

1971

Japans Maritime Self-Defense Force: An Appropriate Maritime Strategy?

James E. Auer

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

Auer, James E. (1971) "Japans Maritime Self-Defense Force: An Appropriate Maritime Strategy?," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 24 : No. 10, Article 2.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol24/iss10/2>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

As the Nixon Doctrine emphasizes the ever increasing importance of partnership between the United States and her allies commensurate with their growing economic power, the debate over definitive defense roles to be played by each nation assumes greater importance. The specifics of such debates within each country weigh heavily upon the ultimate success or failure of the newly evolving approach to alliances being advocated by the Nixon administration. Given her economic power and preeminent position in Asia, Japan's answer to this challenge will be of great significance to Asian power relations and politics in the seventies and beyond.

JAPAN'S MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE: AN APPROPRIATE MARITIME STRATEGY?

A research paper prepared

by

Lieutenant Commander James E. Auer, U.S. Navy

Of all the principles of Japan's national defense policy, perhaps the most significant principle for the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) charges the state with developing gradually an effective defensive power within the bounds of national capabilities.

In studying the current debate being conducted in Japanese defense circles over the most desirable profile for the MSDF in the 1970's, four key questions can be raised: Is there a difference between offensive and defensive warfare, and can certain strategies and certain armaments suited exclusively for defensive warfare be selected? Can a sea strategy for an oceangoing navy be "purely defensive"? What is the role of a navy with a mission of defending its

country from direct and indirect aggression on the sea? Should Japan, taking into account its geographical position; natural resource allocations; political, economic, and psychological conditions; and pledging itself only to self-defense, have an oceangoing navy or a limited, anti-invasion, anti-infiltration coastal guard force?

Despite the fact that these questions have been argued throughout the entire history of the Maritime Self-Defense Force, they have yet to be finally answered. Because they and other important policy questions have not been decided, it is difficult to say that a defense policy or a maritime defense strategy, as such, exists. Generally speaking, it can be said that the civilian

4 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

defense planners of the Defense Agency have argued that there is a difference between offensive and defensive warfare and that purely defensive armaments and strategies can be designed. They have argued that to defend its country the MSDF should be oriented against invading enemy ships and planes as well as against infiltration, sabotage, mining, and other indirect attacks harmful to the territory and coastal security; and as such they have indicated that this force should essentially be a limited coastal guard force.

On the other hand, the leaders of the MSDF have questioned whether there is a difference, other than one of intention, between offensive and defensive warfare, particularly in the tactical sense at sea, and have felt that naval weapons cannot be readily distinguished as being either offensive or defensive in nature. They have argued that a maritime strategy for an oceangoing navy cannot be "exclusively defensive," particularly in the sense that a navy can fix its position on the sea and wait to be attacked. These people feel that to defend its country the MSDF must guard against direct and indirect attacks on its territories from the sea and should insure Japan's free use of the sea. By necessity, Japan is a maritime nation requiring extensive involvement on the sea and an oceangoing navy to safeguard this involvement.

Since failure to resolve this controversy is indicative of the lack of a defense policy, it is important to understand how completely lacking any effort to reach a consensus has been. In order to describe the objectives of the planners of the Defense Bureau, as compared to those of the leadership of the MSDF, this writer will elaborate two positions referred to for purposes of identification as "The Kaihara Vision" and "The Sekino Vision." The first is named after Kaihara Osamu, former head and long a member of the Defense Bureau who has, on occasion, been

called "Emperor Kaihara," in recognition of his strong will and powerful approaches to controversial issues, or *Rikuhara*" (*Army-hara*), in view of his supposedly antinavy attitudes. Kaihara presently heads the Secretariat of the National Defense Council. "The Sekino Vision" is named after Sekino Hideo—a retired commander in the Imperial Navy, a close associate of many former naval officers, an advisor to the Foreign Ministry on security matters, and a prominent writer on national security affairs. Both men have written extensively on their views as to the authorized and practical roles of the MSDF. Both have elaborated their ideas in interviews with this writer; however, they have not named their views as is being done here.¹ While not all members of the Defense Bureau necessarily support Kaihara, and the leading officers of the MSDF may well have ideas more up-to-date tactically and technologically than Sekino's, the ideas of these authorities are believed fairly typical of leading Defense Bureau-civilian and MSDF points of view, respectively.

"The Kaihara Vision" purports to learn from the mistakes of Japanese failure in World War II.² This view holds that the Navy suffered great defeat in World War II as a result of the unrealistic strategy of one decisive fleet encounter and speed-and-surprise attack, a flamboyant spirit which was more concerned with spectacular successes and style than with final outcome, and an optimistic thinking that some kind of "divine wind" would always come to aid Japan. Kaihara criticizes Japanese strategic planners of that period for not taking into account the harsh realities of what a Pacific war against the United States would entail and, as a result, never having any real chance of victory. Kaihara praises the plan of Adm. Inoue Shigemitsu submitted in early 1941 as the one brilliant piece of realistic thinking that came forth from the prewar navy.

The plan was, of course, rejected; and Kaihara fears that today Japan may again be rejecting a realistic Inoue-type plan for unachievable and dangerous dreams.

"The Kaihara Vision" posits that the small island country of Japan can never wage a major war with a superpower because of the twin damaging characteristics of its geography and natural resource allocation; *i.e.*, the narrow islands dictate that Japan cannot retreat and regroup but must always fight from one frontline, and with scant resources Japan must always import basic raw materials and export finished goods in order to sustain a vibrant economy. Particularly in the nuclear age, despite the level of destruction Japan might be able to inflict on another country, geography dictates that there will be no second-strike capability and that Japan will be among the sure losers in any nuclear exchange with a big power. Kaihara feels that those individuals such as Sekino who advocate a Japanese nuclear deterrent force are "beautiful dreamers" such as existed in Japan before the war. Rather than deterring any attack upon Japan or enhancing national security, possession of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) or nuclear submarines carrying multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's) would yield the opposite result by stimulating fears in the hearts of other powers who remember Japan's erratic behavior in the past. Strategic nuclear deterrence can be and already is willingly provided for Japan by the United States which is capable of credibly deterring the Soviet Union at the present and China in the future, something Japan could never do now or then.

