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In an effort to determine the extent and presence of any differences of opinion among the younger and older members of the naval officer corps, the author of this article conducted a survey among the students of the Naval War College and the students of the Officer Candidate School of Newport, R.I. While the results of this survey do reveal differences in attitudes and opinions, the degree is such that the term "generation gap" is hardly warranted. The evidence indicates that the junior officers are more concerned with domestic issues than with international problems. An understanding of these attitudes will allow the commander to enjoy a closer rapport with his juniors.

IS THERE A GENERATION GAP IN THE NAVAL OFFICER CORPS?

An article prepared

by

Commander James A. Barber, Jr., U.S. Navy

During the last few years, the social fabric of the United States has been under an obvious strain—one which has inevitably had an effect on the military services. One of the symptoms of this strain, or perhaps even one of its causes, is what has been called the "generation gap." This gap is said to result from radically different values and attitudes between those who are under the magic age of 30 and those who are already on the dismal side of that threshold.

Within the Navy those in command positions, the commanding officers and executive officers, are almost invariably of the "over-30" generation, with the balance of the wardroom and most of the crew under the age of 30. If we are to believe the news media, a yawning gap exists between these two groups in regards to values, attitudes, and priorities. Whether there is such a gap and, if

so, just what its dimensions are, must be known and understood if we are to have the effective leadership which the situation demands. The study reported here is an attempt to evaluate the dimensions of the generation gap in the naval officer corps. An equally important problem is that of understanding the attitudes of the new generation of enlisted men—but that must await another study.

To evaluate the extent to which a generation gap exists within the Navy officer corps, an attitude survey was administered to two generations of naval officers: the "over-30" group being represented by 161 students of the Naval War College, in the grades of lieutenant commander through captain, and the "under-30" generation represented by 456 officer candidates only a few weeks before receiving their

commissions as ensigns.¹ Methodological information on the surveys may be found in appendix I.

Ranking of Important Issues. Before exploring the findings on priorities and issues, it may be well to note that the questionnaire was prefaced with a cover page indicating that responses should be in terms of basic attitudes, that is—their “four beer” opinions—rather than a careful evaluation of what was in the best national interest. Presumably answers would have been somewhat different, and quite possibly would have shown less divergence of opinion, if we had asked for reasoned opinions rather than personal attitudes.² For the purposes of this survey, however, it was desired to try to get at fundamental personal attitudes rather than reasoned opinions. It is always difficult in a survey to know just how “real” the responses are—but because identical questionnaires and methods were used, the responses here should provide a good basis for comparison.

In exploring these personal attitudes, it is important to determine both what the respondents think *about* an issue and how *important* they think that particular issue is. A generation gap can exist either over priorities (assessments of the degree of importance of an issue) or over issue solutions themselves (what should or should not be done in a specific case) or both. As an example, there is general agreement that the Vietnam war should be settled, but *how* it should be settled arouses great controversy. Conversely, although most people agree that disarmament is desirable, some find it a burning issue, while for others it is relatively unimportant.

These two dimensions of attitude must be explored separately. One portion of the survey was therefore designed to determine to which issues respondents in the two age groups assigned the highest priorities. To do this, 33 issues were identified which had

recently received considerable attention in the news media. Each respondent was asked, after reading over the list, to place a checkmark next to those 10 issues he thought were most important. Two blank spaces were provided to write in other important issues not included on the original list. About 25 percent of the respondents did enter additional items, but because of classification difficulties and because of the difference in meaning between a write-in and a suggested answer, the write-ins were not separately coded during evaluation.³ The issues are ranked in terms of the number of times they were chosen as among the 10 most important issues. This ranking may be seen in appendix II.

Both groups place “Settling the Vietnam war” at the top of their priority lists, with 83 percent of the officer candidates including it among their top 10 issues, compared with 77 percent of the naval officers at the Naval War College. The ranking issue does not tell much about the preferred method of settlement, but both groups make it their most important issue by a substantial margin. After that, the lists are different.⁴ For the Naval War College students, the next three most important issues are control of crime, Communist-supported insurgency, and race relations. For the officer candidates, the order of issues following Vietnam is race relations, the continued existence of poverty in the United States, and control of crime. Caution is necessary to avoid misinterpretation of rankings, however, since differences of a few percent can account for substantial differences in rank order. Control of crime, for example, is listed by 67 percent of the senior officers and 60 percent of the officer candidates, but this relatively small percentage difference causes a difference in rank order between second and fourth place.

