1968

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Recommended Citation

McGovern, Thomas E. Jr. (1968) "An Analysis of War," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 21 : No. 5 , Article 6.
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
AN ANALYSIS OF WAR

by

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Correspondence School

(This article is excerpted from a correspondence course solution submitted by Lt. Comdr. Thomas E. McGovern, Jr., U.S. Naval Reserve, who is a student in the Naval War College Correspondence Course, *International Relations.* Lieutenant Commander McGovern has taken a series of questions from this course in combination in order to produce a highly professional analysis of a subject of paramount interest: war. His originality, initiative, comprehensive treatment, and scholarly approach illustrate clearly both the broad scope of the course and the flexibility and knowledge that can be demonstrated by an astute student. He is to be commended for the excellence of his contribution. Ed.)

FOREWORD

Acts of violence—Whether on a large or a small scale, the bitter paradox: the meaningfulness of death—and the meaninglessness of killing.[1]

The paradox so deeply felt by the late Secretary-General of the United Nations was nowhere better illustrated than in his own life. Possessed of an intellectual and spiritual introspection bordering on mysticism, guided by a degree of moral certitude whose demands were more stringent on himself than upon those around him, he nonetheless chose to play out his role in the

arena of public service as a source of temporal fulfillment, in a drama whose essential ingredients included political compromise, the pragmatic quid pro quo, and the various techniques associated with the harsh reality of keeping the international community of nations from each other's throats. For if Dag Hammarskjold could be deeply moved by the absurdity of violence, as he was in 1955, he could also write, in the same year, that

> In our era, the road to holiness necessarily passes through the world of action.[2]

To a great degree, Dag Hammarskjold's observations of his personal crises, albeit at times almost eschatological, are a reflection of the concern felt by many on the question of violence and the human condition. This concern has historically been translated into inquiry into the nature and control of violence from a variety of approaches and points of view with a correspondingly variable degree of success. One has only to scan the list of authors suggested as a supplement to this installment to observe that this problem has the effect of a lodestone on the efforts of the historian, political scientist, political economist, professional diplomat, psychoanalytic sociologist, as well as the civilian and military strategist, to name but a few. Beyond these there have been attempts to bring to bear on the problem a synthesis of several disciplines, most notably in our time by Quincy Wright. Moreover, the nature of the problem itself constantly defies analysis due to its own dynamism influenced by a multiplicity of factors as varied as are the attempts to grapple with it. The advent of nuclear weaponry and the growth of insurgency as a means to effect volatile political change are but two rather obvious illustrations of this point. The mercurial nature of the problem thus lays something of a burden on the student of international relations, particularly in methodology. I

have therefore chosen to preface my submission with this Foreword, outlining in general my areas of discussion as well as areas of exclusion.

Professor Hartmann has plowed his initial furrow in this field by suggesting that the general causes of war fall into two areas: the simple, or unifactor, and the complex, or multifactor.[3] He offers several examples of the former, including the will to power, and an important instance of the latter, the consummation of national interests.[4] It may be argued that setting out to analyze the causes of war prior to attempting a definition of the concept of war itself is a bit premature. But I would submit that any definition falls within the areas of the unifactor or multifactor considerations described above. Several commentators on this subject have approached this problem of definition from the legal point of view. Professor McDougal has stated,

> [War] is rather a legalistic term to describe certain consequences of intense coercion between states on certain types of problems.[5]

The purely legal definition suggests a qualitative status change between a condition of peace and one of war, as it does between a condition of war and lesser manifestations of violence. It could, in theory, be the outgrowth of either the simple or complex causes suggested by Hartmann. It could, in theory, be either rationally or irrationally based, thereby bringing into focus the concepts of will to power or national interest and suggesting to the student the necessity of considering the problem of war as a reasonable or unreasonable undertaking. This inevitably involves discussion as to whether war and, more generally, acts of violence are fundamental to human nature, as was suggested by Hobbes.

> Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called

War; and such a war as is of every man, against every man.[6]

To accomplish this task satisfactorily, I have chosen to consider the entire range of questions included in the first exercise of this installment in a single presentation. The theoretical implications suggested above will be developed in sections titled "War and Reason" and "War and Unreason." A section on the "Nature of War" will deal with the impact of technology on the conduct of war and, more specifically, the areas of inquiry developed in respect to the place of nuclear weaponry. The sections "War and the Balance of Power" and "The Control of War" will deal with the principle and historical development of the balance of power and the problem of arms control and disarmament respectively. Finally, some observations on the role of intelligence in relation to the other areas of inquiry will be presented, to the extent practicable. I have chosen to do this because of the lack of attention given to the subject, particularly by Professors Hartmann and Stoessinger.

A word as to areas of exclusion. One of the more systematic approaches to the problem of war and its control as evidenced by much of the suggested reading has been legally oriented. While reference will be made to this approach as applicable, it is my belief that fuller development of this approach is more appropriate to the next installment, particularly with regard to removal of threats to peace and control of aggression.

Similarly, it is my belief that a detailed consideration of the Communist view of war and violence is more proper to a later installment. To a certain degree it must be developed herein since an overall view of the Communist approach to international political change is necessary to an understanding of post-1945 dialogs in disarmament and arms control. But the specifics of this problem form an important part of the premise of a later installment. This is particularly true of Lenin's contributions, notably in his "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination" written in 1914, and Mao's synthesis of the principles of guerrilla warfare, as further refined by Che Guevara and Vo Nguyen Giap. The Communist view of war and violence will not be neglected in this installment, but a full development will be deferred.

On the questions of insurgency and the disarmament problem, I must acknowledge at the outset my debt to the *Naval War College Review* for providing the papers written by Lt. Comdr. Compton E. Ward, USN, and Comdr. Raymond G. Burkemper, USN, in the September and November 1967 issues, respectively. These are first-rate pieces of analytical and historical scholarship in the opinion of this writer, and while not all their conclusions are wholly acceptable, the comprehensiveness of their work in these areas has proven extremely valuable and will be so noted.

On the question of seapower I have not had available the recently published *Soviet Naval Strategy*,[7] by Comdr. Robert W. Herrick, USN (Ret.) at the time this paper was being prepared. Having served with Commander Herrick approximately 10 years ago, and having developed at that time a high degree of respect for his scholarship and analysis, I am hopeful of utilizing this volume in subsequent installments. I have made use of the excellent research paper "Communist Party Control in the Soviet Navy," by Comdr. Richard W. Bates, USN, *Naval War College Review* (October 1967), which, I would assume, covers a portion of the subject.