Another "unrealistic dream" of today, attacked by Kaihara, arises from the sense of failure resulting from defeat in World War II. This has been characterized as the desire of Japanese naval officers, represented by Sekino, to

secure Japan's commercial sealanes against "invisible enemies," *i.e.*, against unidentified submarines which are usually assumed to be Soviet or Chinese. According to Kaihara such a role for the MSDF is unauthorized, unrealistic, and impossible.

The role is unauthorized because Japan's sealanes extend throughout the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and attacks on Japanese merchantmen in these far distant areas are not the narrowly defined types of direct and indirect aggressions against "the nation" spelled out in the missions of the Self-Defense Forces.

The role is unrealistic because these sealanes do not extend over narrow fixed paths which can be somehow "secured" but instead are infinite in number, depending on the destinations to be sought, types of shipping employed, weather conditions encountered, et cetera. Further, it is unrealistic because the equipment with which to perform such a task is, first of all, unavailable and, second, if it were available, it would be unattainable in sufficient quantity ever to be effective. To illustrate, Kaihara treats the problem of ship sonars and torpedoes. Despite the best sound and navigational ranging (SONAR) system available, detection of a submarine is by no means assured; he recounts some of the difficulties experienced by the U.S. Navy in this field. Torpedoes, he adds, have trouble catching fast nuclear submarines even if they are equipped with homing devices and can be delivered near to their target; again he talks about the great problems experienced by the U.S. Navy and the great expenditures it has put forth in this regard. He often asks the MSDF pointed questions as to the capabilities of its present stock of torpedoes to operate in areas like the shallow Malacca Straits or the straits near Japan. Even if reliable equipment were available, Kaihara asks, how could the MSDF be in enough positions to help attacked ships which might be located anywhere in the

6 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW


Pacific or Indian Oceans? He questions whether "the invisible enemy" could be distinguished as "the" enemy; and, posing himself as that enemy, he picks only the weakly defended areas or gaps to make his attacks. Quoting figures given in studies by groups favoring ideas like Sekino's as to the number of escort ships that would be necessary to sustain a supply of 20 vessels per day into Japan, Kaihara questions the ability to sustain this amount, even with the large number of escort ships required. He even questions the ability of Japan to provide sufficient manpower needed to greatly expand the MSDF, noting the recent recruiting difficulties and projecting meager fruits from even a highly unlikely 2-year conscription system.

Finally, the mission is impossible because it is oriented against the Soviet Union, which Japan has no capability to fight. He believes the present oft-mentioned strategy of trying to block Soviet submarines from passing through the Soya Strait between Hokkaido and Sakhalin en route to the Pacific from their base in Vladivostok is offensively oriented. He notes the fact that the Soviet Pacific Fleet alone possesses 120 submarines (20 of which are nuclear) and is three times larger than the entire U.S. Navy submarine fleet at the beginning of World War II, a fleet that subsequently destroyed Japanese maritime commerce. Kaihara points out that, despite the claim that the 1967-1971 defense buildup program was supposed to provide the MSDF with monitoring capability in the Tsugaru Strait between Honshu and Hokkaido, where Soviet submarines can pass unbothered in peacetime, the buildup program, which has been declared 97.5 percent completed by the Defense Agency, has not provided effective monitoring capability in this area. By concentrating solely on antisubmarine warfare, Kaihara feels the MSDF is trying to fight the Second World War all over again. Despite the fact that its

priorities are now different, he feels the results of any such conflict would inevitably be the same.

"The Kaihara Vision" is persuaded, however, that there is a proper, authorized, and necessary role for the MSDF. The role comes directly from its stated mission, to defend Japan against direct and indirect invasion. Since Japan is surrounded by water on four sides, an invading enemy must come over or through the water. He feels that instead of using undefinable terms like "securing sealanes" and "securing command of the sea" the MSDF should discuss the neglected but legal role of "repelling enemy invasion." The latter, he feels, naval officers do not want to do because they feel the threat of direct invasion is very small, and they would rather concentrate on larger goals on the open sea. Kaihara also feels that the danger is very small, but that even if it is only one or two percent, it must be guarded against. Also, and very important, this danger of direct or indirect territorial invasion is the only kind of threat authorized for Japan's Self-Defense Forces to resist. Realistically Kaihara believes that the Soviet Union might well be the enemy, and he thinks that resistance must be offered. He states that the most favorable outcome is not spectacular victory but to delay conquest until diplomacy can solve the crisis or outside help from the United States or the United Nations can be enlisted.

Although ideal or maximum figures for aggregate tonnage and number of ships are left unspecified and are determined by the relative threat, specifically "The Kaihara Vision" would do several things immediately. First, it would dissolve the Self-Defense Fleet which is headquartered in Yokosuka and put its frontline ships in the Ominato and Maizuru Regional Districts (see map on following page) which are oriented toward the most likely direction of invasion. Secondly, it would unite the



8 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Maritime Safety Agency into one anti-invasion, anti-infiltration, and rescue force oriented toward the authorized and only reasonable missions a Japanese sea force can support. It would employ destroyers, minesweepers, coastal patrol and rescue ships, and aircraft designed to cope with invading amphibious forces, covertly laid minefields, infiltration of saboteurs or insurgents, as well as aiding ships in distress in peacetime. It would employ submarines mainly as targets to train destroyers against attacks they might receive while resisting an enemy invasion force. Third, it would reallocate budgetary resources to stop merely buying ship platforms and fancy weapons which support "beautiful dreams" rather than providing a balance of ships, aircraft, ammunition, and fuel which provide an effective, limited capability against invasion. Fourth, it would frankly state the capabilities of Japan and its dependence on the United States, allowing the latter to operate out of and completely control the Pacific-oriented bases of Yokosuka and Sasebo, realizing that to compensate the United States for its support of Japan, the latter must allow the United States to use these bases in its own interests.

* * * * *

"The Sekino Vision" would agree that Japan made a drastic mistake in attempting to fight a Pacific war with the United States but would maintain that Japan's geography and natural resource allocation require that the nation be a Pacific power, politically, economically, and also in a military sense. Hopefully, from the Pacific war and the subsequent friendly treatment by the United States, particularly between the U.S. Navy and the Japanese Navy, Japan has learned that it has nothing to fear from and has common interests with the United States in the Pacific and that the

relationship between the two navies will always remain friendly as it has for the past 25 years.