Perhaps a more meaningful way of assessing differences in which issues

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each generation sees as important is to identify those issues on which there are substantial percentage differences and those on which differences are relatively small. If a difference of 10 percent is arbitrarily taken as indicating a notable difference in evaluation of the importance of an issue, there were seven issues out of the 33 that the officer candidates thought were notably more important than did the more senior officers. These issues, and the percent of difference, are listed in table I. Of the seven issues, three are concerned with domestic social issues (the continued existence of poverty in the United States, race relations, and the quality of the public schools), and four are concerned with averting the danger of war (disarmament, the need for detente between the United States and the U.S.S.R., the spread of nuclear weapons technology, and the danger of nuclear war). Of these, all but detente and the spread of nuclear weapons were among the 10 most important issues as ranked by the OCS students.

Those issues which were ranked by

the officer candidates substantially lower than by the more senior officers are listed in table II. Despite their greater concern for war in the abstract, they seem somewhat less worried than their seniors about specific areas of potential conflict. The greatest percent difference in rankings is in the case of Communist-supported insurgency, a difference of 32 percent, and a difference in rankings from number 3 for the more senior officers to number 16 for the officer candidates. Officer candidates also give less importance than do their seniors to several other issues of military security, including maintenance of the NATO alliance, decline of the U.S. merchant marine, and the danger of war in the Middle East. In domestic issues they attribute less importance than do the senior officers to the issues of the role of the press, the image of the military services, and the danger of internal subversion.

Although there are noteworthy divergences in viewpoint evident on some of the issues already mentioned, it would seriously distort any attempted

**TABLE I—ISSUES THAT CONCERN OCS STUDENTS
MORE THAN THEY DO NWC STUDENTS**

	% Diff.
1. The continued existence of poverty in the United States	39%
2. Disarmament	34%
3. Race relations	20%
4. The quality of the public schools	15%
5. The need for detente between the United States and the U.S.S.R.	14%
6. The spread of nuclear weapons technology	14%
7. The danger of nuclear war	13%

**TABLE II—ISSUES THAT CONCERN OCS STUDENTS
LESS THAN THEY DO NWC STUDENTS:**

1. Communist-supported insurgency	32%
2. The role of the press in shaping public opinion	29%
3. Maintenance of the NATO alliance	26%
4. Image of the military services in today's society	24%
5. The decline of the U.S. merchant marine	18%
6. The danger of internal subversion	12%
7. The danger of war in the Middle East	12%

assessment of a generation gap to focus only on those issues on which there are substantial differences of opinion. On 19 out of the 33 issues there is less than a 10 percent difference in the proportion of times each issue is included among the top 10. These 19 issues include both high- (settling the Vietnam war and control of crime) and low- (the reunification of Germany, commercial exploitation of pornography) rated issues. It is worth noting that "the generation gap" is among the six least-often included issues for both the officer candidates and the Naval War College students, ranking 29th and 28th, respectively, among the 33 issues ranked.

The evidence from the ranking shows that the officer candidates are in substantial agreement with their seniors on the relative importance of a number of issues but in disagreement on several others. The most important differences appear to lie in a greater concern on the part of the officer candidates for domestic social issues and for what can be called pacific means for the settlement of international issues and less concern on their part for issues of military and internal security. Whether or not these differences constitute a "gap" requires closer examination of specific attitudes toward some of these issues.

Attitudes on Domestic Issues. Our examination of the rankings of issues shows that one of the more important areas of difference between the two groups is on domestic issues. A difference in assessment of the importance of an issue does not necessarily imply a difference in attitude on the issue itself—though, as it turns out, there is also a noticeable difference in attitude toward several specific domestic issues.

One basic dimension of political attitudes is the liberal-conservative continuum. Included in the survey was the question "In domestic politics do you regard yourself as a conservative, a little

on the conservative side, a little on the liberal side, liberal?"⁵ Almost four-fifths of the senior officers consider themselves conservative or somewhat conservative, compared with somewhat less than half of the officer candidates. Less than 4 percent of the Naval War College students characterized themselves as unreservedly liberal, compared to 19 percent of the officer candidates.

