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Clyde B. Sargent

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Many analysts err in their efforts to evaluate Communist China's foreign policy because they do not have an understanding of the world view of China's policymakers. Although this is not an easy task for any Westerner, it is a necessary prerequisite to any comprehension of the realities that lie concealed beneath the fog of ideological jargon that envelops the official pronouncements of Communist China. In the following article Professor Clyde B. Sargent discusses this world view and its interrelationship with the five major changes which China's foreign policy has undergone since 1949.

WORLD OUTLOOK AND FOREIGN POLICY OF COMMUNIST CHINA

A lecture delivered at the Naval War College

by

Professor Clyde B. Sargent

Our subject is "The World Outlook and Foreign Policy of Communist China." This subject implies describing the world as it is seen by the Communist Chinese, and this is not an easy task for any Westerner. In my reading for this presentation I have consulted Chinese, Indian, Australian, and American sources of interpretation, but I have relied even more upon my own long observation and study of historical and contemporary Chinese attitudes. I have tried to eliminate my own preconceptions and cultural attitudes in order to give you the Chinese view, but my efforts may nevertheless be defective, for they will represent the Chinese view as described by an American. Nevertheless, I hope to be able to give you some insights which will broaden your understanding of the goals and perspectives of Communist China.

To understand Communist China's world view and foreign policy, one must understand communism, China's long history, Chinese perceptions, and even Mao Tse-tung's thought. One must also understand China's view of the nations of Europe, the Americas, Africa, Asia, and Australia. One must, in addition, be able to read and interpret the Chinese Communist language of diplomacy, which often has inferences and assumptions that may radically alter the meaning of concepts that sound innocuous in English. A phrase such as "protect China's independence, freedom, and integrity," for example, often implies the so-called "recovery" of vast territories in Siberia, Central Asia, the Himalayan kingdoms, continental Southeast Asia, Taiwan, Korea, portions of India, the Andaman Islands, and the Sulu Archipelago between the Philippines

and North Borneo. A phrase such as "peaceful coexistence" may imply the prior communization of the nations of Europe, Africa, and the Americas. In interpreting such phrases as these, one must understand a distinction between rhetoric and reality and attempt to discover the truth of China's international problems and international intentions through the shrouds of ideological jargon.

Communist China's "world view" is a significant determinant of its foreign policies and international relations. This view of the world, and China's role in it, is created by three significant perspectives. One of these is the sense of China's historical greatness and a determination to reach that greatness as it is perceived by the Communist Chinese. The second is a sense of humiliation at China's past indignities at the hands of the West, which produces in its turn a certain sense of resentment and vindictiveness. The third perspective is China's sense of existing in a hostile world, surrounded by both Soviet "revisionism" and American "imperialism." Each of these affects the development of China's foreign policy and gives her leaders power to motivate their people for specific goals. Understanding these perspectives is essential for understanding China, yet their potency is often overlooked by students of the subject.

China's Foreign Policy. China has formulated her foreign policy objectives in the light of this world view. In general terms, China hopes to create and maintain national security, create and maintain domestic prosperity, and regain (in Chou En-lai's words) "China's rightful place in the world." These objectives in themselves seem acceptable and reasonable, but the point of future contention between China and the non-Communist states of the world is that China foresees the attainment of these general goals in a friendly Communist

world. It is this effort to create a world Communist society on a basis of Chinese concepts that will continue to cause friction between China and her non-Communist neighbors.

In more specific terms, China hopes to force the withdrawal of U.S. power from Asia, weaken U.S.S.R. domination of world communism, prevent a United States-U.S.S.R. detente, and recover its "lost territories," which represent a constant reminder of Chinese humiliations in the 19th and 20th centuries.

The important question to ask in this regard is: What is the extent of Chinese aspirations? There are three different estimates of Chinese intentions currently proposed. One is that of "secluded security," according to which China would be content to function as a world power from within borders generally acceptable to other nations. This would include a suzerainty and control of some of the "lost territories," notably Taiwan, Tibet, Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria, representing what might be the People's Republic of China's medium acceptable terms. The other lost territories might, according to this interpretation, be acceptable in the form of friendly buffer states whose foreign policy was oriented toward Communist China. China's policy also might be primarily focused toward the political and economic domination of all of Asia, especially the mainland of the Eurasian Continent. Lastly, it could also envision the leadership, however this might be defined, of "one world" of communism.