Sekino feels that there exists a stable balance of strategic nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union, neither being willing to strike first because of fears of the loss of 100 million lives and the destruction of the greater part of its industry. Since neither is willing to strike, their pledges of nuclear protection for their allies appear less credible. He does not believe either the United States or the Soviet Union will wage a nuclear war resulting in its own destruction to protect an ally against foreign attack. For this reason, he believes, America's European allies in NATO have armed themselves with tactical nuclear weapons. These, backed with a pledge of U.S. strategic support, can hopefully succeed in deterring or checking a large-scale enemy invasion with credibility short of forcing the United States to actually engage in strategic nuclear warfare with the Soviet Union. Sekino believes that such tactical nuclear weapons have been deployed in Okinawa and effectively shelter Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan and seriously doubts, as do many U.S. military authorities, how credible Japan's security will be if these weapons are removed with the reversion of Okinawa to Japan.³ Since mainland China has already developed and is continuing a buildup of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM's) and is progressing toward the possession of an ICBM system, unless nuclear weapons are definitely pledged in support of Japan by the United States, possessed by Japan under some kind of bilateral sharing arrangement, or possessed outright by Japan, a blackmail situation could develop. In the future Sekino believes that Japanese nationalism will not tolerate such a situation and that a cooperative arrangement with the United States is therefore best from the standpoint of dealing with the threat and of easing the

fears of U.S. and friendly Pacific countries as to Japan's intentions. To objections that such weapons are not credible because of the lack of a second-strike capability by Japan, stemming from geography, he would maintain that ballistic missile submarines possessed by Japan would be able to threaten minimum unacceptable damage to China and, when backed by the United States, to the Soviet Union. Since these missiles could be delivered even though Japan's territory might be destroyed, they would hopefully deter an attack in the first place. This scenario he believes to be more realistic than the present potential blackmail situation.

As to the protection of maritime traffic, Sekino acknowledges its difficulty but not its impossibility. Citing the figure of Japan having to import 99 percent of its oil to survive, he feels it is a "beautiful dream" not to be worried about the situation. Although he also worries about direct invasion, he argues that direct invasion is the one instance where the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security provides for assistance for Japan from the United States, while on the seafarces the United States has no commitment in writing to help Japan. "Therefore, Japan cannot expect the cooperation of the powerful Seventh Fleet in protecting maritime traffic, although it can expect the Seventh Fleet's cooperation in case of direct invasion of Japan."⁴

Sekino cites figures similar to Kaihara's on the size of the Soviet submarine force and concedes the great expanse of Japan's trade routes. He also agrees that the enemy would certainly attempt to attack the weak points in Japan's security posture. Thus he feels it is ridiculous that Japan, whose gross national product is second in the non-Communist world and whose merchant fleet is the largest in the world, should expect to get by in 1976 with an MSDF of 250,000 tons of ships and 250 aircraft. His summary of the strengths

of Pacific navies and his estimate of required and officially projected Japanese sea force strength are listed in table I.

In wartime "The Sekino Vision" posits Japan reducing its shipping to about half the normal peacetime level and limiting its operating areas to the seas north of Indonesia, between Australia and Japan, and between the United States and Japan in order to maintain approximately 50 percent of its present economic activity, which he judges to be enough to secure national life. The majority of crude oil now comes from the Persian Gulf; Japan cannot control the Indian Ocean; and even if it could, oil could be shut off at the source in the politically sensitive Middle East. Should this happen, Japan would have to secure its oil in Indonesia, the United States, and Australia, hopefully cooperating with the United States and Australian Navies and keeping friendly relations with Indonesia, Malaysia, and other Southeast Asian countries. Even without the direct cooperation of the United States and Australia, which might be too busy to help, if Japan could secure the seas north of Indonesia, and oil delivered to Palau Island (a U.S. trust territory east of the Philippines), and other large ports from more distant sources by foreign ships, it would be possible to maintain the minimum necessary supply.

To answer charges that his plan is just a "beautiful dream" or impossible, Commander Sekino has posited what he calls a "Maritime Safety Zone" which he would establish during wartime between two chains of islands, an eastern one running from the Izu Islands south of Tokyo Bay to the Bonin Islands to Iwo Jima and then to the Marianas and a western chain from Kyushu to Okinawa to the Philippines to Borneo. On appropriate islands of both chains, sonar listening stations monitoring fixed sonar arrays and antisubmarine fixed-wing and helicopter patrol plane bases would be

10 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

TABLE I—STRENGTHS OF PACIFIC NAVIES AS TABULATED BY SEKINO HIDEO

Organization	Total Tonnage () # of Ships	Carriers () ASW	Cruisers & Destroyers	Submarine () Nuclear	Air- craft	Mine War Ships
U.S. Seventh Fleet	650,000 (150)	4 (1)	44	10-12 (conv or nuc)	550	0
USSR Pacific Fleet	700,000 (700)	0	57	100 (20)	200	70
Mainland China Navy	260,000 (1400)	0	27	33	500	50
Taiwanese Navy	145,000 (240)	0	12	0	0	12
South Korean Navy	64,000 (180)	0	23	0	0	12
Philippine Navy	29,000 (65)	0	10	0	0	2
North Korean Navy	24,000 (200)	0	0	4	0	30
Japanese MSDF (1971)	132,800 (200)	0	37	10	180	44
MSDF (1976- <i>Proj.</i>)	250,000 (250) (maximum)	0	59	25	250	59
MSDF (<i>Sekino Vision</i>)	565,000 (350) est.	0 (3)	112	9 (6)	570	64

Source: Sekino, "Japan and Her Maritime Defense," "A Diagnosis of Our Maritime Self-Defense Force."

