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Vincent Davis

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The organizational charts of the executive department do not accurately reflect the patterns of power and influence among the various agencies and subdivisions included in that department. These patterns are, in fact, dependent upon the incumbent President, his style, and his method of operation. In this article Dr. Vincent Davis seeks to analyze recent trends in the decisionmaking process of the executive department, especially during the first year of the Nixon administration. This year has continued the trend toward greater centralization of authority within the White House staff.

AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY:

DECISIONMAKING IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

An article prepared

by

Dr. Vincent Davis

adapted from a lecture given by him at the

Naval War College

Senior military officers have an immediate and practical interest in studying the process of making American security policy because they frequently find themselves involved in the process. Scholars in the behavioral sciences, in contrast, are more typically interested in trying to identify long-range patterns and trends. My purpose here is to try to meet both of these sets of requirements, by describing the process as it seems to have unfolded in Washington over the past year but by placing this in the context of a broader and longer range perspective. Even for the military officer who may find himself directly involved in the process, it may be useful to understand the longer run historical patterns and trends so as to avoid the error of assuming that the most recent examples of these old tendencies are altogether new and altogether a function of a peculiar set of current circumstances.

For example, I might begin by ticking off a list of things that have happened during or after every American war or sustained warlike crisis. This is one way of predicting that these same things will now happen again in the early 1970's if one assumes that the Vietnam war is in the process of being terminated. Indeed, some of the happenings that I will list here are already beginning to take place.

First, the military budget will be cut rather sharply, and force levels will be correspondingly reduced. Therefore, there will be at least a *de facto* reduction in overseas commitments, even if public rhetoric tries to disguise it. The new postwar Armed Forces will reflect a deemphasis on ground units, meaning especially sharp cuts for the Army and the Marines and a relative enhancement of the Navy and the Air Force. For a complicated set of reasons that I will not try to present here, my guess is that

the Navy will receive greater emphasis than the Air Force, meaning that the Navy is likely to emerge in the 1970's as the most prominent element in the United States post-Vietnam Armed Forces no matter how well or how badly the Navy itself should try to promote this eventuality. This will place a special burden and responsibility on naval officers to think their way clearly through a complicated set of strategic questions.

Continuing with these simple extrapolations from past American history, we can expect a renewed emphasis on domestic concerns and a corresponding reduction in concerns over foreign problems in the United States in the 1970's. Some military men and units will be subjected to great public criticism, in some cases as scapegoats for failures of civilian leadership at higher levels, but in some cases deservedly. And, finally, we can expect the overall U.S. Military Establishment, including policymaking procedures, to be overhauled. We always reorganize our policymaking procedures and Armed Forces after every war. Parenthetically, one thing that happened after all past U.S. wars which will probably not happen now is the emergence of great, acclaimed military heroes. This is a clue to one way in which the Vietnam war has differed from past American wars and perhaps a clue to basic changes in American values. But it also suggests that the Armed Forces may be in for even rougher sledding now than after earlier wars because there will be few, if any, great heroes to offset the bad publicity and reduced status of the military profession resulting from criticism of military men. At this point, however, I should turn from these general introductory remarks and get into my main theme: the ancient American habit of reorganizing the U.S. Military Establishment following every war or sustained warlike crisis.

There are some deeply ingrained American characteristics which may help to explain this overall trend, but there are some special new circumstances, first emerging around the turn of the century, which I think are particularly significant. I would emphasize three major events during the 1895-1905 decade: The first was the U.S. defeat of Spain; the second was the Japanese defeat of Russia; and the third was the invention of the airplane.

The U.S. victory over Spain and the Japanese victory over Russia meant that a power in the Western Hemisphere and a power in Asia were suddenly major powers on the world scene. World politics, therefore, were never again to be merely an extension of international quarrels within Europe. And this true globalization of world politics that occurred at about the turn of the century began adding major new complications to international politics which are still unfolding and which we do not yet clearly understand.

The invention of the airplane, however, was in my judgment at least as significant in complicating the nature of international politics as was the emergence of the United States and Japan on the world scene. It foreshadowed the critical role played by science and technology in altering the importance of all other factors in international politics for the remainder of this century and presumably into the next century. We can almost say that science and technology can now be regarded as an independent worldwide variable, reducing all other factors to dependent variables. In some ways the invention of the airplane was more revolutionary than the invention of nuclear weapons a half century later. For example, the organization of military forces in all countries, for thousands of years prior to about 1900, was mainly based on one very simple principle. If a military force fought on the land side of a coastline, it was called an army, and if it fought on the sea side of a coastline, it was called a navy. But the

invention of the airplane erased this ancient use of the coastline as the basic organizing principle of all armed forces everywhere. Now, 70 years later, we are still groping for some new ideal and widely accepted principle to guide us in organizing armed forces.

From the point of view of Americans, however, the turn of the century marked the emergence of the United States as a major and, in many respects, eventually the major world power. This was accompanied by a gradually growing awareness that the military and the nonmilitary aspects of U.S. foreign policy were, or at least ought to be, coordinated parts of a single orchestrated whole. The first step around 1900 was an effort to create better coordination within and between the Armed Forces themselves. In 1900 the Navy's General Board was created. In 1903 the Army's General Staff system was introduced. Also, in 1903, the Joint Army-Navy Board was created, the direct precursor and forerunner of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Many other reorganizations also then occurred between and within the armed services after the 1900-1905 period, as well as some parallel organizational efforts to coordinate the State Department with the military establishment.

There have been six or seven of these since the turn of the century that are probably worth noting. In 1916 President Wilson created an agency called the Council of National Defense on the eve of U.S. entry into World War I. It, however, became moribund almost from the start as President Wilson leaned more and more heavily on the military officers in fighting the American part of World War I, primarily on General Pershing.

In 1938, on the eve of another world war, President Roosevelt created the Standing Liaison Committee, consisting of the Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff of the Army, and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles who chaired this three-man group. The Standing Liaison Committee can claim a few accomplishments. It made some progress in readying our Latin American allies for participation with the United States in Western Hemispheric defense preliminary to U.S. involvement in World War II. But once again, as we got into the war, this device for coordinating military policy and foreign policy fell into disuse.

In 1944 President Roosevelt created a new device, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee or SWNCC (pronounced "SWINK"), primarily designed to help forge U.S. foreign policy for the post-World War II period, especially with respect to matters such as the United Nations. But it was not as effective as many people had hoped it would be.