The more liberal political orientation of the officer candidates is also reflected in their response to two more specific questions on race relations and social welfare activity. It will be recalled that domestic poverty and race relations are two of the issues which the officer candidates rate as relatively more important than do the more senior officers. When asked to assess the adequacy of Federal programs in the areas of unemployment, education, and housing, more of the senior officers feel that the Government is doing too much than feel that it is not doing enough. The situation is just the opposite among the officer candidates, 60 percent of them believing that the Federal Government is not doing enough in these areas.

A similar but smaller divergence in attitudes toward the role of the Federal Government is seen with regard to race relations. When asked "If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing, the Government should see to it that they do," 68 percent of the Naval War College students agree, compared with 74 percent of the officer candidates, but substantially more of the officer candidates feel strongly about their agreement.

On the basis of responses to these questions, the officer candidates, as a group, are somewhat more liberal in their general domestic orientation than are their seniors; are notably more anxious to see the Federal Government take action to correct social ills; and are slightly more often in favor of Government action to insure fair treatment of Negroes. Neither the senior nor the

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junior groups are homogeneous in their responses to any of these questions: although more of the officer candidates are liberal, a substantial minority consider themselves conservatives, and in responses to each of the other questions there is substantial overlap in responses. There is some clear difference in the overall tenor of responses between the officer candidates and the more senior officers, but because of the substantial overlap that exists in almost every case it would be difficult to characterize this difference as a true polarization of opinion.

Domestic versus International Orientation. Several questions in the survey permit a more direct exploration of the difference in orientation between the officer candidates and the more senior officers on the relative importance of domestic problems. One of the questions asked was, "A great deal of discussion has taken place in this country concerning the priority which the Federal Government should attach to domestic and international problems. From the point of view of U.S. national interests, which do you think should receive the most emphasis, domestic or international problems?"

The distribution of responses to this question is about what would be anticipated on the basis of the earlier finding that the officer candidates are relatively more concerned about domestic questions. Almost 70 percent of the officer candidates think domestic problems should receive the most emphasis, compared with fewer than 22 percent of the more senior officers. It is here—in the greater emphasis the young officers place on domestic problems—that the greatest divergence of opinion between the two age groups appears. The difference is understandable: the career officers have, as a matter of professional necessity, focused much of their attention on international concerns for a number of years and have, in the

majority of cases, spent many years at sea or in foreign countries. The officer candidates are, in almost every case, fresh from 4 or more years on a college campus, where domestic concerns have occupied a great deal of attention. As a result, it is here that the most substantial difference in opinion does exist.

A related question covers the degree to which the United States should concern itself with problems in other parts of the world. As could be anticipated, a higher proportion of the officer candidates agree with the mildly isolationist sentiment that the United States has "gone too far in concerning itself with problems in other parts of the world." Although not so striking as in the case of domestic versus international concerns, the difference between the two groups is still substantial, with more than 63 percent of the officer candidates expressing some degree of isolationist sentiment, as compared with only 36 percent of the Naval War College students. It should be noted, however, that only 14 percent of the officer candidates are in strong agreement with the statement with almost as many, 13 percent, in strong disagreement.

One further question bears upon U.S. international concerns. The survey respondents were asked whether they thought that in international affairs the United States paid too much attention to military, economic, or political matters. Differences in response to this question are smaller than in the other two questions in this area, the only notable difference being that about 10 percent more of the officer candidates think that too much attention is being paid to military matters, and almost twice as many of the Naval War College students felt that about the right amount of emphasis was being placed on all three, as compared with the responses of the officer candidates.

The biggest difference between the two groups lies in the considerably

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greater concern of the younger group with domestic problems and their lesser concern with international problems. It is on this issue that we come closest to a genuine polarization of opinion, with a substantial majority of the officer candidates showing greatest concern over domestic problems, while almost half of the more senior officers are most concerned about international problems. It should be recognized, however, that the difference shown here is more one of emphasis than it is one of fundamental attitude, since the questions were, in most cases, of what issues should receive the most attention, not necessarily what should be done about them. As will be explored in succeeding sections, however, there are some attitude differences as well.

Attitudes on International Issues. A number of questions were included in the survey concerning specific international issues. One has to do with the fundamental question of U.S. relationships with the Soviet Union. Large majorities of both groups favored continuation of U.S. negotiation with the Soviet Union, with about 94 percent of the senior group in favor compared to 97 percent of the junior group. The officer candidates, however, were more often in "strong" agreement than were the students at the Naval War College. Only small numbers of either group expressed even mild disagreement with the policy of peaceful negotiation.

