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Peace and the Strategy Conflict

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Hohenberg, John. *Between Two Worlds*. New York: Praeger, 1967. 507 p.

The general premise of the study which produced this book was that there is a great need for better communication, and thereby better understanding, between the peoples of Asia and the United States. Furthermore, it was recognized at the outset that the shaping of foreign policy in an open society could be critically affected by the work of all facets of news media. The statement is made that "In the tangled affairs of East, Southeast, and South Asia, in fact, the interaction of journalism and diplomacy was even more marked than elsewhere." It also became apparent that the processes of the independent press and its influences are poorly understood by many government policymakers, and vice versa, and that the subject receives little attention by students of international affairs. Thus, the purpose of the study was to examine and analyze the problem and determine ways and means of improving the situation. The Council on Foreign Relations invited Mr. Hohenberg to conduct the inquiry. On leave from Columbia University in 1963, he had traveled, lectured, and interviewed extensively in Asia under sponsorship of the State Department American Specialist program. This book, then, is the result of the inquiry, including even more extensive travel in Asia in 1964 and further intensive investigation during 1965 and 1966 within the United States. At the outset the author makes a profound observation: "Aside from the technicalities of journalism, the exchange of news (which includes ideas and opinions) between the United States and Asia is a political act." The book is readable, capably organized, and extremely interesting; it has a certain degree of historical value and is of valuable assistance to the student of Asia-oriented international affairs. It could almost be classed as a monumental work on the subject, certainly well documented and

highly detailed. It covers a complete gamut of considerations, both geographically by country and area in Asia and functionally with regard to roles of the U.S. President, Congress, Ambassadors, and press—notably *The New York Times*. Even a look into the future is provided. Although a slight leaning toward sympathy for the problems of the press is detected, the volume itself is considered to be extremely objective and useful to the War College student.

J.E. GODFREY
Captain, U.S. Navy

Kintner, William R. *Peace and the Strategy Conflict*. New York: Praeger, 1967. 264 p.

This interesting, well-written book provides a current appraisal of considerations affecting United States and Soviet strategy. In the foreword Mr. Kintner states:

Isn't there an organic relationship among Soviet Communist revolutionary goals, reiterated Soviet intentions to achieve strategic superiority, and a steadily growing Soviet strategic arsenal? If words have any meaning, there is. Yet those who believe themselves more adept at reading the minds of Soviet leaders regard this view as outside the "mainstream" of realistic thinking.

The author assumes that the Soviets are committed to attainment of their revolutionary goals and that they plan to catch up or surpass the United States in strategic nuclear power. The recently deployed antiballistic missile system, if it proves effective, combined with technological advances leading to more accurate, high-yield weapons, and an aggressive civil defense program, could lead to a significant first-strike advantage. This advantage could make a preemptive strike tempting to the Soviets. Although the United States still maintains strategic superiority, that superiority is waning. The author tells why it is waning and suggests measures to insure that the Soviets do not achieve superi-

ority. *Peace and the Strategy Conflict* is a valuable contribution to the rapidly growing amount of material available on modern strategy. It is rewarding reading and is recommended to those who are interested in broadening their understanding of strategic considerations.

S.L. RITCHIE

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

McCarthy, Eugene J. *The Limits of Power*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967. 246 p.

Senator McCarthy's thesis is largely indicated in his title: the United States, though the greatest power in the world, is not omnipotent; hence, the idea of being "responsible" for almost everything that goes on in the world is a dangerous illusion. This summary statement reveals that Senator McCarthy stands, with Senator Fulbright and others, as a critic of the "abuse of power" by recent U.S. Administrations, but especially that of President Johnson. McCarthy both analyzes what he believes to be specific forms of "abuse" and briefly prescribes alternative uses of American power. The book contains 10 chapters. Chapters I-IV include a summary of the need to reappraise our responsibilities; a critique of the sense of power held by Acheson, Dulles, and Rusk; and a caustic dissection of the U.S. military assistance program and the operational aspect of the Central Intelligence Agency. Chapters V-X contain analyses of the main problems in, and suggestions for American policy toward, major parts of the world: Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. McCarthy's book is of curiously mixed quality. Some portions of it read like a primer on U.S. foreign policy and are of no interest whatever to anyone who has some acquaintance with the subject. Also, there is a curious disproportion of treatment: there is a whole chapter on the United States trust territory of Micronesia, equal in length to the chap-

ter on Europe! On the other hand, the chapters on the Military Assistance Program and on the Central Intelligence Agency reveal careful work and are well worth reading. Finally, as a document to reveal the thoughts of a "maybe" contender for the Presidency, the book is of modest interest.

R.H. COX

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Perkins, Dexter *The Diplomacy of a New Age*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967. 190 p.

The subtitle of this very readable little book is *Major Issues in the U.S. Policy since 1945*, and it seems more descriptive of the author's work than the main title, at least to this reviewer. Professor Perkins begins his study with an analysis of the gradual deterioration of United States postwar relations with the Soviet Union, describing the principal events that contributed to the end of the wartime unity. But the root causes, the author suggests, were the divergence of views in the ideological sphere between Washington and Moscow, the fact that what Russia held she intended to keep, and Russia's hopes for the collapse of Europe. From this foundation, Dr. Perkins deals with the major responses of the United States to Russia and the threat of communism in successive chapters devoted to the Marshall Plan, (self-interest, but *enlightened* self-interest); the North Atlantic Pact ("NATO is one of the many auguries of a more integrated Western society"); United States policy in the Far East (it "rests to a substantial degree on emotional grounds"); United States policy in Latin America ("we must take account of the forces that divide as well as the forces that unite, and that make the threat of subversion something to reckon with"). In his concluding chapter, "Today," the author asks how American power has been used. He rejects the charge of "arrogance." The dignity of