One factor that must constantly be weighed in evaluating China's objectives is the present state of her economy. China is presently an underdeveloped nation—its present capabilities for the realization of domestic goals and global aspirations are limited. China is also, however, a developing nation with great potential resources, including manpower, minerals, and morale. These resources certainly make feasible for her

an eventual global role. This is certainly not lost on the leaders in Peking—they possess a strategic perception of time which allows them to program their plans within a concept of 100 years, 200 years, or even longer. “We can wait,” says Mao, “Time is our good ally.”

The determination of Chinese foreign policy is also influenced by several assumptions which explain, to a great extent, some of her policy pronouncements. One of these is that military power is an essential element of foreign policy—or in other words, war pays. While the Chinese sometimes demur on the inevitability of war, the inevitability of violent revolution has never been questioned. Wars and violent revolutions are, in fact, considered to be peaceful over the long term, for they eliminate capitalist regimes which are by nature predatory. It is thus necessary to obliterate capitalism, which threatens the security of all states while it exists. Since the obliteration of capitalism is a national security requirement, anything which would delay this eventuality, such as arms limitation, disarmament, negotiations, the relaxing of international tensions, or United Nations peacekeeping is undesirable.

Communist China's foreign policy since 1949 has changed significantly at least five times. Some changes reflect the extension of China's interests in the outside world as, for example, the overtures to African nations in the early 1960's and to the nations of Western Europe in the late 1960's. Other changes dramatically involve a full 180-degree turn in foreign policy, notably in its attitude toward the U.S.S.R. Throughout this period, however, China has been constant in its opposition to what it calls “imperialism,” notably as perfected in the arch-devil, the United States. The natures of these five phases are significant not only for their identification of Communist China's foreign policy at different times,

but also because they reveal some of the bases of foreign policy formulation. These changes show China's capacity for both practical *tactical* foreign policy and for ideological *strategic* foreign policy.

From 1949 to 1954 China was intimately tied to the U.S.S.R. and relied heavily on the U.S.S.R. She invited relations with all nations who were “friendly” and would sever relations with the Republic of China. In general, she was isolated from the non-Communist world. From 1954 to 1957 China introduced a new element into her foreign relations, notably in Asia. China's significant new policy feature was the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” which I shall discuss later. China established diplomatic and treaty relationships with nations of Asia and Africa. China, at the Bandung Conference of 1955, invited discussions to relax tensions with the United States, and out of this invitation developed conferences at Geneva in August 1955 and later at Warsaw. Developments in this phase in China's policy seem to reflect Khrushchev's first discussions of “coexistence.”

Beginning in 1957 Communist China muted its “peaceful coexistence” program and adopted a new hard line. It became involved in border disputes (as with India in 1959) with other Asian nations and alienated most of its friends. It is presumed that this new hard line developed as a result of a Chinese strategic estimate that the world balance of power had definitely shifted to the Communist world when the Soviets demonstrated competence in space rocketry (sputnik) in 1957, and hence they could soon close in for “the kill.” Contributing to the new hard line may also have been the Chinese failure to attain objectives through the United States-China talks in Warsaw. Perhaps not unrelated was the new hard line that China was taking domestically related to the Rectification Campaign, the Great

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Leap Forward, and austerities resulting from the national disasters in 1959-1960.

The startling and bewildering development from 1960-1962 was Communist China's estrangement from the U.S.S.R.—the Sino-Soviet split. Many reasons are speculated. Included among these are absolutely opposite views on coexistence, negotiation, inevitability of war, efforts to prevent nuclear war, and others. Notable, too, was the Chinese resentment over the lack of U.S.S.R. support in attaining nuclear capability, in efforts to recover Taiwan, and in China's border dispute with India. Also a factor was Chinese resentment over withdrawal by the Soviet Union of Russian technicians. Outstanding was China's concern lest a United States-U.S.S.R. detente develop, frustrating Chinese pursuit of short- and long-range objectives. From this time on, the U.S.S.R. shared almost equally with the United States the poisoned arrows of Peking's foreign policy archers. With virtually no friends in the world and with both pride and ambitions which prohibited a reconciliation with the Soviet Union, Communist China introduced a "new diplomacy."

