

1968

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Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

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Recommended Citation

Kirkpatrick, Lyman B. (1968) "Cold War Operations: The Politics of Communist Confrontation, Part V - The Cuban Case History," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 21 : No. 3 , Article 6.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol21/iss3/6>

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COLD WAR OPERATIONS: THE POLITICS OF COMMUNIST CONFRONTATION

Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

(A series of eight lectures by Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick of the Political Science Department, Brown University, given at the United States Naval War College during the 1966-67 term as a part of the Electives Program. These lectures are selected from those in a course entitled *Cold War Operations* which Professor Kirkpatrick presents at Brown. This is the fifth lecture, and the others will be published in the next three issues.)

Part V — The Cuban Case History

It is ironic that the Cuban Revolution of 1956-1958 produced the only Communist country in the Western Hemisphere.

Cuba is 90 miles south of Key West. The island is a little over 600 miles

long, has an ideal climate. The temperature is 70 degrees in the winter and 80 degrees in the summer. It is probably the greatest botanical garden in the world — 8,000 different species of plants and trees. Cuba is fairly rich

in mineral resources. Cuba was discovered by Columbus; settled by the Spanish in 1511; liberated from the Spanish in 1898 by what some historians call that "splendid little war;" controlled by the United States for the next 4 years; and then self-governed with the exception of two or three periods when the United States intervened under the Platt Amendment. The Platt Amendment gave us authority to intervene when it was considered in the interest of Cuba and the United States. It was abrogated by President Roosevelt in 1934. The United States retained possession of Guantanamo.

Communism was not new to Cuba with Castro. The Communist Party of Cuba was organized in 1925. It was through World War II one of the more powerful Communist Parties in Latin America. It operated on the basis of cooperating with dictators when that was in its general interest. Batista had the first Communist Cabinet member minister in his Government in all of Latin America when Juan Marinello was Minister Without Portfolio from 1944 to 1947.

Batista used the Communist Party to develop, support, and strengthen the trade union movement in which the Communists had always been active. He outlawed it in 1952 when he thought it was becoming dangerous to his interests. In the 1950's the Communist Party of Cuba probably had a strength of 15,000 to 25,000 active members with four to five times that number in support.

The questions most frequently asked are: "How could the Cuban Revolution happen? Why didn't we do more about Castro? Wasn't he always a Communist?" There is also a popular myth that he was supported by the U.S. Government in various ways before he came to power. Perhaps more pressing, the question was asked, "How could we be so ignorant after

more than a half century of good relations with Cuba?"

Fidel Castro was born of a good, land-owning family in Cuba. He went to the University of Havana where he was known as a revolutionary. He tried to capture the Moneada Army barracks in Santiago on 26 July 1953, and his whole party was practically wiped out. He spent the next 2 years in prison on the Isle of Pines after an emotional speech at his trial entitled "History Will Absolve Me." Batista, in a feeble-minded moment, released the political prisoners, including Castro, in 1955. Castro left Cuba and came to the United States where he probably got financial support here from other Cubans. In Mexico, Castro and his associates were trained by General Mayo from the Spanish Civil War. Some 82 of them returned to Oriente Province in 1956 on the yacht *Granma*. Twelve reached the mountains, and out of that 12 developed a revolution.

Was Castro a Communist in 1956? Nobody positively knows whether he was a card-carrying Communist prior to December 1961 when he announced that he was a Marxist-Leninist. He was definitely a revolutionary. He apparently always had disliked the United States. The testimony on this comes, to a large degree, from his own sister. He has used anti-United States as a primary political platform since 1960. Several of Castro's original followers were Communists. Guevara was, and Raul Castro's present wife, Vilma Espan, was known to have been a card-carrying member when she attended graduate school in the United States. She was not married to Raul when they were in the mountains in 1956.

