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A Response to Z-Gram 62

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A RESPONSE TO Z—GRAM 62

(In response to Z-gram 62, two student forums—one representing the College of Naval Command and Staff and the second the College of Naval Warfare—were established at the War College to discuss possible means of improving the Navy along the lines being pursued by the Chief of Naval Operations. Based on questionnaires circulated among their respective students, the following two edited reports were presented by these committees to the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. Ed.)

College of Naval Command and Staff Report

Edited by Commander Theodore R. Swartz, U.S. Navy

Forum Member

While this forum identified the broad areas of personnel and material as the main concern of today's Navy, it will direct its attention to the personnel problem. Discussion of material will be limited to the problem areas that have the greatest impact on the Navy's personnel ills. Our objective is to focus on personnel afflictions, offer some recommended solutions, and suggest methods for their implementation.

Our Navy personnel shortcomings can be summed up in three statements:

- Difficulty in recruiting motivated and trainable volunteers that could be further aggravated by the all volunteer force concept
- Severely reduced effectiveness of assigned personnel
- An unacceptable retention rate

This forum proposes that the Navy's emphasis be placed on recruitment, effectiveness, and retention. We maintain that the individual must be reasonably satisfied to be effective and, therefore, have concentrated on the need for increasing the satisfaction of in-service personnel.

The survey conducted at the College of Naval Command and Staff, as analyzed by this forum, indicated that the lack of job satisfaction was the single most important cause of poor retention. The second greatest cause was pay. It is significant that most of the officers who listed pay as an important factor causing dissatisfaction also specified that it was insufficient for the hours worked and responsibility of the job involved. In other words, factors which contribute

to the lack of job satisfaction were given as reasons for demanding more money. While not diminishing the need for more pay, a major portion of the Command and Staff students supported increased job satisfaction, in some form, as a partial solution.* The individual must be satisfied with the Navy in order for the Navy to be satisfied with the individual. When this balance is brought about, recruitment and retention should measurably improve.

The satisfaction of personnel can be viewed in two distinct but related areas:

- Insufficient knowledge about handling and managing people. We have termed this the "psychic income problem."

- An overcommitted Navy, which results in a "deficit management dilemma."

Psychic income is defined as "those factors which enable the individual to feel fulfilled"; that is, his needs are satisfied, and he can see his goals being obtained through his participation within the group. Not providing this psychic income seems to be the root source of the collective ills which result in dissatisfaction among Navymen. The basic human need to feel fulfillment can be thought of as being divided into social and ego needs.

The social needs are characterized by a desire for belonging, for association, for giving and receiving friendship, and for acceptance by one's contemporaries. Research has shown that men being transferred often, or merely under the threat of being unexpectedly transferred, do not identify with or join groups. As a result their basic social needs go unsatisfied, an "esprit de corps" does not exist, and, in the case of the Navy, combat effectiveness is

markedly reduced. As related to the contemporary scene, the personnel instability which is so prevalent in the fleet is counterproductive to the social needs of Navymen and reduces the combat readiness of Navy units.

Man's ego needs are related to self-esteem and reputation. Self-esteem is enhanced by achievement, competence, knowledge, and self-confidence. His reputation is enhanced by status, prestige, recognition, and appreciation and the deserved respect of others. The ego needs of Navymen are not being reasonably satisfied just as their social needs are not. Our people are getting away from the ship and squadron environment in order to achieve psychological fulfillment.

We submit that lack of psychological need satisfaction is one of the major problems we have in the Navy today. If we as leaders and managers, are unable to prove and demonstrate to our people that they are important and essential to their units, capable and dependable enough to have some freedom in carrying out their responsibilities and deserving of the trust and confidence of their superiors, then we cannot expect them to have job satisfaction.

The second area that relates to personnel is in the organizational field, the deficit management dilemma. We define this term as attempting to do too much with too little, and we will initially relate it to our people.

It is time to stand up and admit that we cannot satisfactorily perform all tasks with the limited personnel and material resources available. We understand that it is necessary to assign priorities within these resources. Attempting to do too much with too little is deficit management, and this "can do" attitude has affected too many areas and is a major contributing factor in reducing job satisfaction.

The "can do" attitude requires more attention. Originally conceived, this attitude expressed the ability to

*"Although money has only limited value in satisfying many higher level needs, it can become the focus of interest if it is the *only* means available."—Professor Douglas McGregor, MIT.