Beginning in 1961 China began aggressively promoting a bloc of Asian and African nations and, incidentally, of Latin American nations to unite on a platform of racism (for Asia and Africa) and of common colonial experience (including Latin America). The bloc was to devote its efforts to the liberation of the "colored" and the "oppressed." It was to be fanatically anti-U.S.S.R. and anti-United States. A new feature in this policy was a vigorous enlistment of participation by local parties, as distinct from governments, who would aim toward overthrowing governments to "liberate" the colored and oppressed—and, of course, to be under Peking's influence. In this period the Chinese kept a benign and friendly face for governments of Asia, Africa, and Latin

America and aggressively tried to incite political groups to revolutionary action.

The period from 1963 to the present is characterized by a further extension of Chinese policy to Western Europe. China sought relations with the so-called "medium powers" in an effort to disrupt the equilibrium of Europe and thereby disturb and frustrate both the United States and the U.S.S.R. China's targets in this aspect of its policy have included France (diplomatic relations were established in 1964), the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, and Belgium. The Chinese analysis behind this new thrust of foreign policy is that the capitalist countries of Western Europe, Oceania, Canada, and elsewhere have a dual character. These nations are ruled by capitalists who seek to exploit the people; in turn, these leaders and their nations suffer U.S. control, interference, and bullying. In this second role these governments, like the socialist nations, seek to free themselves from the external control of the United States. They, therefore, will welcome relationships that will decrease their dependence on the United States. China offers these relationships.

The Chinese strategic goal is to separate these nations from their connection with the United States. The tactical aim probably includes increasing availability of the products of these countries useful for China's development. In this context Latin America is currently on the "back of the stove" and will appear more prominently in some future extension of Communist Chinese policy. Unremitting animosity for the United States and the U.S.S.R. has continued. A very significant new feature has been China's open challenge of the U.S.S.R. for the leadership of world communism. Also notably expressed in this period is China's world revolutionary strategy for the conquest of imperialism as stated by Lin Piao in September 1965.

In pursuit of the policies reflected

above, Communist China has exchanged recognition with over 50 nations and presently has diplomatic relations with about 45 nations. Until recently, diplomatic relations have been tenuous—without ambassadors in residence since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1965. Diplomatic relations have been with varying degrees of intimacy and intensity and sometimes have burned out altogether (as with Indonesia). China has employed a variety of diplomatic techniques—cultural diplomacy, economic diplomacy, charm diplomacy, to mention a few. She has offered aid to Asian and African nations—notably loans, machine equipment, technicians, and grains—and has sought and participated in trade with nearly a hundred nations. She has supported, with arms and training, clandestine and subversive activities. She encourages “wars of national liberation.” China’s support of these wars has been low-cost, low-risk aid—kept low, according to the Chinese, in order not to “rock the boat” of revolution by alarming governments to repress local revolutionary movements before they acquire ability to take control of the government.

Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” have been a prominently announced policy as a basis for relations between Communist China and other nations. First expressed in negotiations with Nehru in 1954, these became the theme of China’s relations among the other 28 nations at the Bandung Conference in 1955. They have been incorporated into numerous “treaties of friendship” with Asian nations and some African nations. They have been proposed as a basis for relations between Communist China and the United States; they undoubtedly will continue to be offered as a basis of relations between China and other nations. It is useful, therefore, to examine this

fundamental policy.

The five principles of peaceful coexistence are:

1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
2. Nonaggression.
3. Noninterference in each other’s internal affairs.
4. Equality and mutual benefit.
5. Peaceful coexistence.