Similar agreement is found on the desirability of economic help to the poorer countries of the world, with 79 percent of the officer candidates and an even larger 83 percent of the senior officers in favor of foreign aid. In this case the difference between the two groups is no larger than could happen by chance.

On the subject of the long-term policy of the United States in opposing the entry of Communist China into the United Nations, small majorities of both

groups are in favor of a policy change. The principal difference between the two groups is that a somewhat larger proportion of the officer candidates favor a U.S. initiative to get Red China into the United Nations (15 percent OCS favoring U.S. initiative versus 5 percent NWC), while more of the senior officers favor a passive policy of not opposing China's entry (34 percent OCS versus 41 percent NWC). It is of some interest that a larger proportion of the officer candidates (11 percent OCS versus 3 percent NWC) adopt a hard line—*withdrawing support of the U.N. if Red China is admitted*—than is true for the senior officers who, at least in this case, more often adhere to intermediate positions.

It will be recalled that the topic ranked first among the most important problems by both groups was that of settling the Vietnam war. Information on specific attitudes toward the war appears in appendix III. A somewhat higher proportion of the officer candidates thinks that political goals in the Vietnam war are more important than military victory, but substantial majorities in both groups emphasize the primacy of political goals. A somewhat greater difference is found in responses to the statement "The Vietnam conflict is a good illustration of the desire of the Communists to conquer the world." A majority of the senior group (66 percent) agree with that interpretation, with a majority of the officer candidates (55 percent) in disagreement. There is not a real polarization of sentiment, however, since for both groups the majority adopt the "agree somewhat" and "disagree somewhat" responses rather than being in strong agreement or disagreement.

Attitudes toward Military Commitments. Because of the relatively greater importance accorded domestic concerns by the officer candidates, and because of the somewhat higher proportion of

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them with moderately isolationist sentiments, it would be expected that they would be less in favor of foreign military commitments than are their seniors. Several questions are included in the survey which help to clarify their attitudes and are reported in appendix IV. When asked "Should America, in light of the Vietnam experience, continue to guarantee the integrity of its smaller allies against aggression?" both the senior and junior groups have majorities favoring continuation of U.S. protection of smaller allies against aggression, but with a somewhat higher proportion of the officer candidates having some reservations on the matter. Aspects of this question are developed further in a second question on U.S. involvement, with substantial majorities of both groups believing that defense of weaker nations by the United States should be undertaken only in concert with allies. The principal difference in the response is that the officer candidates are more often in complete agreement with the proposition, with the senior officers most often stating that they "agree somewhat."

Two other questions relating to military commitments were asked. When asked to respond to the proposition that the United States should expand its naval commitments to include the Indian Ocean, the senior officers are somewhat more often in favor of the proposition, with 64 percent favoring the proposal compared to 46 percent of the officer candidates. The second question asked for agreement or disagreement with a proposal that the United States withdraw from overseas bases. In light of the somewhat greater isolationism of the younger group, it is not surprising to find that they more often favor withdrawal from overseas bases than do their seniors—but it is also noteworthy that majorities of both groups oppose the action, 58 percent of the junior group disagreeing compared with 77 percent of the senior group.

Despite some differences in the total pattern of responses, the differences again are well short of polarization.

The Likelihood of War. Three questions were asked which were intended to determine individual's perceptions of the probability that the United States would be involved in further wars during the next 15 years. Whether the question is in terms of further limited conventional wars, limited nuclear war, or all-out nuclear war, there are virtually no differences between the two groups.⁶ Overwhelming majorities of both groups expect further limited conventional war within 15 years, the figures being 93 percent for the officer candidates and 97 percent for the more senior officers. Much smaller proportions expect any use of nuclear weapons, even of a limited variety, only 23 percent of the senior officers expecting limited nuclear war, compared with a similar figure of 21 percent for the officer candidates. Only a very few expect all-out nuclear war within 15 years, the figures in that case being 7 percent for the seniors and 10 percent for the juniors. In no case are the differences between the two groups statistically significant.