established. Hunter-killer groups of destroyers, aircraft, and submarines would operate in the zone and augment the direct escort forces which would convoy shipping through some portions of the zone where natural geographical features do not allow sufficient protection from other means. Such features include the sea bottom to the east of the eastern chain of islands which would allow arrays of hydrophones to be set at appropriate depths around the islands. Several high-power, very low frequency (VLF) active (*i.e.*, positively transmitting rather than passive listening) sonar stations would be established on several appropriate islands. By combining the use of active, passive, and semiactive sonars together with the hydrophones and VLF sonar stations, targets would be detected with a considerably high probability to ranges of 100 to 200 miles from the barrage line, thereby allowing patrol planes and helicopters stationed on nearby islands to reach detection points within 1 hour in order to classify, localize, attack, and destroy enemy submarines or, at the least, discourage them from entering the safety zone where they would be subject to detection and attack. This theo-

retical model extends air defense over the "Maritime Safety Zone" with anti-air radars and vertical takeoff and landing fighters (VTOL) stationed on islands of the chains or by equipping jet ASW patrol planes with air-to-air missiles in order to provide effective interception against enemy land-based planes. Since the "Maritime Safety Zone" is south of Japan, Soviet submarines would become more inefficient as they operated further from their bases. The conventionally powered models are posited as being limited to the sea area north of Indonesia. Nuclear submarines would, if passing undetected through the partially monitored Tsushima, Tsugaru, or Soya Straits, encounter various Japanese ASW measures including barriers, patrol groups, and nuclear attack submarine wolfpacks so that even their operating freedom would be much restricted. "The Sekino Vision" does not predict a victory over the Soviet Union or any other country but is an attempt to keep open Japan's sealanes until enemy submarine warfare becomes too costly and is discontinued.

Direct invasion is also seen as a threat, particularly from the Soviet Union. In such a case Sekino sees the

ASDF as being occupied with maintaining control of the air over the battle zone and nearby areas while the MSDF is attempting to destroy invading sea forces en route to Japan before they can land, much as "The Kaihara Vision" would envision. He also concedes that with limited self-defense forces and the strategically narrow island structure, the destruction of such forces at their bases is necessary but is difficult without Japanese attack aircraft carriers. Sekino, like Kaihara, would thus hope to delay the enemy until the arrival of the U.S. 7th Fleet.

Although aims such as cooperating with the United States, repelling direct invasion, having an effective capability in fields such as mine warfare and anti-infiltration patrol are similar, there are widely divergent goals for the MSDF under the two plans just described. Kaihara's ideas posit a limited and cautious Japan realizing its past mistakes, keeping a small, balanced, anti-invasion naval guard force; while Sekino sees a resurgent Japan learning from the past but intent on maintaining its economic role in the Pacific with a larger, ocean-going naval force. Given the political and popular sentiment in Japan against large military establishments, why has the position of Mr. Kaihara, described even by his strategic adversaries as a very able and articulate bureaucrat, fallen short of realization?

Some observations, based on interviews with military and civilian junior and senior personnel, are offered.

First, it is a fact that this view has been resisted continuously by the leadership of the MSDF for many of the same reasons its seniors resisted a union with the Maritime Safety Agency in 1951; the naval leaders do not feel that a coastal guard force is adequate for an engaged, maritime nation. As military men it is difficult for them to be convinced that there are such things as offensive and defensive equipments, per se; it is the intention rather than the

weaponry that determines such a classification. All MSDF leaders to date have been Imperial Navy officers who have been trained by the U.S. Navy. Civilian leaders claim Japan will not have "offensive weapons" but change the definitions to suit convenience and willingly accept protection from such weapons they call offensive which are owned by the United States. In fact, the most defensive weapons the United States has, the MSDF and the U.S. Navy maintain, are Polaris missile submarines which have completely failed in their missions if they ever have to fire since they are supposed to be so invulnerable that they will deter a strike by a potential aggressor. Uniformed leaders are persuaded that possessing "defensive weapons only" is either an economic expedient or foolishly naive. "Exclusively defensive" strategy is not felt adequate for a sea force even though on the ground it might be more advantageous, as von Clausewitz pointed out, because there are no long supply lines to contend with as the extended attacking enemy must do.⁵ On the sea, they argue, as did Mahan, that a navy's advantages come from the ability to remain mobile; offensive and defensive strategies cannot be separated, the latter being rigidly fixed. A nation can either move freely on the sea with its navy and its commerce or it cannot. Whether it chooses to move on the sea with offensive intentions or merely to assert its right to the use of international waters, it must have mobile ocean-going sea forces able to insure that movement against defenders or offenders, respectively, who might otherwise interfere with it. Japanese naval leaders see some truth in Mao Tse-tung's ridicule of "exclusive self-defense." They would hate to see China, with many more people but much weaker economically, able to interfere with Japan's rights on the seas because Japan had limited itself to local territorial defense. They consider a Chinese clenched fist more offen-

12 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

sive than Japanese nuclear submarines but realize that if the Chinese build nuclear submarines, the MSDF may not be able to clench its fist in defense. Although Kaihara feels that some young officers of the MSDF who do not have visions of grandeur based on past experience in the Imperial Navy support his position, and some young officers are willing to express that view privately, there are also some young Defense Agency civilians who think along the lines just described.

But this philosophy has primarily continued because, unlike the leadership in the Ground SDF and Air SDF which admitted many former police officials or other outside groups when they were organized, the MSDF has been led from 1 month after its birth by a straight line of former Imperial Navy officers who have followed their orders but have kept their options open as to the direction the MSDF would eventually go.⁶ These uniformed officers have been supported politically by Adm. Nomura Kichisaburo, who entered the House of Councillors in 1954 and remained there until his death in 1964 at the age of 86, and by Adm. Hoshina Zenshiro, who has been elected four times to the House of Representatives and was still an active and effective supporter in 1971 at the age of 80. In addition, these two admirals' many friends in the U.S. Navy have supported this idea of a large navy as has the general trend of U.S. Government pressure on Japan throughout much of the postoccupation era. Furthermore, many important people in Japanese business, bureaucratic, and political circles are former navy officers and support a naval role for maritime Japan. Some academicians knowledgeable in the field of international politics who have served as government advisers, Foreign Ministry bureaucrats who appreciate the flexibility provided by sea-power, and business men worried about the security of Japan's trade routes also support a Sekino-like philosophy.