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accomplish difficult tasks under arduous circumstances. While this might be commendable on a short-term basis, it appears to us that the now common "can do" attitude has been prostituted to mean that we make up with increased personal input for all the deficiencies in human and material resources which exist. Worse yet, this has now become a daily evolution and is better stated "make do."

The reactions that these shortages in psychic income and management evoke are many but include lack of group identification, lack of motivation, frustration, disenchantment with leaders, disenchantment with career potential, and fostering of a "what's in it for me" attitude at all levels. The results of the combination of these reactions and attitudes are measurable in terms of:

- Excessive supervision by many superiors who realize that assigned tasks are not attainable

- Dilution of integrity of officers and men who cannot, or will not, tell it as it is

- Blind adherence to unattainable objectives in the face of insurmountable deficits in resources

- Loss of professional expertise, as Navymen spend more time in efforts directed toward overcoming resource deficiencies rather than the primary mission, overcoming the enemy

- Loss of command appeal

You will note that the problems associated with psychic income and deficit management all add up to the measure we call job satisfaction. It can be either positive or negative. There are, of course, other factors present, but according to the survey of Command and Staff students, this aspect seems primary. The ramifications of poor, nonexistent, or negative job satisfaction result in a wide variety of effects, but the most important of these is reduced combat readiness.

To solve organizationally induced problems relating to job satisfaction, we

must establish a natural, complete, logical growth training philosophy. As basic requirements the Navy should:

- Ensure complete overhaul, modification, or repair of weapons platforms prior to commencement of the training cycle. In essence, support and material activities should not interfere with the operational training cycle.

- Provide a minimum of 6 months training or buildup time prior to employment of a unit

- Implement an enlisted distribution policy that emphasizes crew stability through a Tour Completion Date concept, similar to the SSBN manning program

- Ensure that required personnel are on board prior to commencement of training cycle

- Establish the policy not to transfer crewmembers because of advancement in rate or acquisition of Navy Enlisted Code (NEC); adhere to Tour Completion Date and to crew stability

- Implement an officer rotation policy, including commanding officers, that matches the previously outlined Tour Completion Date policy

- In reference to the level distribution concept in personnel assignment, less than 100 percent manning is not desirable but is acceptable, provided crew stability is ensured

- Ensure that all weapons, equipment, and required spares are on board prior to the commencement of training cycle

- Provide real opposition in fleet exercises in order to truly evaluate all systems. This implies conceptualizing a valid threat and training to meet that threat.

In summary, the growth training philosophy if adopted will allow development of both individual and unit effectiveness and will provide the operational commander adequate time and resources to prepare for his primary objective—a high state of combat readiness.

Another organizationally induced problem indicated by a strong majority of the Command and Staff class was the dilution of command authority. This phenomenon occurs for two basic reasons. First, insufficient resources resulting in unattainable goals, directly contributing to overmanagement by many seniors who realize that assigned objectives are not possible. Rather than protesting upward, they tend to harass and oversupervise their subordinates, refusing to admit failure. This is termed "excessive guidance and supervision." A realistic appraisal of resources at all levels is necessary to correct this phenomenon. And secondly, excessive administrative controls caused by the lateral expansion of command levels. In order to correct this deficiency, we recommend a critical review of existing chain of command structures at all levels, with the objective of eliminating redundancy and lateral controls. Combining administrative, operational, and support lines into a vertical command line would make the individual commanding officer accountable to fewer superiors, preferably only one.

Addressing the area of problems relating to individuals, we find that the Navy has lost a degree of effectiveness in the organization and the satisfaction of our people because we have not followed established principles of leadership and the chain of command. There is a dilution of responsibility and authority existing at many levels, and what is needed is the restoration of authority and accountability to the person who has the assigned responsibility—in the case of handling men, the immediate superior.

We recommend the institution of leadership training programs based on the integration of behavioral science techniques with the traditional concepts of authority, responsibility, and accountability—including also the importance of evaluation, recognition, and reward.

