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Until 1965 the Japanese Government was willing to follow the lead of the United States in foreign policy while focusing its efforts on economic development. In recent years, however, the Japanese have increasingly pursued an independent policy in which an eventual military disengagement from the United States seems likely. While a temporary prolongation of the security partnership is possible, the United States should, nevertheless, seek to reduce its dependence on bases in Japan and the Ryukyus.

THE UNITED STATES— JAPAN ALLIANCE

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INTRODUCTION

Edwin Reischbauer, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, once remarked:

During the twentieth century as a whole, no country has more consistently regarded itself as in essential conflict with the United States than has Japan, and no country has been more uniformly looked upon as a potential enemy by Americans. The burden of proof, perhaps, should rest on those who assume Japanese-American friendship rather than those who expect the contrary.¹

With this psychological background, considerable statesmanship has been required to preserve the alliance which was cemented between the two nations in the early 1950's. It very nearly came apart in 1960, with the ratification of a new mutual security treaty, and it came

under unprecedented strain in 1968, a year of major national elections in both the United States and Japan. In early October one "well-placed American source" in Tokyo was quoted as saying: "At this point, it would take a miracle to avoid the crunch coming between the two countries. It's like a Greek drama. You know it will end in tragedy, but there doesn't seem to be a damn thing being done about it."²

While a political confrontation may not be inevitable, it is probably no exaggeration to state that a serious crisis in confidence had crept into United States-Japanese relations by the end of 1968, with no one able to explain precisely why this had taken place. Among journalists and scholars, some attributed the deterioration of United States-Japanese relations to the conflict in Vietnam, others to conflicting economic policies, and still others to the question of future relations with Communist China.

The purpose of this essay, then, is to examine the various issues which entered into this crisis in confidence—to determine whether the emotional strains of 1968 stemmed from Vietnam alone, from conflicting but reconcilable approaches toward economic and military cooperation, or from a fundamental divergency in strategic outlook which would have occurred with or without the experience in Vietnam. Based on this assessment, some general conclusions will be advanced concerning the future course of United States-Japanese relations. Finally, this essay will consider the future status of the Ryukyus, which Prime Minister Sato is determined to resolve during his planned visit to the United States in late 1969, and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security which, after 1970, becomes subject to termination by either side on 1 year's notice.

I—THE STRATEGIC OUTLOOK OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

The Peace Settlement of 1951. From Washington's point of view, the primary motive of the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan was to counter a Sino-Soviet coalition in Asia by aligning Japan with the United States in world affairs. For the purposes of prudent calculations, it had to be assumed that a neutral or nonaligned Japan could not carry on normal relations with the major Communist powers without, at the same time, succumbing to demands which would be unacceptable to the West. As John Foster Dulles, the chief negotiator of the Peace Treaty, had put it, "Japan's geographical situation makes her susceptible to falling into the Communist orbit, and the West must take the initiative to prevent this from happening. Provision must be made to prevent Japan from being economically dependent on the Communist countries."¹

What developed in the State Department Policy Planning Council was a

threefold program to strengthen Japan against Communist subversion from within and to ensure that Japan's economic outlook remained "free world" rather than Communist oriented. First, the United States extended to Japan much of the logic of the European Recovery Program. Second, the U.S. Government urged American business interests to allow Japanese goods to compete with their own, not only in third markets, but inside the United States. Third, the United States endeavored, by assistance under the Point Four Program and by stimulation of private investment, to accelerate production in South and Southeast Asia so that this region would replace China and Manchuria as traditional sources of raw materials and markets for Japanese products. In the words of the late Frederick S. Dunn, "It was Allied generosity which Dulles sought to use to persuade Japan that her interests lay in the anti-Communist side."²

In return for this program of economic recovery and opportunity, the U.S. Government felt that Japan should assume, just as soon as possible, the main burden of its own defenses. In general, U.S. policy planners believed that a postwar Japan which was required to plan and support its own defenses would take a much more realistic view of the Sino-Soviet threat. The Japanese, however, took an opposite view on rearmament, not on moral or legal grounds, but because of the primary importance which they attached to economic recovery. In his book *Japan's Decisive Century: 1867-1967*, former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida summarized the rearmament issue as follows:

Dulles argued, in connection with the problem of the nation's future security, that Japan should accept rearmament as a prior condition to the signing of a peace treaty and the restoration of its

sovereign independence . . . This suggestion I opposed outright because my country had not completed its economic recovery.³

The United States failed to acquire from Japan any firm commitment or timetable for rearmament. However, in a third area of concern to both countries—diplomatic relations with China—the Japanese yielded to the political realities in Washington. In retrospect, one Japanese scholar has written:

Had Japan not signed the peace treaty with Taiwan in 1951, things could have been much easier. However, unless she had been willing to forego independence in 1951, it is doubtful whether she could have resisted Mr. Dulles' pressure to recognize Chiang Kai-shek's regime: for recognition of Taiwan was *sine quo non* for the ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty by the United States Senate.⁴

To forestall Communist intimidation of Japan, the United States and Japan agreed to enter into a security treaty which, in its 1952 version, provided that U.S. Armed Forces would assist Japan in meeting internal as well as external threats to its security. In addition, the security treaty provided that U.S. forces stationed in Japan might be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, an area later defined by Prime Minister Kishi as the region north of the Philippines, inclusive, as well as Japan and its surrounding area, including the Republic of Korea and the area under the control of the Republic of China.

The foregoing provisions went far toward providing the sort of flexibility desired to meet the Communist threat in Asia, but not quite as far as the United States had hoped for at the outset of negotiations. Mr. Dulles, for

example, had been authorized by President Truman to explore the possibility of a multilateral arrangement for the Pacific area which would have included Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. He proceeded first to Tokyo where it was made clear that "Japan was unwilling to bind herself to a collective security pact which would involve Japanese forces in meeting defense commitments in the South and Southwest Pacific."⁵

The Japanese attitude toward collective security in the early postwar years is understandable. Where the Japanese had failed to establish a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, they had succeeded, at great cost to their homeland, in fatally undermining Western imperialism in Asia. By 1951, however, the United States was linked through NATO to all of the former European colonial powers, most of whom were trying to reestablish themselves in Asia. No Japanese Government could have assumed political commitments which tied Japan either directly or indirectly to this effort.

