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Between Two Worlds

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Hohenberg, John. *Between Two Worlds*. New York: Praeger, 1967. 507 p.

The general premise of the study which produced this book was that there is a great need for better communication, and thereby better understanding, between the peoples of Asia and the United States. Furthermore, it was recognized at the outset that the shaping of foreign policy in an open society could be critically affected by the work of all facets of news media. The statement is made that "In the tangled affairs of East, Southeast, and South Asia, in fact, the interaction of journalism and diplomacy was even more marked than elsewhere." It also became apparent that the processes of the independent press and its influences are poorly understood by many government policymakers, and vice versa, and that the subject receives little attention by students of international affairs. Thus, the purpose of the study was to examine and analyze the problem and determine ways and means of improving the situation. The Council on Foreign Relations invited Mr. Hohenberg to conduct the inquiry. On leave from Columbia University in 1963, he had traveled, lectured, and interviewed extensively in Asia under sponsorship of the State Department American Specialist program. This book, then, is the result of the inquiry, including even more extensive travel in Asia in 1964 and further intensive investigation during 1965 and 1966 within the United States. At the outset the author makes a profound observation: "Aside from the technicalities of journalism, the exchange of news (which includes ideas and opinions) between the United States and Asia is a political act." The book is readable, capably organized, and extremely interesting; it has a certain degree of historical value and is of valuable assistance to the student of Asia-oriented international affairs. It could almost be classed as a monumental work on the subject, certainly well documented and

highly detailed. It covers a complete gamut of considerations, both geographically by country and area in Asia and functionally with regard to roles of the U.S. President, Congress, Ambassadors, and press—notably *The New York Times*. Even a look into the future is provided. Although a slight leaning toward sympathy for the problems of the press is detected, the volume itself is considered to be extremely objective and useful to the War College student.

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Kintner, William R. *Peace and the Strategy Conflict*. New York: Praeger, 1967. 264 p.

This interesting, well-written book provides a current appraisal of considerations affecting United States and Soviet strategy. In the foreword Mr. Kintner states:

Isn't there an organic relationship among Soviet Communist revolutionary goals, reiterated Soviet intentions to achieve strategic superiority, and a steadily growing Soviet strategic arsenal? If words have any meaning, there is. Yet those who believe themselves more adept at reading the minds of Soviet leaders regard this view as outside the "mainstream" of realistic thinking.

The author assumes that the Soviets are committed to attainment of their revolutionary goals and that they plan to catch up or surpass the United States in strategic nuclear power. The recently deployed antiballistic missile system, if it proves effective, combined with technological advances leading to more accurate, high-yield weapons, and an aggressive civil defense program, could lead to a significant first-strike advantage. This advantage could make a preemptive strike tempting to the Soviets. Although the United States still maintains strategic superiority, that superiority is waning. The author tells why it is waning and suggests measures to insure that the Soviets do not achieve superi-