Another expressed concern which

falls into both defined problem areas is that of development of prospective commanding officers. The problem might be stated: Does the Navy train and develop the commanding officer properly in basic managerial as well as technical specialty skills, technical specialty referring here to piloting an aircraft or conning a ship or submarine. Our conclusion is no. Some examples: an aviation lieutenant commander who has excelled in the operations department of his squadron and is retained there for his tour and, therefore, is not exposed to handling men; a surface lieutenant commander who has, by assignment, been denied the opportunity to develop his shiphandling skills; nuclear submarine engineers who readily become XO's and CO's. These distinct deficiencies are likely to be glossed over by the reporting senior because of the officer's superior performance in the billet assigned. This dilutes the validity and adds to this distortions of the fitness report system and any consequent selection based on it. These types of officers are not ready for command because of the lack of managerial training or technical expertise, or both. We consider that present schools are inadequate to provide all officers with the required managerial training. To correct these deficiencies we recommend that:

- All junior officers be trained in all basic management skills, to include the awareness of human behavioral patterns and current socioeconomic trends. This training should take place before he is placed in a managing position—junior officers should be graduates of a division officer management course before becoming a division officer.

- All officers be provided continuing training in management concepts relating to their level of responsibility. The officer should be a graduate of a department head course, XO course, or CO course before assuming that job.

- A philosophy of practical development of managerial and technical skill

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should be emphasized at the unit commander level to further prepare the prospective commanding officer.

To improve methods of evaluation and implementation of recommendations, the Navy should put the fitness report and evaluation reports in the hands of the immediate superior; it should be signed by him and forwarded via the commanding officer for amplifying remarks by endorsement.

The report should be revised to provide different forms and grading criteria according to the level of job responsibility. For example, separate forms should be designed for division officer, department head, executive officer, commanding officer, staff officer.

This revised form should include guidance on the performance standards desired by SecNav and CNO; that is to say, the fitness report should be utilized as both a performance guide and an evaluation tool. Additional grading standards should be added such as:

- Protects subordinates from outside interference
- Accepts responsibility for subordinates' actions
- Displays loyalty toward superiors and subordinates
- Plans effectively to avoid management crises
- Is respected by his subordinates
- Establishes realistic demands and provides resources to accomplish the mission

In conclusion, our forum believes we must recruit, satisfy, and retain high-caliber individuals. We have focused attention on the second of these which, we feel, most directly affects the overall readiness of the Navy. We have described the satisfaction problem in two areas—psychic income, as relates to the

individual, and the organizational function we define as deficit management. The elimination of the psychic income problem will be a complex task. It cannot be accomplished with a General Order No. 21-type approach. It will require a change in attitude by many leaders and the implementation of an active, thorough plan to increase our effectiveness in handling and managing people. We need to demonstrate to them that they are the vital resource. It is our contention that if you satisfy the man, his resultant efforts will satisfy the Navy, and the consequent effectiveness will make for combat-ready units. We must stress leadership and management in terms of responsibility, authority, and accountability.

It is also necessary that we work to solve the deficit management problem and avoid crisis management in the execution of our plans.

We have purposely avoided a point-by-point analysis of Z-grams. The class believes that, on balance, Z-grams have corrected many of the ills that could be immediately addressed. Now that the desired direction of movement is fully appreciated, it is important to continue to ensure individual commanding officer support of the spirit as well as the letter of intent by initiating policy changes directly and privately through the unit commanding officers.

Finally, we believe that these problems can be solved within the Navy and can be done with available resources. Although deficiencies in material assets continue to be a significant factor in our overall Navy problems, increased attention to the human resource theme of recruit, satisfy, retain can help make our Navy efficient, effective, and combat ready.

College of Naval Warfare Report

Edited by Captain Marvin C. Scoggins, U.S. Navy

Forum Member

Introduction. For about 200 years the Navy has taken the product of our society wherever it has found him and trained him to become the type of individual required at that precise moment of time. There has been no change in that fundamental process today, but a change has occurred in the product of our society and it has been dramatic.

We believe that the needs of our Navy remain essentially stable. The challenge is to find unique ways to entice, train, and retain this new individual in the Navy. We must keep those traditions that inspire the commander to "lay his ship alongside that of the enemy," and we must foster the loyalty and standards which will ensure that the commander be followed. We are convinced that an experienced commander, allowed to exact the proper discipline and respect, will perform in a manner to "serve in the best interests of the United States."

Recognizing the direction which you have suggested the Navy must go to attract and retain capable personnel, we believe that the effectiveness of the Z-gram program must be thought of as a total program rather than individual actions. Within this context we feel that it has:

- Projected a change in the overall image of the U.S. Navy from both a military and civilian viewpoint. Traditionally viewed as a conservative organization, the program has conveyed a new spirit of flexibility, modern awareness, and a concern for the individual.

