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Nationalism Versus Communism In Chinese Foreign Policy


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NATIONALISM VERSUS COMMUNISM IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

**A thesis prepared by
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INTRODUCTION

When after World War II communism emerged as a powerful force in China, it engendered great puzzlement on the part of many people. First of all, China did not (and still does not) fit the classical example of an industrialized country with a politically conscious proletariat which Karl Marx envisioned as the breeding ground for communism. Furthermore, it seemed

incongruous that communism, with its attack on the "feudal" institution of the family and on individual freedom, could ever be accepted by the Chinese people in view of traditional Chinese ethics and social mores. The official feeling of the U.S. Government is indicated in Secretary of State Dean Acheson's "Letter of Transmittal" in the Department of State's 1949 *White Paper on China*:

We continue to believe that, however tragic may be the immediate future of China and however ruthlessly a major portion of this great people may be exploited by a party in the interest of a foreign imperialism, ultimately the profound civilization and the democratic individualism of China will reassert themselves and she will throw off the foreign yoke.¹

Although the validity of Marx's assumptions regarding the requisite inputs for a successful Communist movement may be easily challenged, the scope of this paper will be limited to Chinese communism as it exists and to what constitutes Chinese communism. The purpose of this paper is to examine the actions of the Chinese Communists from the time just prior to the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party until the present in an effort to ascertain the objectives of Chinese foreign policy and the influence of nationalism versus communism in the formulation of those objectives.

The establishment of communism in China will be viewed through the intellectual evolutions of Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao, the founders of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao Tse-tung's foreign policy pronouncements and his aspirations for China will be examined. Events associated with the Sino-Soviet dispute and China's border involvements with her neighbors will be analyzed to determine the nationalistic and communistic aspects of each. Finally, conclusions are drawn which identify an apparent nationalistic ambition to reestablish something similar to the "Middle Kingdom" concept from Chinese dynastic history and explain the role of Chinese Communism in fulfilling this ambition.

I — NATIONALISM BEGETS COMMUNISM

Throughout the 20th century China has been experiencing a great revolu-

tion which has affected every aspect of life in that ancient civilization. China's general impotence in the face of Western incursions led to frustration, embarrassment, and a desire for escape from the old traditional Chinese culture, which was considered to be the basis of China's weakness. The rising nationalism of the 20th century led to the overthrow of the Manchus in 1911. This was followed by the establishment of a Republic in 1912, which proved to be completely ineffectual. The latest chapter of this revolution, which is still being written, had its beginning with the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921.

Marxism-Leninism. The beginnings of Marxism-Leninism in China are intimately connected with the intellectual evolution of Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao during the years immediately preceding the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In addition to being the actual founders of the CCP, these two — who were Dean of the Department of Chinese

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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Letters and Librarian, respectively, at Peking University¹ — were among the few undisputed leaders of the whole Westernized intelligentsia.² In addition to great influence exerted through the traditional Chinese sage-disciple relationship with their students, who later staged the May Fourth Movement, their effect upon Mao Tse-tung was very great — profound in the case of Ch'en Tu-hsiu.

In the fall of 1918 Mao had taken a minor position in the library at Peking University where he met Ch'en Tu-hsiu briefly. (There were to be endless meetings later.) Although neither seems to have made any impact upon the other at their first meeting, Mao could not escape the pervading influence of the professor who almost singlehandedly had changed the intellectual atmosphere of the time.³ No one before had addressed the Chinese students in the manner of Ch'en Tu-hsiu:

What I want to say, and to say with tears, is that I hope those of you who are young will be self-conscious and that you will struggle. By self-consciousness I mean that you are to be conscious of the power and responsibility of your youth, and that you are to respect it. Why do I think you should struggle? Because it is necessary for you to use all the intelligence you have to get rid of those who are decaying, who have lost their youth. Regard them as enemies and beasts: do not be influenced by them, do not associate with them.

O young men of China! Will you be able to understand me? Five out of every ten whom I see are young in health, but they are also old in spirit. When this happens to a body, the body is dying. When it happens to a society, the society is perishing. Such a sickness cannot be cured by sighing; it can only be cured by those who are young, and in addition to being young are courageous. We must have youth if we are to survive, we must have youth if we are to get rid of corruption. Here lies the only hope for our society.⁴

To Mao, Ch'en Tu-hsiu was a trumpet heralding for China a turning of the ways. Ch'en's was a style mingling exhortation with great hope; it was concise, brutal. This style was to have a definite impact on Mao; his famous phrase "New Democracy" derives from Ch'en. Whole phrases, originally written by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, were to be reflected or copied verbatim in Mao's books written in later years in Yen-an.⁵

The relevance of Ch'en's thinking continues in the mind of Mao even today. A verbatim publication of Ch'en's statement could easily serve as a manifesto for the Great Cultural Revolution which Mao has carried out, since 1966, through the medium of the Red Guards. It is necessary only to interpret the "young" and "old" in the light of present experience; the underlying philosophy remains intact. Mao is still advocating struggle and the maintenance of a revolutionary spirit in China, lest the "old" people be beguiled by the insidious invasion of capitalism, dogmatism, and revisionism, and the "young" people be denied the utopian life their Communist ideology promises them. The rationale underlying the philosophies of Ch'en and Mao — although both their strategies and tactics were vastly different — was the same; both held as a fond dream the restoration of China to the position of power and eminence that they considered was rightfully hers.

In the years preceding 1919 Ch'en Tu-hsiu had adopted a philosophy based on the Western ideas of democracy and science. His philosophy embodied the total rejection of all traditional Chinese beliefs such as Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. He regarded China's impotence in the face of the humiliating incursions of the West to be the result of the passivity and stagnation engendered by the radically antiworldly bias of Buddhism and

Taoism and the initiative-destroying family and social obligations of Confucianism. He was sure he saw the answer to the threat of the West in the West itself — democracy and science.⁶ It is, of course, clear that it is precisely these concepts he is addressing in his cryptic Peking University speech.⁷ The “young” he refers to are those with the vision to appreciate the necessity for the Westernization of China, while the “old” are those too steeped in the traditions of China to see beyond the limitations of that culture.

Li Ta-chao was a man of fundamentally different bent from Ch'en Tu-hsiu. Whereas Ch'en Tu-hsiu concerned himself by predilection with concrete social and literary problems, Li Ta-chao's propensity was notably metaphysical. After becoming professor of history in 1920, he evolved a philosophy which was a strange amalgam of Chinese and Western concepts. Here, mixed with elements of Buddha and Ch'u Yuan are found the ideas of Emerson and Hegel. In spite of his inspirations from Emerson, however, Li contended that the individual finds his significance only in the world spirit. As professor of history, his knowledge of German philosophy, gained through studying Hegel, biased him in favor of impersonal historic forces. Thus, traditional Chinese thought and Hegel both prepared him for easy acceptance of this aspect of Marxism.⁸

Overriding Li Ta-chao's philosophic search for the truth, however, were the same considerations which motivated Ch'en Tu-hsiu — the plight of China. Essentially his philosophy was a defiant reply to the charge that China was a dead civilization with no further chance for development. He succinctly summarizes his stand in the statement that China

... has gone through an extremely long history and the accumulated dust of the past is heavily weighing it down.

By fettering its life, it has brought our nation to a state of extreme decay. . . .

