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War and Order

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public opinion leadership by the President. Gauging public opinion remains a shaky science at best, however, and the President still must depend upon intuition and faith in himself in formulating foreign policy. Perhaps most important is the conclusion that it is difficult to generate active support for either subtle or pedestrian policies, such as long-range economic assistance programs; but, at the same time, vocal dissenters find it much easier today to create the impression of a public opposed to such policies. The author suggests that the President must develop more effective means of communication to maintain the support of a population that is becoming better educated and more sophisticated, or he risks being forced into a policy of crisis publicity which exaggerates crises or potential benefits in order to mold public opinion and maintain public support.

While the bibliography is not all-inclusive, the book is extensively footnoted. It is a well-presented and thoroughgoing analysis of the Presidential role in early American foreign policy, and it merits the attention of any researcher in that field. The volume must be regarded as an essential reference by anyone studying the impact of public opinion on foreign policy formulation.

R.C. ELDER
Commander, U.S. Navy

Kennedy, Robert F. *Thirteen Days: a Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: Norton, 1969. 224p.

During the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the world was probably in more immediate danger of a major nuclear war than ever before or since. *Thirteen Days* is Robert F. Kennedy's personal account of what went on in the high councils of government during that crisis. It is a book that should be read by all those concerned with the effective and judicious use of force, and that includes—or should include—everybody.

The United States had two overriding objectives during the Cuban missile crisis: to avoid a major war with the Soviet Union and to get the Soviet offensive missiles out of Cuba. Despite the fact that withdrawal of the missiles by the Soviet Union involved a virtually unprecedented reversal of policy and loss of face by a major power, both U.S. objectives were achieved in full—and at the cost of but one American life. Most observers count this as one of the most significant successes of U.S. foreign policy—and as such it is a case worthy of careful study.

Disturbing to this reviewer, as a professional military officer, is that, as recounted by Kennedy, at every decision point the military advisers recommended more violent and potentially hazardous courses of action than those finally adopted. He states that President Kennedy

... was distressed that the representatives with whom he met, with the notable exception of General Taylor, seemed to give so little consideration to the implications of steps they suggested. They seemed always to assume that the Russians and the Cubans would not respond or, if they did, that a war was in our national interest. . . . President Kennedy was disturbed by this inability to look beyond the limited military field.

As a case study, *Thirteen Days* sometimes suffers from Kennedy's personal and perhaps somewhat biased point of view, but the immediacy and authority of the account more than compensate. Of added value is a documentary annex of photographs and communications.

J.A. BARBER
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Liska, George. *War and Order*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. 115p.

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Professor Liska, a Research Associate with the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research and Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, presents in this small volume his very simple thesis: like it or not, the power and wealth of the United States force her to have worldwide interests and responsibilities. He proposes an approach to world order which envisions the United States as an imperial, but nonimperialistic, state using her power in a positive, mature manner, not for her own aggrandizement but to intervene whenever and wherever local conflicts threaten to escalate beyond an acceptable level. The author devotes a chapter to each of the three basic objections to U.S. global involvement as currently dramatized by the war in Vietnam. These objections are as follows: (1) global interventionism is contrary to America's unique traditions; (2) global interventionism in the nuclear age is counterproductive in that it generates conflicts which must be avoided; and (3) U.S. interventions represent an outdated anticommunism. Generally, Professor Liska's response to these objections emphasizes the need for this country to adopt a less self-centered view in her foreign policy and the importance of her being willing to accept an imperial position—one which requires all of the three elements: role, commitment, and performance. He believes, too, that the intensity of America's domestic problems will vary inversely as she fulfills her honest foreign commitments and will only increase as she continues to display weakness in her relations abroad. His proposals, although they are perhaps too extreme to be accepted at once, are refreshingly unusual in this day. Accordingly, this book (or even only the fourth and summary chapter, if the interested student is very busy) is strongly recommended for those desirous of hearing both sides of

America's current controversy.

R.W. DURFEY
Commander, U.S. Coast Guard

Rostow, Eugene V. *Law, Power, and the Pursuit of Peace*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1968. 133p.

Eugene Rostow served as dean of the Yale University Law School before joining the State Department in 1966 as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. His book is based on revisions of two Roscoe Pound lectures given at the University of Nebraska in February 1966 and has been updated sufficiently to include the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia among its illustrative examples. Professor Rostow's intent is to consider the interactions of law and experience and their influence on the "task of peacekeeping in the real world." Specifically, he analyzes America's efforts since World War II "to lay the foundations for a new system of international peace" to replace the system of the 19th century which finally collapsed completely in 1945. He states that all four American Presidents since 1945 have been handicapped by having to challenge head-on the American self-image formed from the historical experience of our first century and a half as a nation. Citing the tradition of isolation as a powerful part of our collective memory, Professor Rostow notes that each of our Presidents has, in turn, "been scourged by the angry protest of fellow citizens who preferred to believe that the world is flat." Despite this, he credits each of them with having the wisdom to follow the same basic foreign policy theme first enunciated by President Truman that "totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States." Professor Rostow considers this Truman Doctrine as having evolved "into a kind of common