The question of foreign bases—a unique experience in their history—also troubled the Japanese, not only because of the indefinite duration of the 1951 Security Treaty, but also because the bases conceivably were available for atomic strikes over Communist areas. For psychological and strategic reasons, the Japanese were loath to associate themselves with a doctrine of massive retaliation. Had the Japanese Government pushed too hard on the question of bases, however, it is likely that the United States and her Pacific allies would have taken a very severe position on the Ryukyus and other islands to the south of Japan. Indeed, General MacArthur had proposed, during the early formulation of plans for a peace settlement, that the United States concentrate its postwar forces in the Ryukyus, so as to allow Japan to become the "Switzerland of the Pacific." The

matter might have been resolved along these lines had it not been for the outbreak of hostilities in Korea during the summer of 1950 and the subsequent importance attached by both the United States and Japan to the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan.

What eventually transpired at the San Francisco Peace Conference was Japanese acceptance of the bases under conditions which Prime Minister Yoshida refused to discuss, continued U.S. administration of the southern islands, and an understanding between the chief delegates that the United States recognized Japanese residual sovereignty over these islands. Later, this understanding would be expanded by the Eisenhower administration to a commitment to return the islands to Japanese administration as soon as tensions eased in the Far East. One final feature of the 1951 settlement is worthy of note. Japan was left technically in a state of war with Communist China and the Soviet Union, neither of which recognized the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

The 1960 Revision of the Security Treaty. Largely due to three factors—the industry of the Japanese people, the decision of the Japanese Government to avoid rapid rearmament, and heavy economic transfusions from the United States—Japan's commercial strength and international influence recovered at brisk rates throughout the 1950's. During this period, the Government of Japan monitored very carefully the overall strategic situation in East Asia. The more active the United States became in its containment policy toward Communist China, the more concerned Japan became about its relatively passive role in the 1951 security treaty. The relative increase in Communist Bloc strength vis-a-vis the West, U.S. intervention in the Straits of Taiwan and Southeast Asia, advances in nuclear strategy, and Communist propaganda convinced

many Japanese that any revision of the treaty should give them a large voice in its implementation.⁶

In 1957 the Government of Japan took the initiative by suggesting that the 1951 Security Treaty had become outmoded and, therefore, required renegotiation. In outlining their case for revision of the treaty, the Government of Japan cited six areas in which new arrangements specifically were desired.

The United States is permitted to use bases without consulting the Japanese Government for actions in other parts of the Far East that might involve Japan in a war irrespective of Japan's interests and desires.

Second, the United States could bring into Japan whatever weapons she chose regardless of the wishes of the Japanese with regard to their own territory.

Third, it provided for the intervention of U.S. forces in large-scale internal disturbances in Japan incompatible with the sovereign status of Japan.

Fourth, there was no specific commitment by the United States to defend Japan in case of attack; the treaty provided she may defend Japan if she chooses.

Fifth, it provided for a United States veto over any arrangement for the entry of the forces of a third power into Japan . . .

Finally, there was no provision for a termination of the treaty except by mutual consent.⁷

Most of the foregoing features were modified to the satisfaction of the Government of Japan, either within the revised treaty itself, in the agreed

minutes to the treaty, or in the accompanying executive agreement concerning the status of U.S. forces in Japan. The most important revision was contained in the Agreed Minute, signed by Prime Minister Kishi and Secretary of State Herter in Washington on 19 January 1960. Except in the defense of Japan, the two parties agreed that "major changes in the deployment into Japan of the United States Armed Forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations would be the subject of prior consultation with the Government of Japan." The practical effect of this understanding, which was debated at length in the U.S. Senate, was to place a Japanese veto over the use of military facilities in Japan by the United States. No military combat operations of either a tactical or strategic nature could be launched from Japan without the consent of the Japanese Government. Thereafter, the use and value of U.S. bases in Japan became limited to logistic support purposes.

Another important feature of the negotiations leading up to the 1960 treaty was the decision to deal with the status of U.S. forces in Japan in a separate executive agreement. As in the 1951 settlement, this left the door open for major revisions in the deployment of U.S. forces in and about Japan without revising the basic treaty. Put another way, it made it possible to continue the Security Treaty, with or without the presence of U.S. forces on Japanese soil.

For Japan the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security had produced virtually everything they had hoped for. But the Japanese veto had an important consequence—to increase the importance of the Ryukyus as a base for U.S. military combat operations. Japan also failed to achieve an automatic U.S. response in the case of an armed attack against Japan. Article V of the treaty provided only that the United States would act to meet the common danger

in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Evolution of Outlook Since 1960.

Undoubtedly, the greatest strategic impact on United States-Japanese relations since 1960 has resulted from: (1) the gradual development of hostilities between Peking and Moscow, (2) the emergence in 1964 of Communist China as a threat to United States-Japanese interests in Southeast Asia, and (3) the protracted involvement of U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam.

Initially, the Sino-Soviet conflict produced more challenges than opportunities for the United States, as Moscow and Peking seemed bent on outdoing each other as the dominant force in the international Communist movement. Between 1960 and 1964, as the scene of crisis shifted back and forth from Europe to Asia, separate, but simultaneous, pressure from the two Communist powers forced upon the U.S. Government difficult and often controversial choices with respect to the priority of American security interests and obligations.

During its first 2 years in office, the Kennedy administration concentrated on the Soviet threat, beginning with strenuous efforts to reverse predictions that the Russians would soon overtake the United States in scientific, military, and industrial power. Then, coincident with rising tensions over Berlin and the Cuban missile crisis, the Chinese Communists began to bring increasing pressure against India, joined by the North Vietnamese against their neighbors in Southeast Asia. The Kennedy administration reacted cautiously to the Asian Communist threat, depending upon multilateral aid to India and the Geneva Settlement of 1962 to maintain some semblance of regional stability.

By 1964 Soviet-American tensions had eased somewhat, but the situation in Asia had deteriorated to the point where several other Asian nations with

grievances—Pakistan against India and Indonesia against Malaysia—had aligned themselves with Peking in a coordinated policy of diplomatic and military confrontation. Also disturbing, particularly to the Japanese, was the steady progress Communist China had maintained in developing its military-industrial power, highlighted by the explosion of a nuclear device in October 1964, and the emergence of China as a strong rival of Japan in the export markets of Southeast Asia.⁸

Against the foregoing background, Prime Minister Sato of Japan clearly stood on the threshold of a major decision with respect to future relations with Mainland China. His predecessor, the ailing Prime Minister Ikeda, had sought to maneuver Japan into a position divorced of hostility toward China, and, in July 1964, Sato himself proposed that Japan deepen contacts with China in every possible way.⁹ When, in November 1964, the Liberal Democratic Party met to choose a successor to Ikeda, 80 percent of the delegates reported favored recognition of the Peking Government.¹⁰ Shortly after his election, Prime Minister Sato suggested that the United States and Japan have comprehensive discussions of the world situation at the earliest possible time.

