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War College: Decemeber 1971 Review

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Lectures are selected on the basis of favorable reception by Naval War College audiences, usefulness to servicewide readership, and timeliness. Research papers are selected on the basis of professional interest to readers.

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CONTENTS

CHALLENGE!	1
Vice Admiral Benedict J. Semmes, Jr., U.S. Navy President, Naval War College	
JAPAN'S MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE: AN APPROPRIATE MARITIME STRATEGY?	3
Lieutenant Commander James E. Auer, U.S. Navy	
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: CONFLICT IN THE BUDGETARY PROCESS, 1947-1971	21
Professor Lawrence J. Korb	
STRATEGY: THE ESSENCE OF PROFESSIONALISM	43
Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, U.S. Navy (Ret.)	
FRANCE: A POLITICAL CULTURE DIVIDED AGAINST ITSELF	52
Lieutenant (junior grade) William F. Averyt, Jr., U.S. Naval Reserve	
SOVIET CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: CONFLICT AND COLLABORATION AMONG COMRADES	65
Lieutenant Commander Gerald C. Caron, Jr., U.S. Navy	
THE BAROMETER—READERS' COMMENTS	94
Soviet Mine Warfare	
RESEARCH IN THE MAHAN LIBRARY	97
PROFESSIONAL READING	101

Cover: "Crossing the Line on Christmas Eve" by Joseph R. Corish, artist in residence for First Naval District.

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
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CHALLENGE !

The challenge implicit in adapting U.S. defense posture to the financial and political realities behind the Nixon Doctrine is being met throughout the Armed Forces in several ways. A program at the Naval War College, which has contributed extensively in the past to free world cooperation and should be responsible for even greater contributions in the future, is the Naval Command College. This college was created to prepare specially selected senior naval officers from other free world countries for higher command responsibilities in their own navies and to familiarize them with the methods, practices, and doctrines of the U.S. Navy. Each year between 20 and 30 senior naval officers from as many nations are invited to participate in a 10-month program of lectures, seminars, and discussions. In the words of Vice Admiral Richard G. Colbert, the first director of the NCC and past president of the Naval War College, the program is "an open exchange of thoughts, opinions and ideas—essentially focused on how all our navies, working together, can better ensure the peace and security of the free world."

Today it seems evident that freedom, strength, and stability can only be preserved with an increasing effort on the part of the nations of the free world to cooperate in the quest for peace and in the interest of mutual defense. President Nixon has called for increased cooperation by friendly nations to fulfill the obligations that the United States once accepted unilaterally. In the President's words, "Peace requires partnership and strength. Insisting that other nations play a role is not a retreat from responsibility, it is a sharing of



responsibility." This emphasis on allied cooperation is an important foundation of the President's foreign policy. A realistic and forward-looking foreign policy it is one that will depend increasingly on sea-based forces. Thus it becomes important for the senior naval officers of the free world nations to achieve viable working relationships.

For 15 years the Naval Command College has been engaged in fostering a climate of partnership among the free world navies. From the outset, emphasis was placed on the need to maximize international cooperation to achieve common goals. Throughout the curriculum the student is provided opportunities to increase his understanding not only of the professional aspects of naval strategy, but also of the more subtle implications underlying relationships between nations.

Soon after arrival in Newport, the student officers are invited to become actively involved in the social milieu of their host nation through informal lectures, receptions, and personal contacts. The Naval Command College itself provides a further opportunity for these future senior commanders to observe and to evaluate American life and American government by means of field study trips. Almost 20 percent of the academic year of the Naval Command College is devoted to these trips which provide an awareness of the complex

2 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

interrelationships that form the basis of American society.

Alumni have reported that perhaps their greatest benefits stem from personal contact with one another. In the 14 years since the first class graduated from the Naval Command College, many lasting international friendships have developed among the officers taking part in the program.

The curriculum of the Naval Command College is divided into nine studies. An introductory period offers a brief orientation to the Naval War College and to the Newport community. Subsequent study phases include Strategy and Seapower, Management and Seapower, International Organizations and Defense Arrangements, Naval Operations, Naval Planning and Operations, and an extensive study of the Future and Seapower, examining the significance of seapower to the nations of the free world in providing for their common defense.

A closely related and increasingly significant part of the academic schedule is the opportunity provided for individual and group research. Last year a most notable research project examined "the feasibility of designing a small combatant vessel with appeal to the Navies of the Free World." The resulting paper, entitled "Free World Frigate," was reviewed with keen

interest both in Washington and at other naval ministries. We should hear more of this in subsequent months.

The unique program offered in the Naval Command College has proven to be highly successful in the past. Naval officers from 43 nations have attended the college since its inception, and the record of their personal achievements is impressive. Of some 392 graduates, 138 have already attained flag rank and 22 have become Chief of Naval Operations in their own navies. This record will improve as graduates gain sufficient seniority in their services to reach flag grade.

By contributing to friendship and unity, by encouraging free world nations to cooperate, and by permitting mature naval officers of friendly nations the opportunity to become familiar with the United States and the methods and tactics of the U.S. Navy, the Naval Command College is a positive U.S. Navy effort in support of the Nixon Doctrine.



B. J. SEMMES, JR.
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

As the Nixon Doctrine emphasizes the ever increasing importance of partnership between the United States and her allies commensurate with their growing economic power, the debate over definitive defense roles to be played by each nation assumes greater importance. The specifics of such debates within each country weigh heavily upon the ultimate success or failure of the newly evolving approach to alliances being advocated by the Nixon administration. Given her economic power and preeminent position in Asia, Japan's answer to this challenge will be of great significance to Asian power relations and politics in the seventies and beyond.

JAPAN'S MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE: AN APPROPRIATE MARITIME STRATEGY?

A research paper prepared

by

Lieutenant Commander James E. Auer, U.S. Navy

Of all the principles of Japan's national defense policy, perhaps the most significant principle for the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) charges the state with developing gradually an effective defensive power within the bounds of national capabilities.

In studying the current debate being conducted in Japanese defense circles over the most desirable profile for the MSDF in the 1970's, four key questions can be raised: Is there a difference between offensive and defensive warfare, and can certain strategies and certain armaments suited exclusively for defensive warfare be selected? Can a sea strategy for an oceangoing navy be "purely defensive"? What is the role of a navy with a mission of defending its

country from direct and indirect aggression on the sea? Should Japan, taking into account its geographical position; natural resource allocations; political, economic, and psychological conditions; and pledging itself only to self-defense, have an oceangoing navy or a limited, anti-invasion, anti-infiltration coastal guard force?

Despite the fact that these questions have been argued throughout the entire history of the Maritime Self-Defense Force, they have yet to be finally answered. Because they and other important policy questions have not been decided, it is difficult to say that a defense policy or a maritime defense strategy, as such, exists. Generally speaking, it can be said that the civilian

4 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

defense planners of the Defense Agency have argued that there is a difference between offensive and defensive warfare and that purely defensive armaments and strategies can be designed. They have argued that to defend its country the MSDF should be oriented against invading enemy ships and planes as well as against infiltration, sabotage, mining, and other indirect attacks harmful to the territory and coastal security; and as such they have indicated that this force should essentially be a limited coastal guard force.

On the other hand, the leaders of the MSDF have questioned whether there is a difference, other than one of intention, between offensive and defensive warfare, particularly in the tactical sense at sea, and have felt that naval weapons cannot be readily distinguished as being either offensive or defensive in nature. They have argued that a maritime strategy for an oceangoing navy cannot be "exclusively defensive," particularly in the sense that a navy can fix its position on the sea and wait to be attacked. These people feel that to defend its country the MSDF must guard against direct and indirect attacks on its territories from the sea and should insure Japan's free use of the sea. By necessity, Japan is a maritime nation requiring extensive involvement on the sea and an oceangoing navy to safeguard this involvement.

Since failure to resolve this controversy is indicative of the lack of a defense policy, it is important to understand how completely lacking any effort to reach a consensus has been. In order to describe the objectives of the planners of the Defense Bureau, as compared to those of the leadership of the MSDF, this writer will elaborate two positions referred to for purposes of identification as "The Kaihara Vision" and "The Sekino Vision." The first is named after Kaihara Osamu, former head and long a member of the Defense Bureau who has, on occasion, been

called "Emperor Kaihara," in recognition of his strong will and powerful approaches to controversial issues, or *Rikuhara* (Army-hara), in view of his supposedly antinavy attitudes. Kaihara presently heads the Secretariat of the National Defense Council. "The Sekino Vision" is named after Sekino Hideo—a retired commander in the Imperial Navy, a close associate of many former naval officers, an advisor to the Foreign Ministry on security matters, and a prominent writer on national security affairs. Both men have written extensively on their views as to the authorized and practical roles of the MSDF. Both have elaborated their ideas in interviews with this writer; however, they have not named their views as is being done here.¹ While not all members of the Defense Bureau necessarily support Kaihara, and the leading officers of the MSDF may well have ideas more up-to-date tactically and technologically than Sekino's, the ideas of these authorities are believed fairly typical of leading Defense Bureau-civilian and MSDF points of view, respectively.

"The Kaihara Vision" purports to learn from the mistakes of Japanese failure in World War II.² This view holds that the Navy suffered great defeat in World War II as a result of the unrealistic strategy of one decisive fleet encounter and speed-and-surprise attack, a flamboyant spirit which was more concerned with spectacular successes and style than with final outcome, and an optimistic thinking that some kind of "divine wind" would always come to aid Japan. Kaihara criticizes Japanese strategic planners of that period for not taking into account the harsh realities of what a Pacific war against the United States would entail and, as a result, never having any real chance of victory. Kaihara praises the plan of Adm. Inoue Shigemitsu submitted in early 1941 as the one brilliant piece of realistic thinking that came forth from the prewar navy.

The plan was, of course, rejected; and Kaihara fears that today Japan may again be rejecting a realistic Inoue-type plan for unachievable and dangerous dreams.

"The Kaihara Vision" posits that the small island country of Japan can never wage a major war with a superpower because of the twin damaging characteristics of its geography and natural resource allocation; *i.e.*, the narrow islands dictate that Japan cannot retreat and regroup but must always fight from one frontline, and with scant resources Japan must always import basic raw materials and export finished goods in order to sustain a vibrant economy. Particularly in the nuclear age, despite the level of destruction Japan might be able to inflict on another country, geography dictates that there will be no second-strike capability and that Japan will be among the sure losers in any nuclear exchange with a big power. Kaihara feels that those individuals such as Sekino who advocate a Japanese nuclear deterrent force are "beautiful dreamers" such as existed in Japan before the war. Rather than deterring any attack upon Japan or enhancing national security, possession of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) or nuclear submarines carrying multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's) would yield the opposite result by stimulating fears in the hearts of other powers who remember Japan's erratic behavior in the past. Strategic nuclear deterrence can be and already is willingly provided for Japan by the United States which is capable of credibly deterring the Soviet Union at the present and China in the future, something Japan could never do now or then.

Another "unrealistic dream" of today, attacked by Kaihara, arises from the sense of failure resulting from defeat in World War II. This has been characterized as the desire of Japanese naval officers, represented by Sekino, to

secure Japan's commercial sealanes against "invisible enemies," *i.e.*, against unidentified submarines which are usually assumed to be Soviet or Chinese. According to Kaihara such a role for the MSDF is unauthorized, unrealistic, and impossible.

The role is unauthorized because Japan's sealanes extend throughout the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and attacks on Japanese merchantmen in these far distant areas are not the narrowly defined types of direct and indirect aggressions against "the nation" spelled out in the missions of the Self-Defense Forces.

The role is unrealistic because these sealanes do not extend over narrow fixed paths which can be somehow "secured" but instead are infinite in number, depending on the destinations to be sought, types of shipping employed, weather conditions encountered, et cetera. Further, it is unrealistic because the equipment with which to perform such a task is, first of all, unavailable and, second, if it were available, it would be unattainable in sufficient quantity ever to be effective. To illustrate, Kaihara treats the problem of ship sonars and torpedoes. Despite the best sound and navigational ranging (SONAR) system available, detection of a submarine is by no means assured; he recounts some of the difficulties experienced by the U.S. Navy in this field. Torpedoes, he adds, have trouble catching fast nuclear submarines even if they are equipped with homing devices and can be delivered near to their target; again he talks about the great problems experienced by the U.S. Navy and the great expenditures it has put forth in this regard. He often asks the MSDF pointed questions as to the capabilities of its present stock of torpedoes to operate in areas like the shallow Malacca Straits or the straits near Japan. Even if reliable equipment were available, Kaihara asks, how could the MSDF be in enough positions to help attacked ships which might be located anywhere in the

6 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW


Pacific or Indian Oceans? He questions whether "the invisible enemy" could be distinguished as "the" enemy; and, positing himself as that enemy, he picks only the weakly defended areas or gaps to make his attacks. Quoting figures given in studies by groups favoring ideas like Sekino's as to the number of escort ships that would be necessary to sustain a supply of 20 vessels per day into Japan, Kaihara questions the ability to sustain this amount, even with the large number of escort ships required. He even questions the ability of Japan to provide sufficient manpower needed to greatly expand the MSDF, noting the recent recruiting difficulties and projecting meager fruits from even a highly unlikely 2-year conscription system.

Finally, the mission is impossible because it is oriented against the Soviet Union, which Japan has no capability to fight. He believes the present oft-mentioned strategy of trying to block Soviet submarines from passing through the Soya Strait between Hokkaido and Sakhalin en route to the Pacific from their base in Vladivostok is offensively oriented. He notes the fact that the Soviet Pacific Fleet alone possesses 120 submarines (20 of which are nuclear) and is three times larger than the entire U.S. Navy submarine fleet at the beginning of World War II, a fleet that subsequently destroyed Japanese maritime commerce. Kaihara points out that, despite the claim that the 1967-1971 defense buildup program was supposed to provide the MSDF with monitoring capability in the Tsugaru Strait between Honshu and Hokkaido, where Soviet submarines can pass unbothered in peacetime, the buildup program, which has been declared 97.5 percent completed by the Defense Agency, has not provided effective monitoring capability in this area. By concentrating solely on antisubmarine warfare, Kaihara feels the MSDF is trying to fight the Second World War all over again. Despite the fact that its

priorities are now different, he feels the results of any such conflict would inevitably be the same.

"The Kaihara Vision" is persuaded, however, that there is a proper, authorized, and necessary role for the MSDF. The role comes directly from its stated mission, to defend Japan against direct and indirect invasion. Since Japan is surrounded by water on four sides, an invading enemy must come over or through the water. He feels that instead of using undefinable terms like "securing sealanes" and "securing command of the sea" the MSDF should discuss the neglected but legal role of "repelling enemy invasion." The latter, he feels, naval officers do not want to do because they feel the threat of direct invasion is very small, and they would rather concentrate on larger goals on the open sea. Kaihara also feels that the danger is very small, but that even if it is only one or two percent, it must be guarded against. Also, and very important, this danger of direct or indirect territorial invasion is the only kind of threat authorized for Japan's Self-Defense Forces to resist. Realistically Kaihara believes that the Soviet Union might well be the enemy, and he thinks that resistance must be offered. He states that the most favorable outcome is not spectacular victory but to delay conquest until diplomacy can solve the crisis or outside help from the United States or the United Nations can be enlisted.

Although ideal or maximum figures for aggregate tonnage and number of ships are left unspecified and are determined by the relative threat, specifically "The Kaihara Vision" would do several things immediately. First, it would dissolve the Self-Defense Fleet which is headquartered in Yokosuka and put its frontline ships in the Ominato and Maizuru Regional Districts (see map on following page) which are oriented toward the most likely direction of invasion. Secondly, it would unite the



8 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Maritime Safety Agency into one anti-invasion, anti-infiltration, and rescue force oriented toward the authorized and only reasonable missions a Japanese sea force can support. It would employ destroyers, minesweepers, coastal patrol and rescue ships, and aircraft designed to cope with invading amphibious forces, covertly laid minefields, infiltration of saboteurs or insurgents, as well as aiding ships in distress in peacetime. It would employ submarines mainly as targets to train destroyers against attacks they might receive while resisting an enemy invasion force. Third, it would reallocate budgetary resources to stop merely buying ship platforms and fancy weapons which support "beautiful dreams" rather than providing a balance of ships, aircraft, ammunition, and fuel which provide an effective, limited capability against invasion. Fourth, it would frankly state the capabilities of Japan and its dependence on the United States, allowing the latter to operate out of and completely control the Pacific-oriented bases of Yokosuka and Sasebo, realizing that to compensate the United States for its support of Japan, the latter must allow the United States to use these bases in its own interests.

* * * * *

"The Sekino Vision" would agree that Japan made a drastic mistake in attempting to fight a Pacific war with the United States but would maintain that Japan's geography and natural resource allocation require that the nation be a Pacific power, politically, economically, and also in a military sense. Hopefully, from the Pacific war and the subsequent friendly treatment by the United States, particularly between the U.S. Navy and the Japanese Navy, Japan has learned that it has nothing to fear from and has common interests with the United States in the Pacific and that the

relationship between the two navies will always remain friendly as it has for the past 25 years.

Sekino feels that there exists a stable balance of strategic nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union, neither being willing to strike first because of fears of the loss of 100 million lives and the destruction of the greater part of its industry. Since neither is willing to strike, their pledges of nuclear protection for their allies appear less credible. He does not believe either the United States or the Soviet Union will wage a nuclear war resulting in its own destruction to protect an ally against foreign attack. For this reason, he believes, America's European allies in NATO have armed themselves with tactical nuclear weapons. These, backed with a pledge of U.S. strategic support, can hopefully succeed in deterring or checking a large-scale enemy invasion with credibility short of forcing the United States to actually engage in strategic nuclear warfare with the Soviet Union. Sekino believes that such tactical nuclear weapons have been deployed in Okinawa and effectively shelter Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan and seriously doubts, as do many U.S. military authorities, how credible Japan's security will be if these weapons are removed with the reversion of Okinawa to Japan.³ Since mainland China has already developed and is continuing a buildup of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM's) and is progressing toward the possession of an ICBM system, unless nuclear weapons are definitely pledged in support of Japan by the United States, possessed by Japan under some kind of bilateral sharing arrangement, or possessed outright by Japan, a blackmail situation could develop. In the future Sekino believes that Japanese nationalism will not tolerate such a situation and that a cooperative arrangement with the United States is therefore best from the standpoint of dealing with the threat and of easing the

fears of U.S. and friendly Pacific countries as to Japan's intentions. To objections that such weapons are not credible because of the lack of a second-strike capability by Japan, stemming from geography, he would maintain that ballistic missile submarines possessed by Japan would be able to threaten minimum unacceptable damage to China and, when backed by the United States, to the Soviet Union. Since these missiles could be delivered even though Japan's territory might be destroyed, they would hopefully deter an attack in the first place. This scenario he believes to be more realistic than the present potential blackmail situation.

As to the protection of maritime traffic, Sekino acknowledges its difficulty but not its impossibility. Citing the figure of Japan having to import 99 percent of its oil to survive, he feels it is a "beautiful dream" not to be worried about the situation. Although he also worries about direct invasion, he argues that direct invasion is the one instance where the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security provides for assistance for Japan from the United States, while on the sealand the United States has no commitment in writing to help Japan. "Therefore, Japan cannot expect the cooperation of the powerful Seventh Fleet in protecting maritime traffic, although it can expect the Seventh Fleet's cooperation in case of direct invasion of Japan."⁴

Sekino cites figures similar to Kaihara's on the size of the Soviet submarine force and concedes the great expanse of Japan's trade routes. He also agrees that the enemy would certainly attempt to attack the weak points in Japan's security posture. Thus he feels it is ridiculous that Japan, whose gross national product is second in the non-Communist world and whose merchant fleet is the largest in the world, should expect to get by in 1976 with an MSDP of 250,000 tons of ships and 250 aircraft. His summary of the strengths

of Pacific navies and his estimate of required and officially projected Japanese sea force strength are listed in table I.

In wartime "The Sekino Vision" posits Japan reducing its shipping to about half the normal peacetime level and limiting its operating areas to the seas north of Indonesia, between Australia and Japan, and between the United States and Japan in order to maintain approximately 50 percent of its present economic activity, which he judges to be enough to secure national life. The majority of crude oil now comes from the Persian Gulf; Japan cannot control the Indian Ocean; and even if it could, oil could be shut off at the source in the politically sensitive Middle East. Should this happen, Japan would have to secure its oil in Indonesia, the United States, and Australia, hopefully cooperating with the United States and Australian Navies and keeping friendly relations with Indonesia, Malaysia, and other Southeast Asian countries. Even without the direct cooperation of the United States and Australia, which might be too busy to help, if Japan could secure the seas north of Indonesia, and oil delivered to Palau Island (a U.S. trust territory east of the Philippines), and other large ports from more distant sources by foreign ships, it would be possible to maintain the minimum necessary supply.

To answer charges that his plan is just a "beautiful dream" or impossible, Commander Sekino has posited what he calls a "Maritime Safety Zone" which he would establish during wartime between two chains of islands, an eastern one running from the Izu Islands south of Tokyo Bay to the Bonin Islands to Iwo Jima and then to the Marianas and a western chain from Kyushu to Okinawa to the Philippines to Borneo. On appropriate islands of both chains, sonar listening stations monitoring fixed sonar arrays and antisubmarine fixed-wing and helicopter patrol plane bases would be

10 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

TABLE I—STRENGTHS OF PACIFIC NAVIES AS TABULATED BY SEKINO HIDEO

Organization	Total Tonnage () # of Ships	Carriers () ASW	Cruisers & Destroyers	Submarine () Nuclear	Air- craft	Mine War Ships
U.S. Seventh Fleet	650,000 (150)	4 (1)	44	10-12 (conv or nuc)	550	0
USSR Pacific Fleet	700,000 (700)	0	57	100 (20)	200	70
Mainland China Navy	260,000 (1400)	0	27	33	500	50
Taiwanese Navy	145,000 (240)	0	12	0	0	12
South Korean Navy	64,000 (180)	0	23	0	0	12
Philippine Navy	29,000 (65)	0	10	0	0	2
North Korean Navy	24,000 (200)	0	0	4	0	30
Japanese MSDF (1971)	132,800 (200)	0	37	10	180	44
MSDF (1976-Proj.)	250,000 (250) (maximum)	0	59	25	250	59
MSDF (Sekino Vision)	565,000 (350) est.	0 (3)	112	9 (6)	570	64

Source: Sekino, "Japan and Her Maritime Defense," "A Diagnosis of Our Maritime Self-Defense Force."

established. Hunter-killer groups of destroyers, aircraft, and submarines would operate in the zone and augment the direct escort forces which would convoy shipping through some portions of the zone where natural geographical features do not allow sufficient protection from other means. Such features include the sea bottom to the east of the eastern chain of islands which would allow arrays of hydrophones to be set at appropriate depths around the islands. Several high-power, very low frequency (VLF) active (i.e., positively transmitting rather than passive listening) sonar stations would be established on several appropriate islands. By combining the use of active, passive, and semiactive sonars together with the hydrophones and VLF sonar stations, targets would be detected with a considerably high probability to ranges of 100 to 200 miles from the barrage line, thereby allowing patrol planes and helicopters stationed on nearby islands to reach detection points within 1 hour in order to classify, localize, attack, and destroy enemy submarines or, at the least, discourage them from entering the safety zone where they would be subject to detection and attack. This theo-

retical model extends air defense over the "Maritime Safety Zone" with anti-air radars and vertical takeoff and landing fighters (VTOL) stationed on islands of the chains or by equipping jet ASW patrol planes with air-to-air missiles in order to provide effective interception against enemy land-based planes. Since the "Maritime Safety Zone" is south of Japan, Soviet submarines would become more inefficient as they operated further from their bases. The conventionally powered models are posited as being limited to the sea area north of Indonesia. Nuclear submarines would, if passing undetected through the partially monitored Tsushima, Tsugaru, or Soya Straits, encounter various Japanese ASW measures including barriers, patrol groups, and nuclear attack submarine wolfpacks so that even their operating freedom would be much restricted. "The Sekino Vision" does not predict a victory over the Soviet Union or any other country but is an attempt to keep open Japan's sealanes until enemy submarine warfare becomes too costly and is discontinued.

Direct invasion is also seen as a threat, particularly from the Soviet Union. In such a case Sekino sees the

ASDF as being occupied with maintaining control of the air over the battle zone and nearby areas while the MSDF is attempting to destroy invading sea forces en route to Japan before they can land, much as "The Kaihara Vision" would envision. He also concedes that with limited self-defense forces and the strategically narrow island structure, the destruction of such forces at their bases is necessary but is difficult without Japanese attack aircraft carriers. Sekino, like Kaihara, would thus hope to delay the enemy until the arrival of the U.S. 7th Fleet.

Although aims such as cooperating with the United States, repelling direct invasion, having an effective capability in fields such as mine warfare and anti-infiltration patrol are similar, there are widely divergent goals for the MSDF under the two plans just described. Kaihara's ideas posit a limited and cautious Japan realizing its past mistakes, keeping a small, balanced, anti-invasion naval guard force; while Sekino sees a resurgent Japan learning from the past but intent on maintaining its economic role in the Pacific with a larger, ocean-going naval force. Given the political and popular sentiment in Japan against large military establishments, why has the position of Mr. Kaihara, described even by his strategic adversaries as a very able and articulate bureaucrat, fallen short of realization?

Some observations, based on interviews with military and civilian junior and senior personnel, are offered.

First, it is a fact that this view has been resisted continuously by the leadership of the MSDF for many of the same reasons its seniors resisted a union with the Maritime Safety Agency in 1951; the naval leaders do not feel that a coastal guard force is adequate for an engaged, maritime nation. As military men it is difficult for them to be convinced that there are such things as offensive and defensive equipments, *per se*; it is the intention rather than the

weaponry that determines such a classification. All MSDF leaders to date have been Imperial Navy officers who have been trained by the U.S. Navy. Civilian leaders claim Japan will not have "offensive weapons" but change the definitions to suit convenience and willingly accept protection from such weapons they call offensive which are owned by the United States. In fact, the most defensive weapons the United States has, the MSDF and the U.S. Navy maintain, are Polaris missile submarines which have completely failed in their missions if they ever have to fire since they are supposed to be so invulnerable that they will deter a strike by a potential aggressor. Uniformed leaders are persuaded that possessing "defensive weapons only" is either an economic expedient or foolishly naive. "Exclusively defensive" strategy is not felt adequate for a sea force even though on the ground it might be more advantageous, as von Clausewitz pointed out, because there are no long supply lines to contend with as the extended attacking enemy must do.⁵ On the sea, they argue, as did Mahan, that a navy's advantages come from the ability to remain mobile; offensive and defensive strategies cannot be separated, the latter being rigidly fixed. A nation can either move freely on the sea with its navy and its commerce or it cannot. Whether it chooses to move on the sea with offensive intentions or merely to assert its right to the use of international waters, it must have mobile ocean-going sea forces able to insure that movement against defenders or offenders, respectively, who might otherwise interfere with it. Japanese naval leaders see some truth in Mao Tse-tung's ridicule of "exclusive self-defense." They would hate to see China, with many more people but much weaker economically, able to interfere with Japan's rights on the seas because Japan had limited itself to local territorial defense. They consider a Chinese clenched fist more offen-

12 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

sive than Japanese nuclear submarines but realize that if the Chinese build nuclear submarines, the MSDF may not be able to clench its fist in defense. Although Kaihara feels that some young officers of the MSDF who do not have visions of grandeur based on past experience in the Imperial Navy support his position, and some young officers are willing to express that view privately, there are also some young Defense Agency civilians who think along the lines just described.

But this philosophy has primarily continued because, unlike the leadership in the Ground SDF and Air SDF which admitted many former police officials or other outside groups when they were organized, the MSDF has been led from 1 month after its birth by a straight line of former Imperial Navy officers who have followed their orders but have kept their options open as to the direction the MSDF would eventually go.⁶ These uniformed officers have been supported politically by Adm. Nomura Kichisaburo, who entered the House of Councillors in 1954 and remained there until his death in 1964 at the age of 86, and by Adm. Hoshina Zenshiro, who has been elected four times to the House of Representatives and was still an active and effective supporter in 1971 at the age of 80. In addition, these two admirals' many friends in the U.S. Navy have supported this idea of a large navy as has the general trend of U.S. Government pressure on Japan throughout much of the postoccupation era. Furthermore, many important people in Japanese business, bureaucratic, and political circles are former navy officers and support a naval role for maritime Japan. Some academicians knowledgeable in the field of international politics who have served as government advisers, Foreign Ministry bureaucrats who appreciate the flexibility provided by sea-power, and business men worried about the security of Japan's trade routes also support a Sekino-like philosophy.

A second reason why the civilian Defense Agency position has not triumphed, however, and a more important one because it has allowed the MSDF to keep its options open, is the reality of the "nonpolicy" stance which has been taken in defense. Starting from noble objectives to defend the country, the Japanese Government has refused to take a position on the issues disputed by civilians in the Defense Agency and the leadership of the MSDF. Because the forces were initially very small, the lack of a policy and a strategy were not as obvious since an ability to provide any kind of defense was not available. Some maintained there was a real policy to rely on the United States for external defense while seeking, on Japan's part, mainly to provide for internal security. But as the forces have grown so that one or the other line of thinking could possibly be implemented in the future, *if a policy decision were settled upon*, neither direction has yet been selected for implementation. The Government has remained content to allow civilian defense planners to put forth their views on a limited, effective anti-invasion security force; but it has also allowed the MSDF leadership, supported by conservative politicians and business elements, to build some long leadtime naval vessels which could be used for a future oceangoing navy able to protect Japan's interests in local and more distant waters. It has, most of all, allowed the Finance Ministry to keep defense expenditures to a very low level of the national budget and national product. By combining all three courses of action the result has been a "non-policy." No effective Japanese defense force to do anything on a sustained basis necessary for security, other than perhaps to sweep mines which there was a capability for before the Self-Defense Forces came into being, has been achieved, a point on which Kaihara and Sekino both agree.⁸

Diplomacy has achieved varying de-

gresses of success in obtaining U.S. pledges to defend Japan in time of crisis, and it can be argued that this has been an effective and cheap defense policy, as evidenced by the fact that Japan has been able to avoid war since the end of the American occupation while making a productive economy possible, in part by freeing the Government from large allocations for defense. If this is true and the Self-Defense Forces have merely been a diplomatic disguise to obtain defense from the outside, the Japanese Government has misrepresented itself to the United States for 20 years in putting forth its intent and willingness to provide for its own external defense. Rather than criticizing the Japanese, many of the proponents of this theory credit them with having been somehow very wise in their early decision for and successful execution of this policy. Often these analysts say what Japan really wants is only its internal security responsibility. Without denying that sufficient security has been provided for postwar Japan by the United States, it is something else to say this has been a conscious or wise policy.⁹ If internal security was a firm, significant desire, Kaihara's plan should have been fully adopted. What it calls for in its full scope is a balanced land-sea-air guard force to stop territorial penetration or internal rebellion. If the money that has been spent and is predicted for the very near future were allocated as a man like Kaihara has favored, such a force could be well on its way to establishment. Such a force, albeit a smaller one, with a definite strategy and direction, would possess a much more significant capability than the existent ambiguous symbol force that is crying out for a policy to direct it.

As Japan regains administrative rights to Okinawa, its security guarantees from the United States, which have always been less than absolute, reach an even more limited degree. U.S. policy for the

1950's was massive retaliation with large-scale economic aid to its allies, including Japan, to build up their military forces. For the 1960's it was flexible response with continuing military aid to allies and an unsuccessful attempt to maintain enough General Purpose Forces (GPF) to police the world or to fight major wars in Europe and Asia and a small conflict somewhere else simultaneously. In the 1970's the United States has admitted that the strategy of the sixties was "unrealistic," i.e., the desired capability never really was achieved so that countries such as Japan that were relying on conventional American aid may have been more lucky than wise. Now the United States has promised to provide a strategic deterrent for and possible limited naval and air support in coordination with its allies like Japan.¹⁰ Without a realistic strategy of its own, be it Kaihara-style, Sekino-style, or some other, to implement, Japan must rely on some kind of *ad hoc* strategy in the future should a crisis arise. Without a strategy it will also take longer to achieve capability, since under the present civil-planner, uniformed-leader, finance-official, limited-say, participatory *Ringi* or *matomari* system, a consensus is achieved bureaucratically; but with no substantial policy there can be no strategic implementation.¹¹

The result of defense policy to date has been an aimless force of limited capability, and there is no better example of that lack of direction and capability than the present-day Maritime Self-Defense Force. Yoshida, Hato-yama, Kishi, Ikeda, and Sato, like Ashida and Nomura, have all wanted Japan to be defended by Japanese. They did not develop and continue some wise and unchanging policy to be defended by the United States. They have all wanted the best for Japan, and with U.S. support and some amount of good fortune they have done well. But they have never given Japan a defense policy,

14 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

and thus the direction of their armed forces remains unclear heading into its third era since Japan last had such a policy.¹²

In turning to a discussion of America's role in Japan's defense as it is being envisioned by policy planners for the 1970's and beyond, we should begin by acknowledging the role played by U.S. military aid in Japan's security since the early fifties. There has, however, been an even more valuable American contribution to Japan's naval defense which is often underestimated. As part of the Security Treaty, which went into effect simultaneously with the Peace Treaty in 1952, Japan granted the United States use of facilities and areas in Japan. Although there was no express commitment on the part of the United States to defend Japan, the flagship of the western Pacific striking force, the 7th Fleet, was homeported in Yokosuka; and destroyers, minesweepers, amphibious ships, and support vessels were homeported there or in the other large U.S. Navy Fleet Activities base in Sasebo.¹³ Naval Air Station Atsugi became a convenient location to repair carrier aircraft ashore and a headquarters for land-based antisubmarine warfare patrol planes. In 1960 the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan provided for one of the most generous mutual defense arrangements the United States has ever committed itself to. Article 5 of the treaty states: "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party *in the territories under the administration of Japan* would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions."¹⁴ [Emphasis added.] Most treaties contain a more mutual statement with respect to an attack on either party. For example, article 4 of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines states: "Each party recog-

nizes that an armed attack *in the Pacific area* on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes."¹⁵ [Emphasis added.] The wording of article 5 was felt essential in the case of Japan since article 9 of the Constitution was then interpreted to mean that Japan could never send forces out of its own territory in a combat role.