A second reason why the civilian Defense Agency position has not triumphed, however, and a more important one because it has allowed the MSDF to keep its options open, is the reality of the "nonpolicy" stance which has been taken in defense. Starting from noble objectives to defend the country, the Japanese Government has refused to take a position on the issues disputed by civilians in the Defense Agency and the leadership of the MSDF. Because the forces were initially very small, the lack of a policy and a strategy were not as obvious since an ability to provide any kind of defense was not available. Some maintained there was a real policy to rely on the United States for external defense while seeking, on Japan's part, mainly to provide for internal security. But as the forces have grown so that one or the other line of thinking could possibly be implemented in the future, *if a policy decision were settled upon*, neither direction has yet been selected for implementation. The Government has remained content to allow civilian defense planners to put forth their views on a limited, effective anti-invasion security force; but it has also allowed the MSDF leadership, supported by conservative politicians and business elements, to build some long leadtime naval vessels which could be used for a future oceangoing navy able to protect Japan's interests in local and more distant waters. It has, most of all, allowed the Finance Ministry to keep defense expenditures to a very low level of the national budget and national product. By combining all three courses of action the result has been a "non-policy." No effective Japanese defense force to do anything on a sustained basis necessary for security, other than perhaps to sweep mines which there was a capability for before the Self-Defense Forces came into being, has been achieved, a point on which Kaihara and Sekino both agree.⁸

Diplomacy has achieved varying de-

gress of success in obtaining U.S. pledges to defend Japan in time of crisis, and it can be argued that this has been an effective and cheap defense policy, as evidenced by the fact that Japan has been able to avoid war since the end of the American occupation while making a productive economy possible, in part by freeing the Government from large allocations for defense. If this is true and the Self-Defense Forces have merely been a diplomatic disguise to obtain defense from the outside, the Japanese Government has misrepresented itself to the United States for 20 years in putting forth its intent and willingness to provide for its own external defense. Rather than criticizing the Japanese, many of the proponents of this theory credit them with having been somehow very wise in their early decision for and successful execution of this policy. Often these analysts say what Japan really wants is only its internal security responsibility. Without denying that sufficient security has been provided for postwar Japan by the United States, it is something else to say this has been a conscious or wise policy.⁹ If internal security was a firm, significant desire, Kaihara's plan should have been fully adopted. What it calls for in its full scope is a balanced land-sea-air guard force to stop territorial penetration or internal rebellion. If the money that has been spent and is predicted for the very near future were allocated as a man like Kaihara has favored, such a force could be well on its way to establishment. Such a force, albeit a smaller one, with a definite strategy and direction, would possess a much more significant capability than the existent ambiguous symbol force that is crying out for a policy to direct it.

As Japan regains administrative rights to Okinawa, its security guarantees from the United States, which have always been less than absolute, reach an even more limited degree. U.S. policy for the

1950's was massive retaliation with large-scale economic aid to its allies, including Japan, to build up their military forces. For the 1960's it was flexible response with continuing military aid to allies and an unsuccessful attempt to maintain enough General Purpose Forces (GPF) to police the world or to fight major wars in Europe and Asia and a small conflict somewhere else simultaneously. In the 1970's the United States has admitted that the strategy of the sixties was "unrealistic," i.e., the desired capability never really was achieved so that countries such as Japan that were relying on conventional American aid may have been more lucky than wise. Now the United States has promised to provide a strategic deterrent for and possible limited naval and air support *in coordination with its allies like Japan*.¹⁰ Without a realistic strategy of its own, be it Kaihara-style, Sekino-style, or some other, to implement, Japan must rely on some kind of *ad hoc* strategy in the future should a crisis arise. Without a strategy it will also take longer to achieve capability, since under the present civil-planner, uniformed-leader, finance-official, limited-say, participatory *Ringi* or *matomari* system, a consensus is achieved bureaucratically; but with no substantial policy there can be no strategic implementation.¹¹

The result of defense policy to date has been an aimless force of limited capability, and there is no better example of that lack of direction and capability than the present-day Maritime Self-Defense Force. Yoshida, Hato-yama, Kishi, Ikeda, and Sato, like Ashida and Nomura, have all wanted Japan to be defended by Japanese. They did not develop and continue some wise and unchanging policy to be defended by the United States. They have all wanted the best for Japan, and with U.S. support and some amount of good fortune they have done well. But they have never given Japan a defense policy,

14 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

and thus the direction of their armed forces remains unclear heading into its third era since Japan last had such a policy.¹²

In turning to a discussion of America's role in Japan's defense as it is being envisioned by policy planners for the 1970's and beyond, we should begin by acknowledging the role played by U.S. military aid in Japan's security since the early fifties. There has, however, been an even more valuable American contribution to Japan's naval defense which is often underestimated. As part of the Security Treaty, which went into effect simultaneously with the Peace Treaty in 1952, Japan granted the United States use of facilities and areas in Japan. Although there was no express commitment on the part of the United States to defend Japan, the flagship of the western Pacific striking force, the 7th Fleet, was homeported in Yokosuka; and destroyers, minesweepers, amphibious ships, and support vessels were homeported there or in the other large U.S. Navy Fleet Activities base in Sasebo.¹³ Naval Air Station Atsugi became a convenient location to repair carrier aircraft ashore and a headquarters for land-based antisubmarine warfare patrol planes. In 1960 the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan provided for one of the most generous mutual defense arrangements the United States has ever committed itself to. Article 5 of the treaty states: "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party *in the territories under the administration of Japan* would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions."¹⁴ [Emphasis added.] Most treaties contain a more mutual statement with respect to an attack on either party. For example, article 4 of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines states: "Each party recog-

nizes that an armed attack *in the Pacific area* on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes."¹⁵ [Emphasis added.] The wording of article 5 was felt essential in the case of Japan since article 9 of the Constitution was then interpreted to mean that Japan could never send forces out of its own territory in a combat role.