Willingness to Use Force to Defend Friendly Countries. Questions were asked to determine willingness to use force under circumstances similar to that of the *Pueblo* incident and to determine the degree of force each individual would be willing to employ in defense of friendly countries under certain circumstances. In response to the question "Which of the following responses best corresponds to your own feeling of how the United States should react to an attack on one of its vessels or aircraft not violating the territorial sovereignty of another country?" the more senior officers are substantially more often in favor of immediate military reprisal than are their juniors (48,

percent versus 23 percent) although a substantial majority of the juniors are in favor of military reprisal when diplomatic means fail. Only 5 percent of the senior officers are in favor of completely foregoing military action in such circumstances, compared with almost 20 percent of the officer candidates who are against military reprisal.

When asked what the United States should do if one of a series of friendly countries "is invaded from across the border by outside Communist military forces," responses vary substantially, depending on the specific country involved, but follow a general pattern of the senior officers being willing to use higher degrees of military force in most situations. The results are reported in detail in appendix V. Some inconsistencies occur, however, one example being in the case of India, where 34 percent of the officer candidates are in favor of using either nuclear or conventional military force to defend India, compared with only 23 percent of the more senior officers in favor of defending India with military force. In the case of the defense of Israel, there is no substantial difference between the two groups, while in all other cases the senior officers tend to favor a higher degree of military support. A striking case is that of Canada, where 71 percent of the seniors would employ nuclear weapons if necessary in the defense of Canada, compared with only 35 percent of the officer candidates willing to use nuclear weapons. Since 91 percent of the officer candidates are in favor of using some degree of military force to defend Canada, it seems that their principal objection is to the possible use of nuclear weapons, rather than to the use of U.S. forces to defend Canada.

When presented with a more ambiguous threat—that of internal insurgency rather than overt aggression—neither group displays any willingness to use nuclear weapons. The results for three countries—India, Japan, and West

Germany—are reported in appendix VI. In each case a larger proportion of the officer candidates would prefer to stay completely out of the situation than would the senior officers. In each of the three cases, however, a majority of both groups or, in one case, close to a majority, would prefer to keep U.S. involvement short of actual military participation.

In the case of willingness to use force, as in many of the other attitudes examined, there is a difference in the distribution of attitudes between the officer candidates and the more senior officers. In this case substantially fewer of the officer candidates are in favor of the use of military force in any particular circumstance than is true of their seniors. However, it is important to note that in almost all cases a difference of degree is involved rather than a difference in kind. The juniors are not unwilling to use force—they would in most cases simply favor the use of *less* force in any particular circumstance.⁷

Conclusion. The single most important conclusion to be drawn from the surveys reported here is that neither group is homogeneous. There is no package of attitudes which can be characterized as a standard set for either the officer candidates or the students at the Naval War College. On almost every question some members of each group will be found at each end of the attitude spectrum.

There *is* a difference in the overall distribution of attitudes between the two groups as found in this survey. On most questions more of the younger officers are liberals. They tend to be more concerned with domestic issues than international issues, more worried about issues of social justice, less worried about issues of national security, somewhat more often are mildly isolationist, and in any given circumstances less often favor the use of military force, all as compared with the

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group of more senior officers. In many cases, however, the degree of overlap in attitudes appears at least as compelling as the differences. In responses to almost every question, majorities of both groups select moderate answers, with smaller proportions at the extremes. The typical officer candidate as sketched in this survey is no more a wild-eyed radical than is the typical War College student a militarist—though there may be an example or two of each type in each group.⁸

The officer candidates interviewed in this survey are by now commissioned officers in the U.S. Navy and are serving throughout the world. Based on past performance, it can safely be assumed that they are, in almost every case, serving with competence, and, in many cases, with distinction. There is nothing in this survey to indicate that the attitudes they bring to their service will interfere with their performance. The generation gap in the naval officer corps is, at least so far as can be determined from this survey, one that is by no means unbridgeable. This is not to say, however, that the new generation of

officers sees the world through the same lenses as their seniors. As seen here, in many cases they do not, and if we are to continue to have close rapport between our commanders and their officers, it is necessary to understand just what the differences are. It is hoped that this survey contributes to that understanding.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Comdr. James A. Barber, Jr., U.S. Navy, did his undergraduate work in economics at the University of Southern California. He holds an M.A. in economics from Vanderbilt and an M.A. in international relations and a Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University. His primary operational experience has been in destroyers, most recently as Executive Officer of the U.S.S. *Henry W. Tucker* (DD 875) and as Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. *Hissem* (DER 100). Commander Barber is currently serving as Plans Officer on the staff of the Naval War College.