Despite this limitation, the United States agreed to the mutual defense agreement; the Japanese, for their part agreed in article 6 that: "For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan."¹⁶ Of course, countries like the Philippines also gave the United States bases while still recognizing the necessity to act in response to an attack on U.S. forces in the Pacific area. The Japanese would do so only if U.S. forces were to be attacked in Japanese territory. The first Japanese defense white paper bluntly stated the privileged nature of the Japanese situation:

The United States bears the obligations for the defense of Japan. Our country, however, does not bear obligations to come to the defense of the United States forces, even if an armed attack occurs against the territories of the United States or against the United States forces stationed in the areas other than those under the administration of Japan. This arrangement is different from that adopted by the United States-Korea or the United States-China mutual defense treaties, in which the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China respectively adopts the policy of mutual defense with the United

States with respect to armed attacks against either party in the Pacific areas.¹⁷

In discussing the number of ships and personnel of the 7th Fleet, it must be understood that they do fluctuate considerably from day to day because of its units transiting to and from the Western Pacific. As of 1970-1971 official U.S. Navy strength figures were approximately:

Ships: 150, including four attack aircraft carriers (Cva's) and varying numbers of destroyers, minesweepers, service, submarine, and amphibious units.

Aircraft: 550

Personnel: 65,000, including 15,000 marines.¹⁸

Although they indicate that Japan cannot have its own offensive striking force capability, its leaders often express their willingness to accept U.S. support in this field. This willingness is confirmed by both Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Government leaders as well as opposition members. For example, there was no objection to a recent statement as part of an interpellation in the House of Councillors by Socialist member Maekawa Tadashi: "The Japanese Government has so far been upholding a fundamental defense policy of relying on the United States for nuclear power, while in the conventional military operations, the Self-Defense Forces are responsible for defensive operations leaving the offensive operations to the United States forces. . . ."¹⁹ Even though very few 7th Fleet units have maintained their homeports in Japan, Japan is in fact eligible for being protected by the entire force of some 150 ships, 550 aircraft, and 65,000 personnel. Defense Agency Director General Nakasone clearly stated the importance of the U.S. role; he singled out only one of the three U.S. service elements in his major speech of 1970 on the specific subject of mutual security

between Japan and the United States: "The American nuclear deterrent and the U.S. Seventh Fleet are indispensable to our defense policy."²⁰

To counter the argument that the United States is bearing the larger part of the burden, it is often argued that Japan is exposing itself to attack by having U.S. forces stationed there. It should be observed, however, that not more than 40 ships and similarly small percentages of naval aircraft and personnel have ever been homeported in Japan for lengthy periods of time. In recent years the number has been dwindling steadily to less than 10 ships. On 21 December 1970 it was announced that the 7th Fleet flagship, the guided missile cruiser U.S.S. *Oklahoma City*, would change its homeport to Sasebo and the large ship repair facility at Yokosuka would be returned to Japanese control. This statement was partially amended on 30 March 1971, however, when the relocation of the flagship and the closing of the shipyard were delayed at least 1 year. An influential Japanese newspaper criticized the action as another example of the United States imposing its will on Japan.²¹ It is noted, however, that the Japanese Government readily agreed to the amendment; and, since the U.S. move was believed to be an economic measure to consolidate facilities, it seems unlikely that American desires for such a policy reversal were independent of Japanese requests. Further, although for the present and for the near future Japan seems quite content to accept the U.S. strategic umbrella, the key to U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence, the Navy's Polaris submarine fleet, has never had one of its units enter a Japanese port for a needed repair or a refreshing rest and recreation visit. That Japan is threatened by the presence of U.S. conventional forces which are homeported in or allowed to visit its territories seems less likely than by the nation's economic prowess, by its own miserably

16 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

weak military defenses, and by its strong domination of the trade of non-Communist Asia. Although Japan maintains Self-Defense Forces, no respected military analyst has publicly stated that the country is capable of defending itself. The theory that Japan should renounce the Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty and become an unarmed, neutral nation has never found wide acceptance.

Not surprisingly, though, as a result of the fact that the United States has homeported the headquarters unit of the 7th Fleet in Japan and has pledged to use the fleet in the defense of Japan, the Government has frequently tended to overestimate American protection. What is more surprising, however, has been the Government's silence in relation to public mocking of the 7th Fleet by the opposition and press.

In over 100 interviews with Japanese uniformed and civilian defense officials, this writer has often been told how vulnerable Japan's maritime sealanes are. When asked how Japan would protect them if they were interdicted, many replied that, since the Maritime Self-Defense Force is still very weak, the U.S. 7th Fleet would have to be relied upon. While many people were quick to point out this fact, few acknowledged the fact that such defense is not called for in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security because of Japanese insistence that the treaty be limited to defense against attack occurring in the territories under the administration of Japan. One of the few to have correctly stated the required U.S. aid to Japan as rendered by formal commitment was Commander Sekino who expressed fear concerning the unrealistic assumptions on the part of the Japanese Government:

According to Article 5 of the Japan-US security treaty, the US is not obliged to use armed force to protect a Japanese merchant ship in the high seas. This is a

matter of course in view of the bilateral nature of the agreement whereby Japan shirks responsibility for action beyond its territory.²²

In addition to being correct, commitment-wise, Sekino's statement is given credibility by the stated U.S. defense strategy for the 1970's. In the words of Secretary Laird:

The Strategy of Realistic Deterrence is new. Those who would dismiss it as a mere continuation of past policies in new packaging would be quite mistaken. . . .

. . . We have said, and I would repeat, that we do not intend to be the policeman of the world. Many of our allies are already prosperous; others are rapidly becoming so. Therefore, it is realistic and more effective that the burden of protecting peace and freedom should be shared more fully by our allies and friends.

. . . At the same time, we will maintain adequate forces to meet our commitments in Asia.

It is not realistic or efficient to expect each country to develop an independent self-defense capability against all levels of non-Chinese and non-Soviet attack . . .

. . . But in escort ships, our friends and allies around the world possess a greater number than we do. . . . Therefore it is one of our goals for the 1970's that our Atlantic and Pacific allies should provide a major contribution to protecting the convoys that in war would be carrying material for their sustenance.²³

With the approach of 1972 and the Okinawa reversion, it appears that the shield of the 7th Fleet over Japan may also be approaching the end of an era. In addition to the questioning of false assumptions with regard to the protection of maritime traffic, some intelligently formulated querying of the 7th

JAPAN'S . . . MARITIME STRATEGY 17

Fleet's capabilities to defend Japan even in case of direct invasion has been heard recently from high-level sources.²⁴ With the reduction of U.S. bases being dictated by American economic requirements and being requested by Japanese leaders, important, knowledgeable persons in Japan are wondering what advantage the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security gives the United States, particularly if restrictions are insisted upon. They immediately follow with, if there is no advantage, why keep the treaty at all, i.e., some Japanese are wondering what is in it for the United States.²⁵ One U.S. military leader who once governed Okinawa offered an opinion of the situation after "R-day":

... the Japanese bases are useful only so long as the United States retains free and unrestricted use of Okinawa as an operational base ... if and when Okinawa is returned to Japanese administrative control, its use as an operational base will inevitably be impaired, and the Mutual Security Treaty will then become a net liability to the United States.²⁶

Defense Agency Director General Nakasone, with perhaps political motivation, has called the United States-Japan mutual defense system "semi-permanent" but still has recommended review and possible revision of the security treaty in the course of the 1970's.²⁷ U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird in his second annual, carefully worded, lengthy white paper on defense submitted to the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee in March 1971 modified his statements of the previous year by adding phrases like "together with our allies" in reference to the United States meeting "a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia" and "minor" in reference to "contending with a . . . contingency elsewhere." This strategy, called "realistic deterrence," is "realistic and more effective" in that "the burden of pro-

tecting peace and freedom should be shared more fully by our allies and friends." As to U.S. commitments, Secretary Laird stated that they would be "not based exclusively on our alliances, but rather, our formal and informal obligations derive from and are shaped by our own national interests. . . ." ²⁸ A Japanese analyst commenting on Secretary Laird's report stated: "Japan can expect, if lucky, limited naval-air support from the US only in case of an open, armed attack which, however, might not come unless and before a series of covert approaches have already escalated to a near success."²⁹ Judging by statements of the defense ministers of both countries, it is unlikely that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, much less Japan-United States friendship, will come to an end in 1972. Indeed, the strength of friendship between the two navies seems as strong as ever before in their histories. But both ministers and other spokesmen also indicate that the relationship of the future will be differ-

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Lt. Comdr. James E. Auer, U.S. Navy, was a 1963 graduate of Marquette University where he was enrolled in the NROTC program. He has served as Minesweeping and Operations Officers on a Japan-

based coastal minesweeper and destroyer, respectively. He also attended the U.S. Naval Destroyer School in 1965-1966. Following a tour as Commanding Officer, U.S.S. *Parrot* (MSC-197), homeported in Charleston, S.C., he attended the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, from 1968 to 1971 where he received his Ph.D. in international relations. Lieutenant Commander Auer is presently assigned as political military affairs adviser to Commander Naval Forces Japan in Yokosuka.

18 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

ent. U.S. protection of Japan will be strategic-nuclear with anything less requiring significant, if not primary, Japanese strength. The 7th Fleet cannot be expected to, and may not be able to, provide quick and effective response to attacks on Japan's sealanes or small-scale incursions into Japanese territory. Thus, in the future, Japan's defense strength and capabilities will be more important than ever before; however,

today, many U.S. Navy authorities looking at the MSDF are shocked to find out how one-sidedly symbolic it is and how weak and vulnerable it is when viewed as an autonomous entity. They have no stronger supporters than Messrs. Kaihara and Sekino. Although those two theorists disagree on how the MSDF should be constructed in the future, they are quite in agreement about its limited capability to date.

FOOTNOTES

1. Both Mr. Kaihara and Commander Sekino have read and acceded to English copies of the respective vision as representative of their views. Kaihara's views were obtained from three personal interviews, an unpublished speech in English entitled, "The Defense of Japan and U.S. Military Bases," and especially from his recent article, "Kare o Shiri Onore o Shiru" ("We Should Know Ourselves as Well as Knowing Them"), *Kobuko (The National Defense)*, April 1971. Sekino's ideas were obtained from three personal interviews, an English article, "Japan and Her Maritime Defense," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1971, p. 98-121, and especially from his article, "A Diagnosis of Our Maritime Self-Defense Force," *Sekai no Kansen (Ships of the World)*, November 1970).

2. Kaihara has written one book specifically on this subject, *Senshi ni Manabu (Lessons from World War II)* (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1970).

3. For example, see views of Lt. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.), former High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands and Commanding General of the U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands, from 1961 to 1965 in Georgetown University, Center for Strategic Studies, *United States-Japanese Relations* (Washington: 1968), p. 25.

4. Sekino, quoted in "Japan and Her Maritime Defense."

5. It is necessary to distinguish the serious effort by civilian and military (including MSDF) leaders of the Defense Agency to implement a primarily defensive strategy from terms that have been used politically and economically like *senshu boei* (exclusive self-defense) and *jishu boei* (autonomous defense). Particularly under the administration of Director General Nakasone, *jishu boei*, which was in the past employed in an economic sense to encourage newly independent Japan that like *jishu gaiko* (autonomous diplomacy) it now also had to develop an independent capability in defense industry, has been picked up as a political term to stress that Japan needs to expand its defense strength if not to remain a "bed partner" of the United States. Nakasone's white paper used the terms *senryaku shusei* (strategic defense), which was adopted by some military leaders after a National Defense College professor pointed out to them that Mao Tse-tung had ridiculed the concept of exclusive self-defense as ludicrous, and *jishu boei* in his stated attempt to make defense understandable to housewives. Nakasone has also tried to advance the concept of *hikaku chukyu kokka* (middle class nonnuclear nation) and to change the Basic National Defense Policy to his own five principles of *jishu boei*. Particularly on the latter attempt he has been resisted by Kaihara; and in both cases he has so far been privately and publicly rejected by Prime Minister Sato. I am indebted to Professor Ito Kobun of the National Defense College, who delivered the lecture pointing out Mao Tse-tung's condemnation, for his detailed explanation of these terms. Interview with Professor Ito, 20 April 1971; interview with Kaihara, 23 April 1971. Sato's public disapproval of "middle class nonnuclear nation" is mentioned in *The Daily Yomiuri*, 17 March 1971, and of the revision of the Basic National Defense Policy in *The Daily Yomiuri*, 29 March 1971.

6. The Coastal Security Force (April-July 1952), the Maritime Safety Force (August 1952-June 1954), and the first month of the MSDF saw leadership in the hands of Adm. Yamazaki Kogoro who had come from MSA and had no Imperial Navy experience. During this time, however, retired Rear Adm. Yamamoto Yoshio was in the next office as adviser, as he had been in the first 2 years of the MSA; and Vice Adm. Nagasawa Ko, former Imperial Navy captain, as Chief of Operations Division or deputy to Yamazaki, was already in on all important decisions. Interviews with Admiral Yamamoto, 28 December 1970, and Aso Shigeru, 14 December 1970.

JAPAN'S . . . MARITIME STRATEGY 19

7. For example, Defense Minister Nakasone was a Reserve supply officer in the Imperial Navy and worked for Admiral Hoshina with whom he still has private discussions about MSDF matters. Interview with Hoshina, 30 November 1970.

8. Of course, there is potential to do many things in the MSDF because long leadtime items have been built and in all services because the power of Japanese industry could be applied to them. Although this monograph is concerned only with the MSDF, Kaihara has not restricted his criticism to that service alone. Despite the name, "Rikuhara," he has been critical of the GSDF and ASDF as well, maintaining that none of the services have any capability because of serious lacks of technology, ammunition, and fuel.

9. The most complete and impressive formulation of the internal security policy is that by Martin E. Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy 1947-1968* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).

10. Melvin R. Laird, *Toward a Strategy of Realistic Deterrence* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971), p. 17-19.

11. The *Ringi* system can be described as a method of achieving consensus on the bureaucratic level from the bottom up. Under this system relatively junior executives of a particular section of a business or government organization discuss an issue until consensus is reached and expressed in a position paper. This position, when approved by the section head, is circulated among other sections who also discuss the issues extensively. Once a lower level consensus among concerned sections is reached, a paper is sent to division leaders on higher levels until finally the corporate head is presented with a paper to almost necessarily pass on to the central decisionmaker or President for a final decision. *Matomari* is a not necessarily unrelated process initiated from a higher level. A senior member of a group frequently states a problem on which others are invited to comment, each being careful not to isolate himself as an individual or offend another member by severe criticism. Members comment in a piecemeal fashion as the leader searches for consensus. If agreement cannot be reached immediately, a later meeting can be scheduled with negotiations continuing in the interim. A subsequent meeting will usually result in the all-important agreement.

12. Tsunoda Jun, presently a research expert of the National Diet Library and professor of Kokugakuin University, a scholar of international politics and diplomatic history who served as a young adviser to Prince Konoye and is known as an expert on the Imperial Navy which he has studied most critically and has lectured and written on extensively in Japan and the United States, has been an official adviser to the ruling party from 1952-1969 and is still sought out by many LDP leaders. Dr. Tsunoda denies the existence of any continuous defense policy. When asked what Japan's policy has been, Tsunoda replied, "I didn't know we had one." More seriously, he feels that although Japan has engaged in some diplomatic maneuvering with the United States to obtain American aid, *neither* country has ever set a consistent policy for Japan. He thinks every prime minister he has advised has wanted defense, but none have been willing to take a serious and substantial position on defense. The main reason for this, Tsunoda offers, is the unwillingness to interfere to any significant extent with economic development. Another is the fact that since self-defense capability was required initially as the price of a peace treaty, it has been looked upon by many as a diplomatic effort. The only real policy, Tsunoda concludes, may come in the 1970's if there is an attempt to convert the economic power of the 1960's into political power. "Until then what we do is rather meaningless and we have, perhaps naively, lived in the past and are living now on good faith." Interviews with Professor Tsunoda, April 1971.

13. This is not to say that the U.S. presence, including that of the 7th Fleet, is not recognized and has not produced some annoyances to the Japanese. But of all U.S. support, the 7th Fleet's strength is least noticeable since very few of its personnel are shorebased or have families in Japan.

14. U.S. Treaties, etc., *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1960), v. XI, pt. 2, p. 1634.

15. U.S. Treaties, etc., *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1952), v. III, pt. 3, p. 3950.

16. U.S. Treaties, etc., v. XI, pt. 2, p. 1634.

17. Japan Defense Agency, *The Defense of Japan* (Tokyo: 1970) (official English translation), p. 44.

18. Data provided by U.S. 7th Fleet Protocol Office, Commander Naval Forces Japan Public Affairs Office, Yokosuka, Japan.

19. Translation of Diet interpellation of 19 February 1970, *Japan Defense Agency Bulletin* (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1970), p. 1. The Government seems not to object as the argument tends to make its actions appear wise and to make the Self-Defense Forces appear effective.

20 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

20. Nakasone Yasuhiro, "Proposals on Mutual Security between Japan and the United States," Text of a speech delivered at the Washington National Press Club, 10 September 1970, official Defense Agency translation, p. 8.

21. *Asahi Shimbun*, 2 April 1971.

22. Sekino, "A Diagnosis of Our Maritime Self-Defense Force."

23. Laird, p. 1, 17-19, 81-82.

24. M. Yasuda, "Japan Needs to Review Strategic Environment," *The Daily Yomiuri*, 5 January 1971. M. Yasuda is a pen name for a high-level adviser to an important Japanese Cabinet member.


25. Interview with Kaihara, 23 April 1971.

26. Quoted from *United States-Japanese Political Relations*. The statement reports the views of Lieutenant General Caraway. Although Caraway's views are rather strong and sometimes discounted in Japan, a similar unpublished viewpoint, particularly concerning the necessity of Japan to consider America's interests as well as vice versa, written by Adm. Arleigh Burke in 1971 was read with care by Japanese Government and Foreign Ministry officials.

27. Nakasone, "International Environment and Defense of Japan in the 1970's," Text of a speech delivered at the Harvard Club of Japan, 30 June 1970, official JIA translation, p. 24. Nakasone has frequently called for more respectful and less intimate relations with the United States and more independent defense and foreign policies on the part of Japan. He has often said Japan has been too dependent on the United States for defense in the past and has been reported as referring to the Japanese Foreign Ministry (Gaimusho) as the "Tokyo Bureau of the U.S. State Department."

28. Laird, p. 17, 18, 22.

29. M. Yasuda, "Japan Unperturbed by 'Realistic' U.S. Policy," *The Daily Yomiuri*, 2 April 1971.



A government without the power of defense is a solecism.

*James Wilson: During debate on adoption
of the Constitution, 1787*

Funding is policy and in no place is this more apparent than in the budgeting process in the Department of Defense. The role perceptions of the Secretary of Defense and role playing by the Joint Chiefs of Staff figure heavily in the process, as does the public and congressional mood in regard to defense spending. It is the interaction of these two phenomena that weighs heavily in the establishment of defense policy.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: Conflict in the Budgetary Process, 1947–1971

An article

by

Professor Lawrence J. Korb

INTRODUCTION

The quality and character of policy and the preservation of certain values in the American political system largely depend upon the relationships that exist between and within the branches of Government. In the area of defense policy, one of the most important relationships is the civil-military relationship that exists between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)—the Secretary's principal military advisers and chiefs of the individual services. There are two reasons why the Secretary-JCS relationship is a potentially important one. These reasons involve both policy and value considerations.

First, the Secretary of Defense has the prime responsibility for exercising control over the Defense Establishment.

However, the enormous size of the

Department of Defense (DOD) makes it impossible for him to effectively direct and administer it alone. The realities of the job require that he delegate substantial decisionmaking authority and many executory functions to the Chiefs, both as a corporate body and as individuals responsible for their respective services. Second, because he lacks military expertise the Secretary must depend upon the JCS for informed opinions. However, should a Secretary allow the military Chiefs to dominate the military decisionmaking process, militarism¹ may result; but, if he does not give their expert testimony its proper weight, poor strategic policy may be the outcome.

Although this civil-military relationship has been potentially important since the establishment of DOD in 1947, its significance has become more critical in the last few years and could

22 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

remain at this high level for the remainder of the decade. The internal and external challenges faced by DOD are unprecedented in their scope and intensity and leave very little margin for error.

The best guide for speculation about the future relationship between the Secretary and the JCS would appear to be an analysis of the relationships that have existed previously. Data available for the period 1947 through 1970—during which 10 men have served as Secretary of Defense and 28 different² men have served on the JCS—should provide the means whereby one can isolate factors that will bear on future relationships. However, an examination of the Secretary-JCS relationships across the entire spectrum of defense activities is too vast an undertaking for one paper, and such an approach might well obscure the real factors that determine it. Therefore, this study will examine the relationship only as it has existed within the budgetary process.

Three considerations weighed heavily in choosing this form of analytical approach. First, the very nature of the budgeting process and the fact that it reoccurs annually provides for comparability. Some Secretaries have been involved in wartime situations, while others were in office during crisis periods, but all had to produce a budget annually. Second, all Secretaries and Chiefs have been unanimous in pointing out the overriding importance of the budgetary phase. There is little disagreement over the fact that in defense "dollars are policy."³ Third, data on the Secretary-JCS relationship during the budgetary phase is more readily available than information on other phases of defense activity.⁴

However, before beginning this analysis of the budgetary process, certain definitions and concepts should be made clear. The budgetary process will be viewed through the conceptual lens

of the Bureaucratic Politics Model.⁵ The Bureaucratic Politics Model, as applied to the defense budgetary process, assumes that the process can be best understood as a game and that the outcome is the result of coalition, compromise, and confusion among players who see different faces in the issues because of the positions that they occupy. Although there are many players in the budgetary game in DOD, this analysis will focus only on a few of them, i.e., the Secretaries and the Chiefs.

The JCS refers to the Chairman, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Because the Marine Corps budget is usually less than 2 percent of the entire defense budget and less than 5 percent of the budget of the Navy Department, this analysis will not be concerned with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, although he becomes a member of the JCS when matters pertaining to the Marine Corps are discussed.

Members of the JCS wear two hats. As a corporate entity they are the principal military advisers to the Secretary and provide military advice to him. But, as individuals they are the uniformed Chiefs of their services, responsible not only for recommending, but also executing policies. Although these roles are theoretically distinct, in practice they tend to blur, and many times the Secretary will call upon them individually for advice. Therefore, this study will look at the Chiefs interacting with the Secretary in both capacities.

The concept of relationship can be viewed from at least three perspectives. First, an "is" perspective, i.e., relationship may simply refer to the activities performed by each party, e.g., the JCS produces the budget and the Secretary reviews it. Second, a "how" perspective, i.e., the concept may refer to the way or manner in which the two parties interact, e.g., the Secretary and the JCS have

BUDGETARY PROCESS 23

a harmonious relationship. Third, an "ought" perspective, i.e., the concept may refer to the propriety of the activities performed by each party, e.g., the JCS dominated the budgetary process or the JCS were not allowed to make a sufficient budgetary input.

Each of these perspectives is inter-related to some degree, e.g., the activities performed affect the propriety and should have an impact upon the quality. A meaningful and complete analysis of the Secretary-JCS relationship must involve consideration of all three perspectives.

The "is" does not present many difficulties for operationalization. One simply has to catalog the activities performed by each party. The "how" and the "ought" are somewhat more complex. The way in which two parties interact depends not only on what each party does, but upon their mutual expectations and the environment. The propriety of the activities performed involves the question of balance, i.e., an equilibrium between militarism and poor strategic policy. Therefore, in order to abstract the factors that determine the entire Secretary-JCS relationship, this analysis will discuss the activities performed by each party, their mutual expectations, the environment, and the balance produced by those activities.

Finally, this study assumes that for a Secretary to establish a meaningful relationship with the JCS in the budgetary process, he must deal with them on fiscal matters for at least 18 months. This time period allows the Secretary to participate in substantial parts of at least two budgets.⁶ The Secretaries who meet this minimum requirement are James Forrestal and Louis Johnson from the Truman administration; Charles Wilson and Neil McElroy from the Eisenhower era; Robert McNamara, who served both Kennedy and Johnson; and Melvin Laird, the present Secretary.

The tenure of these six men accounts

for 80 percent of the period since the creation of the position in 1947.⁷

TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION

The first two Secretaries, James Forrestal and Louis Johnson, each served about 18 months in office, and while the environment in which each worked was almost identical, their relationship with the JCS was quite different. The period from the establishment of the Department of Defense, in August 1947, to the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950 was dominated by three factors. First, the defense budget rapidly declined from a World War II high of \$80 billion to \$10.5 billion in FY 1948. Second, there was a tremendous amount of bitterness between the military services caused by the 3-year unification controversy (1944-47), the differing views over the course of future conflicts, and the competition for the scarce resources. Third, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were becoming increasingly bellicose as a result of events in Berlin, Eastern Europe, and mainland China.

Secretary Forrestal

The Budget Process. James Forrestal worked with five military chiefs on two budgetary evolutions—a supplement to FY 1949 budget and the FY 1950 budget. In each of these operations, Forrestal and the Chiefs played similar roles. The Secretary of Defense received definite ceilings from the Bureau of the Budget. He communicated these ceilings to the JCS and asked them to produce a budget within these ceilings.

The Chiefs submitted budgets to him that were well in excess of the ceiling because they could not agree on where to reduce the individual service budgets. Each Chief was willing to cut the total package if the majority of the cuts came

24 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

from the other services. Their budget submissions to Forrestal were simply the addition of the three individual service budgets. In FY 1949 the Chiefs asked for a \$9 billion supplement⁸ and in FY 1950 they requested a total budget of \$29.4 billion.⁹ The ceilings for the FY 1949 supplement and the subsequent year's budget were \$3 billion and \$15 billion, respectively.

Forrestal sought assistance from two outside sources to bridge the gap. One was a board of non-JCS officers that he created to reduce the budget, but it made only a small reduction. He then asked the Secretary of State to provide guidance to the JCS to enable them to adjust service budgets in light of the world situation with the goal of remaining below administration ceilings, but Secretary Marshall refused.

Forrestal succeeded in bridging the gap through personal diplomacy. He summoned the Chiefs to his office and acknowledged that they could not have satisfactory and usable military power under the budgetary limitations, but that if they would produce a budget in the vicinity of the President's ceilings, he would make further attempts to get the President to raise the existing limitations. For Forrestal to present the Chiefs' original estimations to the administration would strain both his and their credibility.¹⁰ The Chiefs cooperated, but the White House did not. In FY 1949 the Chiefs and Forrestal agreed on a \$3.48 billion supplement, and in FY 1950 they settled on \$16.9.¹¹ Forrestal made impassioned pleas to the White House, but Truman refused to raise the ceilings.

The Relationship. Although there was no prior experience concerning the role that the JCS would play in the budget process and the 1947 legislation was vague on the subject, Forrestal's perception of the appropriate role for the Chiefs was quite clear. He expected them to advise him on the division of

funds within the limitations of the President's ceilings and thus share responsibility with him for the division.¹²

Forrestal was equally clear about his own role. He viewed himself as a mediator between both the administration and the military services, trying to bridge the gap between what was needed and what could be had, and between the services, attempting to ensure that the final budget produced a balanced force.

The JCS were primarily service oriented. They viewed their primary responsibility as protecting the interests of their own branch. They realized that defense spending was limited but felt that they could not take responsibility for any reductions that might involve their service. If cuts had to be made, the Chiefs favored letting the other services bear the brunt or "passing the buck" upwards.¹³

The JCS viewed the first Secretary of Defense as a superservice Secretary—just as the service Secretaries are supposed to be spokesmen for their individual services, the Chiefs of Staff thought the Secretary of Defense should obtain more money for defense and safeguard the vested interests of their particular services even if the money was not available.¹⁴ If one examines the public statements of the Chiefs during Forrestal's tenure, one would have to conclude that their relationship with the Secretary was bitter. Air Force Chiefs of Staff Spaatz and Vandenberg argued against Forrestal's balanced force concept and urged Congress to give the Air Force 15 additional air groups.¹⁵ Army Chief of Staff Bradley urged Congress to do away with the funds that Forrestal had provided for naval aviation.¹⁶

However, this was not the case. The Chiefs were merely trying to protect their service interests and their own standing within their services. They did not feel that they were being disloyal to Forrestal. In fact they had a great deal

of respect for the Secretary and appreciated his attempts to increase defense spending by taking their case to the White House.¹⁷

The Secretary-JCS relationship would have to be characterized as balanced. Both the Chiefs and the Secretary were aware of the other's positions; they worked out their differences within the limitations imposed by the White House; neither the JCS, as a corporate body, nor the individual services dominated the policymaking process; the final budget produced a balanced force in which each service received some, but not all, of their demands; and the final budget was a result of the joint efforts of the Chiefs and the Secretary.

Louis Johnson

The Budget Process. Louis Johnson assumed the helm at the Pentagon while Congress was hearing testimony on the FY 1950 budget and the JCS were working on a statement of forces and major national requirements that would provide a foundation for a FY 1951 budget of less than \$15 billion. Johnson did not wait long to make his impact felt on either budget.

Within a few weeks of his appointment, he boasted to the Senate Subcommittee on Military Appropriations that he could save a billion dollars in DOD by cutting out waste, duplications, and unnecessary civilian employment. Obviously impressed, the Senate gave him authority to reduce expenditures by \$434 million.¹⁸

Within a month after succeeding Forrestal—on 23 April 1949, and less than a week after the Navy had completed well-publicized keel laying ceremonies—Johnson canceled construction of the 65,000-ton flush deck supercarrier, the *United States*.¹⁹ This was done despite the fact that the Navy already had about \$1 billion invested in it and

Congress had appropriated funds for the

ship for 3 consecutive fiscal years.

In June the Budget Director informed the Secretary that the budgetary ceiling for FY 1951 would be \$1.5 billion less than FY 1950 of \$13.5 billion.²⁰ Without asking the services for the implications of this development for their programs, Johnson then ordered a reduction in FY 1950 expenditures of approximately \$1 billion and directed the JCS to agree on a budget for FY 1951 below \$13.5 billion or face the prospect of an across-the-board reduction by him.

On two occasions during the summer of 1949, President Truman met with Johnson and the Chiefs to discuss the adequacy of the ceiling. On both occasions the Secretary and the Chiefs assured the President that \$13.5 billion was more than sufficient.²¹

The service budgets which the Chiefs submitted to Johnson amounted to \$13.31 billion. Johnson cut another \$120 million from the budget and sent it to the White House. The Bureau of the Budget reduced this figure by another \$1 billion, and Johnson accepted the final figure of \$12.21 billion with very little argument.

The Relationship. There is little doubt about the role that Johnson perceived for himself. His primary job was to bring about economy in the Pentagon. Johnson saw himself as the President's representative to DOD, enforcing the administration's will on an avaricious military. Johnson would not think of attempting to get the White House to raise the budget ceilings, but he took advantage of every opportunity to reduce spending levels in the Pentagon—an example being the time he seized upon a technicality to split the JCS and cancel the supercarrier.

Johnson's conception of the appropriate role for the JCS followed from the conception of his own job. He expected the Chiefs to divide up the funds voluntarily, within the ceilings

26 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

imposed from above. If the Chiefs could not get together voluntarily, Johnson felt that this was their problem. He would capitalize on their disagreements and reduce expenditures, or he would simply order across-the-board cuts.²²

To understand the Chiefs' perceptions and their relationship with Johnson, it must be kept in mind that first Truman and then Johnson put "the fear of God" into them.²³ Truman informed the Chiefs that he expected them to support his budgetary ceilings publicly and privately. If they did not agree with his policies, they ought to resign.²⁴ Johnson's testimony to Congress about waste in the Pentagon, his order to reduce defense spending, and the cancellation of the supercarrier and subsequent replacement of Admiral Denfeld demonstrated to the Chiefs that they would have to be "team members" or lose both control over funds and their positions.