As far as the degree of support that the Castro forces received from the United States, they received no support from the U.S. Government that I am aware of. Certainly there was none from CIA, and I would doubt very

much whether any other elements of the Government were supporting him or his forces. There was liaison with "26 of July" representatives in Caracas, Mexico City, and in the United States. On at least two occasions CIA personnel went into the Oriente mountains to talk to Castro. He also received American newspapermen in the mountains; Herbert Matthews of *The New York Times* wrote a series of favorable articles on the Castro forces. It is significant to note, from a point of view of guerrilla warfare, that Castro started with a limited number and developed a strength not much in excess of 1,500 at the time the Batista Government was overthrown.

The techniques used by Castro's forces were the usual ones. They were friendly to the local population, and, rather than coercing them or taking food or supplies at the point of a gun, they paid for what they got and developed popular support. They treated their prisoners well, particularly the enlisted personnel captured from the Batista Army, and they tried to convert the officers they could and consequently gained support in this particular area. Their guerrilla warfare tactics included raids on army posts, ambushes of columns, destruction of roads, bridges, et cetera. The Castro revolt was not won in the Oriente mountains. It was won in the cities, particularly in Havana and Santiago. This is the crucial aspect of this revolution.

I want to interject a personal note. I was in Cuba officially in 1956, 1957, and 1958 and saw the revolution developing firsthand.

In 1956 I was the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency, responsible for reviewing all of its activities worldwide in every area. In 1956 I decided to personally supervise our inspection of the Latin American division and laid on a trip that would

take me first to Cuba and then around the entire Continent and back. Allen Dulles, then the Director of Central Intelligence, said, "I think there's a chit that I'd like to have you pick up from President Batista in Cuba." He told me that the previous year his brother, the Secretary of State, in discussions with Batista had noted that he thought that the Cubans particularly, but Latin Americans in general, underestimated Communist strength. John Foster Dulles felt the Latins were not sufficiently aggressive in trying to destroy communism or at least to blunt it. President Batista had promised Secretary Dulles that he would establish an anti-Communist organization in his government and do something about it. Batista had done very little about it except to establish an agency which was getting a meager amount of money but was not producing very much. I was given a letter from the Secretary of State to Batista introducing me and urging that President Batista do something about his commitment.

In July 1956 I visited Cuba. Arthur Gardner was U.S. Ambassador at the time, and together we called on the President who repeated his promise to do something about communism and asked that we present him with some specific proposals, which we did. These proposed that there be established an organization named by the Cubans "The Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activity"; that it should concentrate solely and exclusively on the Communists; that it should be under a Cabinet Minister; and that it should be under a sufficiently senior officer so that it could accomplish something. As a result, they established BRAC, and they put it under Minister of Government Santiago Ray. Named to head it was a major general who had an excellent reputation as being tough but fair and was not generally

implicated in what was starting to become a pattern of atrocities in Cuba. The CIA then started to train their personnel on Communist activities and also, specifically, on Cuban Communists.

This organization developed in 1956 and 1957 fairly well and became aggressive in its work against the Communists. It was able to recruit some good personnel, stressing recruitment of lawyers. It obtained most of its personnel from the military services, and up until the middle of 1957 it was an anti-Communist organization. From then until the fall of Batista, 31 December 1958, it became almost exclusively another agency used by the Batista Government for the repression of the opposition. As such it was contaminated with the rest of his governmental mechanism. The other units so used were SIM, the military intelligence organization, and the Bureau of Investigations, which was their equivalent to our FBI.

In 1956 the United States policy toward Cuba was one of complete support of Batista. Ambassador Gardner enjoyed the most cordial relations with the President and the Government. The Military Mutual Assistance Program supplied the armed forces with military equipment, and the United States subsidized the Cuban sugar crop. This was the year Castro landed. He was regarded as another Cuban exile irritant who Batista wanted suppressed. There was little impression of any potentiality for gaining major support on the part of the 26th of July movement. In 1957 Castro was still in the mountains. His force had gained strength. The Cuban Army was fighting less and less effectively - the usual pattern of an army besieged by guerrillas with little stomach for the fighting. The Army stayed in the barracks and defended areas at night, ventured out by day,

went over the hill and fired a few shots, and returned to say they had seen the rebels. The Batista Army was quite ineffective in most of their operations, with one or two exceptions. There were some battles fought.