What we must prove to the world is not that the old China is not dead, but that a new youthful China is in the process of being born.⁹

The points in common between Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao were their hostility toward traditional Chinese culture and an attempt to find the solution to China's problems in the West. In spite of their differing intellectual predilections, both gravitated toward world views which offered sweeping solutions. This led from preliminary acceptance of democratic concepts ultimately to the acceptance of Marxism as the all-embracing panacea for China. The final reconciliation of the mental conflicts in the acceptance of Marxism was long and difficult for both, but the transition was made, and on 30 June 1921 they held the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai.¹⁰ Among the delegates to this Congress was Mao Tse-tung.¹¹

The Kuomintang-Communist Alliance. At the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920 the consensus opinion of the Eastern delegates was that the East was on the verge of a large-scale revolutionary upheaval. The result of this feeling was a paper drafted by Lenin entitled *Theses on the National and Colonial Question* which stipulated that Communist Parties in the Eastern countries should form “temporary agreements or even alliances” with indigenous national liberation movements. Lenin did not specify the form of these agreements or alliances. He only indicated that the Communists should not merge with the nationalists but should preserve “the independent character of the proletarian movement — even in its germinal form.”¹² The practical difficulties of interpreting this properly in light of Marxist dogma were later to

give Stalin many a headache, principally from Trotsky; nevertheless, the basis for an eventual Communist-Kuomintang alliance was laid.

The Kremlin desired to exploit the revolutionary climate in China for the purpose of securing its eastern flank by locking the imperialist countries out while providing a means of access for revolutionary purposes. It was clear, however, that the Kremlin had no intention of basing all its hopes in China on the impending formation of a Communist Party. Noting the weakness of the Communist movement in China in 1920 Lenin even courted the favor of Wu P'ei-fu, then the strongest warlord in North China.¹³ Lenin realized that communism was completely alien to the Chinese and considered its best chance for growth in China would be by cloaking it in a mantle of nationalism under the protective cover of the Kuomintang.¹⁴

By the time of the Fourth Congress, the interests of the Kremlin had focused in the direction of Sun Yat-sen, "the father of Chinese nationalism." The Soviet Union needed a strong ally in Asia, and Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang looked like the best bet at that time. This approach did, of course, entail some shifting in the ideological sphere to include a new emphasis on bourgeois nationalism and the necessity of a capitalist phase of development in colonial and semicolonial areas.

The ideological problem was not limited solely to the Kremlin, however. Ch'en Tu-hsiu vigorously opposed the Kuomintang-Communist alliance on ideological grounds. However, at a plenum of the Central Committee convened at Hangechow, Maring, a Comintern agent, compelled the plenum, under pressure of Comintern discipline, to endorse his plan for Communist Party members to enter the ranks of the Kuomintang.¹⁵ Maring later ad-

mitted that he did not have specific authority to effect such a union of the two parties, and the Kremlin continued as late as January 1923 to speak of "coordinating the activities" of the two parties without suggesting any closer union.¹⁶ The problem was, however, settled in January 1923 when Sun Yat-sen met with the Soviet Envoy Adolf A. Joffe and drafted a joint resolution which resolved all major issues between Moscow and the Kuomintang Government, and Sun Yat-sen set about to absorb the Communists.¹⁷ By this time Sun had given up hope of any aid from the United States.

The weakness of the CCP played a significant part in its final decision to go along with the Kremlin's desire that it join the Kuomintang. Additionally, in a move to ameliorate the situation for the Communists, the Third Party Congress mapped out a course whereby the CCP would conquer power from the Kuomintang in the ensuing years.¹⁸ In 1924 the CCP participated in the First National Conference of the Kuomintang, as convoked by Sun Yat-sen, on the basis of the policies: (1) alliance with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, (2) alliance of the Kuomintang with the CCP, and (3) assistance to the peasants and workers.¹⁹ Subsequently, Soviet aid, advice, and advisers began to flow in, and the weak, struggling Chinese Communist Party had its start.

Thus, in the face of the growing nationalism of the 20th century and in an effort to realize the aspirations of their people, a segment of the Chinese leadership was drawn inexorably to the door of communism in their search for a solution to the plight of China. Having selected communism as the means to return China to greatness, these leaders next required assistance to sustain the weak, immature Party through its difficult infancy. By allying

themselves with the Kuomintang, the Communists obtained the nurture which their fledgling Party required for its early growth.

II — MAO TSE-TUNG AND FOREIGN POLICY

Chinese communism has historically identified "feudalism" and "imperialism" as its "number one enemies." The "feudalism" opposed has been the powers of the Chinese warlords, the relationships between landlords and peasants, and traditional Chinese cultural patterns in general. The "imperialism" opposed has been the "unequal treaties" imposed upon China by foreign governments since the Opium Wars of 1839-1842 and religious, educational, and philanthropic work of foreign governments in China, which Mao has termed "cultural aggression" and "invasion" aimed at "doping" the Chinese population for the benefit of Western "invaders."¹ The leaders of the Communist-Kuomintang alliance termed their coalition a national bourgeois-democratic revolution against "imperialism" and "feudalism."²

Foreign Policy Aims. The alliance between the Communists and the Kuomintang which Stalin had advocated, although never very stable, completely ruptured in 1927. By 1926 Chiang Kai-shek had built the Kuomintang armed forces into an effective fighting arm and had made himself its dominant figure. In late 1926 Chiang embarked upon a military expedition northward to the Yangtze in order to enlarge the area of Kuomintang power. Because of the political disunity which arose out of the Kuomintang's initial military successes, the movement split. The liberal faction of the Kuomintang proceeded up the Yangtze and established itself at the Wuhan ports, while Chiang led his faction toward Shanghai and

the treaty ports with the idea of gaining control of their financial and material wealth.³

As Chiang's forces approached Shanghai, Communist supporters in the city, still putting their faith in the Kuomintang as directed by Moscow, rose up against the anti-Kuomintang authorities. Chiang paused at the gates of Shanghai, and only after the fighting had subsided, with the Communists victorious and the anti-Kuomintang forces effectively destroyed, did Chiang enter the city, on Communist invitation, with his fresh troops. He thereupon fell upon his exhausted Communist allies, slaughtered them unmercifully, and emerged in undisputed control of the situation.⁴

Although this was a severe blow to Stalin's China policy, Stalin continued to believe, for reasons of his own, that the Kuomintang could still be used as an instrument of Soviet policy. Stalin, therefore, advocated that the Communists continue to adopt the same subservience to the more liberal wing of the Kuomintang, centered in the Wuhan ports, that they had previously been required to adopt toward Chiang. The liberal wing, however, had fallen increasingly under the influence of its own non-Communist and anti-Communist generals, who proceeded somewhat less dramatically but equally as effectively to eliminate their Communist allies, thus completing the disaster. The Chinese Communist Party was decimated and forced to go underground.⁵

Mao rescued a contingent of the underground remnants of the Party and led them away to the rugged border area of Kiangsi Province where he established a base camp among the peasants. It was there that Mao decided to base the Chinese revolution on the peasants instead of on the proletariat as required by classical Marxism and advocated by Stalin. How Mao evalu-

ated Stalin's failures in China is problematical, but it seems certain that Mao decided at this juncture that the only way the Chinese revolution could survive as a viable force was on the strength of its own decisions. These decisions would be tailored to the unique situation in China as Mao saw it, not based unquestioningly on dictates from Moscow. Mao continued to pay lipservice to his political affinity with Moscow and to pay Moscow that outward deference required of all foreign Communist Parties, but things were never the same after 1927. Mao's caution was to limit the extent of CCP submission to the authority of Moscow, and Mao was always careful to reserve sufficient independence for China to prevent its ever becoming a Soviet satellite.⁶

The CCP continued to concern itself with foreign affairs after the dissolution of the Communist-Kuomintang alliance. In November 1931 the Communists established the Provisional Soviet Government of China. They incorporated their foreign policy aims in the platform of their Government.⁷

The immediate abrogation of all unequal treaties concluded between the imperialist countries and the landlord-bourgeoisie [sic] governments of China, the repudiation of all foreign debts contracted by the ruling class of China for the suppression of the mass movement and massacre of the masses, the unconditional rendition of all foreign settlements, concessions and leased territories now under control of the imperialists, the immediate withdrawal of all imperialist land, air and naval forces from Chinese soil, [and,] last but most important of all, the confiscation of all imperialist banks, factories, mines and communication-transportation enterprises located in China as the most effective measure to destroy the imperialist domination, root and branch. Furthermore, the Provisional Government of the Soviet Republic of China declares that it will,

on no condition, remain content with the overthrow of imperialism in China but, on the contrary, will aid as its ultimate objective in waging a war against world imperialism until the latter is all blown up.⁸

