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Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East

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courtesy title of Commodore; hence the title and the focus of the book. In the process of telling the stories of those early Commodores, the authors provide a portrait of the sailing Navy that is both entertaining and useful.

Many things have changed in the Navy since the days of sail; many have not. The tasks of the commanding officers of the Navy in preparing their ships for sea in the face of shortages of men, time, and material cannot help but strike a responsive chord in the heart of anyone who has faced the same problems with a modern man-of-war. The importance of shaking down a ship and crew until they are at the peak of combat readiness is also much the same. The authors attribute the striking success of the ships of the infant U.S. Navy in single-ship actions against the vessels of the world's dominant seapower to the superiority of American gunnery practice and to a degree of complacency on the part of the British. Neither lesson is to be ignored. Two of the highest of the many high points of the stories recounted are the monumental duel of seamanship in which the *Constitution*, under the command of Isaac Hull, escaped the determined pursuit of a British squadron, and the detailed account of the tragic *Chesapeake/Leopard* encounter, with its inescapable parallels to the equally tragic *Pueblo* incident. There can be few more enjoyable and painless ways to acquire an accurate and vivid understanding of the roots of the U.S. Navy than to read *The Commodores*. It is recommended highly.

J.A. BARBER, JR.
Commander, U.S. Navy

Hurewitz, Jacob., ed. *Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East*. New York: Praeger, 1969. 250 p.

One of the most persistent clichés in the lexicon of modern military planning is "the Soviet threat in the Mediter-

anean." In frequency of use (or misuse) it ranks just behind "the disarray of NATO" and somewhat ahead of "the power vacuum in the Indian Ocean." It shares with the other catch phrases a certain virtue of economy, since it lumps together a wide variety of complex policy issues under a single name tag for convenient reference; but it suffers the same weakness as well, and that is ambiguity. Is there really a "threat" in the Mediterranean? If so, is it military or political or both? Against whom is the threat directed and, in the absence of any very threatening activities by the Russians, under what circumstances? The present volume takes a useful first step in sharpening the syntax of analysis. It consists of a collection of essays on various aspects of the Soviet-American rivalry in the Middle East and Mediterranean. It grew out of a conference sponsored by the Academy of Political Science in December 1968, and much of the material was subsequently published in the *Proceedings* of that organization. Beginning with Professor Hurewitz's thoughtful examination of the origins of the rivalry, which establishes the analytical framework of the book, it then proceeds to examine four broad areas of the problem: military, economic, cultural, and political-diplomatic. The 16 contributing authors have been carefully selected, and the quality of scholarship and writing is uniformly excellent. The five articles on the military aspects of the problem should be of particular interest to naval officers, particularly Rear Adm. Joseph C. Wylie's discussion of the role of the 6th Fleet in U.S. diplomacy and the evaluation of the changing naval balance in the Mediterranean by Laurence W. Martin, author of *The Sea in Modern Strategy*. For those interested in the economic overtones of the rivalry, it would be difficult to find more cogent or readable presentations of the essential facts and issues than those provided by Gardner Patterson's discussion of the

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declining American involvement and by Charles Issawi's projection of regional economic trends into the 1970's. Also of great general interest are the articles on American and Soviet policies by John Campbell and Philip Mosely.

The incorporation of a brief index and very useful annotated bibliography makes this small volume an extraordinarily valuable starting place for anyone who wishes to probe beneath the surface of the "Soviet threat."

G.G. SICK
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Moesser, Robert D. *U.S. Navy: Vietnam*.
Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute,
1969. 247 p.

U.S. Navy: Vietnam is the first major pictorial book which portrays the Navy's widespread and varied operations in that part of Southeast Asia. The key word that characterizes this book is pictures: there are more than 200 of them, covering every major facet of U.S. seapower in use north and south of the 17th parallel from August 1964 until December 1967. The publication shows more graphically than could any words the sweat, toil, and professional competence of thousands of Navy men and tens of scores of ships and aircraft during 3½ years of intensive combat operations. The book is divided into seven sections: carrier operations, replenishment at sea, naval gunfire, hospital ships, ships and men, amphibious operations, and riverine warfare. There is a short introduction preceding each section and a brief caption describing the general geographic area and the content of each photograph.

There is little fault to find in this well-presented volume. It might have been desirable to have had pictures showing air strikes in the north, to have had some coverage on Swift boats, and perhaps something on the SEAL operations, but it is remarkable that Mr. Moesser has been able to capture on film

such an incredibly large number of ships, aircraft, and operations. The book presents no position of the author; indeed, he states at the outset that the pictures represent his personal interpretation, visually substantiated, of the Navy in the Vietnam conflict. It is noteworthy, however, that Mr. Moesser was not a casual visitor either in Vietnam or to the Navy; he retired as a chief journalist following 20 years' service after completing his work on the book. The photography and reproduction, so important to a publication of this type, are superb. One can almost feel the powerful concussion in one picture, as the U.S.S. *Camberra* fires a salvo of 8-inch shells. In another picture, the whine of its jet engine and the thud of an A-4 Skyhawk as it catches the number one wire upon its home carrier are almost audible. It is an unfortunate truism that despite the extensive public affairs organization the Navy possesses, there has been a dearth of serious interpretive material going directly to the public to inform them how the Navy spends their tax dollars. *U.S. Navy: Vietnam* helps to compensate for this deficiency.

W.M. POWERS
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Pusey, Merlo J. *The Way We Go to War*.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969.
202 p.

In recent years, and particularly since the involvement of the United States in Vietnam, many people have felt that there has been an abuse by Presidents of war power, i.e., how we go to war. Merlo J. Pusey has attempted to identify the problem in some detail and to suggest steps that might be taken to bring the President and Congress back into a sound working partnership in this peril-laden area of responsibility. A major portion of the book takes a close look at the path the United States has followed, resulting in the present