In preparing for the January meetings in Washington, the Japanese apparently leaned toward accommodation with Peking on the premise that no other alternative would be offered by the Americans. During the course of discussions with President Johnson, however, the Prime Minister was reassured of future U.S. determination in Southeast Asia and led to abandon his earlier views toward accommodation with Peking. While refraining from any reference to the Chinese threat, the Prime Minister concluded his visit with the following commentary:

The present political and economic instability in Asia is a most

serious threat to international peace and security. Almost all of Southeast Asia today can be considered a troubled area—Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia . . . The United States deserves the highest respect for its increasing efforts to maintain peace and stability in this part of the world.¹¹

With Japan's support, the U.S. Government commenced, in the spring of 1965, the first major buildup of U.S. ground forces on the mainland of Southeast Asia.

This author will leave to historians the difficult task of determining the strategic success or failure of the U.S. commitment to Vietnam. Suffice it to say, by 1966 the prospects of a Chinese Communist coalition with anyone had completely collapsed. The Tashkent Settlement had placed the Soviet Union squarely between Pakistan and China in any move against India; the anti-Communist revolution in Indonesia had quickly removed the threat to Malaysia; and Chairman Mao's Cultural Revolution, which began in May 1966, soon took on all of the appearances of a civil war within China itself. The Vietnam conflict, however, continued to drag on to a military and political stalemate, largely as a result of Soviet intervention to sustain Hanoi's effort in South Vietnam.

Once the overall threat to Southeast Asia had subsided, the Vietnam war became more and more intolerable to Japan each day that it continued. At times it threatened to embroil Japan in a nuclear war with one or both of the major Communist powers. At other times, particularly during the 1968 presidential campaign, it seemed to so affect American resolve that the United States never again would come to the aid of an Asian ally. Even the middle course, a protracted conventional war, was considered unsatisfactory, for it

simply reinforced and prolonged the American hold over the Ryukyus as a supporting base.

What added even greater strain to the United States-Japanese relations was the dramatic changes which were taking place in the global balance of power. The Sino-Soviet conflict had deepened to the point where competition between Moscow and Peking had been replaced by open hostility. The effects of the Cultural Revolution and the nuclear weapon development program on various sectors of the Chinese economy had led to a complete reevaluation of the military-industrial threat. The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Middle East and the Indian Ocean area had left a military vacuum which the Soviet Union, rather than the United States, seemed destined to fill. Finally, Soviet-American agreement on a Non-Proliferation Treaty had forced upon Japan a fundamental reappraisal of its posture vis-a-vis the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China.

As we shall see, the cumulative effect of all of this in Japan has been a strategic debate of unparalleled proportions, comparable to those which have occurred at great watersheds in Japanese history. A similar process is occurring in the United States. What this amounts to in Japan is a search for strategic flexibility—alternative arrangements to meet the challenges of the 1970's—just at a time when the United States requires, more than anything else, some sense of strategic continuity. In this fluid situation the question is whether or not United States-Japanese bilateral relations are sufficiently strong to prevent a complete breakdown in the alliance. The answer will be found in the attitude of each nation toward economic and military cooperation in Asia.

II—THE PARTNERSHIP IN PROSPERITY

By 1968 the Japanese could look back over the past two decades with

immense pride and satisfaction in the postwar economic performance of the nation. The losses of World War II had been completely wiped out by the 8-10 percent growth rates of the 1950's and 1960's; the nation had risen to third place among the world's industrial powers; the purchasing power of Japan had become as large as the aggregate purchasing power of Asia, excluding Communist China; and the Japanese people stood on the threshold of unparalleled advances in social welfare. The Japanese economy has reached the point, however, where future expansion cannot be accomplished without considerable difficulty.

First, the excess of labor demand over labor supply will gain proportions in coming years; second, the rate of capital accumulation will decline as private and government spending increases on social infrastructure; third, foreign firms are showing greater resistance to the licensing of technology to Japanese firms; and, fourth, the government needs to build up its foreign reserves by \$3.4 billion, from a present level of about \$2 billion, in order to provide greater monetary stability. Some economists estimate that the technological gap could reduce Japan's annual growth rate by about 2 percent and the fall in savings ratio by another 1 percent.¹ Given these trends, Japan's sensitivity to foreign trade is perhaps greater than at any time in the postwar years.

Potential for Growth in United States-Japanese Economic Relations. Between 1960 and 1967 the total volume of trade between the United States and Japan increased from \$2 billion to \$6 billion, with the United States accounting for 30 percent of Japan's international trade by 1968. So dependent had Japan become on the economic performance of the United States that one journalist was led to comment: "Japan cannot afford an American growth rate as low as 3

percent."² Yet, this is precisely what may happen in the next few years as the United States begins to correct the monetary and fiscal imbalances brought about by underfinancing the Vietnam war. Indeed, "the outlook may be an economy advancing at a very slow pace if at all."³ If this is an accurate forecast, Japan will not find in her alliance with the United States the opportunities for economic growth so characteristic of the past two decades.

In addition to the problem of trade potential, Japanese and American businessmen appear to be at loggerheads over Japanese restrictions on foreign investment and the danger of American restrictions on Japanese imports. From Tokyo, American sources have described the problem as follows:

The United States beset with an international balance of payments problem, running a heavy trade and capital deficit in dealing with Japan, is convinced that the Japanese are moving too slowly away from protectionist trade and investment policies.

The Japanese dependent on trade for survival and having their most important export market and most vital source of raw materials in the United States fear deeply that the United States is moving rapidly toward protectionism.⁴

This crisis of confidence which has crept into Japanese-American business relations, particularly in the powerful automotive and electronics industries, is not likely to affect the current volume of trade between the two countries, since both countries benefit enormously from this trade. However, it does cast a shadow over the prospects for future economic cooperation. Essentially, the solution to this problem hinges on Japanese willingness to allow American

industries to share in the long-range economic growth potential of Japan—a solution which the Government of Japan has been extremely reticent to implement in its policies toward foreign investment in general. In 1966, for example, the total U.S. direct investment in Japan amounted to only \$758 million as opposed to \$1,918 million in Australia.