It might be noted, in conclusion, that I have indicated a preference for the military professional as opposed to the civilian analyst in certain technical areas. This approach runs counter to the rationale of some commentators who make a persuasive case for the civilian strategic contribution, due to an as-

sumed greater objectivity and lack of involvement in day-to-day administrative tasks.[8] Herman Kahn has stated,

> If we treat all questions of the deterrence and fighting of war as a subject to be entrusted solely to those in uniform we should not be surprised if we get narrow policies. The deterring and fighting of a thermonuclear war certainly needs specialists in and out of uniform; but it involves all of us and every aspect of our society.[9]

True enough. But in my opinion there is another consideration which takes precedence. As in many civilian organizations possessed of organizational/administrative characteristics and requiring leadership and decisionmaking capacity, the military establishment has need of the type of contribution suggested by Herman Kahn. Yet the function of such contribution is, indeed, has to be, consultative and supplementary. The assumptions underlying the mission of an institution like the Naval War College are to make available to a degree the time and the atmosphere of objectivity inherent in the "think tank" to those whose particular talents lie in the areas of administrative competence, decisionmaking, and leadership. The result, in this writer's opinion, reflects a fusion of both; detachment and freedom of inquiry coupled with the prudence and experience of command and decisionmaking. While Professor "X" may write the thicker book, have the greater number of footnotes, consult more sources in their original language and frame of reference, there must of necessity be missing the ingredients of decisionmaking and followup. It is for this reason, (and admittedly it is purely personal), that the excellence of the contributions cited above is appreciated as well as the format within which they are made available to other students.

WAR AND REASON

There is no such thing as an inevitable conflict between states. There is

nothing in the nature of the state that, given a multiplicity of states, should make the gain of the one the loss of the other. The more perfectly each one of them attains its proper object of giving free scope to the capacities of all persons living on a certain range of territory, the easier it is for others to do so; and in proportion as they all do so the danger of conflict disappears.[10]

Wherefore, if a man, who is led by reason, has sometimes to do by the commonwealth's order what he knows to be repugnant to reason, that harm is far compensated by the good, which he derives from the existence of a civil state. For it is reason's own law to choose the less of two evils; and accordingly we may conclude that no one is acting against the dictate of his own reason, so far as he does what by the law of the commonwealth is to be done.[11]

The above quotations from T.H. Green and Spinoza at first glance appear to be strange bedfellows. The first is a somewhat nostalgic reminder that the development of classical liberalism had reached a rather overripe state by the mid-Victorian period in England; yet a development not really out of place in an age of scientific and intellectual achievement of vast proportions. This idealistic exercise in right reason, while emanating from the intellectual climate of Darwin, Huxley, Freud, and Marx, was within the general framework of intense intellectual activity characteristic of this free-swinging epoch. The latter quote strikes one as having a more "modern" tone, albeit written in an earlier period, for it contains a concept of human perfectibility inherent in both pragmatic liberal democracy and classical Communist theory. It ascribes to man the ability to create a reason (or rational polity) greater than the sum of its individual contributions which by extension could eventually exercise a "sovereignty" of totally Hobbesian proportions. I think this comparison of certain philosophical similarities between the two systems is germane to the establishment of a rational framework

of analysis for the causes of war from the national interest point of view, since, as Professor Hartmann has suggested, it is as important to consider a state's attitude toward the factors comprising national interest as the factors themselves.

> For the national-interest approach not only makes it convenient and clear to distinguish for any given war (provided enough facts are known) the causes of conflict. At the same time, through the process of analysis itself, it leads to the vital realization that it is not the economic, or historical, or psychological factors in the dispute alone that cause the war. Rather, these formed the stuff of dissension between the states in conflict because of *the attitude toward those factors taken by those states*—namely, *their view* of their national interests.[12]

Beyond this it affords the student the chance to determine to a degree the rational content of the assumptions influencing the attitudes as well as the factors themselves. This is particularly true when one considers the dilemma resulting from too strict an application of the purely rational approach. If, for instance, Hitler's basic assumptions contained in *Mein Kampf* concerning *lebensraum*, the destruction of France, racist superiority, et cetera are accepted at face value, their subsequent translation into policy after 1933 may be construed as quite rational.[13] That it is or is not must therefore depend on substantive value judgments of the underlying assumptions themselves. Bearing this in mind, the concept of human perfectibility which is basic in Western liberal theory (the application of reason to collective political organization) as well as classical Marxism (the application of the ascending dialectic) is not limited to a single race or ethnic group as it is in pure National Socialism. From this point of view it is somewhat easier to establish the qualitative differences in the respective set of assumptions of liberalism-Marxism and National Socialism. In the abstract sense it also allows the student to begin to establish a rational framework within which to set liberal and Communist theory vis-a-vis the concept of war as the extension of national interests.

It should be stressed that the similarity in classical liberal and classical Marxist thought concerning human perfectibility is to be very strictly construed. As I have stated in a previous installment, the development of totalitarian ideology, particularly as an overlay to classical Marxism, constitutes a fundamental assault on the premise of rational political conduct, and while this development is in large measure due to the availability and use of modern technological tools of constraint and indoctrination, there are certain philosophical strains which antedate these essentially modern developments. Particularly in the political thought of Plato and Hobbes, there can be found striking examples of ideas which have been functionally developed in totalitarian societies. For instance, the continuing emphasis placed by Lenin on the importance of a separate elite, developed apart from the working class, which would infuse that class with "truth" (in this case, socialist "consciousness"),[14] and would preserve an undiluted ideology is not unlike the Nocturnal Council of Plato's *Laws* which would serve as the " . . . anchor of the state."[15] and likewise would preserve ideological purity. Similarly there can be found in Plato the technique of purge whereby the intellectually homogeneous assembly would dishonor the young men of the city " . . . above the rest"[16] if they failed to succeed, a technique which has a familiar ring. With Hobbes, the affinity for absolutism is obvious. Beginning his analysis of man with a conception of natural life as being " . . . solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short,"[17] Hobbes gave comprehensive treatment to the denial of reason in the following

manner. For Hobbes, the intensely competitive aspects of contemporary society were evidence of deeply rooted drives which were being constrained only by civil law. These furnished Hobbes with clues as to the nature of prepolitical society. Unlike Plato's state of nature,[18] an idyllic world which collapsed due to God's displeasure and man's imperfection, Hobbes' state of nature was one in which those barbarous instincts now controlled by the state had had free reign. To preserve his life, man agreed to associate himself with others, giving up all his rights to an impartial sovereign who would administer the law without being subject to it.

> The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Foreigners, and the injuries of one another . . . is to confer all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills . . . unto one Will . . . . . This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a real Unity of them All. . . .[19]

It is quite obvious that in this analysis, as in Plato's reference to democratic man as " . . . pedestrian animals which are without horns,"[20] the basic rationality of man is denied. For if men were reasonable to the point of living in harmony with one another, the need for extensive constraint by the sovereign would be minimized. But harmony of interest cannot be achieved by rational consent if men are not basically rational. Since they are not and seek only to insure their security at the expense of one another,[21] and not in rational consultation, the need for absolute control from without becomes clear.