This vitriolic, xenophobic pronouncement shows the concepts of Chinese Communist foreign policy taking form. Although it is couched in the Communist ideological vernacular, the outraged cry of frustrated and humiliated nationalism, smarting under nearly 100 years of Western imperialistic oppression, is clearly discernible. It might, at first glance, appear to be just a wild lashing out at the enemies of Chinese communism, but on closer inspection it seems to be a rather carefully conceived plan, and for an embryonic power its compass is rather startling. It reminds one of Napoleon's warning, given over 150 years ago, that China was a sleeping dragon that had best be left to slumber lest it destroy those who awaken it.⁹

The United Front. The Communists continued to expand the Chinese Soviet areas in Kiangsi and the contiguous provinces of south-central China. At one time, Communist control extended over nearly 300,000 square miles of mountainous and rural areas.¹⁰ Although Chiang Kai-shek's National Government was under considerable strain from the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, Chiang continued to wage a ruthless war of extermination against the Communists. This took the form of five annihilation campaigns which culminated in the epic "Long March" of 1934-35.¹¹

Of the over 100,000 Communists who broke out of the Nationalist encirclement in October 1934, probably less than 20,000 of them reached Shensi Province in the latter part of 1935 after marching and fighting along a circuitous route of some 6,000 miles.

At the end of 1936 the Chinese Communist headquarters was established at Yen-an in Shensi Province.¹²

In his fervor completely to eradicate the Communists, Chiang Kai-shek went to northwest China in December 1936 to help speed up the campaign. Chiang was kidnapped in Sian by refugee Manchurian troops who chafed to fight Japanese invaders, not Chinese rebels. Chiang was presented an ultimatum to form a Kuomintang-Communist united front to fight the Japanese. This had been the line, advocated by both the Comintern and the CCP since August 1935, to which Chiang had turned a deaf ear. The Kremlin and the CCP considered that a united Chinese resistance to the Japanese would serve the dual purpose of diverting Japan from attacking Russia and Nanking from attacking the CCP.¹³

However, Chiang refused the demands of his captors. The Communists were ready to kill him when they received peremptory orders from the Comintern to release him. The Comintern knew that Chiang Kai-shek's rival in the Nationalist Party, Wang Ching-wei, was on his way to Shanghai from Germany with Hitler's blessing. Since Wang Ching-wei was strongly influenced by Germany, the Comintern realized that if he came to power he would probably join China with the anti-Comintern powers, Germany and Japan, to crush the Communists. This would have laid bare to Japanese pressures the whole Russian border with China from the Yellow Sea to Turkestan. The irony of the situation was that, in order to save the Chinese Communists, the Kremlin had to save Chiang Kai-shek.¹⁴

The subsequent unleashing of the Japanese attack near Peking on 7 July 1937 forced the Nanking Government to turn to resist them. This virtually eliminated further hostilities against the

Communists, who were thus saved by Japan from certain extermination at the hands of the Government. This increasing pressure from the Japanese led shortly thereafter to the second Kuomintang-Communist "marriage of convenience" --- the new "united front."¹⁵

Postwar Strategy. The Chinese "united front" relationship continued always in perilous balance with clashes occurring throughout the course of World War II. The critical test, however, was to come with victory over the external enemy. The race for political position was well underway during wartime but naturally accelerated after the Japanese surrendered. Before the war ended --- during April-June 1945 --- the CCP held its Seventh Congress and perfected its strategy for the postwar period by adopting the flexible line of "coalition government."¹⁶ The political moves of the protagonists are amply recorded in the State Department's "White Paper on China."¹⁷

CCP Chairman Mao Tse-tung enunciated the Chinese Communist position in his political report, "On Coalition Government," delivered at the Seventh Congress of the CCP on 24 April 1945, when he hinted at a possible resumption of civil war after victory over Japan. He stated:

It must be understood that, however tortuous the route may be, the Chinese people will fulfill their tasks of achieving independence and liberation and the time for them to do so has already arrived. The great aspirations of countless martyrs of the past hundred-odd years must be fulfilled by our generation; whoever attempts to deter us will certainly fail in the end.¹⁸

In this statement Mao appears to be firmly convinced that his cause will prevail, although he senses that it will be an arduous ordeal. Mao reveals a feeling that it is his destiny to lead the

Chinese people back to a position of pre-eminence in the world, and with the impending victory over the external enemy, he is eager to get on with the task.

Mao Tse-tung turns next to foreign relations in his report to the Seventh Congress. Aware of the policies of Britain and the United States, he offers them evidence of his determination and makes a subtle appeal for a reevaluation on their part. It is a matter of interesting conjecture to try to envisage the paths along which Chinese communism might have developed if the United States had chosen to recognize Mao, sometime after World War II, as the representative voice of the Chinese people rather than Chiang Kai-shek. Mao further states on 24 April 1945:

The basic principle underlying the foreign policy of the Chinese Communist Party consists in establishing and developing diplomatic relations with all countries and in solving all problems of mutual concern, such as military co-ordination, peace conferences, international trade and foreign investments - all these on the basis of complete defeat of the Japanese aggressors, maintenance of world peace, mutual respect of national independence, mutual treatment as equals and mutual help in promoting national and popular interests and in advancing the friendship between nations and peoples.

We request all Allied governments, first of all the governments of Britain and the United States, to pay serious attention to the voice of the great majority of the Chinese people and take care that their foreign policy does not run counter to the wishes of the Chinese people and impair the friendship between the Chinese people and themselves. We believe that a foreign government will commit a grievous error if it supports the Chinese reactionaries and opposes the democratic cause of the Chinese people.¹⁹

American Mediation. In the latter part of 1943 American diplomats be-

came concerned with the possibility of a future civil war in China. Their concern over the Kuomintang-Communist rivalry was that the war effort might possibly be hamstrung and that the Russians would eventually back the Communists. The United States hoped to avert an eventual civil war by encouraging a political settlement and by strengthening the Nationalist Government through a program of building up its armies and calling for reforms. In spite of U.S. efforts throughout the remainder of the war, with peace came the long foreseen civil war in the form of rivalry over the occupied areas.²⁰

The United States had no intention of attempting to resolve the China crisis by fighting another war in East Asia on the heels of World War II. Diplomatic measures, however, were continued, but the prospects for a peaceful settlement looked poor. General Wedemeyer concluded in his 20 November 1945 report, "It appears remote that a satisfactory understanding will be reached between Chinese Communists and the National Government."²¹

President Truman appointed Gen. George C. Marshall as his Special Representative in China on 27 November 1945. The general was charged in his letter of instructions "to bring to bear in an appropriate and practicable manner the influence of the United States" to the end "that the unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible and concurrently to endeavor to effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in North China."²²

Both parties to the dispute accepted General Marshall's good offices and on 10 January 1946 reached an agreement for the cessation of hostilities. The breakdown in relations in July 1946, however, belied the promise of deep-seated dedication to peaceful relations

between the two sides. The mediator was attacked from both sides with the Kuomintang in favor of settlement of the issue by force and against "American intervention," whereas the CCP launched a bitter attack against American policy in China and American military and economic aid to the National Government which allegedly encouraged the Kuomintang's civil war policy.²³

Statement Against America. The Communists continued to concentrate their attention, in foreign affairs, on the United States. In a memorandum, "Explanation of Several Basic Questions Concerning the Post-War International Situation," published on 5 January 1947 at Yen-an, Chief of the CCP Department of Information, Lu Ting-yi, referred to Mao Tse-tung's speech of April 1945 and said in part:

After World War II, American imperialists took the place of Fascist Germany, Italy and Japan, becoming a fortress of the world reactionary forces. . . . The reactionaries of all countries and the Fascist remnants have now all become traitors directly or indirectly supported and protected by the American imperialists selling out the people of all countries . . .

