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Donald D. Pizinger
U.S. Navy

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PRESENT SOVIET POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

A research paper prepared by
Lieutenant Commander Donald D. Pizinger, U.S. Navy
School of Naval Command and Staff

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to draw conclusions regarding the nature of present Soviet policy in Latin America provided primarily from a review of recent Soviet literature. The first part of this paper deals with general Soviet guidelines for social revolution in developing countries. This will be limited to a discussion of the Soviet view of transition to communism in developing countries as it forms a framework and theoretical basis for policy in Latin America. The second part deals with unique circumstances in Latin America and their effect on Soviet policy. The final section draws together doctrine and reality into conclusions regarding present policy.

Much of the literature surveyed, especially that in *International Affairs* (Moscow), was authored by Soviet professors and institutional representatives. It represents some differences of opinion, although agreement on basics is far more singular than would be ex-

pected in Western literature. This literature may or may not represent the view of Soviet decision makers and, therefore, should be used cautiously as a basis for determining policy. However, it is useful to recall that the state is, in effect, the only publisher in the Soviet Union and need not tolerate literature which is too far afield from official thinking.¹ In any event, the literature does furnish some notion of the intellectual atmosphere in which Soviet policy makers move.

I--DOCTRINE AS A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY

Noncapitalist Development. Beginning in the early 1960's, Western observers began to note important changes in Soviet doctrine toward the achievement of communism in developing countries.¹ This new theory of noncapitalist development grew out of several years' experience with the newly emerging countries of Asia and Africa and the underdeveloped countries of

Latin America. The new doctrine decreases the role of local Communist Parties and violent revolution, while retaining the ultimate goal and inevitability of communization. Prior to the early 1960's Soviet theorists thought that developing countries would go through a multistage revolutionary process in which the Communist Party would play an ever-increasing role in the leadership of the revolution, culminating in the final classic seizure of power by the Communists. The new formulas for the advent of socialism have "whittled down independent community activity to the point that the radical regimes and non-Communist mass parties are recognized as performing the revolutionary tasks hitherto reserved to the proletariat and its party."² Supposedly, after a period of economic development and increasing concentration of economic power in the state, the effective political class will automatically convert to communism without revolution.³

There are 3 cardinal traits of non-capitalist development. First, the leaders of the revolution (such as Nasser of Egypt, Ne Win of Burma, and Boumediene of Algeria) are revolutionary democrats and not leaders of the Communist Party. To be a revolutionary democrat one must profess to accept scientific socialism (Soviet socialism and not the Western brand of socialism) and be willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union.⁴ Second, the vanguard role is played by non-Communist, mass parties and not by the Communist Party and the proletariat. With the progression of time, "Marxist-Leninist parties will be gradually formed and strengthened."⁵ That is, the Communist Party will gradually be formed out of the non-Communist parties.

And finally, "being a transitory stage, noncapitalist development combines intermediate and mixed forms of economic relations" with private and state capital working together.⁶ The

eradication of capitalism is no longer seen as an abrupt and tumultuous process but as a gradual displacement. Western aid is not rejected. And to avoid serious economic harm, nationalization may be a gradual process. As one Soviet economist has observed,

In contrast to countries taking the capitalist way, these states (on the non-capitalist path to socialism) join foreign capital in setting up mixed companies in which local bodies hold the controlling interest. . . . The basic difference between the countries advancing along the two opposite ways of historical development is that the capitalist-way countries regard foreign capital as a natural and permanent factor, whereas the non-capitalist-way countries see it as an inevitable but temporary measure.⁷

In other words, the theory calls for economic development prior to communization, thus easing a financial burden that might otherwise be imposed on the Soviet Union (and which might be an impossible burden if several countries needed support) and avoiding the possible embarrassment of countries prematurely announcing communism and then reverting back to the Western camp because of lack of economic support. Ironically, according to Soviet theorists, Western money builds the Communist society.

The new doctrine is still in the developmental stage and is subject to modification. Or, as one Communist article states it, "the Marxist-Leninist theory of noncapitalist development is enriched" through the experience of implementation.⁸ "Advance" will be "neither easy nor automatic" and will require "considerable time."⁹ Mistakes are expected and have occurred in the past. For instance, temporary "regression of the revolution" occurred in Guatemala in 1954 and more recently in Ghana and Indonesia.¹⁰

What are the reasons for this modification in the traditional formula for transition to socialism? Analysts from

the Soviet Union relate it to complexity and diversity in the developing countries. Among the important variables from country to country are the degree of political consciousness of the masses, the degree of economic development, and quality of revolutionary leadership. This may be accompanied by general lack of development of a revolutionary proletariat and Communist Party. According to the Soviets, these complex and diverse factors call for the more flexible and realistic approach offered by noncapitalist development.¹¹

As a Western observation, E.K. Valkenier, in an article in *Orbis* suggests this shift is

... a diplomatic gamble to outmaneuver the Chinese in their bid for the leadership of the Afro-Asian world. Unable to claim any racial or close economic affinity with these countries, the Soviets have sought to find a common 'revolutionary' language. They now accept the validity of the 'socialist' reforms introduced by Nasser, Nkrumah, and Ne Win, no matter how much this approach might flout the traditional Marxist concepts of class and party, of revolution and socialism.¹²