The effect of Truman's and Johnson's activities on JCS activities was amply demonstrated by their failure to question the budgetary ceilings in two meetings with Truman and their testimony to Congress on the FY 1951 budget. Army General Collins actually tried to demonstrate to Congress that the Army contributed more to the Nation's security with less men.²⁵ Chairman Bradley told Congress that the military would be doing a disservice to the country if they recommended higher defense budgets.²⁶

So much of a team man did CNO Louis Denfeld become that he lost control of the Navy. When Johnson canceled the *United States* Denfeld accepted the decision and tried to mediate between the Navy and the Secretary. His admirals could accept neither the cancellation decision nor the attitude of Denfeld and revolted against him.²⁷

So much did the entire JCS become "team members" of the Truman administration that they lost their status as military experts in the eyes of many

observers. This led to a demand by congressional Republicans that Eisenhower immediately replace the entire JCS when he assumed office.²⁸

The Secretary-JCS relationship during this period tilted the civil-military balance in a nonmilitary direction. Rather than presenting the administration and the Congress with a military perspective, the Chiefs advocated a view of defense policy based primarily on an economic perspective. The disequilibrium of the situation was aptly summed up by George Mahon, (D-Tex.), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Military Appropriations, who, after listening to the FY 1951 testimony of the Chiefs, stated that he could not understand how so-called military experts could recommend a budget for FY 1951 that was substantially lower than FY 1950 when, in the interim, there had been "a complete loss of China and Russia has exploded an atomic bomb."²⁹

THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

Two of Eisenhower's appointees as Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson and Neil McElroy, lasted at least 18 months in office. The President's third appointee, Thomas Gates, left office with the Republican administration in January 1960 after only 13 months.³⁰

During the tenure of Wilson and McElroy, a great many changes took place at home and abroad. For the purpose of strengthening the Secretary vis-a-vis the JCS, DOD was reorganized in 1953 and 1958. The Korean war ended, and a "new look" at military strategy produced a policy of massive retaliation. The "great equation"³¹ replaced Truman's budgetary ceilings. Joseph Stalin died and the cold war was succeeded by "peaceful" coexistence. The Soviet Union developed an H-bomb well ahead of schedule and was first in the race into space.

Wilson remained in office longer than any previous Secretary, 56 months, and McElroy lasted 26 months. The General Motors executive was responsible for six budgets, and the Proctor and Gamble president produced two. Both of the former corporation executives had similar styles, and their relationships with the JCS were quite alike.

As a group, the JCS that served with Wilson and McElroy were probably the most colorful, controversial, independent, outspoken, and least cooperative collection of military leaders in American history. The Eisenhower Chiefs so exasperated the former five-star general that he accused them of legalized insubordination.³²

The Budget Process. The production of the defense budget within the executive under Eisenhower usually took an entire calendar year.³³ The process was initiated about 18 months before the fiscal year in which the budget was to be effective and 12 months before the budget was to be submitted to the Congress. For example, work on the FY 1957 budget, which was to be submitted to Congress in January 1956 and which would become effective on 1 July 1956, began in January 1955 and lasted until December of that year.

The process was inaugurated in January when the National Security Council (NSC) produced the Basic National Security Policy (BNSP) document. This document was supposed to be a comprehensive statement of American strategic policy and had as one of its main purposes providing guidance for the JCS in their planning for force and weapon levels.

Although the NSC devoted a great deal of time and energy to the drafting of the BNSP, the document was useless for budgeting purposes. Rather than resolving the sharp differences of opinion over what the strategic policy of the United States should be, it glossed over them to make the docu-

ment acceptable to all parties. It meant all things to all men and settled nothing. For example, the 1958 edition stated that the United States would depend upon the weapons of mass retaliation, but at the same time maintain flexible forces capable of coping with a lesser situation.³⁴

After completion, the BNSP document was sent to the JCS to serve as a guide for their Joint Strategic Operations Plan (JSOP). The JSOP is a document of many volumes that prescribes the forces that the JCS believe are required to carry out military strategy and national objectives. Because the BNSP document could be interpreted in so many ways, each service Chief stressed that portion of the BNSP that enhanced the primary mission of his service. Consequently, the JSOP was really three separate plans added together and called a joint plan.³⁵

Secretary of Defense Wilson tried on several occasions to get the JCS to produce a joint plan, but to no avail. Consequently, he was forced to rely on Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the JCS, and his own staff (OSD) for most of the force level planning. On one occasion he even produced his own long-range plan for force levels.³⁶

The completed JSOP was sent to the services in late June. It was supposed to serve as a guide, or framework, for the individual military departments in the production of their separate budgets.

While the JCS were completing work on the JSOP, the NSC was deciding upon a ceiling for defense expenditures for the next fiscal year. The ceiling was obtained by estimating total income, subtracting the projected expenditures of all other Government agencies, and then allocating the remainder to defense.³⁷ The objective was a balanced budget every fiscal year, and not even such crises as sputnik or Suez could alter that fact.³⁸ The remainder for defense usually came out to between 9 and 10 percent of the gross national

28 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

product. The defense ceiling was transmitted to the service Chiefs by the Chairman in midsummer.

The individual service budgets were submitted to the JCS in September. The JCS were supposed to review the budgets for conformity with the BNSP document and the JSOP. The Secretary expected the Chiefs to produce a total defense budget which conformed as closely as possible to the plans but did not exceed the ceiling.

However, the service budgets exceeded the ceiling by an average of 15 percent.³⁹ Not once did these JCS budgets come reasonably close to the ceiling. On three occasions the budget requests exceeded the ceiling by more than 20 percent, and the JCS refused to trim the budgets. Because of the vagueness of the BNSP and the ambivalence of the JSOP, the Chiefs could and did justify every item in the service budgets and refused to make reductions on the grounds of national security. Moreover, there was still a great deal of bitterness among the services and any attempt by a service Chief to acquiesce in cuts for his service would be looked upon as near treason by his subordinates. Wilson and McElroy tried a variety of approaches to induce the JCS to scale down their budget requests. These approaches ranged from direct commands to subtle hints, but all were equally ineffective. In Eisenhower's first year in office, Wilson twice directed the JCS to indicate where reductions could be made in the services' \$37.82 billion request to bring it under \$35 billion. The JCS refused to follow either directive on the grounds that any reductions would increase the danger to national security.⁴⁰

The following year Wilson directed Chairman Arthur Radford to persuade the Chiefs to make the desired reductions. Radford was unable to get the Chiefs to agree on a lower level of expenditures and was forced to make

the recommendations for reductions himself.⁴¹

In 1958, when he was faced with a JCS-approved budget of \$44.67 billion and an administration ceiling of \$38 billion, Secretary Neil McElroy tried a more subtle approach. He asked the Chiefs how they would divide up \$38 billion without in any way implying that this was the amount they approved. The JCS discussed this hypothetical question briefly and then informed McElroy that they unanimously agreed on how to split up \$34 billion, but each Chief felt he needed the additional \$4 billion for his own service and could not voluntarily give it away to another military department.⁴² In essence, they were telling the Secretary that they needed the entire \$45 billion.

In 1959 Eisenhower intervened personally by inviting the Chiefs to a stag dinner at the White House. During the dinner the former general gave the Chiefs a pep talk on the great need for more cooperation on their part with the Secretary in connection with the budget. Only Chairman Twining was receptive. The service Chiefs refused to change their behavior.⁴³

So little did the JCS have to do with the final defense budget that they never even considered such important questions as the size of the Army, the number of aircraft carriers, or the amount of deterrent forces.⁴⁴ The job of making such important decisions, such as where to make the major reductions, was left to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the President. Wilson and McElroy often ordered across-the-board reductions. DOD's comptroller Wilfred McNeil made most of the detailed decisions.⁴⁵ Eisenhower made about 15 major budgetary decisions annually and was the chief architect of the plan for reducing the Army's ground forces.⁴⁶

The Relationship. Both Secretary Wilson and McElroy had similar

conceptions of their positions. They wanted to manage, but not make, military policy. They desired to concentrate their energies on increasing efficiency and savings in the Pentagon.⁴⁷ Likewise, Wilson and McElroy envisioned similar roles for the Chiefs. They expected the Chiefs to cooperate fully with OSD and to act with them as a single staff for the Secretary of Defense. The Secretaries did not want purely military advice from the Chiefs. Wilson and McElroy expected the JCS to broaden their outlooks to include a wide range of domestic and international economic and political factors.⁴⁸

In their dealings with the Chiefs, they expected the Chairman of the JCS to serve as a "go-between," bridging the gap between administration policy and military demands. While the Secretaries themselves did not want to take the military's case to the White House, they were more than willing to give the Chiefs ample opportunity to do so and were content with situations in which the Chiefs' views prevailed.⁴⁹

The majority of the service Chiefs felt that their primary duties were to provide military advice and to protect the vested interests of their services. The Chiefs felt that neither their military professionalism nor their service interests could be very well protected by taking into account political and economic criteria. The service Chiefs looked to the Secretary of Defense to protect military spending and defense programs from the economy minded members of the administration.⁵⁰

Chairman Arthur Radford saw himself as an active participant in the policymaking process, trying to persuade both the administration and his fellow Chiefs on certain matters. However, since he was in sympathy with the "great equation" and massive retaliation, most of his persuading was saved for the Chiefs.⁵¹

His successor, Nathan Twining, saw

himself as a conveyor between the Chiefs and the Secretary.⁵² He did not want to attempt to persuade his fellow Chiefs to go along with any point of view or to press their views upon the administration.

The Secretary-JCS relationship was turbulent but harmonious. Wilson and McElroy were clearly annoyed by the JCS refusal to be team members and their subsequent public statements criticizing the administration.⁵³ However, they never prevented the Chiefs from presenting their views to key officials in the executive branch and never brought pressure upon the Chiefs to change their ways.⁵⁴ The JCS, for their part, were not happy with the strategic policy or the budget ceilings. However, their resentment was not directed against Wilson and McElroy personally because they realized that responsibility for those decisions lay outside the Office of the Secretary. One Chief, even today, refers to Secretary Wilson as a "great American."⁵⁵

The Secretary-JCS relationship in the Eisenhower administration did not produce a situation in which civil and military considerations were unbalanced. Despite pressure from the administration, the service Chiefs refused to allow economic and political considerations to dilute their military recommendations. JCS positions were given a full hearing within the administration, and there were no barriers placed in the way of the Chiefs informing the Congress of their feelings.

Even though the Chiefs opted out of the budget process at an early stage, the military position was not ignored. Wilson and McElroy relied upon their chairman for advice. Comptroller Wilfred McNeil consulted service officials individually when making the detailed reductions, and the final budget was closely scrutinized by a former general and Army Chief of Staff.

Despite the publicity generated by the public statements and congressional

30 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

testimony of the JCS,⁵⁶ there is no evidence that they succeeded in raising the level of defense expenditures. Congress listened sympathetically but refused to take responsibility for increasing the defense budget,⁵⁷ and a President, who was well aware of the dangers of the military-industrial complex, held the line on spending despite pressure from the Chiefs and their partisans in the Congress and the Nation.⁵⁸

If, as many have agreed, the Eisenhower administration did produce poor strategic policy, the fault does not seem to lie with the Secretary-JCS relationship. The National Security Council and the intra-JCS relationship would appear to be more likely candidates for blame.

KENNEDY AND JOHNSON— "THE McNAMARA YEARS"

Before assuming the Presidency, John Kennedy appointed a committee, headed by Senator Stuart Symington, former Secretary of the Air Force, to study defense organization for the purpose of recommending needed changes. After 2 months of study the Symington committee proposed a radical reorganization of DOD. However, when Robert McNamara accepted Kennedy's offer to become the eighth Secretary of Defense, he persuaded the President-elect to postpone the subject of reorganization until he (McNamara) could assess the situation personally. Nevertheless, Kennedy did give McNamara two directives: first, develop the military structure required for a firm foundation for our foreign policy without regard to budget ceilings; second, operate this force at the lowest possible price.⁵⁹

Armed only with those two directives and without benefit of any new legislation, McNamara made so many changes, both formal and informal, organizational and procedural, that he brought about not just a reorganization, but a revolution in DOD. Nowhere was this revolution more acutely felt than in

the budget process where the eighth Secretary of Defense introduced the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) and cost effectiveness or systems analysis.⁶⁰

The Budget Process. PPBS divided the budgetary process into three clearly defined cycles and lengthened it to 18 months. Thus, preparation of the FY 1966 budget, which was to be submitted to the Congress in January 1965 and was to become effective in July 1965; got underway in July 1963. Cost effectiveness or systems analysis, a technique that looks at alternate ways of performing a job, became the backbone of the budget making process.

The foundation for PPBS in DOD from 1961 through 1968 was the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP). This document was the master plan for the budget process and contained the programs approved by OSD with their estimated costs projected for 5 years. The initial FYDP was produced in 1961 and projected programs and costs through 1965. Each year the FYDP was updated by decisions made during the budget process.

The planning cycle was the first and longest. It began in July and lasted until February and was composed of three steps. The first step involved production of volume 1 of the JSOP by the JCS. This volume was an assessment of the military threat facing the United States and of our national commitments projected for 5 years.

For about 5 years the JCS devoted a great deal of the time and energy to producing this part of the JSOP. Since there was no BNSP document, the Chiefs hoped that their estimates would furnish the basis for all subsequent budgetary decisions. They hoped to make it a substitute for the BNSP.⁶¹

However, by 1965 the JCS realized that the JSOP had little impact on subsequent budget decisions. In fact, they wondered if anyone even read it.

Thus, they began to spend less and less time on it and by 1967 had turned the job over to their subordinates.⁶²

While the JCS were working on the first part of the JSOP, McNamara often assigned special projects to the Chiefs. These projects consisted of a set of specific questions, had very short deadlines, and had great potential implications for the budget. For example, in March 1961 McNamara asked the Chiefs to estimate how many bombers the United States would need in the next decade and set a deadline of 6 weeks.⁶³

The career officials, e.g., JCS, complained a great deal about these short deadlines, but always completed the studies on time. OSD usually found the studies of the career officials lacking in many respects.⁶⁴ From 1961 through 1965, OSD usually was content with pointing out the inconsistencies in these studies. But from 1965 onwards, when the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems Analysis (SA), was established within OSD, SA began to make recommendations of its own, and these were usually accepted by the Secretary.⁶⁵

The second step of the planning cycle consisted of the submission of force level recommendations by the services and unified commands to the JCS. These recommendations were to be based upon the threat and commitments outlined in volume I of the JSOP.

The third and final step of the planning cycle involved the completion of two major documents. The JCS completed volume II of the JSOP. This part recommended the optimum force levels necessary to meet U.S. requirements. Although the force levels were supposed to be based on the advice of both the services and unified commanders, the JCS rarely paid attention to the latter's ideas, and volume II was based primarily upon service inputs. The Chiefs ignored the unified commanders' requests because they were unrealistic and because the JCS were wary of losing

any power to these men, who were theoretically their equals.⁶⁶

While the JCS were completing the JSOP, OSD produced a Major Program Memorandum (MPM) for each of the 10 mission areas and support activities of the defense budget. These memoranda summarized the OSD position on the major force levels, the rationale for choices among alternatives, and the recommended force levels and funding. Although the MPM were in theory programming documents based upon the planning in the JSOP, their authors, in fact, ignored the JSOP, and the MPM became both planning and programming documents.⁶⁷

The programming cycle began with the Secretary's receipt of the JSOP and MPM. This cycle lasted about 6 months, i.e., through the end of August.

McNamara normally reviewed these documents for about 30 days and then provided guidance to the services for preparing Program Change Requests (PCR), i.e., suggested modifications to the Five Year Defense Plan. The primary factor shaping this guidance was the Major Program Memorandum.

The services normally submitted about 300 PCR's annually to the Office of Systems Analysis, whose decisions were nearly always negative. The rejection of the PCR's was attributable to three factors: the services used poor analytical techniques, their requests did not convey any sense of priority in relation to the base program and their cost.⁶⁸

Theoretically all the program decisions should have been made before budgeting began, but this was not the case. Many of the program decisions were negotiated during and after the budgetary cycle.⁶⁹ An OSD official reported that in FY 1968 and FY 1969, 90 percent of the final program decision documents were not written until after 28 December, i.e., after the conclusion of the budgetary cycle.⁷⁰

32 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

While Systems Analysis was reviewing the PCR's, the JCS were reviewing the MPM. The Chiefs' comments on the memoranda were sent to the Secretary in July. For the remainder of the summer, McNamara and the JCS met about 15 times to discuss the Chiefs' adverse comments.

From 1961 through 1965 the JCS were never united on the major issues raised in the MPM. The Navy objected to the B-70; the Army opposed a 15 carrier fleet; and the Air Force was less than enthusiastic about ABM. In their meetings McNamara was able to capitalize on these differences and skillfully played one service off against another.⁷¹

However, from 1966 onward, the JCS worked out their differences prior to meeting with the Secretary and presented a united front to him. For example, the Air Force wanted 35 wings of tactical aircraft and the Navy 17 carriers. Prior to meeting McNamara they agreed on 29 wings and 15 carriers. Similar negotiations were conducted on the ABM.⁷²

The Chiefs realized early that McNamara was dividing and conquering but were not able to work out their differences until Taylor stepped down as Chairman and LeMay no longer served as Air Force Chief of Staff. Taylor was regarded as an administration man, and LeMay was an uncompromising crusader for airpower. General Wheeler, Taylor's successor as Chairman, refused to bring split opinions to McNamara. He would tell the other Chiefs that he would wait until they came to some agreement before adjourning their meetings.⁷³

This united front eventually paid off for the JCS. When they were divided, McNamara could carry the day by pointing out the division to the President and Congress. But even McNamara was hesitant about overruling a united or common professional military opinion.⁷⁴ Consequently, such items as

a nuclear carrier and the ABM, which the Secretary opposed for about 5 years, were eventually approved.

The budgetary cycle officially began in September when the services were asked to prepare their budgets in the traditional categories—that is each service separately rather than in program packages, for submission to OSD by 1 October. In issuing this call for budget submissions, McNamara emphatically pointed out, year after year, that the services were not to feel bound by any budgetary ceiling, real or imagined. They were to be guided only by decisions made in regard to the Major Program Memoranda and Program Change Requests. The Secretary repeatedly stated that this country could afford whatever was necessary for defense.⁷⁵ Theoretically, the budgetary cycle was to consist only of costing out approved programs.

Despite McNamara's rhetoric, the JCS had a very good idea of what the total and individual service budgets would be. Sometimes the Comptroller let the service Chiefs know as early as July. On most occasions it was a simple matter of arithmetic. It was more than a mere coincidence that what this country could afford for defense from FY 1963 through FY 1966, i.e., before the Vietnam buildup, came within 1 percent of \$46 billion each year and that the Army, Navy, and Air Force shares of the budget remained the same as under Eisenhower, a fairly constant 27, 32, and 41 percent, respectively.⁷⁶ A service Chief, who served under Eisenhower and McNamara, said that in regard to budget ceilings there was no real difference between either administration.⁷⁷ Another Chief remarked, "Weapon systems became more and more difficult to justify as we approached our portion of \$46 billion."⁷⁸

Any lingering doubts about a budget ceiling in DOD were shattered during

the Vietnam buildup when McNamara directed the services to delete programs that were not urgent, to assume for budgetary purposes that the war would be over by the end of the fiscal year and that during the year there would be no increase in the level of our commitment to Vietnam, and to stretch out maintenance and repair cycles by about 50 percent.⁷⁹ These directives made it necessary to have four consecutive supplemental budgets from FY 1966 through FY 1969 and caused the JCS to contemplate resigning en masse,⁸⁰ thus destroying McNamara's credibility with Johnson, and eventually contributing to McNamara's firing.⁸¹

From 1961 through 1965 the service budget requests exceeded the amount eventually approved by about 10 percent. However, from 1966 through 1968, as McNamara's standing within the administration waned, the gap between the amount requested and amount granted widened enormously. According to DOD figures, FY 1967 requests exceeded the actual budget allowed by 19 percent, in FY 1968 by over 28 percent, and in FY 1969 by over 30 percent.

From October through December the Comptroller's office reviewed these budgets. In its review the office normally initiated some 600 subject issues, areas of potential savings. Although these issues were theoretically technical—for instance, the cost of a submarine or the cost of equipping an infantry battalion—the issues reflected intuitive feelings on the part of the personnel in the Comptroller's office about where they felt cuts ought to be made.⁸² McNamara reviewed the budgets personally and, with the subject issues as a guide, made about 700 budgetary decisions annually. Often his decisions concerned the smallest matters, e.g., the color of belt buckles. During his review McNamara consulted with the JCS about 20 times. These consultations took place on the Secretary's terms.

McNamara never allowed the Chiefs to review the budget as a whole but only asked them to comment on items individually. He was not interested in whether the Chiefs preferred x or y, only their opinion of x. In deliberating about x, the Chiefs never knew if he would ask about y.⁸³

The executive phase of the budgetary cycle concluded in late December when the President met with the Secretary and the JCS for about 4 hours. Despite vigorous opposition on the part of many members of the JCS during their "days in court," the President invariably sided with McNamara. Some of the issues raised in these meetings included the B-70, number of Polaris submarines, and pilot shortages.

The Relationship. Robert McNamara had very definite ideas about what he was supposed to do in the Pentagon. His role conception had two dimensions. First, McNamara described himself as an active manager providing aggressive leadership—questioning, suggesting alternatives, proposing objectives, and stimulating progress.⁸⁴ Second, the eighth Secretary of Defense desired to eliminate waste, unnecessary duplication, and needless goldplating in DOD.⁸⁵

McNamara expected the JCS to be more than military advisers. He wanted them to incorporate economic criteria into their traditional military requirement studies. Advice based on purely military judgment was useless in his eyes.⁸⁶

The Secretary viewed the JCS as one of the many resources available to him to be used on his terms. The Chiefs were no more or no less important than any of his other advisers. The ability of the JCS to influence policy was dependent upon the quality of their advice, not their position as his principal military advisers.

McNamara expected the Chiefs to be satisfied with the increased level of defense spending and to accept his

34 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

innovations as "more rational" than previous methods. Once he had reached a decision, the Secretary expected the Chiefs to support it, even if they opposed the rationale for the decision. Those who did not would be treated like other appointed subordinates.⁸⁷

By the 1960's a new crop of military leaders were moving to the forefront. The gladiators of World War II had for the most part retired.⁸⁸ This new crop of leaders were primarily staff men, planners and administrators, more at home behind a desk than in the field. As a group they generally exhibited two characteristics. First, they viewed themselves as professionals and were very serious about maintaining the integrity of that professionalism.⁸⁹ Second, they felt that the primary responsibility of members of the JCS was more toward the corporate entity than the service.⁹⁰

These leaders expected three things from the Secretary: first, that he solicit their military perspective on all important decisions; second, that he transmit or allow them to transmit that perspective to the administration and the Congress; and third, that he respect the integrity of their professionalism. The Chiefs felt that the following types of activities represented attempts to undermine their professionalism: attempts to persuade them to take economic and political factors into their deliberations; pressure to rubber stamp decisions that the Chiefs had no part in making or with which they disagreed; overruling the JCS on military grounds; exacting retribution on a Chief or his service for maintaining a certain viewpoint; seeking to play one service off against another; and maintaining that the military can have "whatever is necessary" and can be justified as such, there is no ceiling on defense expenditures.⁹¹

Within a short time after McNamara had become Secretary of Defense, many people were complaining that he had upset the civil-military balance. These people claimed that military men and

military considerations were not playing a sufficient part in the making of defense policy—that is, the civilian leadership in DOD was bypassing the JCS on too many occasions, virtually dictating military planning on others, and preventing the Chiefs from advising the Congress.⁹²

There is no doubt that the Secretary-JCS relations were anything but harmonious. The Chiefs felt that McNamara was undermining their professional integrity in nearly every conceivable way. The Secretary thought that he was controlling the military and making decisions in the most rational, scientific, and unbiased way possible.

However, it is difficult to say that civil-military relations were unbalanced under McNamara. Civilians made the decisions and military advice was available. It was not that the administration did not know how the military felt. Rather, they chose to make decisions on other criteria.

Moreover, despite pressure from McNamara, the military leaders made known their views to the Congress. In the early years of McNamara's tenure, Anderson and LeMay made Congress aware of their feelings about McNamara's method, and in the latter part of his administration even the Chairman of the JCS joined his colleagues in opposing McNamara on certain issues.

Initially McNamara was able to capitalize on splits within the JCS, but within a few years the Chiefs had remedied that situation. At the beginning of his term, the Secretary was able to remove at least one Chief, but Congress soon mandated a fixed 4-year term.⁹³ In the end, McNamara himself was removed, and what was possibly his most important decision, not to deploy the ABM, was reversed.

NIXON ADMINISTRATION

Melvin Laird, who had observed McNamara's revolution from his seat on

the House Subcommittee on Military Appropriations, felt that McNamara's methods had led to overcentralization in decisionmaking.⁹⁴ Accordingly, when he became the 10th Secretary of Defense, Laird instituted certain changes in the defense budget process to redress this situation. The essence of these changes was contained in a "treaty" signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the service Secretaries, and the Chairman of the JCS. This treaty, "negotiated" soon after Laird assumed the helm at the Pentagon, provided that the Secretary of Defense would look to the services and the JCS in the design of forces and that the Systems Analysis Office would limit itself to evaluation and review and not put forward independent proposals of its own. In return for this concession the Secretary of Defense expected the services to work within the ever-decreasing budget ceilings.⁹⁵

The Budget Process. The length of the process is still about 18 months, the foundation is still the Five Year Defense Plan, and it includes many of the same steps as McNamara's, but as the "treaty" indicates, the emphasis is different.⁹⁶ The JCS inaugurate the planning cycle by producing volume I of the JSOP, the strategic assessment, and sending it to Laird. The Secretary reviews the JSOP and then issues a coordinated, complete, and current strategic guidance document for the entire defense community, the Strategic Guidance Memorandum (SGM). This document is essentially the JSOP with some updating and enlargement and is issued in January, e.g., the SGM for FY 1972 was issued in January 1970.

In January the Secretary also issues a tentative Fiscal Guidance Memorandum (FGM), projecting dollar constraints for the next 5 years. While the elements of DOD are reviewing the tentative FGM, the JCS complete the force structure portion of the JSOP, i.e., volume II.

This is prepared from a purely military perspective, i.e., without regard to the fiscal constraints of the tentative FGM.

The Secretary reviews the comments on the tentative FGM and volume II of the JSOP and then completes the planning cycle by issuing a Fiscal Guidance Memorandum (FGM) in March. The FGM sets definite ceilings on the total budget and on each service. In Laird's three budgets the FGM has set a figure of from \$70 to \$75 billion and split the figure evenly among the three services.⁹⁷

The ceilings for the FGM are a product of the Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC), a subcommittee within the National Security Council system composed of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Undersecretary of State, the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Chairman of the President's Council on Economic Advisers. The task of this committee is to anticipate the political, economic, and social implications resulting from changes in defense spending, budgeting, and force levels.⁹⁸

This body was created in October 1969 and has become involved in the FY 1971 and 1972 budgets. The ceilings that it produces have been guided by a desire to balance the budget and an anticipation of how much Congress will allocate for defense. The ceiling for FY 1971 was \$75 billion and for FY 1972 it was \$70 billion.⁹⁹

The programing cycle begins in April when the JCS draw up a Joint Force Memorandum (JFM), which presents the Chiefs' recommendations on force levels and support programs that can be provided within the fiscal constraints of the Fiscal Guidance Memorandum. The JFM also includes an assessment of the risks in these forces as measured against the strategy and objectives of JSOP, volume I, and a comparison of the costs of its recommendations with the FYDP.

36 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Finally, the JFM highlights the major force issues to be resolved during the year. In 1969 and 1970 these issues have included the B-1, ABM, and ship-building.

In May each service submits to the Secretary of Defense a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for each major mission area and support activity in the defense budget. These memoranda express total program requirements in terms of forces, manpower, and costs and must provide a rationale for deviations from the FYDP and the JFM. The Secretary's office no longer issues program documents.

In July, Laird completes the programming cycle by issuing Program Decision Memoranda (PDM) for each budget area. These are based upon the inputs of the JSOP, Joint Force Memorandum, and Program Objective Memorandum and are then reflected in the FYDP. During July and August the Secretary meets with the JCS to resolve any disputes over the PDM. These disputes have mainly centered around a manpower-weapons tradeoff. The JCS have opted for decreasing manpower and putting the limited funds into advanced weaponry. In the FY 1971 and 1972 budget evolutions a compromise has been worked out.¹⁰⁰

The budgetary cycle commences on 30 September, when each service submits its budget to the Secretary. The budgets are supposed to be based on the approved programs resulting from the various decision documents. The service submissions have come within 3 percent of the established ceiling. In FY 1970 Congress authorized \$77.5 billion for defense, and in FY 1971 the service requests amounted to \$77.3 billion.¹⁰¹

After a review of the budget estimates by the Secretary's staff, working with 51 representatives of the Office of Management and Budget, the budget is sent to the Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC). This committee reviews the budget in November and

December. The DPRC made very few changes to the FY 1971 budget but in December 1970 recommended that an additional \$6 billion be added to the FY 1972 budget to maintain troop levels in Europe and the strength of the 6th Fleet. DOD wanted to reduce both of these items to stay within the \$70 billion ceiling. President Nixon ratified the decision when he decided to have a deficit budget.¹⁰²

The Relationship. Laird saw a need to modify the active manager philosophy of McNamara. He felt that his predecessor's approach had led to "overcentralization in decisionmaking." Secretary Laird gives the services broad guidelines and reviews their implementation.¹⁰³

Laird views himself as the Pentagon spokesman within the administration. He is not content merely to accept guidelines from the White House and transmit them to the military. The Secretary participates in making administration policy and challenges those policy assumptions which he feels militate against the best interests of his department.¹⁰⁴

Moreover, Laird adamantly resists the efforts of outside agencies to intervene in the internal affairs of DOD. So far, he has successfully kept the Defense Program Review Committee from deciding how DOD will spend its share of the budgetary pie.¹⁰⁵

Laird also sees himself as DOD's advocate before the Congress and the public. His public statements do not emphasize the waste and inefficiency in the Pentagon. Rather, Laird points out that present defense spending is at "rockbottom."¹⁰⁶

The Secretary perceives the JCS as his primary military advisers in the budget process. He wants to know what their feeling is concerning the defense needs and priorities of the country. Laird respects their professionalism and does not want them to merely rubber

stamp decisions made outside the JCS, nor does he expect the Chiefs not to inform the White House or the Congress when they are concerned about a security issue.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, Laird encourages the JCS to take their case to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Defense Program Review Committee, and the Office of Management and Budget.¹⁰⁸

The present Secretary is desirous of achieving consensus within the Department, especially with the JCS. Therefore, he is willing to bargain, negotiate, and compromise with the Chiefs to achieve their agreement.¹⁰⁹

The JCS of 1970 are willing to perform as team members, provided their professionalism is respected. The Chiefs no longer desire to opt out of the budget process as soon as the service estimates are submitted. The JCS want their opinions considered on every item which they feel is important. They recognize that resources are declining but desire that the fiscal constraints be made explicit at an early stage in the budget process. This enables them to know where they stand and to set priorities.¹¹⁰

The Chiefs see the Secretary as the "defender of defense." They expect him to protect their services from the onslaughts of those who want to reduce defense spending drastically. The JCS feel that Laird should present their viewpoints to the interdepartmental committees or the White House, when it is necessary, and allow them to do so should they feel strongly enough about an issue.¹¹¹

The Secretary-JCS relationship under Laird seems to be as harmonious as the relationship under McNamara was bitter. From all accounts, the Secretary-JCS honeymoon is still going on.

The civil-military relationship appears well balanced. The military voice is heard within the administration and before the Congress, but there is no evidence that military men or military considerations dominate the policy

process. If poor strategic policy does result, it may come as a consequence of a continuation of the tripartite division of the defense budget. The chances of such a division producing a balanced force are infinitesimal.

CONCLUSION

The most salient aspect of the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the JCS is that it is continually changing. Moreover, the nature of the relationship does not seem to be progressing linearly or changing in any certain direction. Rather, the relationship vacillates in a number of different directions. For example, Laird's relationship with the JCS is more like that of Forrestal than that of McNamara. It seems that at present the experience of the late 1940's is more relevant than the 1960's.

The prime determinant in the relationship appears to be the role perceptions of the Secretary. Within certain minimum legal constraints¹¹² and within certain parameters, tolerated by the White House,¹¹³ the Secretary of Defense is free to determine how much or how little both he and the JCS will do in the budget process. McNamara and Laird operated with the same Chiefs, within the same organizational milieu, and in a similar environment. Yet their relationships with the JCS were quite different. Forrestal and Johnson even operated with the same President, but their relationships were very dissimilar.

