

1970

Challenge

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CHALLENGE !



Annually since 1949, the Naval War College academic year has ended in June with a week long symposium of professional, business, and military leaders from all over the country meeting to discuss with our graduating class contemporary international problems facing our nation. This year's Global Strategy Discussions were a fitting conclusion to an academic year highlighted by the enunciation of the most explicit foreign policy statement by an American president in a generation. Our theme was United States strategy, especially as it affects our national maritime posture, in light of the President's foreign policy statement to Congress in February of this year—a statement which has come to be known as the Nixon Doctrine.

In this, the first issue of the *Naval War College Review* of the new academic year, I would like to share with you some thoughts on the major points made during June's Global Strategy Discussions and put them in the perspective of what I believe to be the major challenge for the Navy in the 1970's.

As our keynote speaker, Under Secretary of the Navy John Warner spoke to the "Challenge of the 1970's" from the Navy viewpoint. The Honorable U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs followed with an address on "The Formulation of Global Strategy." The third day United States Senator Harry F. Byrd spoke on "The Outlook in the Senate for Advice and Consent." Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, spoke on the next day on "The Role of the Navy in National Strategy." Finally, Professor Walt W. Rostow, former Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

addressed the subject of "Domestic Determinants of Foreign Policy," reprinted in this issue.

The keynote address stressed that our national strategy for the era ahead is to be founded on three pillars, pillars which President Nixon outlined in his foreign policy statement: *Partnership*, *Strength* and a willingness to *Negotiate*.

Vital in this new strategy of course is partnership. As various speakers underscored, the United States is no longer going to be the world's policeman. We are going to carry less of the burden of free world security.

Clearly our country is at the beginning of a new chapter in its history. At the end of World War II, we had no choice but to assume the leadership and the primary role in guaranteeing the protection of free world nations. We were faced with the fact that many of the countries we had helped save in war were economically broken and politically weak and desperately needed help. We were the only ones capable of providing that help. Our response was positive. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the North Atlantic Alliance were early benchmarks of a period which spans two and a half decades and which I believe forms one of the proudest and finest chapters in our nation's history.

Today, those countries that were weak and broken in the aftermath of World War II are relatively strong and

healthy. There is every reason to believe that they are able to share with us the burdens of protecting the security of our Free World. Indeed, as the President said, we have come to expect "a more responsible participation by our foreign friends in their own defense and progress."

The second pillar of the Nixon Doctrine is strength, American strength to meet the direct challenges to our own security in today's world and to support our commitments to other nations' security, commitments which remain as firm as ever. As various speakers emphasized, we must maintain that national, unilateral strength at a level which will never permit a potential enemy to consider that he has superiority and can force our capitulation directly by military force or indirectly by blackmail. And when we speak of strength, we also mean the courage to use our military might to respond to a threat to national or free world security so that we do not, in President Nixon's words, act "like a pitiful helpless giant . . . when the chips are down."

Finally, the third pillar in our national strategy for the 1970's consists of moving from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation. Why else are we in Paris with the North Vietnamese trying to end the conflict in Southeast Asia, in Warsaw seeking to normalize relations with the largest nation in the world, and in Vienna with the Russians hoping to make SALT the most significant arms talks in history? Of course, as we all recognize, negotiation is closely tied to the other two pillars of the Nixon Doctrine—for we can only expect to have a credible hand at the conference table if we ourselves are strong and if we can be confident of the backing of strong and loyal allies.

Greater reliance on our allies and a proclivity for negotiation, however, do not mean that we are succumbing to the isolationism some in this nation would advocate. To the contrary! As the Pres-

ident continues to make clear, we are not involved in this world because we have commitments. Rather, we have commitments because we *are* involved. And I believe we shall remain so involved, honoring our commitments as we have since the end of World War II.

Inherent in the Nixon Doctrine is the requirement for a lowered profile abroad and a reduction, if not a withdrawal, of our land based forces from various overseas areas. At the same time, there is a reaffirmation of our security commitments to some 42 nations around the world. If this reaffirmation is to be recognized as meaningful, it certainly will require our continuance of a forward strategy, a forward defense posture. Clearly any such strategy, to be realistic, will have to heavily depend on seabased forces. This logically means an expanded mission, a heavier burden for the Navy-Marine Corps team in the years ahead.

With our defense budget comprising the smallest percentage of our Gross National Product since 1951, and with the nation firmly committed to bilateral and multilateral security arrangement with many nations around the world, we in the Navy are therefore faced with a tremendous challenge in the 70's, one which Under Secretary Warner so aptly called the challenge "To Do More With Less." Nor was Mr. Warner alone in stressing this point. Indeed, it was one of the main recurring themes of the entire week and was even stressed the next week by our graduation speaker, Congressman L. Mendel Rivers, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

And when we speak of the new military strategy, a *Blue Water Strategy*, called for by the Nixon Doctrine we must remember that it may well apply to our posture for nuclear war as well as for conventional war.


Throughout the week of our discussions the question of the survivability of our current land based strategic offen-

sive systems repeatedly was raised, particularly in light of Secretary of Defense Laird's estimate that the USSR might well achieve by 1974 a capability to destroy some 95% of our Minutemen and most of our SAC bases in a first strike effort. More and more I believe it is being recognized that the most feasible way to maintain our nuclear deterrent in the years ahead is to deploy a greater share of overall strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems to sea. Ballistic Missile Ships, the Underwater Long Range Missile System, and the Sea Based Anti-Ballistic Missile System represent three of the most promising such concepts for the future. However, the cost will be high!

On the other hand, we will clearly require modern, effective and balanced general purpose forces to meet the demands of the limited wars which our speaker cogently argued would mark the years ahead. Here again the costs will be high.

So as we scan the horizon ahead, we can recognize the difficulties and the demands that will be placed on us in the 1970's. It will not be possible to meet these difficulties, resolve these demands unless each of us in the Navy develops and exploits new and meaningful approaches which can meet our needs at modest cost. It will be an All Hands operation—like the old coaling ship operation.

Doing the best we can within our limited resources, while meeting the increased requirements placed on the Navy-Marine Corps team will indeed make this a most challenging decade.



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Cover: Artist Russ Vickers' concept of the USS *Raymond A. Spruance*, DD-963, a new class of destroyer scheduled for delivery in the fall of 1974.