The major reorganizational development after World War II was the National Security Act of 1947 which created the National Security Council, undoubtedly the one most important device thus far invented to coordinate the military and the nonmilitary aspects of U.S. foreign policy. But, as we will note a little later here, there have been a great many changes and some evolutionary circumstances surrounding the National Security Council, including some rather recent efforts to modify or supplement it. In 1966, for example, NSAM 341 was originated and written by General Maxwell Taylor. This created the so-called SIG/IRG system, a Senior Interdepartmental Group supplemented by five or six Interdepartmental Regional Groups. The SIG/IRG system didn't have an opportunity to get very far before the end of the Johnson administration but, as I discuss later, there have been interesting changes that have flowed from the SIG/IRG innovation.

Alongside these rather formal agencies and committees the informal groups have come and gone, some on an *ad hoc* basis, in an effort to coordinate military

and nonmilitary aspects of foreign policy. To note just some that have taken place in relatively recent years: In 1961-63 President Kennedy created a thing called the Special Group (CI). CI stood for counterinsurgency. This was the group chaired by the President's younger brother, Robert Kennedy. It was designed to try to formulate American policy with respect to involvements such as the one we were on the verge of getting into in Vietnam.

In the 1965-66 period, President Johnson created the Contingency Coordinating Committee, Triple C, or CCC. It did a little effective work for a few years and then passed out of existence.

Probably the best-known informal group in recent years was President Johnson's so-called Tuesday Lunch. It was introduced in about 1966 and really took the place of the National Security Council as the most important agency at a very high level in the American Government in making overall American foreign policy during the last few years of the Johnson administration.

Having now briefly reviewed this earlier and more recent history, I will revert to my tendency as a scholar to look for patterns. Two patterns, or two general conclusions, can be drawn from this history of reorganizations over the past 75 years.

The first of these patterns is steady centralization. Each unit and component of the military and foreign policy establishment of the U.S. Government has tended to gradually lose responsibility and authority to some unit or component at a higher level. As another implication of science and technology, modern communications tempted higher levels of authority to try to manage a broader and broader spectrum of military and foreign policy planning, programing, and operations.

The second of the two major trends sometimes may seem to work against the centralization trend but never very effectively or for very long. I am speaking of the role of personality, especially the President's personal style. Just as buying a scorecard when you get to the ball park will not tell you who is going to win the game, neither will a formal organization chart, such as the kind you see on Government offices everywhere, tell you how the game is played down in Washington. No law and no directive can force the President of the United States to use an agency or group in any particular way, even if the Congress has created an agency presumably for the President's benefit. For that matter, any executive, whether he be the President of the United States or a Cabinet-level secretary or a military commander must lead in terms of his own personal needs and style as long as he is not in clear overt violation of major directives.

I think, as a scholar, that I could discern two broadly general styles of decisionmaking in Presidential leadership here. One we could call the orderly method, the other the disorderly method. The disorderly method was probably best typified by Franklin D. Roosevelt and, to some extent, by John F. Kennedy. The advantage of the disorderly style is that it is supposed to increase the channels of advice and information to the leader but at the expense of coordination and carefully staffed solutions. The other or orderly style, as typified by Eisenhower, is supposed to produce better coordination and staffing but at the expense of a widened range of options and innovative ideas. Parenthetically, one interesting aspect of Secretary of Defense McNamara is that he appeared to be closer to the orderly model although working for two Presidents who were closer to the disorderly extreme.

It is now appropriate to turn to a detailed look at the centralization trend within the U.S. Military Establishment following World War II. It is best exemplified by four major legislative enactments. First, the all-important National Security Act of 1947 created not

only the position of Secretary of Defense but also the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council, all of which were major centralizing steps. Next, the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act provided the Secretary of Defense with a Department of Defense—for the first 2 years he had no department -and also provided him with major staff support in creating the positions of Deputy Secretary and several Assistant Secretaries of Defense. The third piece of important legislation was the 1953 set of revisions to the National Security Act, which removed the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the chain of command while further enhancing the powers of OSD and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Fourth, the highly significant 1958 revisions greatly added to the powers of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and particularly the Secretary himself in his role in the chain of command immediately below the President as Commander in Chief.

Thomas S. Gates, Jr. was the first Defense Secretary to serve under the provisions of the 1958 legislation, and he took some important steps in accordance with it. The period of almost 8 years in the 1960's under Secretary McNamara's tenure, however, produced the most revealing signs of the great growth in the activities and powers of OSD as suggested by the 1958 enactment. For example, the number of professional civilian personnel in OSD shops increased from about 1,300 to about 2,300 during this period, close to doubling. The military personnel assigned to OSD shops increased from about 400 to about 800 over the same span, almost precisely doubling. At the same time, there was an increase from 13 to over 40 people who carried the title or rank of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, each with his own fairly substantial staff. Ironically or--as some critics allege--intentionally, McNamara failed to implement centralization in the spirit of the 1958 legislation on the military side of the Pentagon within the context of the JCS shops and the joint specified and unified commands at the same time that he was so vigorously and vastly increasing the centralized powers on the civilian side within the context of the various proliferating OSD shops.

The same basic centralization trend was also at work at higher levels, especially in the White House, following World War II. Most studies of the National Security Council tend to focus on the organizational machinery while including statistics on how often the NSC met or how many times it met during a specified period and how many policy papers it handled during the period. A more meaningful index of centralization at the White House level with respect to defense and military affairs might be a count of the number of people under successive Presidents who have worked full time on these matters directly for the President or for the National Security Council and whose offices were actually in the White House or the Executive Office Building or related nearby spaces and who were on the President's payroll—in contrast to people who worked only occasionally on these matters or who represented other departments and agencies or who were on loan from other departments and agencies or who were on payrolls other than the White House payroll and whose offices were located elsewhere around Washington. Unfortunately, precise figures on the number of people in the category described here are not easy to obtain. Nevertheless, some generalized estimates or guesstimates are possible.

Starting with the first occupant of the White House to operate under the provisions of the NSA of 1947, President Truman had serious reservations about the utility of the National Security Council. Although he gradually made more use of it, especially during

the Korean war, he tended to rely heavily on his main Cabinet-level agencies especially the State and Defense Departments and on a variety of individual advisers and consultants, including a number of senior military officers. His personal White House staff on national security and foreign policy matters was largely confined to the Executive Secretariat of the National Security Council, and it is a reasonable guess that this group never numbered more than perhaps a dozen professionals.

The overall size and scope and elaboration of the National Security Council apparatus and related machinery were greatly expanded during the Eisenhower years in the 1950's, but it is a reasonable guess that the total number of full-time professional staff people associated with this range of activities on the Presidential or Executive Office budget did not exceed 20 or perhaps 25 people.

