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... BALANCE OF POWER

... COMMUNIST CONTROL SYSTEM



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW



FEBRUARY 1968

FOREWORD

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College.

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Lectures are selected on the basis of favorable reception by Naval War College audiences, usefulness to servicewide readership, and timeliness. Research papers are selected on the basis of professional interest to readers.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the lecturers and authors, and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department nor of the Naval War College.

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Cover photo: Washington Crossing the Delaware by Emanuel Leutze (American, 1816-1868). Courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, Gift of John S. Kennedy, 1897.

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CHALLENGE!

Because of the emphasis on operational experience, the officer selected to attend the Naval War College is sometimes beset with doubt as to the true career value of this assignment. In response to this doubt, in my opening remarks to the students this year I emphasized that attendance at the College afforded an unparalleled opportunity both to widen their perspectives and to deepen their professional knowledge. How much of this broadening and deepening has been accomplished in the brief time since those remarks were made is difficult to measure, but I am sure that it is far in excess of what was anticipated.

The Naval War College emphasizes the ingredients basic to educational excellence in an effort to engender imaginative thinking about new problems and about old problems in new ways. This imaginative thinking is a product of broad perspectives and deep professional knowledge. To illustrate this, let us view the example of an early great military leader, who happened to be the father of this great nation of ours.

Gen. George Washington, Commander in Chief of the Continental Army, had little familiarity with seamanship or, for that matter, even the basic techniques of the naval profession. Yet the clear perception of the functions of naval power which become so obvious in a study of his campaign illuminates a genius rarely equaled afloat or ashore.

For the first 3 years of the Revolutionary War, the British Army enjoyed the strength and luxury afforded by an almost complete freedom of sea communications. Ample supplies were assured by the easy flexibility and rapid mobility of troop movements and the powerful support of artillery fire and



landing forces from numerous great men-of-war. In striking contrast, the American Army began with a critical need of obtaining munitions from overseas. Its ordinary supply of food, clothing, and other necessities of mere daily living were frequently most precarious because of the hold of the British Navy on the coastal and inland waterways of this country.

Washington stressed extreme shortages and lack of mobility in his first report to Congress in July of 1775. In his need he turned first to Governor Cook of Rhode Island who controlled a few small vessels of the state naval forces. As the result of General Washington's appeal, six armed vessels were operating in Washington's Navy by November fifth, serving the double purpose of reducing the supplies to the besieged British in Boston and replenishing the poverty-stricken American Army.

During the first 3 years of the Revolution, the General was balked at every turn by the overwhelming British sea supremacy, with the minor exception of a respite gained by the temporary American naval control on Lake Cham-

plain. After spending 8 months outside of Boston in the reorganization, training, and equipping of an army to defeat the British troops, their seapower and the mobility it provided robbed him of his goal. Moving to New York, which he correctly surmised as the next hostile objective, Washington was suddenly faced there with overwhelming numbers brought against him by the same maritime forces which transported the troops who menaced his rear. British naval forces were the instrument in the ensuing campaign which threatened his flanks and rear constantly and finally forced him into New Jersey in retreat.


From this location in December of 1777 he faced frustration on all sides. Lack of communications cloaked the movement of the enemy. His troops were exhausted from a series of marches and countermarches which resulted from trying to outguess the mobile movement by sea of the British troops. Finances, supplies and equipment, and the lack of these would have shattered the morale of a lesser man. With arrival of word that the British Army was sighted embarked in transports, he reasoned that they would strike either up the Hudson, where Burgoyne was advancing from the north, or at Philadelphia.

Between the frequently alternating probability of these two objectives, the American Army was further weakened by detachments sent to the north at the request of Congress. When they finally met Howe below Philadelphia, where seapower had transported him in stealth, the burdens which this same

seapower had imposed on Americans made it impossible for them to offer effective resistance.

France's entry into the war completely changed the strategy of General Washington. The French Fleet opened to him for the first time the opportunity of effective employment of seapower to his own end. The prompt vigor with which he grasped the situation was most extraordinary, considering his lack of experience in this field. Crushing burdens which naval superiority had levied upon him, however, were sufficient to convince him of the imperative need for utilization of naval power on a broad and effective scale. From the arrival of the French Fleet until the conclusion of the War, American military operations consisted of an army held in readiness for close cooperation with the fleet. This was to be the military strategy during the last 4 years of the American Revolution. History shows the soundness of this strategy.


While the Naval War College makes no attempt to recreate the genius that was Washington in the balance and breadth of its curriculum, his genius should be an inspiration and a challenge. And the quick and inspired grasp of the importance of seapower by a man who disclaimed any knowledge of naval operations should show how vital it is to broaden the potential of each individual student. This must be the primary goal of the Naval War College, for its assigned task is to prepare every officer in attendance for the higher responsibilities toward which he aspires.



JOHN T. HAYWARD

Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

President, Naval War College



ORGANIZATION OF A POWER SYSTEM: UNILATERALISM AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

Professor Hans J. Morgenthau
A lecture delivered to the Naval War College
on 4 October 1967

The problem which has been assigned to me is interesting for the very simple reason that the issue could be raised at all as a matter of serious choice between what is called unilateralism and the balance of power. The assumption that there exists such a choice points to an age-old prejudice concerning the balance of power, a

prejudice which has been particularly strong in this country, to the effect that a nation has a choice between a balance-of-power policy and another kind of policy supposed to be morally and politically superior. You have the classic example of this prejudice in the great wartime speeches of Woodrow Wilson who said that one of the war

aims of the United States was not to create another balance of power but to make an end to the balance of power; to replace the balance of power with a condominium of power and thereby to make an end also to all the risks, liabilities, and moral ambiguities of what was disparagingly called power politics. You have an echo, and a very strong echo, of this negative conception of the balance of power in the statement which the then Secretary of State Cordell Hull made in 1943 when he returned from the Moscow Conference at which the establishment of the United Nations was agreed upon. He declared that the United Nations would make an end to power politics and all the aspects which go with it, such as balances of power, armaments races, spheres of influence, and so forth. And the very same statement was made by President Roosevelt in his report to Congress on the Yalta Conference of March 1945. In other words, there was here the expectation that governments had a choice between a balance-of-power policy and some other kind of policy. This conception, it has always seemed to me, is utterly mistaken. A nation has no choice between a balance-of-power and another kind of rational policy. It has a choice between a balance-of-power policy and nothing at all. The idea of American isolation and of a policy of isolationism appears to derive from this conception opposing the balance of power. But this is correct only in a very superficial way. For if you go only a little deeper into the history of American foreign policy, you realize to what extent even those who verbally were opposed to the balance of power in actuality operated on its premises.

Take the very early period of American foreign policy. The founding fathers were, of course, very acutely aware of the dependence of the very

existence of the United States upon the distribution of power among the great European nations who were the protectors of colonies on the periphery of the new United States, and they were very acutely aware of the necessity to exploit the divergences among those great European powers in order to safeguard the independence of the United States.

It is interesting to note, for instance, that a man who in theory was opposed to the balance of power, such as Thomas Jefferson, in his diaries and letters during the Napoleonic Wars instinctively always took the side of that party to the war which seemed to be losing at the time. Whenever Napoleon was winning, he took the side of Great Britain; when Great Britain seemed to win, he took the side of Napoleon; and he once even expressed in clear terms the opinion that the future of the United States depended upon a kind of equilibrium between the great European powers.

Take another example, just in passing: the policy of the United States during the Crimean War — a period which is generally regarded to be the heyday of isolationism. Taking a look at the reports of our ambassadors and the orders which were given by the Secretary of State to the ambassadors, one realizes again to what extent, instinctively, the foreign policy of the United States was oriented toward promoting and supporting an equilibrium among the different principal European nations.

Why did Wilson enter the First World War in April 1917? Not primarily because of the violation of maritime rights by the German Navy, but because in April 1917 it had become obvious that without the intervention of the United States there was a very good chance that Germany would win the war and thereby destroy the Euro-

pean balance of power, replacing it with a German hegemony. And why did the United States, from the very beginning of the Second World War, take an open position in favor of the Western Allies against Nazi Germany? Not on ideological grounds, because those grounds had existed before, but again because a victory of Nazi Germany, meaning the destruction of the European balance of power, would also have meant a direct threat to the security of the United States. And why did the United States, immediately after the end of the Second World War, embark upon the policy of containment of the Soviet Union? Because again there was a great power in Europe then in the form of the Soviet Union which threatened the European balance of power.

There is a consistency in American foreign policy underlying all kinds of philosophies about foreign policy, all kinds of governments both in terms of quality and party affiliations. And this consistency is not an accident. For the balance of power is not a matter of choice. It's not something invented by statesmen, let alone professors. It is for foreign policy what the law of gravity is for physics. Surely, if you wish, you can disregard the law of gravity, but you're going to break your neck. And certainly you can disregard, if the fate of a nation is in your hands, the balance of power, but you risk the security and the existence of the nation. So from any rational point of view, there is no such thing as a foreign policy which is not firmly based upon the balance of power. A foreign policy which is not based in such a way is simply irrational and incompetent foreign policy. And, as I've pointed out, even in the heyday of American isolation the United States was not so much isolationist as neutral. It didn't want to get involved in the squabbles of Europe. But it was not indifferent to

the outcome of those squabbles. And I should say that in this respect the national interest of the United States and, in consequence, its foreign policy ran on parallel lines with those of Great Britain. For what the United States felt almost instinctively, Great Britain, of course, noted with much greater acuteness: that any nation on the European Continent which would acquire a hegemonial position by this very fact would threaten the security of the British Isles. In consequence, an approximately equal distribution of power among a number of rival and antagonistic nations was regarded to be essential for the security of the British Isles. What has been true of Great Britain has been true in a less acute sense, because of its actual existential isolation, of the United States as well. And it is interesting to note that what is true of the American tradition in its European policy is also true in its Asian policy.

When the United States became politically and militarily interested in Asia - this was around the turn of the century - it formulated the open door policy with regard to China. This policy aimed, first of all, at keeping the door open to all nations, without discrimination, as concerned the economic exploitation of China. But this open door policy very quickly took on political and military aspects, for in the same way in which the United States had realized that a European power gaining a hegemonial position in Europe by that very fact constituted a threat to the security of the United States, so American statesmen realized that any European or Asian power which would add to its own power the enormous power potential of China would thereby make itself the master of Asia and constitute a threat to the vital interest of the United States. And this general principle underlying the open

door policy very quickly was put to the test in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese war.

Theodore Roosevelt took a very active part in the settlement of this war for the purpose of limiting the effects of the Japanese victory over Russia. He didn't want Japan to become a hegemonial power in Asia by virtue of its victory over Russia, and so he supported Russia against Japan. And this became the basic rationale of our Asian policy up to Pearl Harbor, or one may perhaps say more correctly that Pearl Harbor was the culmination of that policy.

The Washington Treaty of 1922 was an attempt, and a temporarily successful attempt, to limit the power of Japan. The opposition, first verbal and in the late 1930's active, to the Japanese conquest of China derived from the same rationale. And the resistance in the spring and fall of 1941 on the part of Roosevelt and Hull to the attempt on the part of Japan to expand its empire to Southeast Asia and embark upon a virtually limitless course of conquest led directly to a collision course of which Pearl Harbor was the outward manifestation and culmination. As soon as the war against Japan started, we again continued to pursue a balance of power policy in trying to strengthen China as a counterweight to Japan. It is a measure of the failure of that policy that China transformed itself from a potential ally of the United States, providing a counterweight to the power of Japan, to the enemy of the United States, to the main threat to the balance of power in Asia, which now requires another counterweight in the form of Japan. So the superficial inconsistency of our policy is the result of a profound underlying rational consistency, for again we have followed one basic interest in Asia, the preservation and, if need be, the restoration of the balance

of power. Our position with regard to China, in my view at least, can only be rationally justified in terms of limiting the power of China through the creation and maintenance of a counterweight so that China cannot become a hegemonial power in Asia, by that very fact threatening the security of the United States.

It has been said that under present circumstances, especially if you look at the nuclear confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union, that the balance of power either has radically changed its nature or that it doesn't exist any more at all. Again I must emphatically disagree. The nuclear mutual deterrent between the United States and the Soviet Union is the most primitive pattern of the balance of power. That is to say, two political units oppose each other, each threatening the other with destruction if it oversteps certain bounds, and you can imagine two hypothetical troglodytes sitting in the entrances of their caves, each armed with a stone and each threatening the other if he should enter the territory of the enemy, to keep each other in check as long as they can convince each other that a step beyond the imaginary boundary will lead to their respective destruction. It is exactly this primitive pattern of the balance of power which we are witnessing today in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. And I should say in passing that this pattern has, at least for two decades, preserved the peace between the two superpowers.

In general, of course, the balance of power shows more sophisticated and more complex patterns, more particularly beneath the nuclear confrontation. We are witnessing the traditional ways in which the balance of power operates. It operates through armaments races, through respective increase in the conventional power of antagonistic

— actually or potentially antagonistic — nations. It operates through the formation of alliances in which Nation A adds to its own power the power of Nation B directed against Nation C, either alone or supported by another ally, Nation D. So you have the classic patterns of the balance of power operating as they have always operated. Only they operate now within the framework of an overall nuclear balance of power which has reverted to the most primitive pattern that one can imagine.

It is an open question as to whether this conjunction between a nuclear balance of power operating through deterrence and the more conventional patterns of balance of power — armaments races, alliances, spheres of influence, and so forth — can indefinitely prevail. And here, of course, we are in the presence of the problem of proliferation. What is going to happen, we must ask ourselves, if and when — and I'm afraid it's more a when than an if — a considerable number of nations will be in the possession of nuclear weapons? There are those who believe — as, for instance, Generals Beaufre and Gallois believe, and it is probably more than just by accident that both are French generals — that this will simply lead to a universal revival of the traditional patterns of the balance of power. Instead of having a multiplicity of nations with conventional weapons, you will have a multiplicity of nations armed with nuclear weapons as well, and they will keep each other in check as they did before, even more efficiently, because of the universal fear of the actual use of nuclear weapons.

This somewhat charming picture of a fully armed nuclear world presupposes a self-restraint and a wisdom and a prudence on a universal scale similar to that which the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union

have shown in the last 20 years. This, it seems to me, is an assumption which is much too optimistic in view of our historic experience. You need only to imagine what would have happened if, let me say, Sukarno or Nasser or Mao Tse-tung had had nuclear weapons at their disposal during one of the recent crises. History shows that governments are not necessarily staffed by the most intelligent, the most high-minded, the most morally restrained individuals. In many states, throughout history, there has been a very small distinction between what we would call gangsters and responsible statesmen who hold the decision over war and peace in their hands. Indeed, one doesn't need to go to such lengths, one need only to look at human fallibility which is the heritage of all of us. To the extent that you spread the availability of nuclear weapons, you also give this human fallibility greater room to operate. Thus, it is probably too sanguine to expect that even the United States and the Soviet Union will forever have responsible, wise, and prudent governments which will not resort to, or be maneuvered into resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. If this is so, one can certainly argue that in view of the map of the world today, with about 130 so-called sovereign nations, most of which are not even able to take care of their internal affairs, it would require nothing less than a miracle that if many of those nations were armed with nuclear weapons, those nuclear weapons would not be used in one or another instance.

However, the argument of the optimists continues to the effect that these nuclear weapons would be used among the minor nuclear powers, and the major nuclear powers could watch the situation without getting involved. This is highly unlikely in view of the strategy of nuclear war, arising from its technology and the political purposes it

serves. Minor Nation A is not likely to be isolated from the rest of the nuclear nations. It is likely to be an explicit or implicit ally of another, of a major nuclear nation. And it is likely to attack Nation B, a minor nuclear nation which is also the explicit or implicit ally of another major nuclear nation. And while when nuclear war is waged with intercontinental ballistic missiles one can determine, under the best of circumstances at least, approximately the origin of the missile, one cannot do so if a minor nuclear nation, as it is likely to, will use a primitive delivery system. It may use a so-called suitcase delivery system; or it may use a merchant vessel which will blow up in a harbor; or it may use a submarine cruising just outside the territorial waters. And it is interesting to note that the two major of the minor nuclear powers, Great Britain and France, have pointed to the possibility that, by using nuclear weapons in the way I have just indicated, they can unleash a general nuclear war, they can force the hands of the major nuclear ally, that is to say, the United States. The British Government, in its White Paper on Defense in, if I remember correctly, February of 1964, made exactly this point. It argued that Great Britain cannot wage war against the Soviet Union with the nuclear weapons it has, and it is not going to use them against another minor nuclear power. But maybe a situation will arise in which it wants to wage nuclear war, or at least use the threat of nuclear war, and the United States might not; it can then force the hand of the United States. And the London *Economist*, more bluntly commenting on this statement, argued that the Russians will not see the Union Jack painted upon the nuclear missile with which we (the British) will hit them.

Here is, I think, the main danger to

the peace and order of the world arising from proliferation. In other words, the balance of power, in the nuclear sense, is not likely to operate as it has operated in the past when nations were armed with conventional weapons. And I should also say, emphasizing merely what I have said before, that the nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union, while it is in its pattern the most primitive type of the balance of power, operates in a different way. It doesn't operate through the actual use of nuclear weapons through which the balance is reaffirmed or disaffirmed, as the case may be. But it operates through the deterrence of both sides, both being convinced that this balance exists.

It is, of course, an open question as to whether the balance in which we and the Russians believe in actuality exists. This is always a problem in balance-of-power calculations, and in the past a nation which was convinced that the distribution of power favored it, that it had an advantage and especially an advantage which might not last, would then go to war in accord with its own estimation of the balance of power. Since generally somebody loses in a war, obviously somebody always makes the wrong calculations about the balance of power. But when it comes to nuclear weapons, neither side can afford to put its calculations about the balance of power to the test of actual experience, because even if it is proven to be right, it will probably lose because it will suffer unacceptable damage. And when it is proven to be wrong, of course it will be destroyed by the nuclear power of the other side which it has underestimated. It is this novelty of nuclear power which, while it has not changed the pattern of the balance of power, has changed the application, the actual realization.

It is this novelty which has raised

another question which your outline also raises, and that is whether the balance of power ought to be replaced by something else. Does the balance of power still perform the function which it has performed, however incompletely, in the past, to preserve at least a modicum of peace and order in the world? In other words, the question arises as to whether the present state system, based upon a multiplicity of sovereign nations keeping each other in check through the instrumentality of the balance of power, is still adequate to perform the basic function any political arrangement must perform, that is to say, to preserve a modicum of peace and order in the relations among nations. I think a good argument, at least a good rational argument, can be made in favor of the proposition that nuclear power which is, of course, only the most spectacular example of general technological power in the fields of communications, transportation, and warfare, that the whole modern technological world, which we have created and which we are in the process of re-creating again and again, has made the nation-state as obsolete as a principle of political organization as the first industrial revolution did the feudal system as a principle of political organization.

I think a rational case can be made in favor of the proposition that the basic function of government, the preservation of a modicum of peace and order, can no longer be adequately performed within the present state system. In other words, the destructive power of the modern instruments of warfare, together with the potential unification of the world through the modern technologies of communications and transportation, has made the nation-state an inadequate instrument of political control. It is not by accident that the only true relatively self-

sufficient nations are not nation-states but continental states, the United States and the Soviet Union. This suggests, with regard to nuclear war, a direct relationship between the extent of territory and the viability of states. The traditional nation-states of western Europe, such as Great Britain, France, and Germany, are so utterly vulnerable to nuclear war that their destruction is a foregone conclusion.

I remember a few years ago I gave a lecture at the NATO Defense College, and I said that three H-bombs were all that was needed to wipe the British Isles off the face of the earth. A British general got up, quite indignant, and said that it wasn't so, it was five H-bombs. In any event, it is the smallness of the territories and the enormous concentration of population and industry in those territories which make those nations, let us say, natural targets for total nuclear destruction. It is only continental nations which, with their enormous expanse of territory and widely dispersed concentrations of industry and population, while also enormously vulnerable, are not so vulnerable that their total destruction can be regarded to be a foregone conclusion.

But in any event, if one accepts as the rational argument that the system of a multiplicity of sovereign nations, preserving peace and order through the instrumentality of the balance of power, has become obsolete, the conclusion is not the abolition of the balance of power while keeping the sovereign nation-state intact. The logical conclusion is a radical transformation of the state system with a concentration of governmental power in one center which will do for the nations of the world what national governments today are doing for individual citizens, that is to say, to maintain a modicum of peace and order. This is, of course,

another way of saying that a world government, a world state, is the only rational alternative to the present balance-of-power system.

Let me come back to the argument, which I regard to be naive, against the balance of power while remaining wedded to the present state system. This is completely inconsistent. It is psychologically understandable because our deepest loyalties, of course, are still tied to the obsolescent nation-state. It would require a revolutionary transformation of our moral allegiances, our loyalties, our whole way of thinking and acting if we were to transfer those loyalties from the individual nation-state to which we belong to a world government which is not even on the horizon and about whose nature one can only theorize and with which one has no real experience. But logically, rationally, if one is dissatisfied with the balance of power as it exists today, and if one even regards its operations in a generalized nuclear situation as a direct threat to the survival of civilization on this earth, then one must make a total jump — one cannot just take a half step and oppose the balance of power. One must say that the system of the multiplicity of sovereign nation-states, of which the balance of power is a mere manifestation, must be replaced by something utterly different in which the balance of power is no longer going to operate as it operates today.

But let me say in conclusion, even then, if you are not going to have a totalitarian world government, you're going to have a balance of power or a series of balances of power within such a world government, within such a world society. For the balance of power performs on the international scene a very similar function to that which it performs in the domestic affairs of democratic and pluralistic

nations. It is not by accident that we call our system of government a system of checks and balances. The relations among the three branches of the Government, between the Federal Government and the States, between the two parties, among the different groupings within Congress, all show the basic pattern of the balance of power in which one group checks and restrains the other, and vice versa, so that no single group can run away with the ball. Thus, in a world government, if it is to be pluralistic, if it is not to be a monstrous totalitarian government, you are bound to have balances of power in which the power of one social unit is pitted against the other so that both mutually restrain each other. So let me end in the way I have begun. The desirability of the balance of power is not subject to debate. Whatever its effects are, whatever its weaknesses and its virtues are, it is as indispensable for a pluralistic society as is the law of gravity for the world of nature.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Dr. Hans J. Morgenthau, Professor of Political Science and Modern History, University of Chicago, has been director of its Center for Study of American Foreign and Military Policy since 1950. He studied at the Universities of Berlin, Frankfurt, and Munich; received the J.U.D. from the University of Frankfurt; and did graduate work at the Graduate Institute for International Studies, Geneva.

Dr. Morgenthau was admitted to the Bar and practiced law until 1930. He served as Assistant to the Law Faculty, University of Frankfurt, and was acting President, Labor Law Court, Frankfurt. He was Instructor in Political Science, University of Geneva; Professor of International Law, Institute of International and Economic Studies, Madrid, Spain; Instructor in Government, Brooklyn

College; Assistant Professor of Law, History, and Political Science, University of Kansas City at Kansas City, Mo.; and Visiting Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago. Dr. Morgenthau became Associate Professor in 1945 and Professor in 1949.


Since 1949 Dr. Morgenthau has been Visiting Professor at the University of California, Harvard University, Northwestern University, Columbia and Yale Universities. He has been Visiting Lecturer at the Air War College and Army War College since 1950. He served as a consultant, Department of State; was associated with the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study and with the Foreign Service Educational Foundation. He was visiting Professor of Government, Department of Government at Harvard University in 1960-61.

