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EMPLOYMENT OF MODERN NAVAL FORCES IN DEFENSE OF NORTHERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE

The NATO alliance is composed of many nations for whom uninterrupted foreign trade is an economic necessity. The military and economic bonds that hold together the NATO nations are maritime in nature, and the recent growth of Soviet capability upon the seas threatens the cohesion of that alliance. In protecting these bonds, NATO's naval forces can be used as an instrument of direct defense, deterrence, or deliberate escalation.

A lecture delivered at the Naval War College

by

Vice Admiral Gert Jeschonnek, Federal German Navy

INTRODUCTION

Because of the political division of Europe into two opposing military power blocs—the continental Soviet bloc consisting of the Warsaw Pact nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization consisting of 14 maritime nations of the West—the Federal Republic of Germany, as a member of NATO, has coupled her destiny very closely to that of the leading seapowers of the Western World. In order to recognize and assess our military situation and its inherent strengths and weaknesses, it has become indispensable to take under special consideration the relationship of seapower to the grand strategy.

The purpose of my presentation is to point out within the framework of the Atlantic alliance the vital significance of the sea and seapower for the defense and security of the northern flank of Europe. This, of course, includes the Federal Republic of Germany. In my

concluding remarks I shall make only a brief reference to our own naval forces since I do not wish to exceed the scope of my subject.

THE STRATEGIC THREAT AT SEA

The Significance of the Sea in the Alliance. The German defense policy is traditionally continental and related to the security of its political position in Europe. Since 1955 it has, however, been forced to take more and more into its considerations the worldwide political situation and its developing tendencies. The reason for this lies in the dependence of the Federal Republic of Germany on an extensive and profitable foreign trade and its membership in a maritime alliance.

Attributable to our close association with the West, the Federal Republic of Germany has developed into an economically effective and modern industrial state whose worldwide foreign

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trade is dependent on extensive imports and exports. This foreign trade has become the foundation of existence of our densely populated country. Changes in the balance of power which affect foreign trade relations do not remain without repercussions on the economic and living conditions within the Federal Republic. Since the major portion of our foreign trade is overseas commerce, maritime communications with our business partners assume predominant importance.

Let me illustrate this fact by quoting two figures: The quantity of goods involved in overseas foreign trade and transhipped to and from German and Netherlands-Belgian seaports amounts to about 135 million tons per annum, reaching an average rate of 370,000 tons per day. This figure represents about 90 percent of the entire German trade volume. Any interruption of the sea lines of communications would therefore deal a decisive blow to foreign trade and would constitute a severe threat to the internal stability and constitutional order of our country. This is the reason for the intense national interest of the Federal Republic in a peaceful utilization of the sea as a route of transport and vital line of communication to our partners in trade and the reason for our dependence on the powers guaranteeing these sea lines of communication within the Atlantic alliance. Since these conditions apply likewise to most of the other European industrial states and maritime nations, the sea becomes a common bond upon which the protection and guaranty of the communications is a concern common to all the countries who are members of the North Atlantic alliance. In addition, maritime intercourse has a highly strategic value for warfare. In spite of the growing efficiency of air transport, those who control the sea will, for a long time to come, still possess the most efficient, effective, and extensive system of transport capable of

deploying and moving, within a short period of time, troops and supplies and be able to concentrate forces and shift these concentrations of forces by using the sea.

A glance at the map shows that the NATO alliance is spread over a wide geographic area, its military center of gravity located in Northern America, approximately 4,000 nautical miles distant from the central European front-line. Consequently, the control of the sea, which alone links all the Allies with each other, is a precondition of our common defense. This is why the strategy pursued by the alliance is inseparable from the problem of unhampered mobility at sea and in the airspace above the sea. The Atlantic Ocean is and remains the heart of the Atlantic alliance. The NATO alliance would never have come into being nor would it have been capable of remaining in existence had it not had the capabilities of deploying and maintaining military forces in Europe, of building up and protecting overseas bases, and had there not been an urgent necessity for the exchange of raw materials and finished goods.