Soviet articles lend support to this interpretation. Mao Tse-tung is accused of being "leftist, petty-bourgeois," in opposition to a more conservative Soviet policy. For example, foreign policy specialists Prokopyev and Zhukov decry the "recklessness" of "leftism" and "leftist, petty-bourgeois" theories of China which would "push" and "speed up" revolutions with the help of war and which act as a "splitting activity."¹³ Supposedly, these "leftist lines of Mao Tse-tung's group are causing great damage to the national liberation revolutions, thereby hindering the noncapitalist development of some countries and disorganizing the ranks of the revolutionary democrats [Soviet followers]."¹⁴ Or, as the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Chile recently

stated, "Petty-bourgeois revolutionaries [Chinese followers] tend at times to underrate the workers and the Communist parties, to gravitate towards nationalism, recklessness, terror and, at times, even anticommunism and anti-Sovietism."¹⁵

In another Western view, H.S. Dincerstein, who is an American specialist on Soviet military power, states the modified formula represents concern by Soviet leaders that nuclear war might grow out of small-scale confrontations. "Peaceful transition to socialism" would reduce the possibility of United States-U.S.S.R. confrontation. He also feels the communization of Cuba demonstrated to Communists that traditional methods of transition were not necessarily models for today inasmuch as Castro achieved power as a non-Communist and then became a Communist, absorbed the party, and carried the country with him.¹⁶ In sum, the present guidelines for transition to socialism in a developing country resulted from a combination of U.S.S.R. competition with China; secret concern for United States-U.S.S.R. nuclear war; lessons demonstrated by the Cuban revolution; and reality of the complexities connected with the developing countries as experienced in Egypt, Algeria, Indonesia, and elsewhere.

Guerrilla Support. While noncapitalist doctrine neither holds violent revolution as necessary in the transition to socialism nor encourages it, it should be observed that nothing in the doctrine denies "support" for guerrilla movements or wars of national liberation. In fact, a typical Moscow line regards "as just and supports wars in defence of the freedom and independence won by the peoples against imperialist aggression, wars for national and social liberation."¹⁷

In this connection, in January 1966 the leading Soviet delegate to the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America meeting

in Havana declared that the Soviet Union was ready to give "all-around assistance" to the "national liberation struggles," going so far as to pinpoint targets in Latin America by expressing his country's "fraternal solidarity with the armed struggle being waged by the Venezuelan, Peruvian, Colombian and Guatemalan patriots for freedom against the stooges of imperialism."¹⁸ As far as it is known, in the 2 years since the above statement, the Soviet Union has yet to give any significant material assistance. As a Western explanation, D. Tretiak regards this ambivalence in Soviet support of guerrilla movements as an "amelioration of ideological tensions" in a Soviet search for accommodation with Fidel Castro.¹⁹ Castro has long contended that revolutionary violence is necessary to bring about any meaningful political change in Latin America. He claims that when holdy led guerrilla units can take to the field and sustain themselves there, they will precipitate the conditions which will assure their eventual success. He has been openly critical, even scornful, of the traditional Communist doctrine that the urban proletariat (blue collar worker) should be the focus of revolution and contemptuous of the newer Soviet line that peaceful means to socialism are acceptable for Communists in many countries today.²⁰ At the time of the 1966 Solidarity Conference, Castro particularly criticized Latin American revolutionaries who wasted time in "theorizing" and urged preparation for "a most violent struggle." He said that "sooner or later, all or almost all" peoples of Latin America would have to take up arms to "liberate" themselves and called for a "joint spontaneous struggle."²¹

Dinerstein agrees that verbal support by the Soviet Union helped ease Soviet relations with Cuba and further suggests that, from the Soviet point of view, verbal encouragement to active guerrilla movements in Latin America

... is a way of preserving some influence over revolutionary situations... The Soviets probably feel confident that these guerrilla movements will not succeed in overthrowing governments and setting up communist states, for, if this were to happen, the Soviet Union would find it embarrassing not to help such new states and yet very dangerous to help them. Most likely, the Soviets assume that the United States would intervene before matters reached such a point, and that American intervention, in turn, would provide justification for the Soviet Union's general policy of supporting anti-Americanism in Latin America.²²

Briefly stated, the Soviet Union will provide verbal support for political expediency and convenience without particular concern for ideological considerations, or without actually intending to provide material support. The result is opportunism and flexibility within a framework of low risk—as appears to be the present situation in Latin America.

Conclusions. The doctrine of non-capitalist development supports a policy of using local forces—nationalist leaders, non-Communist groups, and Western capital—to perform the revolutionary tasks hitherto reserved to the proletariat and the Communist Party. Moreover, it asserts that properly controlled "imperialist" capital may be useful or even necessary, that armed revolution is not mandatory, that the transition to socialism may take a long time, and that there may be setbacks. In short, non-capitalist doctrine supports a policy which is inexpensive and low risk. And while it offers no guarantee of success, it does offer some promise, and it may be expensive and frustrating for the United States and the countries of Latin America to counter.

The next section discusses a number of somewhat unique aspects in Latin America which tend to compound policy problems for the Soviets and reinforce the wisdom, or perhaps neces-

sity, of following the present, inexpensive, and low-risk policy.

II-UNIQUE ASPECTS AFFECTING SOVIET POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

United States Dominance.

U.S. imperialism is . . . the main, direct external enemy of the peoples of all the Latin-American countries. For many of them it is the main enemy . . .¹

Enemy number one is U.S. imperialism . . .²

These statements leave no doubt that United States dominance in Latin America is a rallying point for Communist attack. Their attacks and frustrations are echoed in vociferous, verbal complaints regarding U.S. economic, political, and military influence.