FOOTNOTES

1. Officer candidates constitute an appropriate group to determine attitudes among junior officers, because they are only a few weeks from becoming officers themselves, and because OCS graduates account for a large portion of the junior officers in the Navy. They do not, however, constitute a random sampling of their age group. They are all college graduates, have voluntarily applied for officer candidate status, and have survived a selection process. As a result, it is reasonable to expect that they are more "establishment" oriented than the average young American. This survey is concerned with an evaluation of differing attitudes *within* the officer corps, not between the officer corps and outside groups.

2. The assumption here is that there is likely to be more divergence between personal attitudes toward issues than there is between considered evaluations of national interest—though quite certainly there can be divergences in both.

3. The one write-in response which was noteworthy, and which should have been included on the original listing, was the pollution of man's environment. Unfortunately, the issue was not included.

4. See appendix II.

5. This question was taken from a survey conducted on a sample of Pentagon officers in 1954. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960), table 28, p. 237. Janowitz' 1954 results are quite similar to those reported here for Naval War College students 15 years later.

6. No attempt was made in the survey to define "limited conventional," "limited nuclear," and "all-out nuclear" war. As a result, it is the individual's interpretation of these sometimes

ambiguous phrases that governs the response, although it can be expected that the senior officers are more familiar with official definitions.

7. The questions in appendices V and VI were adapted from a *Time*-Louis Harris poll reported in *Time Magazine* on 2 May 1969, p. 16-17. In every case both the OCS and NWC groups are more willing to use military force in each circumstance described than are the representative sample of Americans listed in the *Time* poll. This reinforces the interpretation that within the officer corps the difference is one of degree rather than kind.

8. Militarist is used here in the sense of one who has made an ideology of war. See the *New Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 1968, vol. X, p. 300.

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APPENDIX I

METHODOLOGY

The data obtained in this report were obtained from surveys conducted at the Newport Naval Base in June and October 1969. The survey instrument used was a self-administering written questionnaire. The first survey, of naval officers enrolled as students in the Naval War College, was distributed to all enrolled students in the School of Naval Command and Staff and in the School of Naval Warfare in June 1969. Respondents were aware that the survey was being conducted under Naval War College auspices, but care was taken to ensure that responses were voluntary and anonymous. Of 185 questionnaires distributed, 161 were returned for a return rate of 87 percent.

The second survey was of a group of First Class officer candidates at the Officer Candidate School in Newport, R.I., in early October 1969. At the time of the survey, they had been in attendance at the school for about 3 months. The same questionnaire was used for both surveys, and care was again taken to ensure that responses were voluntary and anonymous. The officer candidates were not advised that the survey emanated from the Naval War College, but only that it was being given as a matter of interest to determine prevailing views on a number of issues. The officer candidates were allowed to take the questionnaires to their rooms to be completed, and upon completion they were returned to a voluntary pile, with no checking to see who did and did not return the questionnaires. Of 500 questionnaires distributed, 456 were returned for a return rate of 91 percent.

The statistical test used as a measure of statistical significance is chi square, and the level of probability adopted as a criterion of statistical significance is .05. Wherever a difference would occur more often than five times out of 100 by chance, it is reported as not significant (NS). Wherever the probability of the difference occurring by chance is less than .05 the actual probability level reached is reported.

Because of limitations of space, only a portion of the information from the surveys has been reproduced in this article and the accompanying appendices. Copies of the questionnaire and more complete sets of tables are on file in the Naval War College Library.

APPENDIX II—THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES AS SEEN BY STUDENTS AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE AND BY OFFICER CANDIDATES