He has been author or coauthor of numerous books in the field of political science since 1929. Among the latest are: *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, *Politics Among Nations*, *In Defense of the National Interest*, *Dilemmas of Politics*, *The Purpose of American Politics*, and *Politics in the Twentieth Century*. He is editor of *Germany and the Future of Europe* and *Principles and Problems of International Politics* (with Kenneth W. Thompson). He is a contributor of articles to numerous professional journals, including *American Political Science Review*, *The Annals*, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, *Commentary*, *Commonweal*, *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, *Political Quarterly*, *Review of Politics*, *Yale Review*, *New York Times Magazine*, and *Daedalus*.



The whole art of war is being transformed into mere prudence, with the primary aim of preventing the uncertain balance from shifting suddenly to our disadvantage and half-war from developing into total war.

Clausewitz: On War, viii, 1832



COLD WAR OPERATIONS: THE POLITICS OF COMMUNIST CONFRONTATION

**Professor
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick**

Part IV — The Communist Control System

(A series of eight lectures by Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick of the Political Science Department, Brown University, given at the United States Naval War College during the 1966-67 term as a part of the Electives Program. These lectures are selected from those in a course entitled *Cold War Operations* which Professor Kirkpatrick presents at Brown. This is the fourth lecture, and the others will be published in the next four issues.)

In the world today there are roughly 50 million Communists and 88 Communist Parties. Party organization is fundamental to their operations everywhere in the world. There is a well-established control system binding the Communist Parties of the world together. Parallel controls may be exerted in any given country through the great number of Communist organizations. It must be emphasized that we are not just talking about 88 Communist Parties in the world, we are talking about scores of front organizations and scores of other devices, governmental as well as non-governmental, used to achieve their objectives. In all of this, organization is the key to their success.

The basis is the Party. The Parties all over the world are generally set up on the same scale or the same model as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, variations being adopted either for national means or for circumstances. Circumstances will differ if the Party is legal or illegal and the degree of freedom with which it can operate. Circumstances also include the number of Communists in the country involved and the size of the hard-core cadre on which the Party is based. Although the Parties are all modeled more or less after the system of the Soviets, there are differences in almost every country. Changes are frequent and are adapted to the objective of making their work as effective as it can be. However, there are certain basic philosophies of Communist Party organization which are important to understand right at the start.

First and foremost, any Communist will explain to you with a certain degree of vehemence that Communists have a democratic system and that they follow democratic practices. To a certain degree this is correct. Their democracy is the ability of any Party member to discuss "freely" at any

Party meeting any of the issues with which they are concerned. It would take a fairly brave Party member to directly attack any of the policies of the Party, international, national, or local, but beyond question there is a degree of criticism that goes on in the Party meeting. There is a general freedom of discussion allowed, again varying with the Party and the conditions and with the leader. After discussion the Party unit will make a decision to follow the same policies or to suggest to the next higher level echelon that the policy be changed. Once this decision is made, the discussion ends. This is where the phrase "democratic centralism" originates. The "democratic" indicates discussion has been allowed. The "centralism" is that the word of the Party is final. Nobody will criticize the policies adopted by the Party or they will be charged with deviation. If they criticize or argue with Marxist philosophy, they will be charged with being revisionist.

One of the interesting practices Communists use in Party activities is the policy of criticism and self-criticism. It is described in the memoirs of many of the ex-Communists, particularly a book like Wolfgang Lenhardt's memoirs of his experience as a Communist. Lenhardt was a young German who was taken to Russia in the thirties and who grew up in the Soviet Union. He was trained throughout the entire apparatus, starting with the Komsomol, going into the Comintern, and then finally being specifically trained to return to Germany as a Communist functionary, which he did and then defected. He wrote his book *Child of the Revolution* which is a description of their system. Lenhardt described his first experience with criticism and self-criticism. He was summoned before a cell meeting in the training school in which he was working and was told

that he should be critical of himself for his errors. He then was put through an inquisition in which he learned that the smartest thing was to be critical of yourself and admit that you had made errors. At least it was the least painful way. This then became a common practice to him, sitting in on these sessions of criticism and self-criticism. This technique is used by Communist Parties to try to avoid complacency among the cadre, to discover areas of negligence, particularly in the ideological fields, and to examine their projects from a realistic point of view to see if they are succeeding or not succeeding.

Communist Parties would claim that self-criticism is also to prevent the development of the bureaucratic cast. In that it has obviously failed, because they have developed a bureaucratic cast. Finally, and far from least, is that this practice of criticism and self-criticism is used to engage more of the members in participation. As we all know, any organization, regardless of what it is, has the participating types and the nonparticipating types. So in their system they work from a point of view of insuring that everybody will participate. Here perhaps I should emphasize that we are talking about the Party cadre and hard-core activists, thoroughly trained, thoroughly skilled, and completely dedicated to their work. Even they, however, go through the processes of criticism and self-criticism.

With this as a basis for the theory of how the Party operates, let us run quickly through its organizational structure. The National Party Congress is the highest body in the system. It has supreme authority to ratify the actions taken by the Central Committee, the Party Conference which will be held between Congresses, or decisions taken by the General Secretary or the First Secretary of the Party. The agenda for any Party Congress is thoroughly

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., was educated at Princeton University; he is presently Professor of Political Science at Brown University.

Prior to World War II, Professor Kirkpatrick worked for the U.S. News Publishing

Corporation and during the War served in the Office of Strategic Services on the Staff of Gen. Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group as intelligence briefing officer. At the end of World War II he returned briefly to the U.S. News as editor of *World Report* and then went to the CIA where he served in a variety of positions, including Division Chief, Assistant Director, Executive Assistant to the Director, Inspector General, and, from 1962 to 1965, Executive Director. In 1965 he left the CIA to become Professor of Political Science at Brown University.

For his service in World War II, Professor Kirkpatrick received the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, European Theater Ribbon with five battle stars, and both the French and Belgian Croix de Guerre. In March 1960, Professor Kirkpatrick was chosen by the National Service League as one of the ten outstanding career officers in the Federal Government.

ly and carefully prepared in advance. There should be no surprises at a Party Congress, certainly not to either the Politburo or the Central Committee. Prior to the Congress the Politburo and Central Committee have passed on and approved all actions to be taken at the Congress. In the event of a Congress of the Party of the Soviet Union, even the exact text of speeches will be approved in advance. The texts of the proceedings of the Party Congresses of the Soviet Union are published and available in 18 different languages for distribution all over the world.

It is the role of the Congress to ratify all actions that have been taken within the Party structure since the previous

Party Congress. The theory is that Congresses should be held at least every 2 years. This has not been the practice in many countries. The Soviet Union has gone several years between Congresses, particularly under Stalin's regime. The Chinese Party went 16 years without a Party Congress and obviously was going through some of its more serious organizational problems.

Next down on the hierarchy is the National Party Conference. This is a smaller group. It is not as large as the 4,000 delegates that attend Party Congresses in Moscow but is representative. It is a body which can take action or ratify actions taken in interims between Party Congresses. It is consultative to a greater degree than the Congress itself. It can make changes in the Central Committee up to 10 percent if it is necessary to elect new members because somebody died, resigned, or was removed by the Congress. It is a body which the 23rd Congress of the Soviet Union urged be held more frequently. The Russians apparently felt they were not holding conferences frequently enough to make up for the gap between the Congresses. These Congresses are expensive, bringing a great number of people together from all over the Soviet Union and the world. Each is elaborately staged, the proceedings translated into 55 different languages or dialects simultaneously and broadcast throughout the world or distributed by Tass.

The next group in the Party hierarchy, moving down, is the Central Auditing Committee. The easiest way to describe this is to say it is, in effect, the inspector general of the Soviet system with perhaps greater emphasis on finances than an inspector general in one of our services or organizations would have. There is an important aspect to it because we frequently don't equate financial responsibilities with

Communist Parties. They seem to be somewhat incompatible by their varied nature. But the Communist system requires a great deal of money, the passing of a great deal of money across international boundaries between Parties and through various apparatuses. Just as Marx did not succeed in legislating human nature, the Communists have not been able to legislate as far as money is concerned, either, and have had defalcations in use of Party funds just as any other organizations do. The Auditing Committee is important not only to try and keep the Party system relatively honest but, even more important, to prevent scandals which rock the Party system. In Germany not long ago one of the functionaries in the Hamburg Party decided that it would be just as nice to use Party funds to bet on horses as to pass them on to Party Organizations. This shook up the German Communist Party. The Central Auditing Committee is also used by the Party Secretary as a fact-finding group for his own purposes.

The body that really runs the Party is the Central Committee. This is elected by the National Party Congress. Candidates are screened carefully in advance by the Secretariat, passed by the Politburo, probably even screened by the Central Committee itself. We can rest assured that anybody elected to the Central Committee has a very clean security record, has no blemishes as far as the Party is concerned, and is one who can be trusted completely.

The Central Committee is the directing body of the Party between sessions of the Congress but, in effect, will make decisions which the Congress will inevitably ratify. It varies in size around the world from 16 members to about 250, with the Chinese and the Russians having the largest Central Committees. The Committee is composed so that full membership can always be present. If

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the delegate to the Central Committee himself is not present, his alternate will be present, and his alternate can vote when the principal member is not there.

The Central Committee will meet every 3 to 6 months and sometimes more often in the case of a Party crisis. Its decisions are binding on all lower echelons and can be reviewed only by the Party Congress itself. It has such duties as convoking congresses and conferences, determining the basis for electing members, determining Party tactics, directing the work in non-Party organizations, and representing the Party in its relations with other countries. The latter has become a very important aspect in its control system. At the 23rd Party Congress Leonid Brezhnev reported that in 18 months members of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union's Party have had 68 meetings with over 200 delegates from other Parties throughout the world. Obviously some of this is a divide-the-work program because the General Secretariat could not possibly handle all of the meetings, so they spread it out among the Central Committee members and this becomes a method for inter-Party control.

Before any Soviet official is assigned overseas, his assignment must be approved by the Central Committee. This may be either a subcommittee of the Central Committee or it might be the Politburo, depending on the importance of the assignment. Obviously, before an appointment reaches the Central Committee for approval a great deal of staff work has been done in advance through the Secretariat. The Secretariat is responsible for insuring that a thorough security check has been made by the KGB and that the official concerned has a record which is completely clear. We can envisage quite graphically what would happen if the Politburo recom-

mended for assignment an official overseas such as Colonel Penkovskiy who later defected or started to work for the West. So the Central Committee's functions are managerial.

Many of the functions of the Central Committee will be delegated to the Politburo or Presidium or Executive Board or the Standing Committee — they change the names variously. The Politburo is the real key to power, being the small daily working body. It is generally composed of about 10 to 12 members. There is no standard pattern as to who these members are, but they will inevitably include the Prime Minister or President of the country concerned. Members will include the General Secretary or the First Secretary of the Party, perhaps one or two other secretaries, and frequently the Minister of Defense. The official charged with ideology is almost inevitably on the Politburo, and it is the working body.

Colonel Vladislav Tikochensky, formerly Chief of the Polish Mission in West Germany who defected in May 1965, the highest ranking Polish official to defect, indicated that the Politburo of the Polish Party met a minimum of three times a week and that their meetings generally lasted 6 to 8 to 10 hours a day. He went on to say that not only did they have lengthy meetings, but Gomulka, the General Secretary of the Party, is adamant about having anybody called out of the meeting. He said that at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, when the Communist world was badly shaken by President Kennedy's speech of 22 October, Polish intelligence was concerned that war might be imminent. Tikochensky tried to get the Foreign Minister out of the meeting and was unsuccessful. He finally extracted him only by sending in a message to the effect that he thought war might be imminent. This is indicative

of at least how one General Secretary runs the political bureau and the extent of its work. Undoubtedly, as in any political structure, it will vary from country to country, but it probably is endemic to the Communist system that lengthy meetings take place in which there is a great deal of discussion.

The bureaucracy of the Party is controlled by the Secretariat. The Secretariat runs all the actual day-to-day functions of the Party. The General Secretary or First Secretary controls the patronage, personnel, and the cadre or organization. He undoubtedly has the closest ties with the secret police of the state as distinct from the Party disciplinary organization, and consequently he is in a position, if his colleagues in the political bureau or the Central Committee allow him, to get complete control. It is interesting to note that this is the general pattern throughout the history of communism - that the First Secretary has tried to achieve dictatorial control. Khrushchev did not achieve it. He got close but was upset by his colleagues on first the Politburo and then the Central Committee. Stalin achieved it and after achieving it ruthlessly eliminated everybody who opposed him.

There can be several secretaries in a Party organization. There may be a second, third, or fourth secretary, depending on how the Party is organized. Each of them will be responsible for various phases of Party activities. In Poland, Gomulka, the First Secretary, is, of course, the key man and runs the Secretariat. His responsibilities are very broad, Party-wide. There are two other assistants who sit on the Politburo with him, one is charged with Foreign Policy and Security, and the other is charged with Military Affairs and Economic Affairs.

In the larger Party systems there are several departments, each of which will

report to one of the Secretariats. The cadre department, or personnel, is a key department, because it handles the selection, training, work assignments, promotions, and discipline of all Party members and maintains records. Let me emphasize here that these records are extensive and detailed, and great emphasis is placed on records. The Communists not only keep records in Moscow of all of the members and all of the people under consideration, but they also have records on the members of other Parties throughout the world. It staggers one's imagination to think of the mechanical aspects of handling these files.

The second department is an organization department. We would probably be more accurate to call this the statistical department, because it concerns itself with the statistics of organizational work and also with the development of new Party units. One of the most important departments is Agit Prop, or Agitation and Propaganda. This is an area on which the greatest stress is placed in all of the major Communist Parties, most particularly in China and in Russia. The agitation end of it is not just simply concerned with fomenting disturbances, but it is the mass action group in the Party. It has a highly trained cadre in every area of the world, in all of the Parties, a group that can be called out on the streets at any given time to put on any given type of agitation that is wanted, ranging from mobs throwing rocks at U.S. Embassies to activists stirring up riots and insurrection. This is accomplished by well-trained cadres recalled periodically to their centers for the latest techniques and devices. The basis is not on the masses, but on small cadres who know where to recruit the masses. They have leaders in the universities, in the factories, and in various other parts of society.

The Communist information and propaganda effort is on a vast scale. The printing establishments are elaborate and effective. The organization is based upon a small cadre of trained publicists, trained ideologists, and trained historians working together absolutely and totally indoctrinated with the Party philosophy and highly skilled in putting out propaganda so that it is appealing whether it is in Africa, Indonesia, or Latin America. The agitation and propaganda department in many of the Parties controls the Party training programs. The Communist training programs are intense, and the Party *apparatchik* who wants to get ahead is going to get all of the Party training he can. The trainees are subject to constant scrutiny and indoctrination. They are tested for vigilance, motivation, discipline, toughness, and dedication, and if they fail in any of these characteristics then they are relegated to relatively minor jobs. The philosophy is that there must be a reservoir of trained people, so the Agit Prop department is important.

The work of the financial department is self-evident. Party requirements for money are great. They have full-time workers raising money. They use their publications to raise money. A profitable publication such as *Humanite*, the French Communist daily in Paris, will occasionally have levies put on it for funds to be transferred either to the French Communist Party or perhaps to another Communist Party elsewhere in the world. The Party requires dues, and a high Party functionary might well have a levy put on his salary. The Party occasionally will raise money from non-Party organizations such as trade unions, women and youth organizations. One of their principal problems is the transferring of funds. The Party uses gold, which they will produce at a

cost twice the international rate, if necessary, in the Soviet Union, but their favorite monetary unit is the U.S. dollar, and they use this on a worldwide basis to finance their activities.

The next department is the mass organization department. It concerns itself with all types of activities where masses are involved.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has many other departments. A Women's Department plans exploitation of the women's groups. The Labor and Welfare Department places great emphasis on trade unions and labor unions and exploits social conditions. An Economic Department engages in the use of trade and finance to assist Party ends. Community Affairs works primarily at municipal levels. The Agricultural Department works with the peasants and farmers. Cultural and Education penetrates the intellectual areas, always one of their most fertile fields. It has a Sports Department and emphasizes sports and the quality of Soviet athletes. The Chinese are now challenging in the same area. The Youth Department is one of their most important. The Youth Festival held in Moscow in 1957 cost an estimated \$100 million. It was done beautifully. They put out the red carpet for the youth of the world that they brought there. They obviously paid expenses for many of the delegations. The hundred million dollars nearly approximates the entire annual budget of the U.S. Information Agency. A Minorities Department deals with minority groups. The Foreign Department determines foreign policy.

From the point of view of international communism, the Foreign Department is the most important of the Party. It handles the dealings with foreign Parties, both overt and covert. It handles the visits of foreign visitors to the Soviet Union. It works closely with the State Security Committee, and

it succeeded the Comintern as the central organization point for international communism as far as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is concerned.

Communist Party units are organized on the same basis in lesser degree at all of the other levels in the Soviet Union. Each of the Soviet Republics will have a miniature of the national organization. Each of the provinces and districts will have a smaller embodiment of this. When there is a Party Congress, such as the 23rd Party Congress of March 1966, the system starts preparing for the Congress months in advance by holding discussions at the basic cell or branch level of issues that are to be raised or decided upon at the National Congress. The necessary material will be issued well in advance from Moscow through the Republics, regions, and districts and down to the branches so that discussions can take place.

One of the key issues at the 23rd Party Congress was how the international Communist apparatus should be controlled in the future. What should the Russians say about the Chinese? Should they exacerbate the split with China, or should they try to patch it up? So it was essential to educate all of the 10 million Party members of the Soviet Union as to these issues before their 4,000 representatives convened in Moscow. It was interesting to note one document which was circulated through Poland. This document was sent to all of the Party meetings throughout the Soviet Union and dealt with relations with China. It was published in the Hamburg newspaper *Die Welt*, and then the text of it was printed in *The New York Times*. This is the type of document discussed at all of these Party meetings before a National Party Congress.

A Party cell or branch can be organized in just about any segment of

society. It can be organized in a city block or a factory. There will be several branches or cells in any sizable factory. It can be organized in a cooperative or a collective farm. Generally speaking, the size of cells is limited for control purposes and discipline and to keep it a flexible unit. The Brazilian Party, for example, has no branch larger than 50 people. Once a branch is larger than 50 people, another branch is organized. Each branch or cell will have its own leader or secretary who will be responsible for seeing that meetings are held on a regular basis. Either he or a very trusted and dedicated individual will be the Political Commissar of the branch charged with the constant orientation and indoctrination. The unit will meet as often as once a week and, in some instances, more often. In China, particularly in the factories, the cells or branches meet on a daily basis, perhaps during lunch hour they are regaled by the radio giving them the latest word of Mao or other political indoctrination. Each unit studies theory, engages in criticism and self-criticism, is lectured on Party objectives until they are known perfectly. This is one of the strengths of the Communist system, constant working and constant training of the basic cadre.

According to Leninist philosophy and the accepted guidance of all Parties, there should be an underground Party in every country to take over in the event that something happens to the overt Party. In some countries, 12 to be exact, the Communist Party is illegal. In these areas Communists operate on an underground basis. Depending upon the degree and quality of the local security service, the underground Party may operate from outside the country. The Spanish Communist Party has its headquarters in France where the Communist Party is legal, where the French Surete is not terribly con-

cerned with communism and probably does not bother the apparatus of the Spanish Party unless it attracts attention or gets into difficulty. The underground Party, or the covert or illegal Party apparatus, will be a very much smaller version of the organization already discussed. It will probably have certain elements the general open Party would never have. It will combine maximum security with minimum discernible activity. It will work toward developing a cadre or apparatus. This is its primary responsibility, and this cadre or apparatus will have much more emphasis on action than on political affairs. It will have a section for guerrilla warfare. This will train small groups, all over the country if possible. It will cache arms, will prepare to act when directed. The illegal apparatus can never act on its own. It must get direction from the Party, and the Party would have to get approval from Moscow. The illegal Party will have sabotage groups. Thus the underground Party, by its very nature, will have all of the techniques available to it that we would normally associate with an intelligence service. It will have to have the capacity for making false documents, particularly where it is operating illegally in an area. It will have to have all the various "ratlines" for moving people and supplies and money across frontiers.

The Third International, or the Comintern, was the original international control system. In the Comintern all of the Parties were represented in Moscow. It issued directives to all of the Parties of the world. It became less effective in the 1920's and went out of existence when Stalin abolished it in 1943. It was abolished by Stalin because he had developed the Foreign Bureau of the Party in the Soviet Union to the degree where it could take over the entire Comintern apparatus

including personnel, networks, and organization.

The Cominform, which lasted from 1947 to 1956, never had the control mechanisms of either the Third International or the present Party. It was more an ideological clearing house and control apparatus. From 1956 on the international control system has operated primarily through the Party, through conferences of Communist Parties, through the Party Congresses, and through bilateral meetings. The Congresses and the conferences, as well as the bilateral meetings, are probably more important for what we do not know about them than what we do know about them. Communiques issued after such meetings are often completely unrevealing of anything that might have been discussed. If you examine the travels of the members of the Politburo and the Central Committee you will find that the Russians are constantly on the move on visits to Communist countries and Parties to give guidance and to negotiate aid and trade agreements.

The controls of international communism are not solely through the Party system, issued by the Foreign Bureau of the Party. The Soviet Embassy plays a role in the control systems throughout the world. Thus a second area of controls comes out through the Foreign Ministry which in the normal course of international relations will issue guidance to friendly powers as to the direction of Soviet policy and also will be the recipient of comments from other nations. A third area of control is through the intelligence system. This is an important aspect of the Communist control mechanism. The intelligence systems of all of the other Communist countries, with the exception of Albania and China, are, in effect, satellites of the Soviet intelligence system. In Scandinavia, for

example, the Poles are operating on what is practically a mass basis by direction of Moscow, because the Russians are extremely concerned with their Scandinavian flank, and the degree of intelligence activities up there is immense. The control is exerted to the degree that an intelligence operation by any one of the satellite services can be taken over by the Soviet liaison officer indicating that the operation should be transferred to the Soviet system.

There are other controls through front organizations. These vast organizations with millions of members are financed almost in full by Moscow. Moscow will exercise its controls through all of these organizations - trade unions, youth groups, cultural societies, and the women's groups.

Thus, when we speak of the Communist control system it should be emphasized that we are not speaking of any monolithic or unified type of organization. There is tight control in the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. It guides, controls, and directs all these organizations throughout the world. Through various levels, through parallel organizations, through what must be either identical or very similar types of guidance and directives, the Communists have been able to achieve a high

degree of international unity. It is interesting to note that mistakes were made primarily when there was dictatorial or one-man rule much more frequently than when there has been either collective or Party rule. For example, some of the greatest confusion was caused when Stalin unilaterally abolished the Comintern without advising in advance the other Party members. The Hungarian Communist Party, for example, was so confused that it announced its own dissolution which, of course, had to be changed fairly quickly on orders from Moscow. Another occasion when orders were confused was Khrushchev's 20th Party Congress speech when he denounced Stalin. The Party organization and apparatus had not yet been geared up to give the guidance to the various Parties in the world in advance as to what was taking place. For a period of about 3 weeks all of the senior leaders in Moscow were meeting with Party delegates from all over the world to explain to them what de-Stalinization meant and the role that they should carry out.


The Communist control system is being exerted through governmental, Party, and other channels throughout the entire Communist apparatus. Despite occasional mistakes, the control system is remarkably effective.



Weigh the situation, then move.

