

1969

Book Reviews


The U.S. Naval War College

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

War College, The U.S. Naval (1969) "Book Reviews," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 22 : No. 10 , Article 9.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol22/iss10/9>

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.



PROFESSIONAL READING

Bauer, K. Jack, *Surfboats and Horse Marines*. Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1969. 279p.

K. Jack Bauer, Associate Professor of History at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, is an authority on U.S. military history and well acquainted with the naval service from his previous positions as Head of the Operational History Section in the Department of the Navy and as Historian for the U.S. Marine Corps. His work, *Surfboats and Horse Marines*, is an attempt to present in one volume a detailed history of the naval operations that occurred during the Mexican War (1846-1848). He has organized his work in two separate parts—the first deals with the war in the east, the Gulf of Mexico, and the second with the western war, the Pacific Ocean. This method of presentation appears quite suitable since the simultaneous actions in both theaters were unrelated, and no attempt was made to coordinate the operations of the Home Squadron in the Gulf with those of the Pacific Squadron.

The author's easy style, thorough research, and extensive knowledge of naval matters ensure interesting reading. Of particular importance are the comprehensive discussions of future Civil War naval leaders, of fleet logistical support, and the development of an amphibious body within the U.S. Navy. Although scant attention has been paid to the naval operations of the Mexican War, it was here that the character and career of such men as David G. Farragut, David D. Porter, Samuel F. DuPont, and Raphael Semmes were molded for

the next war. Here too the naval commanders and the Department of the Navy were tested in their ability to adequately plan for and maintain logistical support for squadrons at sea during hostilities. Both were found to be completely unprepared for the task. In the Home Squadron, Commodore Connor introduced specially constructed surfboats, a self-contained Naval Brigade, and detailed procedures for landing General Scott's force at Veracruz. This excellent opportunity for the development of an amphibious doctrine within the Navy was soon lost to history.

In his conclusions the author quotes Alfred T. Mahan's statement on the prime objective of a navy, "that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it, . . . and which, . . . closes the highways by which commerce moves to and from the enemy's shores." Bauer maintains that if Mahan's definition of the Navy's role is correct, then the U.S. Navy was eminently successful in performing its mission in the Mexican War.

This naval history is interesting and informative, but there are a few minor observations, both pro and con, that are relative to the book as a historical work. The author's selection of a title is very misleading; it implies a thorough study of both naval and marine actions. In his preface he states that his narrative "deals only with naval operations" and these operations received the thrust of his labor. The marine actions take the form of an appendix to the shipboard events. For those interested in the

100 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

record of marine participation in these engagements, see Clyde H. Metcalf's *A History of the United States Marine Corps*, New York: Putnam's, 1939; or R.D. Heinl's *Soldiers of the Sea*, Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1962.

Although some historians may find fault with the author's lack of footnotes, his documentation in the bibliographic notes and the valuable material contained in the appendices more than compensate for this slight omission. The only additional comment that might be made about the material presented by Professor Bauer concerns the quality of the maps included in the text. This may be a personal preference, but more detailed maps would help the reader to better understand the operational situations that confronted the squadron commanders.

Surfboats and Horse Marines is an impressive research into the little publicized naval operations of the Mexican War and should prove useful to the student of naval history in the areas of management, logistics, and amphibious warfare. In addition, this publication supplies excellent reading for the armchair sailor or casual reader who enjoys sagas of the sea.

W.S. PULLAR, JR.
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Beihman, Arnold. *The "Other" State Department*. New York: Basic Books, 1968. 221p.

This work is a study of the United States Mission to the United Nations (USUN) and its relationship to the State Department and to the United Nations organization. On the organizational wiring diagram, USUN is at the same level as other diplomatic missions throughout the world and, like them, presumably receives policy guidance and orders from the Secretary of State. Such policy guidance is the particular concern of the State Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs under

an Assistant Secretary. However, the Assistant Secretary is, of course, hardly in a position to do much guiding because the man he wishes to guide has Cabinet rank and is therefore on a level with the Assistant Secretary's own boss two echelons above. The main thrust of Mr. Beihman's well-reasoned and documented thesis is that the USUN is in a unique and powerful position and is not necessarily responsive to the wishes of the Secretary of State and his departmental officials. Many instances are cited where the policy pursued by the USUN has been openly conflicting with that of the State Department. One of the major reasons for this state of affairs, the author feels, is that the USUN Chief has always been a man of national eminence, with his own political constituency. He has never been a career Foreign Service Officer—that is, until now. One might conjecture that in his appointment of career diplomat Charles Yost as Ambassador to the UN, President Nixon has taken heed of Mr. Beihman's argument.