Standing against the world reactionaries — the imperialists of America and their running dogs in various countries — is the world democratic might . . .

This world-wide united front cannot possibly be of any other character than that of a united front hunting for world peace and democracy and independence of all nations against the American imperialism and its running dogs in various countries. This united front will undoubtedly have the sympathy and moral support of the socialist Soviet Union . . .

In general, everything has changed after the Second World War, and is still continuing to change. How strong the people have become — how conscious, how organized, determined, and full of confidence! How maniacally savage the reactionaries have become

— outwardly strong yet inwardly feeble, turned against by masses and deserted by their allies, devoid of all confidence in their future! It may be forecast categorically that the face of China and the world will be vastly different after three to five more years. All comrades of our party and all people of China must resolutely fight for a new China and a new world.²⁴

Any idea that the Chinese Communists might have entertained about the United States possibly finding some sympathy for their cause, either before or subsequent to the end of World War II, was abandoned in July 1946 when they resumed hostilities with the Chinese Nationalists. Lu Ting-yi's memorandum spells out the Chinese Communists' conception of the world situation at the beginning of 1947 and rings of bitterness and disappointment at the U.S. decision to continue its support of the Nationalists. It indicates their intention henceforth to consider the United States their number one enemy in a determined drive to change the face of China and the world. It contained a plea for the Soviets — who still maintained diplomatic relations with the Nationalists — to join unequivocally in their struggle.

Lean to one Side. As predicted by General Wedemeyer the Nationalists lost Manchuria in 1948, and in 1949 they lost all China. On 1 October 1949 a new "coalition" government was established at Peking under the firm control of the CCP. The position of this government and the course it was to follow was clearly spelled out in Mao Tse-tung's 30 June 1949 article, "On People's Democratic Dictatorship."

Mao wrote "On People's Democratic Dictatorship" to commemorate the 28th anniversary of the founding of the CCP. In it he called on the working class and the Communists to work hard and create conditions for the natural elimination of classes, state authority,

and political parties, "so that mankind will enter the realm of world Communism." Up to that time, he said, the "principal and fundamental experience" gained by the Chinese people had taught them to:

... unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals and unite with the peoples of all countries. That is, ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the People's Democracies and with the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in all other countries, and form an international united front.²⁵

He indicated this meant "leaning to one side":

The forty years' experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years' experience of the Communist Party have taught us to lean to one side, and we are firmly convinced that in order to win victory and consolidate it we must lean to one side. In the light of the experiences accumulated in these forty years and these twenty-eight years, all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road.²⁶

Mao acknowledged his willingness to do business and establish diplomatic relations with all foreign countries, and he admitted that victory was not possible without international help. He denied, however, that aid was required from Britain and the United States:

Would the present rulers of Britain and the United States, who are imperialists, help a people's state? . . . Throughout his life, Sun Yat-sen appealed countless times to the capitalist countries for help and got nothing but heartless rebuffs . . . Internationally, we belong to the side of the anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union, and so we can turn only to this side for genuine and friendly help, not to the side of the imperialist front.²⁷

Thus Mao clearly indicated that, for the moment at least, Peking had molded its foreign policy to fit the needs of international communism as directed by Moscow. Although having long ago decided on communism (Mao's version, at least) as the salvation for China, Mao did not envision his role in alignment with the U.S.S.R. as anything similar to the gallant warrior delivering up the prize of conquest to his king. Although identification with the birthplace of Communist power and authority was necessary for ideological reasons, it also fit neatly into the nationalistic requirement for power which required economic and military assistance and the enhancement of Mao's prestige — both necessary to Mao's dream of the restoration of China to its rightful place of preeminence in the world.

III — THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

Chinese-Russian relations have a history of controversy as far back as the intermittent border war over the Amur River valley which began in the 1650's. Tsarist Russia obtained substantial areas of Chinese territory with the Treaty of Aigun in 1858, the Treaty of Peking in 1860, and the Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1881. Furthermore, the Russian Communists, after coming to power, did not forego a policy of aggrandizement at China's expense. In 1929 they fought a war over control of the Chinese Eastern Railroad in Manchuria. They also violated the Sino-Soviet agreement of 1924 by detaching Outer Mongolia from China and establishing a Russian protectorate over the area.¹ Even after the Chinese Communists came to power, Stalin continued to follow Russian historical precedent and viewed China more with avarice and fear than with fraternal goodwill.

Sino-Soviet Alliance. The mistakes Stalin had made in China at the expense of the Chinese Communists by no means ended with the termination of World War II. The small faith Stalin had in the CCP and the ever-present problem of protection of his eastern flank manifested themselves again after the cessation of hostilities. By advising Mao against a premature attempt to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek immediately after World War II, Stalin gave Mao ample reason to suspect the Kremlin was more interested in dividing the imperialists than in the risk of supporting a Chinese Communist seizure of power.² Evidence of Stalin's caution in China in the early postwar years is contained in a Yugoslav account of his statement in February 1948 to a group of Yugoslav leaders. He is quoted as having said:

It is true we also have made mistakes. For instance, after the war we invited the Chinese comrades to come to Moscow and we discussed the situation in China. We told them bluntly that we considered the development of the uprising in China had no prospects, that the Chinese comrades should seek a *modus vivendi* with Chiang Kai-shek, and that they should join the Chiang Kai-shek government and dissolve their army.³

Not only had Stalin been incorrect in his assessment of the chances for success of the Chinese Communists at the end of World War II, but the ensuing armed conflict left Stalin little choice but to support it, since failure to support "the first genuinely self-propelled Socialist Revolution since 1917 could have seriously compromised Soviet leadership of the communist movement."⁴ Since Mao had indicated in June 1949 his intention to "lean to one side," his establishment of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949 was quickly followed by Russian recognition on 2 October.

Sino-Soviet relations were expanded in February 1950 with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. From the 9 weeks that Mao spent in Moscow in secret negotiation with Stalin before the Treaty was concluded, it can reasonably be assumed that the bargaining was tough on both sides. The Treaty called for common action to prevent aggression by "Japan or any other state that may collaborate with Japan directly or indirectly." Thus, the mutual assistance portion of the Treaty was clearly directed against their common enemy, the United States.⁵

In the economic and financial assistance field Russia contracted to advance \$60 million credit per year for 5 years to finance 50 specific projects. In exchange for this commitment Stalin obtained joint Sino-Soviet stock companies for development of oil and non-ferrous metal, joint management of the Changchun Railway, and the use of the naval base at Port Arthur.⁶ To the Chinese the Soviet assistance for industrial development must have seemed quite niggardly, since it provided for only a very limited program. However, it seems reasonable to assume that Stalin was in no hurry to help Mao achieve his aspiration of rapid industrial development. Thus, what ostensibly might have seemed to be two fraternal Communist leaders entering into an agreement on the basis of a common ideology emerged as a haggling between two distrusting heads of state conducted with all the nationalistic zeal of a couple of capitalistic imperialists.

Throughout the remainder of Stalin's life he relegated Mao to the status of a junior partner; a role not, however, incompatible with Mao's dynastic concept of how the world should be ordered. To Mao there should only be one supreme authority, and at that time

it was Stalin. Mao was content to hide his time, learn, and do whatever possible to increase his stature in the eyes of the world. The Chinese limited victory in halting the advance of U.N. troops in Korea enhanced the prestige of Mao's government throughout Asia.⁷ With the passing of Stalin the new Soviet leaders restored Port Arthur, returned control of the joint stock companies, and advanced support for construction of 141 major projects. On the political scene the new Soviet leaders demonstrated the compatibility of the two countries by showing increased respect for Mao's ideological stature and acknowledged the increased status of China within the partnership.⁸

Thus the Sino-Soviet romance rolled along in the 1950's fairly smoothly, interrupted only by such minor things as the Soviets providing military supplies for the Korean war on credit terms rather than as grants and a Russian attempt to form a joint company to exploit resources in Sinkiang, which the Chinese branded in 1954 as "Soviet economic imperialism."⁹ But nothing arose which seemed to be completely insurmountable.