In the meantime, the students were becoming restive, and the Revolutionary Directorate in Havana was becoming more and more aggressive. Batista was inclined to take harsher repressive measures, and the police and military forces were using more and more violence. It was starting to become a critical situation. The pattern of events that followed from there on was a vicious cycle. As the Castro forces gained strength in the mountains, the students and the professional class in the cities were becoming alienated from the Batista regime. The Batista police would take repressive measures. The United States protested the repressive measures and started to withdraw its support. Some allege that the instant the United States started to withdraw its support was the beginning of the downfall of Batista and of the gaining of control by the 26th of July movement. It is important to note that at the start the 26th of July represented just one element of the Cuban population. It was not receiving support from the other political parties and only gained this gradually.

The United States changed Ambassadors in late 1957. Earl Smith replaced Arthur Gardner. Ambassador Smith almost immediately became involved in an incident which had a profound effect on his mission. He was urged by his staff to visit Santiago which was then the major center for the Castro revolution. He did so and was met there by a group of Cuban women clad in black protesting the atrocities of the Cuban police and military. The Cuban authorities moved in rather vigorously, rounded up the women and carried them off. Amba-

sador Smith protested, whereupon it was quietly let known to him that he might be declared persona non grata for interfering in the internal affairs of Cuba. Consequently, he hastened to make peace with the Cuban Government, his responsibility being to deal with Batista. From then on there developed in the United States Embassy in Havana a split in which everybody, with one or two exceptions, was concerned about the growth of the opposition. Ambassador Smith was in the difficult position of trying to keep some established relationships with the Batista Government at a time when it was putting great pressure on him and when his staff was advising him that the Government no longer had popular support. The cycle then accelerated with finally the cutting off of all military assistance to the Batista Government and eventually its fall.

To give you an illustration of the situation: When I arrived in Cuba in the summer of 1958 I was greeted at the airport with the statement that the Ambassador had forbidden all Embassy personnel from seeing the opposition. This would have prevented our finding out anything that was going on in Cuba. So I had a rather interesting session with the Ambassador and said that if this was indeed the policy that he was going to follow then I had no real alternative but to recommend to Washington that the CIA personnel be recalled. CIA was there to deal with nongovernment as well as government elements. There was no purpose in having an intelligence organization there if it was not allowed to find out what was going on in the country. The Foreign Service was there to deal with the Government. CIA personnel, who were well known to the Batista Government, were there to deal with any other elements in Cuba. The fact that CIA people were seeing 26th of July representatives was

interpreted by the Batista Government as giving support, and this was widely advertised to that degree.

Ambassador Smith saw the point and relented as far as Agency personnel were concerned. Agency personnel, in turn, were enjoined to be as discreet as possible in their meetings.

One interesting episode occurred at this point. The number-two man in the station was urged to meet three people who wanted to see him on an urgent basis in Havana. After consultation with the Minister Counselor, the First Secretary, and others it was decided to go ahead with the meeting. Consultation is generally fairly broad because provocation is always a possibility. The Batista military intelligence service might have their people solicit a meeting with a CIA man and then claim he was giving aid and comfort to the enemy, and we would have one of those episodes which are all too frequent in intelligence operations.

After careful consultation within the Embassy and after checking a good deal on the identities of the three individuals that requested the meeting, it was decided to go ahead. The meeting was obviously under surveillance by SIM. No sooner had the CIA man arrived than all four were arrested. The three 26th of July men were jailed, but the American was released after he established his identity. The Batista Government made it immediately known that they were going to declare him persona non grata. The head of the Cuban BRAC, the anti-Communist bureau, called the CIA Chief to say this should not be allowed to take place, that this had been a frameup by military intelligence. He suggested to the CIA Chief that he advise the Cuban Government through the proper channels that the United States would take a rather dim view of this man being declared persona non grata and that he should inquire

as to why a DC-4 with a certain serial number left an airport in the Miami area on a certain date with illegal arms. As a result, the action against the CIA officer was dropped. The Batista Government gave an elaborate luncheon to insure that there were no hard feelings. An interesting point is that here was one of Batista's appointees, the head of BRAC, sufficiently concerned with what was going on to nullify one of his own government's operations. It is illustrative of how decent Cubans at that time were concerned by Batista's repressive measures.