G.H. WINSLOW
Commander, U.S. Navy

Drueker, Peter F. *The Age of Discontinuity*. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. 394p.

Professor Drueker, in this very interesting and readable book, has attempted to identify and discuss the discontinuities which are likely to mold and shape the near future, the closing decades of the 20th century. He claims no gift of prophecy, however, only forecasting the probable changes that today's trends indicate.

The author discusses the major discontinuities in four areas: new technologies, major changes in the world's economy, the concentration of power in organizations, and the universe of learning and knowledge. In the first area—technologies—Mr. Drueker claims that the three major fields of activity that

powered the tremendous growth of Western (and Japanese) industry in the last 20 years—agriculture, steel, and automobiles—are mature, if not stagnant. They may continue to prosper, but they will not provide the impetus for continued economic development. In their place, the author sees four new mushrooming spheres: the information industry, with the computer as its core; the oceans; materials; and megalopolis, or the technologies of providing services for metropolitan areas. The shift from an international to a truly world economy is the subject of this book's second part. The awareness of most of the peoples of the world of the "good things of life" has led to the establishment of one common set of economic values and preferences, regardless of economic condition or political status. The author devotes considerable discussion to the impact that this change in standard of values is having, and will have, on existing economic institutions and policies. The growth of "institutions" (government, business, social, and church), their current and future influence on society, and recent disenchantment and revolt against them are the concern of part Three of this treatise. The fourth, and—by the author's account—most important, change is the growth of knowledge and the ascendancy of knowledge as the central "factor of production" in America's advanced, developing economy. The knowledge industries, which now account for one-third of the U.S. gross national product, will within 10 years account for one-half of a much larger GNP. The changing educational standards that have been a part of this knowledge explosion are explained and criticized in detail by Professor Drucker.

This is a highly informative and interesting book, with the author drawing some strong and controversial conclusions. Most of these conclusions are backed by persuasive argument, if not by fact, and in this respect the reader

will be forced to do some serious thinking about what he has read. The book is highly recommended to anyone who is interested in how the changes of today may affect life tomorrow.

D.J. KERSHAW
Commander, U.S. Navy

Fall, Bernard B. *Anatomy of a Crisis*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969. 283p.

The full title of the book by Mr. Fall is *Anatomy of a Crisis; the Laotian Crisis of 1960-61*. In the process of dissecting the Laotian crisis, the author has left a very bloody cadaver that this reader found a bit unsightly. Some portions of the cadaver are easily recognizable, having only a few clean wounds; such areas, unfortunately, are few. Most of the remains are cruelly crossed with a mass of ugly gashes made with tools of all degrees of sharpness and size and made for unfathomable reasons. The author begins his autopsy in the French colonial period and traces the political misfortunes of Laos through the second Geneva Accord of 1961. As he wields his scalpel, knife, and axe, he seems anything but consistent to the reviewer. In their dealings with the French and the North Vietnamese and at the conference tables of Geneva in 1954, Mr. Fall invests the Laotians with acumen and diplomatic skills, but from that point on all Laotian diplomats appear as graft-ridden power grabbers, with only the narrowest of viewpoints. The Laotian fighting man, according to the author, fought bravely and with valor against the Japanese of World War II and against the North Vietnamese in the 1950's. After this time, without "good leadership" (presumably French leadership) he has never again attained the same levels of bravery or dedication. The most easily identifiable portion of the cadaver is the theme of American failure in Laos. Here his strokes are deep and clear. To say

102 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

that he is not enamored of Mr. John Foster Dulles is the kindest possible assessment of his treatment of President Eisenhower's Secretary of State. The author strives to make it clear that he feels the U.S. Laotian policy in the 1954-1961 years, besides wasting millions, redounded to the detriment of Laos.

Why the autopsy? The reviewer has the nagging feeling that the body of Laos was laid bare to the knife not to find the cause of death, but rather to prove what Mr. Fall has said before, that the United States should not be practicing medicine in the Far East. If Mr. Fall did not make his message clear enough, Mr. Roger M. Smith, in his Epilogue, states it thus: "The United States today finds that it is unable to reverse the tragic situation which it helped to create." Mr. Smith closes the last chapter of the book with, "In countries in which the United States is doggedly persevering in its attempts to crush Communism, it is doing worse than postponing the satisfactory resolution of these problems."