President Kennedy moved into the White House in 1961 with a determination to cut back sharply on the NSC apparatus and associated organizational machinery. He gradually modified this position somewhat, and President Johnson modified it further. One knowledgeable observer once referred to the "half-dozen people on McGeorge Bundy's staff" when Mr. Bundy was the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs during the Kennedy administration. Actually, a better estimate would be a total of from 12 to 20 full-time professional people closely associated with the Bundy operation in the White House during most of the 1961-66 period, and a figure close to 20 when Dr. Walt Rostow replaced Mr. Bundy during the 1966-69 period. Therefore, although President Kennedy wanted to reduce the size of the White House staff working for the President on military and foreign policy matters, and although President Johnson tended to revert somewhat to President Truman's (and also President Eisenhower's) tendency to lean heavily on his Secretaries of State and Defense and their departmental people, the actual size of the Bundy-Rostow staffs during the 1960's did not ultimately appear to represent a significant reduction in the size of counterpart groups in the Eisenhower White House of the 1950's. In summary, then, there seems to have been a gradual but steady increase from perhaps 12 up to perhaps 20 to 25 full-time White House professional staff people closely and directly concerned with military and foreign policy matters beginning with the enactment of the NSA in 1947 and ending with President Johnson's departure from the White House in 1969.

This gradual but steady growth was no longer gradual after Mr. Nixon moved into the White House in early 1969. Dr. Henry Kissinger assumed the position of Special Assistant (or simply Assistant) for National Security Affairs and promptly started to assemble and organize a large and complex staff. By 1 year later, in early 1970, competent estimates put the size of that staff at 45 to 50 full-time professional people. Some estimates ranged as high as 70, and one estimate even suggested a figure of 140.

The problem with all such estimates, of course, is the decision on whom to count and whom to omit. Take, for example, the fact that the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization was made a statutory member of the National Security Council in the original 1947 legislation. The name of that agency was later changed to the Office of Emergency Planning and then again to the Office of Emergency Preparedness, but its director has always remained a statutory NSC member. In the 1960's the OEP Director usually appeared to be a patronage political appointee such as former Tennessee Governor Buford Ellington, and he seemed mainly concerned with civil disasters such as floods. But the OEP

Director in the Nixon administration is retired Army Gen. G.A. Lincoln, a man with highly distinguished credentials as a military policy specialist. Moreover, Lincoln's own OEP staff includes several active and retired military officers with impressive reputations as military policy specialists. Insofar as Lincoln himself is a statutory member of the NSC, the question then becomes whether to include his OEP staff members as part of the full-time White House group concerned with military policy matters.

Similar questions arise when deciding whether to count certain people in earlier administrations who were technically on loan from or representing other Government departments and agencies but who quickly appeared to be working personally and exclusively for the President primarily on military policy issues. Such people included Gen. Andrew Goodpaster in the Eisenhower administration and Gen. Maxwell Taylor and C.V. Clifton in the Kennedy White House and the staffs who worked directly for these officers while they worked for the President. Nevertheless, it seems clear by any standard of measure that the number of full-time professional people primarily concerned with military and foreign policy questions within the overall context of the White House and Executive Office staffs has taken a very sharp jump upward in the Nixon administration compared to the gradual increase in earlier post-World War II administrations. In summary, the trend toward centralization at the White House level was slow and steady from about 1947 to 1969 but rapidly accelerated in the first Nixon year.

At this point I will digress from the scholar's inclination to look for long-term trends and will turn to something similar to a journalist's role in providing the kind of detailed report on specific developments within the Pentagon, the White House, and elsewhere in Washington during the first year of the Nixon administration, on the assumption that these are the kinds of details likely to be of greatest interest to an audience of senior military men.

Two warnings should be introduced. First, several high-level boards and committees were created during 1969 with the task of reviewing some or all aspects of U.S. military and/or foreign policy including the policymaking machinery. Changes could conceivably result from the recommendations of these groups which would significantly alter any trends apparently evident in President Nixon's first year. Second, many observers feel that domestic politics in the United States and in many other nations were entering a period of high instability and flux in the late 1960's carrying over into the 1970's. Various kinds of radical change became at least conceivable and perhaps probable. Any such changes in the internal and external policymaking environments could produce radical changes in any trends apparently evident in the first 12 months of the Nixon administration. In summary, any commentaries on these early trends, including the commentary here, are likely to be highly premature. But, with these caveats on the record, it is possible to proceed with the commentary.

If a person likes to think in terms of winners and losers and if the Pentagon is looked at first, then some gross simplifications can be suggested. The Pentagon winners in the first Nixon year, in contrast to what took place during the preceding 8 years, generally included the separate services (especially the service Secretaries, in the eyes of some observers) as well as the collective Armed Forces as represented by the JCS Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a whole. The Department of Defense Comptroller, Mr. Robert C. Moot, recently issued a new nine-step budget process giving the services the major role in originating and preparing the defense budget based on guidance from Secretary of Defense Laird. Laird's guidance

will, in turn, be heavily based on the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP). This is almost a direct reversal of what tended to occur in McNamara's Pentagon where the OASD civilians, primarily those in the shops of the Comptroller and Systems Analysis and International Security Affairs, did almost all of the originating which resulted in McNamara's Draft Presidential Memoranda (DPM's). To the small extent that the military people participated in this process, it was at too late a stage to make much difference. The JSOP was regularly produced throughout the McNamara period, but it became a rather esoteric document for the record without much significant impact on policymaking or policy. The new procedures outlined by Mr. Moot, which were well reported in *The New York Times* (by William Beecher, 29 September 1969) and the *Army-Navy Journal* and other periodicals, appeared to represent a dramatic change. In summary, the Nation's uniformed military leaders and the separate services are now supposed to have substantial involvement and heavy responsibilities for preparing the defense budget from the beginning to the end of the annual cycle.

Those who have lost authority and responsibility in Laird's Pentagon in contrast to their more powerful roles in McNamara's DOD obviously include the OASD shops previously noted: Comptroller, Systems Analysis (SA) and International Security Affairs (ISA). The Comptroller has reverted, apparently, to the more traditional role of chief budget officer but with a much diminished voice on the substantive side of policy issues. Recent press reports suggested that Mr. Laird found SA to be a more useful group than he had indicated in stringent criticisms before he became Defense Secretary, but that he nonetheless reduced SA to the role of analyzing various policy options rather than the role of forcing the Secretary's preferred option. ISA, sometimes called the Pentagon's "Little State Department," clearly played a reduced role in the first Nixon year, although some observers felt that the ISA role could gradually increase again if ISA acquired more talented personnel and a few more ifs such as the question whether the State Department would play a more effective and stronger role or a weak and further reduced role.

