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# **COLD WAR OPERATIONS: THE POLITICS OF COMMUNIST CONFRONTATION**

**Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick**

## **Part III — The Sino-Soviet Split**

(A series of eight lectures by Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick of the Political Science Department, Brown University, given at the United States Naval War College during the 1966-67 term as a part of the Electives Program. These lectures are selected from those in a course entitled *Cold War Operations* which Professor Kirkpatrick presents at Brown. This is the third lecture, and the others will be published in the next five issues.)

One of the important controversies in the world today, and one which underlines the thesis that there is just as intensive a cold war going on within the so-called Communist bloc as there is between the Communists and ourselves, is the Sino-Soviet split.

There are still those who question whether this is a serious disagreement or whether it is camouflage to lull us into a state of euphoria. There are also those who say, "Should we really worry about China? It probably will not stay Communist and maybe this problem will disappear with time." The United States reacted similarly after the Bolsheviks took over Russia. We waited 17 years before we recognized their Communist system of government.

It is only realistic to acknowledge that it is possible that the Chinese and the Soviets could solve their differences just as it was possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to be aligned in World War II. However, it is much more likely that the Chinese and the Russians may fight at some point in the future rather than be aligned. The issues between them are serious — perhaps more serious from a nationalistic point of view than from ideological differences over communism.

Trouble between China and Russia started at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the early stages of the proceedings a message from Mao was read to the assembled parties of the world praising the leadership of Josef Stalin, then deceased some 3 years, for his years of service as the spokesman of the Communist world. Mikoyan started off the fireworks by a fairly severe criticism of Stalin. Then Khrushchev, in a 6½ hour speech, exposed the evils of Stalin. The Chinese were furious over their loss of face for it was obvious to all

that they had not been advised of the Russian position in advance.

This may well have been Khrushchev on his own. Here was a politician who operated often on political whims and instincts without taking his colleagues into his confidence. This particular trait was part of the reason for his downfall in 1964. It is possible, and even probable, that Khrushchev did consult with some of his colleagues before denouncing Stalin. But it is most unlikely that he followed normal Party procedures of clearing it with the Presidium and then the Central Committee. We know that the Sino-Soviet split was one of the reasons for Khrushchev's removal in 1964, and precipitation of this in 1956 probably was very important in this regard.

It is interesting to note that in that same year, 1956, the Chinese took what would have appeared to have been diametrically opposite positions during the Polish and the Hungarian revolts. In Poland the Central Committee decided to recall Gomulka to his post as Party Secretary. He had been out for nearly 8 years on the orders of the Russians. The Poles decided they were going to exercise their independence from the Soviet Union. The Russians were sufficiently concerned by this display of independence to alert troops along the border and had ordered one of the divisions in Poland to start to move on Warsaw.

Apparently the Chinese put some considerable pressure on the Russians at this time not to use force against Poland on the thesis that this was an intraparty squabble and that each of the Communist Parties of the world had a right to make its own decisions while following the general lead of the Russian party. How effective their pressure was and whether Khrushchev, Molotov, and Mikoyan, who went to Warsaw to try to force the Poles'

hand, decided not to use force because of Chinese pressure we do not know to this time. But the Chinese made their voice heard in the affairs of European Communist Parties.

The Chinese took an opposite position in the Hungarian revolution and urged the Russians to use force, because the Communist Party was no longer an effective factor, and Hungary threatened to break away from the Communist bloc.

These instances of Chinese pressure are illustrative of another issue between China and the Soviet Union. This is the extent to which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is recognized as the world leader and should exercise full authority or the extent to which there should be independent roads to socialism. The Chinese believe that the national Parties should exercise a certain degree of independence, although at that time they still acknowledged that the Russian Party was the one to follow.