In southern Europe the Greeks and Turks might never have joined NATO had the sea lines of communication in the Mediterranean not been protected and controlled by friendly powers. The same applies, in northern Europe, to Denmark and Norway. Their future, as well as the future of the Federal Republic of Germany, the BENELUX countries, and the United Kingdom would be seriously endangered if the Allies were not able to control the Northern Atlantic and its adjacent waters.

The Soviet Quest for Seapower. Let me now turn to the enemy situation in order to highlight some significant changes which are relevant to the assessment of the grand strategy of our alliance—changes which in the long run

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are likely to influence our own position and point of view.

I believe that the Soviet bloc still has as its objective the imposing of the Communist system throughout the world. Support of this assumption can be seen in the ever-increasing military expenditures of the Soviet Union and its allies, its gains in the noncommitted world, and its politically directed economic commitments. However, it has become apparent that the methods that the Soviets are employing to achieve their goal have undergone a remarkable change during the past few years. This stems from a change in the strategic thinking of the Soviets.

The nuclear stalemate of the big powers and the buildup of strong NATO ground and air forces in Europe have led to a considerable restriction of the freedom of action open to the Soviet leaders in enforcing their political objectives by the use of military force. It is true that the Soviet attempt, made during the Cuban crisis, to skip the hurdle of the defensive barrier on the European Continent was a failure, and the continental power was forced to accept an embarrassing setback in its cold war with the naval power. But, at the same time, this setback made it quite clear to the Soviet leaders how closely limited the operational capabilities of a continental power may be vis-a-vis a naval power. Further, a power position on a worldwide scale cannot be achieved without naval power and without adequate supply bases. Therefore, the Soviet Union has intensified her efforts to free herself from the strategic encirclement of the naval powers and to expand her political influence in the world with the aid of her own naval power. The expansion of Soviet power at sea is one of the most essential developments in the field of military politics in the second half of our century. For the first time in Russian history—constituting, therefore, a new phenomenon in the continental conflict

between East and West—the Soviet Navy has been assigned the mission of an offensive force operating in all oceans of the world.

Let me quote some facts in support of this statement: The Soviet Navy, with its fleet of nuclear-powered submarines armed with intercontinental missiles and its Atlantic going cruisers and destroyers whose long-range surface-to-surface missile armament has no match in the West, is on its way towards becoming the world's most advanced navy. In this process an impressive management ensures that new scientific knowledge and technological development are rapidly transposed into effective weapon systems. The time requirement for the construction of Soviet naval vessels is somewhat less than that of American shipyards and considerably shorter than in Germany.

The main emphasis in the building of the Soviet naval forces is placed on the large submarines and heavy combat ships. About 180 new submarines and 40 guided-missile cruisers and guided-missile destroyers have been commissioned; others are under construction. For the next few years an annual rate of at least 7 to 8 nuclear-powered submarines is expected. But also major surface units, including two helicopter carriers and landing ships with an amphibious landing capacity of 55 armored vehicles or 1,200 men each, have been or are being commissioned. In addition, the Soviets are building up a capacity for underway replenishment which will permit the maintenance of a major number of submarines in the Atlantic Ocean, extending simultaneously the radius of action of these submarines. Observations during the last years showed that some submarines remained at sea up to 4½ months in the Central Atlantic.

Any evaluation of Soviet naval power should be based on the assumption that merchant vessels, fishing vessels, and research vessels, too, are designed for

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potential military use and are on call at any time their political leaders might choose. The Soviet merchant fleet is of high quality and is steadily growing. Since 1946 its tonnage has grown from 1.6 million tons to 12 million tons and will catch up in the midseventies with the largest merchant fleets in the world. The Soviet Union trains nine times as many naval engineers and designers as the United States. The number of their research vessels equals the total number of such vessels in the rest of the world. The Soviet fishing fleet must be regarded as the world's largest. It includes big factory ships carrying on board up to 14 fishing vessels of 50 tons each which are well suited for amphibious operations.