The JCS role perceptions may make them unhappy over the part that the Secretary eschews for himself or that he allots to them, but there is little that the Chiefs can do about the situation. The JCS may do somewhat less than the Secretary desires, but it is almost impossible for them to do more or to alter the Secretary's activities. Moreover, if the JCS behavior is completely out of line with the Secretary's expectations or

38 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

if the Chiefs complain too much about their position vis-a-vis the Secretary, there is a real possibility that the violators will be removed. When forced to choose between a Secretary and a Chief, the President invariably sides with the former. Admirals Denfeld and Anderson and General LeMay were dismissed when their behavior deviated too far from the Secretary's norms.¹¹⁴ Eisenhower tolerated deviant behavior on the part of the Chiefs, but he also permitted this throughout his administration.¹¹⁵

A secondary determinant would appear to be the environment. There is no doubt that the activities of the JCS are influenced by the public and congressional mood. In the 1950's and early 1960's, when the public and Congress favored higher levels of defense spending, the JCS refused to operate within administration ceilings, while in the late 1940's and late 1960's, when the public and congressional mood opposed the level of defense spending, the JCS were more cooperative. However, the environment is not nearly as important as the role perception of the Secretary to the nature of the Secretary-JCS relationship. Forrestal and Johnson and McNamara and Laird operated in similar environments.

Despite changing role conceptions and a changing environment, the civil and military elements, as reflected in the Secretary-JCS relationship, have remained well balanced. Although some temporary aberrations have threatened to upset the equilibrium, adjustments by both sides have restored the balance. Despite charges by pro and antimilitary forces throughout the years, there is no evidence that either element has dominated the process for any significant length of time.¹¹⁶

A second important aspect of the relationship is how little the quality of the relationship has affected the "is" or the "ought" dimension. The JCS had a harmonious relationship with Forrestal and a bitter one with Johnson. Yet they

cooperated much more with the latter. The JCS had a high regard for Wilson and were quite bitter about McNamara. Yet they were at least as cooperative with the latter as with the former.

What of the decade of the 1970's? The decade will probably continue to see a tight lid on defense expenditures. The Tentative Fiscal Guidance Memorandum projections through 1977 are somewhat below FY 1972 spending levels.¹¹⁷ If inflation persists and the administration continues to move toward a volunteer army, the amount for weapons procurement will continue to decline in absolute terms.¹¹⁸

Nevertheless, a revival of the inter-service rivalry of the forties and fifties among the JCS does not appear likely. The men who will come to the Chiefs in the 1970's will be of a different breed than the World War II gladiators. Vietnam has not created any heroes, and the Chiefs of the 1970's should have neither the stature nor the desire to repeat the experiences of the forties and fifties.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Professor Lawrence J. Korb did his undergraduate work at The Athenaeum of Ohio, his master's degree work in political science at St. John's University, and earned his Ph.D. in the field from the Graduate School of Public Affairs, State University of New York at Albany. He has taught in the general field of international politics at State University of New York and at the University of Dayton. As a naval flight officer he was on active duty from 1962 to 1966; he served in patrol squadrons ONE and on the staff of Commander Patrol Force 7th Fleet, spending 2½ years in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia. Lieutenant Commander Korb continues to be active in the Naval Reserve, has lectured at the Naval War College, and is currently a member of the Humanities Department at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy.

The future Chiefs should be highly professional, with a considerable amount of graduate education. They will have good friends in the other services and will have had a considerable number of joint assignments. Their professionalism and joint service¹¹⁹ will make it difficult for them to stoop to the level of the immediate post-World War II debates in public.¹²⁰

The big unknown will be the Secre-

tary of Defense. The situation would be very different if a William Proxmire rather than a Henry Jackson should succeed Laird. As experience has demonstrated, there has been no consistent progression toward any particular Secretary-JCS relationship. We can hardly project the role to be played by future Secretaries of Defense without first knowing the personality of the men who will hold the office.

FOOTNOTES*

1. Alfred Vagts defines militarism as a condition characterized by the domination of the military man over the civilian, an undue preponderance of military demands, and an emphasis on military considerations, spirit, ideals, and scales of value in the life of the state. Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), p. 14.

2. Six of the 28 men served both as a service Chief and the Chairman. Of the seven Chairmen of the JCS, only Admiral Radford did not serve as head of his service.

3. Bernard Gordon, "The Military Budget: Congressional Phase," *The Journal of Politics*, November 1961.

4. Data for this study comes from congressional hearings and interviews. A list of interviewees is appended to these footnotes. The author has sought to present their views as accurately as possible and bears the responsibility for any unintentional distortions.

5. This model has been developed by Graham Allison in his "Conceptual Models of the Cuban Missile Crisis," *The American Political Science Review*, September 1969, p. 689-718.

6. Few men are able to step into a job as complex as Secretary of Defense and make major changes immediately, even if they should so desire. Even the dynamic Robert McNamara submitted a budget prepared by the Eisenhower administration to the Congress.

7. The average tenure for the Chairman of the JCS is 3 years and 6 months; an Army Chief of Staff is 2 years and 7 months; a CNO is 2 years and 9 months; an Air Force Chief of Staff is 3 years and 9 months. Secretary Johnson's tenure was 17 months and 21 days, which rounds off to 18 months.

8. Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 415. Work on the basic FY 1949 budget was completed before Forrestal took office.

8. SCA, 1950, 17.

10. Millis, p. 418, 500.

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*, p. 448.

13. Interview.

14. *Ibid.*

15. HCAS, *Selective Service Hearings*, p. 463; and HCA, 1950, I, 210-11.

16. HCA, 1950, IV, 567-75.

17. Interviews.

18. SCA, 1950, 32.

19. For a complete account of the decision, see Paul Hammond, "Supercarriers and B-36 Bombers," in *American Civil-Military Decisions* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1963).

*Because the majority of the footnotes in this paper will come from the annual congressional hearings on the defense budget, a simplified system to reduce the citations to manageable proportions has been used. References to the hearings of the committees will be found in the following form: HCA or HCAS, 1965, I, 57 and SCA, 1965, II, 95. HCA and SCA refer to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees before which the hearings on the defense budget are conducted (HCAS—the House Armed Services Committee), the year refers to the fiscal year for which the money will be appropriated, and the Roman numerals signify the volume number.

40 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

20. The events of the executive phase of the FY 1951 budget were extracted from the testimony of Wilfred McNeil, DOD Comptroller, HCA, 1951, I, 104-06; and Budget Director Frank Pace, HCA, 1951, I, 2659-2664, and an interview with McNeil.

21. Interview.

22. Interview.

23. Interviews. The JCS relationship with Johnson may be characterized as "synthetic harmony."

24. Millis, p. 430.

25. SCA, 1951, 15-16; HCA, 1951, II, 249.

26. SCA, 1951, 73.

27. See Hammond for an excellent discussion of the "Revolt of the Admirals."

28. Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1957), p. 374-99.

29. HCA, 1951, IV, 1739.

30. The fact that Gates was in office for so short a time is unfortunate for this study. Because of early experience in DOD, Gates had a highly satisfactory relationship with the JCS. Hearings, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, 1961, v. I, p. 734.

31. The components of the "great equation" were military and economic strength. The administration viewed the budgetary process as an exercise in balancing this equation, i.e., equating needed military strength with maximum economic strength. Eisenhower assumed that maximum economic strength rested on the foundation of a balanced budget.

32. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 356.

33. The format for Eisenhower's budget was obtained from interviews with McNeil, Burke, Taylor, and Radford; and Maxwell Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper, 1959); and Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier* (New York: Harper, 1956).

34. Taylor, p. 82-83.

35. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much is Enough* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 12-13.

36. Taylor, p. 206.

37. Interview.

38. Congress was dismayed when Eisenhower's FY 1959 budget, submitted about 3 months after Sputnik, amounted to only \$37 billion. HCA, 1959, 353.

39. HCA, 1964, II, 585.

40. HCA, 1954, 317, 470-71.

41. HCA, 1955, 43-45. Wilson and Radford tried to convince the JCS that a sound economy was an aspect of national security and a proper subject for military appraisal.

42. Nathan Twining, *Neither Liberty nor Safety* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966) p. 56.

43. Taylor, p. 78.

44. U.S. Congress, Senate, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, *Hearings on Major Defense Matters*, 86/1, 20 May 1959, p. 206.

45. In a perceptive article, Donald Gmz, "The Bureau of the Budget and Defense Fiscal Policy," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 1959, pointed out that the fact that such detailed decisions were made by civilians was the fault of the JCS. McNeil did consult with the JCS on an individual basis.

46. Interview.

47. Interviews. See also Huntington, p. 443-44; and James Roherty, *Decisions of Robert S. McNamara* (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami, 1970), p. 46-60.

48. Ridgway, p. 102.

49. Interviews. For example, Burke convinced Eisenhower to overrule Wilson on drafting men into the Navy.

50. Interviews.

51. Interviews.

52. Interview. Radford was the only Chairman to play an active role.

53. The JCS invariably criticized the administration's strategic assumptions and division of the budgetary funds before the Congress. In 1959 they put their complaints in writing.

54. Interviews. In fact, Eisenhower kept one of the least cooperative Chiefs, Arleigh Burke, for 6 years.

55. Interview.

56. Their memorandum to Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson in 1959 caused a great deal of controversy.

57. In Eisenhower's 8 years, Congress actually reduced his defense budgets \$2.6 billion.

58. When the JCS complained to the Congress about Eisenhower's strategy in the spring of 1953, the President wrote to the floor manager of the bill that he took full responsibility for the budget and the goals it contemplated. *Congressional Record*, v. XCIV, pt. 6, p. 7817.

59. HCA, 1963, 4.

60. The best source on McNamara's methods is Enthoven and Smith. The format for McNamara's budget procedures is adopted primarily from this book. I also relied on interviews with Taylor, Decker, Anderson, McDonald, McConnell, and Barber. John Creecine, *Defense Budgeting*, and William Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (New York: Harper, 1964) are also excellent sources.

61. Interview.

62. Interviews.

63. HCA, 1963, II, 4-6.

64. Enthoven and Smith, p. 32.

65. Interview.

66. Interview.

67. Enthoven and Smith, p. 94, call the JSOP the "best example of the unrealistic alternatives provided by the military." Enthoven's office wrote the MPM.

68. HCA, 1960, I, 88. William Niskanen, "The Defense Resources Allocation Process," Stephen Enke, ed., *Defense Management* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967), p. 10. The PCR's would have added about \$40 billion annually.

69. Enthoven and Smith, p. 56.

70. Interview: OSD official, April 1968, quoted in Creecine, p. 41.

71. Interviews.

72. Interviews.

73. Interviews.

74. Interview.

75. HCA, 1963, II, 4-6; HCA, 1965, I, 304.

76. Roberly, p. 76.

77. Interview.

78. Interview.

79. HCA, 1967, I, 280; SCA, 1967, I, 69.

80. Townsend Hoopes, *The Limits of Intervention* (New York: McKay, 1969), p. 90. This point was disputed by some interviewees, but at least one substantiated it.

81. Phil G. Goulding, *Confirm or Deny* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 168-214.

82. April 1968 interview with an official in the Comptroller's office, quoted in Creecine, p. 51.

83. Interview; HCA, 1965, IV, p. 447-95.

84. Robert S. McNamara, "McNamara Defines His Job," *The New York Times Magazine*, 26 April 1964, p. 108.

85. By the end of 1967, McNamara claimed his methods had saved over \$6 billion; HCA, 1968, 32.

86. HCA, 1963, II, 4-6; Maxwell Taylor, "Post-Vietnam Role of the Military in Foreign Policy," *Air University Review*, July-August 1968, p. 51; National Security Action Memorandum, June 1961.

87. His ideas on this subject are set down in a memorandum from Cyrus Vance, his deputy. It is printed in full in SCA, 1966, 285.

88. General LeMay was the last of the World War II heroes to sit on the JCS. He was retired on 31 January 1965.

89. Robert N. Ginsburgh, "The Challenge to Military Professionalism," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1964, p. 255.

90. Interviews.

91. For an excellent statement of the JCS position, see George Anderson, "Address," National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 4 September 1963. Anderson was the first Chief to graduate from the National War College.

92. Some of the individuals who held this position included Congressmen from the Armed Services and Military Appropriations Committee, former Chiefs Thomas White and Nathan Twining, Secretary of the Army Elvis Stahr, academician John Ries, and Pentagon observers Hanson Baldwin and Clark Mollenhoff.

93. Effective 1 January 1969. It was passed as a rider to the FY 1968 appropriations bill.

94. HCA, 1971, I, 153.

95. Enthoven and Smith, p. 334; Interviews. DOD is caught in a crossfire between public

42 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

and congressional sentiment demanding less spending on defense and inflation pushing costs upward.

96. Laird's budget procedures are outlined in HCA, 1971, III, 480-81.

97. In Nixon's three budgets the Army has received \$67.7 billion, the Navy \$67.8 billion, and the Air Force \$69.9 billion. *Department of Defense Fact Sheet*, February 1971, p. 22; Enthoven and Smith, p. 334-35.

98. Richard M. Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: a New Strategy for Peace*, Report to the Congress, 18 February 1970 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970), p. 20; Richard M. Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace*, Report to the Congress, 25 February 1971 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971), p. 228.

99. Interview, DPIC Working Group member, March 1971.

100. *Ibid.*

101. HCA, 1971, I, 159.

102. Interview, DPRC Working Group member.

103. HCA, 1971, I, 153; Enthoven and Smith, p. 335.

104. Interview. Recently Laird intervened to attempt to secure a pay raise for the military in spite of the wage freeze.

105. Interview, DPRC Working Group member.

106. HCA, 1971, I, 162.

107. Interview.

108. Melvin R. Laird, Press Conference, 14 August 1971.

109. *Ibid.* The Tripartite Division of funds is one reflection of the compromises made to date.

110. *Ibid.*

111. *Ibid.*

112. As McNamara's experience has shown, formal legal reorganizations mean very little as far as the Secretary-JCS relationship is concerned.

113. McNamara remarked on several occasions that the Secretary could not remain in office without Presidential support. C.W. Barklund, *Men of the Pentagon* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 224.

114. Johnson and McNamara were the only Secretaries who were fired, but their demise was brought about by the Korean and Vietnam wars, not their relationships with the Chiefs. For an account of McNamara's demise, see *The Pentagon Papers* (*The New York Times*), (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p. 510-40.

115. Eisenhower permitted Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey to get away with telling Congress that there were several places where Eisenhower's FY 1958 budget could be cut. HCA, 1958, 5.

116. It should be noted that a balanced relationship does not of itself produce good strategic policy. As Samuel Huntington has pointed out, it may well be that the normal methods of American politics are incapable of producing good strategic policy.

117. Interview, DPRC Working Group member.

118. Personnel costs alone in FY 1972 were over \$40 billion.

119. Unlike the 1940's and 1950's, the services now send their best men to joint assignments, i.e., the Joint Staff. Interview.

120. Several interviewees pointed out to me that it is difficult to disparage a service in which you have good friends, with whom you mix socially. Moreover, defense funds have been declining for 5 years with no public disparagement. The general consensus appears to be that the survival of the military as a viable entity is heavily dependent upon the JCS speaking with one voice.

Interviewees: Adm. George Anderson, USN, 5 September 1968; Arthur W. Barber, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 2 February 1968; Adm. Arleigh Burke, USN, 6 September 1968; Gen. George Decker, USA, 4 September 1968; Gen. John P. McConnell, USAF, 17 June 1971; Adm. David McDonald, USN, 27 August 1968; Wilfred McNeil, 13 December 1968; G. Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), 29 January 1971; Adm. Arthur Radford, USN, 4 September 1968; Robert Sikes, 14 August 1968; Gen. Carl Spaatz, USAF, 5 September 1968; Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, (Ret.), Military Assistant to the President, 4 September 1968; Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, USA, 8 October 1971.



To this writer, strategy is the comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to attain objectives. Unless one has an understanding of the concepts of strategy, the art of creating, distributing, and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy will be haphazard and, in some cases, disastrous—witness the British action in Suez in 1956 and the U.S. Bay of Pigs episode in 1961.

STRATEGY: THE ESSENCE OF PROFESSIONALISM

An article

by

Rear Admiral Henry F. Eccles, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Introduction. Strategy can be discussed from two perspectives—that of the student of strategy, who is unhampered by deadlines and free from adherence to any particular formulation or authority other than that imposed by intellectual rigor; and that of the executive authority, who must formulate specific national and military strategic policies and plans. This latter activity must always be done within a specified time and must always be both responsible and authoritative. For the purpose of this article, I will discuss the first point of view, emphasizing the nature and structure of strategy while choosing to omit both the methods and considerations used in reaching strategic decisions, and the critique of specific strategic policies and plans. Unless one is willing to confine discussion of the subject to some specific aspect of the general concept, discussion often tends to dissolve into lamentations and confusing speculative arguments rather than constructive analysis.

In dealing with this subject, I ask that the reader bear in mind that when one has executive responsibility for the formulation of an operative strategy, little time or energy can be devoted to developing constructive theory or concepts. One must decide on the basis of one's basic assumptions, one's view of current facts, and on the fundamental concepts one has already developed. Assumptions and current facts, of course, vary greatly according to circumstances, but concepts, if well thought out, have much greater endurance.

What Strategy Is. In his book *Strategy*, Liddell Hart devoted the last 40 pages to the theory of strategy and to grand strategy. Here, in developing "a new dwelling-house for strategic thought," he discussed the ideas of Clausewitz and Moltke and then wrote:¹

We can now arrive at a shorter definition of strategy as— "the art

44 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy." For strategy is concerned not merely with the movement of forces—as its role is often defined—but with the effect. When the application of the military instrument merges into actual fighting, the disposition for and control of such direct action are termed "tactics." The two categories, although convenient for discussion, can never be truly divided into separate compartments because each not only influences but merges into the other.

As tactics is an application of strategy on a lower plane, so strategy is an application on a lower plane of "grand strategy." While practically synonymous with the policy which guides the conduct of war, as distinct from the more fundamental policy which should govern its object, the term "grand strategy" serves to bring out the sense of "policy in execution." For the role of grand strategy—higher strategy—is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, toward the political object of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy.

This places strategy, grand strategy, tactics, policy, and objectives in a clear perspective.

The element of policy stressed by Liddell Hart here and elsewhere was clearly brought out in the Naval War College publication *Sound Military Decision* which states:²

Understanding between the civil representatives of the State and the leaders of the armed forces is manifestly essential to the coordination of national policy with the power to enforce it. While military strategy may determine whether the aims of policy are possible of attainment,

policy may, beforehand, determine largely the success or failure of military strategy. Therefore, it behooves policy to ensure not only that military strategy pursue appropriate aims, but that the work of strategy be allotted adequate power, and be undertaken under the most favorable conditions.

These thoughts, together with the Rosinski concept of strategy's being the art of control, provide the foundation for the conceptual unity and coherence essential to military theory. Rosinski wrote:³

... Strategy is the comprehensive direction of power; Tactics is its immediate application.

This definition requires the recognition that there is much more to strategy than mere direction of action. It is a type of direction which takes into account the multitude of possible enemy counteractions and thus it becomes a means of control. It is this element of control which is the

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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lege, and is currently serving as a consultant for logistics at the War College.

He has had a variety of duty in submarines, destroyers, cruisers, battleships, and in 1946-47 commanded the U.S.S. *Washington*. Prior to his retirement in 1952, he was Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics, Commander Allied Forces, Southern Europe. His publications include: *Operational Naval Logistics*, *Logistics in the National Defense*, *Military Concepts and Philosophy*, and numerous articles for the *Naval War College Review* and other professional journals.

essence of strategy: Control being the element which differentiates true strategic action from a haphazard series of improvisations.

Thus, strategy in contrast to haphazard action, is that direction of action which aims at the control of a field of activity be it military, social, or, even intellectual. It must be comprehensive in order to control every possible counteraction or factor. . . .*

Implications of the Concept of Strategy. Many discussions of strategy suffer from the semantic confusion arising from the two commonly used meanings of the word "strategic." The first meaning evolves from defining strategy as the art and science of using political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation to support national policy. Thus, in this sense, "strategic" refers to the plan or scheme for such use.

*This concept of strategy as a comprehensive control has the advantage that it applies equally to the offensive and to the defensive. On the offensive, the aim of strategy is to break down the enemy's control while simultaneously preventing him from interfering with our attack. On the defensive, strategy similarly seeks to constrain the enemy attack to such a form and degree that, while the defense may be forced back, it still maintains control of its actions and avoids collapse. As long as it can manage to do so, as long as it can continue to parry all decisive thrusts of the enemy, it may suffer a series of defeats but it will still be a coherent strategy and avoid wholesale catastrophe.

In this sense a discussion of the strategy of the three services can best be analyzed in terms of control. Control is easiest in land warfare, has always been more difficult in naval strategy, is still more difficult in the field of air warfare, and is most difficult in that of the combined strategy of all three forces. . . .

Herbert Rosinski, "New Thoughts on Strategy," Unpublished Paper, September 1955.

The second meaning defines "strategic" action as the physical destruction of an enemy's war-making capacity. This second meaning refers primarily to economic, agricultural, and military targets. The fallacy that strategy and destruction are synonymous and the consequent development of a "weapon strategy," both come from the careless use of the second meaning of "strategic."

The Rosinski concept of "comprehensive control" has certain specific implications of tremendous importance. In particular, it establishes the primacy of strategy in the conduct of national affairs as opposed to emphasis on destruction that is implicit in any "weapon strategy." The idea that the weapon should determine the strategy to be used is based on the implied assumption that strategy and destruction are synonymous. This simply is not true. Naturally, strategy will be influenced by the availability of weapons, but strategy should use destruction only when there is no other way of gaining or exercising control. The concentration of thought on control naturally leads to a reexamination and better understanding of the objectives whose attainment is the purpose of the attempt to exercise control.

The concept of continuing control prepares the mind for shifting the emphasis from weapon to weapon or from tool to tool in accordance with changing situations or with the changing capabilities or application of the weapon or weapon systems involved. Thus, the intellectual concept of strategy as "comprehensive control" naturally leads to the intellectual concept of flexibility. But "flexibility" itself must be understood lest it degenerate into mere hesitancy, uncertainty, and vacillation. The essence of true flexibility lies in the continuing clear appreciation of the aim, the purposes, the objective.

Objectives. Strategy is always concerned with objectives. But merely to

INFLUENCE OF
INDIVIDUAL EVENTS
AT THIS LEVEL
ON OBJECTIVES
OF NEXT HIGHER
LEVEL

0

GREAT

CONSIDERABLE

MODERATE

MODERATE
TO SMALL

SLIGHT

100 50 0

SPECIFIC

%
GENERAL
0 50 100

OBJECTIVES

INTERNATIONAL

NATIONAL

JOINT & SPECIFIED THEATER

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

JOINT & SPECIFIED TASK FORCES

STRATEGIC & TACTICAL OBJECTIVES

TASK GROUPS

TACTICAL OBJECTIVES

TASK UNITS

TACTICAL OBJECTIVES

TACTICS

GRAND
TACTICS

GRAND
STRATEGY

%
INTANGIBLE
0 50 100

DEGREE
OF
PERMANENCE

HIGH--
close relation to
continuing interests

HIGH--
Drawn from the
continuing national
interest

HIGH

MODERATE

CHANGE
REGULARLY

CHANGE
RAPIDLY

100 50 0

TANGIBLE

A GENERAL APPROXIMATION OF A COMPLEX PROCESS
WHICH LAYS THE FOUNDATION FOR OPERATIONAL PLANNING

state the objective is not enough; the objective must be analyzed. The mere statement of an objective can easily degenerate into a rigid and dangerous slogan. The analysis should not only clarify the purpose for which action is to be taken, it must also show what constitutes a satisfactory attainment of the objective. Here we encounter one of the chief problems of strategic thinking. How are the objectives influenced by the course of events? How does one distinguish steadfast adherence to a firm purpose from dogmatic pursuit of an outworn or irrelevant objective? In modern conflict, objectives are multiple and seem to have a hierarchy of major and minor, immediate and ultimate. The chart "The Analysis of Objectives," is a grossly simplified picture of an extremely complex and important analytical process which ultimately provides the necessary linkage between national policy and combat action.

But since plans, once prepared, frequently have great and dangerous momentum, the running estimate of the situation must involve an alertness to changes and particularly to the reactions of the opponent which influence one's own objectives. Both political objectives and political control are essential elements of all strategy. This brings us squarely to the vital relation of strategy and tactics.

Strategy, Interwoven with Tactics and Logistics. Edward Lasker, the chess grandmaster, made the following perceptive comment:⁴

... Strategy sets down the whole of the problems which must be solved in war, in order to attain the ultimate result aimed at; tactics solve such problems in various ways, and according to the conditions prevailing in the particular case. Sound strategy, when setting the task, must never lose sight of tactical practicability, and only a thorough knowledge of tactical

resources makes correct strategy possible.

This last description explains why the term "strategic doctrine" is so frequently a dangerous misnomer. Doctrine arises from repeated experience and is useful in dealing with recurring situations. Its purpose is to provide a good solution to the repeating problem to be applied almost automatically when a recognized situation occurs. It saves time and achieves instant understanding between unit commanders without the necessity for consultation or elaborate communications. It simplifies decision and facilitates coordination in action. It is an essential element of tactics, logistics, and communications, but has little, if any, application to strategy.

Bear in mind that most strategic problems seldom recur in such a manner that the tactical resources are so disposed as to make a doctrine applicable. There is, however, room for doctrine in the area of grand tactics.

Sound Military Decision again is useful in explaining fundamental relations:⁵

... Tactics, unguided by strategy, might blindly make sacrifices merely to remain victor on a field of struggle. But strategy looks beyond, in order to make the gains of tactics accord with the strategic aim. Strategy and tactics are inseparable.

It is thus the duty of tactics to ensure that its results are appropriate to the strategic aim, and the duty of strategy to place at the disposal of tactics the power appropriate to the results demanded.*

*... [The latter consideration imposes upon strategy the requirement that the prescribed aim be possible of attainment with the power that can be made available.

Consequently, while the attainment of the

48 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

In military strategy the interweaving of logistical, tactical, and strategic considerations in the mind of a single responsible individual will always be an intuitive process based on professional experience and judgment. Both the logistical and tactical factors contain many quantitative aspects whose evaluation is subject to many modern analytical techniques.

In moving from purely military strategy to the level of national strategy, we have an increasing emphasis on economic and political considerations.

Duncan Ballantine's comment on logistics is instructive:⁶

... As the link between the war front and the home front the logistic process is at once the military element in the nation's economy and the economic element in its military operations. And upon the coherence that exists within the process itself depends the successful articulation of the productive and military efforts of a nation at war.

The understanding of the interweaving of strategy-economics-logistics is enhanced by recognizing the two phases of logistics, producer and consumer.

At the level of national strategy, political factors, both international and domestic, are important. At this level strategy, economics, and logistics tend to coalesce; with national and international economics, i.e., producer logistics, limiting the forces one can create, and operational logistics, i.e., consumer logistics, limiting the forces one can tactically employ. Strategic deploy-

ments involve both producer and consumer logistics. As an example, consider the concepts of prepositioning and employment of a fast deployment logistics ship.

Finally, the classic principle of military decision found in *Sound Military Decision* emphasizes this interweaving of integrated thought by testing each proposed course of action for:

- Suitability—Will it accomplish the mission? Attain the objective? This involves both strategy and politics.

- Feasibility—Can it be accomplished with the means available? This involves tactics, logistics, and economics.

- Acceptability—Are the consequences as to cost acceptable? This involves politics, economics, and logistics.

Control and Deterrence. Deterrence is certainly a very important aspect of strategy, but it by no means is the only element. But since it is a negative element, undue concentration on it may easily detract from the essential positive aspects of strategy. I believe, however, that its full implications have not been adequately understood.

Concepts of strategy and control must be examined in two major aspects. "Strategy is the comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to attain objectives." Thus, we can examine the nature of the situations and areas that must be controlled in order to attain objectives, and the means and methods of the use of power in its various forms by which such control will be exercised.

We also must examine the means and the methods by which the power which is being used is itself controlled. The uncontrolled use of power can easily be both self-defeating and disastrous. This means strict political control of all military action must be exercised through the elaborate worldwide com-

aims of strategy, generally depends upon the results gained by tactics, strategy is initially responsible for the success of tactics. It is therefore in the province of strategy to ensure that the attainment of tactical objectives furthers, exclusively, the aims of strategy, and also that the tactical struggle be initiated under conditions favorable for the attainment of the designated objectives.

mand control system made possible by modern electronic technology.

But the controlled use of force has a further vital implication first brought out by James E. King, Jr., in 1957:⁷

... We must, in short, guarantee that only effectively limited hostilities can be rationally undertaken.

Moreover, we must be prepared to fight limited actions ourselves. Otherwise we shall have made no advance beyond "massive retaliation," which tied our hands in conflicts involving less than our survival. And we must be prepared to lose limited actions. No limitations could survive our disposition to elevate every conflict in which our interests are affected to the level of total conflict with survival at stake.

Armed conflict can be limited only if aimed at limited objectives and fought with limited means. If we or our enemy relax the limits on either objectives or means, survival *will* be at stake, whether the issue is worth it or not . . .

This, in effect, means that the level of tactical defeat which in the past has been acceptable in pursuit of a higher strategic objective has been raised. This in turn places greater burdens on all levels of command. Combat morale, which is the single most important element of combat effectiveness of the armed forces, must be maintained in spite of severe defeats suffered while refraining from the use of powerful and available weapons. This, in fact, is the hidden and heretofore unmentionable aspect of deterrence.

Karl Deutch in *The Nerves of Government* provides a perceptive discussion of the theory of games. His comments on certain similarities between politics, strategy, and chess, particularly as to the pressure of time allowed for making decisions, is particularly apt. For instance:⁸

The theory—as theory—assumes, in short, that thinking or calculating can be carried on without any limitation of time or cost.

This assumption seems unrealistic in politics. It seems even unrealistic in such cases as chess. According to an unpublished study by Dr. L.C. Haimson, Russian handbooks of championship chess have advised promising players since the 1930's not to follow a "strongest position" strategy, but rather to force their opponent to make some definite commitment on the board, even at the cost of some loss in position to themselves. Once the Russian player has induced his adversary to commit his pieces to a particular position on the board, and to commit his mind to working out the possibilities of a particular kind of strategy, he is then advised according to this theory of chess, to make a radical switch in strategy and to confront his opponent with a new set of problems for which his pieces are not effectively disposed and for which his mind is not prepared. A possible political parallel to these tactics might be seen in the way in which the Soviet-initiated Berlin blockade in 1948 engaged United States attention at a time when the Chinese Communists were winning the civil war in mainland China; and again the way in which the Korean War of 1950 forced United States attention to the Far East, with a corresponding lag in the consolidation of Western positions in other areas.

In such situations the main attack may well be directed at first not so much against the principal material resources but rather against the decisionmaking capacity of the player. Through confronting his mind with a bur-

50 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

den of decisions greater than he can manage within the limits of available time and intellectual resources, the efficiency of his decisions, and only subsequently his physical position, is to be impaired or disrupted.

... And it should be clear what the Russian theory of chess playing, as described by Dr. Haimson, hopes to accomplish. It is aimed at overloading the second or selection stage in the strategic thinking of its opponent. Once this opponent has been forced into making a commitment that seems advantageous to him when considered by itself, then his material and intellectual capacity for responding to radically new changes may have been overburdened. From this point on, the player has two enemies against him: the radically changing strategies of his opponent and the ticking of the clock.

His footnote is also helpful:*

In addition to illustrating the interweaving of strategy, tactics, command and morale, the above discussion raises a further point—this point being that the commonly used distinction between strategic and nonstrategic war is, in fact, a semantic trap which can cause real trouble. In recognition of this, I would like to raise the following question: If

*This strategy differs significantly from the familiar one of keeping one's opponent "off balance." To keep an adversary off balance may mean, among other things, to prevent him from committing himself thoroughly to any course of action. The Russian chess strategy, like the warfare of the ancient Parthians, would on the contrary encourage him to make such a commitment, in the hope of turning this commitment later to his (opponent's) disadvantage. The latter strategy, unlike the former, can employ deliberate pauses of activity, as well as positive action. The difference between the two strategies resembles thus, in some respects, the difference between boxing and jujitsu.

one attacks the core industries and power and transportation facilities of a nation with high explosive rather than nuclear weapons, does that constitute "strategic war"? Or does the word "strategic" war apply only to the widespread use of atomic or thermonuclear weapons?

I submit that the use of the term "strategic war" is dangerous and may easily confuse us.

Strategy—Morale and Values. The understanding of power and force and their effective use is critical to the understanding of strategy. Again, we come to the basic problem of capabilities and limitations and through these to the problems of public, as well as military, discipline and morale. Discipline and morale are frequently taken for granted or else ignored in the writings of so-called military intellectuals.

Strategy becomes most complex when we try to relate concrete tangible military violence to the abstract intangible elements of national interests and national values. This is a necessary, if painful, process, for a strategy which is contrary to the values of the people of the nation concerned will not be successful. A strategy which does not serve the national interest is self-defeating. Yet, how do we define or describe national interests and national values in terms which provide a firm base for a sound strategy?

