

1969

## Book Review

The U.S. Naval War College


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## PROFESSIONAL READING

Gallup, Grace V. and Hardy, Ann A. "Chronological Bibliography of the Naval War College." Unpublished Bibliography of Articles. U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 1969.

This bibliography of articles dealing with the Naval War College was prepared to assist students doing research on the history of the War College. The reference material consists almost entirely of periodical articles with *The New York Times* and the *Naval Institute Proceedings* providing the bulk of the material. The chronological arrangement is intended to provide an historical view of the development and growth of the War College. Any study of the history of the War College should begin with this bibliography which will spare the student many hours of index work. It is available at the Mahan Library Reference Branch, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., on a loan basis.

D.G. WHITE  
Ensign, U.S. Naval Reserve

Graber, Doris A. *Public Opinion, the President, and Foreign Policy*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968. 374p.

The American political ideal that a democratic government should keep the people well informed and then respond to public opinion is largely a myth as it applies to the problems of foreign relations. The author draws this significant conclusion from an analysis of four major foreign policy problems early in

American history. The cases she considers are Adams' determination to seek an accommodation with France in 1800, Jefferson's purchase of the Louisiana Territory, Madison's decision to fight Britain in 1812, and Monroe's enunciation of his doctrine on foreign intervention in Latin America. The case studies lead to four broad conclusions, all of which seem to hold true today. The first is noted above. Second, the early Presidents did try to gauge public opinion, but for its advisory value and not for its veto or for support of their policies. The author's third and fourth broad conclusions are that the Presidents accepted, without questioning, largely symbolic methods of information exchange between the public and themselves and that the Presidents were certain of their ability to identify public opinion and identify themselves with it. Public opinion, in each of the cases studied, was a very important factor, but it was by no means as important as the given factors of the problem in question. It was critical only when necessary to the success of implementing the President's policy. The author projects her scholarly study to the present to draw several noteworthy inferences. First, the fiction prevails that a single public opinion exists which must be heeded because it reflects the public good. "It thus turns opinions that have somehow captured the public opinion crown into tyrants that must be appeased by wooing or subduing them." Also, the cases show the need for strong

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public opinion leadership by the President. Gauging public opinion remains a shaky science at best, however, and the President still must depend upon intuition and faith in himself in formulating foreign policy. Perhaps most important is the conclusion that it is difficult to generate active support for either subtle or pedestrian policies, such as long-range economic assistance programs; but, at the same time, vocal dissenters find it much easier today to create the impression of a public opposed to such policies. The author suggests that the President must develop more effective means of communication to maintain the support of a population that is becoming better educated and more sophisticated, or he risks being forced into a policy of crisis publicity which exaggerates crises or potential benefits in order to mold public opinion and maintain public support.

While the bibliography is not all-inclusive, the book is extensively footnoted. It is a well-presented and thoroughgoing analysis of the Presidential role in early American foreign policy, and it merits the attention of any researcher in that field. The volume must be regarded as an essential reference by anyone studying the impact of public opinion on foreign policy formulation.

R.C. ELDER  
Commander, U.S. Navy

Kennedy, Robert F. *Thirteen Days: a Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: Norton, 1969. 224p.

During the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the world was probably in more immediate danger of a major nuclear war than ever before or since. *Thirteen Days* is Robert F. Kennedy's personal account of what went on in the high councils of government during that crisis. It is a book that should be read by all those concerned with the effective and judicious use of force, and that includes—or should include—everybody.

The United States had two overriding objectives during the Cuban missile crisis: to avoid a major war with the Soviet Union and to get the Soviet offensive missiles out of Cuba. Despite the fact that withdrawal of the missiles by the Soviet Union involved a virtually unprecedented reversal of policy and loss of face by a major power, both U.S. objectives were achieved in full—and at the cost of but one American life. Most observers count this as one of the most significant successes of U.S. foreign policy—and as such it is a case worthy of careful study.

Disturbing to this reviewer, as a professional military officer, is that, as recounted by Kennedy, at every decision point the military advisers recommended more violent and potentially hazardous courses of action than those finally adopted. He states that President Kennedy

... was distressed that the representatives with whom he met, with the notable exception of General Taylor, seemed to give so little consideration to the implications of steps they suggested. They seemed always to assume that the Russians and the Cubans would not respond or, if they did, that a war was in our national interest. . . . President Kennedy was disturbed by this inability to look beyond the limited military field.

As a case study, *Thirteen Days* sometimes suffers from Kennedy's personal and perhaps somewhat biased point of view, but the immediacy and authority of the account more than compensate. Of added value is a documentary annex of photographs and communications.

J.A. BARBER  
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Liska, George. *War and Order*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. 115p.

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Professor Liska, a Research Associate with the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research and Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, presents in this small volume his very simple thesis: like it or not, the power and wealth of the United States force her to have worldwide interests and responsibilities. He proposes an approach to world order which envisions the United States as an imperial, but nonimperialistic, state using her power in a positive, mature manner, not for her own aggrandizement but to intervene whenever and wherever local conflicts threaten to escalate beyond an acceptable level. The author devotes a chapter to each of the three basic objections to U.S. global involvement as currently dramatized by the war in Vietnam. These objections are as follows: (1) global interventionism is contrary to America's unique traditions; (2) global interventionism in the nuclear age is counterproductive in that it generates conflicts which must be avoided; and (3) U.S. interventions represent an outdated anticommunism. Generally, Professor Liska's response to these objections emphasizes the need for this country to adopt a less self-centered view in her foreign policy and the importance of her being willing to accept an imperial position—one which requires all of the three elements: role, commitment, and performance. He believes, too, that the intensity of America's domestic problems will vary inversely as she fulfills her honest foreign commitments and will only increase as she continues to display weakness in her relations abroad. His proposals, although they are perhaps too extreme to be accepted at once, are refreshingly unusual in this day. Accordingly, this book (or even only the fourth and summary chapter, if the interested student is very busy) is strongly recommended for those desirous of hearing both sides of

America's current controversy.