Sun Tzu, 400-320 B.C. The Art of War, vii

SET AND DRIFT



OPNAV Politico-Military Policy Division Head Graduates from Correspondence Course of Naval Warfare



Capt. George P. Steele, U.S. Navy, was graduated from the Naval War College Correspondence Course of Naval Warfare in November 1967. In the endorsement forwarding a diploma to Captain Steele, Adm. T. H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, stated:

1. Delivered with my congratulations and awareness that the award of this diploma represents some 1,700 hours of individual study and that you are only the third active duty officer ever to have qualified for this diploma.

2. WELL DONE!

When asked about the value of Naval War College correspondence study, Captain Steele made these comments:

Just a generation ago the objective of the U.S. Navy line officer was a rounded career. It was then entirely possible for an officer to serve in a variety of types of ships and become competent in many of the fields that are now regarded as specialties or sub-specialties.

Several wars and a technological age later, there is just too much to learn for any naval officer to become really proficient in all aspects of the line. Now the twin objectives are to become an expert in some phase of the profession and a knowledgeable generalist in the rest. It has been my opinion that one should work toward both of these ends at the same time, and this is the reason that I have pursued the Naval War College non-resident program.

The knowledge that can be acquired through the War College correspondence courses, I have found, can be of the utmost assistance in command of a small ship on independent duty. It is evident that the more general background information an officer has, the better he can serve on a staff or in a Washington office.

As has every professional officer, I have had to face many situations

drawing on every bit of my knowledge. It is my conviction that Naval War College nonresident courses furnish indispensable tools for use at such a time.

Captain Steele's experience and distinguished career make these words particularly meaningful. Graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy and commissioned an Ensign on 7 June 1944, he attended Submarine School at New London and was subsequently assigned to U.S.S. *Becuna*, making two war patrols against the Japanese.

Subsequent assignments include Staff, Commander Submarine Squadron 8; instructor at Submarine School; Executive Officer, U.S.S. *Harder* (SS-568); and Commanding Officer, U.S.S. *Hardhead* (SS-365).

On 5 December 1959 Captain Steele assumed command of U.S.S. *Seadragon* (SSN-584). In August 1960 *Seadragon* sailed for Pearl Harbor, Hawaii via the Northwest Passage and the North Pole. *Seadragon* thus became the first submarine to go under icebergs and the first ship of any kind to go through the Northwest Passage via the Parry Channel, which she did running submerged under ice.

After a tour as Tactical Training Officer on the Staff of the Deputy Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Captain Steele became the first Commanding Officer of U.S.S. *Daniel Boone* (SSBN-629). While commanding *Daniel Boone* he made the first Polaris patrol in the Pacific Ocean, sailing from Guam on Christmas Day 1964.

In August 1966 Captain Steele reported to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as Head, Europe and NATO Branch, Politico-Military Policy Division, his present assignment.

NCC Field Trip. Naval Command Course students visited the Harvard

University campus and other points of interest in the Boston, Mass., area 10 and 11 January 1968 to supplement their studies in military management and international affairs.

This visit supplemented a 1-day field trip to the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration earlier this year. It included the entire Harvard campus and cultural, historical, and geographical points of interest in Boston.

Lectures, discussions, and demonstrations enabled the students to further their knowledge of U.S. educational institutions, to provide them with an opportunity to meet and hear distinguished authorities in international affairs, to witness management practice teaching by the case study method, and to learn of the culture, history, and geography of New England.

NATO Defense College. "As the President of the first and oldest service college, I particularly want to greet the students of the newest," said Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, USN.

The Naval War College President was speaking to the students of the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, on 20 October 1967.

He added, "I am sure it (NATO Defense College) will contribute materially to the basic strengths of the free world."

Admiral Hayward noted that it would be foolish not to recognize the pitfalls in making prophecies concerning either technical progress or what the impact will be from a strategic point of view. He nevertheless accepted the challenge to give his ideas on the subject.

"In any discussion of the future, as in navigation, one must have a point of departure," he began. "We must talk about the world and the strategic situation as it exists today."

Strategy was defined first from a national viewpoint as "the use by a nation of its military, economic, political, and psychological forces in peace or war to attain its national objectives." It was pointed out that strategy is not confined to military forces nor to a state of war.

Admiral Hayward went on to describe weapons systems and deterrents past, present, and future, citing situations where technical innovation did have in the past and could have in the future its greatest strategic implication.

"It is apparent," he said, "that technical innovation covers the entire spectrum of the physical sciences. Acoustics, light, electromagnetic radiation, atomic structure, materials, atmospheric physics, all can have direct impact on the strategic situation and balance between nations."

It was noted that the degree of impact will be a function of the type of conflict, and the types of conflicts extend across a spectrum of their own, from the megawar to the cold war. Too, advent of new concepts and the uses of technical innovation in various conflicts require both the technology to make them possible and their acceptance by military institutions.

"So we see technical innovation and its impact across the entire spectrum of military problems. It is not all strategic nor all tactical. It is apparent if a nation is to have a usable strategy in this modern, complex world of today it better be very technically proficient," stated the Admiral. He reminded his audience that only a shortsighted person would limit his forecast to a specific technology. His interest should lie in the many technical fields and their interaction with each other. He also observed that the work in materials alone can change the whole world, with examples given such as silicones, fluorides and organometallics.

In conclusion, Admiral Hayward said, "It is in these areas (the physical sciences) one must look for impacts or weapon systems with strategic implications."

He has been invited to address NATO Defense College students again in March 1968.

Holiday Recess. During the recent 2-week holiday recess, when organized classes, committees, and lectures were suspended, Naval War College students were entrenched in paperwork. Naval War College librarians can attest to the amount of research and background work accomplished during the recess by students deeply involved in preparation of their theses and other research papers.

Naval War College Management Education Program. Prior to 1965 there was no formalized course in military management conducted by the Naval War College, although individual portions or lectures of other studies did cover subject matter that could properly be categorized as a subarea of military management. In 1965 the need was recognized for a formal course and, as a consequence, a 3-week study of military management was inaugurated for the School of Naval Command and Staff in the fall of 1965. The School of Naval Warfare initiated its study of military management in May of 1966, although on a more limited scale. The need for military management education was not confined to resident students at the Naval War College alone; it existed on a Navy-wide basis. Consequently, in the spring of 1966, the Correspondence School was charged with the mission of developing a Correspondence Course in Military Management, and efforts were initiated in that direction.

The present resident course in military management is being conducted

simultaneously for the Schools of Naval Warfare and Naval Command and Staff. The course is 33 units (about 40 student hours) in length and is presented as an integral part of the Fundamentals of Strategy Study. The purpose of the course is to delineate the economic and quantitative analysis concepts and procedures applicable to the military management decisionmaking process and to describe the Department of Defense and Navy Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Resource Management Systems. In order to achieve this objective several teaching methods are employed, two of which are innovations not used in previous years. In addition to the regular lecture and reading programs, this year the military planning game and case studies were introduced as educational training techniques. There was also increased faculty participation in the lecture program.

In addition to the core curriculum, resident students are being offered two electives which support the Military Management Course. "Introduction to Military Operations Research" is given by the Chair of Physical Sciences. The second elective is "Managerial Planning and Control" which is conducted by Professor Zenon S. Zannetos of the Sloan School of Management, present incumbent of the recently established James V. Forrestal Chair of Military Management.

Of related interest is the fact that management education is also included in the Naval Command Course for senior officers from Allied nations. Prior to last year a very limited number of management lectures was presented in the logistics study, but in academic year 1966-1967 a short course was introduced which covered the basic techniques and concepts of management. The bulk of this course was given by consultants from the Har-

vard University School of Business. For this academic year the same course of action has been selected; however, the length of the course has been increased.

The recently issued Correspondence Course in Military Management is designed to familiarize the student with various concepts, principles, processes, applications, and techniques of modern military management. The objective is not to develop a mastery of technical skills, but rather to provide the student with a survey of the management field. Although the correspondence course is predicated upon the objectives and concepts of the resident U.S. course, because of its nature it also provides educational experience in the basic theories and concepts of management, such as organizational theory and behavioral science. It is estimated that each of the three installments will require about 60 hours of student effort. Since its introduction on 1 September 1967, over 140 students, 25 of them ranking Government civilian officials, have enrolled in the Naval War College Correspondence Course in Military Management.

The establishment of the Senior Officer Executive Management Course was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations in August 1967. Initial planning indicates that the course will be oriented primarily towards general management concepts and practices rather than emphasizing management as practiced within the Department of Defense. The prospective student body for this course will be 35-40 senior Navy and Marine Corps officers, primarily Flag/General Officer selectees. It is expected that the course will run for 3 or 4 weeks during the summer months.

In addition to the courses described above, a new after-hours voluntary course in data processing has been recently instituted. This course covers 47 2-hour sessions and is designed to


develop familiarity with computers, data processing systems, and programming in order that the student may be able to apply modern military management techniques in future assignments. About 20 students are enrolled in this program during this academic year.

In response to a recognized need, the Naval War College has developed a management education program during the past 2 years that is designed to meet the requirements of the officers of the Navy and Marine Corps. It is also recognized that such a program must be responsive to change when dealing with the dynamic field of management; consequently, continuous evaluations and modification, as necessary, are inherent within the Naval War College management education program.

International Law. On 21 November 1967, a set of Naval War College

"Blue Books" in international law was presented to the University of the Philippines, College of Law, Quezon City, Republic of the Philippines. The presentation, on behalf of the President of the Naval War College, was made to Dean Vincente Abad Santos by Capt. Robert Kaufman, USN, Chief of Staff, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines.

The "Blue Books," treatises on international law prepared by holders of the Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law, are held by almost every law school library in the United States. In recent years an increasing degree of interest has been expressed by foreign law schools. And, in addition to the Philippines, the series has been presented to libraries in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Ethiopia, France, Egypt, and Nigeria.



Today the expenditure of billions of dollars every year on weapons, acquired for the purpose of making sure we never need to use them, is essential to keeping the peace.

*John F. Kennedy: Speech at
American University, Washington,
June 1963*



POSTWAR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: PROBLEMS AND CONFLICTS IN ASIA

Professor Frederick J. Horrigan

**A lecture delivered to the
Naval War College
on 19 October 1967**

Professor Hartmann — thank you for the gracious introduction. Gentlemen — it is a pleasure to be here this morning. It is always an honor to receive an invitation to speak at one of our War Colleges. You know, I have often been sitting as you are now waiting for a lecture to begin or for the speaker to get to his point and I have asked myself at these times — what

should one keep in mind as he prepares notes for a War College address? I have come to believe that the lecturer should pose three questions to himself: What do I know that most of such a highly professional group doesn't already know? What can I say that they could not read in half the time from a more authoritative source? And finally — a key question — What can I con-

tribute to their understanding of the assigned topic that possibly would increase their capability in some future posts of responsibility to plan and implement U.S. national security policies? These introspective questions must operate as an essential guide for the selection of whatever remarks the speaker hopes to cover in the limited time he has available.

I might add to the above that all who take the platform should be more forthright in fully bringing out in advance the rather neurotic character of this enterprise of foreign affairs analysis. After all, we do peer out at the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the world from a tiny aperture and our human tendency is to impose a rationale and an order on the events we see, or think we see. It is a heroic endeavor, but one that has its limitations. This is especially true for the realm of prediction and prescription. If one is licensed by the Commonwealth to prescribe for disturbed and unmanageable human beings, he will not only be examined for his mastery of a body of scientific knowledge but in his training as well there will be a requirement, in some schools of medicine, that he undergo analysis himself to reduce the likelihood of bringing his unconscious biases and quirks of perception to the treatment of the patient. But when we diagnose the ailments of a disturbed, violent world and prescribe for sick nations, we are at liberty, both in fact and at law, to never lay bare for a moment our own sense of these limitations. An experience on an overseas trip several years ago helped me to establish the tone I would like to adopt during my talk this morning. In one of the African countries I was entertained along with other members of our group and, as established by convention, wore a name tag with "Dr." printed before my name. A lady of great girth and color-

ful local dress strolled over to where I was standing, fixed her eye on the tag and then on me and said, "Man, are you a healing doctor or a talking doctor?"

Well, gentlemen, I am a "talking doctor," but I can diagnose at least two syndromes to which a speaker on such a large topic as problems and conflicts in Asia may be susceptible. These are the Platte River syndrome and the Mother Hubbard syndrome. The first—like that famous Nebraska river—is a tendency to be an inch deep all the way and a mile wide at the mouth; the other group of symptoms, called the Mother Hubbard after those long, loose garments supplied by missionaries to Polynesian girls in the last century, is the compulsion to cover everything and touch on nothing. The plan I have, if time allows, is to treat this topic under four headings: (1) the reaction of our country to the rising scale of problems and conflicts in Asia and in this connection to set out the terms of the argument between the so-called "globalists" and "neoisolationists" over the future course of United States-Asian relations; (2) to touch on the deeply rooted problems of the area which transcend national boundaries and ambitions; (3) to highlight some outstanding feature of each Asian region which has a critical bearing on the kind of order that will eventually emerge in the area; (4) to conclude by formulating some knotty problems for U.S. national security policy that you may wish to consider during the coming academic year at the Naval War College.

The debate over American policy toward Asia takes its place in a context of a more general assessment of the nature of the contemporary international environment and a definition of our national interests around the globe. As I read the literature on the subject, the parties to the dispute share the view

that some clear lines have now emerged from the struggles of the last several decades. They would agree, I believe, that there has been a measurable decline in the efficacy of political ideology nearly everywhere and that pragmatism has shown its hand in many areas of human relations formerly viewed ideologically. As a methodology for solving modern problems, it is, in short, a burnt-out case, at least for the present, and always excluding Communist China. Most agree also that today there is a new Europe, increasingly prosperous and confident, and again with one exception, General de Gaulle, not inclined to meddle with the rest of the world with any great emotional involvement or material cost to itself. I think there is a further measure of agreement that the penultimate dissolution of the colonial order and the worldwide conquest of nationalism, coupled with the resurgence of China as a major power complex for the first time in the history of the modern West, creates a wholly new set of problems for the international order. In relation to the less-developed countries, there is more and more a common appreciation and some apprehension that the scientific revolution is passing them by and that the gap between the two worlds of development is opening wider rather than closing. Finally, there is a large area of agreement that military blocs are loosening in their cohesion as participants review the costs and benefits of membership. So much for common perspectives.

Let us now turn to the definition of the threat and extent of U.S. commitment for further comparison of the views of the protagonists in the great debate. It is generally agreed, I take it, that the United States has emerged in our time as *the* world power in terms of strategic mobility. In 1967 the United States had more than 700,000

soldiers stationed in some 30 countries. We are a member of four regional defense groups and an associate member of another group. We have mutual defense treaties with 42 countries, are a member of 53 international organizations, and furnish military and economic aid to over 100 countries. This great effort has been made to meet a threat which, in the view of strategists over the past decades, was primarily an East-West confrontation in a bipolar world. Now it appears that this neatly structured threat is being superseded or perhaps simply enlarged by the growing possibility of a new kind of conflict along the axis of a North-South split among the nations of the earth. This new confrontation would find its rift not primarily on the basis of ideology but from the emergence of conflict between the industrialized Northern Hemisphere countries on the one hand and the poor, unstable, newer nations of the Southern Hemisphere on the other, where there is being marshalled an array of problems compounded of racial tensions, endemic poverty, and exploding populations that threaten them with a marginal existence and internal disorder for the indefinite future. In this view the greater danger to peace lies in a revolution-prone "third world" where the wrenching transition from colonialism to independence and the multiple tensions of modernization have been accompanied by situations of both organized violence and unintended civil disorder. Into this cauldron of virulent nationalisms and civil strife the great powers may be drawn either by doctrine or inadvertently, against their conscious will, even against the explicit definitions of their vital interests.

Now it is at this point that agreement on the estimate of the situation breaks down, and prescriptions for future policy diverge radically. That group

labeled neoisolationist would argue that in regard to most of the non-European world our vital interests are not at stake; that insofar as we do respond, we mistakenly continue to utilize means which were appropriate only in postwar Europe, i.e., military containment and economic aid; that we lack the sustained capability to project even our great power over such immense distances and to measure and control the responses of peoples of alien culture. In a word, their view is that a dangerous gap exists between what we would like to see happen and what we can reasonably hope to accomplish. Most of these criticisms focus today on the area of greatest U.S. involvement — Asia.

The other side of this argument has been carried by many advocates — both in government and private life. It is best I think, at this point, to let one of the most eloquent spokesmen for an activist Asian policy set forth the central propositions of that policy. Harold Kaplan in the 21 August 1967 issue of *The Department of State Bulletin* defines these fundamental propositions as follows:

First, that we are geographically and historically a Pacific power, with a vital interest in the independence and peaceful development of the Asian nations. This implies, of course, that we have an equally vital interest in preventing the domination of the area by a hostile power which — for whatever ideological or other reasons — might seek to organize the human and physical resources of Asia against us.

Second, that social and economic modernization can occur in underdeveloped societies under more rewarding and less destructive auspices than the Maoist formula of the “war of national liberation” and that we have an interest in demonstrating that the Maoist formula is not, in any event, an infallible road to power.

Third, that our situation in the world imposes extraordinary responsibilities upon us, particularly with re-

spect to the preservation of mankind from nuclear warfare. In Asia, as elsewhere, this means that people must come to expect, as a matter of course, that we will honor our commitments and keep our word, however onerous the cost may seem in a purely local context.

Finally, our problem in Asia is not that the course we are pursuing may lead us into conflict with mainland China. That conflict exists, and our present concern is how best to reduce, contain, and finally end it. In other words, our problem is so to manage our conflict with mainland China that the chances of a world conflagration can be minimized and the possibilities of peaceful development for China herself, as well as for the nations which must live on China's periphery, can be preserved.

I have asked you to bear with me in this brief review of the pro and con over foreign policy objectives because I believe that such a résumé is useful background for a discussion of more specific problems and conflicts. Moreover, these arguments suggest the extent to which strategic planning for the entire Afro-Asian area may be affected by the outcome of this domestic debate in the coming year.

At this point I would like to introduce my second proposition for your consideration, which is that conflicts in Asia and, indeed, in the rest of the underdeveloped world find their roots today and probably even more in the future in conditions that superficially cannot be described as political or as elements of foreign policy. I refer, of course, to the by now familiar catalog of ills which affects most of mankind outside the developed West: high mortality rates, rudimentary hygiene, undernutrition, small per capita consumption of energy, illiteracy, static agricultural production, and an unchecked population growth that eats away the marginal gains in economic growth. In the last hundred years, I am told, the

share of the rich countries in world production has leaped from 60 percent to 85 percent, while the poor lands' share has fallen from 40 percent to 15 percent. I have no greater appreciation than you do, I am sure, for lectures which cite statistics. These heavy facts are at best more congenial to textbooks and official reports than to a late morning talk. Nevertheless, I should like to reiterate a point I touched on earlier, namely, that the fruits of the scientific and technological advances are not reaching the poorer countries in such a manner as to help them solve their problems. Precisely what effect the widening gap between the rich lands and the poor lands will be, we can only surmise. No one had quite realized until recently what a tremendous gulf separates the various worlds of development. The Western-oriented world, for example, in which we would include Japan, the Republic of South Africa, Israel, and the Commonwealth countries of Oceania, accounts for only 20 percent of the world's population but with its 700 million people produces a G.N.P. of \$1,100 billion — about 60 percent of the world's wealth. In the era of transitional politics we can only be certain that this disparity will sooner or later be converted into a politics of violence with broad implications for the foreign policy of the United States.

As we turn now to the southern flank of Asia, the role of India in the creation of a stable balance of power in the area is affected both by its definition of national security requirements and its mammoth internal development problems. As India moves into the third decade of its independence, it faces two major problems in maintaining the integrity and security of the state. The first is to insure its security from either Chinese Communist attack or conflict with Pakistani or, in the worst case scenario, from concerted action by its

two hostile neighbors. The second is maintenance of the unity of the Indian national state by vigorous opposition to internal, fragmenting forces such as communalism, linguistic secession, and disruptive regionalism. I have no way of knowing how high on the scale of national security objectives is control of the Indian Ocean by Indian power or by elements not hostile to it, but it is certainly one of the critical issues for the next decade. If the British presence east of Suez is withdrawn, what immediate problems are suggested by the vacuum left in this extensive inland sea of Afro-Asia? Not until the most recent defense cuts did it finally become clear that the dominance of the littoral of this sea by British power was in a state of dissolution. What other force, if any, is available to lend stability or exert power in this area? India's grave internal problems and preoccupation with the security of its land frontiers suggest that its attention and available resources will be focused there rather than on security arrangements in the Indian Ocean. Closely associated with what India sees as the primary threat to its security, the baseless hostility of China, is the question of whether India should attempt to develop and produce nuclear weapons. Pressures to "go nuclear" will undoubtedly be a persistent feature of the defense debate over the coming years. The pronuclear views of some elements in the Indian Army and conservative parties are a matter of record. Arguments are made that such a development would increase the prestige of the central Government, bolster India's status among Afro-Asian countries, and provide a deterrent against some combination of hostile forces possessing nuclear weapons. A search for alternative arrangements to achieve security without severely taxing India's economy will proceed until some decision is made. This perfectly understand-

able concern with nuclear policy is, of course, portentous for the kind of Asia that will emerge from our own troubled times. We might return to these two strategic variables — the future of the Indian Ocean and nuclear proliferation in the South Asia region during the question period.

For the present I would like to move along the rimland of Asia to highlight one or two matters connected with Southeast Asia that you might profitably consider during your studies this year. Undoubtedly, other lecturers will discuss this area in more detail, but as part of my mission here this morning to raise questions I would recommend two major features of the Southeast Asian region to your attention. The first is that Southeast Asia comprises 10 separate states and nearly 250 million people who are by no means "Southeast Asians." Regional identity and cooperation are only now beginning to appear in a region which has been described as a place on the globe where certain groups of people, holding very little in common, live contiguous to one another. These diverse peoples, so particularistic in their historical experience, religion, language, and ethnic composition have for centuries formed a sort of "low pressure area" in world politics and because of this lack of unity represented an attractive objective for strategic and economic penetration by outside powers. To be sure, there have been some very encouraging initiatives toward regional cooperation, but the past dies hard, and this history is essential to an understanding and appreciation of the long road that must be traveled before a genuine regional identity can develop that, in turn, can support collective security and broad economic cooperation. The direction of this growth, as I say, has been toward this goal in the past 5 years and hopefully it will continue.

Another development in the region which I would like to bring to your attention is the surfacing of what might be called a second generation of nationalism led by younger and more pragmatic men for the most part and concerned with a different order of problems than their predecessors. The old style leadership, forged in the heat of the struggle for independence, was given to striking attitudes and adopting postures. Sukarno and his counterparts throughout the Afro-Asian world often continued to shadowbox after the decision was announced — with tragic consequences in the case of Indonesia. This second generation of leadership having to come to power in an independent country, is now turning its energies to the task of building a nation. The internal threat of communalism rather than the beastliness of the colonialists has top priority on their agenda. From this generation may come the inspiration for regional cooperation in cultural, educational, and economic affairs that could serve as a target for the aspirations of the young people of the Southeast Asian countries.

The extent to which Japan will play a role in the growing involvement of Asian states in each other's destiny is the subject for rewarding speculation. Japan's economic growth has now made her the world's third industrial power. She has achieved a mature working democratic order and is beginning to reassert her interests in the affairs of her Asian neighbors through joint action to further the development of the entire region. This reviving self-confidence and assertion of leadership in economic cooperation offer the possibility that Japan's enormous potential may in time help shape a prosperous and secure environment in Asia.

