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

PROFESSIONAL READING

Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission. *Interoceanic Canal Studies 1970.* Washington: U.S. Govt. Print Office, 1971. 129p., five annexes.

This massive volume is the end-product of the latest U.S. Government-sponsored study of a new isthmian canal project for Central America. Like the Manhattan telephone directory, the volume is 2 5/8 inches thick. Despite its formidable dimensions, the report is perhaps the most important reading a naval officer can find. But what kind of a reading should the naval officer give this report?

Certainly he should be a questioner, a challenger of all its premises. The Naval War College has been diligent to prepare readers for this. The December 1965 *Naval War College Review* contained a still important article on the significance of a new isthmian canal. In the January 1967 *Review* a student author examined the proposed routes and concluded that the best course is to convert the present Panama Canal to a sea level route. The October 1967 *Review* contained an article which examined the January 1964 disturbances in Panama and related these to the politics of the present canal operations. All these articles are worthwhile preparation for reading the present volume. Beginning in 1965, the Interoceanic Canal Study Commission issued annual reports which led up to the present final report. Earlier, there was an Isthmian Canal Study pursuant to P.L. 79-289 in 1947. In 1960 "Canal Plans" and a "Report on a Long-Range Program for Isthmian Canal Transits" were presented. There were further studies in 1964. The present volume reviews the isthmian canal interests of the United States and other nations, potential canal traffic and revenues, possibilities for use of nuclear excavation techniques and related problems of international law, general criteria for a useful new canal, and environmental considerations. The report analyzes *some* alternative routes and explores financial feasibility. Management factors in a sea level construction project and subsequent canal operations are given a separate chapter. Massive annexes to the report present staff studies of foreign policy considerations, national defense aspects, canal finance, traffic in interoceanic and intercoastal shipping and engineering feasibility.

The Interoceanic Canal Study Commission was unable to reach any final conclusion on the employment of nuclear excavation methods. However, it finds use of conventional means of construction "physically feasible." The Commission says that, "If suitable treaty arrangements are negotiated and ratified and if the requisite funds can then be made available, we recommend that construction of a sea level canal be initiated on Route 10 no later than 15 years in advance of the probable date when traffic through the present canal will reach its transit capacity. Current trends indicate that this will be near the

end of this century . . ." Route 10 runs through territory of the Republic of Panama. Construction cost is estimated at $2.88 billion, at 1970 price levels. The report concedes that the Commission cannot predict whether growth in traffic, the time when the new canal becomes operative, the interest rate on the project indebtedness, or payments to the host sovereign will permit amortization of the construction costs out of toll revenue.

Should a new canal be built in the equatorial region between 5° and 10° N. latitude, where both climate and politics can be torrid? (The Gulf of Campeche-Gulf of Tehuantepec ["Route 1"] route through politically stable Mexico is given the barest mention in the report.) Is the rubble of excavation only an economic burden, or could it be turned to a profit when used as fill for coastal industrial site development, borrowing such techniques from the Dutch and Japanese? If we decide to move the rubble for such purposes along the axis of the isthmus, are we led to think seriously of a Texas-to-Colombia rail link? Can the heavy lift helicopter, proven in Vietnam, play a role in this project? Is there a role for the technology of giant conveyor belts in moving excavation debris? Some years ago, studies were made for a Lake Erie-Ohio River bulk cargo conveyor belt system of comparable magnitude to what a canal project would require.

The reader will not find such questions discussed in the report. Does the report, despite its thoroughness within the bounds set for it by the Commission, need an injection of questioning imagination? Let the reader decide. Any naval officer who believes in a high degree of interfleet mobility for major fleet units owes it to himself to study this monumental report—and to question it.

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Jonathan T. Howe. *Coping with Multicrises: Sea Power and Global Politics in the Missile Age.* Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1971. 412p.

The versatility of seapower is an article of faith among naval officers. However, since Alfred Thayer Mahan's studies there has been too little serious scholarly effort to ascertain the precise utility of seapower as an instrument of national policy. Commander Howe, currently on Dr. Kissinger's White House staff, has made a significant contribution in his analysis of the role of U.S. naval forces in two crises: the Quemoy crisis of 1958 and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Both crises were further complicated by being second crises, occurring when the United States was already occupied with Lebanon and Vietnam, respectively.

Analysis of these second crises is complicated by an attempt to determine the vulnerability of the United States and constraints placed upon U.S. action by the preexisting crises. In this regard, lessons learned or techniques mastered by the decisionmakers in the management of the second crises are applicable to the very highest levels of government and have little to do with the actual influence and effect of the application of naval forces. Both the analysis of the crises themselves and the points Commander Howe makes are subtle and elusive.

Even so, this in no way diminishes the value of the study, which is based on extensive research, correspondence, and interviews with the principal military, naval, and political figures in each crisis. Important interviews and significant statements are included in the appendices.

