Secondly, there is the difficulty that China may have with the concept of the equality of nations; for China has never conceived of herself as being one among equals, but rather always as China among inferiors in a hierarchically arranged world. Theoretically speaking, even the world's offer of equality could be interpreted as insulting, scornful, and disrespectful of China's self-perceived superiority. These are all perceptions with which China will need to struggle intellectually and emotionally whenever it may be willing to accept alternatives to a Chinese-dominated Communist world, and these are perceptions that other nations must understand as they consider their relations with China.

Chinese Concepts of Authority and Obedience. Principles of authority and obedience have been fundamental concepts of Chinese political and social organization. Related also are concepts of hierarchy and status, ethics, morality, ideology, and the omniscience and infinite wisdom of Chinese rulers. The combination is a concept of paternalism and political morality. Additionally there was belief in the infallibility of rulers (emperors or fathers), and associated responsibility for obedience of subordinates.

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Chinese society (including government and family) was hierarchical and authoritarian. Basic attitudes included (a) respect for authority and (b) a sense of duty to obey. In principle, these attitudes were desirable and appropriate. The leader—ruler or father—theoretically exemplified cultivated virtue and accumulated wisdom. His behavior was in accord with accepted doctrine. He, the leader, therefore, knew what was best for those over whom he exercised authority.

At the pinnacle, even the Emperor's role was in part fatherly. He manifested illustrious virtue, provided a model of rectitude and benevolence, and filled the hearts of his followers with passion to emulate him. The righteous leader's wisdom and benevolence were unquestionable. Therefore, since his exercise of authority was for the welfare of his people, respect and obedience by subordinates were proper and desirable. To criticize or decline to follow was self-condemnatory and reflected moral waywardness that must be rectified through introspection, suasion, and indoctrination.

These attitudes of authority and obedience, and the accompanying characteristics, are evident in the Chinese People's Republic. Their presence may explain, in part, Mao's power over people, the seemingly fanatical desire to fulfill his wishes, the emphasis on rectification of character, and numerous other aspects of popular behavior.

The Nature and Power of People. Mao emphasizes the importance of people. He sees people as the source of power, surpassing in importance the material instruments of power. To him people are more important than all the sophisticated institutions and hardware of modern societies, and he chides the West for its disregard of the potential power of people, seeing therein a fatal error.

His emphasis on people is based upon

the power of indoctrinated masses dedicated, even fanatical, in pursuit of stated goals. His concern differs from Western emphasis on the importance of people as developed by Western Judaic-Christian cultural heritage. His concern is on people power. His conviction is not from faith alone, for Mao's victory was created by the people power of the peasant masses, and he aims to prepare China for "takeoff" by prior preparation of dedicated masses.¹ This explains Mao's great emphasis on the indoctrination of people.

I think Mao views the man of the masses as intrinsically good—even though some men have been misguided and have developed aberrant and incorrect ideas. With these beliefs he sees (as did even the Confucians before him) man's susceptibility for correction, for development of rectitude, and his potential for correct thought and deed. Thus Mao places great emphasis on education, political indoctrination, and the development of correct thoughts. Perhaps even, unconsciously influenced by the Buddhists, Mao emphasizes introspection, self-criticism, and self-cultivation as the means of achieving his goals of popular political and social education.

All this adds up to enormous effort for the development of man—for the party, for China, and for the revolution—to an expression of confidence in the capacity of the masses to develop character that will make them invincible.

Chinese Concepts of Time. Concepts of time differ from society to society. Each society tends to function within roughly identifiable concepts of time. To illustrate by two extremes, people of the United States tend to function within and under the influence of a concept of time that is very short, whereas people of traditional China tend to function within and under the influence of a concept of time that is

extended. For the United States this concept of time is one or two generations (20-40 years); for China it is one or two centuries. Other societies may tend to function at these extremes or somewhere in between.

Thus, the Chinese possess a concept of time that vastly differs from our own. This is a capacity to think of time in terms of decades and centuries—rather than years and decades. This difference is important, because an individual's or a nation's programing pursuit of goals is related to his concept of time. If we desire to understand Chinese activity and to evaluate activity by criteria relevant to China, and not to the United States, we must understand Chinese concepts of time.

