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One of the most important factors in Western Europe's economic and political recovery after the Second World War was confidence in the military strength and solidarity provided by NATO. Because of this, investments and long-term programs were undertaken in an optimistic spirit. One danger of the current cutbacks in military expenditures and commitments on the part of the United States is that this spirit of confidence will be lost, with a resulting deterioration in strength, growth, and solidarity.

STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES OF ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE

An address presented at the Naval War College
by
General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Jr., U.S. Army

It is a pleasure to visit the Naval War College and to have an opportunity to discuss some of the problems that are facing my NATO command, Allied Command Europe, but, before I get into the main portion of my remarks on the "Strategy and Capabilities of Allied Command Europe," I would like to discuss briefly with you some of the atmospherics which seem to surround the military services today.

This is, after all, a period of not only national, but international challenge and criticism—some of it well founded, much of it decidedly not. I want to talk about this because it is part of the background of one of NATO's key problems today—the support of essential military undertakings.

Challenges and searching probes can be of great value, for intelligent examination is a necessity if sound, up-to-date

solutions are to be reached. Indeed, such examination is the very purpose of your attendance here at the college. But in much of what we see today there is often a destructive element at work and sometimes a motive of self-interest. One of the first targets seems to be the institutions connected with the so-called "establishment." The military services and their members find themselves being assailed. There is nothing new to this in our democratic societies, of course; we have had echoes of it many times over the years. I tend to regard it, in a phrase of General Eisenhower's, as one of "Job's boils"—one more burden or harassment that we as military men must and can bear as part of our commitment to serving our country and its national security. When the questions are loaded and the charges are the opposite of the truth, the contribution

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we can make is all the greater—and all the more urgently needed.

Now, if we can accept that there is a cyclic nature to the type of attitude we are currently seeing, then we must concede that we are indeed in a deep and difficult trough at the moment. It is useful to ask, though, whether the confusion and stridency expressed by many of our critics do not tell us more about the character of the criticism than they do about the proven security system and the dedicated military men that they are attacking. The readiness of the critics to assail the ABM or the MIRV or the draft or the military budget or agreements with our Allies or troops in Europe or MAAG's and Missions or the influence of the military is matched only by the strength of their expectation that they will enjoy the security that these activities help provide.

Now all of this reflects a weakness on the part of some—to take for granted all those underpinnings of life and well-being that they should know are essential, but which they do not wish to have intrude on the daily comforts of living. National security is surely one of these underpinnings. Without it, the abundance that our people are enjoying as a way of life would be an impossible dream.

Yet, despite this abundance, the point is sometimes made that there are defects in our prosperity—that pockets and layers of poverty and injustice exist that are intolerable. With this I would strongly agree. But I would want to suggest that the solution is to correct the evil that exists—not to tear down the foundation of security on which our whole society and prosperity rest. This is the fatal flaw in many of the demands that are raised to choose between military strength and the remedy of the social ills. The choice is a false one. We must do both, and we can. Moreover, we should ask ourselves, can we really expect to cure our domestic ills if we **live in fear for our security?**

An answer to all this, in my view, lies in two interlinked intangibles: first, the innate commonsense of the American people, and second, our own traditional military concepts of duty to the nation. The American people, in the long run, will make clear, I believe, their deep understanding of the importance of security to the values of their civilization; as time goes by, the curve of the cycle will rise because they appreciate being free and because they are happy that external aggression is deterred.

The second intangible lies within the attributes of character, attitude, and performance that we of the military bring to our duties. Our own proper concept of duty remains plain—we must contribute to our professional tasks the maximum of our capabilities. We must continue to demand the finest equipment available and not accept second best, for there is no cost-effectiveness factor that can ever account for the lives of the men we lead.

We must continue to give our military advice as we see it and not as others might have us see it. This is not always a popular course. One is reminded of a story about Genghis Khan—that he used to cut off the heads of messengers if they came bringing bad news. Today's punishment is, happily, not so severe. But good news or bad, our professional advice must be based on the integrity that has so long been associated with the military services.