Obviously, this is a highly intuitive process which means that it is an individual matter in which opinions differ strongly. Here we find the major sources of those elements of paradox, contradiction, and equivocation which today are so apparent and so disturbing.

If our concepts of the nature and structure of strategy and its relation to the other elements of military thought and action are vague or confused, we will inevitably further compound our troubles. Plato's Lament as expressed in

The Republic, "Until philosophers are kings," etc., is still pertinent.

Conclusion. I have indicated the complexity of thought associated with the use of the word "strategy." The word "strategy" can be properly used in a great variety of levels and contexts. I believe that in some contexts it is desirable to use a qualifying word or phrase to maintain semantic clarity. I believe that when any policy or plan of action, no matter how inconsequential, is labelled "a strategy" rather than simply a "policy" or a "plan," the meaning of the word "strategy" becomes degraded. I further suspect that such usage may sometimes have its roots in the user's pretentiousness or sub-conscious desire to inflate rather trivial ideas by the use of a term which sounds important.

While it is useful and sometimes necessary to discuss strategy in isolation from its associated subjects in the art of war, such discussion does not give one an understanding of more than a small part of the strategy. Strategy in its full sense can be understood only when it is considered as part of an interwoven

fabric of coherent military thought and theory. I believe that such interweaving and coherence are enhanced by the use of the description that:

Strategy is the Comprehensive Direction of Power to Control Situations and Areas in Order to Attain Objectives.

I also believe that it is useful to meditate on the words: Comprehensive, Direction, Power, Control, Situations, Areas, Objectives; and that as we so meditate, further ideas will occur.

Finally, I believe that the general quality of military education and, ultimately, military decision and action is improved if the word "strategy" is used with respect and semantic clarity. For if the word is carelessly used, the rigor and comprehensiveness of strategic thinking will be unnecessarily degraded.

If anyone thinks that this discussion has been on a too abstract or theoretical level, I will close by saying that the two greatest specific political-military blunders of our times—the British action in Suez in 1956 and the U.S. Bay of Pigs episode in 1961—contain vivid illustrations of the importance of the points that I have discussed.

FOOTNOTES

1. Basil H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1954), p. 334-335.
2. Naval War College, *Sound Military Decision* (Newport, R.I., 1942), p. 9.
3. Herbert Rosinski, "New Thoughts on Strategy," Unpublished Paper, September 1955.
4. Edward Lasker, *Chess Strategy* (New York: Dover, 1969), p. 17.
5. Naval War College, p. 10-11.
6. Duncan S. Ballantine, *U.S. Naval Logistics in the Second World War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 3.
7. James E. King, Jr., "Nuclear Plenty and Limited War," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1957, p. 256.
8. Karl Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 61-64, 274-275.



52 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Students and advocates of Western-style liberal democracy have long believed they understood the conditions necessary for a stable democratic system to flourish. The most recent of these theories—the so-called “pluralist model” of democracy—has been widely accepted as the definitive description of how democracy works in both the United States and Western Europe. However, this examination of the French political scene, highlighting events since May 1968, challenges past assumptions of what makes democracy work. It strongly suggests that relevant political interactions be reexamined in the light of empirical data derived from countries other than Britain and the United States—if we are ever to gain a more realistic understanding of how democracy can function in alien political cultures.

FRANCE:

A POLITICAL CULTURE DIVIDED AGAINST ITSELF

An article prepared

by

Lieutenant (junior grade) William F. Averyt, Jr.

U.S. Naval Reserve

Introduction. On New Year's Day, 1968, the President of the French Republic addressed the French nation on the prospects of the coming year. De Gaulle was quite sanguine about the immediate future, and indeed he had reason to be. In the field of foreign policy, France had reasserted her primacy in the Common Market through her second veto of British application for membership, attacked the Achilles' heel of the world monetary system by demanding American gold for the mass of dollars accumulating in her central bank, and successfully continued her policy of rapprochement with the Eastern bloc. On the domestic front the general was no less optimistic. He himself was in his second 7-year term, his party had seemingly solved the problem of the absence of a stable majority which had plagued the governments of

the Fourth Republic, and the economy was prospering.

Five months later France was in the midst of the worst postwar crisis ever experienced by a Western nation. Major sections of Paris were barricaded, with pitched battles being fought in the streets; half of the labor force was on strike; universities throughout the country were seceding from the centralized educational system; the state radio and television network faced open revolt and takeover by its own staff; subways, buses, and railroads worked barely or not at all; and De Gaulle himself made a secret trip to the French Army headquarters in Baden Baden, Germany, to ascertain the military's support for him in the event that public order should collapse.

How could this happen in a major country of Western Europe, a “de-

veloped" nation supposedly immune to the problems of political instability which afflict the underdeveloped areas of the world? The answer to the events in France of May 1968—tentative though they may be—involve rethinking of much conventional wisdom about the operation of democratic regimes, class structure, and the effect of economic development on political behavior.

Furthermore, an understanding of the reasons for French political instability is essential to anyone interested in Western European politics and security questions. France is of key importance to defense considerations in the North Atlantic area. She is also in a position to profoundly influence the development of the Common Market, which will increasingly affect American commercial, monetary, and foreign policy interests.

A Model of Pluralist Democracy.

Until recently most Anglo-American as well as European political scientists have, implicitly or explicitly, held certain perceptions of democracy which they utilized in their consideration of Western regimes. In the past 5 years or so, students of the subject have become increasingly dissatisfied with this rather stereotypical model. The model, based as it is on generalizations drawn from the Anglo-American experience, is quite useless in understanding the democratic regimes of continental Europe.¹ The author shall, therefore, examine the salient features of the postwar French political system and, by confronting the Anglo-American model with the realities of the French experience, attempt to develop an alternative model which would be of greater use in studying the regimes of continental Europe.

The longstanding model of pluralist democracy contained the following propositions: Men are the best judges of their own interests. More accurate information about reality helps them to act more wisely; hence freedom of speech,

freedom of press, full and open discussion of differing views, et cetera. Through some agreed upon procedure, men choose their own governors and exercise control over them while they are in power. (The specific process of wielding power could be one of a large number of variations on the theme of presidential and/or parliamentary democracy.) It is necessary to mobilize the population as much as possible, to interest all citizens in the political system, so that all views will be represented and discussed. A variety of intermediary organizations in which citizens can participate is essential to a sense of civic involvement and helps to create bonds between citizens of diverse backgrounds. (These voluntary organizations which overlap the cleavages of society are considered a vital part of the pluralist model.) Individual views on a certain course of action meet in a free marketplace of ideas, and the resulting decision represents the common good.

Economics was a bad word when 19th century liberals developed the model of democracy sketched above. It represented a domain of activity supposedly completely separate from politics. The 19th century liberals did not fully realize how widespread poverty rendered their ideal scheme of democracy farcical. However, in the 20th century, under the attacks of Marxist thought and the worldwide depression of the 1930's, the original theory of liberal democracy was expanded to take into account the challenge of economic development.

Poverty was indeed bad, not only because of its regrettable effects on the human beings involved, but also because it bred radical sentiments and revolutionary potential which might wreck the entire system. Therefore, through government policies of economic expansion, full employment, and a minimum of inflation, lower class poverty could be assuaged and perhaps ended. The workers could assure that this process

54 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

would occur by expressing their views and electing representatives. Increasing affluence would result in the lower classes abandoning their radicalism, adopting a middle class life style, and being fully integrated into the system.

This summary of the pluralist model is, of course, never duplicated in real life; it is based on generalizations which were thought to have a degree of validity for all Western democracies. But are its fundamental assumptions valid? Does it not assume that the polity is considered the end having primacy over all others, e.g., over religious ends? Does it not assume that the political culture is homogeneous, i.e., that citizens share common ideas, values, expectations? That they share a common "cognitive map" of the political universe? Does it not assume that there are no insoluble problems? That economic development will lead to the adoption of middle class values and a decrease in radicalism?

The above questions are definitely relevant to the French case, and they apply to enough of the nations in Western Europe so that we should begin the task of rethinking the pluralist model of democracy.

French Political Culture. In discussing French instability, one soon turns to the question of basic attitudes toward authority in general and political authority in particular. The concept of *political culture* which has been developed in the past decade is extremely useful in discussing political attitudes. A political culture is the composite of values, emotions, and attitudes concerning the nature of authority in a society. An individual, through the process of *political socialization*, learns about the authority patterns by contact with various groups and institutions, beginning with the family and including school, the church, labor unions, political parties, et cetera.

If one thinks of political culture as an alphabet, then the process of

arranging the letters into words is determined by the process of socialization which the citizen has undergone. The way a Frenchman looks at political events . . . has much to do with the attitudes he has observed and learned in both the social and in the political realms.²

With the concepts of political culture and political socialization as a framework, we may begin to examine the pattern of political activity in France.

The Revolution of 1789 is the great fissure in French history, and its divisive influence is felt to this day. Unlike the American Revolution, which provided the basis for a broad consensus for the future to build upon, the French Revolution involved camps of equal strength; it was a test of wills which would inevitably leave behind deep and abiding hatreds among major segments of the society.

America never had a feudal aristocracy, a monarchy, or an established church supported by major social groups; it merely had to throw off British rule.³ The victorious colonies also removed a potential source of future opposition when, in violation of the Treaty of Paris of 1783 by which their independence was recognized, they confiscated the property of the Loyalists (about one-third of the population) and expelled them. Thus the new nation could proceed with a fairly homogeneous middle class population (minus, of course, the slaves). France, on the other hand, was not quite as successful in disposing of potential sources of future opposition. After the defeat of Napoleon in 1814, the monarchy returned to Paris together with the exiled nobility and proceeded to reestablish the old regime. The parties favoring monarchy and republic were so evenly balanced that the question of France's regime was not laid to rest until the last decades of the 19th century. By that time, in the short space of a century, 58

France had already experienced one constitutional monarchy, three republics, and two empires.

The role of the church in French life was also closely bound up with these conflicts. Furthermore, just as the republican form of government was taking root in the 1880's, the Third Republic had to face the problems posed by a new industrial proletariat. Socialism entered the arena just as the monarchy made its departure.

Thus the French nation was divided not only on questions of policy—this was true of every nation facing the second industrial revolution at the end of the 19th century—but it was divided concerning the very basis of its government. In America no sane politician would campaign on a platform of hostility to the Declaration of Independence; in France politicians not only could, but actually did the equivalent of this right up to the postwar period. The very symbols of nationhood—the flag, anthem, and motto—were not reflections of consensus but sources of divisiveness emanating from the fragmented nature of French society.⁴

French Political Participation. The historical roots of social divisions in France go back very far indeed. The exact nature of these divisions in post-war France has prompted much investigation. Historical and political research has often laid such stress on the unique and perplexing characteristics of French life that the broader underlying forces are obscured. Instead of examining the roots of such confusing phenomena as the apparently high ideological content of French politics allied with a seeming apathy toward the outcome of the political process, writers have merely presented these phenomena as “paradoxes” and left it at that.⁵ The statements below represent the results of recent efforts to comprehend certain traits of French political life; it will be seen that the French voter does not

belong to a fundamentally different species from his American counterpart.

• The average Frenchman exhibits lower interest in political parties and lower party allegiance than the average American. When asked to specify the party of their choice, if they had one, only 45 percent of the Frenchmen interviewed did so, in contrast to 75 percent of Americans polled.⁶ This lower degree of involvement in the political process and lack of knowledge about the way it operates can probably be traced back to the earliest socialization processes. There is a lack of comprehensive data about this most important aspect of the political system, but available evidence indicates a socialization process which is less complete than the American one. For example, a recent study of French schoolchildren shows that a surprising 86 percent of pupils 11 years of age could not give any answer to the question “What do political parties do?” In contrast, only 5 percent of American schoolchildren 10 years of age were unable to reply to a similar question.⁷

• Contrary to popular belief, the rapid succession of cabinets during the Fourth Republic (1946-1958) was not the result of a cynical parliamentary game in which aspiring ministers schemed to bring about the fall of the Government so that they themselves could assume office in the next cabinet. On the contrary, these *ministres* (the French term for a deputy in Parliament who was a potential candidate for minister) were among the staunchest supporters of cabinets. Since many of them had already served in a previous cabinet, they realized the difficulties involved in governing the nation. This analysis refutes the accusation made so frequently against the *ministres* by De Gaulle (as well as by political scientists), who never ceased to condemn and ridicule the “parliamentary game” of cabinet turnover.⁸

• The French electorate has demon-

56 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

strated no erratic shifting of support during the Fourth or Fifth Republics. In the Fourth Republic the major parties were the Communists, drawing support from the workers and alienated farmers; the Socialists, supported by the civil servants; the MRP (Mouvement Republicain Populaire), which was formed by progressive Catholics interested in social welfare programs; and the Radicals, backed by those members of the middle class favoring an old style, laissez-faire economy. These parties maintained their share of the popular vote from 1946 to 1958, the only exceptions being three "flash" movements drawing support from wide sections of the population: the Gaullist RPF (Rassemblement du Peuple Français), 1947-1953; Mendès-France's movement to reform the representative system, 1954-1957; and the Poujadist movement of disgruntled small shopkeepers, 1954-1956. Votes were suddenly transferred to these movements from the main parties, only to return to the older pattern shortly afterward.⁹ In the Fifth Republic the Gaullists have eaten into the bases of Communist and MRP support, but there has been no erratic, inexplicable shift of votes.¹⁰ Thus, during the past 25 years, the French political scene manifested a pattern of broad evolution and development.

This finding, linked with the evidence for the first proposition concerning the Frenchman's low degree of party allegiance, suggests the reluctance to become overly involved with political groups. (We shall see below that suspicion and distrust of the state is widespread in French society.) Although the French voter has shown consistency in party support during the past two decades, he is at the same time hesitant to assert that he bears allegiance to the party for which he votes. There is another factor which may have a bearing on this particular point: Most French voters have difficulty understanding the complicated ideological

programs of their parties, which may help to explain the low degree of party identification.

This distance that the average Frenchman maintains between himself and his party may be traced back to his earliest political socialization, i.e., what he learns about politics in the family environment. American studies uniformly show that a person's political preference correlates most closely with his father's party. This is also true of France. What accounts for the difference in degree of party involvement is the low degree of political communication in the French family. The French father does not easily discuss and debate current political issues within the family. Although the majority of American voters can easily recall their father's party affiliation or preference, the majority of French voters cannot. Their reply to this type of question is frequently that their father did not discuss his party choice with the family. Hence, it is not surprising that so many French voters are ambiguous about their own party preference.¹¹ This, and other evidence, indicates the secretiveness which the French family maintains not only in its relations with the outside world, but among its own members, as well as its extreme reluctance to disturb the autonomy of each individual. Distrust and secrecy mark the Frenchman's view of political and social issues.¹²

If these three propositions about the nature of political participation in France are, in fact, true, then the nature of France's political problems is considerably different from what has been popularly assumed. We see a system in which historical parties continue to exist and receive substantial shares of the vote, but which lack followers with a strong sense of allegiance. The party elites continue to speak in rigid ideological terms and thus are unable to make the frequent compromises necessitated by the everyday political realities. There is good evidence available that the party

elites at the top are prevented from making these necessary compromises because of lower level party militants within their party who are at the same time more radical and less in contact with the actual problems of wielding power: "[Centralization] deprives [the party militant] of nearby objectives; it forbids him any partial experience of government; it places him in a sort of exile. The life of the militant is directed toward the center, whence come the news, passwords, lectures . . ." ¹³ This centralization of the political system in France permits almost no political problem solving at the grassroots level. ¹⁴

The question of the role of the party militants is especially interesting, since their apparently high involvement and fervor are at variance with what we have said about the general population. In the Fourth Republic, given the hostility of both extremes (the Communists and the Gaullists) who often attained almost half the popular vote, the parties of the center (Socialists, MRP, Radicals, and Moderates) were left with very little room for maneuver in forming coalition governments. Furthermore, the old historical quarrels continually returned to plague them when cooperation was necessary. ¹⁵ A brief look at the way in which intraparty quarrels impinged on relations among the parties will illuminate the role of the party militants.

The Socialist Party, of course, traces its origin back to the classical Marxist working class parties. In the postwar period, however, only 20 percent of the Socialist electorate were workers; the majority were middle class civil servants, white collar, et cetera. The party militants consisted of the old-line party activists, who tried to keep the party from backsliding into moderate reformism, and the intellectuals running the party's journal, the *Revue Socialiste*, who tried to maintain doctrinal rigor among party leaders. ¹⁶

The MRP was the creation of Catholics who tried to apply the church's new

doctrines of social justice to the French situation. The party was continually torn by quarrels between those party members emphasizing social and economic reforms and those Catholic members who saw property threatened whenever social welfare was discussed. ¹⁷

The third important center party, the Radicals, was a loose amalgam of local notables adhering to a laissez-faire philosophy in the social and economic realms. Their philosophy of anarchic individualism rendered concerted action impossible. ¹⁸

We therefore face a situation in which the average French voter was somewhat less involved in politics than the American voter, while the middle level party activists were more ideological in their approach than their American counterparts:

...aside from the surge movements, the general public played a rather passive role in the Assembly's conflicts. Party activists or militants, however, especially among the Socialists and MRP, seemed to pull the parties away from one another; they perpetuated these parties' internal divisions in the Assembly and heightened the dissension in Socialist congresses. ¹⁹

Among these middle level party militants, historical divisions in the French body politic continued to exist, and the militants in turn greatly influenced the parties at the national level.

Attitudes Toward the Political System. With these three characteristics of French political participation as a background, we can now examine the process by which inputs into the system (demands) are processed into outputs (policies).

The extreme centralization of the French system has made it impossible for local organs of government to decide

58 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

even the most insignificant issues. If a village wants to build a school, pave a road, or lay new sewage pipes, an appropriate ministry in Paris or the prefect must give its approval. There is no decisionmaking nor contact with power on the local level. Power emanates from a distant center, from some remote entity called "the state." Even at the early stages of political socialization, i.e., in the schools, this is evident. There are no civic courses, no instruction in the actual operation of the regime.²⁰

Together with the remoteness of the state, one finds a conception of the state as a potentially hostile, dangerous, and untrustworthy institution from which it is necessary to remain aloof. In the eyes of the Frenchman, the state is "not a referee, but a player—and probably a dirty player."²¹ This type of attitude also characterizes the French labor movement. Whereas English or German labor has traditionally worked in close cooperation with the Socialist Party, indeed, been directed by the party, French labor from the beginning looked with suspicion upon the political system, even upon the Socialist Party. Political action could only involve the labor movement with the doubledealing of politicians; the best course of action was that which lay outside political channels—the general strike being the favorite tactic of French labor to exert pressure on the Government.²² (Recourse to the general strike and suspicion of the party which is traditionally the workers' party, i.e., the Communist Party, were well manifested in the events of May 1968.)

Thus, specific historical factors have resulted in a downgrading of Parliament. Also, the complex influence of French patterns of political participation had already created before World War II a situation in which the state seemed remote and hostile to the interests of the ordinary Frenchman, who was isolated from his fellow citizens as well by

the deep divisions in French society.

Mention has already been made of the highly divided political culture of France. This has its roots in great and deep social divisions: Catholic vs. anti-Catholic, employer vs. worker, sharecropper vs. rich farmer, and small storeowner vs. big businessman.²³ One factor which could conceivably override such deep social divisions would be the voluntary organizations whose memberships overlap the cleavages, i.e., a neighborhood self-improvement association which might include homeowners, tenants, landlords, businessmen, local officials, et cetera. In France, however, existing voluntary organizations do not have memberships which overlap social cleavages; rather, they reinforce them. For example, a French worker may belong to a Communist union, read a Communist newspaper, attend a Communist night school, et cetera; whereas an American worker may belong to a pro-Democratic union; read a rightwing newspaper; belong to a PTA including upper, middle, and lower class citizens, Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, et cetera. Furthermore, civic associations with a political goal were (and are) rare in France. What purpose would they serve when all political decisions are made in Paris? If an organization does happen to be political in nature, it merely forwards citizens' demands to Paris so that the political elites are faced with raw, unprocessed, "unaggregated" demands, making compromise among rigid alternatives all the more difficult.²⁴

The elites in Parliament during the Fourth Republic also faced specific historical circumstances which rendered the problem of governing more difficult. In the early years of the Fourth Republic, 1947-1951, the regime faced a deadlock. The Communists on the left and the Gaullists on the right had withdrawn their support for the parliamentary regime, and by 1951 almost one-half of all votes cast were for these two parties

which had sworn to keep the regime from working.²⁵

The Fifth Republic was designed to avoid the pitfalls of the Fourth. It established a presidential, as opposed to a parliamentary, regime, but the confusing constitutional questions of the Fifth Republic may be omitted here. The basic dilemma was quite simple—how is it possible to institutionalize a regime which is constructed around one man? The problem was certainly aggravated by De Gaulle's practice of dealing semilegally with his own Constitution when it suited his purposes. One example: in order to amend the Constitution to permit direct, popular election of the President of the Republic, De Gaulle did not use article 89 of the Constitution, which prescribes the amendment procedure, but used instead article 11, which authorizes a popular referendum on proposed laws concerning "the organization of the public powers." This maneuver was criticized as a blatant attempt to avoid the more complicated procedures called for by the Constitution (and the hostility of the Senate, which would have to consider the proposed law). The maneuver was condemned by most jurists, the Conseil d'Etat, and the Conseil Constitutionnel, and Parliament overthrew the Government on this issue on 5 October 1962. Yet De Gaulle proceeded to hold the referendum, which resulted in the approval of the law.²⁶

The years of De Gaulle's rule saw many examples of this arbitrary wielding of power, which only aggravated the problem of institutionalizing the regime. Since De Gaulle's departure the party system has shown signs of developing into a loose biparty system, in which the Gaullists and their allies form the majority bloc and the center-left parties, in loose alliance with the Communists, form the opposition. It is impossible to speculate on the future evolution of the party system, however.

Traits of the French System. We thus have a centralized political system in which channels of communication between elites and masses are poor. The elites must compromise but are attacked by their own party militants for doing so. The citizenry is alienated from the central Government and has no expectations of fairness in dealing with it.

It is necessary at this point to gain some perspective on the problem. We need to compare the attributes of the French system with other European countries which possess more stable regimes while possessing, at the same time, many of the attributes of French society. We may thus discover which specific factors are responsible for the peculiar instability of the French political system.

We know that stable democracy can be achieved with a multiparty system: Austria, the Netherlands, West Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Switzerland are all evidence of this. Furthermore, a multiparty system does not necessarily imply apathy on the part of the voters; Norway, for example, has six political parties, and party attachments are as widespread as in the United States.²⁷

Stable democracy can also exist in a highly divided society; witness Austria, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The case of the Netherlands is especially interesting because it, like France, contradicts in so many ways the model of pluralist democracy. One finds in the Netherlands a multitude of voluntary organizations which reinforce social cleavages, widespread apathy among the citizenry, government by elites in the atmosphere of secrecy, and a highly divided society (Calvinist, Catholic, liberal secular, and working class secular). Yet there are several crucial differences between the Netherlands and France. There is the narrow but strongly held consensus accepted by all Dutch social groups that the nation should

60 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

continue to be a monarchy (the House of Orange provides an important symbol of unity). Citizens give deference to the Government because they have faith that it will treat them fairly. Finally, the elites are able to reach compromises at the highest levels of the political system because of the particular mixture of deference and secrecy characteristic of Dutch politics.²⁸

The Dutch case suggests that the ideal model of pluralist democracy does not even remotely apply to many nations of continental Europe; indeed, it should be seen merely as an Anglo-American system writ large. It is therefore necessary to construct an alternative model which may prove useful in explaining many continental European political systems.

Economic Development and the French System. Rapid economic change had especially marked effects on the two groups in French society which played an important part in the events of May 1968: the students and the workers. Here it is important to note the failure of the Government and its economic plans *even on their own terms*, i.e., the modernization of France.²⁹ According to the Anglo-American model, economic development should go hand in hand with better education for students in order to enable them to become skilled, productive members of society. Economic development should also mean increasing affluence for workers, thereby reducing radicalism, rendering political debates less ideological, and making a middle class life style available to the working class.

Keeping in mind this ideal type of development, let us confront the realities of the French case. The population explosion after World War II meant a greatly expanded university population by the 1960's. In 1958 there were 170,000 university students in France; 10 years later there were 600,000.

Despite a university population increase of over 300 percent in 10 years' time, the Government took inadequate steps to prepare for such an influx of students. In fact, the most apparent step taken by Paris in response to the crisis in higher education was merely to fire seven Ministers of Education in a decade. Rather than address the hard questions involved in university reform, the Government chose to pursue the sterile exercise of setting up and subsequently knocking down a series of scapegoats.³⁰ The rigid centralization of the political system only aggravated the problem:

Centralization meant that when the students took on the university authorities they directly challenged the authority of the State. It meant that the university authorities could make no real concessions without consulting the Minister [of Education], a man who in May 1968 had been sitting for 15 months on a file full of incomplete reforms for fear of controversy which might upset the General and compromise his own political future.³¹

The university was failing to provide opportunities for an education leading to a viable and productive career. Moreover, the economy could not absorb the large number of graduates leaving the university each year. Hence the two-pronged and contradictory accusation leveled by the students against the "establishment": On the one hand, they condemned the entire neocapitalist structure and called for its utter destruction; on the other hand, they complained that they could not find jobs within this structure.³²

With regard to the workers, the evolution of the French situation diverged considerably from the ideal model sketched above. Far from reducing radicalism, economic development in the French case actually seemed to increase it.

As modernization increased in rural areas, farm laborers left rural regions and settled in urban industrial centers. This abundant supply of industrial labor helped to keep wages from rising too fast: in 1968 the French laborer's wages were the second lowest in the Common Market.³³ More generally the workers had, to a large extent, been paying for the economic development of the entire nation, with little voice concerning the direction the process was taking. The Government's economic plan was drawn up in councils in which big business and the Government ministries exercised preponderant influence.³⁴ The economic plan for the mid-1960's raised the profit margin for business entrepreneurs, held down wage raises for workers, and neglected the development of public services.³⁵ Control of inflation, which ate into the meager wage increases gained by labor, was blocked by powerful economic interests who were big borrowers and who therefore had no desire to see the inflation end.³⁶ Furthermore, the Government reduced social security benefits in 1967.³⁷ The unions also lacked formal recognition by employers of the type guaranteed to U.S. workers by the Wagner Act.³⁸ All of these developments left the workers feeling that their interests were not being fairly represented and that there was no regular channel through which they could make their protests heard and receive adequate consideration for their position.

The democratic pluralist model that we have been considering throughout this essay asserts that affluence leads to integration of workers within the system and a consequent decline of radicalism. The data for France in the 1950's seem to show that this view needs serious revision, and the 1968 outbreaks probably prove that there has been no significant change in the 1960's. A recent study by Hamilton³⁹ represents an incisive analysis of the thesis that "affluence means conservatism and mid-

dle class life styles." He argues that, on the contrary, affluence in the French case increases radicalism by making available more recruits for Communist indoctrination.

Hamilton shows that French industrialization has drawn labor from rural areas into medium-size, industrial towns where Communist trade unions and the Communist Party are strong. These young workers are receptive to Communist ideology, since they have already been socialized in an area of agrarian radicalism, i.e., central-southern France. The radicalism of this central-southern region owes its origins to the persistence of sharecropping tenancy, which has a high conflict potential between landlord and tenant in comparison with other forms of farming. In addition, the aristocratic and clerical leaders who might have exercised a dampening influence on opinions have long since moved away. These rural laborers, therefore, are already radical when they leave the farms to move to the cities.⁴⁰

When these workers migrate to industrial areas, they merely expand the number of workers susceptible to the influence of strong Communist trade unions. Evidence shows that if the wages of these workers do increase, they still do not change their life style or tone down their radicalism. They maintain a working class culture; to adopt middle class habits would mean ostracism, and they have little desire to change their way of life in any case. The example of skilled workers is revealing. Even when their salaries equal those of white collar workers, they continue to identify with the poorer, unskilled workers and not with their white collar counterparts who may be making as much money as they do. This, after all, is not so surprising; men do not alter their habits merely because an economic index has changed by a few percentage points. Rather, their actions are guided by the influence of peer groups—their neighbors, their family, their fellow

62 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

workers, all of whom participate in a working class culture.⁴¹

Hamilton thus proves that affluence need not lead to the decline of radicalism; indeed, under certain conditions it may actually increase it. (These findings, published in 1967, were amply confirmed in 1968.)

We must now apply Hamilton's findings to our previous conclusions about the nature of political participation in France. It was found that French voters did not have a strong identification with political parties. The party elites seemed remote and excessively ideological; too many parties existed; and they wasted their time splitting hairs, according to the voters. Under these conditions, increasing radicalism fostered by economic development would seek an outlet outside of the regular channels of the political system. The parties were incapable of providing an adequate outlet for dealing with the discontent of the workers.

During May and June 1968, wildcat strikes swept across France, perhaps stunning the Communist Party more than the Government. Although the party was devoted to the same revolutionary rhetoric which it had been mouthing for decades, it was now painfully trying to integrate itself into the political system, claiming that it advocated a seizure of power through peaceful means while cooperating increasingly with the non-Communist Parties of the left. The party tried to control the workers' rebellion by splitting the workers from the student movement, but with little success. After the CGT (the Communist-controlled labor union) and other unions had negotiated the so-called Grenelle accords with employers to end the strike, the workers rejected them decisively. They also retaliated against the Communist Party for its conservatism by defecting massively during the June 1968 legislative elections, causing the Communists to lose half their seats in Parliament.⁴²

The rebellion of May 1968 is of great interest to students of French politics for at least two reasons. First, what many observers had suspected was now made quite clear: the Communist Party was being outdistanced by the workers, who were willing to go to great lengths to achieve better treatment. The Communist Party, in its desire to present itself to the French public at large as a respectable participant in the political process, alienated many of its supporters while failing to gain other sources of support. Second, though they began from different premises, the student movement and the workers found common ground for action against a system which both groups condemned for its utter unwillingness to discuss its policies with the very groups which would be most influenced by them.

A Divided Polity Model. The pluralist model of democracy tells us nothing about societies which are deeply divided and which lack a strong, broad consensus about the nature of the political system. Because of its assumptions about a concerned citizenry, ample opportunities to influence and control the governing elites, and free and vigorous discussion of issues, it is of no use in discussions of societies which have none of these attributes. Let us now try to present some general characteristics of an alternative model, based on the French and Dutch cases, which may be more useful in examining the many continental European democracies which possess few of the characteristics of a pluralist democracy.

We will assume that the country under discussion is rigorously divided with respect to social class and/or religion. Because of its political culture, the population is apathetic about politics and does not possess direct controls on the governing elites. Under which conditions is it possible for this political system to survive while maintaining a stable democratic regime?

• At the very minimum there must be a consensus that all groups profit more from remaining within the present system than by destroying it. This consensus may find powerful symbolic support from the existence of a respected monarchy, a love for the fatherland, or a realization of the necessity of cohesion because of external enemies. The ease with which French regimes have been destroyed seems to demonstrate that powerful groups often feel that they can benefit more by the creation of a new system than by remaining within the present one.

• The distance which the mass of the populace feels between itself and the centers of political power must be balanced by a feeling that those elites who occupy the centers of power sincerely seek the common good. The cynicism and distrust prevailing throughout the French political culture obviously make this impossible in the near future.

• The political leaders must feel the necessity to make compromises. If the second condition is fulfilled, i.e., if voters have confidence in their leaders, it will obviously be easier for these leaders to make political compromises.

In summary, if the polity exhibits these characteristics, the parliamentary process will not consist of a conflict between Government and opposition but, instead, will involve a continual

process of compromise and accommodation joined with a genuine will to find a workable solution.

The above model is substantially different from the model of pluralist democracy, yet it provides the possibility of stability and democracy. When it is applied to postwar France, one may conclude that the French political system has indeed been condemned for the wrong reasons. This essay cannot conclude on an optimistic note with regard to the future of the French system. While it is prevented from operating in a manner similar to that described by the pluralist model, it is also prevented from imitating the divided polity model because it lacks the essential qualities of consensus, deference, and compromise.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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FOOTNOTES

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
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64 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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37. John Ardagh, *The New French Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 298.
38. Cohen, p. 196.
39. Richard F. Hamilton, *Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 196.
40. *Ibid.*, chap. VI.
41. *Ibid.*, chap. IV and XII.
42. Steinfels; David B. Goldey, "The Events of May and the French General Election of June, 1968," *Parliamentary Affairs*, Spring 1969, p. 116-33.



Political thought in France is either nostalgic or utopian.

Raymond Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectual*,
Doubleday, 1957

SOVIET CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: CONFLICT AND COLLABORATION AMONG COMRADES

The concept of continuing institutional conflict between the Communist Party and the armed forces can lead to entirely inaccurate conclusions about the relations between the civilian leaders and career military officers in the U.S.S.R. The top figures in both groups are all political professionals, and most of the so-called conflicts—both of historic and contemporary genre—transcend normal institutional lines. Although the peculiar Soviet version of the classic Great Russian politico-military model is characterized by an inherent potential for discord, it also includes unique provisions for perpetuating the present political system and for sustaining the thrust of the country's national and strategic objectives.