Development Problem of Southeast Asia. Outside the United States, the region of greatest importance to the Japanese economy is Southeast Asia which accounted for another 30 percent of Japan's trade in 1968. To maintain this pattern of trade, the Japanese have advocated, along with many distinguished Americans, a multilateral system of development which stresses the accumulation of capital, the development of technology, and the improvement of management ability. The cost of such a program for a 5-year period (1965-1970) has been estimated by the Japanese Institute for Asian Economic Affairs to be about \$5,890 million.⁵

Given Japanese dependence on Southeast Asian markets and the importance which they had attached to development assistance, the significance of the U.S. commitment of early 1965 was not so much the decision to fight communism in South Vietnam as the promise to underwrite the future economic development of the entire region. As President Johnson had said in his Johns Hopkins speech in April 1965,

For our part, I will ask the Congress to join in a billion dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway. And I would hope that all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will join in this effort to replace despair with hope and terror with progress.⁶

President Johnson's promise received initial congressional approval in May

1966, when \$140 million of the administration's supplemental appropriation was earmarked for the newly emerging Asian Development Bank. An additional increment of \$100 million was set aside by the Japanese Diet for this undertaking, and, when the bank was established in December 1966, Mr. Takeshi Watanabe, a widely respected Japanese financier, became its first president. Two years later, however, the political situation in the United States had deteriorated to the point where the U.S. Senate refused to approve a new \$200 million contribution to the Asian Development Bank and, as an added rebuff to American involvement in Southeast Asia, added \$300 million to the Inter-American Development Bank. By the middle of 1968, then, it appeared to the Japanese that the United States was preparing to withdraw not only its troops, but also its dollars, from Southeast Asia.

The Lure of China Trade. The threat of a U.S. economic withdrawal from Southeast Asia coincided with a Japanese reexamination of trade relations with China. In general, the picture was one of both optimism and pessimism. On the one hand, unofficial estimates indicated that China's total volume of trade in 1971 would reach a level somewhere between \$6,500 million and \$8,900 million, of which Japan's share should be about \$1,380 million (compared with \$170 million in 1967). On the other hand, both Peking and Taipei were making it difficult for Japan to get into the China market. Mainland China insisted that it would make no large-scale contracts unless the Japanese Export-Import Bank extended credit; Nationalist China equally insisted that it would boycott Japanese trade if this were done. In the meantime, Western European businessmen were capturing a major share of the China trade, moving into some former Japanese markets and "forcing Japanese 'friendly firms' to cut

their prices sharply in order to compete."⁷

During 1968 trade negotiations, the Chinese Communists went a step further by warning the Japanese that they no longer were willing to separate economics from politics. They insisted that the Japanese delegation swallow the principle that three demands be included in the trade pact: "Japan would not assume a hostile attitude toward China; would take no part in the 'plot' to form the two China's; and would in no way obstruct better Sino-Japanese relations."⁸ The Memorandum Trade Agreement, concluded on 6 March 1968, included these demands, even though the volume of trade dropped 24 percent from 1967 to only \$117 million.

Much of what China wanted, of course, already had been met in the declaratory policy of the Government of Japan. The Foreign Ministry had indicated that Japan would never again put military forces on the mainland of China and would take no part whatsoever in an anti-Communist alliance in Asia. Then, on 29 July 1968, Foreign Minister Miki made a major foreign policy address at the Australian National University in Melbourne, during which he softened Japan's stand even further. In this address, which later was published by the Foreign Ministry in *Japan Report*, he declared:

No matter who rules the Continent, the alternatives for Japan's continental policy is but one. It is the good neighbor policy to promote co-existence and co-prosperity under the principle of mutual respect.

The logical consequence of Japan's environment is that the fundamental guidelines for our foreign policy, whether toward China, Korea, or the Soviet Union, must be based upon

co-existence and co-prosperity, under the principles of reciprocity, equality, mutual respect, and non-intervention.⁹

Just how Foreign Minister Miki proposed to square his good neighbor policy toward China with the U.S. strategy of military containment was not spelled out. It was clear, however, that a fundamental divergency had developed once again between the United States and Japan on the question of relations with China.

Fruition of Soviet-Japanese Cooperation. In terms of opportunities for economic cooperation and worldwide influence, the Soviet Union had assumed by mid-1968 a stature in Japan second only to the United States. Moreover, the Sino-Soviet conflict had led to a situation in which Moscow, rather than Tokyo, assumed much of the initiative toward improving Japanese-Soviet relations. Equally fortuitous to Japan was the Soviet-American "détente" which enabled Tokyo to respond to the overtures without offending Washington.

In trade and economic development, Japanese-Soviet relations were clearly on the move. The 1968 Trade Agreement between the two countries settled on a total volume of \$627 million, an increase of 30 percent over 1967, and joint development opportunities in Siberia went well beyond anything the Japanese might have imagined in the early 1960's. Most important, in Japanese calculations, was the fact that the Soviets seemed interested in projects which were not of the "flash-in-the-pan" type with no continuing results. A typical joint venture was the 20 July 1968 agreement on the development of forestry resources, in which Japan extended \$163 million worth of industrial products on credit in return for 8 million cubic meters of processed lumber at internationally competitive prices

over a 5-year period. On the drawing board was an even more ambitious project involving \$400 million over a 10-year period for joint development of the Udokan copper mines. That agreements of this sort could be reached at a time when the Soviet Union and the United States were supporting opposite sides in the Vietnam conflict is one measure of the independent stance Japan had assumed by 1968. Equally significant, in terms of basic U.S. policy, was the tendency of Japan to look upon the Soviet Far East as an area of opportunity equal to if not surmounting those available in Southeast Asia.

Japan and the Middle East. In terms of vital imports, no area is as important to Japan today as is the Middle East, where petroleum accounts for 65 percent of Japan's energy. Yet, in this area, "Japan's own political influence is almost zero."¹⁰ It is probably no exaggeration to assert that a Soviet Union which succeeded in establishing paramount influence in the Middle East, or any portion of the vital Indian-Pacific Ocean trade route, would command also a potentially crippling influence over the economy of Japan. This threat has led Edwin O. Reischauer, who maintains close contact with official Japan, to suggest that the United States begin planning now for a multinational naval force, in which Japan might eventually participate, so as to ensure the safe passage of vital resources through the Indian Ocean region.¹¹ In the meantime, the Japanese can only hope that their economic investments in Siberia pay political dividends in the Middle East.