AS SEEN BY STUDENTS AT NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

AS SEEN BY OFFICER CANDIDATES

RANK ORDER	ISSUE	PERCENTAGE OF REPLIES	RANK ORDER	ISSUE	PERCENTAGE OF REPLIES
1.	Settling the Vietnam war	77	1.	Settling the Vietnam war	83
2.	Control of crime	67	2.	Race relations	76
3.	Communist-supported insurgency	60	3.	The continued existence of poverty in the U.S.	61
4.	Race relations	56	4.	Control of crime	60
5.	The role of the press in shaping public opinion	54	5.	The competition between domestic needs and the military budget	48
6.	The competition between domestic needs and the military budget	44	6A.	The danger of nuclear war	45
7.	Unrest on college campuses	43	6B.	Drug use by young people	45
8.	The danger of war in the Middle East	40	6C.	The quality of public schools	45
9.	Image of the military service in today's society	39	9.	Disarmament	41
10A.	Curbing the population explosion	38	10.	Unrest on college campuses	37
10B.	Drug use by young people	38	11.	Curbing the population explosion	35
12.	Maintenance of the NATO alliance	37	12.	The need for detente between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.	34
13.	The danger of nuclear war	32	13.	<i>Pueblo</i> -type incidents	33
14.	The decline of the U.S. merchant marine	31	14.	Strengthening the United Nations	29
15.	The quality of the public schools	30	15.	The danger of war in the middle east	28
16.	<i>Pueblo</i> -type incidents	29	16.	Communist-supported insurgency	28
17.	The danger of internal subversion	27	17.	The spread of nuclear weapons technology	26
18.	The Soviet maritime expansion	26	18.	The role of the press in shaping public opinion	25
19.	Size of the Federal Government	24	19.	The income gap between rich and poor nations	23
20A.	The ABM controversy	22	20.	The Soviet maritime expansion	21
20B.	The continued existence of poverty in the U.S.	22	21.	The ABM controversy	21
22.	Strengthening the United Nations	21	22.	Size of the Federal Government	18
23.	The need for detente between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.	20	23.	Normalization of relations with Communist China	18
24.	The income gap between rich and poor nations	19	24A.	Image of the Military Services in today's society	15
25.	Normalization of relations with Communist China	17	24B.	The danger of internal subversion	15
26.	The spread of nuclear weapons technology	12	26.	Registration and control of privately-owned firearms	13
27.	Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean	9	27.	The decline of the U.S. merchant marine	13
28A.	Disarmament	7	28.	Maintenance of the NATO alliance	11
28B.	The generation gap	7	29.	The generation gap	8
30.	Commercial exploitation of pornography	6	30.	Violence on television and in movies	6
31.	The reunification of Germany	4	31.	The reunification of Germany	3
32.	Registration and control of privately owned firearms	3	32.	Commercial exploitation of pornography	3
33.	Violence on television and in movies	2	33.	Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean	2

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APPENDIX III--ATTITUDES TOWARD THE VIETNAM WAR

It has been said that the Vietnam war is an example of the kind of conflict in which political goals are more important than winning the war in a military sense. Do you agree or disagree?

Response category	NWC	OCS
Agree strongly	40%	49%
Agree somewhat	26%	36%
Disagree somewhat	17%	9%
Disagree strongly	17%	6%
Number of cases	156	442

STATISTICAL MEASUREMENTS: $X^2 = 27.03$ (df:3) Probability = Less than .01

The Vietnam conflict is a good illustration of the desire of the Communists to conquer the world.

Response category	NWC	OCS
Agree strongly	24%	16%
Agree somewhat	42%	30%
Disagree somewhat	26%	29%
Disagree strongly	9%	26%
Number of cases	161	447

STATISTICAL MEASUREMENTS: $X^2 = 25.46$ (df:3) Probability = Less than .01

APPENDIX IV—ATTITUDES TOWARD DEFENSE OF ALLIED NATIONS

Should America, in light of the Vietnam experience, continue to guarantee the integrity of its smaller allies against aggression?

Response category	NWC	OCS
Definitely yes	35%	19%
Yes, with reservations	51%	48%
It depends	12%	19%
No, with reservations	3%	11%
Definitely no	0%	3%
Number of cases	161	451

STATISTICAL MEASUREMENTS: $X^2 = 31.03$ (df:4) Probability = Less than .01

It has been asserted that if weaker nations are to be defended at all by the United States, that it must be done in conjunction with America's principal allies. Indicate your agreement or disagreement with this statement.

Response category	NWC	OCS
Agree completely	31%	51%
Agree somewhat	54%	39%
Disagree somewhat	9%	7%
Disagree strongly	6%	3%
Number of cases	160	436

STATISTICAL MEASUREMENTS: $X^2 = 19.76$ (df:3) Probability = Less than .01

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APPENDIX V—ATTITUDES TOWARD USE OF MILITARY FORCE
AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION

India is invaded from across the border by outside Communist military forces. The United States should:

Response category	NWC	OCS
Use military forces to extend all needed help, including nuclear weapons if necessary	8%	5%
Use military force to extend all needed help, but avoid use of nuclear weapons	15%	20%
Provide help, but short of U.S. military involvement	62%	52%
Stay out	15%	14%
Number of cases	157	439