All these vessels, which operate widely dispersed in many parts of the world, are under centralized control from the Soviet Union. For this purpose a system has been developed which enables the Soviet Government to track, with the aid of computers, the position and movements of each vessel and to give instructions to the vessels at any time. None of the Western nations has a comparable system at its disposal. By virtue of its strict and centralized control, the Soviet merchant, fishing, and research fleet is an outstanding instrument of Soviet policy even in peacetime and, moreover, a proven means for the surveillance of Western shipping movements.

The Soviet leaders endeavor to utilize their rapidly growing naval power for the creation and expansion of spheres of power and influence in the world. The proof of this lies in the following:

the Soviet trend towards the construction of seagoing combat ships,

the employment for political purposes on several occasions of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean, off the Vietnamese and Korean coasts and in the Japanese Sea, and of late also in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean

the attempts to obtain base rights outside their own territory, e.g., in Algeria and Egypt, with a view to increasing the effective time on station of their units at sea and in peripheral waters,

a worldwide activity of Soviet submarines,

and last, but not least, by the statement and remarks of the Soviet leaders: For example, the First Deputy of the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy stated recently:

Our Party and Government continue to devote much attention to the further perfection of the Fleet. The necessity of doing so arises from the fact that military operations in distant theaters of naval warfare will be of very high importance and that our Fleet will play one of the most significant roles in a future war.

The Strategic Position of the Soviet Bloc at Sea. In view of the Soviets' determined efforts to achieve the status of a major naval power, the question arises as to how far have the Soviets gone and how far have they yet to go to fill the requirements of a major seapower?

In order to establish naval power as an instrument of military force, three elements are indispensable: a fleet, a strategic position at sea, and maritime thinking. The success achieved by the Soviets in equipping their naval forces has demonstrated that they are capable of producing the necessary equipment for naval warfare, i.e., a combat effective fleet. Furthermore, it cannot be denied any longer that the Soviet leaders are increasingly capable of maritime thinking. However, the mere fact that the Soviet Union has some maritime frontiers is not sufficient to make her a major naval power. It is rather decisive where her maritime frontiers are located and whether she is in an

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advantageous position vis-a-vis the West from the point of view of naval strategy. Such a position has never been held by the Russians for centuries. And although after the Second World War the Soviets succeeded in extending their sphere of power right into Central Europe and in extending their European coastlines, free access to the world's oceans continues to be denied to them. It is merely the rough Arctic coast from which the Soviets have direct connection to the Atlantic. However, the approach to the West's maritime lines of communication is long, icebound for part of the year, and highly hazardous in the gaps of Iceland. All other European coasts of the Soviet Union and of her Allies border peripheral waters, the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea—the approaches to which are the Turkish and Danish Straits controlled by NATO.

It is true that the Soviet bloc, which is a coherent landmass and economically self-sufficient, is largely independent of the sea and, unlike the West which has to rely on international trade relations and maritime communications, cannot be hit decisively at sea. However, the dependence of the Soviet Navy on maritime communications with its bases, shipbuilding and industrial centers, and its training installations in the European peripheral waters increases steadily. The large shipyard and industrial capacities are located on the Black Sea and in particular on the Baltic Sea.

Although it is possible, with the aid of modern technology and potential support by noncommitted countries, to increase considerably the endurance at sea of the Soviet naval forces, this does not imply a decisive improvement of the unfavorable basic situation of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the Western naval powers from the point of view of naval strategy. This is why the Soviet Union pays particular attention to the straits leading into the world's oceans, recognizing them as strategic positions of the first order. Supported by her bases on the

peripheral waters, she is well capable of projecting seapower at and from the sea as long as the countries at the straits remain neutral. Location, type, and scope of such actions are governed by the requirement that they must not involve the countries at the straits in the conflict, i.e., in particular that they do not constitute the *casus foederis* for NATO. However, should the straits be closed because of the adjacent states entering into the conflict, it must be a particular concern of the Soviet Union to keep open her access to the oceans by improving her position from the point of view of military geography.