F.C. GILMORE
Captain, U.S. Navy

Friedman, Milton and Heller, Walter W.
Monetary vs. Fiscal Policy. New York: Norton, 1969. 95p.

Monetary vs. Fiscal Policy is the result of the seventh annual Arthur K. Salomon lecture at the Graduate School of Business Administration of New York University. Essentially the "lecture" was a debate pitting the leading exponent of the "new economics," Walter Heller, against the recognized leader of the "monetary school," Milton Friedman.

Heller contends that the "new economics" has always taken monetary problems into account, and the real issue "is *not* whether money matters—we all grant that—but whether *only* money matters. . . ." His analysis leads

him to the conclusion "that we should not take refuge in rigid fiscal rules like the lock-stop tax cuts espoused by Barry Goldwater and Milton Friedman" or make the money supply the sole guide to Federal Reserve policy. The American economy should also take into account interest rates and credit availability and rely on discretionary policy rather than a rigid formula of a fixed increase in the money supply of "3, 4, or 5 percent a year." He is apparently more willing to suffer some inflation than are the representatives of the money school in return for more employment. Heller points out the weak points of the monetary school of economists, showing that they are not precise in their definition of money; they focus on the money stock exclusively, overlooking other important financial variables; they do not concern themselves enough with velocity of money; they do not show *when* money matters, for great variation is observable in the lags of monetary change and resultant alterations in employment and production; they do not explain the apparent existence of "permanent income"; they assume a fractionless economy; and, finally, they would jeopardize the U.S. international position by a rigid rule concerning the money supply. Friedman answers Heller in part by saying that he has been misinterpreted and in part by saying that the evidence supports his position. He also points out that the "new economics" during Heller's time gave only lipservice to money policy, judging by the reports. To Friedman, no fiscal policy is free of monetary policy, and there is no evidence one can accept that the expansion following the tax cut of 1964 was all due to fiscal policy. He points to the failure of the surtax to change the direction of the economy in 1968, along with other specific instances of the apparent failure of fiscal measures.

This timely book is noteworthy in that it points up the issues now

bothering the macro-economist. It is the reviewer's opinion that Heller underestimates money but is right about the need for discretionary policy; Friedman is correct in saying that the belief in fiscal policy rests on a shaky base unless money is also taken into account.

P.L. GAMBLE

Theodore Roosevelt Chair of Economics

Morgenthau, Hans J. *A New Foreign Policy for the United States*. New York: Praeger, 1969. 252p.

Hans Morgenthau's newest book is a provocative appraisal of contemporary U.S. foreign policy. Organized in nine chapters, it first sets forth "the basic issues," looks next at the extreme swings of American policy from isolationism to globalism (with its anti-Communist tone), moves on to consider the "foreign policies of communism," then to the United States and the developing world, to Vietnam, to Europe, to China, to nuclear power, and ends with "seven principles" for American foreign policy. For its length it is an ambitious book, but since it is largely analysis and appraisal, rather than history, it does sufficient justice to Mr. Morgenthau's subjects. The author's general approach is well indicated on page 3: "If one should characterize American foreign policy in a sentence, one could say that it has lived during the last decade or so on the intellectual capital accumulated in the . . . spring of 1947 . . . and that this capital has now been nearly exhausted." Those familiar with Morgenthau's writings in general will find his treatment of "the foreign policy of communism" (chapter III) one of the most challenging expansions or additions to his previously published views. His presentation on the nuclear weapons question in chapter VIII will certainly arouse controversy, including his flat statement (page 242) that "nuclear weapons in the hands of both superpowers are not instruments of

national policy; they only provide assurance that national interests can be supported with the conventional diplomatic and military methods." (This is one of his "seven principles.") His argument that "the policy of [United States] peripheral military containment on the Asian mainland ought to be gradually liquidated" is especially well developed. All in all, the book is a solid and useful example of the "new criticism" which seeks to establish guidelines which avoid both the pitfalls of "globalism" and the absurdities of "Fortress America."

F.H. HARTMANN

Alfred Thayer Mahan Chair of
Maritime Strategy

Ulam, Adam B. *Expansion and Coexistence*. New York: Praeger, 1968, 775p.