STATISTICAL MEASUREMENTS: $\chi^2 = 12.86$ (df:3) Probability = Less than .01

Israel is invaded from across the border by outside Communist military forces. The United States should:

Response category	NWC	OCS
Use military forces to extend all needed help, including nuclear weapons if necessary	9%	6%
Use military force to extend all needed help, but avoid use of nuclear weapons	37%	35%
Provide help, but short of U.S. military involvement	41%	49%
Stay out	14%	10%
Number of cases	153	440

STATISTICAL MEASUREMENTS: $\chi^2 = 5.04$ (df:3) Probability = Not significant

Canada is invaded by non-Canadian Communist military forces. The United States should:

Response category	NWC	OCS
Use military forces to extend all needed help, including nuclear weapons if necessary	71%	35%
Use military force to extend all needed help, but avoid use of nuclear weapons	28%	56%
Provide help, but short of U.S. military involvement	1%	7%
Stay out	0%	2%
Number of cases	158	450

STATISTICAL MEASUREMENTS: $\chi^2 = 63.46$ (df:3) Probability = Less than .01

**APPENDIX V—ATTITUDES TOWARD USE OF MILITARY FORCE
AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION (Cont'd)**

Brazil is invaded from across the border by outside Communist military forces. The United States should:

Response category	NWC	OCS
Use military forces to extend all needed help, including nuclear weapons if necessary	27%	10%
Use military force to extend all needed help, but avoid use of nuclear weapons	46%	38%
Provide help, but short of U.S. military involvement	24%	43%
Stay out	3%	9%
Number of cases	155	440

STATISTICAL MEASUREMENTS: $X^2 = 43.76$ (df:3) Probability = Less than .01

Japan is invaded by non-Japanese Communist military forces. The United States should:

Response category	NWC	OCS
Use military forces to extend all needed help, including nuclear weapons if necessary	41%	12%
Use military force to extend all needed help, but avoid use of nuclear weapons	47%	48%
Provide help, but short of U.S. military involvement	11%	33%
Stay out	1%	7%
Number of cases	157	446

STATISTICAL MEASUREMENTS: $X^2 = 78.95$ (df:3) Probability = Less than .01

West Germany is invaded from across the border by outside Communist military forces. The United States should:

Response category	NWC	OCS
Use military forces to extend all needed help, including nuclear weapons if necessary	54%	18%
Use military force to extend all needed help, but avoid use of nuclear weapons	40%	58%
Provide help, but short of U.S. military involvement	6%	20%
Stay out	0%	3%
Number of cases	157	447

STATISTICAL MEASUREMENTS: $X^2 = 77.84$ (df:3) Probability = Less than .01

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APPENDIX VI—ATTITUDES TOWARD USE OF MILITARY FORCE
AGAINST COMMUNIST INSURGENTS

India is faced with a serious internal insurgency problem led by an indigenous Communist movement and has requested our help. The United States should:

Response category	NWC	OCS
Use military forces to extend all needed help, including nuclear weapons if necessary	3%	1%
Use military force to extend all needed help, but avoid use of nuclear weapons	8%	11%
Provide help, but short of U.S. military involvement	71%	57%
Stay out	19%	32%
Number of cases	156	441

STATISTICAL MEASUREMENTS: $X^2 = 13.92$ (df:3) Probability = Less than .01

Japan is faced with a serious internal insurgency problem led by an indigenous Communist movement and has requested our help. The United States should:

Response category	NWC	OCS
Use military forces to extend all needed help, including nuclear weapons if necessary	4%	3%
Use military force to extend all needed help, but avoid use of nuclear weapons	36%	16%
Provide help, but short of U.S. military involvement	59%	59%
Stay out	2%	23%
Number of cases	159	441

STATISTICAL MEASUREMENTS: $X^2 = 51.46$ (df:3) Probability = Less than .01

West Germany is faced with a serious internal insurgency problem led by an indigenous Communist movement and has requested our help. The United States should:

Response category	NWC	OCS
Use military forces to extend all needed help, including nuclear weapons if necessary	8%	4%
Use military force to extend all needed help, but avoid use of nuclear weapons	43%	22%
Provide help, but short of U.S. military involvement	48%	55%
Stay out	1%	20%
Number of cases	158	444

STATISTICAL MEASUREMENTS: $X^2 = 52.86$ (df:3) Probability = Less than .01