The methods used to improve her strategic position will have to make allowance for the change of the strategic concepts and in the application of military force. Therefore, the Soviets will endeavor to probe NATO's will to make a stand. They will probe those areas that are subject to military and political weakness, and to exploit such weakness to the maximum possible extent by penetrating such a power vacuum at low risk to themselves. In so doing they will make every effort to avoid any escalation jeopardizing their own existence and endeavor to prevent any direct confrontation with the United States of America.

The probability of limited aggressions against NATO countries is greatest where the least defense is to be expected, where such aggressions would secure free access to the oceans earliest, and where the limited character of the actions could best be demonstrated and a direct confrontation with the United States avoided. In the central and northern European regions, such areas are in particular northern Norway, the Baltic approaches, and the high seas.

FUNCTION OF THE NAVAL POWERS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE

Naval Warfare and Naval Power. Naval warfare, being an integral part of

warfare in general, cannot be regarded in isolation. Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that the outcome of wars was frequently in history influenced decisively by the results of naval warfare and will possibly be influenced similarly in the future.

The objective of naval warfare is to deny the enemy and to secure for oneself the use of the sea, i.e., to gain maritime control. If an enemy succeeded in impeding the western European countries in their use of the sea, he might be able to undermine the economic and constitutional structure of these countries. To prevent this is one of the objectives of Western naval warfare. Another objective is to connect isolated areas with the main capabilities of the West. In the last analysis these objectives can only be achieved by naval power. Naval power today is characterized by its mobility, flexibility, and high degree of operational readiness.

Maritime mobility is defined as the capability of rapidly concentrating military power when and wherever this may be required and requested. This capability may, in some cases, prevent application of force since it permits timely presence in areas of tension. It permits a surprise concentration of forces at sea and off coasts without political warning and without necessitating the use of foreign territory.

Flexibility as applied to maritime conditions offers a wide spectrum of operational possibilities and methods and permits a graduated, differentiated application of force under strict control and tailored to the objective pursued—ranging from the exercise of police functions at sea over demonstrations and blockades to bombardments and invasions, including the penetration deep into the continents with conventional and nuclear weapons.

A high degree of operational readiness and the capability of operating independently and remote from home

bases over prolonged periods are the most prominent characteristics of naval power. Naval forces are characterized by the fact that their personnel are fully combat ready after a short period of preparation, their basic allowance of equipment is always available, and they can operate over wide areas independent of their bases.

If naval power is to be employed to its best advantage, its application must be planned on a large geographical scale. The NATO Allies cannot fight naval wars independently; they can only fight such wars in coordinated action and in accordance with the overall scheme of warfare.

Mission of NATO's Naval Forces. The entire train of thought developed so far in this presentation leads to the mission and assignments of the NATO naval forces. The mission assigned must be in consonance with the three most important basic criteria of NATO's overall defense concept. These criteria are:

- the strategy of credible deterrence,
- restoration of the credibility of deterrence, in the event of its failure, by deliberate escalation,
- direct defense.

Now, first of all, *deterrence*. Its objective is to restrain the enemy from hostile actions by making it impossible for him to calculate the risk involved in his aggressive action. Consequently, deterrence is a strategic instrument applied in peacetime and in periods of tension.

With naval forces, as with ground and air forces, deterrence is based on the availability of combat-ready, versatile, and modern combat units. However, this availability of forces in being is merely the basic factor of the deterrence effect, since it influences the scope but not the incalculability of the

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enemy's risk. The effectiveness of combat units is founded on firepower and movement. Theoretically speaking, availability of forces in being in peacetime is interpreted as "firepower"—merely one definite factor in the strategic play of forces.