A research paper prepared

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INTRODUCTION

If the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to hold power, it must, therefore, prove its ability to do so by its military organization.—V.I. Lenin.¹

Background. In 1957, at the height of the post-Stalin struggle for political power in the Soviet Union, Allen Dulles suggested that the Soviet military officers were participating in the selection of a new national leader and that they might even seize power themselves and establish their own type of dictatorship.² Although the events which Dulles alluded to did not develop as he predicted, the prospect of a military takeover of the Soviet Government apparently seemed plausible at the time.

In fact, the concept of continuing "instability, tension and conflict" between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Red army* remains alive and well today, having been nourished by a substantial amount of Western literature on the subject and by the vivid profile of Soviet military leaders on the international scene in recent years. Their

*The Soviet armed forces were known officially as the "Workers' and Peasants' Red Army," or Red Army, from 1918 until 1946, when the designation was changed to Soviet Army. The Red Fleet and the Military Air Fleet, although occasionally independent in theory, have nearly always been subordinated in fact to the Soviet ground forces. For simplicity, the term "Red army" will be used throughout this paper to signify the entire Soviet military establishment.

66 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

presence in Czechoslovakia and Egypt, at crucial times, comes to mind.

Embodied in the idea of continuing conflict is the notion that the Soviet military establishment forms some sort of opposition force—normally submerged, but sometimes visible—to the leadership of the CPSU and thus, by inference, constitutes “a perennial threat to the political stability of the Soviet state.”³

That the *entente cordiale* between the CPSU and the Red army has not always existed is recognized as a historical fact on both sides of the Iron Curtain. But, aside from the manifest truth that in every country there is some essential incompatibility between professional politicians and career soldiers, it is also a fact of life that virtually every identifiable pillar of the Soviet state—the Government apparatus, the industrial managers, the state police, the literary elite, and the armed forces, et cetera—is continually in some form of real or perceived conflict with the party.⁴ Yet, organically, all of these interest groups are composed of card-carrying party members.⁵

The Problem. Thus, the study of Soviet civil-military affairs involves a search for the answers to two key questions: First, are there, in fact, genuine and lasting institutional disagreements between the Communist Party and the Soviet military establishment? Second, what effect does the civil-military relationship, whatever its nature, have on the overall Soviet political system?

The conflict/instability thesis is usually supported by such premises as the problem of political interference in operational military matters, military resentment of the party's penchant for periodic purges, the party's denial of a professional identity for the military establishment, the party's fear of military participation in succession struggles, and perennial concern over the role

of the military in policy formulation. The author proposes to review these premises to determine if sufficient evidence exists to support a different hypothesis which would describe the general Soviet civil-military situation as being not only a mutually satisfying relationship for both groups, but also a carefully designed and generally stable institutional arrangement for carrying out the aims of a major power in the arena of international political-military competition.

POLITICAL INTERFERENCE IN OPERATIONAL MATTERS

Evolution of the Political Control System. The first duty of all revolutionaries who come to power is to stabilize their authority, by whatever means available. The problem of building a loyal and efficient military establishment is part of this task, and it boils down to a conflict between professional excellence and political reliability. To obtain efficiency, the leaders of the revolution must equip and professionalize their force. To insure loyalty, they must develop a satisfactory control system.

For the Bolsheviks, engaged in a desperate struggle for survival against foreign intervention and internal counterrevolution from 1918 to 1920, this problem was particularly acute. Coming to power in 1917 with a deep sense of hostility to the military establishment, they saw it—rightly so—as one of the key instruments of state oppression, and they were determined to destroy it. But in 1918 they were forced to create a Red army. In need of professional military expertise, the new Soviet Government was forced to rely on the command and staff level talent of the old Imperial Russian Army. Consequently, several hundred thousand former Czarist officers and noncommissioned officers were recruited or coerced into service.⁶ This was a remarkable *tour de force*

since these same officers and NCO's had been a prime target for prerevolution rhetorical abuse from the Bolsheviks.

Although the former Czarist officers and NCO's were used, in most cases they were not trusted. The circumstances of fighting on 21 fronts, over enormous areas, and against a broad spectrum of opposition virtually forced the beleaguered Bolsheviks to devise a comprehensive system for overall command and control. The system which evolved consisted of a triple network of controls: political commissars, party cells, and security police. The names have changed over the years, but the basic administrative format which the Bolsheviks constructed during the Civil War remains the same. The commissars, who were originally civilians assigned to the various military units, are now regular officers with military rank and with the billet title of political deputy to the commander, or Zampolit.⁷ Moreover, in every military unit there is a party cell headed by a party secretary whose job is to assist the Zampolit in his political education work.

Security police personnel are also in the military, but they report separately to the KGB organization, which spreads down to company level. Each regiment and separate battalion has two or three officers of counterintelligence assigned to it, each with his own network of agents and informers. Military intelligence, as distinct from counterintelligence, is a separate service, restricted principally to the collection of strategic or tactical military intelligence in foreign countries. Even the highest officers of the military's own Intelligence Directorate, the GRU, are always under KGB surveillance. In this regard, however, the military establishment is not different from the rest of Soviet society. The security police keep an eye on everyone, regardless of their position, title, or professional affiliation.

The political deputies operate through an independent chain of

command, which extends from the squad level up through all higher echelons to the Main Political Administration (MPA). The MPA is technically within the Ministry of Defense, but actually it reports directly to the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

In theory, the authority of the commissar, or political deputy, has never extended to operational military matters; but this has often been more formula than fact. As we know from contemporary experience, the borderline between political guidance and operational control is, at best, nebulous to civilian leaders enamored by the mystique of military command and tempted to participate in decisions involving purely tactical matters.

Operational Conflicts. During the Civil War and World War II, there were some instances of conflict over tactical matters between military commanders and their political commissars. However, the most serious disputes usually involved commissars against other commissars (or other civilian political leaders) and commanders against other military officers, i.e., within institutional boundaries. The most notable case during the Civil War was that of Stalin, who was temporarily relieved of his duties⁸ and publicly denounced by Trotsky, the leader of the Red army, for interfering with military operations at Tsaritsyn (later Stalingrad).⁹

The disagreement between Trotsky and Stalin, both of whom were essentially "civilians," illustrates one of the many curious cross-threads running throughout the fabric of the Soviet civil-military relations; tensions are by no means confined to intergroup conflicts. The most severe political infighting, over the years, has usually been within institutional boundaries, whereas many firm political alliances have transcended normal institutional boundaries.

68 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Numerous intragroup squabbles and intergroup alignments which originated during the period of the Civil War were to have a lasting effect on Soviet civil-military relations. The Red army's officer corps at that time was by no means a homogeneous force, being composed of three distinct social categories: the revolutionary "Red Commanders" (graduates of 3-4 month training courses), drawn from the industrial workers;¹⁰ the ex-NCO's and ensigns of the old Imperial Army, primarily from the peasant class; and the aristocratic former field and staff officers of the old Imperial Army. A professional rivalry inevitably emerged between the ex-officers and ex-NCO's of the Imperial Russian Army, particularly as the latter were eased into lower command billets. In addition, there were bad relations between the Red Commanders and the ex-Czarist officers. The Red Commanders—many of whom had served in the Imperial Army as enlisted men—viewed their former Czarist officers with suspicion and distrust. The ex-Czarist officers scoffed at the professional abilities of the Red Commanders, who were trained in the new military schools hastily organized during the war.¹¹

The politico-military feuds reached their greatest intensity during the struggle with Poland in 1920. When the ill-fated Warsaw operation was undertaken, after some early vacillation and bickering among the high Bolshevik leaders, the plan of projecting the Communist revolution into Western Europe on the bayonets of the Red army failed ignominiously, due to military inter-command disagreements and shameful insubordination to higher level staffs.¹² Stalin, however, although criticized by both civilian and military leaders for obstructing the tactical operations, gained long-term political capital out of the episode by gathering under his wing a loyal coterie of young Red Commanders, including Voroshilov and Budennyi.

Historians offer many reasons why the Bolsheviks eventually triumphed over their combined foes in the Civil War period. The classic explanations—raw peasant manpower, youthful enthusiasm and courage, professional expertise of the ex-Czarist staff officers, a superior terror machine, gross incompetence of the opposition, et cetera—only obscure the main point. The fact is that in spite of—or perhaps because of—the highly centralized politico-military leadership, the Red army was transformed into a formidable fighting force. Viewed in perspective, the party's control procedures over the Red army were not unreasonable under the circumstances. Indeed, it is very likely that the Red army would not have survived as a viable force without this firm guidance. Lenin acknowledged this during the war:

Hundreds and hundreds of military experts are betraying us and will betray us; we will catch them and shoot them, but thousands and tens of thousands of military experts have been working for us systematically and for a long time, and without them we could have not formed the Red Army.¹³

Development of Unity of Command.

In 1924 the Central Committee of the Party approved the introduction of a new "unity of command" program. In fact, what was established was still a dual form of command, but there was a difference in the division of responsibilities. Nonparty commanders received full administrative and operational autonomy, while the commissars remained responsible for political instruction and morale. Meanwhile, a party-member commander could serve as a combined commander-commissar, attending to both the military and political work of the unit, with only a political officer (politruk) to assist him. The new regulations clarified the situation somewhat, but not entirely. Although in theory all

SOVIET CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 69

commands were ordained unified, in practice some were obviously more unified than others.

Thus, the seeds were planted for the growth of a new rivalry, between party and nonparty commanders. By 1934, however, almost 70 percent of the officer ranks were party members. In the higher command echelons, party saturation was even more impressive. As the percentage of party members among the officer ranks increased over the years, the position of the political commissars became somewhat anomalous. The commissars, now relegated to the position of political deputies, lagged behind the professional military in education and technical efficiency. As a result, many, voluntarily or involuntarily, fell under the soldiers' influence. During Stalin's ruthless collectivization programs, the professionals became alarmed over the morale of the peasant soldiers. Some of the more influential military leaders were able to persuade Stalin to make concessions in favor of the peasant troops under their command and of their families. The political deputies, many of whom were of peasant origin themselves, supported the professional military leaders.

The purge of the military high command in the late thirties was followed by a restoration of the authority of the political commissars. A party decree, in August of 1937, made the commissars coequal with the professional officers in military and political affairs. The dual command system had obvious military disadvantages which were quickly brought to light during the early stages of the Russo-Finnish war. Consequently, a party decree of 12 August 1940 again abolished the political commissars' billets and returned to the system of political deputies.

After the Nazi invasion in June of 1941, the position of commissar was reinstituted, and 45,000 of the high- and middle-level party officials were sent into the armed forces to take over

as political commissars.¹⁴ This action was taken after large-scale surrenders during the early days of the war threatened a total collapse of resistance. The response of the party to the crisis was to strengthen the will of the officers and enlisted men to resist. "Death is preferable to capture" became the motto.

When the tide of battle turned, the party reverted to the unity of command principle. By October of 1942 the professional officer corps had clearly established in combat its loyalty to the regime. The post of political commissar was abolished again, and the party political organs in the armed forces were subordinated to the military commanders.

In recent years, in line with the unity of command concept, a crossflow of military and political training for all officers has been emphasized. The most capable officers are rotated through command, political, technical, staff, and rear service posts.¹⁵ Marshal M.V. Zakharov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, has written: "a Soviet military leader . . . is personally responsible [to the party and the Government] . . . for the constant combat mobilization readiness, for high military discipline, and for the political and moral state and education of the group . . . entrusted to him . . . The Soviet Commander is both a military and a political leader . . ."¹⁶

Party Activity in the Military. During World War II the Red army was infused with hundreds of thousands of loyal Communist Party members. By the end of 1941 the Red army had about 1.3 million Communists. In 1942 the number of party members in the armed forces was increased to more than 2 million and by the end of the war about 3.4 million, or almost 50 percent of the entire party membership. In addition, during the first days of the war, 900,000 Komsomol members entered the armed forces.¹⁷

In the postwar years the party's

70 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

political activities in the military have tended to become more pervasive but— from the commander's point of view— less of a nuisance. Over the years the professional military officers have learned to live with the system. In fact, the situation is not without advantage for the commander. The party continues to support the principle of one-man leadership,¹⁸ and commanders are specifically exempted from criticism by other party members in the military. Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky, a prestigious military figure, has stated:

The Communist Party . . . in its activities systematically carries out work in strengthening the one-man command, viewing it as the most important condition of high military discipline of the personnel and of combat readiness of the Armed Forces. . . . The question about one-man command and its strengthening should always be the center of attention of commanders, political organs and party organizations.¹⁹

This policy is undoubtedly not considered to be in conflict with the program of the CPSU, which clearly states that "party leadership of the armed forces, and the increased role and emphasis of the party organizations in the army and navy are the bedrock of military development."²⁰ Indeed, the program is implemented by the broad scope of activities of the political control organs, which includes such tasks as transmittal of information concerning unit activities to higher levels within the apparatus; supervision of political education and indoctrination; regulation of advancement of officers so that only those who are desirable from the party's point of view are promoted to positions of authority; and maintenance of general loyalty to the regime through extralegal means such as intimidation, threats of dismissal, public humiliation, or outright coercion. The Zampolit prepares fitness reports on the political reli-

ability—promotion potential—of the commander and all other officers. In some cases this has resulted in strained relations, but generally speaking, the ill feelings created by this situation are minor compared to the universal hatred and distrust of the KGB agents. The KGB agents watch both the regular and political officers, in search of deviations from the general party line.

The party charges the military political organizations with the specific duty of educating "... all Soviet soldiers . . . in the spirit of unqualified loyalty to the people, to the Communist cause, of readiness to spare no effort and, if necessary, to give their lives in the defense of their Socialist country."²¹

In addition to the political instruction programs, the central organization of the MPA also edits and publishes educational materials and supervises the establishment and maintenance of service clubs, movie houses, and libraries. Thousands of military commanders and staff officers are also drawn into "command activities," under party auspices, contributing volunteer service of a political type, e.g., delivering propaganda talks, investigating the quality of performance of a Governmental or party agency, or serving as a part-time auxiliary instructor for a political department. The steady routine of political indoctrination succeeds to a surprising extent, particularly as a disciplinary tool and as a morale-motivation device.

There are indications in the Soviet military press of occasional disagreements, even today, between the regular and the political officers, usually over whether training time should be devoted to professional military subjects or to political dialectics. This is more the exception than the rule, however, and nearly always occurs at the lower command levels. Tensions have also been reported between the political officers and officers who resent being forced to take part in the extracurricular political

activities. This reluctance, especially among younger technical officers, to participate in party work has generated ill-feeling among the political workers and also some of the other professional officers. The latter resent the fact that they themselves must submit to indoctrination and political work, while the technocrats, who enjoy greater career security and preferential treatment, are allowed to remain aloof from such timewasting activities.²²

Such incidents should not overshadow the fact that, as a matter of institutional policy, the top party and military leaders are in basic agreement on the overall beneficial effects of the centralized politico-military control machinery.²³ Marshal Zakharov has stated that "party organizations struggle to improve the combat readiness of the troops, to strengthen military discipline, and to improve military and political training in the armed forces."²⁴ Similarly, Marshal Sokolovsky is on record with the view that "Political agencies and party organizations . . . should concentrate all their efforts in party-political work toward the successful fulfillment of our main task—a further improvement in the combat preparedness and combat capability of the armed forces of the Soviet Union."²⁵ Marshal R.Y. Malinovsky, in numerous speeches and writings during his tenure as Minister of Defense from 1957 to 1967, expounded the view that "the leadership of the party is the decisive source of strength and might of our Armed Forces."²⁶

THE EFFECT OF PARTY PURGES

Early Personnel Reductions. There have been five periods in the history of the Soviet Armed Forces when, for one reason or another, major "purges" were aimed at the military establishment. At least that is the way these reductions in force are usually described by most Kremlinologists. A close look at the

circumstances of each period suggests it is a misleading oversimplification to describe all of these cutbacks as "purges."

The first so-called "purge," which occurred in the early 1920's, was in reality a massive demobilization. Following the Civil War the Red army numbered over five million men. It was clearly a matter of economic necessity to reduce the size of the military establishment. Three million men were demobilized in 1921, 800,000 in 1922, and 140,000 more in 1924.

Naturally, the first to go were the least reliable individuals among the old imperial officers and NCO's. Many political commissars also lost their jobs during this period. This reduction occurred at a time when the party leaders were arguing amongst themselves over the form and future of the peacetime Red army.

The dispute over strategic doctrine was not resolved until the midtwenties, when the Soviets finally settled upon a mixed militia and regular force. This, in turn, provoked another turnover of personnel. The reduction in force in the late twenties was more on the basis of professional qualifications and political orthodoxy, although not necessarily party membership. Class origin was, however, taken into consideration, as the party made a deliberate effort to instill a proletarian image to the armed forces. In 1929 an age restriction for certain billets (a limit of 36 years for company commanders, 40 for regimental commanders, and 45 for generals) was instituted to rejuvenate the command structure with the young Red Commanders.

The Great Purges. The ruthless purge of top Red army leaders in the late 1930's forms a vital premise of the thesis of continuing conflict between the party and the military. This narrow interpretation of the events of that period is a good example of the sort of

72 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

historiography of which the Soviets themselves are frequently accused, i.e., explaining the events of yesterday in the light of the political realities of today.

The officers of the Red army were initially outside the scope of the widespread purges which Stalin initiated in the midthirties to tame the party apparatus. Although the political administration and the state security controls were still present, military officers were immune from arrest by civil authorities.

The secret police assault on the military began in late autumn of 1936, with the discreet "demobilization" of several Red army officers. As civilians, the ex-officers were now subject to arrest by the secret police. This was the payoff for bitter disagreements in Spain between army officers and secret police officers.²⁷ Criticism of secret police tactics in Spain by various army leaders was interpreted as disloyalty to the regime. Additionally, down at the working level it was a much easier matter for the secret police to construct a case against officers who had traveled abroad and associated with foreigners, including non-Communist participants in the Spanish Civil War.

The irony of this situation is that it was the top talent which suffered. Soviet officers who fought in the Civil War in Spain in 1936-38 under *orders* of the Soviet Government were usually welcomed back to the Soviet Union with warm congratulations and high decorations from the Commissar of Defense, Marshal Voroshilov, followed by an interrogation by the Soviet secret police.²⁸

In addition, many commanders and commissars were seriously concerned about the appalling effect on the morale of their troops caused by Stalin's ruthless collectivization policy. Although there were some protests and complaints, there is no evidence to suggest the existence of any sort of organized opposition or conspiracy within the military.²⁹

In May of 1937 Stalin was per-

suaded, on the basis of false documents originated by the NKVD in collusion with the Gestapo and relayed through Czechoslovakia to his personal secretariat, to strike down the top figures in the Red army.³⁰ Marshal Tukhachevsky, the Red army's most prominent leader, and six of his top commanders were arrested on charges of treasonable conduct and Trotskyite activity. After a secret court-martial, they were convicted of conspiracy with the German General Staff and promptly executed. Although the documentary evidence against the top marshals was false, it was very convincing. From the top marshals on down the chain of command, it was easy to build cases against many other officers on the basis of professional association.³¹

At a time when the Red army was rapidly increasing in enlisted manpower and striving to introduce new weapon systems, the blood purge of the officer corps was an incredibly senseless and shortsighted policy which resulted in the virtual elimination of the top echelons of the command structure. It was not uncommon for the commanding officer, commissar, chief of staff, and the service chiefs of an entire command to be purged. One-third of the Red army officer corps was executed, imprisoned, or dismissed from active service, including three of five Soviet Marshals, all 11 Deputy People's Commissars of Defense, 13 of 15 Generals of the Army, and 75 out of 80 members of the Military Soviet. Fifty-seven of 85 commanders, about half of all regimental commanders, and all but one fleet commander were purged, if not shot.³² However, most of the officers below the rank of colonel were imprisoned rather than executed.³³ The purge reached the political officers as much as the military commanders. Gamarnik, the chief of the MPA, committed suicide as the secret police were on the verge of arresting him. As Khrushchev pointed out later, "... during this time [1937-41] the

cadre of leaders who had gained military experience in Spain and in the Far East was almost completely liquidated."³⁴

But it is wrong to suggest, as some political analysts are wont, that the purges produced a generation of mediocre Soviet leaders. Many of the early promotions proved highly successful. A brilliant young division commander named Georgi K. Zhukov advanced within 3 years to the position of Chief of the Soviet General Staff. However, some of the "deep selectees" who were found to be incompetent were later purged.

In the process of molding a new officer corps, Stalin also restored the influence of the new political commissars over the military commanders. An important task for the new commissars was to ensure that the younger officers, including the new commanders, were carefully indoctrinated with the belief that the purge was only directed against specific political criminals who were clearly identified as "enemies of the people." As a result, the survivors of this period, including many who were sacked but not shot, attributed their very existence to the benevolence of the party, in general, and to Stalin, in particular. All of the deep selectees owed their early promotions to Stalin.

Only later, when the full horror of Stalin's crimes was revealed at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, did it become known that this was a blood purge directed against every element of Soviet society. All of the pillars of the ruling elite—including, for a time, the secret police themselves—were victimized by Stalin.

Thus, the remarkable thing about the purges is that they were never *perceived*, either at the time or later, by the emerging generation of political and military leaders as being a deliberate, illegal attack on the Red army by the party.³⁵ Khrushchev touched on this point years later when he said, "The extermination of the Old Guard of the

army was for a long time considered a credit to the men responsible rather than a crime for which they should have been punished."³⁶ The memoirs of some of the survivors tend to corroborate this. The manner in which many officers were eliminated, e.g., through administrative orders and secret tribunals, contributed greatly to the widespread ignorance of the enormity of the purge. Many officers were apprehended by the secret police while in transit to new duty stations. Thus, the old and new commands were only vaguely aware of the officer's disappearance, let alone his arrest. The secret police, of course, arranged all of the transfer orders as well as whatever followup cover story was necessary to account for the officer's disappearance or reassignment while en route.

In fact, if anything, the purges forced the members of both the party apparatus and the military establishment closer together into a common, undying hatred of the secret police organization.

Significantly, none of the purged generals were put on display at the infamous public show-trials in Moscow. They were tried and executed in secret. This may have been due to recognition by the secret police that the rugged old campaign veterans could not be coerced into humiliating themselves in an orgy of self-vilification, to which the purged civilian politicians were forced to submit. Thus, the Soviet Armed Forces emerged from this period with what might be described, in capitalist public relations terms, as a "clean image," in contrast to the malevolent shadow cast by the secret police. Although this might seem somewhat like a Pyrrhic victory, even in a totalitarian state there are some distinct political advantages (as we shall see later) for an institution which enjoys strong popular support.

Postwar Demobilization. The next so-called purge occurred between 1945 and 1948. Some authors have described

74 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

this as a small-scale repetition of the blood purges of the late thirties. In reality no blood was shed, although several careers were terminated abruptly. The object was to ensure the hegemony of Stalin, by preventing the formation of cliques around popular military leaders. Marshal Zhukov, Marshal A.A. Novikov, and Fleet Adm. N.G. Kuznetsov, the top figures in the army, air force, and navy, respectively, were all demoted. (Stalin later recalled Zhukov and Kuznetsov to respectable positions.)

The 1945-48 period was also an era of massive demobilization, from 11,365,000 men in the armed forces in May of 1945 to 2,874,000 men in 1948.³⁷ For those who wished to make the service a career, it obviously helped to have good marks in both professional performance and political reliability. In this regard, however, the Soviet political leaders were not exactly pioneering some new innovation in the field of civil-military relations. The requirement of rigid party line conformity is something which all military men have to face, especially during periods of severe personnel reductions. Aside from this fact, the Soviet political leaders were faced with a serious postwar internal crisis, resulting from Stalin's wartime relaxation of civil controls. The political subordination process taking place in the Red army was just another aspect of the regime's overall program for reestablishing control over the whole of Soviet society.

Khrushchev's Reductions. The fifth "so-called" purge occurred during the period 1956-61, under Khrushchev. This was unquestionably a reduction in force, motivated by economic considerations but with strategic overtones. Manpower was reduced from 5,723,000 in 1955 to 3,623,000 in January of 1960. Plans called for a further reduction to 2,423,000 by the end of 1961. (This plan was altered, however, in the

middle of 1961, and the military manpower levels were subsequently raised.) In financial terms, the Defense Ministry's share of the budget dropped from 19.9 percent in 1955 to 12.9 percent in 1960. The cutbacks involved the forced retirement of about 150,000 career officers.³⁸ The attrition was particularly high among those officers who lacked technical qualifications.

Again, this was during a period of major conflict between the top leaders regarding what strategic doctrine the Soviet Union should develop. As in so many previous disputes, the conflict was generally within institutional boundaries. The harsh impact of a changing technology and the modernization of the Soviet armed forces caused considerable division within the officer corps. Large numbers of tradition minded (i.e., ground-force oriented) officers were replaced by technically qualified officers as the Soviet Union moved into the strategic missile era.³⁹

When Khrushchev proclaimed his new doctrine, the older generation of officers was divided into two categories—those whose ideas were out of date and those who were still capable of rendering useful service. Those whose names were not renowned in battle and who did not occupy the very highest positions in the armed forces were removed. The promotion of 454 generals in 1960 is clear evidence of the elevation of a new cadre of officers to major leadership positions in the military.⁴⁰ Many of those who were released were the same individuals who had been deep selected in the late thirties and enjoyed major commands during World War II but, by the late fifties-early sixties period, had fallen out of step with the new technology.

Where political considerations made it necessary to retain some of the senior marshals and generals, they were—with a few notable exceptions—virtually removed from positions of responsibility and decisive authority. New positions

were, in fact, created for them. An informal group known as the "general inspectors"—a kind of old marshals' corps—came into being.

By 1965, barely one-quarter of the marshals of the Soviet Union (i.e., the officers of the highest rank) and only about one-third of the marshals in the technical arms had taken part in actively promoting or writing about the revolution in military techniques and technology.⁴¹

The important point here is to draw a distinction between the feelings of the members of the older generation, who were understandably unhappy about being passed over and put out to pasture, and the overall attitude of the group which remained in the service in positions of responsibility. Through a political decision a new generation of military leaders evolved, owing their success to the party.

* * * * *

It is well to remember that the Soviet political system feeds itself on purges. It has always done so, and there is no reason to doubt that it will continue to do so in the future. By and large, however, the armed forces have suffered less from purges over the years than any other of the major pillars of the ruling elite. The period of the late 1930's is the only one which could be categorized as a genuine purge of the military. And Stalin personally, rather than the Communist Party, has been blamed for the events of that unhappy era. The other so-called purges—in the early twenties, the late twenties, the late forties, and the late fifties—were not political reprisals and, in the long run, usually benefited the Soviet armed forces.

It is highly probable, however, that in due course a new generation of military leaders will emerge to replace the "Class of 1960" at the top of the armed forces. It will not be a sudden and drastic turnover, though, because

literally hundreds of the more senior officers have already died from natural causes in recent years. When the replacement process is completed, many Western Krenlinologists will probably hasten to recognize the effect as a drastic new purge, adding further fuel to the fires of continuing conflict between the CPSU and the Red army.

THE PARTY'S DENIAL OF A PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY FOR THE MILITARY

Background. The allegation that the Communist Party has consistently denied the Soviet military establishment any sort of professional identity is another major premise of the theory of continuing conflict.⁴²

There is some basis in fact for this charge. In general, the historical tendency of the Soviet system itself has been to suppress the emergence of autonomous interest groups of any kind that might develop a life of their own and challenge the leadership monopoly of the party. Strong political pressure to completely emasculate the military establishment was applied, in particular, after the Civil War. A rank structure was not introduced until the midthirties. After World War II Stalin claimed all the credit for the achievements of the Soviet armed forces during the war.

Conversely, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the opposite conclusion can also be drawn, viz., that the civilian political leaders have carefully fostered the development of a unique professional identity for the military's officer corps.

The Militia Dispute. In order to fully comprehend the development of professionalism in the Soviet armed forces, it is necessary to have an understanding of the politico-military events of the post-Civil War period. From 1920 to 1925 there were many bitter disputes within the party over a variety of issues,

76 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

including the problem of devising a permanent form and function for the Soviet armed forces. This was due, in part, to the simple fact that the Bolsheviks had no clear concept of what the permanent military arm of a socialist state should be like. As Lenin said, "We proceeded from experiment to experiment; we endeavored to create a volunteer army, feeling our way, testing the ground and experimenting to find a solution to the problem."⁴³

The debates on the organization of the armed forces were further complicated by the fact that the overall strategic role of the military in Soviet external policy was also being discussed. The Soviet state had emerged from its Civil War totally isolated and surrounded by a hostile world. The Bolsheviks were faced with the need to maintain sufficient military strength to cope with a serious foreign relations situation. In Lenin's words,

We are living not merely in a state, but in a system of states, and it is inconceivable for the Soviet Republic to exist alongside of the imperialist states for any length of time. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end comes, there will have to be a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states.⁴⁴

Meanwhile, on the home front, a rising spirit of dissatisfaction among the peasants, which culminated in open rebellion in several areas, presented the Red army with problems of military pacification and punitive operations.

The ensuing conflict within the political hierarchy was between the proponents of a loosely organized and locally controlled citizen militia force and the advocates of a strong, professional military force. Trotsky, the leader of the Red army during the Civil War, became the leading advocate of the citizen militia forces. He envisaged a

gradual two-stage development for the Red army. After the initial period, during which as a matter of wartime expediency the Red army was forced to operate in accordance with traditional military concepts, he preferred transforming the armed forces into a decentralized militia organization. Not only was the militia concept economically more feasible for the Soviets, but also more nearly in accord with traditional pacifist-socialist principles, and—hopefully—more easily controllable by local civilian party cells.⁴⁵

With their professional security at stake, the members of the military hierarchy attacked the militia idea on the grounds of inefficiency. As the idea of a mixed military establishment—part militia and part cadre army⁴⁶—emerged as a possible and workable system, the opposition to Trotsky gradually shifted its attack from the organization of the Red army to discussions of tactical doctrine. The notion became popular that a newly developed proletarian military technique (essentially guerrilla warfare procedures, using cavalry forces) accounted for the success of the Red army during the Civil War. The Red Commanders, largely self-trained in the heat of battle, took credit for devising this new military doctrine which they considered unique in the history of warfare. Aside from the political aspects of the situation, this was the first case of professional pride for the young Red Commanders, and it revealed a strong streak of personal ambition as well as sincere faith in the future of the new Red army.

In late 1923 and early 1924, several investigating commissions, representing the Central Committee, examined the military/material status of the Red army and submitted reports which were highly critical, by implication, of Trotsky's policies. By mid-1924 Stalin had achieved an irretrievable grasp on the political apparatus of the military and, as a result, Trotsky had been effectively

replaced in the leadership of the Red army by Mikhail Frunze.⁴⁷

Under Frunze a unified structure and a unified tactical doctrine were imposed on the Red army. The military organization as a whole was modernized and stabilized. Staff and administrative functions were clearly delineated, new life was pumped into the naval and aviation branches, and emphasis was placed on improving the overall technical competence of the armed forces. Party members were infused into the military machine, and regulations were revised to permit a younger age distribution on the major staffs. Frunze's basic slogan, "make way for the Red Commanders," heralded the political debut of a new generation of military leaders, headed by Stalin's old cohorts from the Tsaritsyn operations and the Polish campaign: Yegorov, Budenny, Voroshilov, et al. During this period of military reform, a new style of political soldier emerged—typically an ex-enlisted man or proletarian who possessed only a rudimentary military education, a superficial understanding of Marxist phrases, and a ruthless ability for making decisions in terms of narrow political chauvinism.

The most noteworthy aspect of Frunze's regime, however, was the new political and psychological spirit which he instilled in the armed forces. To Frunze the serious business of modern warfare required the complete subordination of all aspects of society, including in particular the officer corps of the military establishment, to the strong leadership of a single, elite, national policymaking organization, i.e., the Communist Party. This is the basic philosophy which the civilian political leaders have pushed ever since, and four generations of Soviet officers now accept it and believe in it as a way of life.

Building the Base. As Stalin gradually eased into control of the Soviet political system in the midtwenties, the Red

army entered a new epoch. An early clue to one dimension of this era was revealed in the style and substance of a speech to the Central Committee on 19 January 1925, in which Stalin forcefully supported additional defense expenditures for the Soviet Armed Forces.

By 1928 Stalin was sufficiently in command of both the party and the government apparatus to institute the Soviet Union's first Five-Year Plan for economic development, which was a conscious attempt to create the industrial base needed to support a modern military establishment. A major objective of the plan was to raise the combat capabilities of the Red army to match those of its potential enemies in Europe and Asia.⁴⁸

As a result of the rapid growth in heavy industry, the Red army soon began to increase both the quantity and quality of its armaments and military technology.⁴⁹ Unlike the Western democracies, who were lulled by the spirit of pacifism in the thirties into a penurious attitude toward spending for national security, the Soviet Union openly pushed for military preparedness. Not only was industry mobilized for military production, but the populace was psychologically conditioned for war. Young people were taught in numerous paramilitary organizations, voluntary sports associations, small arms courses, aero clubs, and evening nursing courses that their primary duty was to prepare for the defense of the Soviet homeland from foreign invaders.