In the summer of 1958 it was the 11th hour. To our observations there was little chance of Batista staying in power. The repressions taken by his forces had reached a degree where conservatively one could estimate that 85 percent of the people were against him. Another anecdote illustrates this. As a general rule, during my travels I refrained from meeting with local people unless it was for liaison or representation. I was urged on this occasion to see a representative of the 26th of July movement who was very anxious to see a senior U.S. official aside from the Embassy. After checking with the First Secretary and other non-CIA personnel, I agreed to see this man in my hotel which was not in the center of the city. I was nervous about this session because I did not want to be entrapped or have my visitor caught by the Batista police. This man was a highly respected professional, nonpolitical in every sense of the word. He had never been involved in politics in Cuba. He stayed for 3 hours and told of the degree of repression that was taking place, confirming what others had said about police murders in Havana running from 10 to a hundred a week. These were murders of students, the professional middle class, and others. There

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were obviously some true revolutionaries and some Communists involved.

In order to insure that I did not believe this story was fabrication, he brought pictures with him. The pictures were taken by a doctor of a woman schoolteacher who had been arrested by the Batista police on suspicion of plotting against the government. She fortunately had been released and not murdered because her sister had high-level friends in the Batista Government but not before they had tortured her severely. With her permission the doctor had taken pictures of her body. According to the doctor's testimony, and I was perfectly willing to accept his word for it, hers was the most mistreated human body he had ever seen in his life.

The State Department recalled Ambassador Smith to Washington in November 1958 for consultations. At the same time, former Ambassador William Pawley visited Batista on an unofficial basis to persuade him to yield to a military junta that would be acceptable to the 26th of July movement in order to avert a blood bath. Batista would not listen. He recognized that problems had become increasingly serious for his government, but he still thought he could hold out. He refused to step down at that particular time. On the 31st of December, less than 6 weeks later, Batista decided that he could not last, summoned his close friends and advisors to a military camp outside Havana, and left. Castro arrived in Havana 8 days later.

Looking at this aspect of the Castro revolution before the takeover, we should do a balance sheet as to how much of this was the fault of the United States; how much of it was the fault of the Batista Government, and indirectly, therefore, the United States because we supported Batista; and how much of it was based upon social conditions in Cuba itself.

How much was based upon the appeal of Castro? Castro is a leader with a certain amount of natural attraction for the Cubans. He is a great orator from a Cuban point of view. His political platforms as announced from the mountains seemed moderate. He had not at that time obtained the full support of the Popular Socialist Party, the Communists. In April 1958, before the takeover, he called an unsuccessful general strike in which the Communists refused to participate — the alleged reason they gave being that they had not been informed in advance. Shortly after that the PSP did send a liaison officer to Castro in the mountains, and from then on there was liaison between the official Communist group and Castro.

The second phase of the revolution occurred between the takeover on 1 January 1959 and 1962. This was a phase in which, initially, the U.S. Government recognized Castro. His original Cabinet was one of the best Cabinets of any Cuban Government. It was composed of moderates, a large number of respected statesmen, all individuals who seemed to the State Department and others in Washington to represent a good element of Cuba. This Government seemed to offer assurance of the basic standard requirements for recognition — the maintenance of law and order, the protection of American citizens and American property, and adherence to the general conduct of international relations.

Castro immediately ran into serious financial problems. When Batista left Cuba he had something in the neighborhood of \$500 million in banks outside of Cuba. In Cuba, prior to the Castro takeover, graft was generally considered the thing to do, or at least a way to get a reasonable income by political activities. The amount of Batista's graft was probably a little

larger than the normal Latin dictator would take out, but still not so shocking from a Latin point of view. Castro, finding the treasury practically empty, asked for assistance from U.S. companies, and three major oil companies made an advance of \$15 million. Castro responded by directing them to refine Soviet crude oil, which they refused to do, and he confiscated their property.