If one looked at the Defense Department alongside the State Department and asked the question about winners and losers, the State Department clearly seemed to be a resurgent part of the policymaking process. This does not mean that DOD was therefore a net loser, because in some respects the developments of 1969 looked like a more effective new alliance between State and Defense with State simply playing a stronger role than before. Furthermore, the policymaking process is not necessarily a constant-sum (or zero-sum) game in which every winner must be offset by an equivalent loser. There were several apparent reasons for the resurgence of State in the first Nixon year, some of which will be suggested a few paragraphs later in the discussion of changes at the White House level, but one obvious reason was the emergence of more talented personnel. Secretary of State Rogers gradually won respect in Washington in 1969, but even more significant perhaps was the almost instant and universally high respect won by Under Secretary Elliot Richardson from the moment he took office in early 1969. Richardson thus became one of those rare men who was greatly liked and well regarded simultaneously within his own agency, within all agencies and parts of Government doing business with his agency, within the press, within academic circles, and within foreign circles. At lower levels in the State Department, the so-called "Young Turks" among the Foreign Service officers, who had taken control of the American Foreign Service

Association 2 years earlier, were pressing for internal reforms in State and were winning what appeared to be a sympathetic audience in Secretary Rogers, Under Secretary Richardson, and in many other useful circles. Those internal reforms, if fully implemented, seemed certain to make the State Department a stronger and much more effective participant in making American foreign policy.

It would be useful at this point to shift the focus to the White House level, because many of the changes in the roles of the Defense Department, the State Department, and other participants in making overall American foreign policy can be appreciated only by an effort to understand changes at the White House level in the first Nixon year. First, as noted a few pages earlier here, the National Security Council and all of the machinery related to it is far larger than ever before. Ironically, President Nixon issued in early 1970 a confidential and toughly worded new directive, according to some press reports, which called for massive personnel cuts throughout the Government, but in 1969 he had already created the largest payroll and the largest staff within the White House and the Executive Office in the history of the Presidency.

The National Security Council, its staff, and related machinery were not only the largest in history by the end of 1969 but they were also parts of the most complex, elaborate, and hierarchically structured governmental organization at that level in history. This overall apparatus consisted of at least four components under the Director of the NSC Staff (and also the Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs), Dr. Henry Kissinger. First is the NSC Review Group chaired by Dr. Kissinger. It has the all-important task of deciding which papers should go to the NSC itself and how those papers should be written. Second is the so-called Under Secretary's Committee which is chaired by the Under Secretary of State and which greatly resembles the SIG of President Johnson's SIG/IRG system except that the Under Secretary's Committee (USC) is now formally a part of the NSC apparatus. The USC tends to deal with papers referred to it by the Review Group either because those papers are not quite important enough to go to the full NSC itself or because the papers deal more with operational matters than policy issues. Third, there are the six interdepartmental Groups, or IG's, each headed by the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State. Five of the six correspond to the State Department's regional bureaus (Europe, Middle East, Africa, East Asia, and Latin America) while the sixth is the functional Political-Military Group corresponding to PMG in State. (If ISA is the Defense Department's "Little State Department," PMG has sometimes been referred to as the State Department's "Little Defense Department.") These six IG's are the direct successors to the IRG's of the Johnson administration's SIG/IRG system, except that the IG's are now formally a part of the NSC apparatus. The IG's are ordinarily the source of most of the working papers circulating through the overall NSC machinery. The IG's may originate papers and studies on their own initiative or at the suggestion of the President or Dr. Kissinger or others. The fourth organizational component consists of the NSC Ad Hoc Groups, which are formed to prepare studies and papers when such an arrangement seems more appropriate than assigning the task to one of the six IG's. The Ad Hoc Groups therefore supplement the IG's.

Dr. Kissinger's own staff is also large, complex, and elaborately structured. It includes the usual retinue of military and administrative assistants. (A noteworthy feature is that the senior military officer assigned as a policy adviser to the White House now works directly

for Dr. Kissinger, in contrast to an earlier period when—for example—Gen. Maxwell Taylor had the title of Military Representative and worked directly for President Kennedy although in close liaison with Mr. McGeorge Bundy in the role similar to Dr. Kissinger's role in the Nixon White House.) Dr. Kissinger's own team also includes an Operations Staff with regional and functional specialists, a Planning Staff, a Program Review Staff, an Assistant for Special Projects, and an Assistant for Long-Range Plans. It is this group working directly for Dr. Kissinger that was conservatively said to number somewhere between 45 and 50 professional people as of the end of 1969.

There are also some new names for White House documents. Almost every new administration seems to feel that it should change the names of lots of things. Americans tend to confuse change with improvement, and people therefore give the President the benefit of the doubt if he changes names on the assumption that these changes represent improvements. One formalized new piece of paper that began to circulate in the Nixon White House in 1969 was the National Security Study Memorandum, or NSSM. These documents can be signed either by the President or Dr. Kissinger and are ordinarily used to start the ball rolling by asking one of the IG's or some other group to start thinking and writing about some problem. After everybody has written his paper on this problem or has hacked away at somebody else's paper, and after the decisionmaking wheels have cranked around a few revolutions, and after the President is thus ready to make a decision, the new piece of paper which floats out is called a National Security Decision Memorandum, or NSDM. The NSDM seems to have replaced the NSAM, or National Security Action Memorandum, of an earlier period. In any case, the NSDM's are used to report Presidential decisions whether they result from deliberations within the NSC context or from any other process.

At this point it then becomes necessary to say a few words about a brand new group which was created by President Nixon only at the end of 1969 and which appears to be part of the overall National Security Council apparatus. This new group illustrates the hazards that I warned of a few pages earlier—the dangers of premature judgments about Nixon's White House and his NSC. I know of one scholar who wrote an article in the late summer of 1969 criticizing Nixon's NSC but, before the article appeared in print, this latest new component of the NSC machinery was created and appears to meet one of this professor's main criticisms.

This latest and newest component created in November 1969 is called the Defense Policy Review Committee, or DPRC. If it is premature to comment on the overall Nixon NSC machinery after only 1 year, it is obviously all the more premature to comment on a new component in existence for less than 2 months. Yet, the DPRC has created so much comment in Washington, and is potentially such a powerful and significant group, that some discussion of it seems warranted.

