

1968

## Strategy of Action

B. V. Ajemian

André Beaufre

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Beaufre, André. *Strategy of Action*. New York: Praeger, 1967. 136 p.

This book is the most recent of three outlining General Beaufre's theories of total strategy. The previous two were *Introduction to Strategy* and *Deterrence and Strategy*. The author states that the strategy of action is positive and implies achieving something despite what others do, as opposed to deterrence which implies prevention of someone else's initiative. It is a total — not just a military — strategy, which is a technique to be used by government to implement policy in the field of international relations. It will generally involve action in military, psychological, political, economic, and diplomatic fields. Political diagnosis is its essential prerequisite. In the author's words, total strategy is "the art of the dialectic of the opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute."

Force may be the use of military means, the threat of its use, or nonmilitary methods of pressure. The "direct mode" of action involves the primary use of military means, while the "indirect mode" makes use primarily of nonmilitary methods. The author believes that the indirect mode of the strategy of action is the mode of the future because of constraints imposed on the direct mode by nuclear capabilities.

He outlines the five steps generally involved in his concept, the first being definition of the political aim and the final one always being negotiation. Using this type of analysis made available by the concept of the total strategy of action, General Beaufre concludes that an objective appraisal of a "statesman's intuition of forecasts" is made possible. This latest book, as well as the previous two, would appear to be a must for the serious student of strategy not only in the military, but of

strategy in the overall context of international relations.

B. V. AJEMIAN  
Captain, U.S. Navy

Brogan, Sir Denis W. *Worlds in Conflict*. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, c. 1965. 133 p.

The underlying theme of Sir Denis' book is a view of the present world situation in terms of a historic perspective. The author suggests that America, in her role as defender of the West, must henceforth be less idealistically committable and more objectively patient — acting in the light of her historical destiny. NATO, Southeast Asia, De Gaulle, the Common Market, emerging nations, the Communist threat, China, and the vexing problem of a political solution in Vietnam are but a few of the many areas that Sir Denis examines. The author does not content himself, however, with a mere description of the present world problems but offers in addition his own possible solutions, suggestions, and candid predictions, in view of the past and present. His statements, such as, "NATO in its old character cannot survive much longer," or "The West can never face the rest of the world in its old spirit of confident superiority," are logically and invigoratingly discussed. *Worlds in Conflict* is informative and thought-provoking. It is highly recommended for anyone at all interested in world policies and the national stance of America. It is a new approach — not a panacea.

T. E. LUKAS  
Commander, U.S. Navy

Clark, John J. *The New Economics of National Defense*. New York: Random House, 1966. 242 p.