The Chinese have not elaborated their concept of the content of these principles—concepts that are implicit to them but not explained to us. This unexplained content needs to be considered. For example, acceptance of the first principle probably involves endorsement of China’s concept of her “lost territories.” To some degree the meaning of nonaggression was revealed by a supplement included in many of the treaties based on the principles. The supplement is that both parties agree “not to take part in any military alliance directed against the other party,” first included in the treaty with Burma. The purpose seems to be to secure withdrawal from any association with the United States. Alienation of the United States is generally regarded as a primary aim. A companionate aim is endorsement of most of Communist China’s objectives.

Peaceful coexistence means one thing in English, but the implications of China’s meaning include prior extermination of imperialism and capitalism and the organization of the world on a basis of Chinese communism, or at least in neutrality with it. The Chinese have asserted that peaceful coexistence with the United States is not possible, and while it is acceptable to talk about peaceful coexistence for tactical purposes, it is not wise to take the idea too seriously.

As a strategic policy in relations with “imperialistic” nations, the Chinese oppose negotiation, easing of tensions, peacekeeping, disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and

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restrictions upon the development of nuclear capabilities (as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963). As a tactical policy, however, negotiation may be an acceptable activity.

The strategic policy relates to the inflexible Chinese belief that "imperialism" must be defeated. The defeat of imperialism can result only from struggle, not from compromise. Struggle must be vibrant, continuing, and protracted. Those actions that would mute struggle would decrease opportunities to eliminate imperialism. Compromise, like negotiation, neutralizes the forces of struggle and makes imperialists more aggressive. Therefore, struggle, tensions, revolutions, and perhaps war are desirable in foreign relations since they promote the spread of communism.

The tactical policy of easing tensions is acceptable as an expedient, however, and may be used to disengage one's self from an untenable situation or to promote divisions among the "imperialists"—as, for example, negotiating with allies of the United States in order to foster a division and separation.

China's new world revolutionary strategy for the conquest of imperialism was first widely publicized in a speech on 2 September 1965 by Lin Piao, speaking on the topic of "Long live the victory of the people's war!"

The world revolution is to be conducted from and by the "rural nations" of the world (the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America) who will surround and defeat the "urban nations" (of Europe and the United States). In this strategy there is a close analogy with Mao's strategy for his development of power and control in China up to 1949. In this concept the basic conflict is not class (as workers versus capitalists) but nations (underdeveloped versus developed). China's authorship of this new perspective of protagonists gives her another basis for leadership of the world revolution.

China's policies are both tactical and

strategic. Her strategic policies are inflexible and are consistent with her ideology and ultimate goals. Tactical policies, however, are versatile, flexible, shrewd, fickle, and sometimes quite uninformed. They do not need to be consistent with ideology, and conflicting policies may exist with different nations at the same time. Thus, policies are determined ideologically or practically and are expressed in strategic and tactical terms.

Some Conclusions. A review of Communist China's development and application of foreign policy over the past 20 years permits a few observations that may possibly help us better to understand China's international activities.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Professor Clyde B. Sargent, who is presently the Director of The George Washington University Center at the Naval War College, has extensive firsthand knowledge of Chinese civilization. He completed his undergraduate work at Denison University in political science in 1930 and a master's degree in English at Trinity College in 1932. He then took a master's degree in Chinese language and civilization from the College of Chinese Studies in Peking and taught for 6 years as Chairman of the Foreign Languages Department of Cheeloo University in Tsinan, China. During the war years, Professor Sargent served as a special assistant to the American Ambassador in Chungking and as a major in the OSS. In 1946 he returned to the United States and completed, during the following year, a doctorate at Columbia in Far Eastern studies. Since that time Professor Sargent has served in a variety of positions, including Political Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the United States-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on Korea (1947-1948), Director of Foreign Area and Language Training with the U.S. Government (1948-1965), and Professor of History with the East Asian Institute, Oakland University (1966-1967).

One of these is that China's determination, at the present time, to eliminate what it calls "imperialism" is non-negotiable. This determination, I believe, is based on China's current concept of its need for national security purposes of living in a world where imperialism has been extinguished. A second observation is that the foreign policy of China is both tactical and strategic. While particular goals may be modified for particular purposes and situations, this modification should not be mistaken for an alteration of Communist China's strategic goals. Also, China's policies are based upon both nationalistic and ideological considerations. In fact, the Chinese concept of national security as being possible only in a Chinese-dominated Communist world wed nationalism and ideology in terms of the goals which they seek. Only when the Chinese concept of the environment required for national security is altered will a discussion of whether their foreign policy is impelled mainly by nationalism or ideology be profitable.