Despite this limitation, the United States agreed to the mutual defense agreement; the Japanese, for their part agreed in article 6 that: "For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan."¹⁶ Of course, countries like the Philippines also gave the United States bases while still recognizing the necessity to act in response to an attack on U.S. forces in the Pacific area. The Japanese would do so only if U.S. forces were to be attacked in Japanese territory. The first Japanese defense white paper bluntly stated the privileged nature of the Japanese situation:

The United States bears the obligations for the defense of Japan. Our country, however, does not bear obligations to come to the defense of the United States forces, even if an armed attack occurs against the territories of the United States or against the United States forces stationed in the areas other than those under the administration of Japan. This arrangement is different from that adopted by the United States-Korea or the United States-China mutual defense treaties, in which the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China respectively adopts the policy of mutual defense with the United

States with respect to armed attacks against either party in the Pacific areas.¹⁷

In discussing the number of ships and personnel of the 7th Fleet, it must be understood that they do fluctuate considerably from day to day because of its units transiting to and from the Western Pacific. As of 1970-1971 official U.S. Navy strength figures were approximately:

Ships: 150, including four attack aircraft carriers (Cva's) and varying numbers of destroyers, minesweepers, service, submarine, and amphibious units.

Aircraft: 550

Personnel: 65,000, including 15,000 marines.¹⁸

Although they indicate that Japan cannot have its own offensive striking force capability, its leaders often express their willingness to accept U.S. support in this field. This willingness is confirmed by both Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Government leaders as well as opposition members. For example, there was no objection to a recent statement as part of an interpellation in the House of Councillors by Socialist member Maekawa Tadashi: "The Japanese Government has so far been upholding a fundamental defense policy of relying on the United States for nuclear power, while in the conventional military operations, the Self-Defense Forces are responsible for defensive operations leaving the offensive operations to the United States forces. . . ."¹⁹ Even though very few 7th Fleet units have maintained their homeports in Japan, Japan is in fact eligible for being protected by the entire force of some 150 ships, 550 aircraft, and 65,000 personnel. Defense Agency Director General Nakasone clearly stated the importance of the U.S. role; he singled out only one of the three U.S. service elements in his major speech of 1970 on the specific subject of mutual security

between Japan and the United States: "The American nuclear deterrent and the U.S. Seventh Fleet are indispensable to our defense policy."²⁰

To counter the argument that the United States is bearing the larger part of the burden, it is often argued that Japan is exposing itself to attack by having U.S. forces stationed there. It should be observed, however, that not more than 40 ships and similarly small percentages of naval aircraft and personnel have ever been homeported in Japan for lengthy periods of time. In recent years the number has been dwindling steadily to less than 10 ships. On 21 December 1970 it was announced that the 7th Fleet flagship, the guided missile cruiser U.S.S. *Oklahoma City*, would change its homeport to Sasebo and the large ship repair facility at Yokosuka would be returned to Japanese control. This statement was partially amended on 30 March 1971, however, when the relocation of the flagship and the closing of the shipyard were delayed at least 1 year. An influential Japanese newspaper criticized the action as another example of the United States imposing its will on Japan.²¹ It is noted, however, that the Japanese Government readily agreed to the amendment; and, since the U.S. move was believed to be an economic measure to consolidate facilities, it seems unlikely that American desires for such a policy reversal were independent of Japanese requests. Further, although for the present and for the near future Japan seems quite content to accept the U.S. strategic umbrella, the key to U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence, the Navy's Polaris submarine fleet, has never had one of its units enter a Japanese port for a needed repair or a refreshing rest and recreation visit. That Japan is threatened by the presence of U.S. conventional forces which are homeported in or allowed to visit its territories seems less likely than by the nation's economic prowess, by its own miserably

16 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

weak military defenses, and by its strong domination of the trade of non-Communist Asia. Although Japan maintains Self-Defense Forces, no respected military analyst has publicly stated that the country is capable of defending itself. The theory that Japan should renounce the Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty and become an unarmed, neutral nation has never found wide acceptance.

Not surprisingly, though, as a result of the fact that the United States has homeported the headquarters unit of the 7th Fleet in Japan and has pledged to use the fleet in the defense of Japan, the Government has frequently tended to overestimate American protection. What is more surprising, however, has been the Government's silence in relation to public mocking of the 7th Fleet by the opposition and press.

In over 100 interviews with Japanese uniformed and civilian defense officials, this writer has often been told how vulnerable Japan's maritime sealanes are. When asked how Japan would protect them if they were interdicted, many replied that, since the Maritime Self-Defense Force is still very weak, the U.S. 7th Fleet would have to be relied upon. While many people were quick to point out this fact, few acknowledged the fact that such defense is not called for in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security because of Japanese insistence that the treaty be limited to defense against attack occurring in the territories under the administration of Japan. One of the few to have correctly stated the required U.S. aid to Japan as rendered by formal commitment was Commander Sekino who expressed fear concerning the unrealistic assumptions on the part of the Japanese Government:

According to Article 5 of the Japan-US security treaty, the US is not obliged to use armed force to protect a Japanese merchant ship in the high seas. This is a

matter of course in view of the bilateral nature of the agreement whereby Japan shirks responsibility for action beyond its territory.²²

In addition to being correct, commitment-wise, Sekino's statement is given credibility by the stated U.S. defense strategy for the 1970's. In the words of Secretary Laird:

The Strategy of Realistic Deterrence is new. Those who would dismiss it as a mere continuation of past policies in new packaging would be quite mistaken. . . .

. . . We have said, and I would repeat, that we do not intend to be the policeman of the world. Many of our allies are already prosperous; others are rapidly becoming so. Therefore, it is realistic and more effective that the burden of protecting peace and freedom should be shared more fully by our allies and friends.

. . . At the same time, we will maintain adequate forces to meet our commitments in Asia.

It is not realistic or efficient to expect each country to develop an independent self-defense capability against all levels of non-Chinese and non-Soviet attack . . .