The DPRC was brought into existence, according to one observer, because some relatively minor little foreign policy problem was created for the President by the unexamined consequences of one force reduction which had been ordered earlier. Another observer stated that the DPRC was created at the suggestion of Secretary of Defense Laird, who felt that he could not provide adequate guidance within the Pentagon on the matter of the defense budget unless he knew how defense matters were regarded in terms of priorities within the entire Federal budget context. But, whatever the origins of the DPRC idea, its functions and missions are truly staggering. Its main task is to try to anticipate *all* possible

political and economic and social implications, both foreign *and domestic*, resulting from any changes in defense spending, budgeting, force levels, and related considerations, trying to assess trade-offs between domestic and foreign programs. This really goes to the heart of everything, down to bedrock. This is big government's biggest problem—the question of overall priorities. If DPRC works as it is apparently designed to work, it will be the first time in American history that any person or group short of the President himself has been assigned the task of looking at *all* policy problems of the United States ranging across the whole spectrum from domestic to foreign.

The membership of DPRC is noteworthy. The chairman is Dr. Henry Kissinger, who thus added a dramatic new increment of potential power to a set of roles already putting him astride key crossroads at the highest levels of government. The other five members are the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State, the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers.

Most powerful new units of government arouse resentments in certain quarters but, oddly, none of the groups represented in the DPRC appears to be unhappy about it with the possible exception of the Budget Bureau. Dr. Kissinger does not seem displeased to gain another critical lever on behalf of the President. The Defense Department Secretariat appears pleased because DOD is provided with two representatives (some people say it should be three, counting Dr. Kissinger) against only one for each of several other agencies. This factor, it is said, should give DOD a useful arena in which to fight against any proposed cuts in the defense budget. The uniformed leaders of the Armed Forces are said to be happy about having the JCS Chairman sitting on DPRC, thus giving the JCS Chairman a second membership on a very high-level decisionmaking body within the White House context (he also sits on the NSC Under Secretary's Committee). The State Department is said to be happy about DPRC, because State thus gains for the first time a strategic foothold in making the DOD budget at a critical early stage before the annual budget cycle even begins. (It remains to be seen how the work of DPRC will influence the new nine-step budget-making process outlined for DOD by Comptroller Moot, as described earlier here.) The Bureau of the Budget is said to be happy about DPRC because it is provided with a powerful arena in which to attack DOD budget proposals, perhaps with the Council of Economic Advisers as an ally, although other people have said that the Bureau of the Budget is not pleased to be merely represented at a table presided over by Dr. Kissinger on matters pertaining to budgetary questions. The Council of Economic Advisers clearly has no reason to be displeased about a move which places it more nearly in a line rather than an advisory staff position. And the President himself is said to be pleased about DPRC because it gives him a device for trying to keep everybody and everybody's budget under control at the earliest policymaking stage rather than at the later stages where the Bureau of the Budget has tried to play this role for the President.

The DPRC will presumably have an opportunity to make some impact on the budget for FY 72 in the cycle that has already started, but its first full opportunity for influence will be the budget for FY 73 in the cycle beginning in the fall of 1970. Until at least another year has elapsed, it will therefore be too early to say anything definitive about the DPRC, except that on paper it at least seems to have the potential for being the one most crucially important organizational

innovation of the Nixon administration.

This review of the formal components of the policymaking process in the area of foreign affairs in the first Nixon year would be incomplete without at least a few speculative remarks concerning the intelligence community. For obvious reasons, it is hard to get reliable reports on this subject, but some things can be suggested. First, it is said that the intelligence agencies are the only groups in the entire defense and foreign policymaking machinery in Washington which retain independent access to the President, through channels separate from the elaborate machinery presided over largely by Dr. Kissinger. Of course, the intelligence community is represented within that machinery too; for example, the Director of Central Intelligence is a statutory member of the National Security Council. But, with reference to the intelligence community's separate channels, some observers have suggested that it could perhaps acquire more power in the future as a kind of balance wheel among the other participating governmental agencies. These intelligence agencies have been perceptive enough to detect President Nixon's desire for more analysis and interpretation on top of the bare facts of intelligence gathering, and the agencies are therefore trying to provide this greater degree of interpretative analysis for him. This could also mean, incidentally and speculatively, an enhanced role for the interpretative and analytical components of the intelligence community such as the Office of National Estimates within CIA.

Having completed this quick review of the formal organizational components of the overall National Security Council apparatus, it is now appropriate to take a look at informal procedures and individuals. As suggested earlier here, a person can learn a few things by studying the scorecard, but sooner or later it is necessary to go to the ball game and take a look at what actually happens—including a look at the individual players. What actually happens in government seldom bears a close resemblance to what one would guess from looking at the formal organization charts.

As for informal procedures, it can be reported that almost all pieces of the machinery within the overall National Security Council apparatus have been very busy, with the NSC itself having ordinarily met at least once a week during the first Nixon year. However, many people think that the Kissinger staff is more important than all other parts of the machinery, because first of all this staff decides what the NSC itself will see and in what form and language it will see it. But, wholly aside from the relative influence of various parts of the formal machinery, informal procedures had begun to emerge by the end of 1969. One keen observer with a second-row seat in the Executive Office Building and with the background to understand what he sees privately reported the following:

> Only a few of the issues are reviewed by the full NSC itself. More often, the President, Dr. Kissinger and one of two principals from the NSC staff will discuss these issues, *but outside of the formal NSC.* [Emphasis added.] Furthermore, these discussions may be very informal and may extend over a period of time. It is safe to say that many of the most important and sensitive issues now being addressed by this Administration are being handled in this way. Vietnam, for example, has been handled this way.

Other evidence tends to support this suggestion concerning the importance of informal procedures. For example, recent reports in the press stated that Dr. Kissinger and Under Secretary of State Richardson meet for lunch every

Thursday. As far as is known, this is the only kind of regular lunch meeting scheduled by Kissinger or others at high White House levels. It could conceivably serve as the nucleus for a later development along the lines of President Johnson's "Tuesday Lunch." It could also mean a growing role for the Department of State, perhaps offsetting the fact that DOD/JCS has more representation than State in such groups as the Under Secretary's Committee and the Defense Policy Review Committee. Looked at in broader perspective, there may be the makings within the Nixon administration of a curious marriage between the elaborate staff inclinations of the Eisenhower period and the freewheeling *ad hoc* inclinations of the Kennedy-Johnson period. The overall NSC machinery may handle the detailed nitty-gritty in a nice orderly manner while the President and Dr. Kissinger and a few others make the really big decisions in an informal manner. It could even be a happy marriage, avoiding the extremes of orderliness and disorderliness while having the best of both.