None of the foregoing means that the


policies of Communist China cannot change. Even ideology has not prevented the Chinese from adopting tactical policies which are completely alien to their political perspective. The important question is: Will the inevitable changes in leadership and decisionmaking personnel result in new policies less threatening to the world?

The answer to this question at least partially depends upon whether China can find acceptable solutions to her problems and frustrations relating to national security and international stature. Whether she can do so is not up to China alone. China, whether Communist or not, seeks a sense of national security, domestic well-being, and international dignity. If she is able to perceive achievement of these minimum goals without altering the world environment, China may then be able to pursue her national interests by means that are acceptable to the rest of the world. Only then may China see co-existence as a strategic policy rather than a tactical device used to promote the conquest of a hostile and frustrating world.



To an imperial city nothing is inconsistent which is expedient.

Euphemus of Athens: Address to the Camarinaeons, 415 B.C.



THE BAROMETER

(A letter addressed to Col. W.F. Long, USA, in response to his article in the February issue titled, "A Perspective of Counterinsurgency in Three Dimensions—Tradition, Legitimacy, Visibility.")

The February issue of the *Naval War College Review* arrived a couple of weeks ago and your contribution on counterinsurgency immediately caught my eye for several reasons. First, I was delighted to see that you, as an Army officer, raised challenges to the operational assumptions under which we have labored for so long in Vietnam and elsewhere. Second, I was interested in your call for a study of counterinsurgency on a higher (academic) plane, to include the use of knowledge and techniques from the social sciences. A similar position was expressed by Dr. Frank Trager of NYU National Strategy Information Center during his visit here to talk to our senior ROTC cadets. Third, I noted another voice urging more and better intellectual activity among the military leadership of this country and in the service schools. . . .

Since the issue arrived, I've wrestled with the problem on how to comment to your article. Initial objections to statements supporting your challenges to assumptions have been demolished after a more thorough reading. Yet, I still have some comments.

I think that the problem of legitimacy is the fundamental problem we face in our counterinsurgency efforts. The solutions to the problems of tradition and visibility would follow rather easily in comparison, I believe, once the question of legitimacy was solved, since

the moral issue of "who is right?" is bound up most closely with that particular problem. I think the most effective device to secure legitimacy is a spontaneous invitation by a government whose character or whose crisis situation engenders empathy or sympathy in the American people. Perhaps the next most effective device is a clearly defined treaty or alliance which provides specifically for direct U.S. military entry to support a government which again meets the approval of the American people, or perhaps more accurately, the liberal news media.

On a more polemical note:

With respect to your first challenge, I am not sure I agree that "any concept . . . aimed at improving political access, social mobility, and economic betterment would be destabilizing." I think the operational environment and the level of administration from which implementation is viewed must be considered. I tend to agree that your "true equation" is applicable to the Vietnamese society, which has a sophisticated cultural tradition and which had undergone some material gain (Westernization) under the French. But, I would suggest that the Montagnard society, which I considered near zero on a "development scale" (at least in 1963-4), would fit into the "hoped for" equation, at least for a time. Perhaps a failure to recognize the two different societies early in 1961, and to make plans and allowances accordingly, was a cause for some of our problems.

With respect to your second challenge and ignoring the question of

legitimacy, I object to your statement that "... the military man is simply not professionally fitted to make substantive contributions to political, economic, or sociological problems..." Is not one of the cornerstones of the military profession, the study and application of leadership? I will concede that the stereotyped concept of military leadership ("Follow Me," et al) is inappropriate in most situations in the areas stated. But, I would argue that the other techniques of leadership used in myriad military, noncombat situations adequately fit the professional soldier to solve recognized or demonstrated problems in those areas.