As I come into the final section of my prepared remarks, I would like to

draw out of the score of problems and potential conflicts, four items that we can label as knotty problems for study and reflection. The first of these is the unresolved problem of Communist China's capabilities and intentions, particularly the latter. In terms of military capabilities she will soon have a tactical nuclear capacity and the strongest conventional force in Asia. Her current emphasis on "peoples' wars" asserts a potential threat to every non-Communist state in Asia. Whether or not a foreign policy based on ideology, nationalism, and xenophobia remains a permanent complement to a Communist regime in Peking no doubt depends on the outcome of the domestic struggle for power. I do not need to underline before this audience the tremendous task of managing this continuing problem in the years ahead.

A second kind of problem which may develop in Asia over the next decade is the temptation by one of the parties to a regional dispute to turn to nuclear weapons development with the intent of using the bomb as a threat to a rival or antagonist in regional disputes. We have tended to minimize the potential political leverage of nuclear weapons to resolve disputes since they have more or less frozen the status quo in the central balance of power and have at the other extreme been irrelevant to low-level conflicts. But this does not exhaust the possibilities of their political effectiveness in one or more of the bitter regional disputes. Each of us can think of several regional conflicts where escalation to nuclear war would have had incalculable consequences. The problem presented to the world by hostile regional powers armed with nuclear weapons, outside the constraints of an alliance system, and with inexperienced command and control of such weapons is a dismaying possibility of the future.

The third knotty problem we may wish to examine is the consequence for U.S. strategy and force commitments of what appears at this time to be the imminent withdrawal of a substantial British presence east of Suez. I cannot conceive of any problem facing the United States that would be more pertinent this year to your deliberations here at the Naval War College. I was in the United Kingdom this past summer and came away with the distinct impression that there is a deep-seated instinct in some sectors of British public opinion to "opt out" of its irritating and expensive residual responsibilities in Afro-Asia. There is certainly enough discussion in statements presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence to this effect, so that it hardly puts this observation in the category of news. Nevertheless, I sense, perhaps mistakenly, that the currents of opinion supporting this move are deeper than the official statements allow, and I would not be surprised to see more and more pressure in the direction of further reduction of these commitments. One friend put it this way:

You see (old chap) the British attitude toward their role in the world has a lot of old-fashioned ideas ingrained in it, naturally enough. For example, the old nonsense that the Orient begins at Calais. Or the rather dark view of the doings of Europeans in general. And our deep suspicion of giving up a jot of our precious sovereignty. Frankly, there has been little spontaneity in our approaches to closer relationships with these countries. However, every modern current of technology, of defence planning and budgeting, and of politics as well is flowing the other way. Perhaps we are still trying to solve 20th century problems with 19th century attitudes. Perhaps we should just chuck the whole lot and help shape the environment in which we live --- the European world. And cultivate a European personality to go with it.

The British are asking themselves the question: Are we still a world power? a major power? or a European power? To which of these three roles shall we adjust our pride, our capabilities, and our responsibilities? In going home to Europe from which this island people came, there seems to be a sense of relief. A world role today, they say, is not just disagreeable and thankless but is appalling in cost. They cite the figures for maintaining one British soldier east of Suez today — £10,000 compared to £800 prior to World War Two. So what ties remain to keep them out there — in the cold, so to speak? The Commonwealth? The Commonwealth has been evolving in any case, and individual members who are strong want to go their own way. Others, if weak, represent a potential burden. How far and how fast the reduction of the international role of the United Kingdom will proceed, I do not know. But I do hazard a guess that the statements suggesting staged withdrawals and moderate cuts in defense spending are definitely optimistic and while hoping for the best, we should prepare for the worst. The worst, in my view, would be such radical reductions as to present a danger to the world and perhaps to the United Kingdom itself.

The very last point I wish to make this morning is that we had best be prepared to live in a world of revolutionary violence and study this phenomena with some greater sophistication than has been the case in the past, in academic as well as Government groups. What kind of volatile combination do landless peasants, ambitious colonels, embittered tribesmen, and hungry slum dwellers provide as rebels against an established order? Has a lid been taken off a virtual Pandora's box from which long subdued tribal, ethnic, and religious hatreds will erupt in violence? What is the connection be-

tween anticolonial wars, tribal wars, wars of nation-states to determine regional hegemony and ideologically inspired coups and social revolutions?

My time is up, and I would close with a verse from the Old Testament, if you will permit me, that seems to sum up our modern dilemma. In the Book of Proverbs, chapter 26, verse 17, there is this thought: "He that passeth by and meddleth with strife belonging not to him is like one that taketh a dog by the ears." So I would ask you in this year ahead to ask yourselves — what strife belongeth to us? At what cost? And for what purpose?

I know it is going to be a good year for you. I am happy that you have asked me to come. And I hope I have raised some issues for your consideration.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Professor Frederick J. Horrigan holds a B.A. from DePauw University, and an M.A. and a Ph.D. from Indiana University.

Professor Horrigan, who served with the U.S. Navy in World War II, has been a Research Associate at

the Institute of Public Administration, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand; Lecturer at Indiana University; Assistant Professor at Louisiana State University; and Associate Professor and Chairman, Political Science Department, University of South Florida. He was awarded a Carnegie Fellowship at the Center for International Development, Indiana University, and has been a Lecturer in Southeast Asia Area Training Program at Indiana University and the University of Hawaii. Since 1965 Professor Horrigan has served on the Faculty of the National War College at Washington, D.C.

Professor Horrigan is the author of "Local Government and Administration in Thailand," his Ph.D. dissertation; "Provincial Government" in *Problems and Politics and Administration in Thailand*; and various articles and book reviews.

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CANTON GOVERNMENT AND AMERICAN REACTION, 1921-1925

**A Research Paper prepared by
Commander Reo A. Beaulieu, United States Navy
Faculty, School of Naval Command and Staff**

(This paper was prepared for the study "Intellectual History of China" which was offered to officers at the Naval War College by Brown University. Ed.)

INTRODUCTION

The recent history of China is primarily the response of an ancient, stable civilization to the impact of Westernization and modernization in the 20th century. The transformation and modernization of China have been wrought by violent, revolutionary change; all attempts at evolutionary change through self-strengthening devices — political and social adjustments — have proved futile. After the collapse of the Manchus in 1911 a prolonged civil war among numerous provincial military governors kept China in turmoil. Self-seeking militarists tried to unite China through military force without success while attempting to conserve the ancient political, social, and economic institutions. Sun Yat-sen led the attack to break China completely out of her past and to adopt Western institutions. The early formation of the Kuomintang Party and its attempt to seize political power through the appeal of nationalism was a necessary first step in the process of political modernization.

In late 1920 Dr. Sun Yat-sen returned to Canton to establish a southern government in China. At first glance the Canton Government did not seem much different from other provincial governments which were vying for power against Peking. It was initially supported by southern militarists and attempted to widen its sphere of influence to other provinces by the traditional use of military force. But the Canton Government contained certain elements of a burgeoning national revolutionary movement which would sweep China within 5 years and become its most potent force and national spokesmen.

It possessed dedicated leaders who were responsive to the needs of the people and who became spokesmen for

their grievances. The Kuomintang Party organization, at first a loose coalition of petty bourgeoisie (small merchants and intellectuals), succeeded in overcoming most of their internal difficulties and attracting new followers. Additionally, the intellectuals, students, labor leaders, and other nonpolitical organizations became identified with the movement and formed a wide base of popular support. The eventual success of the movement, however, was not inevitable. It was plagued by financial difficulties, ignored by foreign powers, and generally obstructed by the existing military power centers of China. It lacked the traditional instruments of power: economic resources, military resources, and political recognition. Nevertheless, it captured the minds of the Chinese people and developed a national consciousness that would support its rise to power.

Foreign governments were more concerned with the constant civil war in North China than in the developments at Canton. The civil war "made it hard for many foreigners to see that the country was in the midst of a transition period, in which intense disorder might be accompanied by deep currents of constructive change acting underneath the surface."¹ They were hoping for a strong man to emerge and to "pull the country together under a conservative government which would restore order and safeguard foreign property."² American reaction to the Canton Government was mixed. Private Americans were generally sympathetic to the goals and principles of the Canton Government since it attempted to establish a representative and republican form of government. Official American policy was designed to support the Peking Government and to preserve the status quo of traditional Chinese relationships with provisions for evolutionary change.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the elements of the early Chinese nationalist movement, to trace their development, and to assess American reaction to the Canton Government. This study is applicable today because the United States is currently confronted with many potential revolutionary situations throughout the underdeveloped world, and our attitudes may determine our political relationships with these nations for many years. Some would argue that "the West missed a golden opportunity to influence the direction of the Chinese Revolution through cooperating with Sun Yat-sen"³ and that "the United States would perhaps be well-advised to adopt a bold policy of helping and guiding revolutionary movements in these (underdeveloped) areas, instead of trying to preserve the status quo or to support outmoded and reactionary leaders."⁴

This paper will be limited to the early stages of the national movement from the election of Dr. Sun as President of Canton to his death in March 1925. For convenience it is divided into two sections, the first period covering the election of Dr. Sun to his return to Canton in February 1923, the second period until his death in March 1925.

THE END OF THE BEGINNING

This period encompasses the establishment of the Canton Government in May 1921 through the defeat of Sun Yat-sen by his former ally, General Ch'en Ch'ung Ming, in June 1922 and his exile in Shanghai, to his final return to Canton in February 1923. During this period the movement attracted the attention of the Chinese elite by reforms in the local government and general modernization of the city of Canton. It sought the support and sympathies of foreign governments and attempted to gain political recog-

nition. It widened its popular support, perhaps unconsciously, among the students and the labor organizations. Also, Sun Yat-sen established his first Soviet contacts.

The Canton Administration and Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Dr. Sun Yat-sen was elected President of the Canton Government on 5 May 1921 "by 222 votes of the original 1,000 members of Parliament."⁵ The vice consul in Canton, Ernest B. Price, wrote that:

... he ... was amazed at the display of popular interest in this event The (inauguration) parade was made up of and represented nearly every activity in the city: students, merchants, guilds, labor organizations, and but distinctly in the minority — governmental representatives The most interesting feature of the whole thing was the very apparent part taken in the demonstration by the common people In view of the more than usual lack of ordinary police surveillance, the order, cheerfulness and apparent unanimity of that huge crowd of people was remarkable.⁶

The Canton Government set about to reform the municipal government, to modernize the city, and to improve its financial administration. Dr. Sun's followers were "the aggressive young men of China, who were intent in giving a demonstration to China of what modernization may do for a city."⁷ The administrative acts of the government included the abolition of gambling, the reduction and reorganization of the Army, the abolishing of unnecessary governmental posts, and the improvement of taxation.⁸ A new pattern of local government was created, and Sun Fo was made mayor of the city. The appearance of the old port was changed: the ancient city wall was demolished; macadam roads and boulevards were constructed; the bund and the business center of the city were improved; public utilities were developed;

and parks and playgrounds were planned.⁹ The new look in Canton attracted the attention of China and, to a lesser extent, of the foreign powers and made the prospects of their government look brighter.

Foreign Program of Canton. It was quite natural for Sun Yat-sen to seek support and sympathy for his movement from the West since his personal background and democratic outlook pointed naturally in this direction. On becoming President of Canton he issued a Manifesto to the Foreign Powers in which he attacked the legitimacy and constitutionality of the Peking Government and requested the foreign powers to recognize his regime. He promised that "the legitimate rights of foreign powers and their nationals, duly acquired by treaty, contract or established usage, shall be scrupulously respected."¹⁰ Additionally, he made a special appeal to President Harding through his representative in Washington, Ma Soo. He especially looked to the United States for assistance in establishing a representative government in China, for withdrawal of its recognition of Peking, and for recognition of his government.¹¹ The letter was returned to the vice consul in Canton with instructions to forward it to Dr. Sun, although it had apparently been opened in the State Department.

By October 1921 Dr. Schurman, the U.S. Minister in China, wrote to the Secretary of State that "Canton (is) becoming a more important factor in national affairs."¹² The United States invited a Chinese delegation, composed of both northerners and southerners, to attend the Washington Naval Conference. The Canton Government steadfastly refused to participate in the delegation. Dr. Sun's views were expressed in a letter in which he said that:

In our eyes there is only one legal government in China. It is out of the question that the delegates of the Canton government should attend an international conference along with the delegates dispatched by the illegal government at Peking. Should the powers refuse to recognize the only legal government at Canton, we will never dispatch our representatives to the Washington Conference. It follows, therefore, that no items relative to the Republic of China, which have been deliberated upon and decided at the Conference will be binding upon our country.¹³

During the Conference the Sun Government kept up a constant hail of advice and pungent comment to the official Chinese delegation and the representatives of the Western Powers through its representative in the United States.

Ma Soo opposed the Ten Points submitted by the Peking delegation. The Canton Government's program included: "the withdrawal of international recognition from the Peking Government, noninterference by foreign powers in the political affairs of China, and the adoption of open diplomacy in dealings between China and the powers, and between the powers themselves with reference to China."¹⁴ Much of the Canton program would eventually be brought to fruition as their movement gained strength in China. Canton believed that the following principles relating to China should become applicable:

1. Territorial Integrity: (a) Settlement of the Shantung question by the cancellation of the Sino-Japanese treaty and notes of 1915, and recognition of the fact that China's declaration of war against Germany automatically terminated the Kiaochow leasehold. (b) Cancellation of the Sino-Japanese treaty and notes of 1915 relative to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; the railways in North and South Manchuria to be

converted into Chinese state-owned properties (c) Recognition by Great Britain of Chinese sovereignty in Tibet which would be granted autonomy. (d) Relinquishment of all leased territories. (e) The restoration to China of all Settlements and Concessions; during an interim period, their administration to be vested in a council consisting of an equal number of Chinese and foreign members, with a Chinese chairman. (f) The withdrawal of foreign troops, whether their presence was warranted by the treaties or not.

2. Economic Integrity: (a) Freedom from treaties imposing fiscal limitations of every sort. (b) Remission of the remainder of the Boxer indemnity payments, and the use of such funds for educational and industrial purposes. (c) The elimination of spheres of interest or influence.

3. Administrative Integrity: (a) The gradual abolition of consular jurisdiction by installments. (b) Japanese police agencies to be removed. (c) Telegraphic and wireless installations maintained in China by Foreign Governments and their nationals to be dismantled.¹⁵

Kuomintang Leadership and American Reaction. The Kuomintang Party cherished the ideas of establishing a representative and republican form of government in China. They represented a considerable bloc of the original Parliament that was formed after the Chinese revolution of 1911. When the Parliament was dissolved under Yuan Shih-kai, approximately 200 of its members eventually arrived at Canton. The Kuomintang, far from being a party of radical or even liberal revolutionists, was a loosely constructed coalition that relied for its support on the various groups that constituted the bourgeoisie, mainly small merchants and intellectuals. The Canton Government ostensibly functioned under the Kuomintang with Sun Yat-sen maintaining, for the most part, a personal and autocratic relationship with his supporters.¹⁶

The vice consul in Canton was impressed by the ability of the Canton leaders, their devotion to principles, and their concern over the welfare of the people.

These leaders of the Southern Government are enlightened men, acquainted with foreign ideas and methods, and, for the present at least, are making a praiseworthy attempt to demonstrate their ability to work together and to govern the people over whom they are exercising power to the satisfaction of the people themselves . . . All things considered I am of the opinion that it is to the interest of the United States to adopt towards these men who constitute the present *de facto* government of a considerable portion of South China an attitude of sympathy.¹⁷

Additionally, he stated that "I am also convinced that in this group of men, not merely Dr. Sun but the really large and loyal group of men who are supporting the principle and cause of democracy in South China, lies the only hope for China."¹⁸

But Mr. Price's views were definitely in the minority among State Department officials. These officials seemed to form their opinions of the Canton Government more on Sun Yat-sen's personality than on the competence and devotion of his followers and were ready to report on all sources of conflict or difficulty which would cause the demise of Dr. Sun. Generally, Sun was considered to be a visionary and impractical dreamer,

. . . who embarrassed his associates by his impractical and grandiose schemes. He is reported to be a man of great personal vanity, although sincere in his motives, and much given to initiating projects of national magnitude that he has not as yet in any case brought to fruition. His prestige is undoubtedly great in his own province of Kwangtung, but in the North he is regarded as at the best an impractical idealist.¹⁹

General Ch'en Ch'ung Ming, the Civil Governor and Commander of the Kwangtung forces, was generally considered to be the abler man of the two and the better administrator. In May 1922 when Sun had "dismissed" General Ch'en because he did not favor or assist the northern expedition, Dr. Schurman compared the two leaders in a telegram to the Secretary of State:

Sun is a born leader, agitator, fire-brand . . . Chen is lawyer, soldier, administrator. Ultimate goal of both is unified democratic China with provincial autonomy. Sun would march straight to Peking with his small and miserable army having sublime confidence in his own ability to establish and rule unified and perfect republic; Chen sees reasonable preparations are necessary. His own program is the political and economical development of Kwangtung and the spread by force of example and proven accomplishment of good democratic provincial governments.²⁰

In the north, General Wu Pei-fu had succeeded in overthrowing General Chiang Tao-lin and was advocating the formation of a constitutional government. Many Americans and the State Department favored General Wu and hoped that he would be able to unite China. However, he would not be able to form a constitutional government without the support of Sun Yat-sen who controlled about 200 members.²¹

Sun seemed ready to negotiate at first but then issued a statement posing as defender of the constitution against

. . . the militarists in North China and demanding for the protection of the nation two conditions: (1) punishment of men now confessing their crime who, in 1917, effected dissolution of parliament; (2) guarantee against future dissolution of Parliament and protection against militarism by organizing half of the troops into labor battalions under their own officers on terms of a fair living wage and reasonable hours of work.²²

Within 10 days of this telegram of Dr. Schurman to the State Department, Sun was overthrown by General Ch'en and forced to retire.

Official American attitude toward Sun Yat-sen may be best illustrated by the following excerpts of telegrams addressed to the State Department after Sun's defeat.

From Vice Consul in Canton (Huston) to Dr. Schurman: 'Sun appears to be willing to retire if allowed dignified exit. Hinted that if consular body would offer good offices might be acceptable.'

Schurman statement to the State Department: 'Mediation by foreigners might eliminate Sun Yat-sen more speedily but it would not permanently settle the issue which would inevitably return to plague the Chinese.'

'If Ch'en Ch'ung Ming himself cannot bring Sun's retirement the Peking government should grapple with the difficulty. Sun is the one outstanding obstacle to reunification which with disbandment of superfluous troops is the cardinal policy of President Li Yuan-hung and his cabinet and supporters . . . Now that nothing remains but the elimination of Sun, not victorious but defeated, it would seem that the undertaking should be left to the Chinese Government if Ch'en Ch'ung Ming cannot or will not accomplish it.'

'I venture to suggest that foreign mediation will dignify and magnify Sun Yat-sen and assure him of prestige in the future.'²³

American public opinion and sentiment toward the Canton Government does not seem to have been aroused in this early period. Events in China were generally reported in the back pages; editors and journalists generally favored the rise of some strong man or political leaders, such as General Wu Pei-fu. Canton's representative in the United States, Ma Soo, and Chinese residing in the United States continually tried to gain support of Americans to their cause at every opportunity.

According to an American correspondent to the *Shanghai Weekly Review*:

Almost to a man the Chinese residing in the United States comes from Canton or from the Canton district, and every one of them is a rampant adherent of the Canton Government with result that there is a peculiar situation in the public opinion of the United States about China The average American has heard so much about the glories of Canton and the alleged infamies of Peking, that he wonders why the United States Government continues to recognize the Peking Government.²⁴

The Development of Popular Support. Popular sentiment on political movements in the early 1920's was evident in only a slight minority of Chinese society, and public opinion was certainly not representative. The Canton Government, however, succeeded in attracting some measure of popular support even at its inception, as evidenced by the inauguration parade. The attitude of the Kuomintang leadership and the administrative acts of the Government further broadened its popular base, especially among the students, intellectuals, and labor organizations. However, Mr. Price observed that "the business people, particularly the larger ones, view the situation with a good deal of pessimism So far the Chinese commercial classes have refused to assume the burden of self-government, while at the same time complaining if those who do rule demand their assistance and participation."²⁵

That the students could be a major force in China was amply demonstrated during the May 4th movement. The students generally looked to the Kuomintang for leadership and invariably favored Sun Yat-sen as the leader of new China.

I suppose that if a straw vote were to be taken among the students

throughout China the result would be a complete victory for Sun Yat-sen in the North as well as in the South. Such is the impression conveyed by students in Peking, at least, for almost to a man they come out openly for Sun. But they have no leadership and their numbers are comparatively small.²⁶

Even during his exile to Shanghai, Sun's popularity continued to grow among the students. In February 1923 a ballot was taken by *Weekly Review of the Far East* "to ascertain the men held highest in public esteem in China. Sun Yat-sen's name headed the list, outranking by many votes the second favorite."²⁷ Dr. Schurman reported to the State Department in March 1923 that:

Students notably in Peking have since formation of Cabinet protested and paraded against Peng Yung Yi as Minister of Education. They had very generally the sympathy of their teachers, and Chancellor Ts'ai of National University Peking resigned and went away on strike. Apparently in protest against Government and police, who interfered with their recent lantern demonstration, some students have sent telegram to Sun Yat-sen addressing him as President of China, denouncing Premier and especially President Li and inviting Sun to lead his troops into Peking, drive away these two tyrants, and dissolve the illegal parliament.²⁸

On his return to Canton in February 1923, Sun was dragged from his automobile and carried in triumph to the platform to address a group of students at the Queen's University at Hongkong. "Even the British faculty had to admit that China's first President, though he might be a radical and a dreamer, was still the unrivaled conqueror of the minds of the China's coming generation."²⁹

The labor movement grew with astonishing speed and militancy in the early 1920's. These new organizations

were quite different from the guilds and were built on the ideas of the solidarity of labor and increasing class consciousness. These early movements were primarily directed to securing economic gains through the use of strikes and boycotts. The Canton Government was the first provincial government to legalize union organizations. In May 1922 the first national labor conference met in Canton under the leadership of Hongkong seamen who had won a substantial victory over the British earlier in the year. The conference was attended by delegates of 230,000 union members.³⁰

The strikes were effective in making economic gains and in increasing memberships.

Hundreds of labor unions have been formed, with an estimate membership of 500,000. Canton has over 200 unions, Shanghai, nearly 100 . . . In Canton in 1921, there were twenty-one strikes, only one of which failed. From 1919 to 1923, there were two hundred and seventy-nine strikes within the international settlement of Shanghai. Of the 69 more important strikes in China from June, 1921 to February, 1923, forty-two were completely successful, only a few of the remainder being total failures.³¹

The attitude of Sun Yat-sen to the labor organizations was in sharp contrast to that of other provincial leaders of China and was instrumental in convincing Maring that the Canton group was the nucleus of a national revolutionary movement.