- Convinced intermediate commanders that they cannot institute *de facto* resistance to changes which are deemed beneficial to the Navy as a whole.

- Allowed servicewide participation, regardless of rank or rate, in a program

from which all have been able to realize relatively "instant response."

While conceding the relative success of the program, the opinions of the students of the College of Naval Warfare range from strong concurrence, based on an awareness for the necessity of using such tactics, to concern about the long-range effects of such a course of action. Nearly all concur that most individual actions were long overdue, and many were amazed that they had not been previously implemented Navy-wide after seeing them successfully used by their respective individual commands. No matter what the initial opinion, there seems to be concern about the effect on future discipline, the integrity of the chain of command, and the authority of the individual commanders.

Two specific areas of concern appear prevalent: First, the backing that will be received if the commander is maligned by seniors or criticized by juniors while honestly attempting to carry out the spirit of directives; and second, the methods and caliber of personnel used to monitor compliance with directives.

We recommend that every effort be made to reemphasize the desirability of implementing policy and recommending change through the chain of command. We believe that the Z-gram should now be used more selectively and in instances where the commanders and overall bureaucracy fail to be responsive. The integrity of the chain of command is basic if we are to motivate junior officers to seek command. The most potent influence regarding command appeal perceived by junior officers is the image of the commanding officer. Commanding officers who can communicate and demonstrate to juniors the merits of achieving com-

mand perform the fundamental service of winning the junior officers' loyalty and whetting their ambitions. In order for the commanding officer to successfully play his role in this process, it is necessary for him to believe that his billet is a rewarding one wherein he enjoys the trust and confidence of his seniors. Basically, we are saying that command cannot be enhanced, it is self-enhancing; it cannot be given as a reward, it is self-rewarding.

The goal should be to identify and solve problems associated with reward, authority, pride, and prestige. This will enhance the entire naval profession, including that facet we describe as command. Recognizing the fundamental concerns of reward, authority, pride, and prestige, our forum identified the three basic problem areas of *motivation*, *overstructuring*, and *human factors* as deserving your attention. The remainder of this presentation will expand on these factors.

Motivation. The first of the problems identified under motivation is the need to take necessary steps to improve the Navy image in the eyes of the American public, especially in the eyes of such opinion molders as the academic community and the news media. Our suggestions to achieve this are:

- Continue emphasis on efforts to further eliminate unnecessary regimentation and abrasive regulations, and gain widespread publicity for these efforts

- Capitalize on the Navy's deterrent role of protecting vital economic lifelines rather than waging war in inhabited land areas

- Endeavor to develop additional new recruiting appeals analogous to "Join the Navy and see the world," which are responsive to contemporary values

- Increase the Navy's community relations efforts within the United States along the lines of the overseas "people to people program"

- Emphasize the Navy's role in civic action programs and humanitarian assistance efforts

- Impress upon U.S. Congressmen that to achieve an all-volunteer force they must affirmatively assist in projecting a favorable image of the Armed Forces and, further, should allow the military to utilize commercial advertising to the fullest advantage in competing with civilian employers.

Another area of concern under the broad area of motivation is what we call "the command syndrome." That is, the conviction that an officer must have command in order to succeed and, stemming from that, the pursuit of and assignment of officers to command billets who are not truly best qualified.

Our recommendations here include:

- Recognize command as a somewhat more narrow specialty than is presently the case. Establish a formal set of rigorous qualifications which must be attained prior to assignment to a command; formally recognize attainment of command qualification irrespective of whether an officer is actually assigned to command.

- Assign the limited number of commands available only to those who are best qualified and strongly desire such an assignment. Personal image and aptitude in interpersonal relations with subordinates should stand very high in determining which among those highly qualified should actually be assigned to command.

- Reward officers exercising command but do not permit these rewards to carry over after completion of the command tour.

- Establish other specialties, at least some of which require formal qualification and which lead to successful officer careers. Require the same degree of formality and selectivity in screening for key assignments in these fields as is required for command (i.e., set up equivalent screening boards and have some of these boards convene before

command screening boards meet in order to stress the importance of other specialties).

- Prove through selection board results—directed if necessary—that alternative specialties do offer viable roads to success to the same degree as does command.