The other factor, however—the moving or deployment of ground or air forces in peacetime—is of either limited strategic importance or has an undesirably heavy effect, in particular when it takes the form of "buildup" or "mobilization." Hence, it is not an appropriate means of securing the incalculability of risk in the peacetime play of forces.

The employment of naval forces can be regarded as different. They offer greater flexibility of employment for political purposes. The deploying of naval forces to an area where conflicts are anticipated can be an effective move. Although the enemy must expect that move, he is ignorant of both where it will take place and of its type or extent, and he cannot calculate the risk to which this move will expose him.

For some time the Soviet Union has clearly demonstrated to us, in the Mediterranean, this strategic concept of force constituted by the flexibility of naval powers in peacetime. The same objective is served by the establishment of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic by SACLANT. The existence of this task force with its capability of appearing everywhere at any time, demonstrating the solidarity of NATO on the spot, and exerting a strategic influence in the political play of forces cannot be overestimated in its importance for the incalculability of the enemy's risk and hence for deterrence.

The purpose of deliberate escalation is to restore the credibility of deterrence, should hostilities have broken out in spite of deterrence. The difficulty is to demonstrate, by appropriate actions, an adequate measure of readiness for,

and capability of, escalation, but on the other hand not to cause the enemy, by too severe measures, to raise the level of escalation. On land, the necessity of respecting the enemy's territorial rights and population renders this move extremely difficult. At sea, conditions are different and more advantageous. Here, such considerations are hardly relevant. Naval forces can be employed to achieve, with a comparatively large freedom of action, a deliberately controlled effect either giving great political weight to minor military actions or keeping military measures within desirable or acceptable political limits. The resolution to resort to nuclear defense, for instance, might be demonstrated by nuclear employment at sea without exactly initiating the first step in a nuclear war.

In the event of such a deliberate escalation, the Maritime Contingency Force Atlantic is of special importance as a particular element of NATO naval warfare. If certain naval forces of the member countries are concentrated by, and assigned to, a NATO commander at a moment to be carefully chosen, this measure constitutes a definite step of appreciated escalation. In comparison with peacetime conditions it constitutes the activation of an existing potential, but does not necessarily result in general alert. Nevertheless, such a step demonstrates the resolution of the Allies to honor their commitments if hostilities should continue.

Thus, the Standing Naval Force Atlantic and the Maritime Contingency Force Atlantic are two NATO task forces enabling NATO to exercise deterrence effectively and to restore, if need be, any degree of credibility of deterrence that may have been lost.

The German Navy's participation in the Standing Naval Force Atlantic is, so far, confined to exercises to which it dispatches one destroyer or one frigate each for a period of 3 to 4 months. As to the Maritime Contingency Force

Atlantic, which will not be activated until conditions of tension arise, the German Government, according to present policy, has not decided to participate.

The purpose of direct defense is to counter attacks of the enemy on the spot. Therefore, the role of naval forces will vary between one location and the other. Their mission is:

to repel attacks against the maritime lines of communication between the United States and western Europe,

to protect the territories of the NATO countries against attacks from the sea, and

to give direct support to land warfare.

Defense against attacks on the maritime lines of communication is of importance everywhere in the Atlantic Ocean and is today—after the French ports have become nonavailable—more important than ever. The waters concerned include the Mediterranean, the North Sea, and the Norwegian Sea. In case of a prolonged war, this is one of the primary missions of the NATO naval forces for the overall development of the conflict.

The direct protection of the territories of the NATO countries against attacks from sea is most significant where NATO coasts are exposed to an amphibious threat. In this respect, northern Norway and the Baltic approaches are particularly vulnerable spots.

