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Law, Power, and the Pursuit of Peace

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Professor Liska, a Research Associate with the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research and Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, presents in this small volume his very simple thesis: like it or not, the power and wealth of the United States force her to have worldwide interests and responsibilities. He proposes an approach to world order which envisions the United States as an imperial, but nonimperialistic, state using her power in a positive, mature manner, not for her own aggrandizement but to intervene whenever and wherever local conflicts threaten to escalate beyond an acceptable level. The author devotes a chapter to each of the three basic objections to U.S. global involvement as currently dramatized by the war in Vietnam. These objections are as follows: (1) global interventionism is contrary to America's unique traditions; (2) global interventionism in the nuclear age is counterproductive in that it generates conflicts which must be avoided; and (3) U.S. interventions represent an outdated anticommunism. Generally, Professor Liska's response to these objections emphasizes the need for this country to adopt a less self-centered view in her foreign policy and the importance of her being willing to accept an imperial position—one which requires all of the three elements: role, commitment, and performance. He believes, too, that the intensity of America's domestic problems will vary inversely as she fulfills her honest foreign commitments and will only increase as she continues to display weakness in her relations abroad. His proposals, although they are perhaps too extreme to be accepted at once, are refreshingly unusual in this day. Accordingly, this book (or even only the fourth and summary chapter, if the interested student is very busy) is strongly recommended for those desirous of hearing both sides of

America's current controversy.

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Rostow, Eugene V. *Law, Power, and the Pursuit of Peace*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1968. 133p.

Eugene Rostow served as dean of the Yale University Law School before joining the State Department in 1966 as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. His book is based on revisions of two Roscoe Pound lectures given at the University of Nebraska in February 1966 and has been updated sufficiently to include the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia among its illustrative examples. Professor Rostow's intent is to consider the interactions of law and experience and their influence on the "task of peacekeeping in the real world." Specifically, he analyzes America's efforts since World War II "to lay the foundations for a new system of international peace" to replace the system of the 19th century which finally collapsed completely in 1945. He states that all four American Presidents since 1945 have been handicapped by having to challenge head-on the American self-image formed from the historical experience of our first century and a half as a nation. Citing the tradition of isolation as a powerful part of our collective memory, Professor Rostow notes that each of our Presidents has, in turn, "been scourged by the angry protest of fellow citizens who preferred to believe that the world is flat." Despite this, he credits each of them with having the wisdom to follow the same basic foreign policy theme first enunciated by President Truman that "totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States." Professor Rostow considers this Truman Doctrine as having evolved "into a kind of common

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law of international order, a prudent role of reciprocal safety," which, by its simplicity, minimizes uncertainty and miscalculation. He relates the major international events of the last quarter century to this theme, with emphasis on the most significant events of recent years, the Vietnam war and the Middle East crises.

It is clear that Professor Rostow is a firm supporter of the policies followed by the Johnson administration; however, he avoids the title of "apologist" for those policies—just barely. He presents them as simply the logical result of continued adherence to a longstanding policy of proven worth—one which comprises the only foreign policy for America if international peace and order is to be attained. Professor Rostow claims that the continuing debate over our Vietnam policy is actually a screen for the real debate over whether the United States should have a foreign policy at all and to what extent force should be used in carrying it out: Are American interests worldwide, after all, or should they be confined to the small circle of industrialized and friendly nations? He believes the idea advanced by the debaters that the law can prevail without force is illusory and that "in international society, law is inconceivable without the rational and agreed control of force."

The book, concise and clearly written, contains a valuable outline of the basic themes fundamental to the continuing debate on American foreign policy. It is "must" reading for all who are concerned with the development of foreign policy. Professor Rostow's premises are brilliantly lucid, and the simplicity of his logic is obviously intended to confound the McCarthyite elements of modern American life; they will have a difficult time refuting his position short of relying on flashing but unsubstantive hyperbole. This volume should be read now, in order to provide basic background information on which

to base an appraisal of foreign policy developments which the new administration might propose. If Professor Rostow is correct, the American people must unreservedly accept the fact of their Great Power status and their obligation to exercise that power in concert with the other major powers of the world. President Nixon, as their agent, will have little practical choice but to continue the basic policy of all Presidents since 1945 and to suffer the same excoriation by the outspoken minority that has been the fate of all four of his predecessors in this new era of American international involvement.

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Tatu, Michel. *Power in the Kremlin.*

New York: Viking Press, 1968. 570p.

Michel Tatu, self-appointed French Kremlinologist, using the Soviet press as his main source of information, reconstructs the struggle for power in the Kremlin—Khrushchev to Kosygin. Having been in Russia during Khrushchev's regime, the author researched the reported movements, actions, and published words of the top dozen or so political figures in the U.S.S.R. to evaluate their effect upon the political life of Nikita S. Khrushchev. One is impressed, as he reads this book, with the manipulative ability required of any man who rules in the Kremlin. This man must be capable of actively directing the country's foreign policy, domestic economy, ideological development, and the international Communist movement while, at the same time, protecting himself from his domestic and foreign political enemies. The downfall of Khrushchev can be traced to an overestimation of his personal popularity, an underestimation of his political adversaries, and his miscalculations in handling several of the sensitive situations and issues that confronted him during his rule. The author explores specific issues that