The subject of this work is Soviet foreign policy during the first 50 years of the Communist government, including its forces, personalities, styles, and structures. From Brest-Litovsk to the 6-day Arab-Israeli war, the author spans the many phases of Soviet diplomatic history. Definite threads of continuity are to be found in this monumental tracing of Moscow's foreign relations. For instance, in the 1918-1921 period, in which Soviet leaders were struggling for pure survival of their state and when Germany was their main concern, peaceful coexistence in its embryonic state might he said to have been practiced. Says Professor Ulam of this period: "Inherent in this Soviet diplomacy of despair was the clear assumption that there was no nonsense about the sanctity of treaties; once power relations were changed, Soviet Russia would claim her own." With exquisite detail, the author moves through the period of 1917-1921, when the Soviet Union was desperately trying to retain the right to exist, and into 1921-1928 wherein a new type of state was created and then through the years of collective security

104 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

prior to the Grand Alliance. Throughout the pages a base of knowledge and understanding into what makes today's Soviet foreign policy is gradually constructed. A very important facet of the U.S.S.R. foreign policy is developed in this work—a view of the international system as seen by the Soviet leaders. Two statements by Ulam illustrate this picture dramatically. Firstly, recognizing that the United States has been the main concern of Soviet foreign policy since 1945, he writes: "the main difficulty with American-Soviet relations has been that for the most part the policies of the two countries moved at different levels and reflected different understandings of the realities of international life." And, secondly, in discussing the Soviet view of negotiations, the author asserts: "[negotiations] are a means of assessing your opponent's intentions and strengths and, if necessary, of arriving at a bargain." Coupling these two statements, a thread, as well as a Soviet view, can be appreciated.

In the post-World War II era, all the paradoxes within the Soviet system inherent in expansion and coexistence are treated with remarkable insight by Ulam. One constant reality is the Soviet preoccupation with China in the Khrushchevian era and thereafter. There are sufficient data provided so that many

parallels can be developed from episodes in Soviet expansionist efforts since World War: that is, in Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, and the 6-day war as described by Ulam. In telling of the last, he opines: "For all its long-standing guile and newly acquired caution, Soviet foreign policy can, because of previous commitments and a well-nigh irresistible temptation, become involved in a very risky gamble." Thus, a further thread—pragmatism vice principles—comes to the fore. The author is not optimistic regarding the future; he writes: "if the history of the Soviet Union's first fifty years proved anything, it proved that Communism because it puts such an emphasis on political power, enhances rather than diminishes international tension." Professor Ulam, a renowned American authority on the Soviet Union, has contributed a most lucid, analytical work in the field of Soviet diplomatic history. At the same time, though the book is well structured and interesting throughout, it does require both prior historical background of the 20th century and tenacity on the part of the reader to complete the 700-odd pages! It is highly recommended for the student of Soviet affairs.

B.F. COYE
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy





BOARD OF ADVISORS TO THE PRESIDENT

Vice Admiral Bernard L. Austin, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Honorable Charles E. Bohlen
Career Ambassador
(Retired)

Mr. J. Carter Brown
Director
National Gallery of Art

Mr. Emilio G. Collado
Executive Vice President and Director
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey

Mr. William W. Foshay, Sr.
Partner
Sullivan and Cromwell

Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Vice President for Research and Development
General Dynamics Corporation

Dr. Thomas W. McKnew
Advisory Chairman of the Board
National Geographic Society

Mr. Stanley Powell, Jr.
President
Alexander and Baldwin, Inc.

Mr. Henry S. Rowen
President
Rand Corporation

Dr. Maurice F. Tauber
Melvil Dewey Professor of Library Service
Columbia University

Dr. Edward Teller
Associate Director
Lawrence Radiation Laboratory
University of California



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE STAFF AND FACULTY

President

Chief of Staff

Administrative Assistant

Flag Secretary

Public Affairs/Protocol Officer

Flag Lieutenant

Advisers to the President

State Department Adviser

U.S. Army Adviser

U.S. Air Force Adviser

U.S. Marine Corps Adviser

U.S. Coast Guard Adviser

Special Academic Adviser

Development Programs Officer

Vice Adm. R.G. Colbert, USN

Rear Adm. F.G. Bennett, USN

Ens. S. Bergren, USNR

LCdr. J.H. McCoy, USN

LCdr. A.R. DeMarco, USN

Lt.(jg.) P.W. Hanley, USNR

Ambassador R.H. Davis

Col. W.F. Long, Jr., USA

Col. G.F. Glick, USAF

Col. T.C. Dutton, USMC

Capt./Cdr. R.W. Durfay, USCG

Prof. F.H. Hartmann

Cdr. I.D. Crowley, Jr., CEC, USN

Chairs and Consultants

Alfred Thayer Mahan Chair of Maritime Strategy

Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History

Chester W. Nimitz Chair of Social and Political Philosophy

Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law

Chair of Physical Science

Stephen B. Luca Chair of Naval Science

Theodore Roosevelt Chair of Economics

James V. Forrestal Chair of Military Management

Comparative Cultures Chair

Milton E. Miles Chair of International Relations

CIA Consultant and Faculty Adviser

Military Chair of Air Strike Warfare

Prof. F.H. Hartmann

Prof. S.E. Ambrose

Prof. D.D. Warren

Prof. O.J. Lissitzyn

Prof. J.C. Allar

Prof. E.L. Beach

Prof. P.L. Gemble

Prof. T.H. Williams

Prof. J.M. Roberts

Prof. A.C. Miller, Jr.

