

1971

## Book Reviews

J.H Bostick


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### Recommended Citation

Bostick, J.H (1971) "Book Reviews," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 24 : No. 10 , Article 8.  
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## PROFESSIONAL READING

Professor Scott and his associates have addressed the complex, often oversimplified, subjects of insurgency and counterinsurgency in an extremely scholarly and analytical manner. The book views an insurgency as a system of inputs and outputs regulated by numerous variable control mechanisms. The end result of this systems analysis approach is a dynamic model of insurgency based not on historical precedent, but on flexible input variables. Thus each insurgency and its parallel counterinsurgent effort should be analyzed as a separate entity, examining in detail the unique political, sociological, psychological, economic, and military factors involved. This analytical approach to the study of insurgency and counterinsurgency movements, coupled with a basic understanding of the probable interactions among participants, should prove to be a most effective tool for the practitioner as well as the student of insurgencies and their suppression.

The strategy and tactics involved in the insurgent and counterinsurgent movements are discussed lucidly, with emphasis placed on the innovative rather than the dogmatic approach to a particular problem.

In light of this Nation's bitter experience in Vietnam, the increasing number of ongoing insurgencies throughout the Third World, and the domestic turmoil germinating the seeds of insurgent actions in this country, *Insurgency* is both timely and important. It is highly recommended, especially for those offi-

cers actively involved in counterinsurgency operational planning and training.

J.H. BOSTICK  
Commander, U.S. Navy

Trewhitt, Henry I. *McNamara*. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 307p., index.

For what is essentially a biography, *McNamara* reads with a novel-like fascination. Whatever one's feelings may be about this most controversial and energetic man during his tenure as Secretary of Defense, both critic and admirer can expect a rewarding reading experience. The admirer will come to better understand the whole man, and the critic will get a heartwarming reexamination of the old-fashioned virtues of patriotism, devotion to duty, and loyalty. What is unique in the "McNamara Monarchy" is that Mr. McNamara presumed automatic loyalty from below (or quit) in his intense desire to provide loyalty upward to the two Presidents he served.

For the student of strategy or top-level management and decisionmaking, this book goes deeply into the development of the doctrine of flexible response and the transition from the Foster Dulles' concept of "massive retaliation." Considering both were based on the domino theory (the latter by intent, the former by application), it is little wonder that the storm of controversy broke although the makers of both concepts anticipated calm seas and quiet waters.