By concept of time I mean the ability to conceptualize time. Concept of time is one's time consciousness. It is the extent of time within which a people envisage accomplishment. It represents the time factor within which accomplishment is planned, programed, and pursued.

The concept of time—time consciousness—is related to and reflects one's feeling of *involvement of one's own personal values* within a time frame. A Chinese easily feels personal involvement within a time frame of a century—for some Chinese, much longer. He has the capacity, to *conceive* and *perceive* in personal terms, events in which he is personally a part and involved within a time frame of a century or more. In contrast, the time frame within which we Americans feel personally involved is probably a maximum of about 40 years, with gradual shortening as we increase in age.

One's capacity to conceive of time with which one is personally involved is culturally created. The important factors determining the difference between Chinese and Western (notably American) creations of time concepts are differences in identification of the basic social unit—for the Chinese, the family;

for the Westerner, the *individual*. Involved in these differences are differences in attitudes toward ancestors and descendants and related to all of these is each individual's sense of personal involvement with the people (relatives) with whom he is culturally conditioned to feel a personal relationship, acquaintance, and involvement.

Let us look at the differences between the Chinese and the American concepts of family. The Chinese is reared and conditioned to think of himself as a subordinate element in the basic group—the family. Traditionally, the Chinese male was never free of his family—nor did he wish to be. Moreover, he had active responsibilities toward not only living antecedents and descendants, but also for identified ancestors for many generations. He brought his wife into his family home, and he reared his children there. He found himself in continuing association with his parents and possibly paternal grandparents (if they were living). His sons, in turn, brought their wives to the home and had their children there. Thus, he was in intimate personal association with five generations. Taking 20 years as the rule of thumb span for a generation, we see his personal involvement and intimate personal acquaintance with blood relatives who span a century. Moreover, his involvement is more than a mere acquaintance with these relatives; for the Chinese concept of family imposes upon him an individual responsibility in relation to each and all of these five generations. His involvement is intimate, real, and active.

Furthermore, in many Chinese families the active consciousness of the tie to and responsibility for members of the family is extended way beyond the five primary generations which he probably has known personally. As a minimum, this extension of consciousness is for 10 antecedent generations; it may be for many more than 10

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generations. This consciousness is maintained and is reinforced by scheduled ceremonies at the beginning of each New Year when portraits of ancestors for 10 generations are ceremoniously hung and are the focus of reverent rites. Their accomplishments and their roles in creating the living members of the family are recalled and respectfully recounted. This extension adds another century and a half to Chinese conceptualization of time. In the cases of "great families," this extension of awareness derived from focus on ancestors may go back a thousand years or more. For example, the late Dr. H.H. Kung—the great financier and brother-in-law of Madame Chiang Kai-shek—claimed that he could document his lineage back to Confucius who lived about 500 B.C. and whose name was K'ung.

This sense of a personal relationship with a span of time that would not concern us is suggested by the answer one might receive from a Chinese when one asks him where his home is. He might reply, "Shansi."

"And when were you last there?"

"Oh, I've never been there. You see, that's where my grandfather lives, and his ancestors lived there. Our family home is in Shansi, but my father came to Shantung 50 years ago, and we have been here temporarily ever since."

The Chinese extended concept of time and the intellectual capacity to feel intimacy over vast time spans are reinforced by a strong sense of history. Great emphasis on historic events, stretching back into the heroic legendary periods of 4,000 years ago, and stories emphasizing the virtues and vices of leaders and people of every century have created a feel for vast spans of time. Even peasants, on hundreds of occasions (possibly every week or 10 days at market time), have watched itinerant troupes of actors or heard the ever-present professional storyteller in the market tell of the heroes and villains

of legendary and historic times. Every schoolboy (including Mao) has read of third century warfare, the cunning and treachery in the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, of the 12th century Robin Hood-like bandit exploits in the *All Men Are Brothers*, and the romantic social novel *Dream of the Red Chamber*, which takes the reader back in time "4,623 years." These exposures to history over thousands of years and the vivid reality portrayed by the marketplace storyteller have made centuries and millennia of history vital, vibrant, and real for every peasant. Urbanites—workers and gentlemen—had the popular opera which, similarly, focused on historical events and persons of the past 2,000 years.