Significant emphasis was also placed on providing the officer corps with training in new military technology and operational procedures. By 1938 over 50 percent of the corps commanders were graduates of command-staff level courses (some of 2-3 years duration). As a result of the refresher courses and training in the academics, this generation of officers received, albeit rather late, a fairly complete military education. A thorough political education was

78 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

also stressed so that by 1938, 95.9 percent of the corps commanders and 87 percent of the regimental commanders belonged to the party. Good Communists and hard workers, they were "... excellent executors of orders, stubborn, conscientious, and incapable of discouragement."⁵⁰ Eventually they were to defeat the German generals.

Although many of the officers of this generation took no part in the Civil War, they were all brought up on legends about its heroism. Their formative years were colored by works such as N. Ostrovsky's *How Steel Was Hardened*. As young officers they were beneath the scope of the purges in the late thirties.

Thus, in addition to substantial material improvements in the Red army during the 1930's, a broad base of politically loyal and technically proficient young officers was carefully groomed for higher command.

The Wartime Generation. In the 1940's the Soviet military establishment added a new generation of professional officers. This is the generation that fought the Great Patriotic War in the trenches at Stalingrad, in the tanks at Kursk, and in the great rolling offensive across the broad steppes of Eastern Europe. As young officers in the best years of their lives, they were inspired by the words and music of Russian nationalism.

Thus, the wartime generation of officers is professionally and psychologically quite distinct from the preceding and succeeding generations in the Soviet armed forces.⁵¹ For many, their meritorious service in World War II resulted in early postwar promotions to battalion and regimental command. In these positions of responsibility they obtained the necessary professional qualifications and political "visibility" to move higher. The members of this generation, many of whom are now flag officers, are now serving on high-level

staffs or in command of divisions or corps.

Obviously, the wartime generation of officers perceives itself as being the hard-core cadre of a professional military force. At the same time their ideological commitment to the party and the regime is quite impressive. This makes sense only if one understands the weird perspective of two careers lived jointly by the same man. Every Soviet official of any standing has a professional career and a career in the party; his performance in each constantly affects his promotion prospects in the other.

The Postwar Professionals. In the postwar years the Soviet armed forces have added two new generations of officers, with each group possessing different but perfectly valid reasons for making a career out of the military profession.

The middle management level of officers is composed largely of captains, majors, and colonels between the ages of 35 to 45. Except for some of the older ones, this generation did not participate in the Great Patriotic War. Their ages ranged from 5 to 15 at the outbreak of the war; all of them grew up in wartime in an atmosphere of intense and enthusiastic patriotism. Their fathers, uncles, and older brothers all served in the armed forces. Most of the members of this generation lost some known relative. In many cases both parents were lost during these years. Their first really vivid impressions were derived from the patriotic upsurge during the war, which produced in many a youthful desire to commit some feat of heroism such as the "gallant, fearless knights" at the front were performing.⁵² During the war the older ones worked in munitions factories while the younger ones went to school. From 1943 on many orphans entered special homes or attended one of the newly created Suvorov cadet schools.

SOVIET CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 79

The concept of dedicated service to the regime became deeply implanted. Thus, many of the young men in this generation remained in the army after enlistment and attained commissioned or noncommissioned rank. In addition, they have been able to actively participate in the growth in size, sophistication, and striking power of the Soviet armed forces in the past two decades. It would be unreasonable to even suggest that this group harbors feelings of professional inferiority.

The youngest generation of officers in the Soviet armed forces is composed of those individuals who were the war and immediate postwar babies. For them the Stalin period and the war belong in the past. Many of them, as children, did not experience the patriotic upsurge of the older generations. Thus, in some respects the members of this generation are more independent minded than their elders, who matured under different social conditions. But their ideological commitment to the regime is based on a commonly held belief that they have received the best possible education and professional training. In particular, they have been privileged to play major roles in the modern technical revolution within the Soviet armed forces. In the age of thermonuclear weaponry and missile technology, they have the training and operational experience in nuclear physics, rocketry, electronics, and computer systems. And they also grasp the modern language of industrial management and mathematical manipulation. From the standpoint of military professionalism, they enjoy certain prerogatives denied others, and they have the satisfaction of knowing that the Soviet high command recognizes that "... to such officer-specialists belongs the future of our armed forces."⁵³

* * * * *

The foregoing discussion of the evolution of four generations of military

officers suggests that the civilian political leaders have deliberately fostered the development of a high degree of professionalism in the Soviet armed forces. The process has involved some growing pains. In general, however, in return for the finest equipment and training that rubles can buy, the regime has created a loyal and thoroughly professional military establishment.

By developing a highly professional force, with all subordinate levels submissive to the top echelons, and then winning over the top military leaders, the party has accomplished its objective of complete control of the organization. Adequate loyalty at the top is ensured by a lifetime of ideological indoctrination, plus the tangible rewards which come with rank and high pay. The aspiring young Soviet military officer looks forward not simply to being a great general or admiral, but to becoming a flag officer with a good party record and good party connections.

THE SPECTER OF "BONAPARTISM"

Background. The specter of "Bonapartism," a counterrevolutionary coup by a strong military figure, has haunted the Communist Party's leaders ever since they came to power in Russia.

There are valid Russian historical precedents for the Bolsheviks to fear a mutiny from within. Even under the Czars the matter of succession was often a problem. A change of rulers was often brought about by murder, intrigue, and revolt. On several occasions the regime's own Praetorian guard sided with the opposition.⁵⁴

The First Succession Struggle. The first Soviet confrontation with the problem of succession came with Lenin's passing from power. Trotsky, the War Commissar and leader of the Red army, was widely feared as a potential Bonaparte, i.e., a creature of the Revolution who might become its subverter.⁸³

80 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Despite his influence among the upper ranks of the Red army, Trotsky was unable to make good use of his support.

However, if Trotsky was unable—or unwilling—to utilize the Red Army as a power base, his opponents were not nearly so squeamish. In the postwar years the amorphous alliances which were created during combat gradually evolved into the shadowy form of a political bloc within the military. Although for several years the members of this group were neither fully coherent in their views nor completely consolidated in their relationships, they were one of several political stalking horses used by Stalin in his efforts to oust Trotsky from control of the armed forces. Stalin's military supporters included officers of notable prestige such as Frunze, Voroshilov,⁵⁵ and Budenny.⁵⁶

The territorial reorganization concept pushed by Trotsky in the post-Civil War period alienated those military officers who realized that there would be no room for professional careers in the militia setup. However, not all of Trotsky's opponents were motivated by self-serving interests. Many of them were alarmed and frustrated by an apparent trend toward doctrinaire military conservatism.

The newly developed proletarian military doctrine was opposed by the older ex-imperial officers, on professional grounds, and by Trotsky as being bad Marxism, i.e., a true Marxist approach should be based on the avoidance of blind support for a doctrinaire military science. As the controversy continued, Trotsky was gradually made to appear to be the champion of "reactionary" policies. The fact that the ex-Czarist officers now supported him was taken as proof of his deliberate stand against the "progressivism" of the Red commanders. The effective power of Trotsky was so far reduced by mid-1924 that he was not allowed to vote at the 13th Party Congress, and by

1925 he had been ousted from the War Commissariat.

Thus the military was deeply, albeit indirectly, involved in the fateful fracas for leadership at the top which ensued during Lenin's lingering illness from May 1922 until his subsequent death in January 1924. This bitter succession struggle was played out against a turbulent backdrop of widespread social unrest, narrow political intrigue, and stumbling statesmanship. Although the Red army was not prepared to participate as an active political force in this power struggle, neither could it remain isolated and immune from the situation.

The Zhukov Affair. The oscillations of Marshal G.K. Zhukov's career after World War II form another vital premise to the theory of continuing conflict between the party organization and the military establishment.

During the war Zhukov directed the first major Soviet success in the defense of Moscow, turned the German tide at the Battle of Stalingrad, lifted the siege of Leningrad, and led the Russian advance to Berlin. For sheer operational brilliance, his exploits were unsurpassed in the Soviet military high command.

With his outstanding war record, he became the country's most famous and popular soldier. There are indications, however, that Zhukov was neither well liked personally nor well respected professionally by his peers in the military. On the purely human level, this may have been a reaction to the opportunistic manner in which Zhukov clawed his way to the top during the prewar period or to the arrogant and harsh manner with which he customarily treated his subordinates.⁵⁷ Also, from a "service reputation" standpoint, Zhukov was never fully exonerated from complicity in the Soviet failure to provide the industrial wherewithal, strategic planning, and tactical training necessary to forestall the early operational advances of the Germans.⁵⁸

SOVIET CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 81

After the war Stalin banished Zhukov to a series of obscure billets. It is uncertain whether this was due to political envy or professional jealousy. Most likely Stalin was motivated by a mixture of the two sentiments. Stalin obviously resented Zhukov's grassroots popularity. At the same time, Stalin was embarking on a deliberate effort to portray the bumbling efforts of the Soviets during the early wartime months as part of a preconceived "Stalinist military doctrine." This effort was bound to bring some sort of noisy rebuttal from a man of Zhukov's temperament and immense professional ability.⁵⁹

After a tour as Commander of the Odessa Military District, Zhukov was transferred to the command of the Ural Military District. In the midst of his political exile, in 1950, he attended the provincial party conference at Sverdlovsk (Zhukov had been a party member since 1920) and delivered a short speech. The delegates applauded him for 5 minutes, against the orders of their party secretaries. This little index of Zhukov's political sex appeal annoyed Stalin profoundly, and the marshal was forbidden to attend any large meetings in the future.⁶⁰

In 1951 Zhukov was recalled from obscurity for a mission to East Germany, and in 1952 he was elected a Candidate Member of the Central Committee. This may have been done to bolster the military as a counter to any political aspirations the secret police might have had.

Stalin's death in March of 1953 left a tremendous void at the apex of the Soviet governing hierarchy. In the leadership crisis which followed, Zhukov lined up the support of the armed forces behind the party organization, in common opposition to the secret police organization led by Beria. For this he was rewarded with full membership in the Central Committee. Later, as a Khrushchev supporter in the middle fifties, he emerged as the Minister of

Defense and even became the first military man to be voted into the inner circle of the ruling elite, the Presidium.

Exactly when Zhukov moved beyond the pale of normal civil-military relations is uncertain. The actions taken by Zhukov in June of 1957 to support one political clique against another raised doubts in the minds of many political and military leaders.⁶¹ Shortly thereafter he showed "bad form" in a public speech, presenting himself as spokesman for the armed forces and picturing the latter as a popular force prepared to deal with political cliques (which did not serve Zhukov's view of the national interest). With the support of many military leaders, Khrushchev quickly engineered the removal of Zhukov as a threat to civilian political authority. The old warhorse was put out to pasture and treated as a nonperson for several years.

In Khrushchev's behalf, it should be noted that he was simply taking the same action which President Harry Truman was forced to take with an insubordinate U.S. general 6 years earlier. As Khrushchev noted later, "He [Zhukov] didn't correctly understand his role as Minister of Defense, and we were compelled to take action against him in order to prevent him from going through with certain schemes which he had concocted."⁶²

The widespread, high-level military support for Khrushchev's demotion of Zhukov indicates more than the usual element of Soviet orthodoxy. Although Zhukov was the senior military officer in both the armed forces and the party political hierarchy, he apparently owed no special allegiance to either organization. Moreover, his opponents covered both sides of the fence. Zhukov dug his own political grave by his arrogant behavior; when he was pushed into it by party officials, it was across the outstretched ankles of many of his fellow military officers. The "Stalingrad Group," consisting of influential

82 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

officers such as Marshals Malinovsky, Grechko, Chuikov, Zakharov, Moskalenko, Bagramian, Krylov, Biriuzov, Sudets, Erementsko, Golikov, and Rotmistrov, whom Khrushchev had associated with to some extent during the siege of Stalingrad, all disliked Zhukov.⁶³

The point here is that as the misdeeds of Stalin were not representative of the party's views, as a whole, neither is Zhukov's "Bonapartist" behavior characteristic of the military organization. Zhukov was his own man.

The Palace Revolution. After Khrushchev was dethroned in October of 1964, many Western Kremlinologists immediately fingered the top Soviet military leaders as prime suspects in the affair. The combination of Zhukov's flirtation with power politics and well-known military objections to Khrushchev's economic and strategic policies was dredged up to form a circumstantial, if somewhat shallow, case against the military establishment.

Although longstanding differences with Khrushchev undoubtedly helped put the military leaders in a frame of mind receptive to the suggestion of ousting Khrushchev, there is no real evidence to suggest that the military either initiated or participated in the palace revolution. Whatever role the military played—if any—evidently it was minor. The least that can be said, however, is that the top military leaders made no attempt to use the resources at their disposal to save Khrushchev from his fate.

By the fall of 1964 there was general opposition to Khrushchev's policies and leadership style from virtually every element within the Soviet power structure. He was brought down by a coalition of his political peers rather loosely grouped around a common desire to maintain the Soviet Union's traditional commitment to the predominance of heavy industry. One of the first acts of

the new leadership was to make it clear that there would be no change in economic priorities, i.e., no shift in resource allocations from the defense sector. The new leadership would promote consumer welfare, to be sure, but not at the expense of the military's purse, as Khrushchev had advocated.

The most significant aspect of this entire situation is the notable restraint which the military high command displayed during a period of fragmented party leadership. This would have been a prime situation for a strong military figure with legitimate, longstanding party credentials to step in and seize power. A number of top military figures, such as Marshals Konev, Malinovsky, Grechko, Golikov, Vershinin, Zakharov, et al., were well qualified on both professional and political grounds to take over the top job.⁶⁴ None, apparently, felt disposed to do so.

The Sustained Succession Struggle. Since the day Khrushchev was dismissed, on 14 October 1964, it has been widely questioned in the West whether the collective leadership would endure or eventually be dissolved and replaced by a single strong man.

In part, this speculation was due to the apparent inability of the collective leadership team to cope with a continuing series of domestic and international problems, e.g., an ideological revolution in Czechoslovakia, border clashes with China, the failure of agricultural policies, space program slippages, a drop in the industrial growth rate, restiveness among the intellectuals, disaffection among youth, and accelerated disintegration of the world Communist movement, et cetera.

In addition, the complex structure of the Soviet system, not to mention several hundred years of Russian history, hardly indicates that collective rule is workable. Power tends to flow into the hands of a single, ruthless individual. A dictatorship requires a

dictator, and, in the interim period between dictators, the struggle for power continues behind the scenes.

The classic Communist succession struggle involves three phases: initial "collective leadership," for purely administrative stabilization; followed by a period of fierce backyard factional struggle; and, finally, complete consolidation and control by the new leader.

The collective leadership which replaced Khrushchev at first sought to return to the forms prescribed in party statutes. They held frequent Central Committee meetings in 1965 and managed to hold the 23d Party Congress in March of 1966. The Party Congress revamped the Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee in conformity with the new leadership. By 1967 Brezhnev was more-or-less the "first among equals" of the collective leadership, with Premier Alexi Kosygin and President Nikolai Podgorny remaining as representational figures in what seemed to be an informal triumvirate or troika.

The traumatic experience of the Czechoslovak crisis shattered the neat image of the new ruling oligarchy. As the crisis developed and climaxed with the invasion of 20 August 1968, signs began to appear of both a vacuum of power and a struggle for power at the top, with effective influence frequently appearing to pass into the hands of either the marshals of the Soviet Army or the shadowy agents of the KGB.

Among all the various leaders, factions, patronage groups, and rival machines involved in the power struggle, the malevolent presence of the secret police organization constitutes the biggest threat to all other contenders.

Conversely, the army is the only potentially "popular" organization in the competition. The Soviet people do not easily identify with the CPSU and secret police machines, which have enslaved and terrorized them for over a half a century. The armed forces, however, enjoy a reputation for loyal service

to the people, in defense of the homeland against foreign invaders.

Thus, during the prolonged inner struggle phase until Brezhnev's eventual triumph as the single supreme figure in 1971, there was frequent speculation that the military high command represented the real ruling authority. For instance, in a speech in London on 25 September 1969, Charles E. Bohlen, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, expressed the belief that the present Soviet political system would soon (within a decade) disappear. He foresaw either a military takeover or a seizure of power by disgruntled young Russians.⁶⁵

Anatole Shub, veteran *Washington Post* correspondent to Moscow, observed in 1969,

The Politburo leaders and the Party machine have yielded considerable power . . . to the army and the KGB, neither of which is under quite the firm control that Khrushchev seemed to exercise over both between 1958 and 1963. . . . The real authority of the top leaders, individually and collectively, is thus considerably circumscribed. . . . Most Moscow Kremlinologists suspect that Brezhnev has retained power as long as he has mainly through the support of the military-industrial complex . . .⁶⁶

The results of the 24th Party Congress, which clearly established Brezhnev as firmly in control of the Soviet Union in April of 1971, may be interpreted as a victory of sorts for the armed forces. Brezhnev has always been known as a heavy industry man and, as such, a favorite of the military hierarchy. Although the new number two man, Nikolai Podgorny, generally, favors consumer goods production at the expense of defense needs, his promotion to the second spot in the Kremlin lineup is probably more of a payoff for his long career as a party apparat-

84 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

chik and his strong Ukrainian support, rather than an indication of a major shift in economic priorities. In any case, at his advanced age (68), it is doubtful if he can be considered a serious contender for the role of heir apparent.

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The author's conviction is that the military never has attempted and will never attempt to take over the throne itself. Yet, the evidence would appear to confirm that the military has never been on the losing side during a succession struggle. The Soviet officer corps has a vested interest in preserving the existing political order, which even a temporary putsch would destroy. The military leaders are indebted to the system for the lofty positions they occupy and for the overall status of the armed forces in the Soviet society. Indeed, their upbringing and sense of tradition has conditioned them to reject any alternative system. While they are not reluctant to express divergent views on various party policies, they have never revealed any desire to become an independent political force which would rival the party itself.

The evidence suggests, however, that any civilian political leader with serious expectations for the top job in the Kremlin must establish a good working relationship with the top military figures. If nothing else, the military controls, behind the regular party workers and Government administrators, the third largest bloc of seats in the Central Committee (14 full/20 alternates in 1966).⁶⁷ Also, by conservative estimate, approximately 60 percent of the Soviet industry works directly to support the military.⁶⁸

ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN POLICY FORMULATION

Policy Debates. A detailed analysis of Soviet politico-military policymaking
<https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol24/iss10/10>

procedures is beyond the scope of this study. However, inasmuch as policy conflicts are sometimes apparent between Soviet political and military leaders, the author will attempt to give a broad interpretation of the effect of these disagreements on the overall politico-military relationship.

During the past decade there has been frequent evidence in the Soviet military press of independent military views on the allocation of resources and foreign policy, as well as the more technical military questions of force size, composition, doctrine, and nuclear testing.

The focal point of all policy disputes between Soviet military and political leaders has always been the problem of resource allocation. In allocating resources, the regime must decide what compromises to make between three pressing sets of requirements: light industry and consumer needs; heavy industry and military-defense claims; and overall economic growth. Khrushchev's attempts to drastically reduce armaments and manpower were vigorously and successfully opposed by the military leaders. It should be noted that many civilian political leaders also opposed Khrushchev on this issue.

In the early years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin period, the civil-military competition for rubles continued. The new military budget for 1965, announced in late 1964, called for a reduction in defense spending of 500 million rubles, suggesting a continuation of Khrushchev's emphasis on strategic missile forces at the expense of conventional forces.⁶⁹

A series of articles in the military press took issue with the cutbacks and with the one-sided emphasis on deterrence.⁷⁰ Civilian leaders continued the debate on resource priorities at the top political echelons in 1965. By late 1965 the defense-oriented people appeared to have won their case. The 1966 military budget was increased 5 percent to 13.4

billion rubles. The defense budget was further increased to 14.5 billion for 1967, and 16.7 billion for 1968, and 17.7 billion for 1969.⁷¹

The effect of this spending was to transform the U.S.S.R. from an essentially continental military power into a truly global superpower, with a balanced lineup of forces composed of strategic attack and deterrence systems, a formidable blue-water fleet, and conventional ground troops supported by modernized amphibious and airlift capabilities. The massive military buildup enables the U.S.S.R.'s civilian political leaders to maneuver in the foreign policy arena in a climate of recognized Soviet power.

Policy Formulation. In theory, the military's position on the national policymaking level ranks far below that of the civilian political leaders. A clear statement of the civilian leaders' authority is contained in Marshal Sokolovsky's authoritative *Military Strategy*: "Concentrations of the leadership of the country and its Armed Forces in the hands of the highest political agency of government control, as during the years of the last war, is a decisive condition for the victorious waging of a war. . . ."⁷²

In the Khrushchev era the military was represented on the higher military council, which functioned directly under the Presidium of the Central Committee.⁷³ In the early Brezhnev-Kosygin period, this institution appears to have been disbanded, possibly because the collective leaders were reluctant to allow a single person to wield the power which chairmanship of such a body would bestow. Curiously, the reference to a "... possible organization of a higher agency of leadership of the country and the Armed Forces. . . ." contained in the post-Khrushchev revision of *Military Strategy*, omitted the words "... and will be headed by the First Secretary of

the Central Committee of the CPSU and the head of the government, to whom the functions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces may also be entrusted."⁷⁴

A series of articles in the military professional press in 1965-67 added to the ambiguity over military access to the apex of politico-military policymaking. Marshal M.V. Zakharov, in an article in *Red Star* in February of 1965, stressed the importance of professional military expertise in the formulation of defense policy. As Chief of the Soviet General Staff, he also cautioned against the errors of subjectivism, superficial judgments, et cetera.⁷⁵

In an article in the January 1966 issue of *Military Thought*, Col. Gen. N. Lomov called for the creation of a "single military political organ which would unite the political and strategic leadership in wartime as well as in times of peace." Lomov argued that the complexity of modern warfare and the new weapons developed as a result of the technological revolution had raised the premium on professional military expertise in any command arrangement over the armed forces. Lomov pointed out that "recommendations" of the higher military command as a "highly qualified adviser" on military problems "cannot be ignored by the deciding political levels." Marshal Sokolovsky also spoke out for more professional military influence upon the strategic planning process in April of 1966.

Other military leaders upheld the political leadership. In an article in *Red Star*, Maj. Gen. V. Zemskov stated that solution of the complex tasks of modern war "falls completely within the competence of the political leadership."⁷⁶ Although Zemskov rebutted the contention that military professionals should have greater access to the top level of strategic planning, he also pointed out that there was need in the Soviet Union for peacetime creation of a single "supreme military-political

86 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

organ," through which the political leadership would exercise its role.⁷⁷ This was an oblique admission that the Soviet Union lacked adequate institutional arrangements for top-level coordination between the political and military leadership.

Further evidence of the military's concern for a fair share of the decision-making process can be seen in the flowering tributes in *Military Strategy* to the expertise of the "many talented officers and generals" and in a blunt reference to the fact that "... there are no examples where an army not having a definite organization and led by an inexperienced military leader successfully waged war with an army headed by an experienced military leader."⁷⁸ The flurry of memoirs which senior Soviet military officers rushed into print with, in the post-Khrushchev era, reflected the same critical view of the political leadership of the armed forces during World War II.⁷⁹

The marshals continued to assert themselves. In March of 1967 they succeeded in preventing the appointment of a civilian to the job of Defense Minister. When the incumbent, Marshal Malinovsky, died, party spokesmen spread the word to foreign newsmen that his replacement would be Dmitri Ustinov, a party civilian with a long career in the management of defense industry. After a week of factional struggle, Marshal Andrei A. Grechko emerged as the new Defense Minister.⁸⁰

Later in 1967 the Soviet military leaders were accused of precipitating the Middle East crisis. Subsequently, the Soviet military moved advisers, instructors, warships, and hardware into the area on an unprecedented scale.

The Czech Crisis and Its Aftermath. The Czechoslovakian crisis in 1968-69 represented a continuing display of military assertiveness in the field of major foreign policy for the Kremlin. After initial vacillation by the top civilian

political leaders, the marshals exerted sufficient pressure to force a well-executed military solution to the Czechoslovak problem.⁸¹ Later, when the civilian leaders bungled the political aspects of the invasion, the military professionals were forced to assume an even more active politico-military role during the subsequent occupation period. The zenith point for the Soviet military leaders came in April 1969, when Marshal Grechko personally flew to Prague to force the top Czech party leaders from office and install a new administration favorable to the Kremlin.⁸² Sending the Minister of Defense to dictate to a foreign Communist Party was not merely a failure to observe diplomatic form, for it also raised the serious question of whether the party was using the army to carry out its orders or vice versa.

Party officials, disturbed by the rising influence of the military, rebounded with a symbolic reminder of the primacy of civilian political leadership. The traditional May Day military parade through Red Square was abruptly canceled, and, for the first time in the Soviet era, the Minister of Defense was denied the honor of making the major speech of the day. However, at the purely civilian demonstration which was arranged, a conspicuous cluster of bemedaled marshals and generals shared the reviewing stand with the top civilian political figures.

In recent years the military press has continued to publish articles which reflect hard-line criticism of the political leadership's judgment on matters such as negotiating with the United States and slowing down the arms race.⁸³ The official position of the party is that struggles between socialist and capitalist countries "are and must be carried out by peaceful means—economic, political, ideological, but not military."⁸⁴ The general thrust of the military's argument is that as long as any form of class struggle continues, "the concept of war

SOVIET CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 87

as armed conflict in the name of definite political aims remains in force even in the present era."⁸⁵ Ergo, the need remains for continued reliance on a high level of national security based on a "steady strengthening of the military might of the Soviet Union and of the entire Socialist camp by development of production forces and continuous growth of its material-technical foundation."⁸⁶

* * * * *

It is, of course, impossible to know precisely and to what extent factional pressures and professional grievances influence the overall decisionmaking process in the Soviet Union. After all, it is not easy to establish and weigh pressure group influence in our own society, where access to relevant data is more open than in the U.S.S.R. However, some general observations can be ventured.

First, the influence of the military high command on general policy has grown immensely in the post-Stalin era, largely because of the critical importance of the Soviet armed forces in foreign affairs considerations and domestic economic issues. The fact that most major issues are usually resolved to the satisfaction of the marshals indicates that some form of institutional arrangement exists for a clear-channel transmission of military inputs to the decisionmaking process.

Second, the evidence hardly supports the proposition that the Soviet marshals have successfully usurped the ultimate authority and policymaking prerogatives of the party leaders or that they even aspire to do so. No military leader since Zhukov has been admitted to the Politburo, which is the elite ruling body of the regime.

Third, the question of who—i.e., party or military leaders—exerts the most influence on major policy decisions is largely immaterial. The

significant factor is that the really vital issues are resolved promptly and by the responsible politico-military professionals at the top. The Soviets can respond to strategic issues very rapidly.⁸⁷ In contrast to the United States tortured and drawn-out decision-making process, e.g., irresponsible public debate by unqualified and poorly informed amateurs over a missile defense system, SST development, management of the Indochina war, NATO force posture, et cetera.

Fourth, the fact that politico-military policy disagreements do crop up in the Soviet political system periodically indicates the existence of a healthy relationship among the top leaders. The fact that the military officers do voice their candid opinions, in public speeches and on the pages of professional journals, indicates lack of fear of reprisal. Even the civilian political leadership itself does not always agree on some of the matters at issue. Disputes over policy and conflict on the question of who should make policy decisions pervade the Soviet political system.⁸⁸

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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88 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Moreover, the civilian leaders are obviously intelligent enough to realize that the military leaders are only doing their duty in lobbying for increased national security. (In this regard, it appears that the Soviet military leaders were able to state their case more freely during the crucial decade of the 1960's than U.S. military men were.)⁸⁹

Fifth, with the apparent approval of the civilian leaders, the service chiefs appear to enjoy unrestricted "decision-making power within their own sphere of professional interest," when the international situation calls for specific operational military action.⁹⁰ Khrushchev was the last civilian leader with any legitimate credentials as a pseudo-commander, based on actual wartime operational experiences.

CONCLUSIONS

Eternal peace lasts only until the next war.

—Russian Proverb⁹¹

On the Question of Lasting Disagreements Between the CPSU and the Soviet Military Establishment. Are there, in fact, genuine and lasting institutional disagreements between the CPSU and the Soviet military establishment? The answer to this question must be prefaced with the reminder that the political cohesiveness of a particular governmental system in any major country is downright difficult—if not impossible—to measure with electronic precision. Factional disputes and group liaisons, as well as certain basic trends and prevailing problems, can all be identified. Yet, in politics the whole is not always equal to the sum of the parts. Nonetheless, a negative answer to the preceding question is supportable when the following points are considered.

First, the Communist Party's political control over the armed forces in the Soviet Union has fluctuated greatly in

degree and effectiveness over the years. But the civilian political control has never been so oppressive as to transform the military establishment into an angry and carnivorous beast estranged from the mainstream of the Soviet political system. On the contrary, the military has always led a moderately active, although inconspicuous, political life. The Soviet civilian leadership has always encouraged a sense of political participation and development among the professional officer corps. That this was done for reasons of self-preservation in no way detracts from the situation. Many of the top military leaders even sit on the party's Central Committee. However, the Soviet political system is in no danger of becoming a stratoocracy.

Second, it is important to realize that the effect of the party's centralized politico-military control system is perceived differently at various strata within the military. At the operational levels, for instance, the party's efforts have been—and, no doubt, will remain—a source of some friction and frustration to many professional officers. Similarly, but for different reasons, officers in the command hierarchy continue to express various complaints, but these are in no way extraordinary in scope or in intensity of feeling. Overall, the routine inconveniences caused by party interferences are shared by all elements of the society, and most Soviet citizens learn to live with them. The situation is somewhat analogous to a persistent, but tolerable, head cold; certainly it is nowhere near as debilitating as, say, a terminal case of cancer. One must be careful to not confuse a myriad number of minor complaints with an accurate representation of the overall attitude of the majority.

Third, with regard to the major Soviet politico-military disputes, e.g., over matters such as national security and the domestic economic situation, it is obvious that institutional labels are meaningless. Many of the major Soviet

politico-military disputes, (e.g., strategic doctrines, employment of forces, et cetera) have been of an intra-institutional nature, rather than across party-military lines. While the professional soldiers consistently argue for a greater allocation of resources for national security, at the top they are all party members. All of the leading civilian and military leaders are in basic agreement that no economic program will be undertaken which might impair Soviet security. In nearly every case the so-called major historical "conflicts" have been resolved to the satisfaction and long-term advantage of the military establishment. Moreover, the Soviet military leadership has always welcomed the party's efforts toward intensive industrialization, systematic control of the sources of food and raw materials, and imposition of discipline on the masses.

Finally, there is the matter of ideological orientation. The military is even "more ideologically oriented than is the Party."⁹² The Soviet politico-military leadership really does believe that peace is only the interval between conflicts. In addition to the basic Marxist-Leninist viewpoint on this subject, there is the factor of a scarred psychological heritage, resulting from centuries of foreign invasions on Russian soil. The military's ties to the Soviet state are rooted as much in national pride as in party ideology, and the party has skillfully managed to capitalize on this aspect by identifying itself with the objectives imposed by Great Russian geopolitical determinism. If nothing else, the historical direction of Mother Russia is clear to both civilian and military leaders.

Effect of Soviet Civil-Military Relations. The overall effect of the political-military institutional arrangement on the Soviet political system is one of stabilization. The ruling elite enjoys the unqualified support of the overwhelming majority of the Soviet mili-

tary establishment, which would willingly assist in suppressing domestic disorders or a modern-day revolt from within the ranks—such as the Streltsi, Dekahrist, and Kronstadt uprisings. The Soviet military establishment has, in effect, replaced the secret police apparatus as the principal pillar of the regime.

The manifold dimensions of this fact are of direct concern to the West, i.e., the West cannot expect future Soviet internal developments to lessen the threat to U.S. security. For the foreseeable future, the Soviet Union will continue to become a stronger and more formidable opponent.

The evolution of Soviet politico-military relations into an efficient working model greatly improves the U.S.S.R.'s capacity to press the contest with the West. In return for their support of the system, the top Soviet military leaders are in a position to exert an aggressive influence on the overall thrust of Soviet foreign policy. Yet, the Soviet leaders' emphasis on the ultimate political determination of military policy is fully accepted by the military. This is in line with their Marxist view of the essentially political nature of war and in consonance with Lenin's doctrine of tight control by an elite clique.

The extreme centralization of Soviet political, economic, and military leadership provides the U.S.S.R. with a notable strategic advantage over the West. A small group of leaders possesses the power to make profound policy decisions; hence, the system is geared to generate vital decisions much faster than Western governments are able to. The speedy buildup of the Soviet's strategic missilery, their "new" navy, and the blitzkrieg of Czechoslovakia are painful examples of this capability.