The Winds of Change. The year 1956 is an extremely important one in Sino-Soviet relations. It is the year in which Mao decided to modify the relationship of Peking vis-a-vis Moscow and interject Chinese influence into the international arena. The events of 1956 not only made it a propitious time for Peking to expand its operations to the international level, but the course that events were taking made it a necessity in Mao's eyes.

In February 1956 Khrushchev delivered two major speeches at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the first of these, which was a public statement, he attempted to lay down a new line for international communism. He modified

Lenin's views on peaceful coexistence from a tactic to a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy. He further reversed Lenin's stand on the inevitability of war between communism and capitalism and stated that wars were no longer "fatalistically inevitable." He expressed the view that important opportunities existed for the conquest of power through utilization of the democratic and parliamentary institutions of some countries. He expressed the belief that a Communist victory could be achieved through peaceful competition in which the superiority of the Soviet system would be established by economic, scientific, and social achievements.¹⁰

For someone with no reputation as a Communist theorist, the sweeping changes advocated by Khrushchev were, indeed, quite surprising. They were apparently motivated by a realization of the disaster which thermonuclear war would bring to the Soviet Union. This was substantiated when Khrushchev expressed confidence that communism would win the peaceful competition between the two contending economic systems and declared that, "there are only two ways: either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history."¹¹

This first speech was offensive to the Chinese because they interpreted Khrushchev's newly proclaimed doctrine as an attempt by Khrushchev to continue Stalin's monopoly leadership of the Communist movement. Although the Chinese had not to this point voiced a claim to leadership of the Communist movement, they considered Khrushchev to be only an interim, unqualified occupant of that position. Additionally, the Chinese considered Mao Tse-tung to be the senior living Marxist-Leninist theoretician and did not look favorably on such statements by Khrushchev.¹²

The second, "secret," speech delivered by Khrushchev, in which he denounced Stalin as a tyrant and murderer, was also looked on with disfavor by the Chinese. Mao Tse-tung's role in China bore striking similarities to Stalin's former role in Russia; consequently, Mao had a special reason for not liking Khrushchev's attack on Stalin and his "cult of personality."¹³ Khrushchev's revelation of the abuses under Stalin also implicitly raised the question of whether such abuses might not be taking place in China under Mao's very similar type of rule.

Khrushchev's "secret" speech was the vehicle chosen to address a knotty problem which had confronted the Soviets since the death of Stalin: how to establish a more elastic pattern of in-trabloc relations that would permit greater variation within the domestic affairs of individual nations and yet maintain overall unity of the international movement under the leadership of the Russians.¹⁴ This speech set in motion a sequence of events which elicited Chinese responses that clearly indicated the changing posture of Peking and were very revealing of the underlying motivation of Mao.

To understand the actions taken by Mao subsequent to the 20th Congress, it is necessary to understand the "Middle Kingdom" concept from Chinese dynastic history and Mao's fascination with this concept. Mao's hopes for the future of China seem to follow a pattern which is compatible with the re-establishment of something similar to a "Middle Kingdom," ruled over by an elite governing hierarchy, at whose apex sits an omniscient ruler.¹⁵ It is readily seen that a Communist Party with a dictator at its head neatly provides the hierarchical governing body requisite for this scheme. Under this scheme of government, all countries lying outside the "Middle Kingdom"

exercise a measure of autonomy but pay homage to the seat of power and authority. This may take the form of tribute or, at a minimum, obeisance to the throne. A measure of autonomy by outlying countries is accepted and expected as long as the superior culture of the "Middle Kingdom" is acknowledged. Heresy consists only in attempting independent and egalitarian political action.¹⁶ It is a concept based on extreme ethnocentrism.

The polycentric pressures unleashed by Khrushchev's speech caused the Chinese considerable concern when countries started calling for full autonomy. Togliatti, the leader of the Italian Communist Party, called for "full autonomy of the individual Communist Parties and of bilateral relations between them."¹⁷ The Chinese sought to strike a balance by supporting the claims of the individual Communist states for greater independence while retaining their acceptance of Russia as the logical leader of the international Communist movement. The Chinese advocated less interference from Moscow in internal policy matters but insisted that the Soviets be acknowledged as the leader in policy matters of international importance.¹⁸ Mao's world view permitted autonomy in domestic affairs but did not permit of total political independence. At this point in time, Mao was still willing to accept Khrushchev's right to sit on the throne of world communism, but this acquiescence probably stemmed more from Mao's overriding concern that there remain only one source of international political authority than a belief in Khrushchev's qualifications to occupy that position.¹⁹

The line the Chinese were following became apparent during the revolts of the fall of 1956. In Poland there was no desire to break away from the bloc — quite the opposite — they welcomed

alliance with the Soviets as a guarantee against a revitalized Germany and to maintain the Oder-Neisse line.²⁰ The Polish revolt was centered within the country's national Communist Party, and the control of the armed forces remained vested in the Party. Since there was no intent of Polish defection to the West, the Chinese supported Gomulka and were responsible for restraining Khrushchev from intervening with direct Soviet military action.²¹

By advocating the middle road, China gained a reputation for liberalism within the bloc. China's stand furnished the required support for Poland's dispute with Moscow over the Poles' independent road for building socialism. At the same time, the Chinese rigorously condemned as revisionism Tito's road to socialism in which he attempted to adopt a position of neutrality between the two world blocs.²² Tito's stand would have placed Yugoslavia outside the hegemony of Moscow and was therefore heresy.

The Hungarian uprising involved a completely different set of circumstances. Counterrevolutionary forces were demanding international neutrality with the installation of a multiparty democracy. The Hungarian Communist Party had lost control of the army and it was readily apparent that, without restraint, Hungary would defect to the West, thereby fracturing socialist bloc unity. In order to prevent such a catastrophe, the Chinese pressed for direct intervention by Russian military forces.²³

With this background of exerting international influence in Moscow's backyard, Premier Chou En-lai undertook a mission to weld the bloc nations together under the leadership of the Soviet Union. Throughout his tour of the Communist countries he stressed the need for unity as the most powerful guarantee of peace. He emphasized that without unity the countries in the

socialist camp would be picked off one at a time.²⁴

Chinese intervention in bloc affairs had important implications for future Sino-Soviet relations. The formula offered by the Chinese for relations within the bloc elevated Mao's prestige throughout the socialist camp and indicated a position of ideological ascendancy without impairing unity with the Soviets.²⁵ Also, it was instrumental in maintaining a world order in consonance with Mao's conception of a proper structure for the future. It is worthwhile noting that in addition to Mao's apparent aspiration eventually to occupy the throne of world communism, he was particularly concerned that the Communist empire remain intact until this feat was accomplished.

The Dragon Rears Its Head. Between June and November 1957 Chinese Communist domestic and foreign policy underwent a radical transformation from right to left. From their liberal position of defending Gomulka and advocating a confederative approach to bloc unity, the Chinese Communists turned by November to a position of vigorously opposing right-wing "revisionism" and advocating a strict centralist approach to bloc unity. They scrapped their conservative domestic program which was modeled after the Soviets and substituted the beginnings of a distinctively Chinese one, based on ideological as well as material incentives and on the intense application of labor more than of capital to industry. On the foreign policy front there was an abrupt shift away from the cautious, consolidating, Bandung-spirit, rightist strategy.²⁶

It would appear that in May 1957 Mao fell victim to his own ideas and illusions. For years he had carefully fostered the idea that the Communist Party represented the broad interests of the Chinese masses and that it was a genuinely popular party. Mao believed

70 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

he could avoid Stalin's mistakes by being a benevolent dictator and thereby lessen the conflict between ruler and the ruled.²⁷ Laboring under this swollen impression of himself, he instituted the period of a "hundred flowers." This was Mao's phrase for a period of "blooming and contending" in which the Communist rulers invited their subjects to criticize the regime. This period was called to a halt in June, after just 6 weeks of operation, when the situation began to get out of hand. Mao Tse-tung and communism in general were both being attacked bitterly.²⁸ Evidently, instead of "blooming and contending" the peasants were getting pretty "blooming contentious."