For the naval officer as well as for the scholar, the value of the book lies in the questions it raises and the examples given. For example, how will the reduction in the size of the U.S. fleet, a diminished British presence East of Suez, and an expanding Soviet Navy

affect the capability of the United States to act meaningfully in future crises in fairly remote places of the world?

As the author indicates, part of the answer to this question lies in an examination of the "political and military effectiveness of warships as instruments of U.S. policy during the early cold war, at present and in the future. . . ." Such an examination is particularly relevant in view of the Nixon Doctrine and the blue-water strategy it implies.

In the Quemoy crisis of 1958, our initial obligation to the Republic of China was based on a mutual security treaty. However, the island of Quemoy, clearly not one of the Pescadores or part of Formosa, remained in a limbo of ambiguity. For various reasons the President concluded that Quemoy must be held, but maintained a deliberately vague public position. Naval forces provided a low-key and well-controlled means of demonstrating an unequivocal U.S. interest and determination by escorting Nationalist Chinese resupply vessels up to territorial waters, while remaining outside the range of shore batteries.

The absence of Soviet naval forces from the area in the Quemoy crisis placed the Soviets at some disadvantage in their attempts to support Peking. By 1967 the Soviets had a sizable fleet in the Mediterranean, sufficient to intervene on behalf of their Syrian allies if the Israelis sought objectives beyond the Golan Heights. However, the presence of the 6th Fleet was enough to indicate to the Soviets that they could not act with impunity in the eastern Mediterranean. The 6th Fleet showed the value of naval forces for purposes of interposition. As between the two nuclear superpowers, the mere presence of the U.S. ships placed the risks of escalation on the Soviet Union, thus inhibiting Soviet naval initiatives. The intriguing question which Commander Howe does not address is how much of a fleet is enough for purposes of interposition.

By presenting detailed case studies of two crises, Commander Howe has provided a significant amount of raw material for further analysis. For example, what were the precise objectives of the United States? What were the assumptions upon which these objectives were based? Was U.S. national power directed in a comprehensive manner in order to establish control to achieve specified objectives? (This is the definition of strategy.) Can generalizations be made as to the possible future uses of naval power as a result of these two crises?

A serious, scholarly work, *Multicrises* is by no means dull. The final chapter on problems of the 1970's raises additional questions and suggests many possibilities. One is the utilization of regional naval or maritime arrangements to achieve common objectives. Both the scholar and the military professional concerned with security problems cannot ignore this seminal work.

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Rostow, W.W. *Politics and the Stages of Growth.* Cambridge: University Press, 1971. 410 p., index, illus. Hardbound and paperback eds.

This work is obviously one Dr. Rostow *wanted* to write. It is an excellent marriage of politics and economics which results in a clear expression of the Rostow thesis on the economic stages of growth and the role of politics in the American society. To some extent it is both a defense rationale and defense apologia of his life in academia and public service.

It is a specific, all-inclusive, positive treatise about concepts, matters, and things that other authors usually treat in general or less specific terms. He is clearly willing to stand and be counted. Dr. Rostow tends to develop his points and supporting arguments in groups of threes—first, second, and third.

A preface and introduction make the

points that in politics one cannot separate ends and the means. The results actually obtained "are determined as much by the means used as by the objectives sought." Politics help to determine the quality of the environment in which men live. Rapid change, social or political, is hard for the political process to handle with grace. Declared to be an essay in history and the social sciences, Dr. Rostow states that in his earlier book, *The Stages of Economic Growth*, his concern was for the pattern of growth itself. He did not really explore (nor intend to) the process by which nations made the broad collective decisions which determined their national life at each stage of growth. In his current work he looks to see what happens if politics, rather than stages of economic growth, are made the focus of analysis of a comparison between several national experiences. The essence of his new framework for analysis is the linkage between a view of politics as the effort to balance and reconcile problems of security, welfare, and the constitutional order with the stages of growth. He lends great emphasis and identifies the first three of these points as the "three abiding tasks of government," particularly with relation to the Platonic-Freudian view of the human personality. Newton also comes in for consideration. He outlines a "way of looking at politics" wherein he defines politics as the "exercise of power, within a defined territory, through government—the kind of government that goes with the concept of sovereignty . . . " further defined as "the power to deal with other sovereignties; to mobilize and expend resources for growth and welfare; and to dispense justice, . . . [and] enforce law and order. . . . " Behind sovereignty is man himself whose nature underlies the total scope of Dr. Rostow's analysis.

By use of a thesis-concept model, he undertakes a historic review and analysis of eight nation states (Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, China, Turkey, and Mexico) to develop the politics of (a) the preconditions for take-off; (b) the take-off and the drive to technological maturity; and then applies these by comparison to the American case with an excursion into Latin America. Once his basic points are developed, he applies all nations and areas in combination to a new stage of growth which he calls "the politics of the search for quality."