In June of 1960, Khrushchev attacked the Chinese at a meeting of the Parties that took place at Bucharest. This was the first assault by the Russians on the Chinese and preceded by just 2 months an even more direct indication of the break: the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China. The Chinese regarded the withdrawal of technicians as an unfriendly act. The Russians, as they have done on more than one occasion around the world, left several projects unfinished. The Chinese did not have the capability to finish some of these projects. The Chinese nuclear program was undoubtedly affected. The Chinese, as they have demonstrated in recent years, had the capability to complete the nuclear program on their own, but Russian assistance was valuable.

In November 1960 there was a meeting of 81 Communist Parties in Mos-

cow. This group recognized the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the vanguard of the world socialist movement. They reiterated their faith in peaceful coexistence as the basic foreign policy for the Communist world and minimized the necessity of violence. This was an important issue between the Chinese and the Soviets. The Chinese kept saying the way to win this issue was to go to war. They called the United States a paper tiger and chided the Russians for being concerned unnecessarily about American strength. According to Peking, the real solution to world revolution was to fall back on Lenin's principle that the ultimate revolutionary effort had to come through

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### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., was educated at Princeton University; he is presently Professor of Political Science at Brown University.

Prior to World War II, Professor Kirkpatrick worked for the U.S. News Publishing Corporation and during the war served in the Office of Strategic Services on the staff of Gen. Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group as intelligence briefing officer. At the end of World War II he returned briefly to the U.S. News as editor of *World Report* and then went to the CIA where he served in a variety of positions, including Division Chief, Assistant Director, Executive Assistant to the Director, Inspector General, and, from 1962 to 1965, Executive Director. In 1965 he left the CIA to become Professor of Political Science at Brown University.

For his service in World War II, Professor Kirkpatrick received the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, European Theater Ribbon with five battle stars, and both the French and Belgian Croix de Guerre. In March 1960 Professor Kirkpatrick was chosen by the National Service League as one of the ten outstanding career officers in the Federal Government.

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violence. However, as late as 1960 the Chinese, while still preaching violence, were willing to recognize the Russian thesis of peaceful coexistence as the principal base for the Communist foreign policy, although they did stress that occasions would come when the wars of national liberation and violence were necessary.

The Chinese almost immediately after the conference of November 1960 attacked the Russians openly, describing them as opportunists and revisionists — two very critical words in the semantics of communism. China criticized Russian aid to both India and to the United Arab Republic and openly denounced peaceful coexistence as nothing but a tactical weapon. This was not directed towards undermining the unity of the socialist world as much as it was a flag of independence from Peking.

The following year, 1961, a more serious issue developed at the 22nd Party Congress of the Soviet Union. Albania was publicly criticized by the Russians. This brought China to the defense of Albania. They rebuked the Russians for attacking Albania publicly.

The following year the most important development in the Sino-Soviet split was over the Cuban missile crisis. When the Russians decided to withdraw their missiles, the Chinese were outspoken and blunt in their criticism saying the Russians had been frightened by a paper tiger. The Russians replied, "Yes, a paper tiger with nuclear teeth." This exchange brought the break much more into the open and sowed more seeds of fragmentation in the Communist Parties of the world. The Sino-Soviet split was not the sole factor in fragmenting the Communist Parties. Prior to the break Khrushchev's attack on Stalin at the 20th Party Congress had gone a long way

toward undermining unity in the Communist Parties around the world. The attack on Stalin was most devastating from the point of view of Communist ideology. It was something akin to the "God is dead" argument in Christianity. It destroyed belief in a man who had been put on a pedestal to every Communist Party in the world and whose words to that time had had the validity of the Gospel.

In June of 1963, nearly a year after the Cuban missile crisis and a little short of 2 years after the 22nd Party Congress, the Chinese openly rebuked the Russians on Albania in a statement carefully studied by every Communist Party in the world. The Russians asked the Chinese to Moscow for talks. For a period of 15 days they met periodically. Little information on what transpired seeped to the non-Communist world. The Western press reported on the Chinese arrivals and departures at the place of meeting, and that's about all that was heard about it. The Chinese left Moscow and there was no announcement. Therefore it can be assumed that the meetings were a failure and that there was no area for rapprochement or détente between these two parties. The Test Ban Treaty of 1963 further widened the breach. The Chinese looked upon the Russian signature to the Test Ban Treaty as a direct affront. They felt that the Russians were trying — as indeed they were — to prevent the Chinese from acquiring their own nuclear capability.