The acceptance or rejection of this rational premise is crucial to any analysis of assumptions underlying the national interests or, more specifically, the causes of conflict arising out of national interests. If the definition of national interest supplied in the first installment ("the general and continuing ends for which a state acts")[22] is acceptable, as

well as the supporting definition of national interests (" . . . what the decisionmaking group in a government determines is important to the maintenance of the state"),[23] then the association between factors and attitudes becomes apparent. Very generally speaking, a rational state may be expected to pursue its national interest and interests in a rational manner. However, in the event of conflict between individual reason or conscience, and the collective interest, it has been characteristic of Western liberal democracies to reject in part Spinoza's concept of the exclusive role of collective reason. If, as Spinoza suggests, no one acts against his reason in following the collective reason, then he who chooses not to follow collective reason acts irrationally. Yet, in most liberal constitutions this right of dissent is part of the rational fabric of the state, just as in most totalitarian societies it is significantly omitted. If dissent generates necessary strength, it gains the power of government through the electoral process. Thus the electoral process guarantees, over the long term, a continuation, philosophically, of the rational pursuit of national interest if the underlying rational premise is acceptable.

The rational pursuit of national interest and supporting concepts of principles and objectives also assumes the timely establishment of priorities.[24] Examples of principles in United States foreign policy are the sovereign equality of nations, peaceful settlement of disputes, nonintervention, international order based on justice, and concern for the common good.[25] As I suggested in the first installment, the prudence of insisting on nonintervention as a continuing guide to action has not dismissed the concept of intervention as a useful one in support of the national interest. We may consider the United States intervention in Lebanon in 1958 as an example of the concepts of sovereign equality of nations and inter-

national order based on justice being given precedence over the concept of nonintervention. Similarly, Russia's historical long-term interest in securing warm-water ports did not prevent her from attempting to neutralize Turkey prior to the outbreak of World War I rather than to exacerbate tensions which might conceivably have been more to her advantage in securing this goal. Other considerations were given greater priority at the time.[26]

It becomes clear that even in those instances when the national interest (or interests) of a state, the underlying assumptions, and the attitudes of those in power can all be analyzed with regard to their respective rational content, a new factor is introduced when circumstances demand the establishment of priorities. Further difficulties arise when the choices take on, to a greater degree, rhetorical or emotional connotations. Kennan suggests this in his treatment of the Spanish-American War.[27] The crux of the problem of territorial expansion was whether the United States was to depart from its historical policy of expanding to increase its size, or to extend its control over a sizable population with " . . . no wide anticipation that they would ever be accepted into statehood."[28] The constitutional and legal arguments for and against became overlaid with the rhetoric of manifest destiny and moral duty. The current conflict in Vietnam has developed highly emotional overtones, revolving to a large degree around definitions of civil war and insurgency. It therefore becomes necessary to examine the basis of nonrational factors in determination of national interests and to comment briefly on their interaction and influence on the rational factor.

WAR AND UNREASON

The fact that opinions rather than conditions induce political action, the ease with which opinion can be manipulated by special interests, and the presence of irrational drives of adventure, persecution, escape, and cruelty account for the usual irrationality of war and for the relatively slight correlation of its occurrence with any definable population or economic changes. The tendency for individuals to concentrate their loyalties upon a concrete group and to concentrate their aggressive dispositions upon an external group makes it possible that an incident in the relations of the two groups will acquire a symbolic significance and stimulate mass reactions which may produce war.[29]

The techniques available in the modern era for the manipulation and persuasion of public opinion have come under close scrutiny by students of war and allied fields. In commenting upon this writer's observation in the first installment of the importance of media in making available a mass of information to national populations, the reviewing officer speculated on the increasing influence of the lay citizenry in foreign policy formulation resulting from this trend. In relation to the rational environment suggested in the preceding section, this trend is both possible and desirable. But Professor Wright casts a skeptical eye at the positive contribution of public opinion under certain conditions where, in his opinion, the effect of media comes closer to indoctrination than enlightenment. While the media instruments themselves are amoral, their use opens up an area of critical inquiry appropriate to the subject at hand. Beyond this, Professor Wright's contention that opinion can be manipulated with "ease" forces one into a deeper investigation of the underlying "Why?"

Certainly one reason is the wholesale assault on the rational basis for political conduct which the 19th century generated. Certainly the most fundamental of these assaults was the Freudian concept of man's nature. Far from being rational, Freud's individual was grounded in a vast reservoir of unconsciousness, the "id." Because the id as Freud

conceived it was fixed and unchanging in any cultural context, it was a concept fundamentally opposed to the liberal idea of human perfectibility. The conflicts in human nature came into play when that portion of the id which came into contact with the outer environment, the "ego," was repressed by the mores of the culture, the socially conditioned conscience for transmitting culture, the "superego."[30] Thus the fundamental quality of mankind was not the pursuit of right reason but the gratification of the impulses of sex, hunger, and self-preservation. Freud's concept was pessimistic like Hobbes' and was destined to have far greater effect on our time.

The application of Freudian principles in the social sphere (as opposed to the individual) brings one somewhat closer to an appreciation of the factors inherent in mass manipulation. Vilfredo Pareto formed a direct link with Freud since his concepts were closely associated with Freud's, only applied to a larger entity.[31] Freud's "id" became Pareto's "residue," the basic drive in social conduct, a static force common to all cultures. The formulations which residues took in different social actions were called "derivations." Pareto's theory of history was closely allied with these concepts. He saw life in terms of "ins" and "outs," elites and masses, and history was a cyclical rise and fall of elites. Elites, too, fall prey to certain residues which Pareto called the instinct for combinations (not unlike a balance of power grouping for the achievement of ends) and the instinct for group persistence (read self-preservation). While these instincts should be in balance, frequently they are not; especially when an elite becomes entrenched in power, it relies more on the former with its nonviolent negotiative characteristics, leaving group persistence more and more in the hands of the masses. The result is revolution and the emergence of a new elite.

If the above assumptions are acceptable, then it becomes necessary for national leadership to mold public opinion by other means than rational discourse. Here there come into play a variety of concepts which sociologists have usefully gathered under the heading of myths and symbols. The usefulness of myth has been recognized as far back as Plato's reliance on the "royal lie."

> The story of armed men springing up after the sowing of teeth, which the legislator may take as a proof that he can persuade the minds of the young of anything; so that he has only to reflect and find out what belief will be of the greatest public advantage, and then use all his efforts to make the community utter one and the same word in their songs and tales and discourses all their life long.[32]

The importance attached by Freud to the symbol and myth content in dreams, particularly in relation to the father complex,[33] was carried over into the larger framework by Pareto and others. Thus the "myth" of leadership is an extension of the father image. The psychoanalytic approach to the charisma of leadership is usually grounded upon this concept. The personal sense of loss experienced by many at the death of President Roosevelt and, more recently, by the assassination of President Kennedy can be approached from this point of view if one is so inclined. Moreover, this approach can shed light on several of the theories of war advanced by Professor Hartmann as simple or unifactor. Particular reference is made here to the theory advanced by the Nye Committee of the U.S. Senate which Charles Beard characterized as the "devil theory."[34] Here the theory was advanced that if the guilt of those who had profited from the death of Americans in war (e.g. munitions makers and international bankers) was established, then, by controlling such groups, the likelihood of further shedding of American blood would be-

come remote. Erich Fromm has commented on this approach.