Americans, on the other hand, are conditioned to be individuals—to stand on their own feet, to be independent of their parents and family groups, and, later in life, to be independent of their children. Ancestors are of no great importance, and descendants are of only casual importance. Descendants tend to be haphazardly conceived, nervously nurtured, and joyfully released to the same detached freedom and independence that the parents themselves desired and acquired a generation earlier. Adult children tend to wish little from their parents, and the parents expect nothing from their children. Consequently, the time frame of personal involvement in the United States is the time frame of one generation, and we may think of that as somewhere between 20 and 40 years. And as we grow older, the space of time within which we think shrinks. As a consequence, our capacity to think in the time frame concept of the Chinese is virtually impossible.

If you protest that I am overplaying Chinese and underrating our family sentiment and consciousness, I ask you to recall the full names of your four grandparents (that's only two generations back). I estimate that less than 20

percent of you can do it and that a majority of this 20 percent knew them personally. This lecturer still cannot provide the answers. Why? Because I am a typical American, and I do not care about ancestors.

What does all of this mean in practical terms? What do the Chinese do with their extended concept of time, their sense of having more time? Do they just take longer to do what we would do in much less time? Or do they do something different?

I think they operate differently. It means, among other things, that the Chinese may program their pursuit of goals very differently from the way Americans would devise programs for China, and they may operate on bases of priorities that would differ from those of the United States. Awareness of the role of China's different concept of time may give us an understanding of China that otherwise may prove elusive. Certainly if we interpret Chinese behavior and potential based on Western concepts we run the danger of seriously deceiving ourselves.

By way of illustration I suggest that perhaps both programing and priorities for national development, as conceived by the Chinese of the Chinese People's Republic, are related to the Chinese capacity for a very extended concept of time. Recognizing calculated programing and planning that differ from our concepts of what "makes sense" may help us better to evaluate Chinese behavior without gross errors that are likely as we apply Western criteria for national development.

In regard to programing there is a vast difference in the way pursuit of goals is programed when attainment is conceived and pursued within a time concept of, say, 20 years or a century. How often may we be impatient with a teenage son who shows no evidence of preparing for dinner or a trip, until the last 5 minutes when he goes furiously through a series of rapid actions—all of

which he had carefully programed previously in his own mind but which we did not understand. I think we should seek understanding of apparent Chinese programing in this context of "time concepts."

In evaluating China's willingness to pursue goals and capacity for attainment, a different time concept must be applied; for China can visualize goals that may be attainable only within, say, 100 years. China, thus, may program national growth within this extended concept of time. Thus, what we in the United States might see as China's inability to attain stated goals, may merely mean that, in terms of China's time schedule, it is premature to expect evidence of any concrete results. Chinese programing toward attainment may not provide for developments in the near future that would yield evidence of capability. Thus, American estimates of Chinese behavior based on American concepts would disregard programing within a different time concept and would therefore be erroneous.

Concerning priorities, with conception of available time as relatively unlimited, the Chinese may proceed under a system of priorities that differs from the priorities Americans might establish. In problem solving (and China's core problem is essentially national development to goals established by the Chinese) with extended time available, the sense of what comes first—what is absolutely basic—may differ radically from what we might place first in national development.

For example, Americans would emphasize economic development, thereafter building the organizational structure to suit economic development. Is not Mao's emphasis on development of correct attitudes and on "politics takes command" perhaps an endeavor to get the attitudes—political and social organization—and the masses in line before launching off into spectacular economic development? If we see this as Mao's

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intent, one then can see the rationality (from the Chinese point of view) of those activities in China that have seemed to us irrational and in opposition to progress—such as the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards, and excessive reliance on the “Thoughts of Chairman Mao.”