The dispute over the Test Ban Treaty was followed in less than a month by a series of articles in China reporting on the break with Russia. These commentaries were very lengthy: 20,000 to 30,000 word attacks on the Soviet Union.

The following year (1964) was one of attack and counterattack. Race was brought into the issue, both sides accus-

ing the other side of racism — the Chinese saying that the Russians were white like the Americans and were racists like the Americans, the Russians saying that the Chinese were trying to make race an issue and were trying to bring in all of the nonwhite races. In the attacks that went on in the spring and summer of 1964 the Chinese accused Khrushchev of trying to restore capitalism in the Soviet Union, reiterating the very often repeated thesis that this was revisionist, opportunist, and abandonment of Marxism-Leninism. On 14 October 1964 Khrushchev was dismissed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Khrushchev dismissal caught everybody by surprise. While I was still with the CIA every time I talked to a War College audience, or for that matter to any audience, the question came up, "Did we know in advance about Khrushchev's dismissal?" The quickest way to answer it was to say, "No, and neither did he."

These are the facts, and the chronology went something like this: On Wednesday afternoon, 12 October, the first report from Moscow was received in Washington and was rather vague. The report said there had been issued a summons for the General Secretaries of the Communist Parties of the Republics of the U.S.S.R. to report to Moscow for a very urgent meeting. All members of the Central Committee were told to drop what they were doing as there was nothing as important as the meeting in Moscow. Almost simultaneously came reports from the Western press in Moscow. Peter Grose of *The New York Times* called his paper to say that something was brewing in the Kremlin: that high party officials were arriving for a special meeting, and there was a lot of speculation in the foreign diplomatic corps in Moscow. That was about all of the advance

indication that something was happening.

There was little speculation this might involve the removal of Khrushchev. At the time he was vacationing in Sochi on the Black Sea and was asked to return to Moscow by the Presidium. He arrived to he greeted at the airport by KGB officers — which surely must be an indication to most Soviet officials that things are not as they should be — and was escorted to the meeting.

The Presidium met Wednesday night, and Thursday Khrushchev defended his policies and conduct. He was attacked for (1) being responsible for the Sino-Soviet split or at least for aggravating it; (2) his miscalculation on Cuba; (3) the failure of his agricultural program, the New Lands particularly; (4) the Russian economic situation; and (5) for his cult of personality. Thursday the Central Committee was summoned to meet. Khrushchev felt that the Central Committee would back him. The Kosygin-Brezhnev group, who were most concerned about Khrushchev's unorthodox methods, apparently had polled the Central Committee well in advance, and the vote went against Khrushchev. He resigned and went quietly, which was probably the better part of valor under those circumstances.

Immediately following Khrushchev's removal the Russians made a major effort to heal the Chinese breach. In February of 1965 Kosygin went to China to try to persuade the Chinese to open discussions. Kosygin urged the Chinese to attend the meeting of the 19 Parties in Moscow on 29 February. They refused, and this is probably where one might say the divorce was irrevocable.

In September 1965 the Soviets mediated the Kashmir war between India and Pakistan. This again was offensive

to the Chinese who consider that area in their sphere of influence. The Chinese bitterly resented not only Soviet cultivation of India but even more so their cultivation or attempted cultivation of Indonesia, which again the Chinese regard as right within their sphere of influence. It was during this period prior to the ill-fated Indonesian revolt that Chinese and Indonesian relations were strained over the Chinese in Indonesia, a population of about three million. The Indonesians were putting pressure on their Chinese residents, as had most of the countries with large overseas Chinese populations. The Chinese interpreted Russian aid to Indonesia as being a direct affront.