I want to comment on the phrase "substantive contribution." Certainly from a theoretical or philosophical perspective (from which I recognize you are proceeding), or from a high administrative level, a soldier's contribution in the P-E-S area will be slight, if not nil. But on the lower operational level I firmly believe that his efforts can be substantive, even if they affect only one family or other social unit, and I believe the cumulative effect of individual contributions would be significant on the higher level. Further, though you qualify your statement in terms of "a political mandate or a relevant psychological inclination," I would argue that assuming legitimacy, and given culturally sensitizing training, and a mission type order, any professional soldier would be as successful as any civilian—perhaps more so—in view of inherent qualities of discipline, self-discipline, attention to duty, and his capability of applying military force in the insurgency environment when needed. I note from your biographical sketch that you were an advisor in Vietnam. I suspect that you may have had problems with culturally insensitive officers and NCO's. I saw the same problems in two tours and concede this is a great problem but not to the extent that the military should be eliminated from this role.

To your third assumption, my only comment is that after 8 years of political orientation and its resultant counter-insurgency activity in the Kennedy-Johnson style, it is time to try other approaches. We seem to be moving in that direction if the President's recent "State of the World" message is the indicator it is touted to be. Dialectically, perhaps 1976 will see the synthesis of a solution to insurgency. As regards the fourth assumption, I see in your presentation a trace of the traditional, post-WW II bogey (International Monolithic Communism) still remaining. Realizing that the reality of a shattered monolith has yet to be completely recognized by the Armed Forces (if many recent official writings are valid examples) would it not be better for "Military Academe" to be specific as it shows the way by speaking and writing in terms of the Soviet Union and Red China, rather than "Communists"?

Your closing paragraph is the one which stirred me to write to you. As you do, Dr. Trager (and many others, of course) stressed the point about the need for professional soldiers to become "intellectualized." Unfortunately, the number of professional soldiers who have the tendencies and prerequisites to pursue advanced study in the political science/international relations/historical spectrum are few now and may become fewer still. The liberal-oriented political science profession is at a crossroads, and is becoming, if it is not already, a very radical profession. I suspect the impact of this radicalization is reflected in the low number of political science/IR students in our ROTC program, in comparison with engineers, agriculture and business majors. I suspect, too, that the radicalization is beyond recall... and perhaps the answer to this personnel problem will be the new Military Assistance Officer Program.

Another point about your last paragraph intrigued me. I am not at all sure what you visualize when you speak of

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forcing the political leadership to think carefully about the character of a war. I assume that you mean to say that the Armed Forces leadership (JCS) would argue their case dispassionately at first, then passionately to the point of insubordination, disrespect, and resignation, in such a way as to gain congressional and public support for the military view. I doubt that such would happen for several reasons: (a) inculcated Constitutional restraints and institutionally induced restraints on the individual military personnel; (b) institutionally induced attitudes toward a mission or other task which can be summarized as the "Can Do" attitude, or the "must-do-something, even-if-it's-wrong" syndrome; (c) past examples of military dissidents, such as Mitchell, Gavin, or Taylor whose courts-martial or resignations had little, if any, immediate operational impact which is what would be desired; (d) A public and congressional confusion, even loss of confidence, at the appearance of "the Generals" saying they did not want to go to war. The latter reason could even create the opposite effect by marshalling support for the decision to go to war since the American antimilitary bias of which you speak would be expressed in showing those "know-it-all professional soldiers" that anyone can fight and win a war.

This letter has become too long. Despite my polemics and disagreements, my sincere congratulations for an excellent and timely contribution to the field of strategic thought. . . .

Sincerely,

CHARLES W. RAYMOND, 3RD
Major, FA
Asst. Professor of Military Science
University of Delaware

(Colonel Long's open letter response to Major Raymond. Editor)

Major Raymond's letter presents an opportunity to expand some of the ideas contained in the original article, and what follows is linked to his comments.

I agree that legitimacy is fundamental and that the moral issue is at the core of the concept. The consensus of "what is right" is extremely important. The popular conviction that the action to support the "right" was accomplished in the "right way" is equally necessary. As in the basic article, I firmly believe that American military intervention of any considerable duration should be the result of constitutionally determined action, which is also a means of insuring public moral support. One of the larger lessons of the Vietnamese war is that failure to debate the wisdom and propriety of national commitment to war in Congress prior to the fact does not eliminate the debate; it merely postpones the time and changes the nature of the debate.

