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## War in the Deterrent Age

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This book is well written, easy to read, and is recommended as worthwhile background material for anyone with a particular interest in African affairs.

J. E. ARNOLD  
Commander, U.S. Navy

Oglesby, Carl and Shaul, Richard.  
*Containment and Change*. New York: Macmillan, 1967. 248 p.

The book comprises two essays discussing revolution in today's world as viewed by authors who were not known to each other before February 1966. One (Oglesby) had previously been involved in the American domestic movement toward a more just society; the other (Shaul) spent many years in Latin America in close association with Catholic and Protestant student movements. These backgrounds provide a clue to the theme and setting of the essays.

Of the two, Oglesby's "Vietnamese Crucible" is the more radical. The basic premise is a quest for social change through disassociation with total world involvement and through a defeated and outmoded containment. Consider the following events as espoused by Oglesby: In World War II the United States forced Stalin into an accommodation with Hitler; she failed to provide a quick second front in France and thereby caused mass suffering in Russia and justified Stalin's postwar foreign policy in Europe; Washington obstructed Russia's economic rehabilitation by denying her the richest parts of Europe as reparations; Stalin was not a revolutionary but a nationalist, and because of Americans' shabby treatment, he was forced to create a system of buffer satellite states as a sentinel against a resurgent Germany. Consider further a lengthy argument which purports to show that the widening economic gap between the "haves" and "have nots" is prin-

cipally caused, not by communism, but by American corporations, collectively characterized as the "United Fruit Company"; and that this is at the core of third world revolutions; further, that the solution to these ills will be found in states not hampered by private investment, nor harassed nor manipulated by corporate interests of outside states. Big business is made the culprit, and a variety of examples ultimately focusing on Vietnam are used to prove the case against an economic imperialism.

The essay by Shaul entitled "Revolution: Heritage and Contemporary Option" is much the milder in tone and outlook. He places change in historical perspective by relating and identifying with "messianism," and defining the role that Judeo-Christian example has played in our Western self-understanding. He sets forth a blueprint for revolution, preferably without violence, which espouses its causes in a series of coordinated dissents by small, radical groups (the political equivalent of guerrilla warfare) in order to achieve a humanistic world of social equality for all mankind.

There is a need to know what apostles of dissent today are thinking and advocating. This book's redeeming virtue is that it partially serves that purpose.

D. J. MORGIEWICZ  
Commander, U.S. Navy

Palit, D. K. *War in the Deterrent Age*. London: Macdonald, 1966. 244 p.

Military strategy and policymaking have undergone such fundamental changes in concept during the past 20 years that it requires conscious and determined study to keep pace with the sophisticated arguments and theories of nuclear dialectics. Unless this effort is made, not only by professionals but also by thinking people everywhere, obsolete notions based on traditional

usage are likely to continue to prevail in many significant and crucial quarters and thus misguide the actions and decisions of individuals and governments alike. With these statements, Maj. Gen. D. K. Palit, Indian Army, launches into the subject of war in the deterrent age. The author suggests that the establishment of a balance of deterrents in nuclear strategy does not necessarily create a historical condition in which other forms of war become outlawed. On the contrary, he states that we have now entered a new era in history in which strategic planning entails being prepared at all times to wage war at all levels — ranging from the “absurd” war of swift all-out nuclear exchange to Mao Tse-tung’s creeping guerrilla aggression that might involve years of actual but “unconventional” combat. Unfortunately, the very immensity of the requirement creates a reluctance toward its acceptance. It becomes easier to believe that the absolute deterrent is absolute strategy: that the choice in the future could lie only between mutual destruction and peace and that, therefore, the threat of the one is the guarantee of the other.

In this book General Palit directs his thoughts to those who would interest themselves in contemporary defense thinking — professionals and laymen alike. He presents the essence of the arguments and counterarguments in the nuclear debate in concise and relatively uncomplicated form. At the same time he presents a brief history of the development of the traditional concepts of military strategy in conventional, unconventional, and nuclear war. This book may be most useful as a summary of much of the contemporary thought on this most complex subject.

J. A. BACON  
Commander, U.S. Navy

Salisbury, Harrison F. *Orbit of China*. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. 204 p.

Now there was another war and nothing was simple about it . . . There was no agreement, no easy, recognizable consensus Good, only terrible portents of Evil . . . Over the whole world there was alarm and fear lest the contagion spread, lest the engines of destruction . . . might be unloosed in ever-widening circles, fanning out from Asia and beyond. . . It was this which had set me off on a mission to the most distant ends of the earth . . . seeking the sources of the torment and the tragedy . . . Was it really China that lay behind it all? Or was it, as not a few Americans believed, the United States, blundering and bludgeoning, blindly striking out in a kind of frenzy of frustration? Had China and ourselves embarked on a collision course which could lead only to world nuclear destruction?

And so, in 1966, Harrison F. Salisbury of *The New York Times*, intentionally bypassing the Vietnams, went into a 30,000-mile clockwise orbit of China, stopping off in Hong Kong, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Burma, India, Sikkim, Moscow, Mongolia, several Siberian cities, and Japan. In each he established contact with what the reviewer can classify only as observers, because with but a few exceptions — Gen. Ne Win of Burma being one of the most notable — they are referred to only as the official, the sergeant, banker, physician, China-watcher, diplomat, the pilot, American officer, mayor, et cetera. Of particular interest is the insight offered in the chapter on Burma which for more than 3 years has been sealed to foreigners; diplomatic missions have been reduced, most foreign aid has been discontinued, newspapermen are banned, tourist trade has halted, and foreign businessmen are denied entry. Salisbury’s visit was a rare exception.