On the other side, the Russians wanted an invitation to the Afro-Asian meeting in Algiers, and the Chinese refused on the grounds that they are not an Asiatic power. The Algiers meeting was scuttled on this issue.

In February of 1966 the Chinese accused the Russians of being an ally of the United States and of trying to encircle China.

The Sino-Soviet dispute has become increasingly critical. There has been steady friction between the two powers over military aid to Vietnam, and this argument has gone through some amazing convolutions. The Chinese charge the Russians a fee for transshipment across China by rail, not allowing them to overfly China to take supplies to North Vietnam. At one point they urged the Russians to establish a joint Sino-Soviet Fleet Headquarters in the Pacific, which the Russians interpreted as a Chinese entrapment to get them into a war with the United States over the Formosa Straits. And now one presumes that as part of the issue of aid to Vietnam the Chinese are undoubtedly saying to Moscow, "If you want to give them aid, why don't you ship all of it in by sea?" Again the Russians

probably see behind this that this is another attempt to aggravate the issue with the United States.

The Communist Parties of the world are badly divided as a result of the differences between Russia and China. There are two Communist Parties in Belgium with identical names; one is pro-Peking and one is pro-Russian. Intensive efforts are made by Russia and China to line up support. The Russians exert great pressure diplomatically and carefully to get support from not only the European, but the Central Asian Communist Parties. They have put pressure on the Koreans, Japanese, and the North Vietnamese to align with Moscow rather than Peking.

What are the underlying factors behind the differences between Russia and China? Underlying factor number one is national. These two great powers have a 5,000-mile common border and a history of frontier trouble. They are suffering from nationalistic pangs and are uneasy neighbors. It was announced that there were 150 border incidents in 1965 between China and Russia. This would involve everything from a couple of guards shouting at each other to shooting episodes. The boundary between Russia and China has, through its history, been an area of raids and undeclared wars involving occasionally several thousand men on both sides. Both sides apparently are doing a good deal of infiltrating across the border, particularly in some of the disputed areas - Sinkiang being one area which the Russians through the years have always been terribly interested in. The Chinese have acknowledged the fact that they are exporting from Eastern China into that area more and more young men in order to settle it and to develop their operations in that area. John McCone, the former Director of CIA, who visited the Soviet Union on more than one occasion as Chairman of

the Atomic Energy Commission, reported that his opposite number in the U.S.S.R., in taking him on a tour of some of the Soviet nuclear installations, pointed out the new Russian settlements on the Russian side of the Chinese border and implied they were there for defensive purposes. It is generally believed that some of the Soviet military exercises in the maritime provinces and in Siberia have been based not only on possible attack by the United States but also possible attack by China.

Outer Mongolia has become one of the critical issues. The Chinese were caught redhanded trying to foment a revolt in Outer Mongolia. It is only 600 miles from Peking, providing a good military reason for proselyting. In 1962 and 1963 the Chinese mounted a major effort to try and break Outer Mongolia away from the Soviet Union with the result that some 6,000 Chinese were expelled by the Government in Ulan Bator.

Perhaps what has come home much more solidly to the Russians as a fundamental issue was the fact that during one of Khrushchev's visits to China the Chinese produced a map of the "inner kingdom" of 1840 which was China before the commencement of the extraction of concessions by the Western Powers. The inner kingdom was the last of China's former greatness, it being so-called because the outer kingdom was composed of countries like Thailand, and so on, which came and paid homage to Peking and acknowledged the superior role of the Chinese. The Chinese made it clear to the Russians that they want to return to this status of 1840. This would mean 500,000 square miles of Soviet territory returned to China: specifically in south-central Asia, eastern Kazakhstan, eastern Khirgistan, eastern Uzbekistan, and most of Tadzikistan. Included also would be Outer Mongolia, the Soviet

maritime provinces, Sakhalin, Korea, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Sulu Archipelago, Southeast Asia including Singapore, the Andaman Islands, and Burma. And, of course, the Chinese want the Indian border countries of Nepal, Sikim, and Bhutan.