Having now reviewed both the formal and the informal procedures and devices of the first Nixon year, it is worthwhile to take a brief look at some of the key personalities. It has already been noted here that Secretary Rogers and Under Secretary Richardson have acquired considerable respect both within the Department of State and elsewhere in Washington. Certainly the same is true for Secretary Laird and Deputy Secretary Packard representing the Department of Defense. There is no evidence of any significant dissatisfaction with the key military men, primarily the JCS members, although many of these people will presumably retire soon, and a new cast of characters will assume the key JCS roles. The key officials of the intelligence community, as suggested earlier, appear to have gained good marks in 1969. Major personality conflicts are notably absent at high levels in the first Nixon year, judging from all public reports as substantiated by private observations.

The key personalities, of course, are the President himself and Dr. Kissinger, plus one other man who should be mentioned before commenting on the President and Kissinger. That man is Laurence E. "Larry" Lynn, Jr., a very young economist who is an alumnus of the "Whiz Kid" group in Systems Analysis in the McNamara Pentagon. Dr. Lynn's importance is that he has responsibility on Kissinger's staff for reading apparently every high-level piece of Pentagon paper and introducing such papers into the National Security Council apparatus at all early and critical stages, in contrast to Secretary McNamara's more independent channels of access to the President during the 1960's. Moreover, it is said that Dr. Lynn uses the techniques of the Systems Analysis group in processing the Pentagon papers and other papers for Dr. Kissinger, with whom he has developed a very close working relationship. For whatever it may be worth, it is also said that Dr. Lynn has established cordial working relationships with the military officers in the Laird Pentagon, in contrast to uncordial relationships between many officers and the Systems Analysis people in McNamara's Pentagon. But, aside from this kind of consideration, one highly competent observer has suggested that Dr. Lynn's role is second in significance only to the creation of the Defense Policy Review Committee among the most important innovations of the Nixon White House in the general area of foreign affairs because Lynn represents the routine daily introduction of all high-level DOD thinking into the NSC context at sufficiently early stages that the overall NSC can have an impact on the Pentagon.

Turning to Dr. Kissinger, he is obviously a very important man in the Nixon administration, and perhaps the one most important man short of the

President himself. He sees the President a number of times a day, and he ordinarily travels with the President. He truly directs and manages the overall NSC apparatus not only as the chief of the NSC staff, but also as chairman of the critically important NSC Review Group and the Defense Policy Review Committee. Although he is merely a member of the Under Secretary's Committee and the NSC itself, those bodies see only what is referred to them by the NSC Review Group or by Kissinger personally. People with this much power in Washington ordinarily provoke considerable resentment and bureaucratic sniping, but Kissinger has reportedly done an extraordinarily good job of maintaining good relationships with all individuals and agencies participating in the policymaking process outside of his own NSC staff. This may be because he tries to make sure that the President receives fully accurate reports on the thinking of all involved individuals and agencies. Nevertheless, it apparently remains true that Dr. Kissinger himself gets the last word in telling the President what he thinks about what everybody else thinks.

The President himself, of course, is ultimately the key man in all of these matters, and neither Kissinger nor anybody else who participates in this policymaking process would survive long if they did not faithfully reflect and support the President's wants and needs and style. One key element in the President's style is his very strong resistance to thinking in terms of crises. Dr. Kissinger seems to share this predilection. Both men tend to feel that a crisis signifies a failure of orderly decisionmaking. The President's style has been widely reported as deliberative, contemplative, reflective, and generally cautious, and this kind of style would be difficult to maintain once a situation had been perceived as a crisis. There were actually only two or three candidates for designation as a crisis during the first Nixon year (perhaps the EC-121 incident, the situation in Peru, and the coup in Libya), but none was, in fact, viewed in this light.

Another characteristic apparently shared by the President and Dr. Kissinger is that both like to think in terms of strategic issues, long-range strategic solutions, and formal diplomatic negotiations leading to those solutions. They have therefore been greatly concerned with three sets of negotiations: first, of course, were the Vietnam negotiations (including but by no means limited to the Paris meetings); second were various negotiating efforts to solve the Middle East problems; and third were the so-called SALT talks. Both Nixon and Kissinger, it is said, would like to develop some new grand strategic design to guide overall U.S. foreign policy for the rest of this century, in the manner that several basic strategic concepts appeared to guide overall U.S. foreign policy for the first two decades following World War II.

It seems appropriate, in preparing this presentation for a military audience, to suggest some of the challenges posed for the Nation's uniformed military leaders by the Nixon system of policymaking. These leaders as of the end of 1969 seemed to be in a happy state of euphoria for several reasons. They felt that their new Secretary of Defense, Mr. Laird, exhibited a personality and a personal style which was much easier for them to work with congenially, even when he was cutting back the defense budget, in contrast to their dislike of Secretary McNamara's personality and personal style, even when he was expanding the defense budget. Although President Nixon had not sought direct personal meetings with the JCS and did not desire to have a senior officer working directly for him in the White House, these considerations did not bother the senior military leaders because they felt that their views were being fairly and accurately

represented at top White House levels through a variety of channels. But the cheerful euphoria of the military leaders perhaps obscured some major challenges that nevertheless faced them under the Nixon system.

The first challenge derived from the fact that, precisely as the military leaders had desired during the McNamara period, the Laird tenure of the Nixon administration presented them with an opportunity to be intimately involved in making the defense budget and thus national military policy at all key stages. The possible pitfall here was that the military leaders would have to prove that they could accept this responsibility. Certainly they could no longer claim before Congressional committees that the root of all troubles was the cast of big bad civilians in the OSD shops. A second and related challenge was to avoid a renewal of the harsh older forms of interservice fighting. Secretary McNamara's procedures tended to encourage a united military front against OSD, whereas the enhanced roles for the separate services under Secretary Laird could lead to publicly damaging ruptures between the services. Some people think, however, that a renewal of interservice rivalry is probably inevitable in the face of shrinking defense budgets in the 1970's, and others think that such rivalry is not altogether a bad thing in any case.

The third and perhaps the most important challenge facing the military leaders under the Nixon system is to think in terms of broad and long-range strategic issues. Military leaders were not ready and able to do this after World War II, and civilian strategists filled the vacuum in designing and elaborating the basic concepts—primarily the notions of deterrence and containment—which guided overall American military policy until at least 1960. Then, in the early 1960's, President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara tended to sidetrack the military leaders after being initially disappointed in the efforts of the JCS. Therefore, the military leaders as of 1970 had experienced a quarter of a century in which they were seldom afforded an opportunity or much encouragement to think in broad strategic terms. As of 1970, however, it was clear that President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger wanted to think in such terms and that the military leaders were invited to participate. Whether or not one thinks that a grand new strategic design is the best way to proceed is somewhat beside the point as long as the key men in the White House want to proceed in this way. The challenge to military leaders to be creatively and imaginatively and innovatively responsive is accordingly obvious.