Mr. C.O. Huntley

Capt. W. Wright, USN

Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans & Operations

Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations

Assistant for Plans & Operations

Plans Officer

Research Programs Officer

Coordinator of Research/Professor of Libraries

Research Assistant

Lecture Programs Officer

Intelligence Officer

Assistant Intelligence Officer

Assistant Intelligence Officer

Cept. C.D. Fonviella, Jr., USN

Capt. C.O. Fiske, USN

Cdr. J.A. Barber, Jr.

Col. N.M. Chapin, USA

Prof. E.R. Schwass

Lt.(jg.) E.G. Collado, III, USNR

Cdr. G.H. Winslow, USN

Capt. A.F. Newell, USN (Ret.)

LCdr. T.H. George, Jr., USN

LCdr./Lt. B.F. Coyle, USN

The George Washington University Naval War College Center

Director

Prof. C.B. Sargent

Prof. W.C. Hopkins

Prof. G. Stambuk

Prof. K. Wilk

Prof F.G. Eyck

Administration Department

Assistant Chief of Staff for Administration/
 Secretary, Naval War College
 Assistant to the Secretary
 Development Programs Officer
 Head, Administrative Division/Personnel Officer
 Security Officer
 Registered Publications Officer

Capt. R.S. Guy, USN
 Lt. M.K. McMunn, USN
 Cdr. I.D. Crowley, Jr., CEC, USN
 LCdr. E.L. Gregg, USN
 LCdr. J.B. Pleasants, USN
 Lt. B.F. Beil, USN

School of Naval Warfare

Director
 Assistant Director
 Plans Officer
 Air Force Adviser
 Army Adviser
 Research Programs Officer
 Assistant Research Programs Officer
 GSD/Reserve Training Officer
 Escort/Protocol Officer
 Head, National Strategy Study
 Assistant Head
 Study Coordinators

Capt. R.E. Williams, USN
 Col. D.L. Ward, USMC
 Capt. A.H. Cornell, SC, USN
 Col. H.J. Latimore, Jr., USAF
 Col. W.S. Hathaway, USA
 Capt. R.M. Tucker, USN

Head, Naval Warfare Study
 Assistant Head
 Study Coordinators

LCdr. B.J. Hill, USN
 Ens. J.R. Currell, USNR
 Capt. C.J. McGrath, USN
 Col. W.S. Hathaway, USA
 LCol. J.N. Laccetti, USAF
 Capt./Cdr. R.W. Durfey, USCG
 Cdr. D.E. Carson, SC, USN
 Cdr. J.F. Watson, USN
 Capt. W.H. Lowans, USN
 Capt. W. Abromitis, Jr., USN
 Cdr. H. Nemer, USN
 Cdr. G.L. Summers, USN
 Cdr. S.O. Armstrong, Jr., USN
 Cdr. W.G. Carter, USN
 Capt. M.D. Blixt, USN
 Col. J.W. Kirkland, USMC
 LCol. J.D. Stevens, USAF
 LCol. C.J. Cox, USA
 Cdr. R.W. O'Connor, SC, USN

Head, Military Strategy Study
 Assistant Head
 Study Coordinators

School of Naval Command and Staff

Director
 Assistant Director
 Plans Officer
 Curriculum Evaluation and Development Officer
 Research Programs Officer
 Resources Planning Officer
 Head, Academic Instruction
 Supervisor, International Relations
 Supervisor, International Law
 Supervisor, Management
 Supervisor, Marine Science
 Supervisor, Command Management
 Supervisor, Logistics
 Supervisor, Supply
 Supervisor, Military Planning
 Supervisor, Communications Planning
 Supervisor, Intelligence Planning
 Supervisor, Strike Warfare
 Supervisor, Air Antisubmarine Warfare
 Supervisor, Surface Antisubmarine Warfare
 Supervisor, Anti-air Warfare
 Supervisor, Submarine Warfare
 Supervisor, Mine Warfare
 Supervisor, Amphibious Warfare
 Supervisor, Inshore Warfare