One could say such expansionist ideas are ridiculous from the point of view that they could never really get this territory back, even as allied states. There is question whether China is expansionist. On the other hand, China is a growing power. Over the years undoubtedly it will increase in strength. There is sympathy in some of these different areas for China and admiration for its progress. As a platform, a return to the days of the "inner kingdom" does not seem to be unreasonable from a Chinese point of view.

Fundamental to the Sino-Soviet split and an aspect which affects us to a degree is the antiforeign feeling in China. This is a basic and important factor in Chinese foreign policy today. The Chinese are a very proud people. They are proud of the fact that they have been a seat for their own civilization for 3,000 years while Western civilization has shifted in its center from the eastern Mediterranean further west. They are disdainful of the accomplishments of others, even though they probably would acknowledge that some of their scientific achievements have come from the West. They are bitter about the dismemberment of China. They have described the Russians as among the predators of China, and they have described the Russians as traitors, whereas they have occasionally described the United States as a bold and respected enemy. So there is this very great intensity of feeling about the concessions extracted from China starting with the Opium Wars of the 1840's and extending through the Boxer Rebellion to the end of World War I



when Britain, France, the United States, Germany, Russia, Portugal, and so on, literally told the Chinese Government what to do and made them do it by force of arms. Chinese ideological campaigns conducted internally in the factories and in the villages constantly hammer at the white devil and must be molding these people to a fairly major degree.

There are the ideological differences between Russia and China. Some of these are quite fundamental today. But basic to it is the fact that Mao looks upon himself as the leader of communism for the underdeveloped countries based upon an agrarian revolt and distinguishes his revolt from the Russian revolution by the fact that he depended more on the peasants while the Russians depended more on the workers. It is obvious that Mao wants China to be leader of the underdeveloped countries. The Chinese have told the Africans, the Southeast Asians, and others that they are the leaders rather than the Russians. The Chinese claim that they are still revolutionary, and the Russians are conservative and have forsaken Marxism-Leninism.

The Russians say they are going to achieve communization of the world by peaceful coexistence. The Chinese say they are going to achieve it by force. The Russians acknowledge separate roads to socialism. The Chinese do also but say socialism must be through the wars of national liberalization. At one point they agreed that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was to be the model. In recent years the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, according to the Chinese, is revisionist.

Before the 23rd Party Congress held in March 1966, there was a most interesting cold war operation carried out by the Russians. In the lower level Party meetings held in the Soviet Union in preparation in the cells, dis-

tricts, and Republics, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union circulated a document on the differences with China. The text of this document eventually leaked --- deliberately leaked in my opinion --- to the West. The document was an attack right across the board on all the issues with China. One of the key points was that it had started as a difference between fraternal parties, but the Chinese had raised the level of the difference to where it was now a difference between national states. This is fundamental in looking at the Sino-Soviet split and at their drive for world communism. In the Communist world it is proper to have differences between fraternal parties, but when this is elevated to the national difference between states it becomes more serious and could reach the point of renunciation of their mutual security pact.

In the balance sheet on world communism, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is still restrained in criticisms of China. The Chinese are not so restrained. The Russians are still offering to talk to the Chinese, but the Chinese are going more and more into solid isolation and refusing to talk to the Russians at all.

In the world Communist effort, both of these powers offer aid and assistance to other countries. Russian aid is extensive to the underdeveloped nations of the world and is moderately good. Some Russian aid has been quite good, but they have been criticized by the recipients for the quality of the aid and for the slowness in delivery. Chinese aid, on the contrary, is much more a talking point than an actuality. The Chinese have not been able to deliver, but they talk a great deal about it.