An Assessment. Bearing in mind that it was American generosity which the United States attempted to use in formulating and preserving the alliance with Japan, it is clear that United States-Japanese relations are going to be put to severe tests in the next few years

as the United States considers how to balance its economic commitments at home against those overseas. Japan will be watching especially the attitude of the American people and the U.S. Government toward the Asian Development Bank in which not only Japanese yen, but also Japanese prestige, are at stake.

For its part, the Government of Japan may use the next few years to consolidate the economic gains of recent years or attempt to stroke ahead on the path of rapid expansion so characteristic of the economy through 1968. A slowdown will not be easy for a society which expresses its nationalism in terms of economic achievement. Leading Japanese economists, for example, already are considering how to double the nation's gross national product within the next 20 years. Moreover, in the absence of heavy U.S. expenditures in Southeast Asia, there is concern among Japanese economic planners that deflationary moves in the Japanese economy will threaten the very countries that are now dependent on supplying Vietnam.¹²

Whatever the reason—a need to express their nationalism in terms of economic growth or a need to shore up the post-Vietnam economies of Southeast Asia—any effort by the Japanese to speed up, while the U.S. economy slows down, will have a profound effect on the alliance, since it appears to be primarily in Communist China, the Soviet Union, and lesser Communist states that opportunities for economic expansion loom largest.

III—THE PARTNERSHIP IN DEFENSE

Stresses and Strains of the Vietnam Conflict. As we have seen, Japan concluded in 1964-65 that it was in her national interest to support the buildup of U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia, where the combined pressure of Communist China and Indonesia had

brought about a high degree of political instability throughout the region. In allowing the use of Japanese bases in support of the Vietnam war effort, Japan also could have anticipated a favorable U.S. attitude toward reversion of the Ryukyus once the Vietnam conflict was brought to a successful conclusion. Thus, *even though she was under no treaty obligation to do so*, Japan had two important reasons for extending the area of mutual security and cooperation to Southeast Asia.

In undertaking this political commitment, Japan's leaders had to be relatively confident that the war would not escalate to the point of involving Japan in a head-on confrontation between the United States and Communist China. Informed Japanese apparently convinced themselves around 1966 that adequate ground rules had been established for the air and ground war in Vietnam, for they reported:

In February 1966, at the Sino-American conference in Warsaw, the two countries were trying to obtain each other's agreement not to fight over Vietnam. China put forward three conditions for its nonintervention: (1) no American forces to invade North Vietnam; (2) no attack should be made on or near the Chinese frontier; (3) no measures should be taken to destroy dams in the north or fight inside Hanoi city. To this America replied with a warning that should China intervene, tactical nuclear weapons would be used in the Vietnam war. On these two points the two sides reached agreement.¹

Notwithstanding the Sino-American talks, steps were taken, between 1965 and 1967, to shore up the air defenses of Japan. In June 1965, United States-Japanese agreements were signed providing for a joint cost-sharing program for the production of equipment and

the providing of technical assistance for a base air defense ground environment (BADGE) system. Then, in late 1967, an agreement was signed providing for the production in Japan of the Hawk and Nike Hercules missile systems. A problem which concerned Japanese strategists increasingly after October 1966, however, was the Chinese nuclear missile threat, for which no satisfactory defenses were found.

As the Vietnam war dragged into a third year of intense fighting on both sides, the polarization of American politics into Hawks and Doves greatly troubled the Japanese. In early 1967 they began to concern themselves increasingly with such questions as what would happen to the southern islands (Ryukyus and Bonins) if public pressure was to force a U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia or a Japanese move toward neutrality. One member of the Japanese academic community described the consequences as follows:

If Japan took a step toward neutrality before Sino-American-Soviet tensions eased, America might retreat to a defense line anchored by Okinawa at one end, the Aleutians at the other and the Bonins replacing Japan in the center. Should this happen, Japan would lie under a siege of American troops, thus reverting to the conditions which existed during the last days of the Pacific War when the Allies were preparing to storm her main islands.²

In May 1967 Foreign Minister Miki declared in a press interview that Japan would seek return of the Bonin Islands. The following November, during the second state visit of Prime Minister Sato, President Johnson assured the Japanese of U.S. resolve and good faith by agreeing to enter into immediate negotiations for the return of all of the southern islands except the Ryukyus.

Following the state visit, a Joint Communiqué was issued in which:

The Prime Minister expressed support for the United States position of seeking a just and equitable settlement and reaffirmed Japan's determination to do all it can in the search for peace. He also expressed the view that reciprocal action should be expected of Hanoi for a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam.³

For a time, at least, a broad harmony of view had been restored in United States-Japanese relations. Then, in 1968, a series of events in the United States sent a shock wave through Japan. The most important of these was President Johnson's dramatic announcement to partially halt the bombing over North Vietnam (without reciprocal action) and to withdraw from the 1968 presidential race. His speech on 31 March 1968, comparable to the resignation of a Japanese Prime Minister, was widely interpreted in Japan as an admission of personal responsibility for a fundamental error in U.S. foreign policy.

In 1968 the Government of Japan also began to encounter, like officials in the United States, a serious pattern of student protests. They were antiestablishment, antiwar, and antibases. Soon violence spread to almost every facet of U.S. military activity in Japan. In this situation the Government of Japan found itself in the intolerable position of having to use strong-arm police tactics against Japanese students in order to defend foreign bases. By the middle of the year, the Liberal Democratic Party found each of the four opposition parties lined up solidly against the continued presence of U.S. bases on Japanese soil.

The first indication that the Government of Japan had reached the saturation point occurred in June 1968, when

Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura made the following guarded statement:

Japan does not regard U.S. military bases in Japan as being an absolute necessity for the maintenance of the security of Japan. If strategically possible, U.S. withdrawal or reduction of its bases in Japan would not prejudice Japan's security and would be basically desirable.⁴

In taking this stand, the Government of Japan was quite prepared to sacrifice the \$400-500 million which flowed annually into the Japanese economy from the U.S. bases. They still had to consider, however, the impact a U.S. withdrawal would have on Japan's defense posture and continuing efforts to secure return of the Ryukyus.