> Another pathological mechanism which threatens realistic and effective political thinking is that of *projection*. Everyone is familiar with this mechanism in its cruder forms when it appears in individual cases. Everybody knows the hostile and destructive person who accuses everyone else of being hostile and pictures himself as being innocent and victimized. ... What is the result? The enemy appears as the embodiment of all evil because all evil that I feel in myself is projected on to him. Logically, after this has happened, I consider myself as the embodiment of all good since the evil has been transferred to the other side. The result is indignation and hatred against the enemy and uncritical, narcissistic self-glorification. This can create a mood of common mania and shared passion of hate. Nevertheless, it is pathological thinking, dangerous when it leads to war and deadly when war means destruction.[35]

Beyond serving as a useful tool in analyzing the less sophisticated theories of war, the contributions of "irrationalists" can be employed to explore what has been defined as undefinable: the will to power as a cause of war. Professor Hartmann states that problems of analysis occur because the concept of will to power does not lend itself to any further analysis. It is what it is. Period.[36] Yet if will to power is basic, it is not necessarily undefinable. If it is a prime factor in the outbreak of aggression it might conceivably be useful to approach the problem with an eye toward psychoanalytic sublimation[37] as a factor in the approach. This is by no means offered as a solution but merely as a possible avenue of further refinement, rather than just stopping dead end. Additionally, the background of irrational thought offers insights into the techniques of persuasion which Quincy Wright considers under the headings of "war propaganda" and "peace propaganda,"[38] and which will be developed in subsequent sections. The use of techniques of persuasion to create an atmosphere favorable to the implementation of a particular policy, especially when such policy approaches the total mobilization of resources, would seem to suggest that both the rational and irrational factors involved be given serious consideration and be incorporated in whole or in part into the policy of persuasion as the situation demands.

The influence of irrational thought has tended to be discounted in some quarters as an important consideration in the fields of domestic and international political action. Much of this criticism has been philosophical; e.g., the contention that by choosing the rational scientific approach to explain the fundamentally nonrational nature of man, the "irrationalists" have in fact conceived the most powerful application of reason: the ability to comprehend its own antithesis, unreason. While this may be intellectually titillating, its value is somewhat limited in reflecting on the problem of war and related areas. Assuming the idea to be valid (for the sake of argument), comprehension does not necessarily imply control, although it may well be a step in that direction. The understanding of his psychosis by the patient does not *ipso facto* guarantee that he is "cured." And it is the idea of control perhaps even more than understanding which threads its way through the problems of war which are about to be discussed.

NATURE OF WAR

> For the present, the most plausible explanation of the cause of war is war itself—or, rather, the expectation of war. This is another way of saying that wars occur because nothing exists to prevent them. Since the international system is in essence anarchic, states are forced to consider the possibility of war and prepare themselves for it. Through these preparations—such as arms races and military alliances—tensions increase until what is feared is actually brought about.[39]

Heretofore we have tried to suggest that certain avenues of inquiry into areas of rational and irrational behavior could be useful as a point of departure for further consideration of the causes of war. In so doing it has begun to become apparent that the "simple" causes may, in fact, be a synthesis of a number of factors, rational and irrational. Professor Hartmann has recognized this where, in further refining his concepts of will to power and national interest, he states that the will to power may be " . . . the will or desire to see the national interests achieved or consummated."40 To a degree, Professor Stoessinger implies this in the introductory quotation. The consideration of the possibility of war within the "anarchic" framework of the international state system can be seen as a manifestation of both these concepts. The decision of one state to initiate aggression and another to defend, or of one state to begin to arm and another to respond reflects not only the national interest of each, but also the respective attitudes of leadership toward their interests and the methods of achieving them. It opens an avenue of inquiry into why states have gone to war to secure additional real estate, or to "right a wrong," or as a matter of "principle," or to redress an "insult."

Quincy Wright in his approach to the problem touches on interpretive difficulties by stating that the interpretation of the situation rather than the factor itself is usually the more important causal factor in war and, further, that the theory which maintains that war is necessary to preserve political power is "relatively close to the facts."41 Wright feels that the conditions whereby these developments become sharply accelerated are brought on by a "political lag," that is, a situation wherein necessary political and legal changes lag behind the economic and cultural changes arising from technological change.42 The element of time becomes important.

> War tends to increase both in frequency and severity in times of rapid technological and cultural change because adjustment, which always involves habituation, is a function of time. The shorter the time within which such adjustments have to be made, the greater the probability that they will prove inadequate and that violence will result. War can, therefore, be attributed either to the intelligence of man manifested in his inventions which increase the number of contacts and the speed of change, or to the unintelligence of man which retards his perception of the instruments of regulation and adjustment necessary to prevent these contacts and changes from generating serious conflicts. Peace might be kept by retarding progress so that there will be time for gradual adjustment by natural processes of accommodation and assimilation, or peace might be kept by accelerating progress through planned adjustments and new controls. Actually both methods have been tried, the latter especially within the state, and the former especially in international relations.43

An ideal epoch against which to test this approach would seem to be the 19th century. The extent of technological innovation (and in the technology of war more especially) was immense.44 The industrial revolution produced revolutions in land and sea warfare. The use of railroads for military purposes produced an increase in troop and logistic mobility. Breech-loading, rifled weapons came into wide use, causing a revolution in land tactics. The introduction of steam propulsion into naval warfare was similarly fundamental, as was the introduction of the ironclad, albeit some features had been developed in earlier eras.45 Bringing the century forward a bit, up to the outbreak of World War I, we may consider the submarine as a part of this development and possibly even the airplane. The effectiveness of submarine warfare in the period immediately following the outbreak of war forced Allied reliance on escorted con-

voys, a principle which had fallen into disuse after the Napoleonic Wars although Mahan had drawn the proper conclusions from the lessons of history as early as 1890.[46]

In the cultural development of the century, the individuals mentioned in prior sections contributed to the revolution of thought. Of these, the effect of Marx's thought perhaps is most directly applicable to the "political lag" described by Wright. The impact of early communism caused widespread attempts at political upheaval for the most part concentrated in the year 1848 but also occurring sporadically thereafter. Early Marxism greatly influenced, and was in turn influenced by, the French syndicalists whose preeminent weapon was the general strike.

And yet, there emerges a paradox. Wright's index of battle frequency which shows a constant increase from the 12th century onward shows an exceptionally low figure for the 19th century.[47] By all odds this should not be. For, together with the examples cited above, there were instances where various commercial interests were beginning to create spheres of influence, coming into abrasive contact with one another as foreign trade expanded.[48] Also it may be pertinent to note that no major European power voluntarily modified its political structure during this time to accommodate the forces creating the "political lag." The monarchies of the great powers were essentially conservative in political outlook, a statement valid even for France which occasionally traded monarchy for republic during the era.