The third problem under the overall heading of motivation is that of the “second-term concept” whereby a hierarchy of specialties exists for a given rank. Examples of this are nuclear submarines having greater prestige than diesels, destroyers than amphibs, attack aviation more prestige than antisubmarine warfare aviation, and anything that flies or floats having more prestige than anything that does not.

Our recommendations in this area are:

- Select senior officers for major command or other key assignment on the basis of past performance and irrespective of specialties except in those few instances where previous specialized experience is vital to successful performance in the particular assignment.

- Make every effort to break down the hierarchy of status among commands and specialties so that for a given rank all officers are considered equal regardless of specialization.

- Assure that all specialties are proportionally represented in the detailing community and on selection boards, both in numbers and in level of responsibility.

Another problem is that of officers being assigned to meaningless billets which lack challenge, opportunity for initiative or innovation, or which simply are not full-time jobs. To ameliorate this we suggest realistically and objectively reevaluating every officer billet to determine, first, its essentiality and second, whether the responsibility coincides with the rank assigned. Theoretically, at least, each billet would thereafter be indispensable to the Navy and thus equally important, regardless of posi-

tion. In addition, junior officers could then occupy billets where the responsibility is fully commensurate with their rank. Implementation of this recommendation would cause the officer rank structure of the Navy to be decreased in size with a widening of the base of the pyramid and narrowing at the top.

Another concern regarding motivation is the problem of the passed-over officer and enlisted man who have stagnated in grade, both of whom project a poor image to their subordinates and to all others—in or out of the Navy—with whom they come in contact. Our recommendation for this situation is to obtain legislation providing for prompt separation or retirement—with equitable compensation—of officers who have twice failed selection for promotion. Similarly, enlisted personnel who do not meet a specified promotion timetable should not be allowed to reenlist, and chief petty officers should be carefully screened for continuation at regular intervals.

We also recommend adequately rewarding outstanding petty officers. Here we have two suggestions: first, institute a “spot promotion” system for enlisted personnel below first class (those filling critical billets which call for a higher rate); and secondly, significantly lower the time-in-grade requirements for outstanding first class petty officer eligibility to take the CPO examination. Include a small but significant percentage of such petty officers in each advancement group.

Overstructuring. In the broad category of overstructuring we have identified two specific problems. First, the mission, organization, and functions of naval staffs should be reexamined. Secondly, we must consider the issue of individual exercise of authority and delegation of responsibility.

To more effectively use our available personnel assets, consideration should be given to either reorganizing or com-

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pletely eliminating some of the operational and administrative staffs found throughout the Naval Establishment. Close examination of mission assignments, internal organization, and demonstrated performance would probably reveal that a number of these staffs are ineffectually organized, overpopulated; have overlapping responsibilities; and frequently create as many problems as they resolve. Redundancy of effort, staffing with quantity rather than concentration on quality of personnel, oversupervision of and ineffectual support to operating fleet units are typical examples of staff shortcomings. Career enhancement is questionable. A frequent complaint of junior officers in the surface Navy is that staff duty is less desirable than a regular shipboard billet due to the lack of direction or responsibility associated with staff assignments.

Overlapping of reporting requirements exists at many levels. For example, a surface ship commanding officer is the first link in an administrative chain of command up through his type commander. However, he generally experiences a completely different but frequently repetitive reporting procedure for both administrative and operational matters when underway.

As a result of our discussion in this area, the forum recommends that all existing naval staffs be reexamined for realistic mission assignments and personnel requirements. Whenever and wherever expedient, suspect staffs should be reorganized or "deactivated" and officer and enlisted personnel be reassigned to more productive and challenging billets.

Regarding the problem of proper exercise of authority and delegation of responsibility, a multitude of routine administrative decisions are being made at levels far surpassing the importance of the issues in question. Surface commanding officers are often told not only what to do, but are provided with

excessive guidance on how to do it. When embarked aboard ship, the commanding officer of an aviation squadron frequently assumes the unofficial but demeaning role of division officer in the ship's organization.

Thus, in both situations, the commanding officer's freedom to exercise personal initiative is restricted, his leadership talent is stifled, and his overall command image is degraded in the eyes of his impressionable subordinates. The commander must have the complete trust and confidence of his superiors. The commanding officer's position is greatly enhanced if his personnel observe full support, not oversupervision, from successive links in the chain of command.

