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## The Japanese Navy in World War II

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*U.S. Naval Reserve*

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It argues persuasively that such action is not mere logical managerial behavior, but astute, insightful, psychological managerial behavior. It proffers the idea that "... those who fail to react to the cues that are present but respond only when the evidence is unmistakably clear have forsaken insight in favor of hindsight." The book's greatest asset is its ability to cause the manager (reader) to (1) examine realistically the foundation and presupposition from which he functions; (2) evaluate his own personality structure; (3) become aware of the need to free himself from the false goals that would compromise his purpose; and (4) perceive that it takes strong men to inspire, lead, and develop strong subordinates. "The principal decision to be made involves removing the false dichotomy between operating demands and human needs. The tools for discovery and development are available, but their use means personal commitment and continuous all-out effort." Herein may lie the "crunch point" for the military manager.

Although the book is interesting throughout, the military reader could afford to be selective in his perusal, since not all of it is applicable and useful to the military manager. Parts I and III are germane, while part II deals with salesmen and is of less value to the military manager than to his civilian counterpart. Chapter XIV, on counseling, is particularly noteworthy and is highly recommended for reading by all military managers. The final chapter reiterates the central theme of the book by highlighting the core values and personality constructs required for insightful managing. *Managing through Insight* is exceptional in that it has been written by many different contributors, with the content of each chapter being

derived from the daily practice of a group of counseling psychologists. This singularity is also a liability, since there is some overlapping of content from chapter to chapter. Nonetheless, there appears to be unity in the similarity of practice and philosophical foundation of the group with which the book concerns itself. The volume is strengthened by many illustrative examples which help the reader to see the point as applicable to real problems of real managers. A serious, in-depth study of this book could contribute mightily toward providing the military manager with the managerial expertise necessary to cause servicemen to salute the *man* as well as the *uniform*. The message is positive and will likely stimulate many to dig deeper to discover new insights.

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United States Naval Institute Proceedings, *The Japanese Navy in World War II*. Annapolis: 1969. 146p.

When Japan entered the Second World War, she possessed a strong army, a sizable merchant marine, and a navy whose carrier aviation was second to none. Within a few months she controlled practically all of Southeast Asia and possessed mineral resources which should have enabled her to carry on the war indefinitely. Yet within 3 years of her greatest successes, Japan was a broken and defeated nation, shorn of her Empire, and occupied by enemy troops. *The Japanese Navy in World War II* attempts to tell the naval side of this story by collecting under one cover a series of articles by Japanese naval officers which have, in the past, been published by the *Naval Institute Proceedings*.

One of the most surprising aspects of

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the war revealed by this account is the lack of coordination between the Japanese Army and Navy during those critical years. While the navy sacrificed itself in a vain effort to halt the American "island-hopping" strategy, the army insisted on withholding its forces for the defense of the home islands and for use against the expected attack from the Soviet Union. It refused to detail sizable garrisons for the defense of Japan's outer defense perimeter, and, as the war progressed, continually brought additional units back to the home islands for a last-ditch stand. While this may have been the best course of action under the circumstances, the failure of both services to adopt a common strategic policy detracted from their effectiveness.

The book's major fault is that its coverage is not comprehensive. There is no account of the Coral Sea Battle, in which Japan's thrust to the south was definitively halted. There is likewise no

account of the carrier battle in the Marianas campaign, which resulted in the annihilation of Japan's naval aviation, so painfully reconstructed after Midway. Nor is there any treatment of the effects of American submarine warfare, which reduced considerably the amount of raw materials that reached Japanese industry.

Despite this shortcoming, the book has something to offer to the student of military history. It presents a valuable insight into the viewpoint and outlook of the Japanese which no American commentator is able to do. This is the true value of the book—it allows the reader to view the war through Japanese eyes. It has been said that some of the most instructive lessons of a war are to be found in the writings of the defeated. *The Japanese Navy in World War II* is certainly no exception to this statement.

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