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Orbit of China

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usage are likely to continue to prevail in many significant and crucial quarters and thus misguide the actions and decisions of individuals and governments alike. With these statements, Maj. Gen. D. K. Palit, Indian Army, launches into the subject of war in the deterrent age. The author suggests that the establishment of a balance of deterrents in nuclear strategy does not necessarily create a historical condition in which other forms of war become outlawed. On the contrary, he states that we have now entered a new era in history in which strategic planning entails being prepared at all times to wage war at all levels — ranging from the “absurd” war of swift all-out nuclear exchange to Mao Tse-tung’s creeping guerrilla aggression that might involve years of actual but “unconventional” combat. Unfortunately, the very immensity of the requirement creates a reluctance toward its acceptance. It becomes easier to believe that the absolute deterrent is absolute strategy: that the choice in the future could lie only between mutual destruction and peace and that, therefore, the threat of the one is the guarantee of the other.

In this book General Palit directs his thoughts to those who would interest themselves in contemporary defense thinking — professionals and laymen alike. He presents the essence of the arguments and counterarguments in the nuclear debate in concise and relatively uncomplicated form. At the same time he presents a brief history of the development of the traditional concepts of military strategy in conventional, unconventional, and nuclear war. This book may be most useful as a summary of much of the contemporary thought on this most complex subject.

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Salisbury, Harrison F. *Orbit of China*. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. 204 p.

Now there was another war and nothing was simple about it . . . There was no agreement, no easy, recognizable consensus Good, only terrible portents of Evil . . . Over the whole world there was alarm and fear lest the contagion spread, lest the engines of destruction . . . might be unloosed in ever-widening circles, fanning out from Asia and beyond. . . It was this which had set me off on a mission to the most distant ends of the earth . . . seeking the sources of the torment and the tragedy . . . Was it really China that lay behind it all? Or was it, as not a few Americans believed, the United States, blundering and bludgeoning, blindly striking out in a kind of frenzy of frustration? Had China and ourselves embarked on a collision course which could lead only to world nuclear destruction?

And so, in 1966, Harrison F. Salisbury of *The New York Times*, intentionally bypassing the Vietnams, went into a 30,000-mile clockwise orbit of China, stopping off in Hong Kong, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Burma, India, Sikkim, Moscow, Mongolia, several Siberian cities, and Japan. In each he established contact with what the reviewer can classify only as observers, because with but a few exceptions — Gen. Ne Win of Burma being one of the most notable — they are referred to only as the official, the sergeant, banker, physician, China-watcher, diplomat, the pilot, American officer, mayor, et cetera. Of particular interest is the insight offered in the chapter on Burma which for more than 3 years has been sealed to foreigners; diplomatic missions have been reduced, most foreign aid has been discontinued, newspapermen are banned, tourist trade has halted, and foreign businessmen are denied entry. Salisbury’s visit was a rare exception.

The author senses a clear and present danger that China and the United States are far advanced along a course which can lead only to nuclear war and that the Chinese, unlike most Americans, have already fully perceived this. His solutions lie in the creation of a framework of relationships which would enable China to live in peace with America and vice versa. The key to the China problem is seen as food and population. Mr. Salisbury advances proposals toward solution of these problems and that of breaking down the barrier of Chinese isolation. The book is interesting, easily readable, and probably an authentic statement of the views of those consulted.

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Spanier, John W. *World Politics in an Age of Revolution*. New York: Praeger, 1967. 434 p.

In this book the author attempts to provide the reader with an understanding of the forces that shape the present world. He has limited his analysis to three forces — the revolution in military technology, the nationalist and social revolution throughout the underdeveloped areas, and the “permanent revolution” of communism. The author believes that each of these three revolutions or forces has profoundly transformed the nature of international politics since World War II. Mr. Spanier is not content with the usual explanations of the behavior of states that conclude there are certain enduring trends such as the “seeking of power” and the

pursuing of “national interest.” He delves further, elucidating the specific motives that compel states to behave in certain ways. His contention is that a state’s environment determines its behavior, and an examination of any state’s environment must be made to determine why a state has acted in a certain manner.

One of his principal arguments is that the very nature of the international system will affect, to a large degree, the behavior of states unless a careful study is made of the prevailing conditions at that time. He cautions the reader not to ignore the relationship between domestic and internal factors and foreign policy decisions and that any study of international politics must be a “two-level” analysis of both international and domestic considerations. His chapters on communism (ch. III and IX) vividly make this point for his reader.

This book is not easy to read but contains much useful information for the student of international relations. Mr. Spanier has overcome one serious defect that most authors overlook; that is, he presents each topic separately with its own conclusions so that his reader may pursue his quest for knowledge at his own speed. His conclusion that we must learn to live “with” many of our problems rather than hope to “solve” them is worthy of serious contemplation.

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