Personal criticism—individually or as a group—we can take, for we know we bring the best we can to our duties. But when such criticism takes the form of the denial of support for the defense of the United States and the NATO Alliance—denial of the units and the equipment required—the problem becomes much more serious. For from such denial may come actions which prove to be irreversibly damaging to our country. It is these actions we must do our best, within our constitutional processes, to prevent from happening.

From this fundamental base, let me turn now to some substantive and specific matters regarding Allied Command Europe. I shall do this, first, by discussing the evolution of the threat; second, by outlining the elements of the NATO strategy; and third, by examining the military capabilities of the alliance, in order to illuminate how such capabilities affect the strategy.

First, the threat. There have been many changes in the world since NATO came into being some 21 years ago, but in the primary rank of importance have been the changes in military posture that have occurred in the Soviet Union. The first, and in many ways the most significant of these, has been the fundamental changes which have resulted from the evolution and continuing growth of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces, both offensive and defensive. From the early beginnings—the achievement of the nuclear capability in 1949—they moved on to the thermo-nuclear capability in 1953 and now have achieved a massive and diversified strategic nuclear force, the development of which continues, both in size and sophistication.

A second change in their military posture which has posed far-reaching difficulties for the alliance—and is of special importance to all of us in this hall—has been the expansion and growth of the Soviet naval capability. It is interesting to recall that in his first Annual Report as SACEUR, General Eisenhower, though confronted with many military and economic problems, could nevertheless write that “The naval equation in Western European waters is still weighted strongly in our favor.” The equation at that time was further weighted by the friendly status then of what some have called the true southern flank of NATO—the north African littoral. This naval imbalance in the favor of the North Atlantic Alliance carried forward into the early sixties. At that time the Cuban missile crisis vividly

demonstrated the very limited capability of the Soviet Navy to support the foreign policy aims of the Soviet Union. This lack of operational deep-water experience of the Soviet Navy, the result of the Stalinist policy of using the navy only for its defensive capability, was indirectly illustrated by the commanding officer of the guided missile cruiser *Dzorzinski* in 1961 who boasted of the fact that his ship had undertaken a cruise of 13,000 miles. Yet, it was only 3 years later that Admiral Gorshkov was more proudly proclaiming that “For the Soviet Navy, 1964 is the year of the routine long cruise.” Indeed, 1964 may well have been the turning point in the growth of the Soviet naval capability. That capability today is substantial.

As has been reported publicly, their submarine fleet, for example, is over the 350 mark, with a continuing replacement of older submarines by nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed boats. Their Baltic Fleet normally contains over 500 ships. The Northern Fleet at recent count contained over 160 submarines, all with access to the Atlantic. The newest threat, and currently an especially troubling one, comes from their Mediterranean Fleet which recently had a total of 65 vessels—among them two helicopter carriers and over 10 submarines. To that naval threat on the southern flank of NATO must be added the presence of Soviet advisers in the Arab countries of the littoral. This growth in capability results, of course, from the increasing Soviet awareness of the potential of seapower as a political weapon—an awareness well shown by the way in which Soviet maritime activities have spread throughout the three-quarters of the world that exists as oceans outside territorial waters.

Admiral Gorshkov spelled it out even more distinctly in the following words, “The Soviet Navy by the character of her armament of highly maneuverable forces and military capabilities is

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obliged to be prepared at any moment and at any point of the globe to secure the interests of our state." That is indeed a sobering doctrine.

In addition to this increased naval strength, there has also been a continued expansion and modernization of their already massive ground forces. We know, for example, that their recent series of exercises was among the most extensive they have ever held. And pictures we have seen of the previous large ground exercise—Operation Dniiper—showed us not only the extent of their quantitative strength, but how they are improving in the qualitative sense.