. . . But in escort ships, our friends and allies around the world possess a greater number than we do. . . . Therefore it is one of our goals for the 1970's that our Atlantic and Pacific allies should provide a major contribution to protecting the convoys that in war would be carrying material for their sustenance.²³

With the approach of 1972 and the Okinawa reversion, it appears that the shield of the 7th Fleet over Japan may also be approaching the end of an era. In addition to the questioning of false assumptions with regard to the protection of maritime traffic, some intelligently formulated querying of the 7th

JAPAN'S . . . MARITIME STRATEGY 17

Fleet's capabilities to defend Japan even in case of direct invasion has been heard recently from high-level sources.²⁴ With the reduction of U.S. bases being dictated by American economic requirements and being requested by Japanese leaders, important, knowledgeable persons in Japan are wondering what advantage the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security gives the United States, particularly if restrictions are insisted upon. They immediately follow with, if there is no advantage, why keep the treaty at all, i.e., some Japanese are wondering what is in it for the United States.²⁵ One U.S. military leader who once governed Okinawa offered an opinion of the situation after "R-day":

... the Japanese bases are useful only so long as the United States retains free and unrestricted use of Okinawa as an operational base ... if and when Okinawa is returned to Japanese administrative control, its use as an operational base will inevitably be impaired, and the Mutual Security Treaty will then become a net liability to the United States.²⁶

Defense Agency Director General Nakasone, with perhaps political motivation, has called the United States-Japan mutual defense system "semi-permanent" but still has recommended review and possible revision of the security treaty in the course of the 1970's.²⁷ U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird in his second annual, carefully worded, lengthy white paper on defense submitted to the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee in March 1971 modified his statements of the previous year by adding phrases like "together with our allies" in reference to the United States meeting "a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia" and "minor" in reference to "contending with a . . . contingency elsewhere." This strategy, called "realistic deterrence," is "realistic and more effective" in that "the burden of pro-

tecting peace and freedom should be shared more fully by our allies and friends." As to U.S. commitments, Secretary Laird stated that they would be "not based exclusively on our alliances, but rather, our formal and informal obligations derive from and are shaped by our own national interests. . . ." ²⁸ A Japanese analyst commenting on Secretary Laird's report stated: "Japan can expect, if lucky, limited naval-air support from the US only in case of an open, armed attack which, however, might not come unless and before a series of covert approaches have already escalated to a near success."²⁹ Judging by statements of the defense ministers of both countries, it is unlikely that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, much less Japan-United States friendship, will come to an end in 1972. Indeed, the strength of friendship between the two navies seems as strong as ever before in their histories. But both ministers and other spokesmen also indicate that the relationship of the future will be differ-

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Lt. Comdr. James E. Auer, U.S. Navy, was a 1963 graduate of Marquette University where he was enrolled in the NROTC program. He has served as Minesweeping and Operations Officers on a Japan-

based coastal minesweeper and destroyer, respectively. He also attended the U.S. Naval Destroyer School in 1965-1966. Following a tour as Commanding Officer, U.S.S. *Parrot* (MSC-197), homeported in Charleston, S.C., he attended the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, from 1968 to 1971 where he received his Ph.D. in international relations. Lieutenant Commander Auer is presently assigned as political military affairs adviser to Commander Naval Forces Japan in Yokosuka.

18 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

ent. U.S. protection of Japan will be strategic-nuclear with anything less requiring significant, if not primary, Japanese strength. The 7th Fleet cannot be expected to, and may not be able to, provide quick and effective response to attacks on Japan's sealanes or small-scale incursions into Japanese territory. Thus, in the future, Japan's defense strength and capabilities will be more important than ever before; however,

today, many U.S. Navy authorities looking at the MSDF are shocked to find out how one-sidedly symbolic it is and how weak and vulnerable it is when viewed as an autonomous entity. They have no stronger supporters than Messrs. Kaihara and Sekino. Although those two theorists disagree on how the MSDF should be constructed in the future, they are quite in agreement about its limited capability to date.

FOOTNOTES

1. Both Mr. Kaihara and Commander Sekino have read and acceded to English copies of the respective vision as representative of their views. Kaihara's views were obtained from three personal interviews, an unpublished speech in English entitled, "The Defense of Japan and U.S. Military Bases," and especially from his recent article, "Kare o Shiri Onore o Shiru" ("We Should Know Ourselves as Well as Knowing Them"), *Kobuko (The National Defense)*, April 1971. Sekino's ideas were obtained from three personal interviews, an English article, "Japan and Her Maritime Defense," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1971, p. 98-121, and especially from his article, "A Diagnosis of Our Maritime Self-Defense Force," *Sekai no Kansens (Ships of the World)*, November 1970.

2. Kaihara has written one book specifically on this subject, *Senshi ni Manabu (Lessons from World War II)* (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1970).

3. For example, see views of Lt. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.), former High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands and Commanding General of the U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands, from 1961 to 1965 in Georgetown University, Center for Strategic Studies, *United States-Japanese Relations* (Washington: 1968), p. 25.

4. Sekino, quoted in "Japan and Her Maritime Defense."

5. It is necessary to distinguish the serious effort by civilians and military (including MSDF) leaders of the Defense Agency to implement a primarily defensive strategy from terms that have been used politically and economically like *senshu boei* (exclusive self-defense) and *jishu boei* (autonomous defense). Particularly under the administration of Director General Nakasone, *jishu boei*, which was in the past employed in an economic sense to encourage newly independent Japan that like *jishu gaiko* (autonomous diplomacy) it now also had to develop an independent capability in defense industry, has been picked up as a political term to stress that Japan needs to expand its defense strength if not to remain a "bed partner" of the United States. Nakasone's white paper used the terms *senryaku shusei* (strategic defense), which was adopted by some military leaders after a National Defense College professor pointed out to them that Mao Tse-tung had ridiculed the concept of exclusive self-defense as ludicrous, and *jishu boei* in his stated attempt to make defense understandable to housewives. Nakasone has also tried to advance the concept of *hikaku chukyu kokka* (middle class nonnuclear nation) and to change the Basic National Defense Policy to his own five principles of *jishu boei*. Particularly on the latter attempt he has been resisted by Kaihara; and in both cases he has so far been privately and publicly rejected by Prime Minister Sato. I am indebted to Professor Ito Kobun of the National Defense College, who delivered the lecture pointing out Mao Tse-tung's condemnation, for his detailed explanation of these terms. Interview with Professor Ito, 20 April 1971; interview with Kaihara, 23 April 1971. Sato's public disapproval of "middle class nonnuclear nation" is mentioned in *The Daily Yomiuri*, 17 March 1971, and of the revision of the Basic National Defense Policy in *The Daily Yomiuri*, 29 March 1971.