Capt. W.B. Woodson, USN
 Capt. J.G. Boniface, USN
 Capt./Cdr. M.E. Smith, USN
 Cdr. H.C. Atwood, USN
 Cdr. E.L. Vernon, USN

Cdr. E.H. Steentofte, USN
 LCdr. D.D. Pizinger, USN
 Cdr. J.W. Grunenwald, USN
 LCdr. Q.S. Meeker, USN

Cdr. J.E. Gove, SC, USN
 LCdr. S.O. Hayward, USN
 Cdr./LCdr. R.E. Smith, USN
 LCdr. J.J. D'Amato, USN
 LCdr. J.W. Keathley, USN
 Cdr. R.J. O'Shaughnessy, USN
 Cdr. G.E. Pillow, Jr., USN
 Cdr. J.E. Wessel, USN
 Cdr. R.J. Hurley, USN
 Cdr./LCdr. H.B. Kuykendall, USN
 LCol. W.S. Pullar, Jr., USMC
 LCol. R.E. Jewett, USA

108 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

School of Naval Command and Staff (cont'd)

Army Adviser	Col. L.R. Rawls, Jr., USA
Air Force Adviser	LCol. R.F. Geiger, USAF
Marine Corps Adviser	LCol. D. Keller, USMC
Escort Officer	Ens. J. Sachs, USNR

Naval Command Course

Director	Capt. F.W. Ulbricht, USN
Assistant Director and Plans Officer	Capt. H.L. Terry, USN
Head, Team ALFA	Capt. C.M. Welker, USN
Members Team ALFA	Cdr. J.F. McNulty, USN
	LCol. F.H. Thurston, USMC
	Cdr. D.E. Hernandez, USN
Head, Team BRAVO	Cdr. R.B. Bridgham, USN
Members Team BRAVO	Cdr. J.E. Tarlton, USN
	Cdr. J.B. Hayes, USN
Miles Chair of International Relations	Prof. A.C. Miller, Jr.
Research Officer	Ens. C. Carlson, USNR
Operations Officer	LCdr. R.J. Hiebner, USN
Administrative Officer	LCdr. L.R. Jacobs, USN
Escort Officer	Ens. J.K. Manning, USNR

War Gaming Department

Director	Capt. C.H. Smith, USN
Assistant Director and Planning Officer	Capt. R.B. Jacobs, USN
Special Projects Officer	Cdr. R.A. Horan, USN
Head, Analysis and Computer Division	LCdr. J.M. Johnston, USN
Head, Model Development Branch	Ens. D.R. Bellenger, USNR
Head, Game Operation and Planning Division	Cdr. S.C. Wood, USN
Head, Team "A"	Cdr. A.G. Kelley, USN
Assistants Team "A"	Cdr. J.B. Dana, USN
	LCdr. R.J. Lamoureux, USN
	LCdr. J.M. Leeds, USN
	LCdr. R.J. Art, USN
	LCdr. F.J. Peters, Jr., USN
Head, Team "B"	Cdr. S.E. Harrison, USN
Assistants Team "B"	Cdr. B.J. White, USN
	Cdr. J.R. Stevens, USN
	Cdr. T.G. Kiefabar, USN
Head, Engineering and Maintenance Division	LCdr. F.W. Bailey, USN
Head, Maintenance Branch	Lt. B.J. Kear, USN

Correspondence School

Director	Col. T.C. Dutton, USMC
Head, International Affairs Division	Cdr./LCdr. E.E. Hanson, USN
Asst. for International Relations	Mr. F.J. Flynn
Asst. for International Relations/NISO	Mr. H.S. Noon
Asst. for Security Organizations	
Asst. for Counterinsurgency	Cdr./LCdr. R.J. Brennan, USN
Head, Strategy and Tactics Division	Cdr./LCdr. C.G. Felkins, USN
Asst. for Military Planning	LCdr. C.W. Cullen, USN
Asst. for Naval Operations	
Asst. for Command Logistics	LCdr. P.W. Ogle, USN
Asst. for Military Management	LCdr. A.R. Grogan, SC, USN
Head, International Law Division	Cdr. P.B. Walker, JAGC, USN
Head, Plans and Programs Division	Capt./Cdr. E.S. Harrison, USN

Naval War College Review

Editor	Col. T.C. Dutton, USMC
Managing Editor	Cdr. R.M. Laske, USN
Research Editor	Ens. D.G. White, USNR