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The Way We Go to War

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declining American involvement and by Charles Issawi's projection of regional economic trends into the 1970's. Also of great general interest are the articles on American and Soviet policies by John Campbell and Philip Mosely.

The incorporation of a brief index and very useful annotated bibliography makes this small volume an extraordinarily valuable starting place for anyone who wishes to probe beneath the surface of the "Soviet threat."

G.G. SICK

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Moesser, Robert D. *U.S. Navy: Vietnam*. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1969. 247 p.

U.S. Navy: Vietnam is the first major pictorial book which portrays the Navy's widespread and varied operations in that part of Southeast Asia. The key word that characterizes this book is pictures: there are more than 200 of them, covering every major facet of U.S. seapower in use north and south of the 17th parallel from August 1964 until December 1967. The publication shows more graphically than could any words the sweat, toil, and professional competence of thousands of Navy men and tens of scores of ships and aircraft during 3½ years of intensive combat operations. The book is divided into seven sections: carrier operations, replenishment at sea, naval gunfire, hospital ships, ships and men, amphibious operations, and riverine warfare. There is a short introduction preceding each section and a brief caption describing the general geographic area and the content of each photograph.

There is little fault to find in this well-presented volume. It might have been desirable to have had pictures showing air strikes in the north, to have had some coverage on Swift boats, and perhaps something on the SEAL operations, but it is remarkable that Mr. Moesser has been able to capture on film

such an incredibly large number of ships, aircraft, and operations. The book presents no position of the author; indeed, he states at the outset that the pictures represent his personal interpretation, visually substantiated, of the Navy in the Vietnam conflict. It is noteworthy, however, that Mr. Moesser was not a casual visitor either in Vietnam or to the Navy; he retired as a chief journalist following 20 years' service after completing his work on the book. The photography and reproduction, so important to a publication of this type, are superb. One can almost feel the powerful concussion in one picture, as the U.S.S. *Canberra* fires a salvo of 8-inch shells. In another picture, the whine of its jet engine and the thud of an A-4 Skyhawk as it catches the number one wire upon its home carrier are almost audible. It is an unfortunate truism that despite the extensive public affairs organization the Navy possesses, there has been a dearth of serious interpretive material going directly to the public to inform them how the Navy spends their tax dollars. *U.S. Navy: Vietnam* helps to compensate for this deficiency.

W.M. POWERS

Chief Photographer's Mate, U.S. Navy

Pusey, Merlo J. *The Way We Go to War*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969. 202 p.

In recent years, and particularly since the involvement of the United States in Vietnam, many people have felt that there has been an abuse by Presidents of war power, i.e., how we go to war. Merlo J. Pusey has attempted to identify the problem in some detail and to suggest steps that might be taken to bring the President and Congress back into a sound working partnership in this peril-laden area of responsibility. A major portion of the book takes a close look at the path the United States has followed, resulting in the present

predicament. A brief glance at recent American commitments raises the primary question in this volume, whether the decisions of war shall be made almost exclusively by the President or by the President and with the consent and support of Congress. Mr. Pusey then proceeds to establish the necessary background to answer the query. He points out the fundamental principles of the Constitution with regard to Congress and war power and traces the decline of the restraints that the Founding Fathers put upon warmaking. A detailed discussion of several recent examples (Korean conflict, Formosa, Cuba, Tonkin Gulf) demonstrates the author's concern about the awesome power which the President can wield in committing U.S. forces, if he is not checked by the Congress.

The author states that although "Declaration of War" as previously known may now be obsolete, it is apparent that a need exists for a new format which will properly delineate the exercise of this power in keeping with the realities of today. What follows is an argument for a War Power Act which would correctly stipulate and implement the respective powers of the Commander in Chief and Congress in the warmaking sphere. Such an act would, he feels, "bury the bizarre concept of inherent executive power to make war. . . ." Mr. Pusey presents a strong case for the dangers of executive power beyond those established in the Constitution. His discussion of the subject appears to be correct, valid, and sound; his writing style is comfortable; and the text is of interest to all readers of this review.

S.D. HEYWARD

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Thompson, Sir Robert G.K. *No Exit from Vietnam*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1969. 208 p.

This is one of the most dispassionate,

objective, and valid criticisms of the U.S. conduct of the war in Vietnam to come on the scene. Sir Robert Thompson's commentary on the war in Vietnam covers the period February 1965 to November 1968, when "it was fought mainly as an American war." A noted authority on counterinsurgency warfare, Sir Robert directed the British operations in Malaya from 1948 to 1960 and headed the British Advisory Mission to the Government of Vietnam from 1961 to 1965. In discussing the purpose of the book, he notes that he is not offering a judgment for or against American involvement in Vietnam. Rather, "The main theme of this book is whether or not the war was fought in the right way and the power correctly applied."

In criticizing American aggressiveness and impatience, Sir Robert says, "If we plan for a long haul we may get quick results, but if we go for quick results we may at best get a long haul." He expresses the view that the United States sacrificed quality for quantity, attributing this to the basic characteristic of the American people, that of impatience. He is particularly critical of the military command for permitting Vietnam "to become a veritable witch's brew for half-baked ideas." Sir Robert levels his criticism at two major areas: "The failure to understand the nature of the war and the lack of a clear precise aim at limited cost had reduced the options under United States control to escalation or unilateral withdrawal." The contents of the book support clearly and concisely the title (*No Exit from Vietnam*) in that from a policy point of view the United States has no option but to stay in Vietnam for the long haul. In one of his major points, the author indicates the belief that the United States has ignored the political aspects of the Vietnamese war. "Basically the problem in Vietnam was, and still is, that of government in its broadest sense of organization, both in the