Four facets of U.S. influence receive considerable space in Soviet writings on Latin America. They are the Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps, the non-existent Inter-American Armed Force, and U.S. "monopoly" investments. The first three may be all the more annoying because they seem to have been a United States response to the communization of Cuba and reinforce the veracity of President Johnson's 2 May 1965 statement that "the American nations cannot, must not and will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere."³

Alliance for Progress is criticized as anti-Communist and a "counter-revolution" against real reform (as it suppresses the national liberation movement). It is also criticized as being primarily beneficial to the ruling elite (it helps them stay in power), big land-owners (they can sell their "wastelands" under land reform), and U.S. monopolies (it preserves their status quo).⁴ Two Communists, one Soviet and one Latin American, see the program as having had a dangerous success in delusion.

Early in 1967 the Soviet writer commented:

In the five years of Alliance for Progress, U.S. ruling circles succeeded in slightly strengthening the positions of the national bourgeois groups (non-revolutionary, middle class) inclined to look to the United States in some Latin American countries, and in sowing dangerous illusions among small sections of workers, employees and peasants concerning the sincerity of U.S. intentions.⁵

The commentator from Latin America expanded on the problem of the "illusion" and its danger to communism:

We cannot 'repeal' the facts. In their daily life people take guidance from what they see, from the concrete circumstances, and we have no earthly reason to assume that all the social projects of the pseudo-reformists will be stillborn. Some have been partly realized, which has had its effect on the public sentiment, especially in view of the extreme poverty of the bulk of the people. Some measures (building houses and schools, sanitation, land amelioration, etc.) financed by Alliance for Progress funds, alleviate the lot of the few but they sow illusions among many. And charities sponsored by such U.S. 'aid' organizations as Care, Caritas, Food for Peace, and by some West-German agencies, add to these illusions.

Illusions about the benevolence of a government, Church, charity organization or 'generous' employer may become a peril of the first magnitude if they are nourished for decades by reforms and begin to act as an opiate.⁶

In short, these Communist writers see winning of the minds through peaceful reform as a real danger to the Communist movement.

The Peace Corps is seen as "a vanguard of U.S. imperialism whose task is to help disarm the national liberation movement in Latin America ideologically." Its "main task . . . is to advertise the American way of life, sell U.S. domestic and foreign policy, present an attractive picture of capitalist development and fight communism."⁷ No Soviet writer made a favorable comment

on this program--thus indicating it may be a U.S. success.

One of the favorite Communist topics is the Inter-American Armed Force, even though it does not exist (and in this writer's view is not likely to be implemented). Nonetheless, Communist writers see 4 dangers in its use. First, the establishment of a joint armed force presupposes a joint foreign policy and hemispheric cooperation.⁸ Second, it might be used "to unleash a 'holy war' against Cuha."⁹ Third, it could "crush the popular movements in Latin America . . . or any other country where a situation may arise imperiling U.S. imperialist interests."¹⁰ And fourth, "it has been estimated that this would allow" the United States "to put at least 20 million Latin Americans" under arms and create a "reserve for its military gambles outside the Western Hemisphere."¹¹

Some of the discussions leave the impression that the authors have written ominous propaganda about something nonexistent in order to receive credit for it not being put into effect. On the other hand, other writers are genuinely critical from their viewpoint of existing inter-American military and police aid (about \$90 million from the United States, in fiscal year 1967) as it forms a base for anticommunism and U.S. influence.¹² They are therefore critical of any military program which might extend this influence.

In reviewing U.S. economic domination, Gvozdev and Leonidov consider U.S. investment amounts to \$15 billion (75 percent of all foreign investments in Latin America) and controls 25 percent of all industrial production and half of Latin America's exports. It is this extensive U.S. economic domination which combines with "military-political projects" such as Peace Corps and Alliance for Progress to form the "aggressive U.S. policy in Latin America."¹³

Many Westerners would agree that the dominant presence of the United

States, coupled with an anti-Americanism inherent in Latin American nationalism, creates problems for U.S. policy and exploitative possibilities for Soviet policy. For example, in 1958 Louis Halle, in discussing American aid to Latin America, stated:

Though the intention has been to provide a kind of economic development that will make the Latin American republics more independent, more able to stand on their own feet, it has seemed to me that these aid programs might be having the opposite effect, that they have in fact been promoting a habit among the Latin Americans to look to the United States for the solution of their problems, and to hold the United States, rather than themselves, responsible. If a Latin American country is in bad shape, its citizens and its officials are likely to ask, today, what the United States is going to do about it.¹⁴

More recently, *Newsweek*, in reporting increasing anti-Americanism in Brazil, contained a quote from Washington, "We are not unduly concerned, said one Administration official last week. "There is a great sense of frustration in Brazil, and the U.S. as the big hoy of the bemisphere is the traditional target of that frustration. Things are merely haek to normal."¹⁵

This "normal" situation provides fodder for Soviet propaganda. A general impression of Soviet literature is that all Latin American ills can be blamed on U.S. imperialism, and substantial space is devoted to propagandizing it. This Soviet task is made easier by the lack of their own presence and influence, as well as geographic separation.

The Assistant Director for Latin America of the U.S. Information Agency, Kermit Brown, has testified:

The Communist propaganda effort in Latin America has traditionally availed itself of targets of opportunity and its success or failure has depended in large part on the prevailing winds of official and public opinion. Although there has been no recent dramatic increase in the amount of Communist propaganda or

influence in the area, there is evidence that the Soviet Union, in addition to lending support to terrorist activities, has simultaneously embarked on a subtle, 'soft sell' propaganda program whenever and wherever they are permitted to operate . . . Soviet Communist propaganda strategy for Latin America is directed toward the destruction of U.S. power and influence in the area and ultimately the imposition of Marxist-Leninist regimes throughout the hemisphere. In its present tactical stage, the Soviets' aim is to support programs strongly nationalistic in economic matters and independent in foreign policy.¹⁶

Briefly stated, Soviet policy recognizes weaknesses inherent in U.S. domination and uses these as rallying points for its own political purposes. One of its primary political tools is propaganda. The Soviet Union believes that Cuban communism has inspired the United States to adopt a strong anti-Communist policy in an effort to preclude another Cuba-type revolution in Latin America. Therefore, they are encouraging and utilizing inherent anti-Americanism to counter U.S. dominance.