While the enormous bureaucracy below is used to govern and control, the real decisionmaking power remains in

90 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

the hands of a very few leaders at the top. The Soviet military leaders belong to that group. They are, in effect, part of the "ruling elite."

FOOTNOTES

1. Speech at the Eighth Party Congress, 18 March 1919.
2. Louis Nemzer, "Conflicting Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in the USSR," RAC-TP-142 (McLean, Va.: Research Analysis Corp., May 1964), p. 7.
3. Roman Kolkowicz, "The Soviet Army and the Communist Party: Institutions in Conflict," R-446-PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, August 1966), p. 15-16. Also see Abdurakhman Avtorkbanov, *The Communist Party Apparatus* (Chicago: Regnery, 1966), p. 306.
4. Milton C. Lodge, *Soviet Elite Attitudes since Stalin* (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1969), p. 29, 99-119.
5. Figures released on the 50th anniversary of the regime in 1967 showed 85 percent of the entire military personnel were members of the party or of the Kosomol. Among the officer corps alone, the figure was even higher at 93 percent. John N. Hazard, *The Soviet System of Government*, 4th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 161.
6. The precise number of ex-Czarist officers and NCO's recruited into the Red army is uncertain. "Almost 40,000" is the figure set by George Von Rauch in *A History of Soviet Russia* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 100. The figure is listed as "no fewer than 40,409 ex-officers" and "214,717 ex-NCO's" by John Erickson in *The Soviet High Command* (London: Macmillan, 1962), p. 33.
7. During the initial phase of the war, the commissars were representatives of Lenin's infant Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Although for the most part Communists, their political complexion covered all shades of the socialist left. Of 500 commissars sent out from 1 July to 10 October 1918, there were 300 Communists, 93 Communist "sympathizers," 35 leftist S.R.'s, three "Internationalists," one Anarchist, one S.R.-Maximalist, and 60 of no party affiliation whatsoever. Erickson, p. 45-46.
8. Stalin's position as a civilian involved in the Civil War was not clearly defined. He had no senior military appointment but turned himself into what Trotsky described as a "manager of all the military forces at the front." Erickson, p. 68.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 39-40, 67-68; Kenneth R. Whiting, *The Development of the Soviet Armed Forces, 1917-1966* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University, 1966), p. 17; Von Rauch, p. 89; Ian Grey, *The First Fifty Years: Soviet Russia, 1917-1967* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1967), p. 143.
10. Party membership among the graduates of these courses was as follows: 1918, 70 percent; 1919, 54 percent; 1920, 62 percent; 1921, 65 percent. Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled*, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 470.
11. However, many of these aggressive young officers—men like V.K. Blyukher, S.M. Budenny, S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, N.I. Krylov, R.I. Malinovsky, K.A. Vershinin, M.V. Zakharov, et al—achieved remarkable successes in the field and were not only destined to enjoy later high command in the Red army hierarchy, but to become involved in subsequent politico-military disputes.
12. The Red army's major offensive on Polish soil during this war was a chastening experience. Tukhachevsky led a vast sweep through northern Poland toward Warsaw in anticipation of support on his southern flanks by Stalin's 1st Cavalry Army. The entire process of planning and logistics was poorly coordinated to begin with, and the Poles quickly routed the Russian force after the flanking support from the south did not materialize.
13. Vladimir I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), v. XXIX, p. 448.
14. Nemzer, p. 14.
15. A. Beloborodov, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 6 May 1961.
16. M.V. Zakharov, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 12 October 1962.
17. V.D. Sokolovsky, ed., *Military Strategy*, 3d ed. (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1968), p. 387.
18. From the "New Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," in Arthur P. Mendel, et al., *Essential Works of Marxism* (New York: Bantam Books, 1961), p. 459; and Sokolovsky, p. 385-386.
19. Sokolovsky, p. 386, 394.
20. Mendel, p. 460.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Roman Kolkowicz, "The Impact of Modern Technology on the Soviet Officer Corps," P-3380 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand) (Paper presented at the 6th World Congress of Sociology, 6 September 1966, Evian, France); Roman Kolkowicz, "Political Controls in the Red Army: Professional Autonomy Versus Political Integration," P-3402 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, July 1967), pass.; and Roman Kolkowicz, "The Impact of Technology on the Soviet Military: a Challenge to Traditional Military Professionalism," RM-4198-PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, August 1964), pass.

23. R.Y. Malinovsky, "Address to the XXIII Congress CPSU," William R. Kintner and Harriet F. Scott, et al., eds., *The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs* (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press), p. 278-289; and A.A. Yepishev, "Address to the XXIII Congress of the CPSU," *Ibid.*, p. 289-301.

24. M.V. Zakharov, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 15 October 1961.

25. Sokolovsky, p. 394.

26. Malinovsky, quoted in Kintner and Scott, p. 288.

27. The sanguinary struggle between the NKVD and the Red army erupted in Spain when the secret police knifed through to control over all Soviet personnel, the International Brigade, and the Republican government itself. The army officers objected to the NKVD's insistence on pro-Stalinist orthodoxy, at the expense of victory. Whiting, p. 34. Also see Erickson, p. 452, 455.

28. Seweryn Bialer, et al., ed., *Stalin and His Generals* (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 567, pass.; Whiting, p. 34.

29. George Kalkov, *The Trial of Bukharin* (New York: Stein and Day, 1969), p. 161, pass.

30. Leonard Shapiro, "The Great Purge," B.H. Liddell Hart, et al., ed., *The Red Army* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), p. 70; and Boris Nicolaevsky, "Crimes of the Stalin Era," *The New Leader* (New York: 1962), p. 39; Walter Goerlitz, *History of the German General Staff* (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 307-308.

31. As early as 1922 the Soviets and the then secret German General Staff were engaged in a surreptitious exchange program. Soviet officers such as Tukhachevsky went to Berlin to study the command and staff procedures of the elite professionals in the clandestine Truppenamt organization. The Germans, in turn, were able to train in Russia with real military hardware. Nearly all of the high ranking officers that Stalin purged in the late thirties had passed through the Reichswehr's instructional course. Goerlitz, p. 232-233, pass.

32. Bialer, p. 59; and Whiting, p. 26.

33. Erickson, p. 506.

34. Khrushchev, "Crimes of the Stalin Era," p. 39.

35. Bialer, p. 63-114. As Admiral Kuznetsov described it later, although many of the officers were "tormented by doubts . . . [most] . . . had no idea of the true scale of the violations of legality." *Ibid.*, p. 92; also see Erickson, p. 462, 465-466.

36. Edward Crankshaw and Strobe Talbott, eds., *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 89.

37. Whiting, p. 65-66.

38. Nemzer, p. 30-33.

39. Lieutenant General Kalashnik, deputy head of the MPA, stated that "since 1945 the number of engineer technicians in the armed forces has grown three times," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, no. 22, November 1962, p. 15. While the absolute increase of technicians was indeed threefold, the relative increase was between 10 and 15 times, because in 1962, when Kalashnik was writing, the Red army was only about one-quarter the size it had been in 1945. Kolkowicz, "The Impact of Modern Technology on the Soviet Officer Corps," p. 23.

40. Nicolai Galay, "The New Generation in the Soviet Armed Forces," *Studies on the Soviet Union*, v. V, no. 2, p. 29-46.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 33-39.

42. Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads," RM-4085-PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, April 1964), p. 100; Kolkowicz, "The Soviet Army and the Communist Party: Institutions in Conflict," p. 19, 23-41; Lodge, p. 107.

43. Lenin, p. 153.

44. *Ibid.*

45. Trotsky's plan was not simply an unrealistic melange of utopian thought. The intent was to use the socialist worker-peasant militia program to support the needs of both industry and defense. The militia was to be organized to correspond to major industrial and agrarian centers so that local trade union officials might also become militia commanders. Thus the effect would be a virtual physical dictatorship of the proletariat with worker-soldier cadres spreading the party control over the whole country.

92 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

46. The regular army was reorganized into a peacetime force of 562,000 men. Overall, the army was composed of 29 regular and 42 territorial infantry divisions.

47. Mikhail Frunze, although a party intellectual, compiled an impressive record as a self-taught military leader between 1917 and 1921. He commanded the Eastern Front that smashed Adm. A.V. Kolchak's forces and later commanded the armies which destroyed Baron Wrangel's troops in the autumn of 1920. He emerged from the war with the reputation of being a first-rate tactician and strategist.

48. Sokolovsky, p. 383; Edward M. Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 350-353; Nicolas Spulher, *Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 74.

49. For example, aircraft procurement went from 860 planes a year in 1931 to 3,578 in 1937; tank production increased from 740 a year in 1931 to 3,139 in 1937; and artillery pieces increased from 2,000 guns in 1931 to over 5,000 in 1937. Whiting, p. 23.

50. Michel Garder, *A History of the Soviet Army* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 100.

51. Since the generation of wartime junior officers is now on the verge of becoming the new high command cadre, it is interesting to speculate on the general psychological makeup of the group. The most decisive elements in their makeup may be found in the heavy defeats at the beginning of the war, when entire regiments were virtually annihilated (see Peter Deriabin and Peter Gibney, *The Secret World* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), p. 51). Their most characteristic traits may be seen in an endless stream of tendentious war fiction such as K. Simonov's *Days and Nights*, *The Wing and the Dead*, and *They Were Not Born Soldiers* and in V. Nekrasov's *In the Trenches of Stalingrad* and *The Second Day*.

52. Galay, p. 31-32.

53. Marshal Biriuzov, former Chief of the General Staff, quoted in Kolkowicz, "The Impact of Modern Technology on the Soviet Officer Corps," p. 7.

54. Notably the Streltsi, the elite royal guard, who participated in several mutinies in the 17th century; the officers and imperial guardsmen who participated in the Dekabrist uprising in 1825; and also the troops who joined in with the rebels during the 1905 revolution.

55. Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov was fundamentally a full-time political hack, however, with scarcely any qualifications as a soldier, except for his wartime association with Stalin.

56. Trotsky's reply to Budenny's request for a cavalry command in 1918 provides a clue to the depth of alienation between the two men. Budenny, who had been a professional cavalryman as an NCO in the Imperial Army, was told by Trotsky: "You don't understand the nature of cavalry. That is a very aristocratic family of troops, commanded by princes, barons, and counts . . ." Erickson, p. 70.

57. Bialer, p. 89, 138-141, 417-420, 434-430, pass; Crankshaw and Talbott, p. 170; Garder, p. 147.

58. James E. McSherry, *Stalin, Hitler and Europe: the Imbalance of Power, 1939-1941* (Cleveland: World, 1970), v. II, p. 249-251; Matthew P. Gallagher, *The Soviet History of World War II* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 144, 158-159; Bialer, p. 151, 184-218, and 369-372.

59. For Marshal Zhukov's own authoritative description of the epic defense of Moscow and the subsequent counteroffensive, see Bialer, p. 277-293 and 318-336.

60. Deriabin and Gibney, p. 219.

61. An attempted coup against Khrushchev by the "Anti-Party Group" was thwarted when Zhukov arranged for a spectacular airlift to Moscow for Khrushchev supporters to participate in a special session of the Central Committee.

62. Crankshaw and Talbott, p. 162.

63. Roman Kolkowicz, *Conflicts in Soviet Party-Military Relations: 1962-63* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, August 1963), p. 4, 37-45. Also see Garder, p. 146. Another bitter opponent of Zhukov's was Marshal Ivan Konev, although the latter was not, technically, a member of the "Stalingrad Group." Their professional rivalry dated back to 1939 when Zhukov relieved Konev, for cause, of his command in the Far East and continued unabated throughout WW II and the postwar period.

64. All of these officers fought for the Red army during the Civil War and joined the party before any of the top civilian contenders such as Brezhnev and Kosygin did.

65. Dickinson, p. 916.

66. Anatole Shub, *The New Russian Tragedy* (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 115.

67. Yaroslav Bilinsky, *Changes in the Central Committee: Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1961-1966* (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1967), p. 49.

68. Shub, p. 81. The estimate of 60 percent is imprecise because of the "two-track" Soviet price structure; thus a ruble is worth only about 25 cents in consumer goods, but buys \$2.50 worth of military hardware.


SOVIET CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 93

69. Alfred L. Monks, "Evolution of Soviet Military Thinking," *Military Review*, March 1971, p. 82.
70. Thomas W. Wolfe, "Polieymaking in the Soviet Union: a Statement with Supplementary Comments, P-4131 (Washington: Rand, 23 June 1969), p. 14.
71. Monks, p. 82; Wolfe, "Polieymaking in the Soviet Union."
72. Sokolovsky, p. 376.
73. Wolfe, "Polieymaking in the Soviet Union," p. 17 (n.b.: The Higher Military Council was also sometimes described as the Supreme, or Main, Military Council.)
74. Sokolovsky, p. 476, 487.
75. Thomas W. Wolfe, "Problems of Soviet Defense Policy under the New Regime," P-3098 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, March 1965), p. 9-11.
76. V. Zenskov, "For the Theoretical Seminar: an Important Factor for Victory in War," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 5 January 1967, quoted in Wolfe, "Polieymaking in the Soviet Union," p. 17.
77. *Ibid.*
78. Sokolovsky, p. 378-382.
79. Bialer, p. 339-461; and Dickinson, p. 903.
80. Shub, p. 109.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 97-102.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 107-108; and Wolfe, p. 18-19.
83. Wolfe, "Polieymaking in the Soviet Union," p. 20-21; and Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Policy in the Setting of a Changing Power Balance," P-4055 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, March 1969), p. 11.
84. Sokolovsky, p. 180.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
87. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, *National Policy Machinery in the Soviet Union* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1960), p. 57, 65-66; and Arleigh Burke, et al., *The Soviet Military Technological Challenge* (Washington: The Center for Strategic Studies, 1967), pass.; and Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Power and European Security," P-3429 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, August 1966), p. 25-27.
88. Lodge, p. 114, pass.
89. For readers who might wish to pursue this subject, from the aspects of strategy, tactics, and logistics, I highly recommend the following materials: Jaci Erickson, "A Seat for the Soldier at the National Council Table," *Armed Forces Journal*, 1 November 1969, p. 2; Thomas A. Lane, "The Kissinger Variant," *Armed Forces Journal*, 21 December 1970, p. 8-9; Henry E. Eccles, "The TFX F-111 Aircraft: a Perspective in Military Command and Defense Management," *Naval War College Review*, April 1971, p. 66-87; Paul R. Schratz, "The Ivy-Clad Man on Horseback," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, March 1965, p. 42-49; and Samuel P. Ingram, "Civilian Command or Civilian Control," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1968, p. 26-31.
90. U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *New Directions in the Soviet Economy* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966), p. 61.
91. Robert D. Heinl, Jr., *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1966), p. 235.
92. Lodge, p. 90.



That the soldier is but the servant of the statesman, as war is but an instrument of diplomacy, no educated soldier will deny. Politics must always exercise an extreme influence on strategy; but it cannot be gainsaid that interference with the commanders in the field is fraught with the gravest danger.

G.F.R. Henderson: Stonewall Jackson, 1898



THE BAROMETER

(After reading Professor Andrew Patterson's excellent work "Mining: a Naval Strategy" in the May issue, the writer was provoked into investigating Soviet mine warfare capabilities and strategy. Following are the fruits of his research, taken from Soviet literature, describing the state of contemporary mine warfare in the Soviet Navy. Ed.)

SOVIET MINE WARFARE

In recent years mine warfare appears to have been deemphasized in the Soviet Navy, but Moscow almost certainly still maintains a considerable capability to lay defensive mine barriers in the approaches to the Soviet coast and for offensive operations in the strategic narrows through which NATO ships and submarines must pass. Soviet naval interest in the past few years apparently has been focused on such topics as ASW, new missile systems, new types of nuclear submarines, and electronics. The relative merits of these systems rather than mine warfare are being discussed in the Soviet journals. Nor can any great Soviet innovations in mine warfare be inferred through a review of open source press accounts of recent Soviet naval exercises and ship deployments.

A recent Soviet book in last year's worldwide naval exercise "Okean," for instance, made only one mention of mine warfare and that was an account of how sappers with the attacking forces removed a defensive minefield in the amphibious landing area off the Murmansk coast.¹ A detailed review of available Soviet literature on the subject suggests that the Soviet Navy has a mine warfare capability similar to that attained by U.S. forces during the Korean

war, that there is little command interest in the subject, that Soviet ships seldom exercise in minelaying and mine-sweeping, and that most of the newer classes of Soviet surface combatants and submarines are not being equipped for mine warfare.

This is a significant departure from Soviet naval traditions. According to Soviet sources, the first combat use of mines was by the Russian Navy off Kronstadt in 1855, and there has been a glorious history of developing new types of mines, mining tactics, and sweeping techniques since then.²

Russian mining of the Baltic and Black Seas during the First World War was effective against German naval forces, but the Soviets apparently expended little effort in the development of new equipment and tactics during the next decade or so and were ill-prepared for the Nazi use of several new types of influence mines—such as the pressure mine—during World War II.³ Although there were individual acts of heroism by Soviet minemen involved in the clearing of German mines, Soviet surface ships and submarines were virtually bottled up in their ports by the German minefields in the Baltic. German mining of key inland waterways such as the Danube River also cost the Soviets many vessels, and their vital cargoes were delayed. A few Soviet submarines did manage to make their way to sea in the Baltic, but were not very effective in their operations against German shipping. One of the factors almost certainly influencing the Soviet submarines was the psychological impact of operating in waters known to be mine infested.

A Soviet account of this period states that the Germans and their allies laid 247,000 mines, many of them by aircraft, during the war, but also claims that the Nazis lost 108 ships to Soviet mines.⁴ The removal of these mines after the war was an arduous task. Clearing operations started in 1944, but it was not until 1953 that most of the major regions were essentially clear. In the process of clearing some 15,000 square miles of the Baltic, the Soviets destroyed 6,850 mines.⁵ With the lessons of World War II fresh in their memory, mine warfare was in the vogue among the officers of the Soviet high command during the 1950's.⁶

In the decade following World War II, the Soviets appeared to be taking a great interest in the development of aircraft- and submarine-laid mines as a method of protecting the Soviet coast against intruding naval forces. Most of the German technology developed during the war was available to them, and the large Soviet submarine force appeared to be particularly suitable for mining operations. With the development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, cruise missile-equipped submarines, aircraft and surface ships, nuclear submarines, and long-range attack aircraft by the early 1960's, Soviet interest appeared to swing from defensive measures such as mine warfare to the new strategic attack systems. It was during this period that the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Gorshkov, gave his famous order sending the fleet to sea⁷ and set the goal of transforming the Soviet Navy into the world's number one maritime power.

The dearth of information makes it very difficult to assess present Soviet capabilities in mine warfare. Most of the Soviet surface combatants and attack submarines are still believed to be capable of laying mines. There is no evidence, however, that mines are carried on any of the 40-odd Soviet units

normally deployed to the Mediterranean, but Soviet ships and aircraft could effectively mine such areas as the waters south of Crete and Strait of Sicily. Defensive mining measures, using mines stored in Egypt, could be implemented on short notice. Offensive mining in areas frequented by NATO ships (Mediterranean, Sea of Japan, Norwegian Sea, Caribbean) could be accomplished by Soviet aircraft and submarines. The Soviets almost certainly would mine with great care, recognizing a very important drawback; no mine is known to exist which can distinguish friend from foe.

Mine countermeasures likewise are not receiving a great amount of attention in the Soviet Navy. Several mine-sweeping-type vessels frequently are present in the Mediterranean, but these units appear to be used primarily for patrol and escort duties. The small wooden hull *Vanya* class minesweepers appear to be equipped to function as minehunters, and acoustic countermeasures gear has been observed on the decks of several classes of Soviet ships. Again, a review of recent Soviet exercises and literature on mine countermeasures reflects little command interest in the subject.

All of the foregoing does not necessarily mean that the Soviets have fallen into the same trap they did between the two World Wars. Research and development in mine warfare almost certainly continues in the U.S.S.R. There is no reason why the Soviets, like the United States, are not working on mines similar to the Captor, which can be laid covertly by aircraft or submarines to wait in stealth for an enemy submarine. The development of such a mine would obviously be a top secret program in the U.S.S.R., but a recent slip in a Soviet publication strongly suggests that they may be developing an electrical field mine.⁸ This article, which purports to describe U.S. proximity (or influence) mines, enumerates four types: hydro-

96 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

dynamie, aeoustic, electrical, and magnetic. Since Western navies have no electrical mines, the author almost certainly was describing a Soviet system. The fuzing system of an electrical mine consists of a series of moored electrodes which detect discreet changes in the electrical field caused by the electrolysis between the various types of metal in a ship's hull. The approach is somewhat similar to that used in a magnetic influence mine, but probably is more difficult to counter and could be used against submarines.

A final consideration is the value of the threat of mine warfare to reduce the freedom of operation of enemy naval units in the waters off the Soviet coast. If the Soviets were known to have an up-to-date mining arsenal and announced that they had mined an area such as the Norwegian Sea or eastern Mediterranean, U.S. surface combatants and submarines operating in those waters would have to tread carefully.

JOHN CHOMEAU
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
FOOTNOTES

1. *Okean* (Moscow: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1970), p. 129.
2. B. Nikolayev, "Mine-Torpedo Weapons," *Starshina i Serzhant*, no. 11, 1970, p. 20.
3. Von Siegfried Breyer, "Soviet Minelayers and Minesweepers," *Soldat und Technik*, March 1968, p. 116.
4. V. Nikolayev and V. Romanovskiy, *Naval Minemen* (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1957), p. 28.
5. Nikolai A. Pitserskii, ed., *Combat Path of the Soviet Navy* (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1966), p. 20.
6. Breyer.
7. For example, statements by Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov, *Red Star*, 5 February 1963 and *Communist of the Armed Forces*, July 1963.
8. B. Nikolayev. Electrical influence mine shown in schematic drawing as well as discussion of fuzing operations in text, p. 20.



The mine issues no official communiques.

Adm. William V. Pratt, USN: In "Newsweek"
magazine, 5 October 1942



RESEARCH IN THE MAHAN LIBRARY

A LONG LOST FARRAGUT LETTER IS REDISCOVERED

Lieutenant John B. Hattendorf, USN

In his biography of Admiral Farragut published in 1892, Alfred Thayer Mahan noted: "Farragut was essentially and unaffectedly a religious man. The thoughtfulness and care with which he prepared for his greater undertakings, the courage and fixed determination to succeed with which he went into battle, were tempered with grace by a profound submission to the almighty will." This insight into the character of America's first admiral is clearly revealed in a letter which he wrote to his wife just a few days before the Battle of Mobile Bay. Used by Mahan as a source for his biography, the letter was lost to later Farragut scholars and only recently was rediscovered among a collection of Mahan papers which were presented to the Naval War College by Alfred Thayer Mahan II, the historian's grandson. The Mahan documents will appear in the U.S. Naval Institute's forthcoming *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan*, edited by Dr. Robert Seager II.

By the summer of 1863, the first great strategic objectives of the North in the Civil War had been achieved. The fall of Port Hudson, Vicksburg, and New Orleans brought the Mississippi River almost entirely under control. The Confederacy had been severed; the seceded States to the west isolated. Federal forces now concentrated their chief efforts to the east. Rosecrans, Grant, and Sherman began a drive aimed at creating another division, this time

from Nashville to the sea. Leaving command of the Mississippi to Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter, Farragut undertook to tighten the grip on the South by closing the remaining gulf ports.

With the evacuation of Pensacola and the fall of New Orleans, Mobile became the last important Confederate gulf port. It was connected to the major cotton producing areas by rail lines and by numerous tributaries of the two large rivers which emptied into its bay. The town was also an industrial center. It was there that the ironclads *Tennessee*, *Tuscaloosa*, and *Huntsville* were fitted out and the submarine *H.L. Hunley* was built. With the closing of other ports, Mobile took on a special significance to the Southern cause and, also, to the Union Navy which viewed it as an attractive objective.

Farragut made his first reconnaissance of the coastal defenses and naval forces in January 1864. At that time he reported to the Secretary of the Navy that ironclads would be essential for a successful attack. In addition to the guns of Fort Morgan, Fort Gaines, and Fort Powell, the shallow waters at the entrance to the bay were guarded by a squadron of ships which included the powerful, ironclad *Tennessee*, Buchanan's flagship. The main channel, meanwhile, was sown with mines (at that time known as torpedoes). Mobile's defenses were commanded by Admiral Franklin Buchanan, former captain,

98 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

U.S. Navy, who had "gone South" when it appeared as though his native Maryland would secede. He was promoted to admiral in recognition of his outstanding service while in command of the James River naval defenses in 1862. It was his flagship, the ironclad U.S.S. *Virginia* [Merrimac] which sank the U.S.S. *Cumberland* and the U.S.S. *Congress* at Hampton Roads on 8 March 1862 and which fought the U.S.S. *Monitor* the following day.

The main attack did not occur until 6 months later. On 12 July 1864 Farragut issued General Order No. 10 in which he told his squadron commanders: "Strip your vessels and prepare for the conflict." After outlining the specific tactics to be used, he awaited the arrival of the Army transports which carried troops for the landing and the ironclad monitors to be the principal weapons in the engagement. These began to arrive toward the end of the month. Sensing the nearness of battle, he wrote to his son on 31 July:

The monitors have all arrived, except Tecumseh, and she is at Pensacola and I hope will be here in two days. The Confederates at

Fort Morgan are making great preparations to receive us. That concerns me but little. I know Buchanan, and Page, who commands the fort, will do all in their power to destroy us, and we will reciprocate the compliment. I hope to give them a fair fight, if I once get inside. I expect nothing from them but that they will try to blow up if they can. . . .

With such a mother, you could not fail to have proper sentiments of religion and virtue. I feel that I have done my duty by you both, as far as the weakness of my nature would allow. I have been devoted to you both, and when it pleases God to take me hence, I shall feel that I have done my duty. I am not conscious of ever having wronged anyone, and have tried to do as much good as I could. . . .

In the recently acquired letter of the same date to his wife, Farragut does not go into the details of the forthcoming conflict, but he does express the same faith. The letter is reproduced here in its entirety.

U.S. Flag Ship Hartford
West Gulf Squadron
Off Mobile, July 31st 1864

My dearest Wife,

My monitors are all here now, so that I begin to feel that I am the one to attack, and no longer expect to be attacked by Buchanan, although I really wish he had made the effort to test the question—When I shall attack I know not, as I am waiting on the Army as they say—I hope for the best results as I am always hopeful [sic] put my shoulder to the wheel with my best judgement and trust to God for the rest, he has thus far been gracious beyond my deserts, but should he think proper to withdraw that protection and decide that I have done enough mischief in the world and cut me off in the midst of my sins—I know nothing to say, but that I am ready to submit to his wish—My dear sister sent me a holy Virgin like the one Itose gave. She said it was blessed by the Archbishop—that he said I was good to all the Priest-[sic] I only tell you this to show you that they did not succeed in impressing the Bishop that I had robbed the church at Point Coupée—Give my love to your dear mother and sister and Robert and Newton and Ashe May God bless and protect you all, ever prays your devoted husband

D.G. Farragut

To, Mrs. D.G. Farragut
Hastings on the Hudson,
N.Y.

Though obviously a deeply religious person, Farragut did not belong to any established church until late in life. He was raised as a Roman Catholic, and his immediate family were still of that persuasion. Mrs. Farragut, however, was an Episcopalian, and he regularly attended church with her. When he died in 1870, he was buried with Episcopalian rites. The letter tells of the gift of a representation of the Holy Virgin from a sister, Mrs. Nancy Farragut Gurlic, who was then at Biloxi, Miss., and had tried to see him but was unable to do so because of the impending battle. It was, he noted, similar to that given to him by Rose Hughes, a devoted maid of the Farragut family and an ardent Catholic. Farragut was especially pleased when informed that the representation had been blessed by an archbishop who had remarked that the Admiral had been kind to Catholic priests. During the operation on the Mississippi the previous year, he and his men had been falsely accused of stealing private property and robbing the church at Point Coupée near Port Hudson.

The Battle of Mobile Bay fought on 5 August was a brilliant Union naval victory and the crowning achievement of Farragut's career. His determination and daring overcame the formidable obstacles which would have caused a lesser mind to hesitate and turn aside. A concise but accurate assessment of this feat was made by Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles when he remarked in a letter of congratulations: "In the success which has attended your operations you have illustrated the efficiency and irresistible power of a naval force led by a bold and vigorous mind." Never the one to slight his strong conviction that God controls the destiny of men and affairs, Farragut published on 7 August a brief general order which declared: "The Admiral desires the fleet to return thanks to Almighty God for the signal victory over the enemy on the morning of the 5th instant."

Gifts and Acquisitions

Two original journals of the successful American privateer *Yankee* of the War of 1812 have come from Mr. William Veazie Pratt, Jr. The *Yankee* sailed from Bristol, R.I., and was commanded by Capt. Oliver Wilson. The journals are for the first and second cruises and cover the period July 1812-February 1813. Mr. Pratt presented the volumes through the Naval War College Foundation. Papers of Lt. Cyrus W. Breed, USN, were also deposited in the college by the foundation. Breed, a native of Toledo, Ohio, graduated from the Naval Academy in 1865, while it was at Newport, R.I. He subsequently served aboard the U.S.S. *Swatara*, 1867-1869, on the European station and the U.S.S. *Nantasket*, 1869-1872, in the Caribbean Sea. Included in the papers are letters concerning experiences and observations while in European waters, a diary of a cruise to Santo Domingo in 1872 in connection with a revolutionary outbreak, navigational calculations, and sailing schedules. Professor Dirk Ballendorf presented copies of documents relating to the life and career of Col. Earl Hancock Ellis, USMC, Naval War College student and staff member, 1911-1913. Ellis foresaw the rapid rise of Japanese strength in the Pacific while at the Naval War College and later pressed for the strong defense of America's island possessions. An enigmatic character in the annals of Marine Corps

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Lt. John B. Hattendorf, U.S. Navy, holds a B.A. from Kenyon College, an M.A. from Brown University, and a certificate from the Munson Institute of American Maritime History. He served on the staffs of the Office of Naval History and the Naval Historical Collection of the Naval War College.

100 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

history, he died under mysterious conditions in 1921 in the Japanese mandate islands.


Glass negatives of views of American naval ships, circa 1910, were presented by Dr. John B. Ellis, O.B.E., through

Captain Jacobs of the Center for War Gaming. Two old U.S. naval uniforms (circa 1910), were presented for the college museum collection by Professor Tuleja, former King Chair occupant, and Mr. Robert Hanna.



I think Carlyle's saying that the true university is a collection of books is of greater force today than when the Sage of Chelsea uttered it. I have an unshaken conviction that democracy can never be undermined if we maintain our library resources and a national intelligence capable of utilizing them.

*Franklin D. Roosevelt: To Herbert Putnam,
1953; Bookburners*



PROFESSIONAL READING

Professor Scott and his associates have addressed the complex, often oversimplified, subjects of insurgency and counterinsurgency in an extremely scholarly and analytical manner. The book views an insurgency as a system of inputs and outputs regulated by numerous variable control mechanisms. The end result of this systems analysis approach is a dynamic model of insurgency based not on historical precedent, but on flexible input variables. Thus each insurgency and its parallel counter-insurgent effort should be analyzed as a separate entity, examining in detail the unique political, sociological, psychological, economic, and military factors involved. This analytical approach to the study of insurgency and counter-insurgency movements, coupled with a basic understanding of the probable interactions among participants, should prove to be a most effective tool for the practitioner as well as the student of insurgencies and their suppression.

The strategy and tactics involved in the insurgent and counterinsurgent movements are discussed lucidly, with emphasis placed on the innovative rather than the dogmatic approach to a particular problem.

In light of this Nation's bitter experience in Vietnam, the increasing number of ongoing insurgencies throughout the Third World, and the domestic turmoil germinating the seeds of insurgent actions in this country, *Insurgency* is both timely and important. It is highly recommended, especially for those offi-

cers actively involved in counter-insurgency operational planning and training.

J.H. BOSTICK
Commander, U.S. Navy

Trewhitt, Henry J. *McNamara*. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 307p., index.

For what is essentially a biography, *McNamara* reads with a novel-like fascination. Whatever one's feelings may be about this most controversial and energetic man during his tenure as Secretary of Defense, both critic and admirer can expect a rewarding reading experience. The admirer will come to better understand the whole man, and the critic will get a heartwarming reexamination of the old-fashioned virtues of patriotism, devotion to duty, and loyalty. What is unique in the "McNamara Monarchy" is that Mr. McNamara presumed automatic loyalty from below (or quit) in his intense desire to provide loyalty upward to the two Presidents he served.

For the student of strategy or top-level management and decisionmaking, this book goes deeply into the development of the doctrine of flexible response and the transition from the Foster Dulles' concept of "massive retaliation." Considering both were based on the domino theory (the latter by intent, the former by application), it is little wonder that the storm of controversy broke although the makers of both concepts anticipated calm seas and quiet waters.