In the light of the foregoing, the importance of NATO's naval forces is based on the following three factors:

1. They are a particularly suitable instrument of policy which permits the strategy of deterrence to be handled flexibly in peacetime not only by the availability of forces-in-being, but also by the movement of forces;

2. They are particularly suitable in times of crises and in case of limited hostilities to restore by deliberate escalation the credibility of deterrence as far as it may have been lost;

3. They are necessary to repel in direct defense attacks at sea and against coasts from the sea.

ROLE OF NAVAL POWER IN THE DEFENSE OF NORTHERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE

Turning now to the discussion of the particular conditions prevailing in northern and central Europe, I should like to start by pointing out that my foregoing remarks are of special relevance for these regions. In connection with the defense of northern and central Europe, it is the protection of the northern flank which deserves particular attention, a flank which is about 1,500 miles long and where seaward defense is weak. In order to demonstrate the importance of this flank quite clearly, I should like to stress two points which highlight the interests of both sides: the enemy's capability of penetrating this flank by means of amphibious units, and SAC-LANT's offer to support operations on this front by the employment of its naval forces.

As far as the field of naval strategy is concerned, let me confine my considerations on the defense of northern and central Europe to the areas of northern Norway and the Baltic approaches.

Northern Norway. With regard to northern Norway, I want to state that it is impossible to defend this area without the employment of modern naval forces. On the other hand, the area offers itself to an enemy for improving considerably his strategic position at sea. Operations in this area are largely dependent on support from sea. The forces-in-being available for defense would not be capable of maintaining a sustained defense. This is the reason

why SACLANT, particularly in view of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic and Maritime Contingency Force Atlantic, has to keep under control the waters around northern Norway as one of the most essential theaters of operation in his area of responsibility.

Baltic Approaches. In my foregoing remarks I mentioned several times the strategic importance of the Baltic approaches for naval operations. To repeat, they are the defensive barrier which is to prevent a possible breakthrough of Soviet naval forces into the Atlantic. On the other hand, they constitute the direct northern flank of the central European land front and consequently offer to those who control them all operational advantages resulting from such a flanking position. The specific situation prevailing at the Baltic approaches is characterized by the fact that here the two opponents are deployed in a proximity unusual in naval warfare.

The conclusion to be drawn from this situation is that all three elements constituting NATO's defense concept—deterrence, deliberate escalation, and direct defense—may attain increased importance in this area.

For the purposes of deterrence in peacetime by rendering the risk incalculable, here, as anywhere else, land forces can contribute the factor of firepower. The factor of movement, however, can best be represented by modern naval forces if they make appropriate use of the Baltic Sea by being present in peacetime. Similar to the Standing Naval Force Atlantic in the wide sea areas of the North Atlantic Ocean, the NATO forces deployed in the Baltic Sea demonstrate, in exercises and maneuvers as well as in reconnaissance missions, the determination of the Allies to counter Soviet claims regarding the Baltic Sea as *mare clausum*.

In contrast to the conditions prevailing in the Atlantic Ocean, the naval

forces operating in the Baltic Sea must be available on the spot at short notice in view of the close proximity of the enemy. Therefore, the naval forces deployed in the area of responsibility of NATO's Commander Baltic Approaches are, to a certain extent, comparable to the Standing Naval Force Atlantic. However, they are not a NATO task force comprised of a few combat units afloat which has been deliberately established and can be deployed over large areas. Instead they are composed of the organically grown Danish-German NATO naval forces and capable of being deployed and ready for action at short notice in a restricted sea area.

Similar considerations apply to deliberate escalation in this particular sea area. In view of the narrowness of this area and the close vicinity to the opponent, even minor actions may assume political weight. In this setting the NATO naval forces deployed in the

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Vice Adm. Gert Jeschonnek entered the former German Navy as an officer cadet in 1930. From 1935 to 1943 he served as Artillery Officer aboard the battleship *Schleswig-Holstein* and the cruisers *Nürnberg* and *Lutzow*. Following a brief tour as an instructor at the Naval Gunnery School, he attended the Naval Staff College and then served as Staff Officer in the Operations Division of the Naval High Command until the end of World War II. After the war, Vice Admiral Jeschonnek served in the German Minesweeping Service for 2 years and soon thereafter was employed by the Federal Ministry of Defense. In 1955 he entered the Federal German Navy as a commander, where he was assigned to the Navy Staff. After graduating from the first class of the Naval Command Course at the U.S. Naval War College in 1957, he served in several senior staff positions. Since October of 1967, Vice Admiral Jeschonnek has served as Chief of Staff of the Federal German Navy.