I would suggest that one resolution to this paradox could be offered by reference to a principle which both Wright and Stoessinger consider a fundamental failure, and Hartmann considers a fundamental success: the balance of power. Full consideration will be given to this concept and its historical development in the succeeding section; suffice it to say that I do not consider it merely coincidental that during the period when military technology, according to Bernard Brodie,[49] was changing at an unparalleled rate, the balance of power was being most successfully operated. For if this period was one of great unrest and upheaval, technological as well as cultural, it was also the period of un-war. I will leave all the implications arising from this, save one, for succeeding pages, the one being that it might be more profitable to consider the balance of power in Professor Hartmann's context, that is, the combinations of conditions and circumstances contributing to its successful operation, rather than passing it off as unsound and unworkable in the modern era.[50]

Nonetheless, consideration of the "political lag" concept does allow for further analysis of the causes of war along divers roads. Wright has observed that war has technological, legal, sociological as well as psychological implications, each with a different set of assumptions.[51] Each of these sets of assumptions, I would submit, is not as useful considered separately as in consort. For instance, Wright's "technological" assumption conceives of war as a violent encounter of powers each of which has expansive tendencies, and each of which is defined in mechanistic, physical terms. The "legal" assumption presumes that war is a consequence of a situation in which legal sanctions are unable to maintain an accepted system of law. The "sociological" set of assumptions construes war as a form of social conflict occurring spontaneously from group behavior patterns. The "psychological" approach views war as between masses of individuals, each of whom is a distinct personality and upon whom rests the social, legal, and political superstructure. I think it is fair to say, from the point of view of those whose specialties are in the fields of political leadership and mobilization of

resources during periods of tension, that war is at least all of these assumptions. Herein also lies a relationship to the sources of national power explored in Installment One. The qualitative or human factors described by Macridis[52] are surely influenced by the sociological and psychological assumptions listed above and, to a degree, by the legal assumptions. The technological assumptions, from the viewpoint of the intelligence estimate constructed in Installment One, influence and are influenced by the "hardware" and related factors of the previous installment. Thus, to dwell on these factors is by no means purely speculative or superfluous.

The implications contained in the "sociological" set of assumptions should be commented upon briefly prior to passing on to a consideration of the more modern aspects of war. Wright stresses that in this approach there is a mutual recognition by opponents that they must have something in common to initiate or respond to a war.[53] This idea of common ground forms a connecting link between the theories previously described and what could be called an evolutionary or organic theory of war. The idea of conflict among equals is the touchstone of Von Clausewitz's assertion that war is nothing more than a magnified duel.[54] Hobbes gave a more detailed treatment while embodying the same idea of equality between participants.

> From this equality of ability, arises equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore, if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only), endeavor to destroy or subdue one another. And hence it comes to pass, that where an invader has no more to fear, than another man's single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to

dispossess and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labor, but also of his life, or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger of another.[55]

Wright has developed some of the manifestations of war in a similar fashion progressing from battle to campaign to war, although it should be pointed out that, in the latter, he believes that the unity of a war derives more from the legal and political aspects than from the purely military.[56] Nevertheless, the evolutionary concept is present again in his analysis of the way in which statesmen must view certain problems of a continuing nature, namely, (1) the aggressive state; (2) the international feud; (3) the world crisis; and (4) the incipient war.[57] While these problems do occupy the efforts of statesmen, the nature of modern aggression has rendered obscure the lines of demarcation if in fact they ever did exist. For example, in light of the current development of polycentrism and the Sino-Soviet split, a situation could arise wherein a state becomes aggressive by instituting a policy of insurgency, during which time an "international feud" may be continuing between the superpowers and, (depending upon one's belief in the lack of unity in the Communist bloc), the two developments may not be directly connected. The upgrading of insurgency as a major instrument of political change in recent years has modified the evolutionary approach, particularly when viewed within the content of nuclear deterrence. If the premise of mutual destruction remains as firmly entrenched as it appears to be now in international thinking, the usefulness and frequency of insurgency will continue to increase. Other forces tending to create a high instability factor both within and without a state[58] can only enhance this development.

As warfare has developed technologically, certain characteristics have become apparent as the 20th century has

progressed. Apart from the changes wrought by the industrial revolution and invention, there have been noted a gradual increase in the size of forces, a tendency toward militarization of the population and nationalization of the war effort, a preoccupation with the concept of total war, and an intensification of military operations, itself probably a direct result of the technological considerations.[59] Some of these characteristics have been enhanced by the development of totalitarian ideology, as I suggested in the previous installment. Total mobilization of the material and nonmaterial forces of society is a corollary to the total commitment by the society to its ideology. Ideology is thus a factor in insuring a continuation of this state as well as creating the atmosphere and environment wherein total commitment will thrive. Thus it can be seen that the development of nuclear weaponry occurred at a time when the philosophical and technological seeds of bipolarity had already been sown. Nuclear weaponry, though, augmented this historical development.

Prior to discussing in general terms the effect of nuclear weapons on the characteristics of war suggested above, it might be beneficial to isolate one aspect of the problem, namely, the use of nuclear weapons on population centers if only because it undoubtedly played a major role in the decision to employ the atomic bomb against Japan. The plethora of memoirs by the great and near-great of the time offers a spectrum of conflicting views on the subject. What can be extracted with any degree of certainty is that the decision was made with difficulty by President Truman. Winston Churchill would have otherwise. Recalling the period around 18 July 1945, following the Alamogordo test, he writes,

British consent in principle to the use of the weapon had been given on July 4, before the test had taken place. The final decision now lay in the main with President Truman, who had the weapon; but I never doubted what it would be, nor have I ever doubted since that he was right. The historic fact remains, and must be judged in the after-time, that the decision whether or not to use the atomic bomb to compel the surrender of Japan was never even an issue. There was unanimous, automatic, unquestioned agreement around our table; nor did I ever hear the slightest suggestion that we should do otherwise.[60]

But Churchill's olympian certitude is disputed by others. John J. McCloy, then Assistant Secretary of War, recalled to James V. Forrestal a meeting he had had with President Truman in the summer of 1945, "prior to Potsdam" (17 July), during which the President questioned his military advisers as to the necessity of an invasion of Japan. Assured that it was necessary, the President

. . . left it that they would proceed with the plannings for the invasion of Kyushu but that they were to raise the question with him again before its execution and he would reserve judgment on whether or not the attack should be carried into the Tokyo plan (plain?).[61]

It is quite probable that the President was hedging his bets pending the outcome of the atomic bomb test. But the tenor of the memoirs tends to suggest that the agreement may not have been as automatic or unquestioned as the Prime Minister believed, at least not in the President's mind. In light of military projection of casualties which could be expected in the invasion of the homeland, the President's decision was undoubtedly correct. Beyond this it tends to illustrate that the use of nuclear weapons against population centers has been a basic strategic consideration from the outset of the nuclear age.