When Maring came to China in the spring of 1921 and established connections with Sun Yat-sen, whom he first visited in Kwangsi, he decided that the main stream of Chinese nationalism flowed through Sun's Kuomintang. This belief was strengthened when in Canton and Hongkong in January 1922 a major seaman's strike took place and Maring found that the Kuomintang already had substantial

links to the young Chinese labor movement.³²

While Maring visited Sun in Shanghai in August 1922, "various political factions and representatives of twenty-seven labor organizations of Shanghai . . . pledged support to the deposed Canton leader on August 21."³³

Although the Kuomintang was making considerable progress among the students and labor organizations, many foreign observers reported that Sun Yat-sen was not as acceptable to other Chinese, although in no instance have these "Chinese" been clearly identified. Presumably, these opinions were formed from discussions with Chinese Government representatives and merchants who would come in close contact with foreigners. Dr. Schurman stated in May 1922 that "Sun has alienated sympathy of thoughtful Chinese and foreigners, but still strong with labor unions and radicals."³⁴ An American observer reported that "Sun Yat-sen is regarded by the Chinese with indifference and sometimes with mockery."³⁵ Another observed that:

Chinese opinion is much divided over the personality of Dr. Sun, in whom some see a dreamer and visionary of high but utopian ideals, who will lead his followers to destruction, while others have the very highest regard for his practical abilities. All, it seems are at one in granting to him the possession of the purest patriotism . . .³⁶

Summary. In this first period, foreign observers believed that Sun was defeated and that in any case he would never be able to extend his influence beyond Canton. He failed to gain recognition from the foreign powers but succeeded in attracting some Chinese followers to his movement, perhaps unconsciously. He failed to make complete use of their support, however, since he still relied on the traditional use of military force to gain power.

THE BEGINNING OF THE END

When Sun Yat-sen returned to Canton on 21 February 1923 with the assistance of troops from Yunan Province, it may be concluded from the events that followed that he had decided on alternate courses of action to achieve power in China. In August 1922 Maring had "urged him to substitute a campaign of mass propaganda and organization for an attempt to recapture Canton by purely military means."³⁷ The arrival of Borodin in October 1923 marked the beginning of the reorganization of the Kuomintang, the establishment of a new army, and the launching of the mass movement. In 1923 Sun Yat-sen also turned from the Western Powers for support and accepted the assistance of the Soviets. He established more drastic means to secure finances for his government through increased taxes in Canton and through attempts to seize the custom houses. He launched a vigorous and effective campaign against foreign rights, unequal treaties, and foreign imperialism in general. By the time of his death in 1925, Sun Yat-sen was on the verge of successfully completing his life's work of revolution.

Foreign Program. It is questionable whether or not Sun Yat-sen had completely decided to seek the assistance of the Soviets on his return to Canton in February 1923. According to letters published in the *Hongkong Telegraph* in September 1922, he had been in secret correspondence looking toward an alliance of Germany, Russia, and China.³⁸ The Russian revolution had attracted him both by its programs and its spectacular success.

On the one hand, the existence of some similarities between his ideas and those of the Bolsheviks was indeed inspiring and reassuring to a

man like Sun, who had been frustrated in his revolutionary efforts. On the other hand, he could not but admire the Soviet regime for its ability to achieve what he failed to do in China.³⁹

On 1 April 1923, in an Associated Press dispatch, Sun Yat-sen stated that he would begin immediately to modernize Canton Province with the assistance of foreign experts in departments requiring foreign methods and that all nationalities would be welcomed in the financing of government enterprises, but American and British capital would be preferred.⁴⁰ Late in the spring of 1923 he made an appeal to other nations through Dr. Schurman who was then visiting Canton. He requested the United States to approach England, France, and other powers:

... on the proposal of a joint intervention in China for a period of five years . . . Sun Yat-sen had the plan worked out with characteristic detail. It involved foreign military occupation of all the provincial capitals and the lavish use of military and civil experts. The object was to set the provincial and national governments in order, after which elections were to be held, and the foreigners were to train the Chinese administration which was to supersede them.⁴¹

This proposal may not have been sincere, since he issued a Manifesto to the Foreign Powers on 29 June 1923 in which he blamed the militarists for civil war, disunion, and anarchy and blamed the foreign powers for supporting the Peking regime by granting it recognition.

But the Peking Government is not in fact or in law a government, does not perform the primary functions or fulfill the elementary obligations of a government, and is not recognized by the Chinese people as a government. The Foreign Powers, who must all along have realized the farce of their recognition, have been prompted to do

so by the notion that they must have some entity, though it be a nonentity, with which to deal. However, by their action, they have given Peking moral prestige and financial support in the shape of revenues under foreign control so that the Peking Government has been enabled to exist by virtue of foreign recognition and by that alone. Unconsciously perhaps, they have thus done something which they have professed they would not do, that is, intervened in China's internal affairs by practically imposing on the country a government repudiated by it.⁴²

Dr. Schurman felt that the United States should continue to recognize the Peking Government so as not to endanger foreign nationals or to jeopardize international peace among nations with an interest in China.⁴³

When Tsao Kun was elected President in October 1923 Sun Yat-sen reiterated his demands to the foreign powers not to recognize Peking.

I have to request Foreign Powers and their representatives in Peking to avoid any act which may be construed by new Peking usurper as an intimidation or assurance of international recognition and support. The foreign recognition of Tsao Kun would perpetuate internecine strife and disorder and would be envisaged by Chinese people as a frustration of their declared will regarding an act which eats at moral fiber of the national character.⁴⁴

It was reported that Tsao Kun had bought the election for \$10 million. Dr. Schurman observed that on his election there was "no enthusiasm, no crowds, only police, soldiers, and rickshaw men in streets."⁴⁵

The recognition issue was relegated to a minor position in 1924 and early 1925 as anti-imperialism, abolition of extraterritoriality, the revision of "unequal" treaties, and the influence of Bolshevism became the major issues. On 31 December 1923, before a meeting of the YMCA in Canton, Sun is

said to have fully acknowledged his orientation: "We no longer look to the Western Powers. Our faces are turned toward Russia."⁴⁶

Financial Difficulties. Although many overseas Chinese and local merchants supported Sun Yat-sen's movement, the cost of maintaining an army and conducting campaigns against other provinces drained its resources and precipitated inflation. On his return to Canton in 1923 it soon became apparent that he would attempt other means to support his operations. It was reported that government land and temple sites were sold to private purchasers and that an order was issued to the effect that lands of persons who could not present complete title would be confiscated.⁴⁷ According to Dr. Schurman, the institution of oppressive tariff laws and exorbitant taxes made Sun Yat-sen unpopular in Canton.⁴⁸

In 1919 and 1920 the Canton Government had received a percentage of the funds collected in the custom houses through the Peking Government after China's international indemnities had been paid. In 1921 the Peking Government refused to allow any monies to be transferred to the Canton Government, although supposedly the money would be used for land reclamation, road building, and other public works projects. Between January and March 1921 Sun Yat-sen threatened the seizure of the customs revenues, but the United States upheld the opinion that it could only act as a trustee of the funds for the internationally recognized Government of Peking. Wu Ting-fang, on the other hand, believed that the United States "should consider themselves trustees not for a technically and momentarily recognized government such as the so-called Peking Government but for the Chinese people who are the ultimate sovereign."⁴⁹

In September 1923 Sun Yat-sen submitted a telegram to the diplomatic body requesting that surplus funds be turned over to the Canton Government and stating that the money was being used against them by the financing of northern militarists.⁵⁰ The diplomatic body postponed any decision on Sun's telegram since there was, in their view, a possibility that General Ch'en would return to power.⁵¹ Sun apparently shifted his intentions from seizing custom houses to declaring the ports under his control to be free ports "i.e., to collect no dues or duty on goods entering the port but thereafter to levy on all merchandise in Chinese hands such taxes or exactions as they may see fit to impose up to any amount."⁵² By December 1923 Sun was standing firm on his demands and again threatened the seizure of the custom house. He declared that "seizure of surplus is only an internal affair, that if foreign powers should resort to forcible measures it would clearly be an action of intervention in China's internal affairs in favor of Northern militarists."⁵³ Secretary of State Hughes recommended to President Coolidge that a show of naval force should be undertaken in Canton as a precautionary measure.⁵⁴ American naval forces were anchored in Canton from December 1923 to mid-April 1924. The United States was singled out for attacks during the naval demonstration in the hopes of influencing public opinion in the United States. It was noted in the Chinese press that the Canton Government was starting antiforeign agitation and asserting that the enormous customs revenues were needed to reduce taxes and the cost of living.⁵⁵ In commenting on the feelings of the Peking Government, Dr. Schurman stated that:

... it seems to me that Koo's (Wellington Koo) feelings are torn between gratification that probably his custom

house will be saved to him and anguish that the saving is going to be done by foreigners. In general the Peking Government feels the same, and in high official circles there appears, curiously enough, a kind of sneaking sympathy for Sun Yat-sen's claims.⁵⁶

Kuomintang Party Organization and Popular Support.

In 1922 Maring had urged on Sun Yat-sen the necessity for reorganizing the Kuomintang Party and for broadening the base of the national movement. Borodin, on his arrival, was determined to strengthen the movement among the peasants and working classes but "was also convinced that a revolution would not be successful in China without the cooperation of all the groups in the Kuomintang."⁵⁷ At the First Kuomintang Congress in January 1924, it was evident that the administrative machinery of the Kuomintang had been reconstructed, that a highly disciplined party organization had been formed, and that a party program had been formulated. The party organization included Communist cadres who had been admitted as individuals. The party platform was designed to attract workers and peasants through liberal reforms in economic and social conditions. Sun, although interested in economic and social problems, had never previously reached the great masses of the country with his revolutionary principles.⁵⁸

The labor and peasant organizations, however, did not automatically accept the new leadership of the Kuomintang. Both organizations had been gaining strength in 1923. The labor organization was "marked by its independent spirit and militancy . . . There is also evidence that they were skeptical and suspicious of the new 'allies' who were springing up in Canton."⁵⁹ The Kwangtung Peasant Association was already organized before the middle of 1923.⁶⁰ When Sun announced the

"land to the tiller" policy in August 1924, the mass peasant movement in China gained momentum.⁶¹

The reorganized Kuomintang Party did not attract all Chinese, however. In the summer of 1924 a Merchant's Volunteer Corps was organized by the British and wealthy compradores of Hongkong and Canton to challenge the Kuomintang. According to one observer the organization of this centralized and militarized body was an expression of resentment against Sun's regime which was oppressing the Cantonese by the introduction of provincial mercenaries and by levying excessive taxes.⁶² In October the force of newly formed Whampoa cadets, workers' battalions, and peasant guards defeated the Merchant Volunteers and disarmed them. "Scenes of desolation and carnage marked many sections of the city after that fateful day, which aroused a wave of anti-Sun feeling among Cantonese the world over."⁶³ Additionally, the opposition of the commercial classes was reported as follows:

The United Commercial Guilds of Kwangtung Province on September 24 made public a recommendation to the overseas Chinese to withdraw their financial support from Dr. Sun, denouncing him at the same time in the strongest terms. They were supported by the Committee of the Kwangtung Gentry, representing 96 districts in the province, who, meeting at Fatshan, late in September, repudiated the head of the Canton Government, and called it 'irregularly constituted', without even the support of the sentiment and goodwill of the local people. Finally the Kwangtung Provincial Assembly, on September 30, warned the League of Nations that Sun was 'a rebel disturbing local peace, and also disturbing international goodwill by his misrepresentations.' In all these messages, evidence of tyrannical government was adduced.⁶⁴

The Rise of Antiforeignism.

The Manifesto of the First Kuomintang Congress attacked the role of foreign powers in China.

In somewhat Russian fashion the Manifesto formally made anti-imperialism a very important part of Chinese nationalism. It demanded the abrogation of the unequal treaties and the abolition of foreign concessions, extraterritoriality, foreign control of customs, etc. It also offered friendship to those countries which would voluntarily renounce their special rights and privileges in China.⁶⁵

Throughout 1924 Sun Yat-sen denounced the foreign powers for their imperialism. The antiforeign slogans struck a responsive chord among a large cross section of Chinese society, which bolstered the revolutionary movement. Blaming China's ills on the foreigners fired the imagination and evoked strong feelings among the Chinese who had been suffering from civil war, economic deprivation, and social unrest for a long period. The antiforeign movement became not merely an ideological symbol, but a rationalization of the current crisis in China.

Less interested in ideas than in profits, the merchants of the treaty ports, many of whom had industrial connections, desired customs autonomy in order to secure protection for domestic manufactures. The financial classes resented the privileged position enjoyed by certain foreign banks in which not only customs receipts but salt revenues were regularly deposited. Workers in foreign-owned factories, although in many cases receiving wages in excess of any to which they had even been accustomed, were restless under the steady discipline of the modern factory. And even the peasant, normally content to till his fields and raise up sons to worship at the ancestral altars, began to feel vaguely that the foreigner was somehow responsible for the manifold

ills from which the country suffered. For the foreigner, guaranteed special rights under the treaties, seemed to be largely immune from the oppression under which the natives themselves were compelled to suffer.⁶⁶

A "Rights Recovery Movement" developed in 1924 among the teachers of eight Government schools in Peking. In July the teachers issued a declaration reading in part:

Unfortunately, however, internal disorders have led to invasions by other powers and various kinds of administrative affairs are supervised by foreigners, and practically every movement of the people is watched by them. Thus the finances of the country get worse, and the people become weak. They are oppressed by the powers as if they were their servants. . . . We think that all former treaties should be cancelled and replaced with new ones giving equal treatment, thus allowing the people of China a chance to become an independent race in the world, enjoying an equal status with the white race.⁶⁷

In his Manifesto on the Northern Expedition in September 1924, Sun Yat-sen linked the relationship between militarism and imperialism. "The direct cause of our civil war during the last thirteen years has been militarism, and the indirect cause has been imperialism."⁶⁸ On his trip north to Peking in December 1924 he issued at Shanghai "a vigorous statement against foreigners and their wrongs to China, and voiced the already current criticism of missionaries as running-dogs of imperialism."⁶⁹ He also stated that:

. . . the foreigner in China acted like a king and insisted on being treated like one. For thirteen years, foreigners had been engaged in stirring up trouble in the country. Once foreigners were placed under Chinese law, this interference in China's domestic affairs could be prevented, and

it might even have a salutary effect if one or two foreigners were shot for encouraging civil commotion.⁷⁰

Sun Yat-sen continued the denunciation of the foreign powers, the demand for revision of unequal treaties, and the abolition of all special privileges throughout his speeches in 1924. But Dorothy Borg would observe that foreigners were impressed only after the May 30th incident by the amount of latent antiforeign hostility that was present throughout China. "They continued to think 'China' in terms of conditions in the North and in the Yangtze Valley and remained relatively unaware of the developments within the Kuomintang."⁷¹

Other than a brief telegram from Dr. Schurman to the State Department dated 28 June 1922 in which he stated, "I do not believe nor have I found anyone here who believes that a recurrence of antiforeign sentiment leading to attacks on foreigners like those of the Boxers can be considered as a probability for the Chinese of the Twentieth Century,"⁷² little mention is made of antiforeign feeling in the State Department records until the fall of 1924. Chargé d'affaires Bell reported to the Secretary of State on 8 September 1924:

Apparently in connection with a recent movement reported from time to time in the press that certain radical Chinese wish to proclaim September 7th as a day of national humiliation since Boxer protocol signed on that date, printed handbills headed 'To Foreigners' were distributed yesterday in the Legation Quarter and vicinity north of Chienmin warning foreign diplomats and citizens that Chinese can no longer tolerate further acts of violence and insults by our Governments and threatening our lives if we do not give up predatory treaties which strangle China and protocol of 1901. I do not attach any great importance to this occurrence

but send it for what it may be worth as straw in the wind.⁷³

In November and December 1924, American diplomats recognized the popularity of the movement to revise or cancel the special privilege treaties. General Feng Yu-hsiang, the Christian general, had gained control of Peking and a Provisional Government was established under Tuan Chi-hui. The Chargé in China (Mayer) considered that the conservative leaders of the north "would not be able to oppose such a popular movement and might even have to join with it,"⁷⁴ and that "the radical wing of Kuomintang Party and the Soviets (might have) their day in Peking."⁷⁵ The British proposed a conference:

. . . to inform Chinese authorities and people of the continued desires of these powers, as evidenced at Washington Conference, to take up with China, at the very earliest moment that she puts her house in order, the question of treaty revision and these powers to this end would support in every proper way any government in China which would show a capacity for undertaking the task of restoring law and order in the country.⁷⁶

However, the British also felt that the powers should not recognize any administration set up in Peking who were "seeking to incite the Chinese people against the friendly attitude of the powers."⁷⁷ On 24 November 1924 in a telegram to Ambassador Kellogg, Secretary Hughes stated that if the Chinese adopted a policy of cancelling the "unequal treaties,"

. . . it would without doubt bring forth a degree of enthusiasm and popular approval such as no recent Chinese regime has been able to win. Should the powers unite in opposition to such a policy, it seems likely that the Chinese would be able to render of no worth foreign treaty rights by

more passive resistance if not by the use of more aggressive means such as boycotts.⁷⁸

Although American officials were convinced of the unanimous public approval of the rights recovery movement, they were less sensitive to the amount of antiforeign and anti-Christian hostility that was widespread among the Chinese people. Anti-Christian demonstrations were held throughout China over the Christmas holidays, and the churches "were denounced as tools of foreign imperialism and capitalism."⁷⁹ However, the vice consul in Canton stated that "if there has been any increase of antiforeign feeling there is no evidence of any hostility to foreigners."⁸⁰ Also, the consul general reported on 11 January 1925 that "none of our businessmen have received any intimations from interior representatives of anti-Christian move," but that:

Missionaries and educators have received reports of anti-Christian move from interior correspondents but the consensus of opinion at present is that the move is but slightly more extensive than in 1922, that it is as well organized but not so intelligently directed, that the move is a natural sequence of the Chinese educators' challenge of mission education and that thus rivalry will likely continue over a long period. It has elements that may cause antiforeign propaganda but as yet it is not apparent. The agitation is purely anti-Christian education or antimission school to date.⁸¹

Dr. Hawks Potts, at a meeting of the American church mission board, was less optimistic.

He stated that the anti-Christian move looks worse than he thought at first and he regards it to be political. He stated the situation in connection with anti-Christian propaganda is be-

coming more and more serious and is looked upon by clear-thinking good educators and leaders as a dangerous thing not only to the Christian institutions but to the nation at large.⁸²

American popular opinion also assessed that the antforeign feeling was primarily directed against the "unequal treaties and the anti-Christian feeling against the work of the Christian missionaries and the schools under their direction." As early as 1923 one observer wrote that "no one who has studied the recent growth of public opinion in China can believe that China will much longer accept international obligations which have been forced upon her."⁸³ Another wrote later that "is it to be wondered at heart every Chinese is antforeign, that his slumbering hatred of the men who so treat him and his country will spring into flame whenever and wherever possible."⁸⁴ A correspondent for the *North China Daily News* in Shanghai wrote on 7 January 1925,

. . . an article declaring that a serious wave of antforeign and anti-Christian feeling is sweeping across China. The writer attributes the causes to the failure of the present rulers who are attempting to deflect the popular wrath from themselves to the foreigners, also to the large growth of Christianity recently and the Bolshevik poison.⁸⁵

The movement was effective in the establishment of a commission on extraterritoriality that had been promised at the Washington Conference. Sun Yat-sen's protests against imperialism brought a greatly enlarged popular following. "Sun Yat-sen made his appeal to an emerging national consciousness, strongest in its racial form of prejudice against foreigners; he appealed also to fear: fear of racial extinction and fear of economic pressure."⁸⁶

American Attitude toward Bolshevism. American officials were primarily concerned that the Soviet influence in the Kuomintang Party would cause the radical revision or cancellation of the treaties. In late 1924 Mr. Mayer considered the possibility of the conservative leaders, Tuan Chihui and Chang Tso-lin, joining the Kuomintang and believed that if they did join "that there will be the probability if not certainty that the Chinese Government will demand treaty revision or cancellation."⁸⁷ Chang Tso-lin expressed concern over the Bolshevik influence in the Sun Government and wanted the foreign governments to intervene since it was really not an internal but international matter. But Mr. Mayer assessed that Chang's fears were primarily due to his own unstable position and that he desired "the foreign powers to take some action which will permit conservative Chinese leaders to work with them and prevent Bolshevik influence from predominating in China."⁸⁸ Mayer also had "a grave apprehension that extreme Kuomintang and Soviet influence may dominate Peking."⁸⁹

Mr. Mayer believed that the Bolshevik influence and activities were primarily a matter for domestic Chinese administration and not a matter for international concern or intervention. The Secretary of State concurred with Mr. Mayer's observations.

I would point out with respect to Marshal Chang's contention that it is world-wide and international, that the American Government cannot concern itself with the matter except in case American interests are directly involved. The serious aspect of propaganda directed from Moscow is, however, fully appreciated by this Government.⁹⁰

Divided opinions existed on whether or not the Sun Government was com-

pletely under control of the Soviets. In October the vice consul in Canton (Jenkins) reported that "the Sun Government is completely under domination of Soviet agents."⁹¹ Another consul believed that "Sun was not an exponent of Bolshevism but radical nationalism, although he was willing to utilize the Bolsheviks in his political maneuvers and that he had taken pains to disassociate his political movement from Bolshevism."⁹²

It seems likely that "the essence of the Kuomintang-Communist alliance was a marriage of convenience to last as long as their respective interests coincided."⁹³

Summary. With the assistance of the Soviets, Sun's national revolutionary movement gained momentum through a reorganized party organization, a party platform, a new army, and a propagandistic appeal to the Chinese masses. Foreign governments, including the United States, were not particularly knowledgeable as to the direction or to the growing enthusiasm of the movement. They assessed the Kuomintang programs and policies in the light of how these actions would most immediately affect traditional relationships and foreign properties in China and not in the light of an emerging national consciousness. Their reaction was tuned to the necessity for evolutionary change rather than to a recognition that the situation demanded revolutionary change.

CONCLUSIONS

The Chinese national revolutionary movement in its early stages is representative of the conditions in many emerging nations today. Lack of a national consciousness, squalid economic and social conditions, a crumbling traditional society that has lost

authority, a general disaffection of the intellectuals and the young, all of these elements were present in China. Although the Kuomintang Party attracted some Chinese, it lacked in the beginning the necessary organization and mass popular support to be truly effective. The students, labor and peasant organizations remained relatively without political leadership until early 1924, although each was growing in strength and attracting more followers.

Soviet assistance and direction provided the impetus to change the Kuomintang's organization, to establish an attractive party program for the peasants and workers, and to abandon the traditional means of gaining power through military force. With Soviet assistance and recommendation, Sun Yat-sen began to emphasize in 1923 the importance of mass propaganda and in a series of speeches from January to August 1924 outlined his program for the future of China. The combination of Soviet methods and Sun Yat-sen's popularity and leadership enabled the Kuomintang to break out of Canton and become the most potent political movement in China.

As late as the fall of 1923, no foreign government would believe in the Kuomintang's ability to spread its movement throughout China. Sun Yat-sen was a visionary, a popular radical, an impractical idealist, who could never become a "responsible statesman" and a strong leader to unify China. He was obstructing all efforts of the conservative leaders to establish a strong, unified government and should be defeated in dishonor.

The main concern of the American officials was the continuing civil war in North China and the financial difficulties of the Peking Government which affected American commercial and missionary interests. If any change was to be brought about in foreign

rights, extraterritoriality, or customs autonomy, it would be discussed on condition that China "placed her house in order" and would only become effective through "mutual agreement of the contracting parties." But Sun Yat-sen maintained that China would not solve its difficulties until the foreign powers loosened their grip on China. Only after the antiforeign and anti-Christian movement gained momentum in 1924 did the foreign powers pay heed to Chinese thought and pronouncements. As Paul Monroe has stated, Americans paid too much attention to what they thought and not to what the Chinese were thinking.