Latin American Economic Development. Latin America has economic characteristics of both the developed and underdeveloped world. This is partly because "most of the countries of Latin America won state independence a century and a half ago, when capitalism was still a necessary stage of social and economic development for the colonial people."¹⁷ In consequence, the countries of Latin America, when compared to new Asian and African nations, are already further along the capitalist path to development.¹⁸

Further, within the economic setting of Latin America there is a fairly large "worker class" not interested in communism as a method of reform. According to one author, the blue collar "working class" together with clerical workers constitute more than 50 percent of the gainfully employed population.¹⁹ The lack of interest in commu-

nism by the Latin American working class movement in general and the trade unions in particular is explained by

... the fact that the Latin-American working class is better off than the downtrodden rural masses. Because of this many who recently left the countryside to find steady employment in the towns feel that they have radically improved their social and economic status, effecting what might be called their own 'private revolution.'

In other words, a peasant can improve his status by moving to town, and "the rapid influx of new contingents of workers in 1940-55" has produced a large group who can remember when they were much worse off.²⁰

The result of these factors is that a number of countries are already well along the capitalist path to development and lack mass parties interested in following the Soviet scheme of noncapitalist development. When tied with social and political factors, discussed later in this paper, it is easy to see why Soviet strategy adopts a "united front" policy which seeks to join together reformers, both Communist and non-Communist, in a "creeping revolution" formula. Included in this formula are increased diplomatic, cultural, and trade exchanges between the Soviet Union and the countries of Latin America.

Thus far, the Soviet Union has had little economic exchange with Latin America, although new trade agreements have recently been concluded with Brazil, Chile, and Colombia.²¹ Previously, very small amounts of trade have existed with Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico.²² The total 1966 Soviet trade exchange with non-Communist Latin America was about one quarter of that with Cuba.²³ In general, the countries of Latin America have been reluctant to trade with the Soviet Union because of the Soviet Union's preference for barter. Also, a country may find its supply of convertible currency adversely affected because it has less coffee, sugar, meat, or mineral output

available for sale in the West.²⁴ Nevertheless, the Soviet emphasis is on increased trade, not only in Latin America, but all over the world.²⁵

Thus it is that economically, Latin America poses handicaps to successful Soviet domination. The countries are Western oriented and considerably more advanced than those of Africa and Asia. Additionally, the fairly substantial worker and trade union movement is not interested in revolutionary economic reform, including communism. Trade and aid, which are major instruments of Soviet foreign policy in some developing countries, have thus far had limited application for the countries of Latin America, although there is now increasing Soviet emphasis on trade.

Latin American Social and Political Development. There are numerous social and political factors of interest in Latin America; however, only those which have major implication for Soviet policy will be discussed. These are nationalism, and the groups which play a major role in it, and diplomatic and cultural relations between the Soviet Union and the countries of Latin America.

Nationalism, as a force for modernization, would exist in Latin America with or without a Communist menace. Anti-Americanism, itself, has long been one of the chief ingredients of nationalism in Latin America and existed prior to the development of communism in Russia.²⁶ What is significant is that Soviet policy seeks to intensify nationalism and anti-Americanism. J. Gregory Oswald has stated,

Soviet scholars, outspoken proponents of the Communist cause, carefully study this mysterious force (nationalism), determined to employ it against reformist moderate forces seeking the middle way for their nations.²⁷

As previously alluded, this intensification is shown in "the Soviets' aim . . . to support programs strongly nationalistic

in economic matters and independent in foreign policy."²⁸

Achievement of Soviet aims, however, is handicapped by local intolerance for communism, especially Castro communism, among all groups except intellectuals, playing a major role in development of nationalism. Discussing this, Whitaker and Jordan list 4 major groups who play the predominant role in this development of nationalism--the armed forces, the middle class, the intellectuals, and organized labor. The armed forces and middle class are probably the most important. In some countries the bureaucracy, the Church, and the political parties may be added as separate entities, although in most cases they operate through one or another of the 4 major groups.

In discussing each of the groups, Whitaker and Jordan conclude that the armed forces, meaning its officer corps, and the middle class, while fragmented on the issues of nationalism, are similar in that

. . . there are extremes that no substantial part of either of these two groups is likely to tolerate. The populist type is almost certainly such an extreme, especially if it has a Castro-Communist flavor.

The intellectuals, including the university students, present a picture of utter confusion. Most of them are nationalists but their types of nationalism vary with their political affiliations, and those are widely assorted. According to a recent study, they provide 'a significant percentage of the new members drawn into the Communist party' and provide most of its top leadership. Many more of them are anti-Communist Marxists or left-wing democrats, and a respectable number are middle-of-the-road liberals or out-and-out conservatives. . . . A new type of intellectual leader, the economist-in-politics, is appearing as modernization progresses.

The technocracy of Mexico is nationalism of this "new type."