In addition to the traumatic experience of the "hundred flowers" campaign, the Chinese Communist leadership was faced with a domestic economic crisis in the summer of 1957. Serious food shortages had arisen as a result of the failure of collectivization to produce the expected agricultural expansion. And not much assistance was expected from the Soviet Union in resolving the economic dilemma. Clearly, drastic action was required.²⁹

Up to the time of the "hundred flowers" campaign the rightist elements of the Party exerted the principal influence on Mao. It appears reasonable that the left wing of the Party used the failure of the "hundred flowers" experiment to convince Mao of the error of the rightists' domestic policy. This, coupled with an urgency for action in the face of an economic crisis with no outside help in sight, seems a plausible explanation for the left ascendancy in the summer and fall of 1957 and the adoption of their economic development program based on ideological fervor.³⁰

Although the left-right struggle seems to have been primarily over domestic economic policy, an intimate connection between solutions for domestic and

foreign problems seems likely in view of the world outlook of the Chinese left. While not implying a direct relationship between Communist domestic and external policies under all conditions, internal convulsions accompanied by factional disputes are likely to be reflected in the foreign policy arena.³¹ It also seems to fit the pattern to assume that the left convinced Mao that, in view of Russian policy since the 20th Congress and in view of Mao's increasing ideological prestige, the time was ripe for Mao to attempt a stronger influence on the direction international Communist policy was to take.

Thus, by late 1957 the CCP was no longer championing the cause of the East European autonomists as they had in 1956 and early 1957. In November 1957 the Chinese abruptly deserted Gomulka and startled the Communist world by asserting the need for unqualified loyalty to Soviet leadership. This policy was soon to open up a new dialogue between Moscow and Peking.³²

In line with their new tough policy in foreign relations, the Chinese in the fall of 1957 hailed the Soviet advances in intercontinental ballistic missiles and the launching of the Soviet Sputnik as proof that communism was now stronger than capitalism. Mao stated:

I am of the opinion that the international situation has now reached a new turning point. There are two winds in the world today; the East wind and the West wind . . . I think the characteristic of the situation today is the East wind prevailing over the West wind. That is to say, the socialist forces are overwhelmingly superior to the imperialistic forces.³³

Although Peking appeared to disregard the dangers of nuclear war with the West and continued to press the Soviets to take greater risks, Khrushchev held to his peaceful coexistence

theme expounded at the 20th Congress. He rebuked Mao by stating, "only an unreasonable person can be fearless of war in our days."³⁴ However, the Chinese induced the Russians in October 1957 to agree to help them become a nuclear power and even to promise to give them a nuclear bomb. The Chinese Communists revealed this agreement in August 1963.³⁵ It seems plausible that this Russian offer may have been made in exchange for silencing Chinese opposition to Moscow's foreign policy line. Subsequently the Chinese publicly praised the Russians and hailed them as the leaders of communism. The following year, however, difficulties arose in implementing the agreement. The Russians apparently proposed that they retain control over Chinese nuclear weapons. Peking viewed this as a Soviet attempt to gain military mastery over China.³⁶

Although Sino-Soviet differences were marked in 1958, the Chinese apparently still felt there was some chance of influencing the Soviets to take a tougher stand in foreign relations. It seems plausible that the Taiwan incident was an attempt to force the Soviet hand. Chinese Communist propagandists started a campaign on the theme of "liberating" Taiwan. This brought the speedy arrival of Khrushchev in Peking on 31 July.³⁷ Khrushchev's trip ended the hopes for a Taiwan "liberation" and apparently also any further Chinese hopes of influencing the Soviets to accept their foreign policy line.

It would appear that henceforth the Chinese Communist preoccupation would be with wresting leadership control of the international Communist movement from the Soviets. Finding himself unable satisfactorily to influence the course of the international movement with Khrushchev on the throne, Mao decided the time had come to depose him and assert his rightful

claim. To add to the authenticity of his claim to leadership of the movement, it seems likely that Mao thought he had the makings of a spectacular. This was the commune program he had clandestinely undertaken and which the Russians only learned of in 1958 after it was well underway.³⁸

That Mao had finally decided to make his bid for leadership of the Communist movement seems to be borne out in the Chinese assertion that, with the advent of the communes, the shortcut to Communism was a reality, and the achievement of this goal was not too distant a prospect.³⁹ This Chinese claim of preparing to cross the threshold into communism ahead of the Soviets was ideologically significant for the underdeveloped countries of the world. In all the ramifications of the Sino-Soviet conflict as it widens and deepens, the thing that remains constant is the Chinese thrust for leadership of the international Communist movement.

IV — CHINESE BORDER INVOLVEMENTS

The bill that Mao would present to the world, in terms of territorial claims requisite to the reestablishment of Chinese preeminence in Asia, was foreseen in 1939 when he said:

After having inflicted military defeats on China, the imperialist countries forcibly took from her a large number of states tributary to China as well as part of her own territory. Japan appropriated Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukyus, the Pescadores, and Port Arthur; England took Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, and Hong Kong; France seized Annam; and even a miserable little country like Portugal took Macao from us.¹

Although Mao's ideological orientation was vastly different from Sun Yat-sen's, his nationalistic aspiration of restoring China's position in the world was the

same. Sun Yat-sen had earlier decried China's loss of Taiwan, the Pescadores, Burma, Annam, the Amur and Assuri River Basins, and the areas of the Ili, Khokand, and Amur Rivers, as well as such tributary areas as the Ryukyus, Thailand, Borneo, the Sulu Archipelago, Java, Ceylon, Nepal, and Bhutan.² Thus, regaining China's lost territory was no less important to Mao because of ideological convictions than it had been to the "father of Chinese nationalism," Sun Yat-sen.

The Beginnings of Empire. When the People's Republic of China was proclaimed on 1 October 1949, its announced intention in foreign relations was to protect China's independence, freedom, and integrity. Although this intention could be interpreted to mean the extension of the government's authority over parts of China still under Nationalist control, later Communist actions showed that the Communists were thinking particularly of Tibet, of certain border areas controlled by India and Burma, and possibly also Korea and Mongolia.³ It seems probable that the absorption of Southeast Asia was intended to be achieved by strengthening and influencing indigenous Communist movements, supporting indirect aggression in neighboring areas, and, where necessary, using the forces of the People's Liberation Army in limited actions.⁴ China's national interests of maintaining its national security and expanding its power and influence into adjacent areas could thus be achieved.

After coming to power the Chinese Communists wasted little time in implementing their plan to consolidate their gains and initiate the reestablishment of the Chinese Empire. In rapid succession, they solicited collaboration with Tibetan revolutionaries in January 1950; concluded a Treaty of

Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Aid with Russia in February 1950; and instituted large-scale immigration into Sinkiang in March 1950.