As of the end of 1969, military leaders were not the only people in Washington who appeared happy about the Nixon style of policymaking and many of the Nixon innovations in altering the NSC machinery. Indeed, virtually all involved individuals and agencies and departments seemed generally quite enthusiastic. At the same time, however, some reservations and criticisms concerning potential or actual problems had begun to emerge from scholarly specialists on policymaking and from other competent observers. A useful way to close this presentation might be to review some of these early criticisms and reservations, attaching my own personal opinions where appropriate.

Two sets of criticisms were aimed at Dr. Kissinger. The first of these noted that he was a hard and demanding man to work for and that he did not always support his own staff when the infighting got rough. Critics noted that several of the best people on his original team had accordingly departed by the end of 1969, and the question was raised whether it could be an effective team if this kind of attrition forced the recruiting of new inexperienced people at fairly frequent intervals. My own opinion is that, while it is true some of

the most talented men on Kissinger's original team had departed by the end of 1969, I am not sure that the problems of working for him were necessarily major factors in each such departure. The first year of any new administration can be regarded as a shakedown cruise, and some personality incompatibilities and related problems are certain to result in some personnel attrition after the initial period. Dr. Kissinger appeared to have replaced the departed staff members with very good new men, and the overall staff entering the 1970's still seemed to be a remarkably talented and smoothly functioning group.

Perhaps the more serious of the two criticisms aimed at Dr. Kissinger was whether his mental model or view of the nature of the world was wholly adequate to contemporary circumstances. Many scholars have long felt that his most impressive work was his first book, *A World Restored*, based on his doctoral dissertation on the Congress of Vienna. Some of these same people, however, wondered whether Dr. Kissinger himself might not now prefer to try to restore that same kind of world following the Napoleonic wars, using similar diplomatic procedures. Few scholars see much similarity between that early 19th century period in international politics and the nature of the world for the last third of the 20th century. But it is doubtless too early to draw any reliable conclusions about the model of the world that Dr. Kissinger carries around in his head and how he might act in terms of any such model. What is more certain is the fact that he is a remarkably intelligent man with a formidable intellect still very much capable of learning from new events and circumstances. What is also relatively clear is that his first year on the job marked a more impressive performance on virtually all counts than has been exhibited by predecessors in equally sensitive and demanding positions.

Probably more serious than either of the two reservations concerning Dr. Kissinger were some of the early criticisms of various aspects of the overall NSC machinery and the ways it was apparently working in 1969. The first of these was whether the machinery was not perhaps already too rigid and therefore not susceptible to adaptive change. I see little evidence to support this anxiety. For example, I have heard that Dr. Kissinger has some reservations about the way that the IG's are working and that he may make some changes in this regard. I would expect such changes of related kinds if and when the machinery fails to deliver the desired quality of products.

A second criticism which I also do not take very seriously is whether the Nixon system could survive changes in key personnel. Some ask, for example, whether anyone but Dr. Kissinger could make the present system work. In the mid-1960's people were asking the same kind of questions as to whether anyone but Secretary McNamara could make his system work in the Pentagon. Quite obviously, any new people in top jobs at such levels must adapt or adopt a system congenial to their own leadership techniques. The right question, therefore, is not whether new men can make an inherited system work, but whether they can devise a system which works well for them.

A third reservation is whether the Nixon-Kissinger machinery can survive some of the bruising bureaucratic fights that certainly lie ahead. It does seem true that much of the euphoric satisfaction on all sides in Washington in early 1970 derived from the expectation by all parties that they would emerge the winners in all debates and disputes. But, as losers begin to emerge, some sore losers might well direct their displeasure at the machinery or at key men in the machinery. Still, the Nixon-Kissinger machinery certainly seems no more vulnerable to this kind of problem than

any other conceivable policymaking apparatus, and it might be much less vulnerable as long as all parties—including losers continue to feel that they have had a fair day in court.

A somewhat more serious reservation is whether, given the determination to avoid a crisis mentality on the part of the President and Dr. Kissinger, their machinery can function effectively whenever a situation comes along which cannot escape the designation of a crisis. There is probably no way to answer this question in advance of such an event.

A fifth and considerable reservation is whether the determination on the part of the President and Dr. Kissinger to produce a wide range of options for the final decision at the highest levels does not perhaps obscure the fundamental underlying issues on which the final decision ought to turn. Merely to say that Option A, in a hypothetical example, is to expand foreign aid to Country X, Option B is to reduce foreign aid to Country X, Option C is to climate all aid to Country X and give it to Country Z, et cetera, does not insure that the operational consequences of each option have been carefully examined or that the key issues have been explicitly identified. There are some observers who think this kind of problem has been experienced in some, but certainly not all, major issues that arose within the NSC context in 1969.

A sixth and serious reservation is whether the NSC machinery is as well constructed to insure adequate implementation of decisions as in reaching those decisions and policy positions. If, as suggested earlier here, there may be a Nixon marriage between the elaborate procedures of the Eisenhower period and the much less formal procedures of the Kennedy-Johnson period, it might be the case that the Eisenhower-type procedures are used to make decisions and policy whereas the *ad hoc* informal devices of the 1960's are relied on to achieve implementation. The Nixon men seemed apprehensive about creating any sort of implementation-monitoring devices which would raise any of the old problems associated with the OCB of the Eisenhower era, but they may have been less sensitive to avoiding the problems associated with the other extreme of the free-wheeling Kennedy-Johnson years. In any case, several competent observers have suggested that the Nixon-Kissinger machinery as of the beginning of 1970 had not adequately solved the implementation problem.

A seventh criticism which could be heard in the summer and fall of 1969 was that the Nixon-Kissinger machinery lacked a device for integrating or establishing priorities between domestic and foreign programs. But the Defense Policy Review Committee, announced in November of 1969, should go a long way toward meeting this problem if it can handle the staggering task assigned to it.

An eighth and quite complicated cirticism is that the Nixon-Kissinger machinery gave too large a voice to the Department of Defense without sufficient supervisory guidance, while taking steps that in effect tended to further weaken the Department of State's voice. Critics in this category tended to note that DOD and JCS had a stronger overall representation in most of the NSC machinery than did State. Similarly, it was said that State's representatives were in effect pulled out of State and incorporated within the NSC machinery, insofar as the Assistant Secretaries of State were made the chairmen of the NSC IG's and the Under Secretary was made chairman of the NSC Under Secretary's Committee. These facts were coupled with the observation that the Secretary of State appeared to be relatively weak and ineffective in 1969. The question was therefore raised whether this kind of Secretary could strengthen the Department of State while most of his key assistants had

begun to work directly for the White House. One answer to this kind of argument is to turn the case around and say that nothing could give State a greater opportunity to enhance its role in the policymaking process than to have many of its key people plugged directly into important NSC positions while still wearing their State Department hats, in contrast to being merely represented within the NSC machinery as is largely the case for the Defense Department. Accordingly, a more pertinent question, perhaps, was whether State was adequately exploiting its new opportunities by delivering a high-quality product into the NSC machinery, rather than whether the structure of the new machinery in some way undermined the authority of the Secretary of State. Presumably nothing could do more to enhance his authority than for his Department to gain a reputation for consistently high-quality participation in the NSC apparatus.