In approaching this problem I believe that it is desirable to separate the arguments into those of a general nature and those applicable to specific circumstances. In both, the presumptions of

the effect of the act are the same: large-scale destruction of population and habitation. Concerning those of a general nature, it might be well to relate material from Installment One dealing with the industrial and demographic elements of national power. A population center doubling as an important industrial complex would have to be considered as a highly potential target if the industrial factor in national power is given high priority. Here the definition of "industrial" must be construed broadly if the estimate so dictates, since, in addition to heavy industry and manufacturing, the areas of utilities and power production would also be vital. Assuming the nation in question possessed a high degree of internal mobility which, freely translated, could mean the ability to move available manpower with rapidity, targeting consideration would have to be given to population centers which in turn serve as important transportation areas. In certain cases (viz. New York) the definition would extend to the communications and finance areas if, once again, the estimate so dictates.

The psychological effect of the nuclear destruction of population centers is somewhat more difficult to ascertain since there have been only two historical instances upon which to make an assessment. We know that the Japanese Government rejected the ultimatum of unconditional surrender published on 26 July 1945, that atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima (6 August) and Nagasaki (9 August), the ultimatum was accepted on 10 August with the qualification that the Emperor would remain sovereign, the Allies replied that he would be subject to Supreme Command, Allied Powers, and the terms were accepted by the Japanese on 14 August.[62] What the psychological effect was upon Japanese leadership of the destruction of two cities cannot be entirely gauged, although there is some consensus that it

represented an awesome bit of icing on the cake. The lessons of conventional war are similarly indecisive. The use of air *blitzkrieg* tactics on population centers by Hitler was successful in Holland, unsuccessful in Great Britain and in the latter case undoubtedly stiffened the will to resist. Other examples of conventional occupation and destruction of cities for psychological reasons, e.g., the burning of certain buildings in Washington by British forces in 1814, did not materially affect the outcome of the particular war.[63] In one noteworthy instance, Napoleon's occupation of Moscow and its subsequent burning (accidental or otherwise) in 1812 redounded to the advantage of the Russians.[64] It is difficult to predict, in psychological terms, whether nuclear destruction of population centers would have a salutary or adverse effect.

Until now we have discussed the problem of population destruction from a rather general and one-sided point of view. It can be seen that the assumptions underlying the establishment of these priorities in targeting have rested not only on first-strike capability, but on nuclear weapons monopoly. But the frame of reference changes abruptly when the concepts of deterrence and nuclear parity are introduced. For now we begin to play the Great Chess Game with Herman Kahn, Henry Kissinger, and the other grand masters. Hopefully, this writer will not bow out in the first round by committing the Fool's Gambit.

Herman Kahn has set the premise for nuclear attack on population centers in the following words:

> Massive destruction of people and property is not likely to achieve any immediate or essential military objective. It would be more important militarily, for example, for an attacker to try to destroy forces which can hurt him in immediate retaliation. Most experts agree that, unlike World Wars I and II, any future wars are likely to be short and fought only by military

forces in being. If this be true, populations and production lines are of doubtful value at best as a military mobilization base. Moreover, since the number of usable delivery vehicles—bombers and missiles—may be limited, any vehicles "wasted" on cities will be unavailable for their primary mission of destroying the enemy's retaliatory forces.[65]

This type of attack which Kahn calls the Countervalue Attack, could however result from irrational behavior. It could also, given the equilibrium of nuclear parity, evolve into a rational countervalue strategy which some have suggested would be a meaningful substitution for the concept of massive deterrence. This strategy of controlled reprisal (tit for tat) presumes that the threat of destruction of a particular city is more credible than massive deterrence and, as a result, may be more deterring and less costly.[66] The quid pro quo, as Kahn points out, places enormous political pressures on a leadership which accepts the premise of controlled reprisal since, in return for the possibility of the concept controlling further escalation, the leadership accepts, as a part of the bargain, the certainty of the destruction of one or more of its cities. Beyond this I would suggest that there are strategic difficulties as well. The countervalue strategy is a response to an aggressive act. Assuming the Soviet Union initiates aggression against a U.S. city and the United States initiates controlled reprisal, according to the game plan, the U.S.S.R. would then have another crack before time is called.[67] Applying the pragmatic lessons of negotiation of the past two decades, I would suggest that little agreement between parties over questions of equity or value could possibly be reached. This being so, the likelihood of the game being called at Step Three is remote. The countervalue attack could also be combined with an attack against strategic forces (counterforce), but here the same argument applies that was

noted in Kahn's opening statement: unless one has the necessary overkill capacity, why waste the capability? The counterforce plus bonus attack assumes the necessary capability for achievement of strategic goals, perhaps modestly decreased, with the bonus being a small percentage of the population.[68] Here the probabilities are somewhat strained. The counterforce aspects of the premise are, of course, rationally conceived from the strategic point of view. Some of the countervalue arguments, however, are listed as revenge, malevolence, or "reasons he could not articulate,"[69] and we seem to have moved far enough from the rational premises of counterforce to seriously question whether the same leadership could entertain the second premise having derived the first. We seem to move too far into the country where, in Erich Fromm's words, the possibilities become the realities.[70]

The assumptions of nuclear parity and the avenues which much strategic thought seems to be taking indicate a gradual diminution in the strategic value of population destruction. The psychological value of such destruction is something else again, and the difficulty in ascertaining the importance which respective leadership attaches to this factor does not allow us to dismiss the possibility out of hand.

While strategic thought evolving from the idea of nuclear parity has developed its own special set of rules, it can be seen, I believe, that it tends to augment the process of change emanating principally from technology in the modern characteristics of war, particularly in the area of concentration or intensification of military operation. Modern strategic thinking leans toward a general premise of nuclear attack as being of high intensity and short duration. At the same time, the history of conflict from World War II on has proceeded along different lines. This anomaly was suggested in the first installment by refer-

ence to the strategic thinking of 1950 as
being contrary to the flexible response
supposition of the containment policy.
The premises of controlled conventional
response are not the premises of the
strategy of nuclear parity and begin to
approach them only as the concept of
escalation is introduced. A further diffi-
culty is encountered as the concept of
insurgency is analyzed against the back-
ground of flexible response. Within the
context of Communist insurgency, Lt.
Comdr. Compton Ward has refined the
components of insurgency as primary
and secondary power factors.[71] The
primary factors involve the cadre, the
ideology, and the leadership of the
movement. The secondary factors in-
clude popular support, external support,
sanctuary, and political and military
intelligence. Ward sees military action as
being more effective against the secon-
dary material factors rather than the
primary nonmaterial factors. He cor-
rectly sees the difficulty of destroying
(militarily speaking) the leadership or
the ideology, as he does in suggesting
that military action could be effective in
denying sanctuary, preventing outside
support, and confusing military or po-
litical intelligence.[72] However, he does
create some difficulty by stating that
military activity cannot "destroy a
cadre that has infiltrated the masses"
but can be used to "separate the in-
surgents from their ultimate base of
support—the people."[73] Much of the
discussion concerning U.S. strategy in
Vietnam centers on the pragmatic in-
ability to make this distinction. To
some critics (particularly critics of the
search-and-destroy concept) the infiltra-
tion of cadres has become so inter-
twined with popular support that the
two are synonymous. The analysis of
this particular situation must first con-
cern itself with a determination of the
basis of the support which the cadre
enjoys (i.e., whether motivated by
terror or persuasion or a combination of
both) after which the consideration of

the cadres as a primary or secondary
force (or what is more likely, a com-
bination of both) may be more easily
made.[74]