Many factors seem to have contributed to this slow response by the United States to the nationalist developments in China. The United States had returned to isolationism after the First World War, and what foreign policy was implemented was oriented toward Europe. Chinese affairs affected only a small percentage of the American population, commercial and military interests. Until 1924 newspapers and periodicals granted only limited space in the back pages to events in China. The return of Chinese missionaries to the United States in 1924 to appeal for the Chinese missions and the eruption of the Shanghai incident on 30 May 1952 evoked more public response and increased awareness of the Chinese problem. It was only then that steps were taken by the United States to implement some of the provisions that had been promised China in the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-22.

The change in U.S. Administration and the appointment of Kellogg as Secretary of State in early 1925 resulted in two important decisions on China. Secretary Kellogg recognized that with the growth of antiforeign feeling some of China's demands would

have to be met "at an appropriate time," in particular the revision of treaties, extraterritoriality, and customs autonomy. Secondly, the United States would assume a greater leadership role by formulating its own China policy, if necessary. Previously, all policies had been made in concert with the other foreign powers, and the United States had normally acquiesced to the policies of Great Britain.

The telegrams of Ernest Price, vice consul in Canton, to the State Department proved to be accurate and timely in their assessment of the situation in Canton and the Kuomintang but were seemingly ignored by State. Two factors may have contributed to this situation. The sheer size of China, the intensity of the civil war, the number of political and military factors, the lack of direct contact of the diplomatic mission to Chinese personalities other than governmental representatives and large merchants, all played a role in presenting a distorted view of the Chinese problem, especially to the diplomatic representative in Peking. Secondly, the consular officials and the diplomatic

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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corps were administered by separate organizations until 1925 when both were unified under the State Department. The political opinions of consular officials were probably given short shrift.

Certain lessons can be drawn in hindsight from the American experience with the early development of the Kuomintang. It would seem to me that the first requirement for American officials abroad is the development of empathy and sensitivity to foreign sentiment as expressed not only by the current leadership and ruling elite, but also by the masses of peasants, workers, intellectuals, and students. The choice of American policy is not limited on

the one hand to guiding and supporting revolutionary movements, nor on the other to preserving the status quo and supporting reactionary leaders. It is seriously doubted that any foreign observer can thoroughly identify the myriad political, economic, and social factors and understand the personalities and motivations of the major actors in revolutionary situations while in progress. Any nation is constrained in its ability to assist in the modernization of a traditional society and to build effective economic, social, and political institutions in a foreign country. A more prudent, politically practical course of action would seem appropriate.

FOOTNOTES

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7. Lyon Sharman, *Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning* (New York: Day, 1934), p. 221.
8. *Foreign Relations*, p. 325.
9. Sharman, p. 221.
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30. Harold R. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1951), p. 65.
31. A. Percival Finch, "Industrial Awakening of China," *Current History*, June 1925, p. 428.
32. Isaacs, p. 62.
33. John C. Griggs, "Sun Yat-sen and Chinese Unity," *Current History*, October 1922, p. 137.
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35. Nathaniel Peffer, "One of Asia's Three Great Moderns," *Asia*, August 1924, p. 591.
36. "China: the Sick Man of the Far East," *Current History*, September 1921, p. 1038.
37. Isaacs, p. 62.
38. Sharman, p. 245.
39. Leng and Palmer, p. 51.
40. Harding, p. 325.
41. Sharman, p. 250.
42. *Foreign Relations*, 1923, p. 512.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 514.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 519.
45. *Ibid.*
46. Sharman, p. 253.
47. Payson J. Treat, "The Far East," *Current History*, February 1924, p. 704.
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49. *Foreign Relations*, 1921, p. 324.
50. *Foreign Relations*, 1923, p. 552.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 555.
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53. *Ibid.*, p. 564.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 555.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 577.
56. *Foreign Relations*, 1923, p. 566.
57. Borg, p. 16.
58. Leng and Palmer, p. 80.
59. Isaacs, p. 66.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
61. Leng and Palmer, p. 81.
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66. Pollard, p. 288.
67. *China Weekly Review*, 2 August 1924, p. 291, quoted in Pollard, p. 289-290 (footnote).
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70. *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, 11 December 1924, p. 790-791, as quoted in Pollard, p. 292 (footnote).
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
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It follows then as certain as night succeeds day, that without a decisive naval force we can do nothing definitive, and with it everything honorable and glorious.

*George Washington: Letter to
Marquis de Lafayette,
15 November 1781*



THE FORMOSA RESOLUTION 1954-1955, 1958

**A Research Paper prepared by
Commander Albert J. Ashurst, United States Navy
Faculty, School of Naval Command and Staff**

(This paper was prepared for the study "Diplomacy Since World War II" which was offered to officers at the Naval War College pursuing The George Washington University education program. Ed.)

Resolved: That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

*House Joint Resolution 159
(84th Congress, 1st Session)
29 January 1955*

With this resolution the Congress of the United States presented the President with carte blanche to wage war with another power, to interfere in what had been legally considered to be a civil war, and to define the area of interest, all to be based upon his own evaluation. Thus, another pivot point in the U.S. foreign policy was attained; one that essentially closed the door to any possibility of fruitful negotiation with the Chinese Communists, but also one that securely closed a route of aggression that had been open to them. The question is, then, how did the situation evolve that dictated the assumption of such a foreign policy, and what are its ramifications?

On 3 July 1884 Caleb Cushing signed on behalf of the U.S. Government the Treaty of Wanghai, the first treaty between the United States and China. The preamble of the document affirmed the desire "to establish firm, lasting, and sincere friendship between the two nations" and article 1 stipulated that:

There shall be a perfect, permanent, universal peace and a sincere and cordial amity, between the United States of America on the one part, and the Ta Tsing Empire on the other part, and between their people respectively, without exception of persons or places.

A century later, China and the United States brought to a victorious close their war against Japan. They had fought together as allies, and although the alliance had difficulties at times, it still achieved its objective. China had found a staunch friend in the United States who had been primarily responsible for the defeat of Japan, and the United States regarded friendly China as the mainstay of a newly emerging balance of power in the Far East. In less than 5 years the two powers, the United States and Mainland China, were to be antagonists, not allies. The reasons for the rift are many and complex; the innocuousness of the "open door policy," the imposition of an alien religion by missionaries, the traffic in coolies and opium, the restriction and final exclusion of Chinese labor immigration, the birth and growth of the Chinese Communist Party coupled with the increasing ineffectiveness of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang which finally resulted in the flight of Chiang to Taiwan in 1949 were some of the factors, but certainly not all, that contributed to the break in relations that exists to this day. In fact, even as late as 5 January 1950 the policy of the United States was at least neutral, if not friendly, toward that of Mainland China as exemplified by the following statement by President Truman on that date:

The United States Government has always stood for good faith in international relations In the joint declaration at Cairo on December 1, 1943 the President of the United States, the British Prime Minister, and the President of China stated that it was their purpose that territories Japan had stolen from China, such as Formosa, should be restored to the Republic of China. The United States was a signatory to the Potsdam declaration of July 26, 1945 which declared that the terms of the Cairo declaration should be carried

out. In keeping with this declaration, Formosa was surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek . . .

The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.

Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa.

A statement by the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, on the same day, further reinforced and elaborated on that made by the President. The heart of the Secretary's statement was:

We are not going to use our forces in connection with the present situation in Formosa. We are not going to attempt to seize the Island. We are not going to get involved militarily in any way on the Island of Formosa. So far as I know, no responsible person in the Government, no military man has ever believed that we should involve our forces in the Island.

Obviously, when one considers the power differential, the U.S. Government was ready and willing to hand over the Island of Taiwan, the Pescadores, and the offshore islands to the Communist Chinese Government at that time. However, shortly after this date the relationship between the United States and mainland China started to deteriorate. On 14 January 1950 the Chinese Communists seized all U.S. consular property in Peiping. On 14 February 1950 Communist China and the Soviet Union culminated a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. Secretary Acheson's response to this development was, "We now face the prospect that the Com-

munists may attempt to apply another familiar tactic and use China as a base for probing for other weak spots which they can move into and exploit." And, "they (the Chinese) should understand that, whatever happens within their own country, they can only bring grave trouble on themselves and their friends, both in Asia and beyond, if they are led by their new ruler into aggressive or subversive adventures beyond their borders." Could the warning be any clearer? Nevertheless, on 24 June 1950 the Korean war was initiated by the North Korean Army. This action, in consonance with the vast Communist Chinese buildup at Chekiang and Fukien opposite Formosa, led President Truman to initiate the following policy on 27 June 1950:

In these circumstances [attack upon Korea] the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a *direct* threat to the security of the Pacific area and to the United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary to this action, I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done.

Thus, in one fell swoop, the defensive perimeter concept as postulated by Acheson and the policy of noninvolvement in the civil strife between Formosa and the Mainland became diplomatic nonentities. The foregoing policy was further strengthened by a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and the Republic of China on 9 February 1952. The Communists, through the instrument of war, had launched a U.S. foreign policy that was to continue to widen the gulf between Mainland China and the free world. The action of utilizing the Seventh Fleet as the

neutralizing agent in the Formosa Strait by President Truman, although initially taken as a limited military step related to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, soon became the pivot point upon which much of our subsequent China policy was to turn.

Concurrently, with the hardening of U.S. foreign policy which was aimed at containment of the Chinese Communists, the United States also took steps to isolate the Mainland. In the United Nations the United States was set against Communist China's gaining a seat. In June of 1951 Secretary Acheson declared "that a claimant for seating cannot shoot his way into the U.N. and cannot get in by defying the U.N. and fighting its forces." Another example of this isolating pressure was the use of and the recommendation for the embargo of all trade with Red China.

Thus, by the end of the Korean war American policy towards Communist China was one of sharp opposition and hostility. And, conversely, the Island of Taiwan, which in months preceding the Korean war had been regarded as unessential to the vital interests of the United States, was now elevated to the rank of a crucial strongpoint in the entire U.S. security policy in the Western Pacific.

Indeed, during the political campaign of 1952 and throughout 1953 the determination of who was responsible for the defeat of the Nationalists on the Mainland in 1949 and the rise of communism in China was intensely debated. And in his first State of the Union Message on 2 February 1952 President Eisenhower revised the mission of the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa area:

I am therefore, issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China. Permit me to make this crystal clear. This order implies no aggressive intent

on our part. But we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea.

Some experts interpreted this to mean that Chiang's forces were to be unleashed, but without U.S. assistance Chiang was helpless. And no assistance was forthcoming. It should be noted, however, that the Seventh Fleet mission "to prevent any attack on Formosa" remained intact. Although no military consequences were derived from President Eisenhower's action, the political consequences were to link us even more closely to the Nationalist Chinese Government.

During 1954 continued efforts were made by U.S. policymakers to increase the pressure on Communist China through tighter containment restrictions and isolation. On 20 July the Geneva Convention was signed which divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel. Although the French Government originally was conducive to a split at the 16th, it was primarily through the influence of Secretary Dulles that the 17th was finally adopted. This action deprived the Communists of control of two major Vietnamese cities — Da Nang and Quang Tri. Also, on 8 September the Southeast Asia Defense Treaty was signed in Manila. SEATO was designed, of course, to stabilize the situation in Southeast Asia and prevent further Communist expansion. Thus a line was drawn which, together with those drawn in South Korea and in the Taiwan Strait, would establish three firm positions on China's periphery that could halt the outward spread of Chinese Communist influence.

At 0145 on 3 September 1954 the Chinese Communists began a heavy artillery shelling of Quemoy Island off the Chinese coast. This incident, in the words of President Eisenhower, "marked the commencement of a sequence of events which was to extend

through nine months, threaten a split between the United States and nearly all of its allies, and seemingly carry the country to the edge of war, thus constituting one of the most serious problems of the first eighteen months of my Administration."

In addition to Formosa and the Pescadores which had returned to Chiang Kai-shek's Government at the end of World War II, the Quemoy and Matsu groups, which were much smaller and much nearer to the Mainland, had been under the control of the Mainland until 1949 when Chiang continued his control from Formosa. He was prepared to defend them with his full strength since he considered an attack on either of the offshore island groups as a prelude to an attack on Formosa and the Pescadores. He also had several other reasons for maintaining control of this real estate.

1. He was convinced that if he lost Quemoy and Matsu his main forces would lose their will to fight.
2. The islands were considered to be stepping stones for the reinvansion of the mainland.
3. They provided sanctuary for guerrilla raids.
4. They tied down Communist troops to a specific locale.
5. They were excellent harassment and blockading points for two major mainland seaports — Amoy and Foochow.

Eisenhower, however, considered that in a technically legal sense the intervention by the United States in a contest over these islands would be intervention in a Chinese civil war. This was the situation on the day of the shelling, which was disturbing although not completely unexpected. Throughout the first part of 1954

Chiang and Chou En-lai had been threatening each other with invasion, and President Rhee had been throwing verbal fuel on the fire by calling for a combined effort by the United States, Nationalist China, and the Republic of Korea in war against Red China. The vested interests of these leaders were obvious, but they did little to relieve international tensions. In an effort to do so, President Eisenhower had kept the Seventh Fleet in a tripwire position in the Formosa Strait to preclude any Chinese Communist invasion of Formosa. The problem was further complicated by the fact that Communist China had about 62 American nationals under detention of which approximately 22 were military. Negotiations to obtain the release of these people had been carried out since 1951 with only marginal results. With these factors impinging upon his considerations, President Eisenhower now faced the question, "What policy should the United States adopt?" Consultations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff brought two factors to light:

1. The offshore islands were not militarily essential to America's capacity to defend Formosa.
2. The Chinese Nationalists could not hold them without American assistance.

President Eisenhower recognized that the defense of the offshore islands through the use of U.S. military force would be an extremely dangerous act of brinkmanship; consequently, he decided to accept Secretary Dulles' recommendation "to take the offshore islands question to the United Nations Security Council with the view of getting there an injunction to maintain the status quo and institute a cease-fire in the Formosa Strait. Whether Russia vetoes or accepts such

a plan, the United States will gain." Subsequently, Secretary Dulles, in consultation with Foreign Minister Eden and the New Zealand High Commissioner, endeavored to get the New Zealand Government to submit the offshore island problem to the Security Council. Chiang objected to this plan since he felt it would endanger his U.N. seat, but Dulles was able to convince him that the possibility of Mao ever agreeing to such a course of action was less than negligible. Other outside influences were also exerting pressure on the President. Prime Minister Clement Attlee wanted to neutralize Formosa but declined to explain what that meant. The Communist Chinese were threatening to execute 13 of the American prisoners which caused Eisenhower serious concern. Internal Congressional pressures for action were also mounting as the Chinese Communists continued their shelling and buildup of forces.

Consequently, as a result of, or perhaps in spite of, these various decision criteria, on 2 December 1954 a Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China was executed. Thus, the sixth treaty was added to the pattern of mutual security arrangements with other friendly and free nations of the Western Pacific. In 1952, treaties had been concluded with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, and Japan. In 1953 a treaty with Korea was signed, and in 1954 the Manila Pact (SEATO) was concluded. The Nationalist Chinese treaty then represented the last link in the chain of containment in Asia. The important provisions of the treaty were Article II — Collective Security — and Article V — Action to Meet a Common Danger. These articles were not only applicable to Formosa and the Pescadores but also to "such other territories as may be determined by mutual agree-

ment." It should be noted that Article V was to be in accordance with constitutional processes. The Senate, in its evaluation of the treaty, was careful to point out:

1. The treaty was to be strictly defensive in nature.
2. The addition of any other territories would require Senate approval.

However, prior to ratification by the Senate, events dictated the rapid formulation and implementation of a strong policy. On 10 January 1955, 100 Communist planes attacked the Nationalist-held Tachen Islands, about 200 miles north of Taiwan. The Island of Ichang was overrun and occupied by Communist troops. President Eisenhower felt it was time to take immediate action without waiting for U.N. sanction or even ratification of the security treaty. And according to President Eisenhower:

The next day I approved the wording of a special message to Congress asking for presidential authority to use American armed force to protect Formosa and the Pescadores and related positions, if necessary, in defense of the principal islands. I resolved that . . . no uncertainty about our commitment to defend Formosa should invite a major Chinese Communist attack.

This proposal, although very similar to the wording in the security treaty, had one serious caveat. That is, Senate approval would no longer be required to determine what territories in addition to Formosa and the Pescadores were to be defended. The advantage to such a situation was that now there was no way that the Chinese Communists could hope to know just where the United States would set the line. Some indication of the forthcoming

U.S. policy relative to the line was given, however. Chiang had been advised through unofficial sources that the United States would not assist in the defense of the Tachens consequently, he voluntarily evacuated those islands rather than waste his resources in a hopeless defense. Assistance in this re-deployment was requested from the U.S. Government so the Seventh Fleet and other U.S. forces were ordered to assist in the operation. The net gain to the Chinese Communist forces was now the Island of Ichang and the Tachens. The message was transmitted to Congress on 24 January, and by 29 January it had passed both bodies. The vote was 410-3 in the House and 83-3 in the Senate. Two weeks later the mutual security treaty was signed by the President after Senate approval.

The Formosa problem finally reached the U.N. Security Council on 28 January 1955 after being introduced by the New Zealand representative; however, Communist China refused to join in the discussions, as predicted by Dulles, and on 14 February 1955 it was dropped, unresolved, from the U.N. agenda.

Although both the Resolution and the Security Treaty were now in effect, both the President and the Secretary of State declined to commit themselves as to what was to be included in "related positions and territories." Significant pressure, both internal and external, was applied to preclude the offshore islands from the definitions. Prime Minister Churchill agreed that Formosa and the Pescadores should be defended but considered that the inclusion of Matsu and Quemoy was too provocative towards the Red Chinese, and he recommended the evacuation of those islands along with the Tachens. Indeed, Chou En-lai considered the resolution to be a "war message" and repeated his determination to liberate not only the

offshore islands but the Pescadores and Formosa as well. External Affairs Secretary Lester Pearson made the announcement that Canada would not fight over the offshore islands. Domestic criticism of the Administration's policy was also forthcoming. Adlai Stevenson had grave misgivings about risking a third world war over these little islands, and Lewis W. Douglas considered that the islands were legally a possession of Red China. However, as time passed, the threat to the offshore islands abated, and by April Chou En-lai stated at the Bandung Conference that "the Chinese people are willing to strive for liberation of Formosa by peaceful means as far as this is possible." By May an informal cease-fire was in effect, and shortly thereafter the Communist Chinese Government started releasing the American prisoners. Throughout the entire incident neither Eisenhower nor Dulles would commit themselves as to whether the United States would or would not interpose if the Communists attacked Quemoy or Matsu although, according to Beal, President Eisenhower did send a private letter to Chiang Kai-shek assuring him that the United States was committed to the offshore island defense.

After 3 years of relative calm in the Formosa area, the Chinese Communists suddenly initiated a heavy artillery bombardment of Quemoy and began harassing the regular supply of the civilian and military population of the Quemoy on 23 August 1958. This event occurred about 3 weeks after a visit to Peiping by Chairman Khrushchev. On 4 September 1958 Secretary Dulles issued a statement which:

1. Reaffirmed the sovereignty of the Nationalist Chinese over Quemoy and Matsu.
2. Restated the increasing importance of Quemoy and Matsu to the defense of Taiwan.

3. Restated the basic tenets of the security treaty and the Formosa Resolution.
4. Indicated the positioning of U.S. forces.
5. Warned the Red Chinese that the United States would use such force if necessary.

On 11 September 1958 President Eisenhower reiterated the points made by Dulles and further stated:

I do not believe that the United States can be either lured or frightened into appeasement. I believe that I am taking the only position that is consistent with the vital interests of the United States and indeed, with the peace of the world.

As in 1954 the Chinese Communists backed off from their threatening position, and relative calm has existed in the area since that time. Whether the shelling by the Red Chinese was a function of their desire to occupy the offshore islands or a manifestation of the communistic sinusoidal hard-line, soft-line policy is unknown. The important difference between the 1954-1955 incident and the 1958 incident was that in the latter there was no question as to the status of the offshore islands. They, like Formosa and the Pescadores, had entered the realm of U.S. vital interests.

In evaluating the Formosa problem for the 1954-1958 time frame, there are several major factors that come to light:

1. The decision to include the offshore islands within the framework of the Formosa Resolution was political vice military; indeed, political considerations overrode those of a military nature.

2. The legal and moral issues of ownership of the offshore islands were not really critical. The islands were in the self-interest of Formosa; Formosa was in the vital interest of the United States; therefore, the offshore islands ended up as a U.S. vital interest.
3. The offshore islands are located at Red China's doorstep and represent serious threats both as stepping stones for invasion and to lines of communications to Amoy and Foochow.
4. The U.N., as well as our allies, was totally ineffective in either resolving the problem or dissuading the United States from its selected course of action.
5. The offshore islands situation does provide a very vulnerable military testing ground for the resolution and consistency of U.S. Asian policy. The 1958 incident may have been such a test.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Comdr. Albert J. Ashurst, U.S. Navy, holds a B.S. in Economics from the Illinois Institute of Technology and is a graduate of the School of Naval Command and Staff, Naval War College. He has served aboard the U.S.S. *Lenawes* (APA-195), U.S.S. *Rankin* (AKA-103), U.S.S. *Fletcher* (DDE-445), commanded U.S.S. *Munsee* (ATF-107), and was Executive Officer of U.S.S. *Rupertus* (DD-851). He also served on the Staffs of Commander First Fleet and Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

Commander Ashurst is presently assigned to the faculty of the School of Naval Command and Staff, Naval War College.

6. By keeping our policy flexible, especially in 1954-55, the United States avoided the problems developed by the Acheson defense perimeter concept.

In the final analysis, the United States did fulfill its objectives of containment and isolation with a high degree of success. The secondary objec-

tive of developing a viable and strong Formosa was also attained. Although Davids considers that the offshore islands basically represent hostages subject to the easy exploitation by the Chinese Communists, the net payoff to the United States has been a staunch ally in the form of Nationalist China which represents one of the strongest links in the Asian chain of containment.

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We must consult our means rather than our wishes; and not endeavor to better our affairs by attempting things, which, for want of success may make them worse.

George Washington: To LaFayette, 1780



THE BAROMETER


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THE WORLD FOOD PROBLEM

Professor Allen D. Tillman
Oklahoma State University

(Professor Tillman is a Commander in the Naval Reserve who performed his 1967 active duty training at the Naval War College. His article supplements Lieutenant Commander Somers' article, "The Place of Population Control in U.S. Foreign Policy," which appeared in the January 1968 issue. The reader should find the subjects of these articles challenging and provocative. Ed.)

The problem of obtaining sufficient food has plagued man since his beginning. Despite many advances in science and technology during the 20th century, the problem is still acute today; its nature and seriousness was summarized in a recent document of

the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO):

... some 60% of the people in the undeveloped areas comprising some two-thirds of the world's population suffer from under-nutrition or mal-nutrition or both. Since there undoubtedly are some people in the

developed countries who are ill fed, it is concluded that up to a half of the people in the world are hungry or malnourished.

Throughout the early history of man, population was kept under control by disease and famine. The advancement of medical knowledge and its application has reduced the effect of the former to an extent that we have a "population explosion" and a condition in which over 10,000 people starve to death each day. It appears that we are now in a deadly race between an increasing number of people and food production. The purpose of this review is: (1) to consider major factors affecting the demand for food, (2) to consider present-day agricultural production, and (3) to consider assistance programs which the developed areas can extend to the developing ones.

Factors Affecting Food Needs.

Two major factors are causing the expanding food needs: the population explosion and increasing incomes of people all over the world.

It is estimated that there are three billion people in the world today and that this will increase to four billion in 1980 and six billion by 2000 if effective curbs are not initiated.