6. The Coastal Safety Force (April-July 1952), the Maritime Safety Force (August 1952-June 1954), and the first month of the MSDF saw leadership in the hands of Adm. Yamazaki Kogoro who had come from MSA and had no Imperial Navy experience. During this time, however, retired Rear Adm. Yamamoto Yoshio was in the next office as adviser, as he had been in the first 2 years of the MSA; and Vice Adm. Nagasawa Ko, former Imperial Navy captain, as Chief of Operations Division or deputy to Yamazaki, was already in on all important decisions. Interviews with Admiral Yamamoto, 28 December 1970, and Aso Shigeru, 14 December 1970.

JAPAN'S . . . MARITIME STRATEGY 19

7. For example, Defense Minister Nakasone was a Reserve supply officer in the Imperial Navy and worked for Admiral Hoshina with whom he still has private discussions about MSDF matters. Interview with Hoshina, 30 November 1970.

8. Of course, there is potential to do many things in the MSDF because long leadtime items have been built and in all services because the power of Japanese industry could be applied to them. Although this monograph is concerned only with the MSDF, Kaihara has not restricted his criticism to that service alone. Despite the name, "Rikuhara," he has been critical of the GSDF and ASDF as well, maintaining that none of the services have any capability because of serious lacks of technology, ammunition, and fuel.

9. The most complete and impressive formulation of the internal security policy is that by Martin E. Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy 1947-1968* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).

10. Melvin R. Laird, *Toward a Strategy of Realistic Deterrence* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971), p. 17-19.

11. The *Ringi* system can be described as a method of achieving consensus on the bureaucratic level from the bottom up. Under this system relatively junior executives of a particular section of a business or government organization discuss an issue until consensus is reached and expressed in a position paper. This position, when approved by the section head, is circulated among other sections who also discuss the issues extensively. Once a lower level consensus among concerned sections is reached, a paper is sent to division leaders on higher levels until finally the corporate head is presented with a paper to almost necessarily pass on to the central decisionmaker or President for a final decision. *Matomari* is a not necessarily unrelated process initiated from a higher level. A senior member of a group frequently states a problem on which others are invited to comment, each being careful not to isolate himself as an individual or offend another member by severe criticism. Members comment in a piecemeal fashion as the leader searches for consensus. If agreement cannot be reached immediately, a later meeting can be scheduled with negotiations continuing in the interim. A subsequent meeting will usually result in the all-important agreement.

12. Tsunoda Jun, presently a research expert of the National Diet Library and professor of Kokugakuin University, a scholar of international politics and diplomatic history who served as a young adviser to Prince Konoye and is known as an expert on the Imperial Navy which he has studied most critically and has lectured and written on extensively in Japan and the United States, has been an official adviser to the ruling party from 1952-1969 and is still sought out by many LDP leaders. Dr. Tsunoda denies the existence of any continuous defense policy. When asked what Japan's policy has been, Tsunoda replied, "I didn't know we had one." More seriously, he feels that although Japan has engaged in some diplomatic maneuvering with the United States to obtain American aid, *neither* country has ever set a consistent policy for Japan. He thinks every prime minister he has advised has wanted defense, but none have been willing to take a serious and substantial position on defense. The main reason for this, Tsunoda offers, is the unwillingness to interfere to any significant extent with economic development. Another is the fact that since self-defense capability was required initially as the price of a peace treaty, it has been looked upon by many as a diplomatic effort. The only real policy, Tsunoda concludes, may come in the 1970's if there is an attempt to convert the economic power of the 1960's into political power. "Until then what we do is rather meaningless and we have, perhaps naively, lived in the past and are living now on good faith." Interviews with Professor Tsunoda, April 1971.

13. This is not to say that the U.S. presence, including that of the 7th Fleet, is not recognized and has not produced some annoyances to the Japanese. But of all U.S. support, the 7th Fleet's strength is least noticeable since very few of its personnel are shorebased or have families in Japan.

14. U.S. Treaties, etc., *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1960), v. XI, pt. 2, p. 1634.

15. U.S. Treaties, etc., *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1952), v. III, pt. 3, p. 3950.

16. U.S. Treaties, etc., v. XI, pt. 2, p. 1634.

17. Japan Defense Agency, *The Defense of Japan* (Tokyo: 1970) (official English translation), p. 44.

18. Data provided by U.S. 7th Fleet Protocol Office, Commander Naval Forces Japan Public Affairs Office, Yokosuka, Japan.

19. Translation of Diet interpellation of 19 February 1970, *Japan Defense Agency Bulletin* (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1970), p. 1. The Government seems not to object as the argument tends to make its actions appear wise and to make the Self-Defense Forces appear effective.

20 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

20. Nakasone Yasuhiro, "Proposals on Mutual Security between Japan and the United States," Text of a speech delivered at the Washington National Press Club, 10 September 1970, official Defense Agency translation, p. 8.

21. *Asahi Shimbun*, 2 April 1971.

22. Sekino, "A Diagnosis of Our Maritime Self-Defense Force."

23. Laird, p. 1, 17-19, 81-82.

24. M. Yasuda, "Japan Needs to Review Strategic Environment," *The Daily Yomiuri*, 5 January 1971. M. Yasuda is a pen name for a high-level adviser to an important Japanese Cabinet member.

25. Interview with Kaihara, 23 April 1971.

26. Quoted from *United States-Japanese Political Relations*. The statement reports the views of Lieutenant General Caraway. Although Caraway's views are rather strong and sometimes discounted in Japan, a similar unpublished viewpoint, particularly concerning the necessity of Japan to consider America's interests as well as vice versa, written by Adm. Arleigh Burke in 1971 was read with care by Japanese Government and Foreign Ministry officials.

27. Nakasone, "International Environment and Defense of Japan in the 1970's," Text of a speech delivered at the Harvard Club of Japan, 30 June 1970, official JIA translation, p. 24. Nakasone has frequently called for more respectful and less intimate relations with the United States and more independent defense and foreign policies on the part of Japan. He has often said Japan has been too dependent on the United States for defense in the past and has been reported as referring to the Japanese Foreign Ministry (Gaimusho) as the "Tokyo Bureau of the U.S. State Department."

28. Laird, p. 17, 18, 22.

29. M. Yasuda, "Japan Unperturbed by 'Realistic' U.S. Policy," *The Daily Yomiuri*, 2 April 1971.



A government without the power of defense is a solecism.

*James Wilson: During debate on adoption
of the Constitution, 1787*