I think it is important to stress the
association between insurgency and nu-
clear parity since both are in a sense
developments of nuclear weaponry, the
latter directly, the former from the
premise of nonuse of such weaponry via
the catalyst of ideology. It is particu-
larly important when considering the
concept of seapower.[75] I would suggest
that the overall thrust of U.S. naval
doctrine since the advent of nuclear
weaponry has been more toward a
response to a combination of these two
developments than not. Several reasons
for this approach can be suggested. The
U.S. Navy is unique among services in
its possession of land, sea, and air
warmaking capabilities. It has had, as a
result, the wherewithal to develop a
doctrine of multifunctional, multilevel
capabilities. This is perhaps too obvious
a statement to warrant inclusion here.
But I think it is useful to consider the
nature of certain interservice conflicts
against such a background. The most
sensational of these took place during
the tenure of Secretary of Defense
Louis Johnson, as a result of the cancel-
lation of construction of the carrier
United States. Admiral Radford indi-
cated a preference for a concept of war
which was more multifaceted than the
concepts of some of his associates in
subsequent Congressional hearings.

> . . . future war will extend far beyond
> the province of the military. In plan-
> ning to wage a war . . . we must look to
> the peace to follow . . . . A war of
> annihilation might possibly bring a
> Pyrrhic military victory, but it would
> be politically and economically sense-
> less . . . . The results of two World Wars
> have demonstrated the fact that
> victory in war is not an end in itself.[76]

Kissinger later considers this not so
much a doctrinal breach with the Air
Force but rather a strategic one,
namely, the Navy's assertion that carrier

airpower could perform the same strategic mission better.[77] Anyone familiar with budgetary pie cutting will not dispute the fact that it is an excellent occasion to examine self-preservation in all its naked splendor. But beyond the practical considerations of increasing one's freeboard, so to speak, there remains an underlying thread of multiple response which formed a part of the environment of naval doctrine at the time. Kissinger stresses the need for new doctrine, part of which is the tactical force.[78] General Gavin has recognized the unique nature of limited war.

> . . . limited war in its own way is a highly specialized form of combat, more specialized than general global war. It is as though one were to compare skillful surgery to a killing blow. The first requires special instruments applied with restraint, quickly and accurately, the latter a bludgeon with only one object, complete destruction.[79]

While to some commentators limited response has been something of a new field, I would submit that naval doctrine on this subject can be defined more in the nature of an outgrowth and refinement of tested premises than a significant departure from them. It may be useful to note, too, that while intraservice strategic arguments have cropped up in the Navy, as in the case of carrier air versus Polaris strategic nuclear capability, they have for the most part refined existing concepts of flexibility and mobility (and in the case of Polaris, added the idea of secrecy), rather than relying to a great degree on new doctrinal concepts.

It is of interest to note by way of concluding this section that the concept of intensification of military operations has been influenced by the internal manifestations of rapidity and flexibility of response, the most notable of which is the emphasis on centralized managerial control within the military establishment. In many respects the military services were possessed of great foresight in instituting appropriate action in this direction prior to necessary legislation being enacted. The Navy, for example, recommended an appropriation structure along program and performance lines as early as 1946 and had used other aspects of commercial cost accounting prior to the passage of Title IV in 1949.[80] Air Force work in this field was progressing during World War II, and the Ad Hoc Committee on fiscal organization and functions of the War Department implemented a program of single appropriation, centralized procurement, and centralized fiscal operations.[81] These early instances were given further refinement and application under the present Secretary of Defense within a system whereby the purely technical aspects were combined with more substantive managerial judgments.

WAR AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

The mind occasionally plays a whimsical joke on those of us who are attempting to do a job of critical analysis on one problem or another. I think that this happened to me during my investigation of the source material pertinent to the discussion of balance of power. I kept recalling to mind a figure who had been mentioned only in passing in a Russian literature course I had taken in college some 15 years ago, and whose name escaped me at the moment. And so I dusted off an old notebook, thumbed through it and sure enough, there he was; "Semyon Yakovlevich Nadson (1862-1887)." surely the most minor of all minor poets who had ever lived. My lecture notes indicated that he had died of consumption at the age of 24, was a naive idealist with no imagination or skill, and that his verse, according to one of the great Russian literary critics, Prince Mirsky, represented the nadir of Russian poetry. A marginal note, undoubtedly my own observation of the time, read "born

loser." There followed a translation of
some of his verse.

> "Tell me not that he is dead—for yet
>   he lives;
> What if the altar's razed—the flame
>   still flashes brilliaut,
> What if the rose is plucked—the
>   flower still survives,
> What if the harp is broken—chords
>   still sound resilient."

Quite possibly this little verse is uot
pertinent to the task at hand. But in
analyzing the positions taken by the
various commentators on balance of
power (save Hartmann), one is struck hy
the fact that attempts to put it to rest
permanently have been far from success-
ful. The concept, it is said, has been
rendered useless for a variety of reasons;
bipolarity bas upset equilibrium; ideolo-
gy has rendered it impossible to con-
struc diplomacy as an exercise to
achieve limited goals; mass media have
conditioned populations to respond to
total security rather than limited se-
curity. And yet, balance of power
returns, phoenixlike, unwanted by
many, but present nouetheless. It is
possible that what "Semyon Yakov-
levich Nadson (1862-1887)" lacked as a
poet, he made np for as a pundit.

One of the main areas of concern of
the first iustallment had to do with the
juxtaposition of "open" and "secret"
diplomacy in present-day foreign policy
execution. I stressed at the time that the
rational premise of open diplomacy was
more an extension of, than a departure
from, the coucept of secret diplomacy.
The frame of reference was different, to
he sure, since entire nations had sup-
planted the small eore of professional
diplomats, and fundamental issues, such
as the outlawing of war, had supplanted
limited goals. Secret diplomacy was the
executor of the balance of power. When
the one fell into popnlar disrepute, it
was more or less inevitable that the
other would follow.

The argument hetween Stoessinger
and Hartmann over the merits of the
balance of power is a fundamental one,
and for that the student of international
relations can be thankful sinee the issue
is so clear-cut. Stoessinger believes that
the balance of power was inherently
unstable, whereas Hartmann believes
that the improper handling of the bal-
ance of power by participatiug nations
introdnced the instability which could
lead to widespread conflict. The
assumptions underlying both these
positions must now he analyzed. Pro-
fessor Stoessinger cites at least three
reasons for the inherent instability of
the balance of power.[82] The first of
these is that the balance of power
concept historically viewed the "bal-
ancer" as being disinterested in perpetu-
ating its own power. The implication
behind this statement is that at such
time as the "balancer" chose to pursue
self-serving goals the equilibrium of the
balance would be disturbed. Thus the
only guarantee was tbe manifest dedica-
tiou of the balancer to preserve equilib-
rium. Secondly, Stoessinger has mis-
givings over the balance of power as-
sumption that nations were free to
switcb allegiances at will. He stresses
that governments responsive directly to
an electorate would have difficnlty in
convincing the electorate of the validity
of constantly shifting alliances.