This was the start of the breakdown of relations between Cuba and the United States. Castro was invited to the United States by the American Society of Newspaper Editors to speak to their annual meeting in the spring of 1959. He saw people around Washington, including the Vice-President. There had been discussions but no commitments and not much talk about further aid. At this time the Cuban sugar crop was still being subsidized by the United States. It was not until after approximately \$100 million had been spent before it was finally decided to break our relations with Cuba. Castro confiscated \$865 million in U.S. property, an investment which yielded a return of about \$65 million a year.

The pattern of Communist activity after the Castro takeover was one in which more and more Communists moved into key positions. This was resented by non-Communist Cubans. One of the first expressions of dissent was the resignation of the Chief of the Cuban Air Force in protest against Communists moving into the Air Force. The Communists infiltrated every element of the Government until finally they had all the key positions. Most of the people in the original Cabinet either resigned or left Cuba if they could. When the United States cut off aid, Castro turned to the Soviet Union. Today they have about the same subsidy proposition that this country had pre-Castro in the way of

supporting Cuba. It costs the Russians about a million dollars a day to support the Communist Government in Cuba.

This leads to a discussion of what precipitated the Bay of Pigs operation of 16 April 1961. This was before the final Castro announcement that he was a Marxist-Leninist. The Bay of Pigs was brought about by the complete deterioration in relations between the two countries and by a very strong desire on the part of our Government to get rid of him.

The planning for the Bay of Pigs started during the Eisenhower Administration in the summer and fall of 1960. The original planning was predicated upon doing to Castro what he had done to Batista. There was to be gradual infiltration of anti-Castro guerrillas into key spots in Cuba — the Oriente mountains, the Escambray mountains, and other areas where it was believed that there would be sympathy for anti-Castro forces. These guerrilla units, trained for guerrilla warfare and intelligence collection, would, in turn, gain support and build up a pressure system inside the country until, as Castro had thrown over Batista, he in turn would be thrown over by the anti-Castro rebels.

There were two matters of urgency connected with this operation. Item one was that it was known that Cuban pilots were being trained in MIG aircraft. There was concern that as soon as they received Russian jets the possibility of unopposed entry into Cuban airspace would be denied, and it would be even more difficult to infiltrate either assistance or supplies to the rebels inside Cuba. The second factor was the naval one. More and more high-speed coastal patrol boats were arriving in Cuba and would hinder or prevent infiltration by sea. Both of these were considered to be matters of considerable urgency.

In the fall of 1960 the plan was changed from the concept of a small number of guerrilla groups being put in to recruit and train to the concept of landing a sizable force at some point on the coast of Cuba in order to develop a beachhead and raise the flag of free Cuba. The anti-Castro forces could then bring in the Cuban Revolutionary Council from Miami and openly request assistance from other Latin American countries and from the United States.

This was the shape of the project when President Kennedy was inaugurated in January 1961. He was immediately briefed on it and gave permission to continue with the planning and training. The concept was that Cubans would carry out the operation, but obviously the CIA would have to assist in the training and planning. This concept never really worked along those theoretical lines. The Cubans were not qualified to do the bulk of the work, and they were incapable of uniting. There were about 110 Cuban exile groups in the United States, and it was most difficult to get them together. The recruiting for the project itself was difficult. Those who had worked for Batista were unacceptable because other Cubans would not work with them. The Batista Government exiles did not constitute a viable group for returning to develop a new government, and yet they were the only ones who had the military experience necessary for this type of activity.

The force for the operation ended up a rather mixed bag in which there were some people that had been associated with Batista, most of them young men from the middle class. They were trained in military techniques and guerrilla fighting. The training was done in Guatemala with the permission of President Ydigoras. It started off as a covert training area. One of the big landowners made part of his property

available in a remote portion of Guatemala, but it was impossible to maintain the secrecy. The Cubans talked. American newspapermen snooped. By early 1961 it was well known that there was a large number of Cubans training in Guatemala, particularly as the size of what became known as the brigade went first from 600 to 800 and then on to 1,200 and to 1,500. Furthermore, there was mutiny among some of the Cubans. The training camp itself had to be hacked out of the jungle, and this was hard work for many who had done little physical labor in their lives. Some turned against their leaders and were confined. This became an issue widely advertised in the U.S. press.