Baltic approaches area may be regarded as a kind of counterpart of the Maritime Contingency Force Atlantic.

Naval forces may also attain special importance in the Baltic Sea because there will be comparatively little margin for reactions in the form of a "flexible" response at the adjacent land front. The direct proximity to the enemy emphasizes the importance of direct defense in the Baltic and the Baltic approaches area. The specific operational conditions prevailing in this sea area require naval forces to possess operational characteristics which enable them to execute their complex task successfully. With regard to this requirement I should like to mention the following principles;

The smaller the resources devoted to an instrument of defense are to be, the more time must be available for staging the defense and the more important is the exploitation of the depth of the battle area. In the Baltic Sea this depth of the battle area is available. This permits and requires early identification of the enemy by means of reconnaissance and his engagement as far to the east as possible.

Naval warfare is three dimensional. And it must be ensured that the enemy is exposed to threat in all three of these dimensions in order to prevent him from concentrating his defenses against *one* of our capabilities alone.

For any naval warfare capability and weapons system there are particular situations offering especially favorable conditions under which the capability of weapons systems concerned is superior to other naval warfare capabilities and weapons systems. Similarly, there are unfavorable situations in which one naval warfare capability is subject to distinct disadvantages as compared with others or cannot even be used at all. Therefore, the effectiveness of defense at sea, similar to that in land warfare, is based on combined arms operations. In the Navy, combined arms are repre-

sented by the balanced fleet whose formations, units, and weapons are employed in accordance with the situation and with the decisions of the operational commander.

These three principles govern the suitability and employment of naval forces in direct defense in the area of the Baltic approaches. They, together with the requirements for deterrence and deliberate escalation with the objective of restoring the credibility of deterrence, form the essential bases on which our own naval concept is founded. It is from this strategy that force requirements are derived.

In the years to come, the German Navy will introduce modern weapon systems in the framework of the so-called "armaments plan" of the German Forces. We are working in all fields in close cooperation with our Allies and are convinced that our efforts will prove successful.

SUMMARY

In the Atlantic community of NATO, the North Atlantic and its peripheral waters constitute the indestructible medium connecting all partners to the alliance with each other. The maritime lines of communication between them and the rest of the free world are the arterial highway of the community in peacetime and would be the lifelines of the alliance in times of war. Their utilization is the prerequisite to an effective common defense. Ultimately, maritime lines of communication can be threatened and secured by naval power only.

The increasing efforts of the Soviets to gain naval power endanger the superiority of the Western naval powers on the world's oceans and pose a threat to NATO at sea and on the flanks where the Soviets are seeking free access to the sea.

Naval forces are particularly suitable as an instrument of deterrence, deliberate escalation, and direct defense. This

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suitability attains significant importance in the defense of northern and central Europe, being the regions where the struggle of the Soviets and the West for naval power comes to a clash and where there is probably more interaction between land and naval warfare than anywhere else.

In the area of the Baltic approaches, land, sea and naval warfare are interlinked to a particularly high degree in the pursuit of common objectives.

The employment of modern naval forces in the defense of northern and central Europe is indispensable in the Atlantic Ocean, in its peripheral waters, and particularly at their exits into the Atlantic. This employment of naval forces is highly essential as a contribution to the defensive mission of the Atlantic alliance whose political and military importance will remain unchanged even beyond the critical phase which we are living through at present.



Command of the sea is the indispensable basis of security, but whether the instrument that commands swims, floats, or flies is a mere matter of detail.

Sir Herbert Richmond: Statesmen and Sea Power, 1946