Discussing organized labor, Whitaker and Jordan conclude its

... political power ... is still curbed in one way or another by strong forces hostile to that kind (populistic) of nationalism. Moreover, the labor leaders themselves are restrained by the risk that populistic nationalism may end in Castro-type regimes. They are well aware that Castro destroyed not only the existing armed forces of Cuba but also the existing labor organization and the freedom of labor.²⁹

Whitaker and Jordan have been quoted because of the similarity of their conclusions to those of some Soviet writers. In discussing the military, A. Shulgovsky states:

Of late, nationalist trends have become clearly evident in Latin American military circles. . . . In the armies of Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and some other countries, nationalism is identified with the national dignity of the country, the independence of its foreign policy and its equality within the framework of the 'Western world.' Nationalists of that trend do not object to military co-operation with the U.S.A., but want to preserve national control over the armed forces, do not want them to become a pawn in the Pentagon's global strategy.

In Colombia, Peru, and other countries, "there are military groups who associate the idea of nationalism with the demand for the implementation of far-reaching social reforms." However,

It should also be remembered that the military holding views closely approaching those of the radical, revolutionary forces-and there are such-generally leave the army (or to be more exact, are pushed out of it) . . . The view that the army has to play a decisive role in the revolutionary processes unfolding in the countries south of the Rio Grande is therefore completely erroneous. . . . Moreover, the history of the Latin American countries offers many instances of the armed forces becoming the grave-diggers of the liberation movement.³⁰

Guatemala in 1954 and Bolivia in 1964 are given as examples of the latter.

Moscow-printed *Soviet Foreign Policy*, in discussing the Soviet view of

the interests of middle class and organized labor, states that

... the working-class struggle in Latin America is impaired by conciliators and opportunist elements, who are particularly numerous in the trade union organizations. They hold posts of prominence in the trade unions of many Latin American countries and are inclined to strike deals with the big local and foreign bourgeoisie (middle class capitalist), injecting division into the labor movement. . . . The national bourgeoisie (middle class, such as small merchants and industrialists whose interests are primarily nationalistic), which dreads the growing struggle for liberation and the social demands of the people, is hesitant and uncertain in carrying through measures designed to win economic and full political independence.

Nationalistic middle class seek the middle way instead of extremes.

The bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeois (middle class, salaried workers) political parties, alignments and groups, joined in some countries by trade union leaders, follow a line of conciliation.³¹

In other words, organized labor and the middle class are not revolutionary spirited. Indeed, there is no one large group interested enough by itself to enact the Communist strategy. Hence, the "united front" policy becomes almost a necessity.

Establishment of diplomatic, cultural, and commercial ties is a useful adjunct to the "united front" policy as a communications link to radical and subversive reformers and as a base for general propaganda and influence. In any event, *Soviet Foreign Policy* states,

The Soviet Union is doing its utmost to invigorate relations with the Latin American countries. . . . Soviet relations with the Latin American countries. . . . have made progress despite the barriers artificially raised by internal reaction and the US imperialists. . . . And even though the US imperialists stop at nothing-not even at overthrowing lawful governments-to prevent Latin American countries from

pursuing an independent policy, events will nevertheless take their own course.³²

Historical inevitability will triumph!

The Soviet Union maintains diplomatic relations with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay in the south; with Mexico in the north; and, as of January 1968, with Colombia, a bridge linking the north and south.³³ Uruguay is the principal distribution point for Communist propaganda, although there is a considerable amount in all the countries with Russian Embassies.³⁴

Binational cultural centers are established in a number of provincial cities in Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay. These centers and such things as cultural exchanges, trade fairs, and educational services serve as a point of entry into political and business circles. However, their affect on attitude has not been significant. A U.S. Information Agency research survey shows that:

A large majority of the Latin American people continue to maintain strongly negative attitudes toward communism as a system of government which they tend to equate with totalitarianism, toward the Soviet Union and Red China as nations, and toward Castro and the Cuban experience. At the same time, these studies and surveys show a continuing reservoir of good will toward the United States, despite manifestations of misunderstanding, deep-seated criticisms and resentment of certain of our policies and actions.³⁵

This would seem to indicate that Soviet expansion of diplomatic, cultural, and commercial exchange has had little short term impact.

In summary, Soviet policy encourages radical nationalism through a combination of propaganda and "united front" cooperation of radical reformers and established Communist Parties. Its aim is to intensify anti-Americanism and internal discontent. However, success is partly negated by the anti-Communist nature of most nationalist groups. Direct Soviet contact is being increased by

an expansion of diplomatic, cultural, and commercial exchange.

Communist Party Organization in Latin America. Communist Parties exist in all the countries of Latin America, with widely varying strength and status. In some countries, such as Chile and Uruguay, the Communist Party is legal and well established. In others, such as Nicaragua and Paraguay, it is illegal, and its activities are necessarily limited to clandestine operations.³⁶

All Communist Parties have been represented in recent international conferences, such as the January 1966 Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America held in Havana; the March and April 1966 meeting of the 23d Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow; and the Organization of Latin American Solidarity in Havana in July and August 1967.³⁷ The organizational meetings in Havana are of particular note in that they underscore an attempt for unity and the establishment of a permanent Latin American Solidarity Organization in Havana. However, even though the steering group for the Solidarity Organization was established in early 1966, it has yet to make much impact on the organization.³⁸ Nonetheless, the organization is a potential base for unified propaganda, material, and training support.