These increases in strength come from Soviet defense budgets that have risen in each of the past 5 years. Some analysts have indicated that defense outlays for the Soviet Union for the coming year, based on their recently announced budget, would total almost \$70 billion in equivalent U.S. prices. The high priority that they are accord- ing their military forces may be more fully appreciated when we note that these expenditures are being made from an economy that produces but one-half the gross national product of the United States. Such sums make clear that there will be further increases in military equipment and weaponry in the years ahead.

The realities of Soviet military power in Europe—large modern land, sea, and air forces together with continually growing ICBM, MRBM, and sea-based nuclear-armed missile forces—are something the world has never seen in earlier periods. But it is the key fact of life to which we must now shape our plans, our command arrangements, our deployments, and our military preparations of every kind. Nor should we ever forget that these forces are all linked to an ideology committed to the idea of world domination under Soviet Communist leadership. That commitment never changes, but there is constant

evolution and improvement in strengthening the capabilities that support it. It is against this background of sustained Soviet threat that I wish to discuss the next topic with you, which is the strategic concept which guides the major NATO commanders in their missions of deterrence and defense.

In order to understand the significance of the revised strategy that was adopted in NATO in December 1967, it is helpful to review the old strategy of 1956, which was popularly but imprecisely called "massive retaliation." The old strategy had three fundamental concepts.

The first and most important was the unequivocal statement that NATO defense depended upon the immediate exploitation of our nuclear capability, whether or not the Soviets employed nuclear weapons. Despite this emphasis on immediate exploitation, the second concept was that of forward defense. There was no intention of giving up large areas of Europe in a general withdrawal so as to trade space for time. This policy was then, as it is today, a political necessity in recognition of the interests of those Allies that border the Iron Curtain. But it also makes military sense in that it provides for full use of the limited depth of the combat zone in Western Europe. The third concept of that strategy was that there was to be no limited war in Europe. However, this strategy did admit the possibility of dealing with conventional weapons against incursions or hostile local actions. It was never completely an automatic tripwire concept leading inevitably to massive retaliation.

These three propositions constituted the essence of the strategy of 1956. But as early as the late fifties, a desire for greater strategic flexibility, toward a greater choice of options, had become quite apparent. This stemmed from recognition that the Soviet Union was developing a large nuclear capability and from the heightened realization that the

consequences of nuclear war were increasingly unpredictable and were bound to be increasingly devastating. As a result, nuclear response as the sole deterrent became less and less credible. There arose a growing demand to raise the nuclear threshold, and with it there came an understanding that greater emphasis would have to be placed on the ability to fight conventionally. These trends finally led to the adoption of an updated statement of strategy, which I will briefly review.

The revised strategy concept requires that NATO adapt its strategy to current developments in the political, military, economic, and technological fields. It is from this concept that Allied Command Europe has derived its missions of deterrence and defense. In the words of the ministerial communique, these missions are to be carried out through the employment of "a flexible and balanced range of appropriate responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression."

These missions also require a linkage between our forward defense forces back through what I have referred to as the rank upon rank of in-being, reinforcing, and reserve forces and weapons that constitute the alliance's military strength. The final articulation of this military linkage leads to the massive strategic power which the alliance possesses and which it must be prepared to use. This strategic power is, of course, the ultimate deterrent and, should it be necessary, the ultimate defensive weapon. It is through these linkages that the deterrence is made credible to any potential aggressor and that the peace and security of the North Atlantic Treaty area are ensured.

The credibility of the deterrence is shown by the willingness of the members of the alliance to act together in the defense of the Atlantic community, regardless of the form that aggression may take. It is based on the maintenance of a variety of options which

keep the aggressor from being certain of what NATO's reaction will be to any attack or threat of attack. But should the deterrence fail and aggression occur, the defensive military responses of the alliance would be basically three in number.