Early in 1950 a group of East Tibetan leaders was planning and directing a revolt against the Lhasa Government. Peking sent a letter to these leaders requesting that they collaborate with China in the revolt and further stating that China intended to take over the whole of Tibet, and after that Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan.⁵ On October 1950 Peking announced that "the process of liberating Tibet had begun and it was determined to do this by peaceful means."⁶

Actually on 7 October 1950, without warning, 40,000 troops of the 18th and 62nd Chinese Communist Armies crossed into Tibet at three points and overwhelmed the meager and ill-prepared Tibetan Border Forces. By 25 October, the date of their official announcement that the liberation had begun, the major job of occupying Tibet was already accomplished.⁷ Tibet asked the United Nations and India for assistance. The United Nations was too involved with the Korean war to pay proper attention, and India announced that their government did, in fact, recognize China's suzerainty over Tibet, thus withdrawing from any responsibility there.⁸

Prior to the establishment of the People's Republic of China the Soviets had maintained some influence in Sinkiang through the medium of the Soviet-inspired "East Turkestan Republic."⁹ Russia was interested in developing and exploiting the petroleum and mineral resources to be found in Sinkiang. With the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Aid, the Soviets refrained from any further interference in Sinkiang.¹⁰ However, subsequent agreements did allow the remnants of Russian author-

ity to linger in Sinkiang in the form of joint stock companies to exploit oil and nonferrous metals in which capital, direction, and profits were to be shared for 30 years. In spite of this obvious Soviet influence, China was in need of the assistance that the Russians were able to extend. In an effort to counter Russian prestige and consolidate the Chinese Communist position in Sinkiang, the Chinese began large-scale immigration into the area in March 1950.¹¹

Subsequent to the actions taken by the Chinese Communists in 1950 to obtain aid from the Russians and extend their control over Tibet and Sinkiang, their plans of empire were interrupted by the Korean war. Although Chou En-lai stated as early as 1940 that Sino-Korean relations would be of great importance in the future,¹² it seems most probable that the introduction of Chinese "volunteers" into the Korean war was simply a nationalistic response to what appeared to be a threat to the Manchurian border. Although Korea was included in Mao's list of tributary countries appropriated by Japan, there seems to be no evidence that China planned, at the time of the Korean war, to bring Korea once again under its hegemony. Additionally, since China was attempting to spread its influence within the ideological constraints of Communist doctrine, it was not compatible with this ideology to press Korea too hard at that time. As for the argument that China was simply coming to the aid of another Communist Party on ideological grounds, that seems too generous in view of subsequent experience.

After the Korean war China reasserted her claim to Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. In 1954 shellings were conducted against the islands of Matsu and Quemoy, but any anticipated invasion was thwarted by the Chinese

Nationalists who were supported by the U.S. 7th Fleet. Following this half-hearted attempt to extend their control over Taiwan, the Chinese Communists decided to present a peace-loving image to the world.

At New Delhi, on 2 April 1954, representatives of the Governments of the People's Republic of China and India signed an Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India. The agreement set up trade agencies by the Chinese in Calcutta, New Delhi, and Kalimpong. It established trade agencies for the Indians in the Tibetan towns of Yatung, Gyantse, and Garlok. In effect, by referring to the Tibet Region of China, India officially recognized Chinese sovereignty, not suzerainty, over Tibet.¹³

There were five principles, which became known as Panch Shila, enumerated in the preamble to the trade agreement:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
2. Mutual nonaggression,
3. Mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs,
4. Equality and mutual benefit, and
5. Peaceful coexistence.

Panch Shila (peaceful coexistence) became the principle of Indian foreign policy toward China.¹⁴

Between 18 and 24 April 1955, 29 African and Asian nations met at Bandung, Indonesia. At this conference Chou En-lai told all the nations present that China did not desire to spread its ideology but, rather, it sought normal relations based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence as agreed to by China and India.¹⁵ China evidently decided on this ploy to gain time in consolidating her position in areas already under Chinese control, to concentrate needed attention on domestic problems, and to plan the next phase of expansion.

China's Southern Border. In 1957 Mao Tse-tung expressed his belief that China's historical relationship to its past empire would be restored.¹⁶ By this time Mao was thoroughly disillusioned with Khrushchev's leadership of the international Communist movement and was in the process of building up his power position in Asia in order to challenge Khrushchev for the leadership role. This bid was to take the form in Asia of securing China's southern border areas and humiliating India, thereby removing her as a voice of authority in Asia. Actions taken by China in response to events in Tibet were eventually to involve China in a confrontation with India.

A widespread revolt of Tibetan Kham tribesmen, which broke out in late 1955, threatened the security of Chinese communications with Tibet. The main components of this communication system were two roads traversing difficult terrain between China and Lhasa, the Tibetan capital. These long roads ran through Kham-populated territory and were subject to the hazards of guerrilla warfare. Peking decided to build a more secure and reliable road through the high plain of Aksai Chin which linked western Tibet with Sinkiang. This area was relatively uninhabited, and the threat of rebel activity was not likely. The road could also be used the year around. The only problem was that the road was to be built through territory that India claimed. The Chinese apparently decided the requirement for the road was great enough to risk a break with India. Peking undoubtedly assumed that, as in the Tibetan case earlier, India would reluctantly accept the road in order to avoid straining Sino-Indian peaceful coexistence.¹⁷

Chinese parties surveyed the route in 1956, and Peking announced completion of the road on 5 October 1957.

The Indian Government knew nothing of the road construction until a picture of it appeared in a Chinese pictorial magazine. They then sent reconnaissance parties to the area to ascertain if the road was in Indian territory. When, in 1958, it was determined that the road ran across Indian territory, a note protesting infringement of Indian territory was sent to Peking.¹⁸ This was followed by bitter exchanges from both sides.

In early 1959 the Dalai Lama fled to India to escape the Red Chinese who were ruthlessly suppressing the Tibetan revolt. Peking accused the Indian Government of supporting the Tibetan rebellion from the Indian border town of Kalimpong, which, according to the Chinese, was the commanding center of the revolt.¹⁹ By March 1959 the Tibetan revolt was under control, and Peking turned her full attention to India. China directed a violent propaganda war against India, using the Tibetan revolt, suspected Indian and American support, and the border dispute as the reasons for her attack.²⁰ Mao Tse-tung termed the Indians "reactionary, imperialists, and aggressive."²¹

During the time New Delhi and Peking were involved over the dispute of the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh, the Chinese made other significant statements concerning India and border encroachments upon Indian territory. Chinese officers in Tibet stated "that they would before long liberate Sikkim, Bhutan, Ladakh, and the Northeast Frontier Area (NEFA), which was wrongfully held by Indian imperialists."²² Border areas were saturated with propaganda and the people told "that if Tibet was the palm of China's hand, Bhutan, NEFA, Sikkim, Nepal, and Ladakh were its fingers."²³

After border clashes in October 1959, which almost brought Sino-Indian re-

lations to the breaking point, the Chinese changed their tactics and pursued a course designed to isolate India diplomatically from her Asian neighbors. China started negotiations with Burma, Pakistan, and Nepal over her longstanding border disputes with these countries. Nepal signed a border agreement with China in 1960. Pakistan did not conclude her agreement with China over the border of northwestern Kashmir until May 1962. The Sino-Burmese Border Treaty was signed in January 1961. The almost total isolation of India was completed, in her own border quarrels, by adroit use of diplomatic pressure.²⁴

After the breaking point in relations was reached in October 1959, the Chinese made an effort to stem the flood of Indian charges against China and to convince the world that China wanted a peaceful settlement of the border dispute. On 7 September 1959 Chou En-lai proposed to New Delhi the demilitarization of the Sino-Indian border on the McMahon Line and in Ladakh to a depth of 20 kilometers from the then existing areas under control of either country. This would give China control of 6,000 square miles of the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh.²⁵ The Indians rejected this proposal, but, ironically, the provisions of this proposal were precisely what Peking exacted from the situation by humiliating India in the border war from October to November 1962.