Regarding your discussion of the difference between the Vietnamese and Montagnard societies with respect to the destabilizing aspects discussed in the first assumption, I think both societies fit into this category. The more enlightened and self-sufficient the Montagnards become, the more difficult it will be for any outside force to control them, and this is the point I was attempting to make. Further, although U.S. leadership had some spectacular successes with Montagnards, the results were not constructive in a political sense. Certain Moutagnard groups identified with American leaders; however, this identification did not extend to a Vietnamese counterpart, Vietnamese society, the Republic of South Vietnam as a political entity, and most certainly not the United States as a political ideal.

My intention was not to minimize the substantial contributions of Ameri-

cans in Vietnam using traditional (and I think sound) leadership techniques. It is not the capability or lack of it; it is not even the degree of cross-cultural enlightenment that creates the situation. The predicament of the American military leader is that by inclination, education, and law he is not "political." This fact creates the first barrier to his effectiveness. The Communist (or any other totalitarian type) insurgent is by design a general-purpose agitator-organizer-propagandist-warrior. As such he is a political-military weapon which U.S. military forces cannot counter. Equally as important is the fact that the American in uniform cannot blend into the native political administrative machinery, the successful maintenance of which is the key to defeating Communist insurgency.

There is no doubt that American military men understand the necessity for proper behavior toward the civilian populace. Further, in many cases American military advisers in Vietnam seem to be more sensitive to the needs and feelings of Vietnamese people than their Vietnamese counterparts. This, too, has its unfortunate aspects. In the cases where it represented reality, the loyalty of the people would be to the American, and this is politically counterproductive to the government the United States is attempting to bolster. In many cases, where this was simply an egocentric preconception on the part of the American, the results could be doubly disastrous—self-deceptive and self-defeating.

In any counterinsurgency effort, it seems to me that the only hope for success is to maintain or restore a viable administrative apparatus at the lowest level, and it is at this level that any foreigner is least effective. Therefore, political policy and economic and social reforms—the essential elements in a peoples' war—are beyond the capability and outside the purview of U.S. military leadership.

The trace of the specter of international monolithic communism you detected was unintentional and results from language rather than substance. Your point that discrimination is required is correct, and the fourth assumption challenge was made only to indicate that the constructive potentialities of counterinsurgency should militate against any form of totalitarianism. In the wider sense, any movement which depends upon the conception that the power of the people must be wielded by a few self-selected persons may find the job made much more difficult as the educational level and economic position of the people improve. Whether communism is a monolithic movement or not is irrelevant. Any revolution with substantial causes that is captured and guided by a few people "in the know" represents, in the end, simply a change of bosses.

Your observations regarding the radicalization of the political science profession are disturbing. However, for all the reasons in the basic article and those included in these paragraphs, my persuasion is that the Military Assistance Officer Program will only achieve better performance of a demanding military role; it will not—cannot—change the role.

My last paragraph was not intended to advocate a chain of pressures to be exerted by military men against political leaders. The idea is to make certain that the political leadership understands that the character of the war must be an integral part of the decision to intervene militarily. This means that before any military action is undertaken, the impact of the kind of war which would ensue is assessed and inserted into the decisionmaking process. As a part of the education for both the political and military side of the house, I would recommend that all estimates of the situation include a discussion of the inherent and peculiar nature of operations, as well as the usual assessments of

enemy capabilities and own courses of action. Further, there ought to be a political estimate of the situation at home and of the allies and opposition and in the assisted country. This estimate should be as thorough and precise as that expected of the military commander at the tactical level. What I am arguing for is not a high-level form of insurgency by our top-ranking generals,

but an intellectual achievement supported by our extensive and excellent military education system.

I thank you for the opportunity to cope with interpretations which you raised with such candor.

W. F. LONG
Colonel, USA
U.S. Army Adviser, Naval War College

— Ψ —

The capacity to understand the workings of the other man's mind is an essential element in generalship.

John Connell: Wavell, Soldier and Scholar, v. 1964