An example of Russian aid is a \$50 million plant in Ghana for building prefabricated houses built prior to the anti-Nkrumah revolution. It now stands there as a monument to Russian aid.

There is nobody to run it. It is too complicated for the Ghanaians to run. The Soviet technicians were expelled at the time of the revolt. It is too complicated, and the houses it would build nobody in Ghana could buy.

Aid to North Vietnam is a critical issue among the Communist Parties of the world. There is little question about the types of aid the Russians are pouring in, especially antiaircraft missiles, antiaircraft artillery, and technicians. It is hard to say how many technicians are in North Vietnam at the present time. There may be at least 40,000 Chinese technicians. There must be thousands of Russian technicians to help set up and train the North Vietnamese in the missile sites. This is an issue, and an issue which is deep between the two in trying to recruit world communism behind aid to North Vietnam. The 23rd Party Congress talked of volunteers for Vietnam, and it appears that this issue is now caught in the Sino-Soviet split by neither side wanting to encourage the other to send volunteers for fear it will give them a foothold which cannot be dislodged.

In the ideological split it is interesting to note that the Russians are allowing increasingly greater freedoms in their country. The youth of Russia are free in their comments on the Government and its effectiveness. The Chinese are increasingly restrictive. The Russians are in the process of restoring some private enterprise and private holdings. One of the purge effects in China has been to eliminate some of the few private holdings that were still remaining. The Chinese, when they took over industry in China, allowed some of the former capitalists to retain at least an income from their companies, and the result was the rather strange situation of millionaires in Communist China.

One of the irritants in this split be-

tween these two powers came at the time of the "Great Leap Forward" and the Chinese experiment with agricultural communes and with backyard industry. The Russians were openly disdainful. Chinese official comments indicated that this was considered to be a most unfriendly gesture.

Relations with the United States is one of the very important aspects of this split. The Chinese believe the Russians are collaborating with us in erecting a curtain around China, trying to contain them with military power, and developing a system of alliances around China. The Russians, on the other hand, are undoubtedly being driven closer to us by the Chinese issue, by the fact that they are fearful of China and will become increasingly fearful as the Chinese develop their capability for delivery of nuclear weapons. Chinese development of nuclear-tipped missiles will affect all Asia. It is inconceivable that India and Japan will be able to watch the Chinese develop a delivery capacity for nuclear weapons without deciding that they have to have something of a similar nature for themselves. This, of course, in one of the time factors involved, as long as the Vietnamese war poses an issue between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Relations with the United States involve this progression of developments. You can always say, "Well the Chinese would not agree to any restraint on nuclear developments." That may be true. But it is not certain that they would be prepared to go into a total isolation at the risk of possibly greater force being brought to bear on them. We cannot prevent them from developing their own nuclear capability short of general war. The Russians want an agreement with the United States. They would like to see an agreement which would keep the rest of the world from

developing nuclear weapons, exclusive of China and France. This is a serious and fundamental basis of Russian foreign policy. The Russians would like to have greater trade with the United States and trade on a credit basis for some of the things that they need. Although occasionally obscured by the many issues in the cold war, we nevertheless are working with the Russians in many different fields on a collaborative basis. The Russians would very much like to have the Vietnamese war settled on one basis or another as quickly as possible, as long as it does not involve capitulation of North Vietnam. In late 1964 they made a major effort to try and get Chinese terms for Vietnamese peace and were denounced for their pains as being U.S. lackeys. At that time they used India and other intermediaries.

The Chinese did not look with favor on the visit of the Soviet Foreign Minister to the Vatican because they would again interpret this as revisionist. I believe that Mao once said to Stalin, "How many divisions does the Pope have?" which is practically a plagiarism from what Stalin said to Churchill on the same subject during World War II.

In conclusion, we can always assume that through threat or necessity these two powers could conceivably once again align themselves. There are so many basic issues between the two that the possibilities of this are very remote at the present time. The national issue I would rank as the higher issue in the split between Russia and China. But the split of the Communist Parties and Russian and Chinese competition for their support we should never ignore.