Finally, some critics wondered whether the policymaking apparatus was not becoming too centralized in the White House, conceivably leading to a situation where the State and Defense Departments would become mainly charged with the operational implementation of decisions and policy which they had played only a small role in making, in a manner somewhat akin to the status of the joint unified and specified military commands in the DOD establishment. Curiously, some of the critics who worried about this kind of excessive centralization were the same ones who previously supported almost all governmental centralization, especially when Secretary McNamara undertook centralizing changes in the Pentagon of the 1960's.

With regard to this issue of the degree of centralization in the White House, it is interesting to note how far this process has already gone. In 1956 President Eisenhower appointed Mr. William H. Jackson to a key White House position, with the title of "Special Assistant for ________ ________ ________." The blanks were supposed to be filled with wording something like "Coordination of Military and Foreign Policy." But when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles got wind of this, he strongly protested to the President, the blanks were never filled, and Mr. Jackson was soon shifted over to a key position with the National Security Council. Secretary Dulles presumably thought that the NSC was relatively innocuous in coordinating military and foreign policy or that, in any case, the NSC protected his personal relationship with the President and whatever autonomy the State Department itself possessed in making policy far more effectively than if a new Presidential assistant were to be explicitly charged with this kind of coordinating role.

The rather obscure Jackson case of the mid-1950's now seems like a part of the ancient past. My personal opinion is that although the Secretary of State and the Congress and other people used to worry, and some may still worry, about the possibility of the emergence of an all-powerful National Presidential Staff in the field of foreign and military affairs, the trend has clearly been in this direction at least since the National Security Act of 1947. Moreover, the trend was certainly accelerated in the 1960's in view of the roles of Mr. Bundy and Dr. Rostow in the White House, and it was accelerated even further in 1969 in view of Dr. Kissinger's role. As late as 1968 I predicted that sometime during the 1970's a piece of legislation would be enacted which would "unify" the State and Defense Departments in a manner akin to the "unification" of the separate armed services by means of the National Security Act of 1947. It could still happen, but those who laughed at this suggestion were perhaps correct to laugh—although possibly for the wrong reasons. Now it looks as if the same

result might be achieved but by evolutionary means rather than explicit legislation. In summary, Dr. Kissinger's position does, in fact, seem to be evolving steadily toward a job which could be described as the Super Secretary of State *and* Defense.

Whether it would be a "good thing" or a "bad thing" for this to happen is not easy for me to say. I am not a specialist in theories of public administration and I am not very good at normative judgments—certainly not before the fact. I am merely trying to report what seems to be a clear-cut trend toward more and more centralization. But if the trend does continue as I have speculated, it may be overtaken by other issues and events. The first new issue which might overtake it is a building conflict not over how the executive branch organizes itself to handle military and foreign policy, but rather the appropriate relationship between the executive and the legislative branches in making this kind of official policy. A related issue will perhaps be unresolved tensions between the U.S. Government as a whole and the American public as to the appropriate relationships between the officials and the people in this policy area. But, finally, in the middle or late 1970's, a new model of the nature of politics could well serve to erode the further usefulness of the old distinction between domestic and international affairs. In this case Dr. Kissinger could become the Super Secretary of State and Defense at just about the time when most people are deciding that to separate foreign and military affairs from all of the other concerns of government is not the best way to conceptualize the major problems into an organizational framework.

As I close this presentation, I am comforted in my uncertainties by several longer range considerations. First, those of us in my profession have been unable to show any clear connections between styles and forms of decisionmaking on the one hand and the quality of decisions and policy on the other. Therefore, we are not in a strong position to offer dogmatic judgments or guaranteed prescriptions. Second, and in a somewhat related sense, it is worth noting that history tends to be extremely forgiving of all kinds of decisionmaking if things work out happily, but even the most brilliant decisionmaking processes will not save those whose policies do not work out happily. Except for a handful of obscure historians, who knows or cares what kinds of decisionmaking processes or machinery were used by the Continental Congress and General Washington during one cold winter at Valley Forge? And, although Secretary McNamara was widely praised during the 1960's for the procedures which he introduced in the Pentagon, will these take him off the hook for the Vietnam war? Probably not.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Dr. Vincent Davis holds a doctorate from Princeton University in political science and is presently serving as Research Associate at Princeton's Center of International Studies. He has taught at both Dartmouth College and the University of Denver and has served as a consultant to the White House offices, the Department of Defense offices, and several other Government agencies. Dr. Davis has published several books dealing with national security matters and a variety of reports and articles. He is a commander in the Naval Reserve and will assume, in the fall of 1970, the Nimitz Chair of Political Science at the Naval War College.

FOOTNOTE

Two scholarly articles may be suggested for further reading. The first is by Professor Stanley Falk, "The National Security Council under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy," in the *Political Science Quarterly*, September 1964, p. 403-434. The second, focusing more recently on the Nixon White House, is by Professor Edward A. Kolodziej, "The National Security Council: Innovations and Implications," in the *Public Administration Review*, November/December 1969, p. 573-585. Both articles contain many useful notes with further references to other reading.

Any scholar who specializes in this particular subject must rely heavily on others in order to remain informed. Those who have been particularly helpful in developing my research in the past several years include first of all Dr. Laurence J. Legere but also Professor Charles F. Hermann and Lt. Col. William P. Snyder, U.S. Army. Those who have helped to clarify particular points include Col. Thomas N. Hunt, U.S. Air Force, and Lt. Col. R.M. Whitaker, U.S. Air Force. Those who have been kind enough to discuss many of these matters with me over a great many years include Dr. Paul Y. Hammond, Brig. Gen. G.A. Lincoln, U.S. Army (Ret.), Dean Burton M. Sapin, Professor Paul R. Schratz (Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret.), and Professor Frederick C. Thayer (Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.). But none of these people has reviewed this manuscript, and many of them would doubtless challenge some of my conclusions and judgments as well as perhaps some of my "facts." I therefore bear sole responsibility for this work.

A good staff has the advantage of being more lasting than the genius of a single man.

Jomini: Précis de l'art de la Guerre, 1838