Japan's Defense Posture. Coincident with the statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kumura, the Japan Defense Agency announced that it was drafting a white paper on "National Defense in Japan," the first to be published by the government since the end of World War II. The white paper, which is expected to outline reasons why Japan needs self-defense forces and how Japan might counter the Communist Chinese nuclear threat, will not be completed until 1969. In November 1968, however, Director General Masuda of the Japan Defense Agency indicated the general direction of Japanese thought when he expressed the view that, while Japan's defense power was "inadequate" to effectively ensure the security of Japan and neighboring nations, it would be "inadvisable" to depend heavily on the United States for national defense.⁵

As the political and economic consequences of rearmament came under growing debate within Japan, it remained absolutely taboo for any government official to speak of the possibility of a small nuclear deterrent. However, a

fairly clear division of opinion on this issue began to emerge in the press and the academic community. On the one hand, there were those who concerned themselves with the possibility that a nuclear-armed Japan would find it even more difficult to get along with China. On the other hand, there was the unusually bold conclusion that, given the requirement for an expensive rearmament program, the economic arguments for a small nuclear force were not unpersuasive.⁶ Lacking consensus on this vital issue, Prime Minister Sato continued to stress the importance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella while seeking Washington's agreement to reduce, if not relinquish altogether, control over the bases in Japan.

The American reaction to this proposal was summarized by Richard Halloran who had covered many of the riots and disturbances around U.S. bases during 1968:

The American government, however, has recently begun to caution the Japanese that they cannot have it both ways. They cannot expect, goes the new policy line, to demand that American bases be withdrawn and to ask that the security treaty continue . . . They have dropped the hint in none too subtle terms that, unless Japan is genuinely willing to allow the bases to remain and to pick up some of the economic and military burden in Asia, it may be the United States and not Japan that will seek revision of the treaty If the Japanese Government is not willing to see bases remain in Japan, takes no action to persuade the Japanese people of the need for the bases not only for American but Japanese security, and allows anti-American public sentiment and demonstrations to increase,

the United States will be reluctant to give up control of Okinawa.⁷

In short, a withdrawal of Japanese support, while the Vietnam war continued, could jeopardize not only the United States-Japan Security Treaty, but also any possibility for a cooperative solution to the Ryukyus problem.

Pressure for Return of the Ryukyus. Since the early days of the alliance, there had been a very important connection, in the American view, between Japan's attitude toward the security problems of Asia and an eventual return of the Ryukyus to Japanese control. On the whole, Japanese cooperation had been very favorable until about 1967 when the ambiguities of the Vietnam conflict began to be felt in Tokyo as well as Washington. From that point on, Japanese pressure for return of the Ryukyus had become almost unmanageable. In late 1967 the U.S. Government sought to ease this pressure by agreeing not only to return the Bonin Islands but also to the establishment of a trilateral (Japanese-American-Ryukyuan) advisory committee for the purpose of removing economic and social barriers between the Ryukyus and Japan proper. Then, in February 1968, the U.S. Government took another important step toward reversion by unilaterally announcing that the Ryukyus voters would elect, for the first time, their own chief executive.

The November elections on Okinawa produced an unexpected outcome. By a vote of 227,400 to 201,236, the Ryukyuan voters elected as their first chief executive, Chobya Yara, a socialist who had campaigned not only for early reversion but also for the gradual closing of U.S. military installations on Okinawa.⁸ Thus, the United States found in the Ryukyus elections precisely the same problem it had encountered earlier in Japan—an official sentiment which favored the removal of U.S. bases.

Until recently it was doubtful that the economy of the Ryukyus could survive without the annual expenditures of U.S. military forces. Today, this is a questionable proposition, on two counts. First, the shortage of labor in Japan has focused attention on the need to maintain population growth, not for the militaristic reasons of the 1930's, but in order to achieve the optimum for industrial productivity.⁹ In this sense, the Okinawan labor force represents a positive asset to Japanese economic planners. Second, the discovery of oil reserves in the East China Sea Basin could change the economy of the entire region and certainly eclipse whatever economic significance U.S. military installations have had in the past. Japanese development of these offshore resources cannot commence, however, until Japan regains sovereignty over the Ryukyus and, hence, jurisdiction over the Continental Shelf extending into the East China Sea.

Arms Control and Disarmament. While the Government of Japan could be strongly criticized for raising the question of U.S. bases while the Vietnam conflict continued, the U.S. Government could be accused of equally poor timing by thrusting upon Japan a nuclear nonproliferation treaty which had not taken into account Japanese views and held no real prospects for obtaining the adherence of Communist China. Insofar as the latter aspect of the treaty is concerned, the awkward position in which Japan found itself has been described as follows:

...Japan is linked with the United States by the Security Treaty between the two countries and, as such, she is guaranteed by the U.S. against nuclear attack. But if she is involved in the non-proliferation treaty, which would give a general guarantee against nuclear aggression both by

the United States and by the Soviet Union, then she has to face a tricky problem. For supposing the nuclear umbrella Japan seeks is against the Chinese "nuclear rain," the Soviet Union will have to shield Japan against nuclear threats from China. Such a set-up would be quite irrational for the Russians who have not yet scrapped the Sino-Soviet Friendship and Mutual Assistance Treaty, however far apart they may be alienated from China now.¹⁰

In addition to the China problem, the security assurances offered by the nuclear powers left much to be desired. The treaty itself was silent on the subject, and the draft resolution which had been introduced into the Security Council in March 1968 by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union committed none of the guarantors to any precise military action.

Despite the foregoing weaknesses, Japanese neutralists tended to regard the prospect of an international guarantee, *with Chinese participation*, as far superior to continued reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella or development of their own nuclear arsenal. The strategic concept favored by this group has been expressed as follows:

... The American alliance will be replaced with an international guarantee which gives Japan her three great dreams. A Japan lightly armed, without atomic bombs, and fortified by her industrial strength, will be surrounded by a triangle of forces—United States, Soviet Union, and Chinese—each of which will have a fundamental interest in (a Japan) which remains independent and equidistant from the others. And each will know that the least aggression

against a peaceful and independent Japan will see the other two acting against the aggressor.¹¹

Whether a nonnuclear Japan standing at the center of an ambiguous three-sided nuclear triangle will prove palatable to defense-minded Japanese remains to be seen. The point made after mid-1968, however, was that Japan could not even explore the possibilities without some sort of diplomatic reconciliation with the Chinese. These arguments were not entirely unpersuasive for, toward the end of 1968, Washington officials began to lend open support to intensified Japanese bridge-building effort toward Peking.