Numerous writings by Latin American Communists stress the need for party unity and condemn factionalism. A recent statement of the Communist Parties of the 7 Central American countries announces, "Each party has the right to pursue its own line in accordance with concrete conditions prevailing in the country."³⁹ Basically, this is aimed at curbing indiscriminate Cuban encouragement of revolution which, as it now exists, causes quandary in the local parties. In some local situations Cuban propaganda-Radio Havana is a major propaganda instru-

ment--encourages young rebels and revolutionaries into premature action which is embarrassing to the local party. The local parties do not want to lose the support of young militants or bear the onus of being against those who are fighting with weapons in their hands, while at the same time they do not want to support operations which are bound to fail or may provide the local government with an excuse to crack down on the Communist Party.⁴⁰ In summary, the orthodox Communist Parties strongly support the communization of Cuba but are opposed to Cuba's militant stand with the resultant in-country complications for them.

This situation presents several policy problems to the Soviet Union. In order to maintain influence over Latin American Parties, Cuba included, it must be responsive to their needs. It is doing this by supporting the need for unity and by offering a limited form of moral support to guerrilla groups that is acceptable to the local parties and partially acceptable to Cuba. It is by no means an ideal situation for Moscow; however, it does have the virtue of avoiding seriously embarrassing complications for the Soviet Union. This appears to be a realistic middle-of-the-road approach until such time as there is greater likelihood for successful Communist takeovers. As a policy that encourages local parties to give conditional support to nationalist reformist movements, it is consistent with the theory of noncapitalist development.

A future problem for Soviet policy may be that of having to choose between support of local Communists or nonsupport in sacrifice for its own political gains. As Soviet diplomatic and commercial ties increase, they may well be faced with a decision similar to that in Egypt, when Egypt declared the Communist Party illegal. When the political inroad was important enough, the Soviets have not hesitated to make political compromises, including accep-

tance of destruction of the local Communist Party. This situation has not yet arisen in Latin America, but it may arise as the Soviet Union seeks to gain acceptance by local governments. In brief, a nonmilitant policy is probably necessary to consummate political ties between the Soviet Union and the countries of Latin America, and it may require de-emphasis of established parties.

Cuba. The surprise communization of Cuba in the early 1960's raised the expectations for communism's spread to other countries of Latin America. However, after the missile crisis of 1962, Latin American Communist Parties became less responsive to Cuba's call for revolution--a decline which has continued to this day. The main irritants in Soviet-Cuban relations since 1961 have been the debate over the correct means for Communist Parties to take power and the direction of Cuba's economic development. Both countries eventually yielded to accommodation.

In connection with Cuba's economic development, Castro acceded late in 1965 to Moscow's insistence that Cuba concentrate on increased agricultural output instead of industrialization. In turn, Moscow provided some degree of support for Castro's revolutionary goals.⁴¹ This consisted of vocal support for armed struggle during the African, Asian, Latin American solidarity conference in Havana early in 1966. Also, prestige for Cuba was derived from the establishment of the Organization for Latin American Solidarity in Havana and associated continental meetings. Complete accommodation has yet to be achieved, although the present tendency is for all groups--Cuba, the Soviet Union, and local Communist Parties--to compromise. Nonetheless, Castro still appears to be a compulsive revolutionist and, to some degree, unpredictable.

R.A. Stevenson, who is coordinator of Cuban affairs in the U.S. Department of State, views the principal contribu-

tions of Cuba to trouble in Latin America as threefold--training, propaganda, and material support, in order of importance. In the same report, Brigadier General Brown of the Defense Intelligence Agency, reports the training and indoctrination of "several thousand Latin Americans" in Cuba and of at least 4 proven instances of direct Cuban support to insurgent groups. In propaganda, Radio Havana is the primary source of Cuban propaganda with an average at the end of 1966 of 163 hours per week to Latin America.⁴² However, listener response is reported as "poor" due to difficulty in reception and "dull programs." Mr. Stevenson concludes, "In my personal opinion he [Castro] is still a threat. [However] I think that each year he is a failure and doesn't achieve all the things that he talks about, that his influence and his image are tarnished."⁴³ Recent emphasis in increasing unilateral ties between the Soviet Union and countries in Latin America is another indicator of Cuban decline. Additionally, the Organization of American States has taken an increasingly hostile view of Cuba and communism in Latin America, further decreasing Cuban prestige and effectiveness.⁴⁴

In summary, although the major irritants to Soviet-Cuban relations have yielded to accommodation, Castro is still a combination of bitter and sweet--an independent dependent. Cuba symbolizes Communist success in the American backyard. However, so long as Cuba remains defiant of both the Soviet Union and the established parties in Latin America, its usefulness as a staging area is downgraded.

III--CONCLUSIONS

Traditionally, Soviet policy in Latin America has been one of limited involvement. Until recently it sought to work through the local Communist Parties in the achievement of its goal, using

the Russian revolution as a pattern for takeover. However, 2 major considerations have led to a shift in policy. First, the Soviet experience with the developing countries, primarily in Asia and Africa, has led to a deemphasis of and less reliance on local Communist Parties, trade unions, and violent revolutions. Second, although established as a base for communism in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba has also created major economic problems for the Soviets and a challenge by Castro for leadership of the Communist movement in Latin America.

The subsequent policy has been one in which the Soviets seek more direct governmental contacts with the respective countries. By expanding their diplomatic, commercial, and cultural exchange ties with the countries of Latin America, the Soviets develop a closer association with elements that are both desirable and exploitable for Soviet encouragement of radical nationalism and anti-"U.S. imperialism." In seeking this association the Soviets have opted for the "united front"--a broad alliance between non-Communist reformist groups, the local Communist Party, and guerrilla groups. The "front" would promote radical nationalism and condemn U.S. influence.