I cite this simply to note that the alarm signals must have been ringing rather heavily in Havana the entire time the brigade was preparing for the operation. There certainly could have been little uncertainty in Castro's mind as to what was being planned. Castro had developed one of the best intelligence and counterintelligence systems in Latin America. Beyond question he had means for learning what was going on in Miami. I remember hearing a representative of one of our press organizations say that in the course of 1 day in Miami he could find out everything that was going on directed at the Island. This is probably accurate. Anybody that knew his way around Miami and could speak Spanish could find out what was going on.

With the development of the brigade, the concept was to land on the coast of Cuba, secure a beachhead with an airstrip, and then hoist the free Cuban flag. The original plan was to land at the moderate-sized city of Trinidad. This was turned down for policy reasons because it might attract "too high a noise level." The second proposal was to land in the Playa Giron area with a diversionary land-

ing by a secondary group in Oriente Province in order to try and confuse the Castro forces as to which was the main landing. It was also planned that there would be airstrikes on the major Cuban airfield. A first strike a week before the landing would try to destroy the Castro Air Force. The cover story for the airstrike was that it was made by defectors from the Cuban Air Force flying B-26's. This strike did take place, and poststrike photographs showed that it destroyed about half of the Cuban Air Force. The second strike was to take place at H-hour on the morning of 17 April. Castro did an amazing thing after the first strike. He moved all aircraft into just two airfields and all his tanks into Camp Libertad and lined them up bumper to bumper. They would have been good targets for the second strike of the three B-26's which were flying out of Central American bases. This, incidentally, was an operational factor that was to assume considerable importance. The distance from Central America over to Cuba was such that the planes had very little time over the target. The Cubans were not the most precise pilots, and consequently this made their task all the more difficult.

On the night of Sunday, 16 April, the Secretary of State called General Cabell who was then acting Director of CIA. Mr. Dulles was in Puerto Rico on a speaking engagement. Mr. Rusk asked Cabell to come over to the State Department to see him. General Cabell and Richard Bissell, who was the Deputy Director in charge of operation, went over, and the Secretary advised that the President had decided to cancel the second airstrike. The President was in Middleburg, Va., and if General Cabell wished to appeal he could do so directly. General Cabell decided not to appeal.

At that precise moment the ships were converging on the landing beach.

They had a secondary landing area in Puerto Rico in case of cancellation and could divert there. The decision was made to let them go ahead. The brigade at the time of the landing numbered 1,450 of which 143 paratroopers dropped on the key crossroads in the swampy area inland, and the other 1,300 went ashore grouped in five battalions, which were more of the size of a reinforced company. They all landed fairly well. One battalion could not get to its primary beach but landed on a secondary beach. Most of them went ashore by daybreak. At that time the five remaining jets that Castro had, three T-38 trainers and two British Sea Furies, were airborne and sank one of the major landing ships and drove the others out to sea.

From that point on the invasion was doomed. The landing ships could not return to land additional supplies. The ship that had sunk had communications equipment and the bulk of their ammunition on board. The Castro forces fought better than had been expected. There were not the large number of defections which had been anticipated. The militia that was committed fought well. The brigade probably gave 10 casualties for every one it took. When the Free Cuban B-26's were unleashed they did heavy damage to the columns that Castro was bringing down into the area.

The brigade fought brilliantly and with great valor. But several important mistakes had been made. The President of the United States, about 10 days before the landing, had made the statement that the United States would not intervene in Cuba. This was, of course, heard by everybody in Cuba and deterred anybody from joining the beachhead. If they did not believe the United States was behind the landing with military force there was some question as to how much personal risk they would want to take. The second