Another aspect of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which has concerned the Japanese, particularly those interested in keeping all nuclear options open, is the apparent technical and economic advantages which it confers on the present nuclear weapon states. The United States sought to counter this argument, beginning in 1958, with an agreement for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy. Under a new agreement which was signed on 25 March 1968, the United States agreed to supply enriched uranium to fuel 13 large nuclear reactors to be built in Japan and 365 kilograms of plutonium for use by the Japanese in their research and development programs. Equally significant to the Japanese was an agreement, in 1962, to provide for a program of cooperation in the testing of experimental satellites and, in 1968, a further agreement to furnish technical data on inertial guidance systems so as to enable Japan to proceed more rapidly with plans to launch a communications satellite. The latter agreement will be of particular importance to the Japanese because of critical deficiencies they had encountered in the guidance systems of their Mu rockets.¹²

Despite significant assistance from the United States, the Japanese

continue to fret about the question of technological parity and the possible loss of economic opportunity under the treaty. As the argument goes:

... nuclear powers, which are permitted to continue developing military uses for nuclear energy, are enabled to reap benefits from this aspect of nuclear research to profit from their efforts by applying such "spin-off" to the commercial world of peaceful uses.¹³

To provide a solution to the foregoing problem, the Government of Japan has sought, as a precondition for acceptance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Soviet-American agreement to enter into immediate consultations concerning arms control and disarmament. In addition to a diplomacy aimed at the control of nuclear technology at the source, many Japanese feel that such talks should focus on the strategic problems of Asia as well as Europe and consider within that setting such matters as restrictions on ABM systems, prohibition of underground nuclear testing, the establishment of small nuclear free zones, and hot lines linking Tokyo with Washington, Peking, and Moscow. While some Japanese may be sincere in stressing these arms control objectives, the practical effect of such demands is to buy time for those Japanese who believe that, within 5 or 10 years, popular opinion can be brought around to a general acceptance of a national nuclear force.

An Assessment. The United States-Japanese security partnership came under unprecedented strain in 1968, so much so that by the middle of the year the Japanese Government appeared to be making preparations for a complete military disengagement from the United States. The pressure to return the Ryukyus before a Vietnam settlement, the expressed desire that the United States

remove its forces from Japanese soil, the thorough review of Japan's defense posture, the acceleration of efforts in nuclear missile technology, and the emphasis on accommodation with Peking were all steps taken toward an independent foreign and defense posture.¹⁴ The cause of all of this activity can be traced not only to the ambiguous position of the U.S. Government regarding the Vietnam conflict, but also to its insistence that Japan forego the nuclear option with no real prospect of a settlement with China.

Hardly noticed, but especially significant, was the growing divergency of opinion within the Liberal Democratic Party concerning future relations with the United States and China. As in late 1964, most of the conservative members of the Diet preferred to solve the China problem without sacrificing good relations with the United States. By 1968, however, the stakes for Japan had become considerably higher, embracing not only trade relations, but also fundamental questions of national security. The result was to place greater strain on the conservative leadership than at any time since 1960, leading in late 1968 to the resignation of both the Foreign Minister and the Minister of International Trade and Industry, so as to openly challenge Sato's continued leadership of the party.¹⁵

The victory of Prime Minister Sato over his opponents in the Liberal Democratic Party elections of November 1968 has restored some stability to United States-Japan relations. However, the security partnership will never again be what it was at the outset of the Vietnam conflict. We now find, in Japan, a nation much more inclined toward an autonomous defense posture than at any time since World War II and, in Prime Minister Sato, a statesman more firmly committed than ever to the attainment of Japan's complete independence in foreign affairs. Just how the United States and Japan will agree

on a formula for the return of the Ryukyus, at this point, is one of the topics which will be considered in the final chapter.

IV—CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION

Basic Divergencies in Strategic Outlook. Looking to the 1970's, which are very nearly upon us, it is clear that many of the strategic assumptions of the United States and Japan are going to be substantially different than they were in 1950 or even 1960.

In the first place, the Vietnam experience has convinced many Americans that there is something fundamentally wrong with a regional strategy which requires the United States to assume the military burdens while Japan channels its energy into the relatively secure business of development assistance. If the broad alliance between the two countries is to endure, then a much more representative balance will have to be struck in their respective roles.¹ Otherwise, the United States will be faced with only one choice—the progressive withdrawal of American troops from the East Asian region so as to avoid the divisive consequences of having to commit these troops to defend, once again, interests which are largely Japanese.

Second, American generosity toward Japan in the economic sphere is not likely to be in the future what it was in the past. It will be very difficult to convince the American people and the American business community that the United States has a special obligation to raise the standard of living of the Japanese people, to guarantee Japan third place in industrial power, or to enable Japan to maintain technological parity with the nuclear weapon states. This will be particularly so if Japan seeks to avoid both collective security responsibilities in Asia and opportunities for American investors to share

in the economic growth potential of Japan.

Unfortunately, the dominant thrust of Japanese policy today is not toward the sharing of containment burdens in Asia, but toward a gradual military disengagement from the United States. From their perspective there are a number of reasons for wishing to defuse the alliance of its military features. Some of these reasons center around relations with China—the desire to gain access to the China market, the feeling that Japan should reach some sort of political accommodation with China, and the belief that the Sino-Soviet split is so important that Japan simply cannot afford to confront China with another enemy. Japan cannot proceed very far down this road, however, so long as the Vietnam war continues and the United States continues to rely on Japanese bases in support of that war.

Quite apart from the China problem, it will be increasingly difficult to reconcile the continued presence of U.S. forces on Japanese soil with a policy which, for two decades, has pressed the Japanese to build up their own defense forces. Even at the present time, many Japanese seem convinced that they have sufficient forces to defend themselves against any likely conventional threat. This leaves the United States in the position of having to rely on the nuclear umbrella argument whenever a crisis arises in base relations. But this is not a very enduring proposition either, for sooner or later the Japanese will decide that an autonomous nuclear force is more palatable than perpetual dependence on the United States. Already, the Japanese people are among the most “nuclear happy” people in the world in their commercial outlook and, for the first time, “the possibility of Japan going nuclear is under active discussion in Government and military circles.”²

Whatever the future course of Japanese policy—toward a strategic accommodation with the major

Communist powers or toward an autonomous nuclear force—it should be abundantly clear to American policy planners that no one in Japan is spending much time on the problem of preserving a U.S. military presence on Japanese soil.