R.W. DURFEY

Commander, U.S. Coast Guard

Rostow, Eugene V. *Law, Power, and the Pursuit of Peace*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1968. 133p.

Eugene Rostow served as dean of the Yale University Law School before joining the State Department in 1966 as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. His book is based on revisions of two Roscoe Pound lectures given at the University of Nebraska in February 1966 and has been updated sufficiently to include the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia among its illustrative examples. Professor Rostow's intent is to consider the interactions of law and experience and their influence on the "task of peacekeeping in the real world." Specifically, he analyzes America's efforts since World War II "to lay the foundations for a new system of international peace" to replace the system of the 19th century which finally collapsed completely in 1945. He states that all four American Presidents since 1945 have been handicapped by having to challenge head-on the American self-image formed from the historical experience of our first century and a half as a nation. Citing the tradition of isolation as a powerful part of our collective memory, Professor Rostow notes that each of our Presidents has, in turn, "been scourged by the angry protest of fellow citizens who preferred to believe that the world is flat." Despite this, he credits each of them with having the wisdom to follow the same basic foreign policy theme first enunciated by President Truman that "totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States." Professor Rostow considers this Truman Doctrine as having evolved "into a kind of common

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law of international order, a prudent role of reciprocal safety," which, by its simplicity, minimizes uncertainty and miscalculation. He relates the major international events of the last quarter century to this theme, with emphasis on the most significant events of recent years, the Vietnamese war and the Middle East crises.

It is clear that Professor Rostow is a firm supporter of the policies followed by the Johnson administration; however, he avoids the title of "apologist" for those policies—just barely. He presents them as simply the logical result of continued adherence to a longstanding policy of proven worth—one which comprises the only foreign policy for America if international peace and order is to be attained. Professor Rostow claims that the continuing debate over our Vietnam policy is actually a screen for the real debate over whether the United States should have a foreign policy at all and to what extent force should be used in carrying it out: Are American interests worldwide, after all, or should they be confined to the small circle of industrialized and friendly nations? He believes the idea advanced by the debaters that the law can prevail without force is illusory and that "in international society, law is inconceivable without the rational and agreed control of force."

The book, concise and clearly written, contains a valuable outline of the basic themes fundamental to the continuing debate on American foreign policy. It is "must" reading for all who are concerned with the development of foreign policy. Professor Rostow's premises are brilliantly lucid, and the simplicity of his logic is obviously intended to confound the McCarthyite elements of modern American life; they will have a difficult time refuting his position short of relying on flashing but unsubstantive hyperbole. This volume should be read now, in order to provide basic background information on which

to base an appraisal of foreign policy developments which the new administration might propose. If Professor Rostow is correct, the American people must unreservedly accept the fact of their Great Power status and their obligation to exercise that power in concert with the other major powers of the world. President Nixon, as their agent, will have little practical choice but to continue the basic policy of all Presidents since 1945 and to suffer the same excoriation by the outspoken minority that has been the fate of all four of his predecessors in this new era of American international involvement.

J.F. McNULTY  
Commander, U.S. Navy

Tatu, Michel. *Power in the Kremlin.*

New York: Viking Press, 1968. 570p.

Michel Tatu, self-appointed French Kremlinologist, using the Soviet press as his main source of information, reconstructs the struggle for power in the Kremlin—Khrushchev to Kosygin. Having been in Russia during Khrushchev's regime, the author researched the reported movements, actions, and published words of the top dozen or so political figures in the U.S.S.R. to evaluate their effect upon the political life of Nikita S. Khrushchev. One is impressed, as he reads this book, with the manipulative ability required of any man who rules in the Kremlin. This man must be capable of actively directing the country's foreign policy, domestic economy, ideological development, and the international Communist movement while, at the same time, protecting himself from his domestic and foreign political enemies. The downfall of Khrushchev can be traced to an overestimation of his personal popularity, an underestimation of his political adversaries, and his miscalculations in handling several of the sensitive situations and issues that confronted him during his rule. The author explores specific issues that

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affected the fate of Khrushchev: the United States U-2 incident, the de-Stalinization program, the ideological conflict with the Communist Party, the peaceful coexistence policy, the Cuban missile crisis, the allocation of national resources, the domestic economy, and the violations of the principle of collective leadership. M. Tau's portrayal of N.S. Khrushchev is that of a man dedicated to providing greater personal freedom and consumer goods for his people; living in peaceful coexistence with the West; and competing with the non-Communist world on a political, ideological, and economic basis. However, the events of the day and the political pressures from without and within forced him to deviate greatly

from these policies and eventually to surrender his political power to his successors.

This book is not for the uninitiated, as the author discusses in some depth the political and economic structures and the interwoven philosophies and issues which faced Khrushchev. Without the background knowledge of these structures of the Soviet Union, the student would be hard pressed to understand the motivating forces in much of the political interaction which took place. It is recommended for those students who are interested in studying the Soviet leadership in greater depth.

W. ABROMITIS  
Commander, U.S. Navy

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Knowledge of Naval matters is an art as well as any other and not to be attended to at idle times and on the by . . .

*Pericles, fl 460 B.C.*



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