mistake, of course was that the policy-makers were not sufficiently briefed in adequate detail as to the type of operation it was and whether it was covert or noncovert. It is hard to believe that one could describe a brigade landing as covert. The assumption on the part of the policymakers was that it was covert and that it probably would not create a high noise level. It created a major upheaval in the United Nations and around the world. The Bay of Pigs landing activated Communists around the world. It was impossible to conceal where the support had come from for the operation. There had been so much advance publicity about the training, about the recruitment of the Cubans, about the potentiality of the landing, that it certainly was not covert from that point of view. Also, there was not a realistic assessment as to the potentialities or consequences of failure. One of the reasons advanced at the time for not calling it off when the airstrike was canceled was that the Cubans would go ahead and land themselves. This must be viewed with a certain degree of skepticism. The other reason was that the Cubans would make so much noise if it was canceled that it would be just as noisy as if the landing itself had taken place. I question whether the implications from an international point of view would have been just as dangerous. Finally, there is the argument that the Cubans were under the impression that the United States would support them with military forces and that their trainers and leaders had given them this to believe. I had the responsibility of examining this in some detail to find out whether there was any factual basis. The way it would add up is that certainly the trainers were not saying, "Look fellows, if you don't do it you've had it." They were saying, "You can do it, and we're behind you all the way." Now

what "behind you all the way" would mean is subject to interpretation. I don't think you send men into battle by saying, "This is it, go ahead and if you fail it's your fault." So the truth lies somewhere in between. Certainly the impression was given that they were being fully supported. I do not believe anybody actually said, "There are going to be two airborne divisions and the Marines will come out of Guantanamo if things start to go badly for you."

As a result of the prebuildup publicity and the fact that Castro intelligence certainly must have had advance warning that there was going to be a landing made sometime in the spring of 1961, Castro placed in detention camps about 100,000 Cubans just prior to the landing. If there was any resistance of any magnitude left in Cuba at that time this was it. It was in concentration camps at the time of the landing. Most Cubans assumed that U.S. troops would be landing also, and that the United States was going to complete the job. Cuban disappointment at the failure in the Bay of Pigs is a very great one.

There were intelligence failures too. First and foremost, the fighting ability of the Castro Army and the Castro Militia was underestimated. Second, the number of defections that would take place was overestimated. Some of this might have been anticipated, but some came from the fact that there was subjective involvement in which a large amount of intelligence was coming from people who were involved in the operation itself. It was known prior to the landing that resistance groups inside Cuba were having a difficult time surviving; that they were not even getting food from the peasants. There had been one group of 20 in the Escambray mountains fighting 5,000 Castro militia, and the peasants were afraid to feed them. When this

takes place guerrilla forces cannot live on the country and cannot survive.

The Bay of Pigs was a decisive setback for the United States, one in which not just Cubans but others in other parts of the world would wonder about the quality of our commitment. The most important lesson is that this is an example of an attempt to do something by so-called covert action which could not be done or would not be done by either diplomacy or direct military action. The substitution of covert action for either of these is not only infeasible but dangerous. The attempt to use covert action because we did not want to use direct military action is based on the fallacy that it could accomplish something that only direct military action could accomplish. I blame this on the myths that had grown out of World War II when we saw the resistance in Europe doing magnificent things, and guerrilla warfare in places like Yugoslavia keeping a whole German Army contained. There, conditions were different. The Yugoslavs had the bulk of the population with them. They had support, and they had food. In Cuba it was exactly the opposite. The lesson that the Americans can learn from this is that it should have either been supported by our forces behind the Cubans or not attempted at all.

The Cuban missile crisis was a direct result of the Bay of Pigs. The Bay of Pigs probably persuaded Khrushchev that we were not determined as far as Cuba was concerned, when we did not follow up and support the Cubans. Consequently, he decided that he could indulge in nuclear blackmail, using Cuba as a base, and perhaps out-bluff this Government.

Almost from the time of the Bay of Pigs, U.S. intelligence reported constantly on the introduction of Russian arms into Cuba. There was reasonable coverage from agents inside Cuba.

There were not many of them, and most of them were spending more time surviving than they were collecting intelligence. The Russian ships were covered at the European narrows and by aerial coverage as they got close to Cuba. The principal problem was finding out what the Soviet freighters carried. The then Director of the CIA, John McCone, in August of 1962 was saying, "They are shipping stuff in there for a reason, and they are not simply shipping it in for the Cuban Armed Forces." Intelligence coverage was intensified. The twice-a-month U-2 flights over Cuba were increased to four in August and then were unlimited in September, permission being granted to fly whenever weather permitted. The weather was bad in September 1962 as it always is in the Caribbean at that time of year.