Directly related to concepts of time, I think, are the attributes of, *inter alia*, patience, endurance, tolerance, and resolution. These are characteristics relating to national power. Understanding these characteristics in the context of a nation is an asset for analyzing, estimating, and forecasting. Relating these to American and Chinese time concepts, the American tends to be negative and the Chinese positive in possession of these characteristics. Americans tend to have culturally created short fuses on patience, endurance, tolerance, and resolution. In contrast, the Chinese pursue long-range objectives with culturally created patience, endurance, tolerance, and resolution. The Chinese expect accomplishment to involve extended time—even “five or ten generations” (Secretary-General, Chinese Communist Party). “Time is on our side,” says Mao Tse-tung, “we are in no hurry.” Americans, thus, by their cultural conditioning have made an enemy out of time, while the Chinese have made it an ally.

A nation must determine whether its concept of time with attendant characteristics—patience, endurance, tolerance, and resolution—is a strategic asset or a strategic liability. I think the Chinese feel their concept of time as both an asset and a liability. Hence, we observe a phenomenon of contradiction. They manifest patience as they view progress towards very long-range goals; simultaneously, they incite struggle and fanatical activity. For me, the explanation of this contradiction is the Chinese belief that these attributes of patience,

endurance, tolerance, and resolution are strategic assets, while they fear at the same time that these attributes may deteriorate into lethargy, procrastination, detachment, and inactivity. Thus, we see the Chinese People’s Republic negating the negative of these virtues by creating a sense of urgency, activity, and struggle. Thus, the Chinese illustrate efforts to exploit the assets of the extended time concept and to negate the liabilities.

How does Mao Tse-tung’s concept of time relate to traditional concepts, and what is his perception of the nature and use of time? Mao’s perspectives on time also differ greatly from those of the West. This is what we should expect; for Mao is Chinese. Related to and derived

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Professor Clyde B. Sargent completed his undergraduate work at Denison University in political science in 1930 and a master’s degree in English at Trinity College in 1932. He then took a master’s degree in Chinese language and civilization from the College of Chinese Studies in Peking and taught for 6 years as Chairman of the Foreign Languages Department of Cheloo University in Tsinan, China. During the war years, Professor Sargent served as a special assistant to the American Ambassador in Chungking and as a major in the OSS. In 1946 he returned to the United States and completed a doctorate at Columbia in Far Eastern studies. Since that time Professor Sargent has served in a variety of positions, including Political Advisor to the U.S. Delegation to the United States-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on Korea (1947-1948), Director of Foreign Area and Language Training with the U.S. Government (1948-1965), and Professor of History with the East Asian Institute, Oakland University (1966-1967). Professor Sargent is presently occupying the Chair of Comparative Cultures at the Naval War College and serving as lecturer for The George Washington University graduate program there.

from his perspectives on time, Mao stresses the virtue of patience—the virtue of patience not just as an element of personal character, but as an essential ingredient in national strategy. Mao is quoted as saying, “What is a little time in history.”²

Commenting on Chinese People’s Republic admission to the United Nations, Mao said, “If we are not wanted here or there, we can wait ten years. China will always be China. It is not soliciting anything. In one hundred years, it will be even more difficult to ignore it [China]. No, we are not in a hurry. Time is our good ally.”³

And, again, “Things take time. We are in no hurry. We can wait.”⁴

On another occasion, discussing negotiations among the Big Four in April 1946, Mao confidently views a solution “earlier or later,” and he defines “earlier or later” as “several years, or more than ten years, or even longer.”⁵ And elsewhere reference is made to “Mao’s 10,000 year plan.”⁶

Most famous of all expressions of Mao’s perception of time is his favorite and often-cited ancient Chinese fable of “The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains”:

There is an ancient Chinese fable called “The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains.” It tells of an old man who lived in northern China long, long ago and was known as the Foolish Old Man of North Mountain. His house faced south and beyond his doorway stood the two great peaks, Taihang and Wangwu, obstructing the way. With great determination, he led his sons in digging up these mountains, hoe in hand. Another greybeard, known as the Wise Old Man, saw them and said derisively, “How silly of you to do this! It is quite impossible for you few to dig up those two huge mountains!” The