The first of these would seek to defeat the aggressor on the level at which he chooses to push forward. This type of defense is designed to prevent him from physically taking what he wants and to place on him the burden of possible escalation. A second response might be the deliberate raising of the level of conflict on our side, thus making the aggressor's costs in money and manpower excessive in regard to the objectives he seeks. Finally, of course, would be the employment of the strategic power of the alliance—the final articulation of the alliance's military linkage that I mentioned a moment ago. The use of these forces would involve nuclear strikes against the total enemy nuclear threat to us—I refer here to all components of that nuclear threat—and against other military targets as required.

To summarize, the updated strategy proposes a credible deterrent to the whole spectrum of enemy capabilities. It proposes also that NATO have the military capability on our side to deal with that whole spectrum. It differs from the strategy of 1956—first, by rejecting any commitment to immediate exploitation of NATO's nuclear capability, and second, by admitting the possibility of limited warfare, at least for a time, in Europe. In the execution of this strategy, conventional means would be used initially to the maximum.

Ideally, NATO's objective would be to counter aggression without resort to nuclear weapons. But NATO would engage in nuclear war if and after political and conventional military actions were found insufficient. It must be emphasized—and I do emphasize—that

the strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons if necessary.

There is, in addition to these two explicitly assigned missions of deterrence and defense, a third mission in NATO, somewhat more implicit, which seems extremely important to me. That is the maintenance of the solidarity and unity of the alliance. This is an objective and an achievement of the alliance that is not often enough recognized, but which has perhaps been the most successful of all. The nations of the alliance have been enabled to overcome the divisions, the conflicts, and the resulting weaknesses that have beset them in the past.

This is what I have called the "sickness of Europe" or the "scourge of Europe"—this tendency toward internecine strife. We have seen it twice in this century, and we well know that we might not be able to survive a third round of it. But the encouraging fact is that within NATO the nations of Western Europe have been able to work together for their common defense rather than working against one another. After thinking back on what catastrophe, ruin, and vulnerability have resulted from past divisions and conflicts, this solidarity shines through most clearly to me as one of NATO's foremost accomplishments and assets.

It is on these three pillars—of deterrence, defense, and solidarity—that the structure of NATO has remained firm for over 20 years. Whether it continues to do so or not depends vitally—and I say "vitally"—on the strength and determination and the resolve to remain free that exists in the nations of the alliance.

This brings me to my third topic, the matter of military capabilities. And this is in a sense the crux of the matter, for notwithstanding all the rhetoric, the missions of deterrence and defense can be achieved only if the necessary forces are made available to the major NATO commands. In addition, the third mission of solidarity is organically bound

up with the process of credible and visible commitment of forces and supporting efforts made by the individual nations to the integrated military structure.

In our planning with regard to these capabilities, we have concentrated on proposing measures to the nations which are designed to remedy the more serious qualitative deficiencies in our defense posture. Generally speaking, these are measures which would increase manning levels, stock levels, and surveillance capabilities; expand equipment modernization; and deal with the problems involved in the conscript and reserve programs.

That such improvements are important can be seen by considering what would be the effect on the requirements of the strategic concept if they were not made. The major point here is that the further the extent to which our military capabilities are limited or reduced, the shorter becomes the period of time during which military operations could be conducted successfully without resort to nuclear weapons. That sobering thought must go hand in glove with the fact that any reduction in resource allocations not only impairs the military capability of the alliance for defense but weakens the effect of the deterrent—the second major aspect of NATO's strategy.

To sum up, if the NATO commanders are to achieve the full range of options for deterrence and defense required by the strategic guidance, our nations must continue to maintain strong strategic nuclear forces; they must provide tactical nuclear forces properly positioned; and they must increase and improve our conventional forces. Unless these ingredients are supplied, my commanders and I cannot give assurance of carrying out the kinds of missions that have been assigned. These are the three building blocks of our deterrent and defense capability. Carefully linked together and

coordinated with each other, they tell a potential aggressor that his game is "not on."

In discussing the necessity for not only retaining but improving our forces and resources, I have frequently made the proposition that NATO is a tremendous net-plus to every single one of its member nations. In this I refer to the security needs and concerns of each nation. That is true for the United States—it is just as true for every other NATO member.