Both Russia and China are run by very realistic men. These are men who achieved power the hard way. They want to stay there. They are not going to get themselves involved in a miscal-

ulation which might result in their elimination.

As far as the effect of the Sino-Soviet split on relations with the United States is concerned, it is predictable that the more intense this split becomes the more the danger. The Soviet Union would like an understanding with the United States to gain more freedom to cope with China. Russia wants to avoid threats from both East and West. We occasionally underestimate Soviet concern over Germany and the fact that this is one of the key factors in Soviet foreign policy. Russians believe Germany can be a danger to Russia. Stalin said during World War II that the Germans in 15 years would recover and once again be a threat. Russia will worry about Germany as long as there is no agreement with the United States on the German future.

What about a possibility of a general war between Russia and China? There will be no general war unless there is a war which escalates. It is quite conceivable they can have extensive border wars without resorting to nuclear weapons. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that they would use tactical weapons in border wars if they felt they could do that without using the larger weapons.

What about the Vietnamese war in this split? One of the factors that undoubtedly is deterring any discussions on Vietnam is China. The Russians might discuss Vietnam if they could figure a way to get into those discussions without being accused by China of selling the North Vietnamese down the river. This, of course, is one of the key problems in negotiating with the Communists. What good Communist can stand up in Hanoi or Peking and say we ought to negotiate today without being called either revisionist or capitalist? The key issue is the pressure that must be brought on Hanoi to allow

the North Vietnamese to negotiate. The North Vietnamese probably feel they cannot negotiate without at least a tacit agreement from the Chinese that they will not openly intervene if a cease-fire is arranged.

The question often put forward is, "Is it possible that the Chinese and the Russians are negotiating secretly?" The answer is obviously "Yes." These are two countries that have grown up with a great deal of clandestine apparatus; a large number of their leaders are clandestinely oriented and have survived only by being clandestine. Secret negotiations are fundamental to the Communist way of life. They believe open negotiations are impractical, and one of their axioms is, "What is secret is important; what is open is not." There may be indirect contacts between the two, but they are not fundamental or far reaching.

There is a general feeling the Communists do not worry about world opinion. Some Communists worry about world opinion more than the other Communists, and we have a key point right in this issue. The Russians have progressively become more concerned about world opinion. Not that they will not ignore it if it is important from a tactical point of view to gain a major victory and taking drastic action like putting down the Hungarian revolt. Generally speaking, however, the Russians do worry about respectability. They recognize the necessity of international respect in their dealings. They gained a tremendous amount of respect in settling the Kashmir war. So this is a factor also between Russia and China.

So what do we find in the Sino-Soviet split? We find China isolated. The in-

creasing isolation of China has as many dangers as bringing China more into the world family. The United States during the last year has made several gestures to the Chinese to try and indicate at least a receptivity to the opening of discussions of China. These have all been bluntly and thoroughly rejected. We offered to allow Chinese journalists to come to this country if they allowed American journalists to go there. We offered an exchange of medical and technical persons. We indicated an openmindedness to greater discussions between diplomatic representatives. This has all been categorically rejected.

One of the major issues, of course, between the United States and China, an issue which cannot but affect Sino-Soviet relations, is Taiwan and the Chinese Nationalists. Whether it will ever be possible for the Chinese Communists to enter the United Nations as long as Taiwan is a member is a very serious question. We can offer them membership in the United Nations, but if we insisted that the Chinese Nationalists should remain a member it is doubtful whether the Chinese would join. So the future trend is towards an increasing isolation of China. We could find ourselves faced with developments in Asia which will have far-reaching effects that both Russia and the United States will have to work together to solve.

The Sino-Soviet split is probably as serious an issue, with its far-reaching repercussions, as anything in the world today. It is certainly of far greater and longer term importance than some of the lesser conflagrations that we are going to be faced with in other parts of the world in time to come.