Foolish Old Man replied, “When I die, my sons will carry on; when they die, there will be my grandsons, and then their sons and grandsons, and so on to infinity. High as they are, the mountains cannot grow any higher and with every hit we dig, they will be that much lower. Why can’t we clear them away?” Having refuted the Wise Old Man’s wrong view, he went on digging every day, unshaken in his conviction. God was moved by this, and he sent down two angels, who carried the mountains away on their backs. Today, two big mountains lie like a dead weight on the Chinese people. One is imperialism, the other is feudalism. The Chinese Communist Party has long made up its mind to dig them up. We must persevere and work unceasingly, and we, too, will touch God’s heart. Our God is none other than the masses of the Chinese people. If they stand up and dig together with us, why can’t these two mountains be cleared away?⁷

Something of Chinese lack of concern with the rapid ticking off of time never to be recovered is reflected even in the lethargic tempo of public life—both traditionally and even in Communist China today. High officials move slowly, seem unbusy, and can extend official interviews for hours.⁸

“Two kinds of time” is true not only for China in contrast with the West and Japan, but also within China itself. Traditionally, there was contrast between the leisurely, effortless bureaucrat and the energetic and occupied private individual (the peasant and worker) who pursued a different tempo. Today something of the energetic tempo of the private life has become part of the character of cadres subordinate to the leadership; but the leader-

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ship has retained the character of the leisurely, effortless mandarin. This contrast of tempo between the leadership and the cadres produces a phenomenon of conflict and tension within the government of the People's Republic of China. The cadres tend to respond to directives with inordinate zeal, often outrunning the officials. Thus, the officials were outrun by enthusiastic cadres, resulting in the excesses of the Great Leap, the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards, and the purges of 1966.⁹

Some very interesting and extremely relevant current Chinese attitudes appear as we consider Chinese, and specifically, Mao's perspectives on time. Significant attitudes include:

1. Preparedness (psychologically) for a very long-haul pursuit of goals—a recognition that attainment of goals will require extended time, decades, even a century, and a preparedness to pursue goals within this time frame.

2. Recognition of infinite patience as a significant asset in pursuit of long-range goals.

3. Conviction of Chinese capacity for required endurance and perseverance.

It is not our task here to analyze further how the Chinese, including Mao, have developed a concept of time and derivative attitudes very different from our own. It is within the scope of this thesis only to recognize that the Chinese operate within a conceptualized time

frame vastly different from our own. This difference in the concept of time is related to the significance of the family, to perceptions derived from "ancestor awareness," to a long cultivated sense of history, to the Chinese sense of identification with greatness and grandeur, to a congenital conviction of superiority, and to the unbridled self-confidence in Chinese capacity to surpass all known civilization once again.

Our need is to understand these perceptions and attitudes, and to expect China to pursue its goals within the framework of these concepts which are so totally alien to us.

And so I conclude an endeavor to share analysis and interpretations of selected Chinese attitudes that are part of "Chinese National Culture." My aim has been to add tools to strengthen our ability to understand the Chinese People's Republic—for whatever purpose we may have. These analyses and interpretations are largely my own and are open to further inquiry. It has been encouraging to me to find validation for most of these interpretations in the writings of Mao, and notably in his *Little Red Book*.

(Note: The author continues to search for perspectives to increase understanding of Chinese concepts of time and of the strategic significance of relationship between these concepts and Chinese behavior, notably of the Chinese People's Republic. Readers' comments are invited.)

FOOTNOTES

1. Mao Tse-tung *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1966), ch. VIII, XI.

2. Chow Ching-wen, *Ten Years of Storm: the True Story of the Communist Regime in China* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 81.

3. Mao Tse-tung, quoted in John B. McKinney, "Mao's Thoughts: Still a Blueprint for Action," *Military Review*, March 1969, p. 87.

4. "Vice-Premier Chen Yi Answers Questions by Japanese Journalist," *Peking Review*, 26 June 1964, p. 7.

5. Mao Tse-tung, quoted in Arthur S. Lall, *How Communist China Negotiates* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 33.

6. Daniel Mason, "China: Mao's Great-Power Foreign Policy," *New World Review*, 3d quarter, 1969, p. 12-22.
7. Mao Tse-tung, p. 201-202.
8. Lucian W. Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics; a Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968), p. 130-132.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 133-134.

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Lives of nations are determined not by the count of years, but by the lifetime of the human spirit. The life of a man is three-score years and ten—a little more, a little less. The life of a nation is the fullness of the measure of its will to live.

*Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Third Inaugural Address, 20 January 1941*