This Soviet strategy has the appearance of being both realistic and opportunistic. It is comparatively inexpensive and limits the likelihood of prematurely establishing states that might require large amounts of aid, such as Cuba. At the same time it offers the possibility of undermining existing authority and U.S. influence. While this policy may not guarantee success, it is practical in terms of the present political climate in Latin America and keeps Soviet economic and military expenditures in this area within their ability to support. Also, this strategy has the side effect of reducing the Castro influence in local Communist Parties and revolutionary groups.

Although there is no assurance that increased nationalism will necessarily lead to increased Soviet influence and penetration, the United States should not ignore this threat. Neither should it blindly resist nationalistic movements, for to do so would certainly be counter-productive. Fundamentally, U.S. policy for the next several decades should avoid an excessive U.S. presence or exposure, yet encourage and provide economic assistance for constructive regional and functional programs such as Latin American Common Market, regional fisheries, multinational transportation systems, land resource development et cetera. Success in these areas would sap energy from radical nationalism, thereby reducing the threat from a major Soviet tool for promotion of communism in Latin America.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Lt. Comdr. Donald D. Pizinger, U.S. Navy, did his undergraduate work at the University of Kansas, holds an M.S. in Oceanography from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and an M.S. in International Affairs from The George Washington University. He has held various billets in destroyers, and his last operational assignment was Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. *Moc-tobi* (ATF 105).

Lieutenant Commander Pizinger is currently assigned to the faculty of the School of Naval Command and Staff at the Naval War College.

FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Robert Conquest, ed., *The Politics of Ideas in the USSR* (London: Bodley Head, 1967), p. 82.

I--DOCTRINE AS A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY

1. Elizabeth K. Valkenier, "Changing Soviet Perspectives on the Liberation Revolution," *Orbis*, Winter 1966, p. 953, and Herbert S. Dinerstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Latin America*, RM-4967-PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, May 1966), p. 43-44.

2. Valkenier, p. 953.

3. Dinerstein, p. vii.

4. G. Kim and A. Kaufman, "Non-Capitalist Development: Achievements and Difficulties," *International Affairs* (Moscow), December 1967, p. 72-74. Also see O.E. Tuganova, "The Foreign Policy of the Developing Countries," *International Affairs* (Moscow), May 1967, p. 62-63. Leaders on the capitalist path to development, such as most in Latin America, would be called bourgeois-democratic.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 73-74.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

7. R.N. Andreasyan, "Developing Countries and Foreign Capital," *International Affairs* (Moscow), May 1967, p. 72.

8. Kim and Kaufman, p. 73.

9. Y.M. Zhukov, "Contemporary Pace of Development of National-Liberation Revolutions," *International Affairs* (Moscow), May 1967, p. 53.

10. V.L. Tyagunenکو, "Capitalist and Non-Capitalist Development," *International Affairs* (Moscow), May 1967, p. 57-58. Professors Zhukov, Kim, and Tyagunenکو have written extensively on political development in developing countries. Professor Zhukov is an Academician and Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences. Professor Kim is a Doctor of History and Manager of the Department of Korea, the Mongolian Peoples of Asia, and Viet Nam at the Institute of the Peoples of Asia of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. Professor Tyagunenکو is a Doctor of History and Head of the Section of Underdeveloped Countries at the Institute of World Economy.

11. Valkenier, p. 966.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 953.
13. N. Prokopyev, "Problems of War and Peace in Our Age," *International Affairs* (Moscow), December 1967, p. 61-62. Also see Zhukov, p. 54.
14. Kim and Kaufman, p. 72.
15. Luis Corvalan, "Alliance of Anti-Imperialist Forces in Latin America," *World Marxist Review*, July 1967, p. 48.
16. Dinerstein, p. v-vi.
17. V. Israelyan, "The October Revolution and Foreign Policy," *International Affairs* (Moscow), September 1967, p. 9.
18. Quoted in "The Havana Three Continents Conference," *Communist Affairs*, January-February 1966, p. 12. The Organization of American States in extraordinary session denounced the Conference as a violation of the United Nations Declaration of Non-Intervention.
19. Daniel Tretiak, "Cuba and the Soviet Union: the Growing Accommodation, 1964-1965," *Orbis*, Summer 1967, p. 443.
20. Robert A. Stevenson, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, witness report in U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Communist Activities in Latin America, 1967*, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1967), p. 35.
21. "The Havana Three Continents Conference," p. 12.
22. Dinerstein, p. viii-ix.

II-UNIQUE ASPECTS AFFECTING SOVIET POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

1. Roque Dalton and Victor Miranda, "Present Phase of the Revolutionary Movement in Latin America," *World Marxist Review*, May 1967, p. 49.
2. Alvaro Delgado, "Latin American Reformism Today," *World Marxist Review*, July 1967, p. 72.
3. L. Kamynin, "Inter-American Force--a Weapon of Neo-Colonialism," *International Affairs* (Moscow), May 1967, p. 27.
4. G. Loveiko, "Vicious Circle of the Alliance for Progress," *International Affairs* (Moscow), November 1966, p. 32-37. R. Leonidov, "Aggressive U.S. Policy in Latin America," *International Affairs* (Moscow), February 1967, p. 54-59.
5. Leonidov, p. 55.
6. Delgado, p. 72-73, offered the following policy to counter the threat of reform:

However, in the event of the revolutionary forces following a correct policy, government promises and a reform here and there can be used to accelerate the revolution. This can be done by rallying the masses to demand that promises be honored immediately, by taking advantage of the instability that follows any more or less substantial reform, and by constantly stepping up the demands of the public, the more backward sections of which have believed that the loudly advertised reforms would bring about a radical improvement.