Of particular interest to naval officers will be his views on security (chapter eight) and a re-analysis of the theories of Mahan in chapter five.

Professor Rostow ranges widely over history, science, and philosophy and sees these areas through the perspective or eyes of a historian turned economist with the bent of a political scientist. To attempt to address in detail what could be identified as major points would be futile in that the book is an extensive coverage of a multiplicity of views which the author has developed over a lifetime with respect to a myriad of subjects. Central throughout, however, is the thought that modernization of a society and its attainment of political maturity or stability are events which take time, and man is an impatient animal! I would judge his major conclusion to be "that the world community, viewed as a political system, has succeeded in surviving without major war, . . . [for the past] quarter-century which has been the most dangerous man has ever known. . . . On the whole, the world community has done better than ever before in its history in acting communally to perform the growth and welfare functions of government." This book is an effort to explain why this has been so.

In lieu of a bibliography, Dr. Rostow provides an appendix in the form of an "essay in ideas rather than bibliography." Having read and profited from the efforts of others who sought new methods for studying man's oldest prob-

lem (how to rule himself), the author undertakes an objective review and criticism of an extensive number of ideas and concepts advanced by other writers. For the budding political scientist this appendix is without doubt a treasure chest and an excellent review of the jargon, concepts, and literature of the contemporary scene in political science. The notes, which are extensively annotated, complement the appendix.

If the reader keeps in mind the three tines of the author's pitchfork with which he works his way through the vast haystack of history, economics, science, and politics, one could say that this is a book about security, welfare and growth, government, history, philosophy, geography, and even a romance. All would be true.

C.O. FISKE
Captain, U.S. Navy

Schultze, Charles L., et al. *Setting National Priorities: the 1972 Budget.* Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971. 192 p.

Last year the Brookings Institution began the practice of publishing an annual analysis of the Federal budget. This year's product, written by Brookings Senior Fellows, is entitled "Setting National Priorities—the 1972 Budget." It is an important book for anyone interested in U.S. national security, since about one-third of the book is devoted to analysis of the defense budget.

The basic concept underlying both this work, and the annual program of budget analysis which it reflects, is set forth in the preface by Kermit Gordon, Brookings' president: "No other single document exerts as much influence as does the federal budget on how the nation allocates resources and exercises its spending priorities. Yet it receives relatively little attention in public discussion of the Nation's goals and the resources for achieving them."

It was to meet this deficiency that Brookings began the practice of publishing each year a book which would identify the major decisions on allocating national resources that the President makes in formulating his budget proposals, outline the alternative choices available in each major sector, and discuss the costs and benefits—both immediate and short range—of each alternative. The reaction to last year's volume was strongly favorable: Congressman Wilbur Mills, Senator William Proxmire, and Under Secretary of the Treasury Charles Walker were among many members of the legislative and executive branches of government who commended its impartial bipartisan analysis of vital issues. This reaction confirmed the Brookings' belief that it would be useful to continue this series, which represents the only detailed, nongovernmental, unclassified, and objective analysis of budgetary choices available to the public.

This year's book has already been greeted with a similar positive response. It begins with an overview which discusses the overall balance between revenues and expenditures. After several chapters dealing with defense; analyses of revenue sharing, welfare, social security, medical care, environmental quality, transportation, housing, and agriculture follow along with a conclusion concerning fiscal prospects through 1976.

The book avoids making recommendations, either pro or con, regarding the principal issues which it treats. Rather it merely identifies the implications of alternative courses. It is intended to enable the reader to form his own judgments, not to suggest what they should be.

The defense section begins with a discussion of the President's annual foreign policy message—outlining the foreign policy assumptions which underlie the defense budget. This is followed by a chapter on "Major Defense Options," which identifies and discusses

the main features of this year's defense budget:

- a reduction in ground forces of three divisions from the pre-Vietnam level;
- a reduction of attack carriers from 15 to 13, along with an accelerated pace of naval modernization;
- a reduction in the number of air wings from 40 in 1964 to 35, along with a projected modernization of tactical air capabilities;
- maintenance of a diversified strategic deterrent at fairly stable cost.

The next chapter treats special defense issues: the role of the aircraft carrier, tactical aircraft problems and choices, tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, Vietnam, and the peace dividend, and strategic systems and costs. The concluding chapter discusses foreign aid—both economic and military.

Since budgetary pressures and problems drive most key defense decisions and programs, anyone seriously interested in understanding these decisions and programs will benefit from a thorough reading of this book.

HENRY OWEN

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When you read, *read*! Too many students just half read. I never read without summarizing—and so understanding what I read. The art of memory is the art of understanding.

Roscoe Pound, dean emeritus, Harvard Law School