During the early years the population of man increased slowly (figure 1).¹ For example, in the year 1000 B.C., the world's population was about 100 million. A thousand years was required for it to double and at the time Christ lived there were about 200 million people. It required 1,600 years for it to double again, and by the middle of the 17th century there were about 460 million people on the earth. The acceleration of population since 1650 has been phenomenal: the population doubled again by 1810, only 190 years later, and again by 1930, requiring only 90 years. By 1930 we had two

billion people on earth, and the shape of the growth curve since 1930 (figure 1) staggers the imagination.

During the coming 20 years food needs will more than double in the countries which are already hungry, if present rate of population growth continues. Family planning will help, but the effect of such planning, if initiated now, would become more apparent after 1985 than during the next 20 years. The impact of population control will be realized over a period of many years and is very important in solving the overall problem; however, there is an immediate and increasing need for food unless population control programs become drastic. Thus it appears that even with the most optimum estimates regarding a successful population control program it would reduce food needs by only 20 percent, thus we will have to feed an additional one billion people by 1980. The world has simply never before added so many people in a span of 15 years. It is significant that 800 million of these will be added to areas where the population is already hungry.

The food problem is made even more acute by rising income levels throughout the world. All countries have goals for raising the income level of its people and this is noble; however, rising incomes generate additional demands for foods. In some of the more advanced countries, a rise in income has caused more demand for increased production of food than has the increased population. Japan is a good example. Her income is increasing at an annual rate of 7 percent and the population by only 1 percent, but she is presently consuming much more of the world's food resources than in past years. Grain is a major world food resource and its consumption is related to per capita income as is illustrated in figure 2.² When low income brackets




Figure 1 — World Population Growth

are considered it is apparent that the direct consumption of grain as human food rises as per capita income rises up to a point, and at higher incomes grain consumption declines until it levels out at approximately 150 pounds per year. A good example would be the consumption in the United States of breakfast cereals, bread, pastries, etc.; there would be no further increase in these if incomes were increased greatly. However, the more significant relationship in figure 2 concerns that one between income and total grain usage. When personal income is high, man uses more grain for the production of meat, milk, and eggs. As animals convert the energy and protein of grain to the meat, milk, and eggs with an efficiency varying from 10 to 33 percent, there is a loss of energy and protein when grains are used for these purposes rather than being consumed by man. The upper part of the curve indicates that each \$2 increase in annual per capita income requires one pound

of additional grain with most of this being used to produce animal products.

The explosive effects of increased population and increasing incomes upon food demands represent something new and terrifying to the world, and both have occurred since the World War II. In addition, they are gaining worldwide momentum. The effect of these two factors on world grain surpluses is shown in figure 3.³ From 1953 to 1961 the world was producing more grain than it was consuming. The size of the annual increase in carryover stocks varied during this period from a small amount to about 20 million tons. Since 1961 we have been using more grain than is produced, the average being about 14 million tons per year. As the lines between consumption and production have to be brought together, the obvious question concerns *How?* The alternatives are simple: either food production will be increased or consumption will be decreased. A reduction in consumption

where population is increasing and fully 50 percent of the people are not properly nourished is not the popular answer. We must increase food production. If the increased food is to arise from conventional agriculture, as is expected for some time to come, there appears to be only two methods available: (1) expanding the amount

of cultivatable lands or (2) increasing yields per unit of land.

Agricultural Production. It is estimated that the cultivated lands in the world are about three billion acres. There are many estimates regarding the possibilities of expanding these lands, and the quantities of these estimates




Figure 2 — Income and Per Capita Grain Consumption Total and for Food




Figure 3 — World Grain Production and Consumption

vary from a few hundred million to several billion acres. The question is complex because of variable inputs required to make different lands productive. Obviously, if required input is greater than expected return, the land in question will not be cultivated. It is now common to find that in many countries land which was cultivated a few years ago has now been abandoned to pastures and recreational purposes because it is no longer profitable to cultivate it. Examples include some of the former cotton-producing areas of Southeastern United States and areas of New England and the Appalachian Mountains. Similar changes have occurred in other countries. In Japan the cultivated land area reached a peak in 1920 and has declined ever since. Most countries find it hard to expand the cultivated land areas. For example, India plans no major increase in area cultivated lands. The 5-year plan from 1966 to 1971 called only for a 2 percent expansion of cultivated land; how-

ever, during this same period, food requirements are expected to increase by 20 percent. In 1959 this writer traveled over much of the "virgin lands" which the Soviets brought into cultivation in the late 1950's and heard these people express the capabilities of meeting their food needs by cultivating these lands. They are now being abandoned.

There remain, however, two major areas which do offer prospects for expansion of cultivated area: the sub-Saharan Africa and the Amazon Basin in Brazil. However, there are major problems to overcome in each area, and the major one concerns the lack of specific information on the management of such soils when used for crop production over an extended period. Research efforts must be increased in this direction before these lands can be used for large-scale production.

Another possibility concerns desalinization of sea water for irrigation purposes. At the present time cost prohibits its wide-scale usage, but there is hope

that the cost may be low enough for its usage by the late 1970's or perhaps early 1980's. Research efforts in this important area also must be increased by the advanced countries.

Farmland in the United States and elsewhere is being lost because of expanding urban areas, new highways, and industrial expansions. Even the United States, which is the only country in the world having ready reserves of idled cropland, is feeling the effects of such expansions. In 1966 the United States harvested crops on about 300 million acres and at this time idled about 50 million acres. The need for imported food in the U.S.S.R., China, Japan, India, and Western Europe is bringing much of the idle land back into production. And it is estimated that about one-third of the idled croplands in the United States came back into production in 1967. Undoubtedly, some of the remaining will return to production before 1980. Further expansion beyond these lands depends upon inputs needed to cultivate specific lands and expected returns from these.

It appears that for the next 10 to 20 years the expanding world food production cannot be met by solely expanding the area of cropland in the world even though this phase cannot be ignored and that consideration of the possibilities of increasing the productivity of the land already under cultivation must be given.

Greater Yields Per Unit Land Are Needed. When one considers the history of crop yields per unit land, he finds that no great changes took place until the 20th century when many advanced countries obtained rapid and continuing increases. For example, Japan has obtained great increases in yields of rice, while most of the countries in Western Europe, Canada, and the United States have also obtained

great increases in yields of many other crops. A significant question concerns how sustained will this rate of increase be. The challenge, of course, is to keep these increasing.

Those countries which have increased yields per unit land have employed changes in cultural practices, increase in inputs, or a combination of these. Increased capital input has been required in every case and, unless increased mechanization accompanied these changes, increased labor was also necessary.

Brown, in evaluating future prospects for continuing expansion of yields per acre, divided sources of increased productivity into those that recur and those that do not.⁴ Nonrecurring inputs are those which initially cause an increase in productivity, but once put in full operation no further increases in productivity occur; recurring inputs offer further annual increases in yields if more intensive application is made. An illustration of these sources can be made by using corn: Yields of this cereal grain in the United States have increased rapidly during the last 30 years because of two nonrecurring inputs. These were herbicide usage and the planting of hybrid varieties. The increases in yields resulting from the use of hybrids and herbicides were initially great but appear to be a thing of the past because most farmers are employing both of these near the top level. In other words, virtually all the weeds are now controlled, thus no future gain in productivity is expected from this source, even though the hybrids in use today appear to be somewhat superior to those introduced 30 years ago, the increases so obtained are extremely small when compared to the initial increase.

Increase in yield of plants resulting from use of fertilizers is a recurring source of productivity. Most authorities

believe there remain plenty of opportunities for increasing yields of most crops by the intelligent use of this input. For example, increasing plant populations, if light and moisture are present in adequate levels, will respond favorably to increased levels of fertilizers. It appears that there will always be an upper economic limit for fertilizer usage, but it is not yet clear what the upper practical limit would be if economic limitations were loosened or removed completely. Some authorities feel that we are already approaching the upper limit in corn production in the Corn Belt of the United States. It is pertinent for us to ask the same questions of six other crops in the advanced countries. For example, how much more can wheat and barley yields be increased in Western Europe, Canada, and the United States?

Many of the phenomenal increases in yields of specific crops have resulted from the use of nonrecurring sources of productivity. It is expected that as these sources of productivity are reduced or are used up the familiar S-shaped curve which explains growth phenomena will dominate yields per acre. This growth curve for most biologic systems is first characterized by an ever-increasing phase, an exponential one. However, the expansion cannot continue indefinitely, thus the curve flattens out. Even though we do not know with precision the growth curve on our major food crops, there are some good approximations, and it is apparent that the rate of expansion which we are presently experiencing cannot continue indefinitely. Again, we should begin to ask questions regarding how near we are to the slowdown point in major crops in major countries. Perhaps, as Brown suggests, we should also ask if the slowdown be gradual or abrupt. What are the most important factors affecting the practical production of these crops?

What can we do about these? What kinds of research should be initiated now in hope of solving this problem?

The ultimate factor limiting yield per land unit is the photosynthetic efficiency of the crop in question. If we define this efficiency as that amount of solar energy used by plants relative to that available for a specific crop on a specific land unit, we find that photosynthetic efficiency for most plants is low, averaging about 3 percent or less. Bonner feels that we are already approaching the upper limit in those regions with highest level of agricultural development: these areas being Japan, Western Europe, and certain areas of the United States.⁵

We must increase our research efforts for developing plants which have greater photosynthetic efficiency. For example, it might be possible to change the shapes of leaves and other plant characteristics which would allow the plants to utilize more of the available solar energy. Cultural practices must also change in accord with the use of new plant varieties: Effective weed and grass control might make it possible to develop smaller and more efficient plants which require little or no tillage during the growing season. Advances in this direction, of course, will allow an increase in the number of plants per acre, which in itself might lead to increased photosynthetic efficiency. Such factors are significant when one considers that width of rows in many parts of the world are still set by the width of animals used to pull the cultivators.

The major cereals of the Western World have been the subject of much research in the developed countries. The importance of hybrid corn and grain sorghums in present-day production of these grains is great. The "small grains" (wheat, barley, oats, etc.) are a bit more difficult, but more produc-

tive wheat hybrids have been developed and offer the promise of going into production in the near future. What can be done using crossbreeding and other techniques can be illustrated by telling of the success of the Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico. In 1943, this group established a research program for wheat in Mexico. At that time Mexico's 21 million people averaged only 1,700 calories per day, and yields of wheat were only 11 bushels per acre. The varieties were tall and susceptible to diseases, and use of fertilizers did not pay. Mexico was importing over one-half of the wheat it consumed. By 1964 yields had climbed to 39 bushels per acre, and consumption of calories had increased to 2,700. The Rockefeller scientists first developed a new, short, stiff-strawed wheat variety which was disease resistant. Perhaps just as important, they developed management practices to be used with the wheat. The Foundation also concentrated upon training young Mexicans to continue and expand the program started by this group.

It is now estimated that almost all wheat grown in Mexico is of the new variety. Fortunately, some of the short, stiff-strawed Mexican wheat varieties were found to be insensitive to length of day, thus are being exported to many parts of the world. Food prospects in India, Pakistan, and countries of the Middle East are being improved by the wide usage of these short wheat varieties from Mexico. Many young Mexican scientists are developing these programs in the other countries.

Currently, there is much interest in the mutant strains of corn developed by scientists at Purdue University. This corn has greater nutritive value than present-day varieties; pigs fed the mutant variety as the sole protein source gained three times as fast as those fed the best present-day Indiana hybrids.

This discovery has great possibilities if these corn varieties can be produced efficiently in areas where corn is the major diet of the indigenous populations. This drastic change in nutritional value is the result of a single mutant gene and has spurred on research work to uncover such mutants in barley, grain sorghums, rice, wheat, and other grains.

Rice is the main cereal in Asia, thus is the basic cereal for 60 percent of the world's population, yet in tropical Asia yields have been very low and static for centuries. In India, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Burma, and Thailand, yields have averaged about one ton per hectare (One hectare = 2.47 acres), while in Japan, the United States, and Australia average yields are 4 to 5 times that. Some years ago Japanese farmers were sent to these areas to teach local farmers to raise yields using Japanese "know-how." They failed completely. This and other failures have made the Asian farmer a skeptic of modern methods and unwilling to change. In 1960 the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, in cooperation with the Philippine Government, established a Rice Research Institute in the Philippines. By 1966 the 20 major agricultural research scientists developed and released a new rice variety. It is a short, stiff-strawed variety which will respond to nitrogen fertilization. Whereas the old varieties responded to nitrogen fertilization by increased yields of straw, the new varieties yield more grain. In addition, they appear to be insensitive to day length; thus, if water and fertilizers are present more crops can be produced per year, and yields double to triple present ones are possible. In fact, it may be possible now to grow three crops per year if machinery is made available during the dry season; the carabao cannot pull a plow through hard soil during the dry season.

Many diseases, especially those of viral cause, affect plants. Research in this important area is being intensified, but further expansion is costly and requires highly trained scientists.

We must increase yields of agricultural products using all possible means. The achieving of dramatic gains in increased yields per acre, however, requires massive investment of capital and widespread adoption of technology new to the people of the developing areas. The advanced countries must take the lead in this endeavor and, too, must not fail in the further development of their own agriculture. The advanced countries must also take the lead in development of protein sources other than that from conventional farm crops. Such items as growth of algae, extraction of protein from leaves, growing of bacteria and yeast on petroleum products are possibilities that must be investigated, developed, and used if practical. Not to be overlooked are the possibilities of producing in chemical factories pure amino acids which can be fed as protein sources to humans.

The emphasis upon the production of cereals and the nonagricultural production of food has tended to relegate animal agriculture to a passive position as a contributor to world food deficits as regards protein. This emphasis has made many of those concerned with the world food problem to overlook the importance of feed inputs into livestock production. It is a serious mistake, the author believes, to overlook the potential protein supply from livestock production. While it is true that livestock convert the protein of the cereals and the oilseed meals to meat and milk proteins with efficiencies of about 10 and 30 percent, respectively, the complete story is not unfolded unless one looks at the total feed resources and calculates the total conversion of feed resources to food resources. In other

words, livestock are not exclusively grain consuming animals.

Ruminants, which have a large fermentation vat, the rumen, at the head of their digestive tract, can convert forages, which cannot be consumed by humans, to meat and milk. These animals also serve as scavengers for byproducts produced on the farm or in the processing of human foods. In the United States about 70 percent of the protein of the dairy cow is derived from forages; beef cattle derive about 60 percent, while sheep obtain up to 90 percent; figures for all animals are higher in most other countries. With over 25 percent of the world's surface being unsuitable for cultivation and suitable only for grazing, we have the obligation to develop to its fullest extent livestock production which will allow us to utilize efficiently this land mass which otherwise would contribute nothing. In most areas of the world ruminants grazed on indigenous forages require supplemental grain which could be consumed by humans at some time in their productive cycle. If one only considers the efficiency by which that animal converts the grain to food, it would be a mistake to feed supplemental grain to this productive unit. It has been shown that, under Wisconsin conditions, dairy cows produced 171 units of milk protein from only 124 units of protein from the cereals and oilmeals. In other words, the dairy cow, which converts dietary protein to milk protein with an efficiency of about 33 percent, when fed forages plus urea and some of the cereal grains, returns more protein for the small input of grain than if this supplement had been consumed by humans directly. A similar story can be told for beef cattle and sheep. It must be emphasized, again, that animals can serve as scavengers for byproducts in the production of human food. We must increase our

research inputs regarding possible chemical treatment of industrial by-products to make these new sources of animal feeds. For example, the hemicelluloses in wood are extractable with high steam pressure resulting in an acceptable wood product, pressboard. The extractable hemicelluloses are valuable sources of energy for animals. Many tons of sawdust from the wood industry are burned each year adding only to our problem of air pollution. Properly treated with steam and acid or alkali these could be converted to ruminant feeds. There are many more examples.

Livestock production can be increased. Production in the developing countries is only a fraction of that in the United States. In Africa the average age of animals for beef production is 7 years compared to less than 2 in the United States. Milk yields are so low that it requires 15 to 20 cows in parts of Africa to produce as much milk as one Holstein cow in Wisconsin. The average yield of beef per cow in the United States is about 167 pounds while in Asia it is about 26 pounds. The reasons for such poor returns are many and complex, and to improve the situation would involve the use of available technology plus an understanding of cultural and religious roots found in the people. Poor methods in disease control and lack of knowledge regarding management of livestock as regards a supply of human food appear to be major factors.

The distribution of major epizootic diseases of livestock today is about the same as when Columbus found America, except that rinderpest is not found in Europe and parts of Asia and, on the negative side, foot-and-mouth disease is now firmly established in South America. The major epizootic diseases are rinderpest, foot-and-mouth disease, contagious pleuro-pneumonia, African horse sickness, Newcastle disease, fowl

plague, African swine fever, trypanosomiasis, piroplasmiasis, and East Coast fever. It is impossible to develop a fully productive livestock industry where these diseases are not controlled. Highly trained specialists are needed for treatment and control and these require high capital inputs in countries which do not now have the capital and are not fully cognizant of the values.

It is common knowledge that the nutritive value of proteins depends upon its amino acid balance; those protein systems having a balance of dietary essential amino acids similar to requirements are considered to be of high quality. The best sources of quality protein are animal products, meat, milk, and eggs. Animal products are also rich in other nutrients. It is now estimated that 70 percent of the world's supply of human dietary protein comes from vegetable sources and 30 percent from animal sources, varying from 70 percent from animal sources in the United States and 12 percent in India. Quantitatively and qualitatively, animal products constitute an important part of the diet of the people in the world.

The FAO short-term target for animal protein in the diet is 15 grams of animal protein per day with a long-term target of 21 grams. Currently, the world's animal protein provides about 20 grams per day, but it is 44 grams in the developed and only 9 in the developing countries. We shall need to increase livestock production to its maximum potential on the noncultivable grasslands of the world, using grain only to supplement the feeding of these animals when high returns can be expected from grain inputs.

Without question, plant proteins and other sources can be supplemented with amino acids and other products to make these have protein value similar to that of the animal proteins. Plant

proteins will cost less; however, most people prefer animal products, except in areas where consumption is not acceptable because of law or social customs. Because of this preference for animal proteins, there must be consideration of the sociological relationship between the developed and developing countries. When the populations of the developing countries earn more, they will demand more meat products. If these products are available only in the affluent societies of the developed countries, this symbol of affluence could aggravate the sociological relationship between the have and have not countries. Thus, we have another incentive for developing as fast as possible an efficient animal agriculture. This can be done by increasing an understanding of efficiency of the ruminant animal to produce food on lands where little or none is produced at the present time. Intensification of basic and applied research in this area is indicated.

Assistance Programs to the Developing Countries. Education of Americans as well as those in the developing countries regarding the complexity of modern agriculture is the first step in selling a national program which has as its goal increased food production for the world. Such a program will cost our taxpayers; thus, a genuine need must be apparent to the majority of voters for any continuing program. Most Americans look upon the practice of modern medicine or physics as highly scientific professions and do not attempt to second-guess professionals in either field. I do not wish to argue the merits of this attitude but would contrast it to the attitude toward agriculture. Most Americans assume that they are knowledgeable about farmers and farming. They feel that farming requires only soil, seeds, moisture, perhaps a small bit of fertilizer,

and much *hard work*. Reason for this attitude stems from their experience in home gardening, which requires much hard work and is a money-losing form of home exercise. The best garden in the neighborhood belongs to the one who works the hardest. This untested relationship of productivity to hard work is easily perceived by all who will look; thus, it becomes easy to believe that the inability of the subsistence farmers in the traditional societies of the undeveloped nations to produce enough food for their population is caused by *laziness*. The substance of the agricultural sciences, its possibilities and its limitations; the importance of inputs; the importance of longtime adaptive research; the market structure; methods of processing; necessity for capitalization, fertilization, storage, and distribution do not enter minds of many who must make decisions, as voters or administrators, on this important question.

Americans must analyze the situation which has allowed American farmers to be the most productive this world has ever seen. Today, our 200 million Americans are provided with an abundance of food and fiber by only 6 percent of their fellow citizens. In addition, our exports feed many other people in Europe and Asia and contribute significantly to our balance of payments and to this nation's humanitarian responsibilities at home and abroad. How did this happen? This question will receive attention as we develop the following. In this connection, the author believes that the hungry countries need increased quantities of fertilizers, farm chemicals such as pesticides and herbicides, better varieties of seeds, increased water in certain regions, added credit to farmers, productive price policies, improved marketing facilities, improved transportation, and expanded research and educa-

tion. They need all of these things at the *same time and place*.

The two key items in the above list are productive price policies and expanded research and education, and these are considered in that order.

Obsessed with farm surpluses, Americans became very shortsighted in the 1950's and early 1960's. Public Law 480, which made it easy for us to sell our farm surpluses for soft currency, also made it easy for rulers in country after country to adopt cheap food policies without regard to the function of farm prices as economic incentives for increased agricultural production by their own farmers. The reasons for low farm prices are many, and some are deep. There is still the monolithic pursuit of industrialization at the expense of agriculture. Country after country has paid the price for this kind of unbalanced economic growth. In contrast, we can cite the economic policies of the United States, Mexico, Israel, and Taiwan as models of successful agricultural and industrial growth.

It is quite evident that too many developing countries have underplayed the importance of agriculture in economic development. India has only recently adopted a policy which places much heavier emphasis upon food production. The use of economic incentives to boost agricultural inputs is starting to yield results to this troubled country, and hopes for recovery become brighter as these are put into effect. The United States must supply food when the people in the developing countries are starving; however, to use our imported foods to maintain a policy of cheap foods would, in the long term, be disastrous. Our Government must be against such policies even though it may seem harsh to increase food prices at some given time.

Education and research is the second key to increased agricultural produc-

tion. The United States initiated the land-grant colleges under President Lincoln during the American Civil War. In the more than 100 years since we have built up the basic research facts and the trained personnel necessary to develop and expand a viable agriculture. There are trained specialists in land-grant universities, in 3,100 counties of the country, in Federal laboratories, and in industry. The training of these people represents the expenditure of millions of hours of the best scientific brains in the world, and the cost runs into billions of dollars but has paid off.

Until the less-developed countries can build up cadres of highly trained scientific personnel, we must help in the training of these people to work on their problems. In the interim we must provide our own expertise. The former is difficult in countries where freedom to move is a way of life. Because citizens of the United States have recognized the value of science in everyday living, they support large research and training programs in many areas. Expenditures for research and development have increased so rapidly in the United States that there are not enough trained people for all scientific programs; therefore, we are recruiting highly trained personnel wherever available. The United States is now draining scientists, engineers, medicine doctors, and technicians from all countries at an increasing rate: In 1963 we imported nearly 6,000 of these specialists, of which 900 came from Great Britain and 1,200 from Canada. Other countries are so concerned that they coined the term "brain drain." Unless something drastic is done the drain will increase. It has been estimated that over 90 percent of the Asian students who come to the United States for education never return. Over 11,000 trained men left

Argentina between the years 1951 and 1963 and came to the United States to work in our research programs. In 1964-65, over 25 percent of the medical internes in the U.S. hospitals were filled by foreign graduates, largely from the developing countries. They don't return.

In the matter of recruiting talent from the poorer countries, England and Canada and others are just as active as the United States. Nearly one-half of the junior staff in the English Hospital Service come from abroad and primarily from the developing countries.