7. Y. Godunsky and V. Selivanov, "'Apostles of Peace' in Latin America," *International Affairs* (Moscow), April 1967, p. 24-28.
8. Kamynin, p. 30.
9. Dalton and Miranda, p. 46.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 46-47.
11. Kamynin, p. 30.
12. Robert M. Sayre, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, testified in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, p. 81, and reported,

Our overall military assistance in equipment and services to all of Latin America is limited . . . to \$85 million (in fiscal year 1967) with most of the program going for internal security and civic action activities. Our Public Safety program for assisting the police establishments of Latin America totals about \$5.3 million this fiscal year (1967).

13. Y. Gvozdev, "Latin America: Wall Street's New Tactics," *New Times*, 6 September 1967, p. 18. Leonidov, p. 55.
14. Louis Halle, *Dream and Reality* (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 173-174.
15. "Brazil: Something Wild," *Newsweek*, 15 January 1968, p. 43.
16. Kermit Brown, Assistant Director (Latin America), U.S. Information Agency, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, p. 55-57.

17. Tyagunenko, p. 56.
18. According to Dalton and Miranda (p. 49 and 52), "Latin America is approaching the average level of capitalist development. . . . National income per capita is roughly \$440, which is relatively close to the average world index," and "two or three times higher than in other parts of the 'third world.'" There are also significant economic contrasts from country to country and from urban to rural within each country. "Argentina with its average per capita income of \$780 annually," contrasts with "Brazil and Bolivia where the corresponding figure is \$390 and \$140." However, even sharper internal contrasts may exist between urban workers and rural peasants or Indians.
19. Dalton and Miranda, p. 52.
20. "The Latin American Working Class--Its Strength and Weakness," *New Times*, 23 August 1967, p. 2.
21. A. Mazin, "Trade Brings Peoples Closer Together," *Pravda*, 15 December 1967, p. 4, condensed text in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 3 January 1968, p. 15. According to Milton Kovner, "Soviet Aid and Trade," *Current History*, October 1967, p. 220, the trade agreements with Brazil and Chile call for Soviet delivery of machinery and equipment on credit and Soviet acceptance of 25 percent and 30 percent, respectively, of the repayments in manufactured and semi-processed goods with the remainder of payment in commodities.
22. Marshall I. Goldman, *Soviet Foreign Aid* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 157-195.
23. Mazin, p. 4. Sol M. Linowitz, U.S. Representative to the Council of the Organization of American States, reported in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, p. 81-89, that Cuban trade (export and import) totaled \$1,580 million in 1966. About 77 percent was with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, including about \$370 million in Soviet aid in the form of long-term credits and sugar price subsidies. The remaining 23 percent was with free world countries.
24. Goldman, p. 157-158.
25. "Twenty-third Party Congress Emphasizes Importance of Foreign Trade," *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya* (Foreign Trade), Moscow, May 1966, p. 3-5, translated text published in U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Joint Publications Research Service, *USSR International Economic Relations*, no. 63, (Washington: 1966), p. 2-4.
26. Arthur P. Whitaker and David C. Jordan, *Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America* (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 10.
27. Oswald, p. 4.
28. Brown, p. 57.
29. Whitaker and Jordan, p. 10.
30. A. Shulgovsky, "Arms and Politics in Latin America," *International Affairs* (Moscow), May 1967, p. 33-34.
31. V. Israelyan, ed., *Soviet Foreign Policy* (Moscow: Progress, 1967), p. 174-175.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 190. Quote is from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Report to the 22d Congress of the CPSU.
33. Brown, p. 57, and M. Kremnev, "Soviet-Colombian Relations," *New Times*, 31 January 1968, p. 15.
34. Brown, p. 71.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 61-62. Mr. Brown did not define any of the policies or actions causing criticism and resentment and none of the Congressmen questioned what they might be!
36. Sayre, p. 78. According to Sayre, party membership is largest in Chile and Argentina. The Argentine membership has been estimated at close to 60,000, and the Chilean party has approximately 30,000. In comparison, the Cubans claim a membership of about 60,000. Although technically legal, the Argentine party has not been allowed to participate in recent elections. According to Corvalan (p. 49-50), the influential Chilean party polled 354,000 votes in the April 1967 elections for about 15 percent of the vote. As a coalition, total Communist-Socialist vote was about 30 percent.
37. "The Havana Three Continents Conference," *Communist Affairs*, January-February 1966, p. 17; "The 23d Congress of the CPSU," *Communist Affairs*, March-April 1966, p. 22; "At the OIAS Conference," *Pravda*, 6 August 1967, p. 5, translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 23 August 1967, p. 20.
38. Sayre, p. 80.
39. "For Militant Unity--Statement of Communist Parties of Seven Latin American Countries," *Pravda*, 19 June 1967, p. 5, translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 12 July 1967, p. 22.
40. Dinerstein, p. 31-33.
41. D. Tretiak, "Cuba and the Soviet Union: the Growing Accommodation, 1964-1965," *Orbis*, Summer 1967, p. 4-10.

42. Burton R. Brown, Deputy Assistant Director for Intelligence Production, Defense Intelligence Agency, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, p. 22, 57. Shortwave transmission to Latin America from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Communist China was reported to total 312 hours a week at the end of 1966.

43. Stevenson, p. 36.

44. A historical listing of OAS action is provided by Sol M. Linowitz, U.S. Representative to the Council of the Organization of American States, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, p. 81-89.



It is your attitude, and the suspicion that you are maturing the boldest designs against him, that imposes on your enemy.

*Frederick The Great: Instructions
for His Generals, ix, 1747*