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## Eagles in Cobwebs

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held ideas, although the detail of Soviet involvement in China in the 1920's—some of it fresh—is interesting. Among the better parts of the book are comments on internal disagreements within the Soviet Union on foreign policy. But Fischer, of course, like everyone else, runs shorter of this kind of material as he gets nearer the present day. The book is especially complete in its attention to the secret German-Soviet military collaboration of the 1920's and early 1930's.

F.H. HARTMANN  
Alfred Thayer Mahan Chair of  
Maritime Strategy

Institute for Strategic Studies, *Problems of Modern Strategy*. London: 1969. 2 pts.

The Adelphi Papers numbers 54 and 55 grew out of the Tenth Annual Conference of the Institute for Strategic Studies which was held in September 1968. The conference assessed what has been accomplished in strategic studies in the past two decades. Here are published nine selected papers which were presented at the conference. Each paper is an informed discussion of a major segment of modern strategy. Collectively, the papers provide a survey of the whole subject of modern strategic thought as it has evolved since World War II, a major theme being how this thought has been affected by the existence of nuclear weapons. With the explosion at Alamo-gorda, the world turned a corner. Even though many of the concepts of the famous classical strategists such as Mahan and Clausewitz still apply, there is a new dimension. The possibility of limited war is added. The probability of limited war is changed, conditioned as it is by the effect of the nuclear war possibility in the background. The major ideas covered by the papers include the legacy of earlier strategists, the theories of the nuclear age (deterrence, flexible response, escalation, nuclear parity, et

cetera), social systems analysis, limited war, ethical and moral questions, arms control, Great Power intervention, the effects of technological progress, the strategic uses of revolutionary war, and others. The papers are carefully researched and erudite. They are most highly recommended for the sophisticated reader.

R.M. TUCKER  
Captain, U.S. Navy

Lendvai, Paul. *Eagles in Cobwebs*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969. 396p.

This book aims to provide a more sophisticated approach to what is called the "Communist world," in particular, the Balkan States of Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania. The author contends that "despite two decades of professed adherence to the social gospel known as Marxism-Leninism, the quest for national identity has proven more powerful than ideological bonds." Therefore, the Soviet Union could no more contain this nationalism than cobwebs could contain eagles. This is an in-depth study of the Balkan States under Communist rule, presented in infinite detail, with a comprehensive analysis of the development of nationalism in these countries. Its timeliness is clearly shown by a postscript on the meaning of the Czech tragedy, and this analysis alone would be worth searching out the book. The author contends that this incident supports his argument that nationalism is growing and will eventually undermine Soviet domination and influence over the area. As he says in conclusion, "tanks can slow down, but they cannot stop the historic process of decolonization and national emancipation."

The main weakness in this volume lies in the overabundance of detailed information in the individual country analysis. It clearly shows the author's personal knowledge about the area and his thorough and extensive research.

However, such particularization tends to weigh the reader down and detract from the message of the book. For one who desires a detailed, comprehensive, perceptive, historical analysis of the development of nationalism in the Balkan States, it would be difficult to find a better study. For the person who wants a short insight into the development of nationalism in the Balkans and its challenges to the Soviet influence and domination, chapters I and II, the afterword, and the postscript on the Czech tragedy are highly recommended reading.

J.W. GRUNENWALD  
Commander, U.S. Navy

McGovern, James. *Martin Bormann*.  
New York: Morrow, 1968. 237p.

"Recent reports of my death were greatly exaggerated." The foregoing statement, attributed to Mark Twain following a serious illness, could well apply to the subject of McGovern's book, *Martin Bormann*. The number-two Nazi during the final years of the Hitler regime, Bormann was as much of an enigma to his contemporaries as he is to those who are still trying to resolve what happened to him during the last few hours of the fall of Berlin.

The author served in Germany, first with the State Department and then with the Central Intelligence Agency from 1949 through 1954. In 1953 the CIA undertook an investigation of what had happened to Bormann because of an alleged neo-Nazi conspiracy exposed by the British at that time. The author coordinated the investigation through the Berlin office of the CIA. The CIA report was essentially the genesis of this book. It is obvious that the material presented is the result of extensive and careful research. Fortunately, it is easily read and not cluttered with the mass of often digressive footnotes that are found in many books of this type; the background and research materials are covered on a chapter-by-chapter basis in

the rear of the book. Mr. McGovern has given the reader a few new insights into the megalomaniacal atmosphere permeating the seat of power during the last months of the Third Reich. His treatment of the other Nazi leaders is limited but adequate for pointing out how Bormann manipulated the Nazi hierarchy, projecting himself into the position of the second most powerful man in Germany. For the student of Nazi Germany, Mr. McGovern's book should certainly be included among the required readings. In the final chapters of the book, the author cites facts, testimony, and some interesting hypotheses on what happened to the enigmatic Martin Bormann. This reviewer is pleased to report that the author is not a member of the school that claims Bormann is alive, well, and living in Argentina.

R.W. O'CONNOR  
Commander, U.S. Navy

Mnacko, Ladislav. *The Seventh Night*.  
New York: Dutton, 1969, e. 1968.  
220p.

The tragedy that befell Czechoslovakia in August 1968 was but the latest in a long history of nightmares that the people of that land have experienced. The author of this book has been witness to those occurring in the past three decades. He was 14 at the time of Munich. This betrayal and the subsequent German invasion of his land were etched so deeply in his mind that he turned to communism as the answer for his country—not the realistic communism of Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, but some idealistic interpretation of Marx and Lenin that hopefully will lead to that utopian free society in which conflicts do not exist. One can observe how easy it is for the mind steeped in the Communist dialectic to justify the inconsistencies of its political life; the author reflects on such ambivalences as the 1948 coup and consolida-