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## Expansion and Coexistence

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bothering the macro-economist. It is the reviewer's opinion that Heller underestimates money but is right about the need for discretionary policy; Friedman is correct in saying that the belief in fiscal policy rests on a shaky base unless money is also taken into account.

P.L. GAMBLE

Theodore Roosevelt Chair of Economics

Morgenthau, Hans J. *A New Foreign Policy for the United States*. New York: Praeger, 1969. 252p.

Hans Morgenthau's newest book is a provocative appraisal of contemporary U.S. foreign policy. Organized in nine chapters, it first sets forth "the basic issues," looks next at the extreme swings of American policy from isolationism to globalism (with its anti-Communist tone), moves on to consider the "foreign policies of communism," then to the United States and the developing world, to Vietnam, to Europe, to China, to nuclear power, and ends with "seven principles" for American foreign policy. For its length it is an ambitious book, but since it is largely analysis and appraisal, rather than history, it does sufficient justice to Mr. Morgenthau's subjects. The author's general approach is well indicated on page 3: "If one should characterize American foreign policy in a sentence, one could say that it has lived during the last decade or so on the intellectual capital accumulated in the . . . spring of 1947 . . . and that this capital has now been nearly exhausted." Those familiar with Morgenthau's writings in general will find his treatment of "the foreign policy of communism" (chapter III) one of the most challenging expansions or additions to his previously published views. His presentation on the nuclear weapons question in chapter VIII will certainly arouse controversy, including his flat statement (page 242) that "nuclear weapons in the hands of both superpowers are not instruments of

national policy; they only provide assurance that national interests can be supported with the conventional diplomatic and military methods." (This is one of his "seven principles.") His argument that "the policy of [United States] peripheral military containment on the Asian mainland ought to be gradually liquidated" is especially well developed. All in all, the book is a solid and useful example of the "new criticism" which seeks to establish guidelines which avoid both the pitfalls of "globalism" and the absurdities of "Fortress America."

F.H. HARTMANN

Alfred Thayer Mahan Chair of  
Maritime Strategy

Ulam, Adam B. *Expansion and Coexistence*. New York: Praeger, 1968, 775p.

The subject of this work is Soviet foreign policy during the first 50 years of the Communist government, including its forces, personalities, styles, and structures. From Brest-Litovsk to the 6-day Arab-Israeli war, the author spans the many phases of Soviet diplomatic history. Definite threads of continuity are to be found in this monumental tracing of Moscow's foreign relations. For instance, in the 1918-1921 period, in which Soviet leaders were struggling for pure survival of their state and when Germany was their main concern, peaceful coexistence in its embryonic state might he said to have been practiced. Says Professor Ulam of this period: "Inherent in this Soviet diplomacy of despair was the clear assumption that there was no nonsense about the sanctity of treaties; once power relations were changed, Soviet Russia would claim her own." With exquisite detail, the author moves through the period of 1917-1921, when the Soviet Union was desperately trying to retain the right to exist, and into 1921-1928 wherein a new type of state was created and then through the years of collective security

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prior to the Grand Alliance. Throughout the pages a base of knowledge and understanding into what makes today's Soviet foreign policy is gradually constructed. A very important facet of the U.S.S.R. foreign policy is developed in this work—a view of the international system as seen by the Soviet leaders. Two statements by Ulam illustrate this picture dramatically. Firstly, recognizing that the United States has been the main concern of Soviet foreign policy since 1945, he writes: "the main difficulty with American-Soviet relations has been that for the most part the policies of the two countries moved at different levels and reflected different understandings of the realities of international life." And, secondly, in discussing the Soviet view of negotiations, the author asserts: "[negotiations] are a means of assessing your opponent's intentions and strengths and, if necessary, of arriving at a bargain." Coupling these two statements, a thread, as well as a Soviet view, can be appreciated.

In the post-World War II era, all the paradoxes within the Soviet system inherent in expansion and coexistence are treated with remarkable insight by Ulam. One constant reality is the Soviet preoccupation with China in the Khrushchevian era and thereafter. There are sufficient data provided so that many

parallels can be developed from episodes in Soviet expansionist efforts since World War: that is, in Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, and the 6-day war as described by Ulam. In telling of the last, he opines: "For all its long-standing guile and newly acquired caution, Soviet foreign policy can, because of previous commitments and a well-nigh irresistible temptation, become involved in a very risky gamble." Thus, a further thread—pragmatism vice principles—comes to the fore. The author is not optimistic regarding the future; he writes: "if the history of the Soviet Union's first fifty years proved anything, it proved that Communism because it puts such an emphasis on political power, enhances rather than diminishes international tension." Professor Ulam, a renowned American authority on the Soviet Union, has contributed a most lucid, analytical work in the field of Soviet diplomatic history. At the same time, though the book is well structured and interesting throughout, it does require both prior historical background of the 20th century and tenacity on the part of the reader to complete the 700-odd pages! It is highly recommended for the student of Soviet affairs.

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