Prolonging the Security Partnership. Given the attitude of the Japanese and the current reliance of U.S. forces on bases in Japan and the Ryukyus, the most that the U.S. Government can do is to buy time—to hope that a Vietnam settlement will occur soon or, if it does not, that the Japanese can be persuaded to tolerate the bases for a few years longer. Telling the Japanese that they cannot have the nuclear umbrella without the bases is one way to buy time. So were the efforts of the Johnson administration to speed up the processes for return of the Ryukyus to Japan. But these efforts were not as productive as they might have been because of the insistence in 1968 that Japan get on the nonnuclear handwagon. Surely, if there is one area in which the Japanese need time to consider all of the alternatives, it is on the vital question of nuclear strategy. In this sense a more relaxed attitude toward the Non-Proliferation Treaty could lead to a more relaxed Japanese attitude toward the bases.

The Ryukyus present a special problem, not because of the continued conflict in Vietnam, but because of the possibility that Japan will move toward a military disengagement soon after regaining control of Okinawa. The terms of the Mutual Security Treaty, which permit Japan to renounce the Treaty on 1 year's notice after 1970, make the United States especially vulnerable to this possibility. Essentially, there is only one solution to this problem—a formal revision of the treaty so that it continues for a fixed duration of, say, 5 years after 1970. This would provide a period of stability in which to wind down the stresses and strains of the

Vietnam conflict, to arrange for an orderly transfer of the Ryukyus to Japanese administration, and to program a gradual transfer of U.S. military installations to Japanese control. In the meantime, the U.S. Government could take steps necessary to reduce the heavy dependence of U.S. military forces on bases in Japan and the Ryukyus.³

Turning to Southeast Asia, the U.S. alternatives are much more limited. First, the United States cannot arrange a withdrawal from Vietnam which leaves all sorts of hostages to the decisions reached by Japan and the United States in 1965. To do so would cost the United States, if not Japan, an enormous amount of influence among the other Asian nations. Second, the United States may find it difficult to proceed with broad plans for the economic development of Southeast Asia until after a political settlement of the Vietnam conflict. Given the new sense of independence felt among the nations of Southeast Asia, however, there is no reason why Japan cannot maintain a healthy economic position in the area, with or without a speedy end to the Vietnam conflict. Any problems will be due not so much to the absence of opportunity as to the relative importance the Japanese attach to Southeast Asia as opposed to their other global interests.

With respect to Mainland China, the options are even more limited. The Japanese have valid reasons for wishing to enter into substantive discussions with the Communists. Yet, it seems unlikely that such discussions will amount to much unless the Japanese are prepared to make some real concessions in terms of long-term economic arrangements or diplomatic recognition. In this situation there is very little that the United States can do to assist the Japanese, and there are a number of things that the United States cannot do. As we have seen, the United States cannot arrange a withdrawal from the

Vietnam conflict if this means sacrificing the Republic of Vietnam. Equally important, the United States will have to decide which comes first: its political commitments to the Republic of China or its military ties with Japan. Certainly, any effort to place the latter above the former would be just as disastrous as a miserable withdrawal from Vietnam. About all that the United States can do is to allow the Japanese greater flexibility in their own approach to a China policy, with the understanding that the United States neither opposes nor supports whatever solution they may decide is best for Japan.

Putting Disengagement into Perspective. A military disengagement by Japan from the United States remains a very clear possibility. The Vietnam conflict has had a profound influence on Japanese-American attitudes toward the security partnership. So has the Non-Proliferation Treaty and all of the problems and prospects which it presents for Japan. But, even without Vietnam and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the dominant trend in Japan would have been toward greater self-reliance and freedom of action in all aspects of national life. This includes the development of conventional forces sufficient to defend Japan against external attack, the present emphasis on nuclear missile technology so as to move, within the shortest time possible, toward an autonomous nuclear force, and the careful avoidance of security responsibilities in Asia which tie Japan too closely to the United States. In this situation a reshaping of the Mutual Security Treaty may forestall a military disengagement, but it seems unlikely to avoid it altogether.

In terms of present and future policy planning, the principal danger is that the concept of Japanese-American cooperation, in matters of Asian security, will receive an emphasis which is no longer prudent or possible in the light of

changing conditions within Japan. One example would be an effort to preserve the security partnership to the point of completely subordinating the East Asian policy of the United States to that of Japan. Another would be an effort to prolong an American military presence in Japan and the Ryukyus to the point of completely alienating the Japanese people and, eventually, their elected officials. Given these two alternatives, it would be far better to recognize that a military disengagement is not only possible, but essentially desirable, if the United States is to preserve both its influence in Japan and its influence as a Pacific power.

A dissolution of the security partnership would mark the end of an era, but not necessarily Japanese-American friendship. Since 1953, when Reischauer commented on the basic antagonisms between Japan and the United States, significant changes have taken place, the most important of which are the industrial reconstruction of Japan, the tight economic interlock which has grown between Japan and the United States, and the dependence of both

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countries on global patterns of trade. Indeed, it should be possible for the concept of future cooperation to focus progressively less on the defense of

Japanese interests in Asia and more on the problem of maintaining a global environment in which both nations can find peace and prosperity.

FOOTNOTES

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Nor will England hesitate to remind Japan that she, Britain's ally, had permitted a bitter press campaign to be conducted against the British partner of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, at one of the most critical moments of the entire war, when the Allies were being violently attacked in the West and the Russians were falling back in the East . . . And what made the thing especially galling to the British Imperialists was the fact that this Japanese agitation was a demonstration to the world that in the opinion of the Japanese the English were not doing particularly well in the war, and that therefore Japan could do better for herself in China if no Agreement existed.

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IV—CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION

1. Essentially the same conclusion has been reached by former Secretary of Defense McNamara who has written: "If, for example, other nations really believe, as they say they do, that it is in the common interest to deter the expansion of Red China's economic and political control beyond its national boundaries, then they must take a more active role in guarding the defense perimeter." Robert S. McNamara, *The Essence of Security* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 153.

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