In applying its policies to the non-Communist countries around its borders, Communist China has taken two distinct approaches. Towards those countries which seek political accommodation and do not join with the United States or Russia to frustrate its aims, China offers the "Bandung Spirit" and the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence." This cooperation has achieved notable success in

obtaining border settlements with China for Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Although the last is a member of SEATO, its membership has primarily been for the purpose of strengthening its position against India; and this policy evidently has been acceptable to China. The other approach has resulted in political warfare against those Asian countries which cooperate with Russia and the United States.²⁶ For the Indians this has meant enmity with the Chinese, two years of indeterminate border discussions, and invasions of her country. These two approaches as applied to China's borders have given Peking the option of deciding where to commit its forces and where to apply the techniques of infiltration and subversion.

China's alliances with other Communist nations are based on ideological agreement which does not allow for other than the peaceful solution of any territorial disputes. This principle has been observed between China and North Vietnam, North Korea, and Outer Mongolia. Although there apparently have been no border disagreements since 1949 between the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union, in 1964 the issue was raised by Mao Tse-tung when he claimed that approximately 500,000 square miles of China's land had been taken by Russian imperialism during the Ch'ing dynasty.²⁷ Thus, the Chinese Communists have been able to pursue their nationalistic aims within the constraints of the Communist ideology.

V — CONCLUSIONS

In assessing the behavior of the Chinese Communists since the establishment of the CCP in 1921, it seems reasonable to conclude that nationalism is their primary motivating force and that communism (or more precisely

Maoism — Communism modified to serve the unique needs of China) is the means by which they have decided to pursue their nationalistic ambitions. As for the form this struggle has taken, and will take in the future, Chinese history provides a model known as the "Middle Kingdom," which appears to be the basic blueprint for Chinese Communist hopes. Statements of Chinese Communist leaders and actions they have taken to date all point in this direction.

Although the leaders on Mainland China call themselves Communists, their words and actions reveal them to be, in effect, the latest in a long line of emperors and imperial officials who ruled the land for many centuries. They have fused the messianic appeal of communism with Chinese national pride and arrogance. They dream of making China once again the "Middle Kingdom," the center of the world, from which supreme power will be exercised over the "barbarians" near and far. Their ambition is sharpened by a determination to avenge the humiliation and exploitation their nation suffered during the past century and a half at the hands of both Westerners and Russians.

On the road to realizing their ambitions, the Chinese leaders first came under the tutelage of Stalin. Traditional Chinese political assumptions may have disposed Mao to acquiesce in Stalin's primacy between 1949 and 1953, even though, from personal experience, Mao was painfully aware of Stalin's ineptitude in assessing the Chinese scene. China (or, by extension, the Soviet bloc) is a political and cultural universe. It cannot be divided. In this universe there is only one Son of Heaven. He and his dynasty (or party) are the repository of final power. The Son of Heaven is also the repository and embodiment of ultimate

truth (be it Confucian or Marxist), by virtue of which he rules. Mao's necessary acquiescence in Stalin's primacy after 1949, despite his own personal inclinations, may well have been supported by these intellectual dispositions. Historically, China had been under the sway or influence of "barbarians" more than once, but their sway was never permanent. Between 1949 and 1953 Mao could accept Stalin's primacy because Stalin's was an identifiable political role within the context of both Chinese tradition and Chinese communism, as is Mao's today.

The accession of new groups to power in China has usually resulted in a reaffirmation of the Chinese "political style," however modified by immediate circumstances. Mao can no more escape China, with its problems and traditions, than Stalin could have escaped Russia. With Stalin's death, the subsequent political instability in the Soviet Union, and Khrushchev's policy innovations, Mao felt that the mantle of orthodoxy and truth had passed to him. Thus, after 1956 he felt justified in striking out boldly for bloc leadership.

Mao is caught up in a three-way tension between traditional dispositions, the imperatives of modern nationalism, and the Marxist ideological necessity that China be part of the mainstream of world history which is governed by laws that are universal. For Mao, the only resolution of this tension lies in the conviction and insistence that his ideological formulations are orthodox and universally valid. (Ask any Red Guard.) In one dimension, he is fighting for his international political life, for his belief that he now rightly occupies the ideological (and power) position formerly held by Stalin. But in another dimension, Peking's fundamental acceptance of Brezhnev's and Kosygin's ideological leadership would

require, intellectually, much more than Mao's abandonment of his own ideological position. It would require the abandonment and denial of the most

fundamental political principal in the Chinese tradition: the centrality of China and the unique power of China's ruler.

FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Dean G. Acheson, "Letter of Transmittal," U.S. Dept. of State, *United States Relations With China* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1949), p. xvi.

I — NATIONALISM BEGETS COMMUNISM

1. P. S. Robert Payne, *Portrait of a Revolutionary: Mao Tse-tung* (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1961), p. 56-62.
2. Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 8.
3. Payne, p. 61.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 62-63.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
6. Benjamin I. Schwartz, p. 9.
7. *Supra*, p. 2-3.
8. Benjamin I. Schwartz, p. 11.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
10. Payne, p. 74.
11. For an account of the tribulations of the first meeting see Hsiao Yu, *Mao Tse-tung and I Were Beggars* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1959), p. 196-203.
12. Conrad Brandt, *Stalin's Failure in China: 1924-1927* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 3.
13. Benjamin I. Schwartz, p. 38.
14. Cheng Tien-fang, *A History of Sino-Russian Relations* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957), p. 121.
15. Benjamin I. Schwartz, p. 41.
16. Brandt, p. 31.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 33-34.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
19. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1956), v. IV, p. 250.

II — MAO TSE-TUNG AND FOREIGN POLICY

1. As an indication that this feeling expressed by Mao is more Chinese than Communist, Chiang Kai-shek in his book, *China's Destiny*, took the Western Powers to task for their imperialism toward China in political and economic affairs just as Sun Yat-sen had done previously in his *Three Principles of the People*.
2. Wen-lue C. Chen, *Chinese Communist Anti-Americanism and the Resist-America Aid-Korea Campaign* (Lackland AFB, Tex.: U.S. Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, 1955), p. 3-4.
3. George F. Kennan, "Stalin and China," *The Atlantic Monthly*, May 1961, p. 39.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

7. Edmund O. Clubb, "The International Position of Communist China," Hammerskjöld Forums, 1963, *The International Position of Communist China* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1965), p. 8.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Harry Schwartz, *China* (New York: Atheneum, 1965), p. 134.
10. David N. Rowe, *Modern China: a Brief History* (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1959), p. 54.
11. For an account of the almost unbelievable ordeal of the Long March as related to Edgar Snow by Mao Tse-tung see Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China* (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 177-196.
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13. *Ibid.*
14. Rowe, p. 55.
15. Fairbank, p. 235.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 235-245.
17. See Dept. of State, *United States Relations with China*.
18. Mao, v. IV, p. 269.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 302-303.
20. Fairbank, p. 264-266.
21. U.S. Dept. of State, p. 132.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 605.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 170-171.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 710-719.
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26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*, p. 417.

III — THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

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2. Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 12.
3. Stalin, quoted in Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito Speaks* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1953), p. 331.
4. Charles B. McLane, "The Moscow-Peking Alliance: the First Decade," *Current History*, December 1959, p. 327.
5. Harry Schwartz, *Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964), p. 146.
6. A. Doak Barnett, "The United States and Communist China," American Assembly, *The United States and the Far East* (New York: 1956), p. 139-140.
7. Robert C. North, *Moscow and Chinese Communists*, 2d ed. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 271.
8. Howard L. Boorman, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance: a New Dimension in World Politics," *Journal of International Affairs*, v. XI, no. 2, 1957, p. 122-133.
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10. *Ibid.*, p. 156-157.
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12. William E. Griffith, *World Communism Divided* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1964), p. 13.
13. Harry Schwartz, *Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars*, p. 157.
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15. John K. Fairbank, "The People's Middle Kingdom," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1966, p. 575.
16. Paul M. A. Linebarger, et al., *Far Eastern Governments and Politics* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1957), p. 88.
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80 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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To achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears, and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds.

Mao Tse-tung, 1893, On Protracted War