The supply of grain now going to India might be considered partial payment for the many thousands of Indian scientists now working in our scientific laboratories. In this connection it is interesting that the United States is now suffering an internal brain drain: Federal expenditures for research and development have shifted scientific talent from the Central States to those on the east and west coasts, and the possible effects of such a shift upon fundamental research in agriculture and other fields is causing political repercussions in Washington. The siting of the world's largest facility for experimental work in high-energy physics in Illinois can be regarded as part of a deliberate plan to reverse the internal brain drain and restore to the Central States some of their earlier scientific prestige. This is probably only one of many moves in this direction. The Soviets must have had this in mind when they created their new "Science City" at Novo Sibirsk in Siberia.

There is no doubt that the shift of personnel from the poorer countries to the richer ones is causing similar repercussions in the poorer countries and is of great concern to the thinking people of Western Europe and the United States. The author believes that the whole world must be concerned about

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Dr. Allen D. Tillman, who has the rank of Commander, USNR-R, holds degrees in Nutritional Biochemistry from University of Southwestern Louisiana (B.S.), Louisiana State (M.S.), and Pennsylvania State (Ph.D.). He has been a faculty member on the State

Universities of Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma and has served as Research Professor of Animal Nutrition at the Oklahoma State University since 1952 where he directs the Animal Nutrition Research Laboratories. He has been active in research for 27 years and is the author of over 100 publications in the field of nutrition.

In 1959 he was chosen as a member of an exchange team to study animal agriculture in the Soviet Union. He has made similar studies in Argentina, Libya, and Ethiopia and has spent one year as a Fulbright Exchange Professor at the National University of Ireland in Dublin.

Commander Tillman was Commanding Officer of Naval Reserve Research Company 8-13 during the 1966-67 fiscal year, and his unit was judged the outstanding unit in the 8th Naval District during his command.

He is a graduate of the Naval War College Correspondence Course in International Relations and has an abiding interest in this field. He views food production, and the science disciplines necessary for its successful accomplishment, as an important part of international relations.

this shift of scientific personnel from the poorer to the more affluent nations and submits the following idea for a possible alleviation of this condition: It is recommended that the richer nations establish first-class research centers in the developing countries, which would act as the focal point for the training, concentration, and retention of the native talent. The excellent scientists from these countries who were trained in the richer countries and remained would

have challenging positions at home. The richer countries would have to finance these centers for as much as 25 years and be prepared to send many of their best people to such centers for long periods in order to establish and maintain the highest possible standards in these first-class research centers. The

modest success of the Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico can be attributed to the organization of such a group. Requests for such laboratories are beginning to come from the developing countries⁶ and the author believes that we must respond to these calls immediately.


FOOTNOTES

1. Lester R. Brown, "The World Outlook for Conventional Agriculture," *Science*, 3 November 1967, p. 605.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*, p. 606.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 604-611.
5. James Bonner, "The Upper Limit of Crop Yield," *Science*, 6 July 1962, p. 11-15.
6. Thomas R. Odhiambo, "East Africa: Science for Development," *Science*, 17 November 1967, p. 876-881.



The Congress shall have power . . . To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions

*Constitution of the United States,
I, 8, 1789*



PROFESSIONAL READING

The evaluations of recent books listed in this section have been prepared for the use of resident students. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these books of interest in their professional reading.

The inclusion of a book in this section does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein.

Many of these publications may be found

in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections.

Chief of Naval Personnel (C-463)
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20370

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Guam)
Library (ALSC), Box 174
San Francisco, Calif. 96630

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Pearl Harbor)
Library (ALSC), Box 20
San Francisco, Calif. 96610

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC), Bldg. C-9
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC)
San Diego, Calif. 92136

Beaufre, André. *Strategy of Action*. New York: Praeger, 1967. 136 p.

This book is the most recent of three outlining General Beaufre's theories of total strategy. The previous two were *Introduction to Strategy* and *Deterrence and Strategy*. The author states that the strategy of action is positive and implies achieving something despite what others do, as opposed to deterrence which implies prevention of someone else's initiative. It is a total — not just a military — strategy, which is a technique to be used by government to implement policy in the field of international relations. It will generally involve action in military, psychological, political, economic, and diplomatic fields. Political diagnosis is its essential prerequisite. In the author's words, total strategy is "the art of the dialectic of the opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute."

Force may be the use of military means, the threat of its use, or nonmilitary methods of pressure. The "direct mode" of action involves the primary use of military means, while the "indirect mode" makes use primarily of nonmilitary methods. The author believes that the indirect mode of the strategy of action is the mode of the future because of constraints imposed on the direct mode by nuclear capabilities.

He outlines the five steps generally involved in his concept, the first being definition of the political aim and the final one always being negotiation. Using this type of analysis made available by the concept of the total strategy of action, General Beaufre concludes that an objective appraisal of a "statesman's intuition of forecasts" is made possible. This latest book, as well as the previous two, would appear to be a must for the serious student of strategy not only in the military, but of

strategy in the overall context of international relations.

B. V. AJEMIAN
Captain, U.S. Navy

Brogan, Sir Denis W. *Worlds in Conflict*. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, c. 1965. 133 p.

The underlying theme of Sir Denis' book is a view of the present world situation in terms of a historic perspective. The author suggests that America, in her role as defender of the West, must henceforth be less idealistically committable and more objectively patient — acting in the light of her historical destiny. NATO, Southeast Asia, De Gaulle, the Common Market, emerging nations, the Communist threat, China, and the vexing problem of a political solution in Vietnam are but a few of the many areas that Sir Denis examines. The author does not content himself, however, with a mere description of the present world problems but offers in addition his own possible solutions, suggestions, and candid predictions, in view of the past and present. His statements, such as, "NATO in its old character cannot survive much longer," or "The West can never face the rest of the world in its old spirit of confident superiority," are logically and invigoratingly discussed. *Worlds in Conflict* is informative and thought-provoking. It is highly recommended for anyone at all interested in world policies and the national stance of America. It is a new approach — not a panacea.

T. E. LUKAS
Commander, U.S. Navy

Clark, John J. *The New Economics of National Defense*. New York: Random House, 1966. 242 p.

"Systems analysis," "management," "defense planning," and "economics" are terms which have acquired special significance in the Department of Defense since Robert S. McNamara assumed the position of Secretary of Defense. Dean John J. Clark has written a succinct, interesting, and informative book on many aspects of the new developments and applications in defense economics. Except for his treatment of game theory, the author has prepared his account in layman's language which is quite readable and easy to comprehend. His primary emphasis is devoted to how the conceptual framework of problems in microeconomics as applicable to the private sector has been extended into military problems. He presents logical, relevant arguments for the "systems analysis" approach as being definitely superior to the older methods. Dean Clark does not trap himself into selling this as the only answer to the problems. He feels that an economist is a staff man who should not have the final word on defense planning and that dollars and cents should never dictate military strategy or policy. He does believe that the new economic approach to defense problems is useful and that we are on the threshold of a more comprehensive theory of military economics. As a matter of interest, the author gives a brief historical account of war gaming at the Naval War College and uses the Strategic War Game of the Strategic Planning Study as a case study. This book should be on the mandatory reading list for all military officers.

W. D. CLARK

Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Gardner, Brian. *Mafeking: a Victorian Legend*. London: Cassell, 1966. 246 p.

Brian Gardner is a respected author who has written extensively and readably in the field of military history.

Here he tells the story of an incident in the Boer War — the siege, or investment, of Mafeking in South Africa from October 1899 until its relief in May of 1900. The subtitle of the book, *A Victorian Legend*, is well chosen, reflecting both the historical fact and the emotional fantasy of the events, for, in the words of the author, "the facts did not always support the legend." The work is also, to a large extent, the story of Col. Robert Baden-Powell, who was Commander of the Mafeking garrison. He too was a legend in his own time variously portrayed as endowed with typical, nonchalant British courage; plucky and gay. The author's factual account of what actually happened in those 7 months is extremely interesting reading and provides insights into, and lessons to be drawn from, the strategy and tactics of the day, at least in an isolated case in a remote part of the world. It could also be said that it exposes Baden-Powell as more of a legend than a great commander. Narrated in detail is one of two actions initiated by British forces, wherein, unsuccessfully attempting to storm an impregnable Boer position, two-thirds of their troops became casualties. With bland aplomb, Baden-Powell in his report of the engagement said that the action had been satisfactory in that the enemy would have noted "the fatal results of storming a position." After the relief of Mafeking, Baden-Powell promptly rose to the rank of Major General — the youngest in the British Army. He was also described as the greatest English hero since Wellington and the most popular since Nelson. This book is an outstanding example of one of the values of historical study, and that is the process of sorting out the truth from the tradition.

J. E. GODFREY

Captain, U.S. Navy

Herrick, Walter R., Jr. *The American Naval Revolution*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966. 274 p.

The setting of *The American Naval Revolution* is the period after the Civil War and up through the Spanish-American War. The origins of a modern Navy started during this time when the construction of ships changed from wood to iron to steel; propulsion changed from sail to steam; the breech-loading, rifled naval gun came into its own; and turrets and armor plate were introduced. Along with these physical changes came the development of tactics, the strategic concepts of Mahan, the establishment of the bureau system, and the start of the Naval War College. The author treats the problems and disputes associated with each of the changes. None was made easily, and much of the opposition to progress stemmed from within the Navy. In supporting this point, the author cites Benjamin Franklin Tracy, the Secretary of the Navy from 1889 to 1893, rather than a naval officer as the person most influential in implementing the changes and laying the groundwork for a contemporary Navy. The reader will find that the arguments used by those opposed to the progressive changes over a half century ago sound familiar today, and the same areas which were controversial then are still controversial. The last part of the book considers the use of the modern Navy in promoting interests of the United States and examines its performance in combat during the Spanish-American War. Mr. Herrick has come up with a well-documented and very interesting book. It opens up a little-known but a highly important era in American naval history.

R. H. WILSON
Commander, U.S. Navy

Knoehl, Kuno, *Victor Charlie*. New York: Praeger, 1967. 304 p.

Mr. Knoehl lays no claim to any particular expertise in either political attitudes or warfare in any form. He offers his observations tinged by the horror, pity, or frustration of the moment in an attempt to picture for the reader the frightening intensity and complexity of the Vietnamese war. His contribution is valuable for the scope of activity he shows. Few Westerners have traveled so extensively — in recent times — among the soldiers and cadres of both the South Vietnamese/American Government and the Viet Cong.

To err is human and Mr. Knoehl is demonstrably human. He has scarcely a good word for any South Vietnamese official, military or civilian. His depiction of American troops — from the Saigon bars to the Special Forces outposts — carries an obvious bias, for he is quick to highlight their faults and errors and only reluctantly denotes their generosity or gallantry in action. Conversely, the Viet Cong, or "Victor Charlie," are shown as men willing to endure unbelievable hardships and continue with unabated fervor their campaign to prevent foreign domination. Murder, assassination, torture, kidnapping, and forced labor are dismissed as necessary implements of the Viet Cong to prosecute their war. These shortcomings do serve to underline Mr. Knoehl's main thesis — that the Viet Cong are not exclusively Communists, or battling for a Communist Government, but that they are too often peasants struggling to stay alive and free from a corrupt and oppressive regime. He holds out little hope for a final political victory by the United States and the Government of South Vietnam over the National Liberation Front.

In the Introduction, Mr. Bernard Fall indicates that as an Austrian writer and reporter, Mr. Knoebl exerts a not insignificant influence in Europe and that he deserves an audience in America. The reviewer would agree, with a caution to the reader to exercise to the fullest his sense of proportion and balance to compensate for the author's lack of these characteristics in his reporting. Certainly, it is not possible in one short book to cover comprehensively the war in Vietnam. Nevertheless, Mr. Knoebl has given a reporter's view of a wide range of incidents and attitudes that renders this interesting book well worth the reader's time.

R. L. DODD
Commander, U.S. Navy

Mackintosh, Malcolm. *Juggernaut*. New York: Macmillan, 1967. 320 p.

In this history of the growth of the Soviet Armed Forces since their foundation in 1918 some interesting facts are presented, especially the evolution of strategy that prevailed until the purges of 1937. The military leaders up to that time had worked out a realistic military tactics doctrine that, if it had been followed, would have vitalized the Soviet Armed Forces. The purges under Stalin soon reduced whatever originality and forcefulness existed in the Armed Forces to an utter collapse of morale. All continuity in military thought and training was replaced by total control by fear, and this cost the Soviets dearly in 1941. The military was completely subordinated to Stalin and his rule by terror, which lasted until his death in 1953. The main portion of this book deals with World War II and Russia's valiant effort to protect her homeland. Loaded with names, dates, and descriptions of even the most insignificant of battles, this has the effect of greatly attenuating the interest of the reader.

The author hastily wraps up the post-Stalin era in a few pages that present nothing new to the student of the Naval War College. The Soviets' reappraisal of their military doctrine was due to their successes in the development of long-range missiles and nuclear weapons. However, they were faced with the dilemma of deciding just how valuable conventional forces would continue to be in any future world war. Here the author credits President Kennedy's emphasis on such a capability as the catalyst that caused the Soviets to react to the need for increasing their conventional forces. The sources utilized seem fairly accurate, although the reader is cautioned to recheck any figures on the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces with other material. Mr. Mackintosh concludes, rather ineptly, that the hopeful element for the future is "if the peoples of Russia had the final say in Soviet policy, a new world war . . . would not be their way of achieving their national aims." He ignores the real issue here and that is: What chance do the Soviet people have of obtaining this voice?

W. K. CALLAM
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Paget, Julian. *Counter-Insurgency Operations; Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare*. New York: Walker, 1967. 189 p.

This book studies three successful counterinsurgency campaigns conducted by the British Army in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus during the last 20 years. The author, Lt. Col. Julian Paget of the British Army, has made an analysis of each campaign in order to search out factors and principles to be deduced from lessons learned. These he has isolated and identified as necessary for proper prosecution of present and future counterinsurgency campaigns.

He has taken the position that successful counterinsurgency operations are conducted in three phases: "*Phase One*, a period wherein there is increasing lawlessness of some element of the population which is in conflict with the Government. *Phase Two*, essentially a defensive phase in which the insurgents hold the initiative. *Phase Three*, the final stage in which the Security Forces have gained the initiative and bring pressure to bear upon the insurgents. At this point, the emergency may be ended and a political solution to the problem is possible." In each of the cases that the author has explored he has traced the development of the guerrilla activities through the three phases and has concluded by offering general observations and deductions. Consistently, he has emphasized the importance of civil-military cooperation involving a close relationship among the civil administration, the Armed Forces, and the police. In his final chapter, "Fighting the Insurgents," Lieutenant Colonel Paget has extracted from the experiences he has investigated the major essentials for counterinsurgency operations, methods for defeating the insurgents, and means for wooing and permanently winning the hearts and minds of the population. Scholarly and well written, this book on a very timely and important aspect of present and future warfare should prove instructive and helpful to students and practitioners of military art today.

R. N. PETERSON
Commander, U.S. Navy

Roy, Jules. *Journey through China*.
New York: Harper & Row, 1967, c.
1965. 299 p.

Journey through China is an intensely interesting account of the observations and experiences of a French

Army officer-turned-journalist during a 2-month visit to Communist China in 1964. The main purpose of the visit was to gather material for a history of the Chinese revolution. Coincidentally, one perceives, the author also sought affirmation of his empathy for the Chinese. He was bitterly disillusioned and disappointed on both counts. Much of the book is devoted to the delays, denials, frustrations, and quarrels in his dealings with the bureaucracy. The author wanted to visit archives, view documentary films, interview participants in the Great March, et cetera. Instead, under the constant and suffocatingly close escort of Chinese officials, he saw only what the Government wanted him to see — certain factories, cooperative farms, and public museums — and interviewed only persons who knew nothing of, or would not speak of, the great events of the revolution. Mr. Roy was obliged to abandon his basic aim under these circumstances. However, throughout the book, he has liberally threaded a capsule history of the revolution (based on sources other than this visit) with frequent guilt-laden references to the humiliations inflicted upon China by the West in the century following the Opium Wars. But, fundamentally, instead of being handed another documented history of the revolution, the reader is treated to a caustic psychosocial analysis of the Red China of 1964.

In the China described to him as liberal and happy, the author saw a "vast, miserable segment of humanity working itself to death." He found it "fearful and terrifying." Although he frequently lauds the material achievements of Red China and the decidedly improved living standard of the masses, he nevertheless laments the reenslavement of the people to a new master. He is particularly derisive of the awe and

reverence in which Mao is held by the masses and Party mandarins. The author was appalled by the exaggerated, hate-filled propaganda against the West upon which the Chinese people, especially the children, are incessantly fed and by the fanaticism of "work for the Party and the Plan," which was constantly evident. He found an overpowering sense of determination, of implacable destiny. Mr. Roy discovered "no cracks in the wall of public opinion." Instead, there was astonishing rigidity in regard to the Party line by all whom he met. We know that this "astonishing rigidity" of 1964 soon developed into the convulsive cultural revolution, but it is not surprising that the dissension which surely must have existed was effectively concealed from even so perceptive and persistent an observer. He paints a startlingly clear picture of the regimentation and of suspicions run rampant which suppressed all intimacy, candor, and trust in the people.

Although somewhat dated by the march of events, the excellent insight into the Chinese mentality provided by this book has not been diminished. This reviewer recommends it very highly.

J. D. STEVENS

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Rueff, Jacques. *Balance of Payments*. New York: Macmillan, 1967. 215 p.

Jacques Rueff, former Inspecteur Général des Finances and Vice-Governor of the Bank of France, has achieved a certain notoriety in recent years for his advocacy of a return to the international gold standard. His theory of international payments lies behind De Gaulle's paeon to gold in February 1965: "the golden rule . . . that must be enforced and honored again in international economic relations" One turns to Rueff's book,

therefore, in the expectation of finding a thorough analysis of the contemporary international monetary system and a firmly reasoned set of policy proposals. On both scores Rueff's book is a disappointment. Actually, this book is a collection of articles of which the most recent was written in 1963. Five articles are grouped in Part One, entitled "The Facts Beneath the Problem." Only the first article (written in 1963) directly tackles the U.S. balance of payments deficit and the gold exchange standard. The other four (written in 1928, 1933, 1948, and 1949) analyze the problems of trade and payments in the 1920's, the early 1930's, and the late 1940's. Since Rueff has not changed his ideas on the balance of payments, the articles in Part One are somewhat repetitious. Why has Rueff included these old articles? Presumably, to demonstrate that he has known the truth about the balance of payments all along. The author groups two articles (written in the 1950's) in Part Two, which is labeled "Elements for a Balance of Payments Theory." Since the second article was written to explain the first article, repetition also abounds in this section of the book. Actually these articles say very little about balance of payments adjustment. They are mainly devoted to an explanation of the factors determining the money supply and the function of the Central Bank discount rate.

Rueff's balance of payments theory is essentially the classical theory of adjustment under an international gold standard. A deficit transfers purchasing power out of the deficit country and thereby causes a price deflation. At the same time, by absorbing cash balances, the deficit causes a rise in interest rates in the deficit country. If these market forces are not neutralized through the creation of new money by the Central Bank, then exports will rise

and imports will fall until the deficit is wiped out. The gold-exchange system is bad because a deficit in the central reserve country (read the United States) does not cause an outflow of purchasing power necessary to achieve adjustment. Rueff has at least a half-truth by the tail. But he has derived from a simple theoretical model a set of policy prescriptions for a complex, messy world. Reliance on Rueff's "automatic" market adjustment would take balance of payments policy out of the hands of the policymakers. It would leave them no options; they might be compelled to sacrifice other economic goals (full employment, economic growth) for the goal of balance of payments equilibrium. Ultimately, therefore, Rueff's position reduces itself to the value judgment that balance of payments stability is the supreme economic goal.

This book is not recommended for the lay reader, except possibly the first article. The economist-reader will be annoyed by the use of strange names and phrases for the standard terminology of economic theory. Apparently, the translator knows nothing about economics as expressed in English.

F. R. ROOT

Chair of Economics

Wallerstein, Immanuel. *Africa: the Politics of Unity*. New York: Random House, 1967. 274 p.

Mr. Wallerstein, the author of *Africa: the Politics of Unity*, is to be commended for maintaining a positive approach to the subject matter, as disunity rather than unity seems to have dominated contemporary African politics. He makes a courageous attempt to systematize the multitudinous African events which have occurred during the 1957-1965 time frame through the vehicle of the principal theme: African unity, as an ideal and as an objective.

He is even generous in his interpretation of the positive contribution that revolutionaries like Kwame Nkrumah have made in advancing the ideological force of unity as a movement. Also, he generally ascribes to the actions of some of the new ministates a foresight and maturity of conduct which might be questioned at times. Because of the number of minute events examined in detail this is not an easy book to read unless one is already well versed in this period of African history. The author also presupposes a background knowledge of what transpired in Africa prior to 1957. His propensity to review political events without identifying associated factors, such as economics, detracts from the completeness of the discussion. The philosophy underlying the role of the trade unions as the avant garde in the movements toward African unity is related in a detailed, historical manner. The plethora of organization initials that occur as many as 30 times to a page makes for a difficulty in reading that is only partly alleviated by a five-page glossary of initials provided in appendix A. However, for someone desirous of understanding the detailed interplay of African labor leaders and unions the information would be of value.

The synthesis of the author's knowledge appears in the final chapter, "African Unity in the World Context." Relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R., as they have affected African political fortunes, bring forth some critical philosophy from Mr. Wallerstein. He assumes a détente between the two and views this as circumscribing the flexibility enjoyed by African nations during the cold war. The book is recommended only for the serious student of Africa, and even he might start with the last chapter first.

F. W. ULBRICHT
Captain, U.S. Navy

88 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Wolf, Charles, Jr. *United States Policy and the Third World*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967. 204 p.

In this analysis of the relationship between the "third world" less-developed countries and the United States, the author considers some interesting and current problems and some even more interesting alternatives to present-day policies in solving those problems. Of particular interest to the military officer are his analyses of the counter-insurgency issue, military assistance, and economic aid and the relationship of the latter two factors to development. In the author's estimation there has been insufficient thought given to explicit determination of U.S. objectives in the less-developed countries, and, as a consequence, great difficulty has been experienced in rational direction of American efforts in these areas. In the first part of *United States Policy and the Third World* an attempt is made to indicate measures that could be taken to improve the defining of objectives. In the case of insurgency and counter-insurgency, for example, exception is

taken to the presently stated objective of "gaining popular support through economic assistance." Deeper analysis, according to the author, indicates that perhaps the provision of economic support in reality *assists* the insurgents by increasing their available resource base. The second half of the book is devoted to developing some quantitative tools that could be used by U.S. decisionmakers in achieving objectives. The author, however, is the first to admit that these tools are crude at best and would require significant refinement before they could be useful for other than comparative analysis of policies toward individual nations or groups of nations.

This book should be of interest to the military officer because Mr. Wolf endeavors to collate the military, economic, and political factors that affect U.S. policy toward "the third world." The prospective reader is cautioned, however, that some fairly sophisticated statistical techniques are utilized, especially in Part II.

A. J. ASHURST
Commander, U.S. Navy



A constant Naval superiority would terminate the War speedily—
without it, I do not know that it will ever be terminated honorably.

*George Washington: Letter to LaFayette,
15 November 1781*

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On land a General is in command. He can order his troops to advance or withdraw, to feint and maneuver. By his orders he can win or lose battles. But not so the man who is the titular head of an amphibious invasion force. He cannot add troops because there are no more boats to carry them. He cannot even subtract, for so interlaced are all elements of the plan that the alteration of a single part of it will throw the rest askew. In the early stages he cannot materially alter the action of his troops in time or space. Like everyone else involved, he is simply a hired man, doing the will of the Plan.

Ralph Ingersoll, 1900