We recommend that strong, clear guidelines be promulgated which would allow commanding officers to truly exercise command through more freedom, flexibility, control of resources, and sincere self-expression. Commanding officers, in turn, should provide similar latitude and decisionmaking authority to responsible junior officers and petty officers within their own organizations.

Human Factors. In order to properly equip our personnel to deal with people, it is recommended that applicable and relevant short courses of behavioral science training be instituted at all officer indoctrination schools, enlisted leadership courses, and advanced officer schools. Further, we believe that individuals in the enlisted grades are rarely apprised of their performance in a meaningful way. In most instances the enlisted man does not know why, or even if he is progressing, and the evaluator feels little responsibility to justify his markings. It is recommended that there be established a requirement to discuss enlisted evaluations with individuals much in the same manner as has recently been applied to officer fitness reports.

Next on our list of human factors is excessive use of the "can do" spirit which we believe is most destructive to human resources. "Can do" is a natural tendency—born of pride and tradition—but it may also result from fear of an unfavorable evaluation and result in compulsive acceptance of commitments in excess of resources. It is recommended that:

First, there be an intensification of realistic efforts at the highest level to balance Navy commitments with resources;

Second, the OPNAV level stress to all lower echelon decisionmakers the importance of carefully weighing the resources available, maximizing rest and rehabilitation between commitments;

Third, insist upon factual reporting of readiness—allot realistic resources of time, money, and technical assistance.

Another human factor problem is unpredictable training and career patterns of naval officers. If we are to enhance a professional career in the Navy, motivate younger officers, and develop competent middle-grade officers, each must know how to chart his course, receive opportunity based on his individual ability, and be assured of the stability of the system in which he places his confidence. It is therefore recommended that there be established:

- A stable and predictable pattern of opportunity for all specialties of which operational command is but one of many

- A systematic professional education program which will provide intermediate goals and equal opportunity to perform

- Prerequisite requirements for officers during the formative years, ensuring that unsubstantiated elite groups by deep selection prior to the rank of commander are not created

- A system for lineal seniority re-arrangement of all ranks which would preserve the year group stability but

would recognize the relative ability of the individuals

- Adequate tools for the selection process and elimination of those which fail to properly evaluate the individual and which provide no usable data from the considerable effort expended by the boards

Another human factor problem which we considered is the security of the family, an area that we believe is detrimental to motivating or encouraging young people to seek a naval career. In an effort to achieve a proper response to individual needs, the following recommendations are considered vital.

- Establish geographic stability for those who desire it, a "superhome port" concept, to allow prolonged home ownership, stability of children's education, and the feeling of being a normal community member

- Devise alternate incentives for those who do not desire to live in public quarters, BOQ's, or BEQ's. Alternatives might be provided in terms such as additional obligated service in exchange for payment subsidy and low interest home loans or providing basic allowance for quarters to all single personnel.

- Provide meaningful services and advantages for using commissaries and exchanges or reduce them to essentially ships stores carrying only staple items or eliminate them completely and provide compensatory pay increases

- Develop a cost of living allowance for all duty stations in the United States

- Develop a realistic temporary living allowance to properly compensate for the additional costs always inherent during a move

- Provide compensatory time for at-sea periods out of home port but not deployed, such compensatory time to be scheduled by operational commanders in addition to normal required in-port, upkeep time

- Continue efforts for adequate

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
monetary compensation, particularly for adjustments in the lower grades

Conclusion. Our major finding is that while we have lived with these problems for some time, they have been further aggravated by the times we live in, and the stage has been reached when constructive steps must be taken by those in authority. We believe it is important to remember that no matter how inspired, enlightened, and clearly presented a program or policy may be, if it involves change in a large organization there are still ways to sabotage it—whether deliberate or not. Thus, it is vital that CNO expend as much effort to ensure proper execution and monitoring of any program as in developing the

substance of the program itself.

A striking example of what this forum considers to be a misguided process is to be found in one of the means used to implement the equal opportunity and other programs. Specifically, we feel that it is wrong to permit a number of young enlisted men—at least some of whom are non-rated—to roam throughout the establishment and reporting with authority upon matters for which they have no responsibility.

In short, we agree it is time to “get with the program” and in a manner which demonstrates loyalty and responsibility, listening not only to the complainers and malcontents, but also to dedicated career men.



No change that might improve even minutely the level of talent in our naval forces should be overlooked. We must remember always that the basic element of strength in any nation is not in its machines but in its manhood.

Bernard Brodie, A Guide to Naval Strategy