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Rhodesia: Background to Conflict

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McClintock, Robert. *The Meaning of Limited War*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967. 239 p.

Here is presented a series of case studies in limited war, several of which are based upon the personal experiences of the author. The book was written while Ambassador McClintock was assigned as the State Department Adviser to the President of the U.S. Naval War College. The stated purpose of the book "is to study the nature of past, present, and probable war in the last half of the twentieth century," and in the words of the author "is . . . written by a professional diplomat for the elucidation of the citizen who is concerned."

The author's analysis of the past and present limited wars, i.e., wars where there is no direct confrontation between nuclear powers, indicates that each has the common properties of: (1) the use of surrogate forces, (2) the respect of sanctuaries, (3) the inclusion of the new Communist political invention of "wars of national liberation," and (4) the use of international organizations for either debate and/or settlement. It is these factors which place the wars of today in the political rather than the military arena, and, at least to the author, it is not so much whether we win or not, but, rather, are we still there when the game is over? The nuclear stalemate has made general war "a terminal folly," and if the free world, primarily through the use of sea-power, can make national wars of liberation unproductive, eventually differences between nations and ideologies can be settled only at the conference table. For as the author states, "It is the thousand year view that the statesman must assume, and in this perspective the diplomat may take hope from history." Perhaps.

The Meaning of Limited War is easy and interesting reading, and although

the military officer may take exception to, and, in some cases, umbrage at, specific portions or vignettes, the book does provide insight into the meaning of "limited war" from a diplomatic point of view.

A. J. ASHURST
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Mtshali, B. Vulindlela. *Rhodesia: Background to Conflict*. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967. 255 p.

The author of this book is a South African Zulu who is currently working on a Ph.D. degree in political science at New York University. His discussion of the problem of Rhodesia is obviously from the viewpoint of the Black African, and Mr. Mtshali makes no claim for impartiality. His book is, however, straightforward and well documented. It seeks to examine the background of colonial development in Rhodesia and to trace the events which led to Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. In his analysis of the Rhodesian controversy the author is highly critical, not only of Britain, the United Nations, and the Organization of African Unity for their inability or failure to take effective action against the regime of Ian Smith, but also of the disunity within the African nationalist movement in Rhodesia itself. The volume points out that the political energies of the Africans have been seriously dissipated by the utter failure of the black nationalist organizations to act in unison against the white-dominated Rhodesian Government. The author acknowledges that power is now securely in the hands of the white settlers and that Rhodesian independence is a fait accompli which will be extremely difficult to reverse. His conclusion, however, that the crisis in Rhodesia has done irreparable damage to relations between black and white throughout Africa is hard to contest.

This book is well written, easy to read, and is recommended as worthwhile background material for anyone with a particular interest in African affairs.

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Oglesby, Carl and Shaul, Richard.
Containment and Change. New York: Macmillan, 1967. 248 p.

The book comprises two essays discussing revolution in today's world as viewed by authors who were not known to each other before February 1966. One (Oglesby) had previously been involved in the American domestic movement toward a more just society; the other (Shaul) spent many years in Latin America in close association with Catholic and Protestant student movements. These backgrounds provide a clue to the theme and setting of the essays.

Of the two, Oglesby's "Vietnamese Crucible" is the more radical. The basic premise is a quest for social change through disassociation with total world involvement and through a defeated and outmoded containment. Consider the following events as espoused by Oglesby: In World War II the United States forced Stalin into an accommodation with Hitler; she failed to provide a quick second front in France and thereby caused mass suffering in Russia and justified Stalin's postwar foreign policy in Europe; Washington obstructed Russia's economic rehabilitation by denying her the richest parts of Europe as reparations; Stalin was not a revolutionary but a nationalist, and because of Americans' shabby treatment, he was forced to create a system of buffer satellite states as a sentinel against a resurgent Germany. Consider further a lengthy argument which purports to show that the widening economic gap between the "haves" and "have nots" is prin-

cipally caused, not by communism, but by American corporations, collectively characterized as the "United Fruit Company"; and that this is at the core of third world revolutions; further, that the solution to these ills will be found in states not hampered by private investment, nor harassed nor manipulated by corporate interests of outside states. Big business is made the culprit, and a variety of examples ultimately focusing on Vietnam are used to prove the case against an economic imperialism.

The essay by Shaul entitled "Revolution: Heritage and Contemporary Option" is much the milder in tone and outlook. He places change in historical perspective by relating and identifying with "messianism," and defining the role that Judeo-Christian example has played in our Western self-understanding. He sets forth a blueprint for revolution, preferably without violence, which espouses its causes in a series of coordinated dissents by small, radical groups (the political equivalent of guerrilla warfare) in order to achieve a humanistic world of social equality for all mankind.

There is a need to know what apostles of dissent today are thinking and advocating. This book's redeeming virtue is that it partially serves that purpose.

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Palit, D. K. *War in the Deterrent Age*. London: Macdonald, 1966. 244 p.

Military strategy and policymaking have undergone such fundamental changes in concept during the past 20 years that it requires conscious and determined study to keep pace with the sophisticated arguments and theories of nuclear dialectics. Unless this effort is made, not only by professionals but also by thinking people everywhere, obsolete notions based on traditional