Intelligence aspects of the missile crisis are excellent examples of a close interrelationship between intelligence and policymaking at the national strategic level. It was a brilliant case of the policymakers using intelligence to its best advantage. The system then as it worked was that the U.S. Intelligence Board met every morning at 7:30 or 8:00, used the 24-hour work of the National Photographic Interpretation Center, the Joint Committee on Atomic Intelligence, and the Joint Committee on Guided Missiles. The U.S. Intelligence Board presented the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency an estimate to take to the meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council at 10 o'clock and then kept them supplied during the meeting of what was going on inside Cuba.

There were two specific estimates which were pertinent. In August, the U.S. Intelligence Board, based upon the facts then available, stated there was then no positive evidence that the Russians would introduce offensive

weapons into Cuba. By the second week in October the positive evidence was there. The aerial photographs over Cuba plus limited ground coverage were sufficient when put together with the Penkovskiy-produced book on Soviet missile forces to prove to the President those scratchings on the ground were indeed the signatures for intermediate-range and medium-range ballistic missile sites. The second estimate was even a more important one. President Kennedy asked the intelligence system "What will the Russians do if I tell them to take the offensive weapons out of Cuba?" The answer that went back was, "If you tell the Russians to take the offensive weapons out of Cuba and if they know that you

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., was educated at Princeton University; he is presently Professor of Political Science at Brown University.

Prior to World War II, Professor Kirkpatrick worked for the U.S. News Publishing Corporation, and during the war he served in the Office of Strategic Services on the staff of Gen. Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group as intelligence briefing officer. At the end of World War II he returned briefly to the U.S. News as editor of *World Report* and then went to the Central Intelligence Agency, where he served in a variety of positions, including Division Chief, Assistant Director, Executive Assistant to the Director, Inspector General, and, from 1962 to 1965, Executive Director. In 1965 he left the Central Intelligence Agency to become Professor of Political Science at Brown University.

For his service in World War II, Professor Kirkpatrick received the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, European Theater Ribbon with five battle stars, and both the French and Belgian Croix de Guerre. In March 1960, Professor Kirkpatrick was chosen by the National Service League as one of the 10 outstanding career officers in the Federal Government.

will take them out if they do not, it is our estimate that they will take them out." The second part of that is by far the most important comment — if they *know* that you will do it. Here is a philosophy that is important — you can not blind the enemy and expect him to act rationally.

This was the last major adventure of Khrushchev testing the United States. There is no question that this was one of the several factors in his downfall. His effort was to simply point the missiles at us and then extract concessions.

One final word on Cuba since the missile crisis. The missile crisis showed Castro that Russia was not willing to risk war over communism in Cuba. Every intelligence report indicated that he was upset by the Russians acting without his concurrence or agreement, but he had little say or influence. Cubans were not allowed on the missile sites. Castro was not consulted on Russian action.

Today Castro's Cuba is rather a

second-rate satellite of the Russians. It is an expensive satellite. While Castro does have some sympathizers today in the rest of Latin America, his early attraction and impact of 1960 are gone. The missile crisis, among other things, convinced the Latins that Russians would not fight for them so it had an impact on Latin American communism. Cuba is a base for training Latin American Communists. There is a steady flow running into a thousand or more a year of Communists in training in Cuba. It is not really an ideal showcase. The economy has steadily declined. While Castro can count on support of the army, the peasants, and the negro population, the early glamor of the revolution is gone. There is no resistance to speak of in Cuba today. The Cuban resistance is mostly in the United States. The Castro revolution has succeeded in capturing Cuba for the Communists. It has also succeeded in turning the "Pearl of the Antilles" to a lusterless stone.



Discipline is willing obedience to attain the greatest good by the greatest number. It means laying aside, for the time being, of ordinary everyday go-as-you-please and do-what-you-like. It means one for all and all for one—teamwork. It means a machine—not of inert metal, but one of living men—an integrated human machine in which each does his part and contributes his full share.

E. J. King: 1878-1956