Three propositions seem to me to be basic: first, that NATO is essential to the security interests of the United States—just as I believe it is to the security interests of every other member nation; second, that a substantial collective force is essential to a viable NATO and therefore to the security of the United States; and third, that a substantial American contribution, in place on the Continent of Europe, is essential to the continued existence of a strong collective force; therefore, to the continued effectiveness of NATO; therefore, to American security interests.

Now, I do not want to look at this problem of resource allocations merely in the terms of military bookkeeping, but rather from a broader point of view. One question is basic—whether we are going up or going down. Are we eroding the credibility of the deterrent or giving it new strength? Are we in a *de facto* way changing our strategy of defense by reducing the options, or are we making those options more effective and more flexible? Are we weakening the solidarity of the alliance, or are we making it more cohesive?

General Eisenhower, during the early days when I was with him in SHAEF as a staff officer in the 1950's, used to make the following point with people who would become a bit disheartened or discouraged over the very slow pace of rebuilding Europe's defenses. He would say,

Now boys, you've got to consider—are we on the upgrade or the downgrade?—so long as we are on the upgrade, even if the increase is slight, there is going to be a sense of confidence, a sense of growing strength, a psychology, through the alliance that will be in itself an extremely valuable element of strength.

He would add, "What you should worry about is if we ever start a downward trend."

The process of rebuilding that occurred in 1951 is well described as an expanding spiral of strength and confidence in Europe. As this operation began and the military strength began to rise, the NATO peoples gained confidence that they could be defended, that they could be kept secure. There followed a willingness to invest, a willingness to innovate, to start on long-term programs, to take a whole variety of constructive actions. And as that was done, the capability was gained of providing the military resources that were required.

What is most troubling now when any reduction takes place or even when one is suggested—if it is more than the normal process of adjustments to introduce new weapon systems and close out units that are no longer useful—is the possibility that this reduction will start a downward spiral, a downward spiral in which strength is diminished and confidence is diminished along with it.

If such reductions were made, it is not all clear that other NATO nations would come forward to fill the gap that was being created. Reductions could set loose concerns that would impact back upon the present sense of confidence, into the willingness to invest, into decisions as to where to put funds, and what programs to initiate. The result could encourage a potential aggressor to adopt a more adventuresome policy and

posture which, for the moment, is not attractive to him—faced with what NATO puts before him. The concern goes far beyond the arithmetic of military bookkeeping to the connection—the possibly disastrous connection—between such a reduction and the dynamic political and economic process affecting the alliance and its members that could be set in motion.

These are some of the issues involved in the question of military capabilities for defense and deterrence and some of the problems that both the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance must confront and solve if peace and the security interests of NATO members—the United States included—are to continue to be safeguarded within the areas of the Atlantic community.

I recall a signal quoted by the book *Make a Signal* by Capt. Jack Broome of the Royal Navy which carries a message for us today. It was sent in August of 1945 from the British Admiralty to Washington, D.C., and it said: "In view of the end of the war it is intended to propose at the conference in September that the whole world should be declared a non-combat area." That goal has not

been achieved worldwide, but it tells what our aim and our accomplishment have been in the NATO area—to make that, at least, a noncombat zone.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, Jr., U.S. Army, is presently serving as Supreme Allied Commander Europe and as Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command. A graduate of the 1939 Class,

at West Point, General Goodpaster commanded an engineering battalion in North Africa in World War II and was later assigned to the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff. After obtaining a doctorate from Princeton, he served from 1954 to 1961 as Defense Liaison Officer and Staff Secretary to the President of the United States. Since then he has held a variety of positions, including Commanding General, 8th Infantry Division; Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Commandant of the National War College, 1967-68; and prior to his present appointment he served for 1 year as Deputy Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam.



No foreign policy can have validity if there is no adequate force behind it and no national readiness to make the necessary sacrifices to produce that force.

Winston Churchill: The Gathering Storm, xx, 1948