Stoessinger also qnestions the as-
sumption that balance of power equilib-
rium ushered in periods of peace. He
stresses that in two periods of prolonged
peace, the era of Pax Romana and the
century after the Congress of Vienna,
peace was guaranteed by different con-
siderations. In the former, it was guaran-
teed by the might of Rome, and in the
latter, by the combined power of
Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. He
suggests that peace was broken only
wben a condition of relative balance
emerged in the 20th eentnry, thus
setting the premise that equilibrium
ushers in periods of instability rather
than peace.

Professor Hartmann is in agreement with Stoessinger as to England's role as the "balancer" in the period after the Napoleonic Wars.[83] He also agrees with Stoessinger's second point to the extent that the modern trend in alignments has been toward greater permanence in alliances, a fact noticeably more true of parliamentary governments than of monarchies.[84] He is in fundamental disagreement with Stoessinger's third point, particularly as it applies to the period 1815-1914. Hartmann stresses the line of demarcation between Bismarck's successful conduct of balance of power politics and the Kaiser's subsequent period of disequilibrium after 1890.[85]

Comment upon these positions affords access to the broader considerations of balance of power politics. There seems to be some confusion among critics of the balance of power as to England's role as the "balancer," based upon too strictly rational a viewpoint. Quincy Wright believes that the products of military technology which were described in the previous section were responsible for Britain's gradually being forced from the splendid isolation of the role of balancer.

> These inventions, together with the relative decline of British commerce and finance weakened British power overseas. The invention of the airplane greatly increased the vulnerability of the British Isles themselves. As a result, Britain could no longer hold the balance of power. It was forced to join one of the great continental alliances in 1903 and has not since been able to create such a stable equilibrium in Europe that it could safely remain outside.[86]

Like Hartmann,[87] I would suggest that Great Britain's contribution as a stabilizing influence in the balance of power tends to be exaggerated. There are historical instances initiated by Bismarck even prior to his golden years (1871-1890) wherein British nonparticipation in Continental affairs was an unpalatable alternative rather than a consciously initiated policy of maintenance of stability. Concerning the joint Prussian-Austrian occupation of the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein, Bismarck had correctly calculated the implications of British response, to the extent that Lord Palmerston, the Foreign Secretary, was forced to rationalize that "the aggrandizement of Prussia, however improperly attained was not against British interests";[88] this despite the underlying opposition by Britain to this very concept.[89] Beyond this, the factors influencing Great Britain's gradually being drawn away from a policy of isolation at the turn of the century were due to two other major historical changes: first, the loss of her monopoly of industrial mass production which allowed other nations to compete more favorably in world markets, and, secondly, the gradual transformation of the political fabric of the empire itself toward a greater degree of self-government. When placed in a framework which included Hartmann's analysis of disintegration after 1890 the causes for the change in Great Britain's outlook are more correctly viewed. The influence of war technology described by Wright upon this process was not primary, and I strongly doubt that her vulnerability to air attack occupied the thoughts of Great Britain's statesmen prior to signing the Anglo-French agreement on 4 April 1904.[90]

Hartmann has stressed five factors in his treatment of techniques of the balance of power which are worth noting: (1) acquisition of allies, (2) acquisition of territory, (3) erection of buffer states, (4) undermining enemy strength (detachment of allies), and (5) undermining enemy strength (destroying hopes of new allies).[91] Considering the changes which have occurred as a result of bipolarity, the emergence of ideology, and the trend in democratic states towards greater mass participation in foreign affairs, it is interesting to note

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how these concepts have retained a high degree of vigor and usefulness. The acquisition of allies is assuredly a fundamental reason for the erection of Western and Communist-bloc alliances after 1945. The acquisition of territory, particularly contiguous territory, has been noticeably less, especially, as Hartmann states, after the U.S.S.R. and the United States completed their continental territorial expansion.[92] But there are examples of its continued use. Soviet retention of land acquired in the Karelian Peninsula campaign against Finland and its assimilation of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, all in 1940, and its retention of the Kuriles and South Sakhalin are pertinent. Chinese conquest of Tibet is another. The entire territory of the East European bloc furnishes evidence of the continual use of the buffer state. Many adopt a position which would ascribe a similar motivation to the United States vis-a-vis the NATO countries, although this is more correctly viewed within the framework of alliances. Hartmann cites as evidence of continued viability of his fourth point the exploitation of the Yugoslav split with the Soviet bloc in 1948.[93] While I would not go so far as to suggest that Yugoslavia was "integrated" into the Western defense alliance by 1954, this example does furnish impetus to consider strategically the exploitation of polycentrism. Kennan is vague in his analysis of how best to achieve this.[94] On the one hand he suggests that the tendency within the bloc toward concepts of development and conduct along Western lines can have a salutary effect on the international climate; on the other he is not sure whether complete rapprochement with these countries would best serve the West if the respective populations are unhappy under Communist-oriented governments. Further development of this type of argument brings into play the concept of international trade. To the extent that an aggressive country

depends upon external trade sources (it is said), its aggressive tendencies will diminish in a direct ratio since the lack of self-sustenance will render it more vulnerable as it undertakes aggression.[95] As to undermining enemy strength by destroying the hope of new allies, Hartmann cites the example of the Russo-German Alliance prior to the outbreak of World War II.

In the area of general criticism of the modern usage of the balance of power, some commentators have shown a degree of ambivalence due, I suspect, to fundamental rejection of the concept. Wright, in his chapter on prevention of war has this to say:

> Diplomacy should aim to isolate the aggressive government both from its own people and from other governments rather than to make a counter-alliance to contain it.[96]

He stresses that the difference is essentially a juridical one, implying, of course, the lack of juridical content in balance of power alignments. He suggests that isolation by alliance (essentially the Bismarckian concept) would only succeed in solidifying support within the country for leadership. Yet the problem of definition and implementation of such juridical constraints remains. What type of sanctions would they be? And what guarantee is there that they would not achieve the same effect of uniting support behind the leadership? What use could leadership make of the war and peace propaganda[97] concepts mentioned previously? The success of application of these sanctions under these circumstances would surely be a somewhat remote possibility.

It is interesting to speculate on several modern examples of conflict which by definition have remained "limited" from the vantage point of balance of power. Perhaps the terminology "balance of terror" would be more useful here. Some have suggested that the combination of factors of polariza-

tion, ideological rigidity, together with the fact that nations seek a preponderance rather than a balance of power, have rendered the balance of power obsolete.[98] Thus the balance of power has become a balance of terror if one introduces the threat of nuclear destruction at this point. Yet this threat, according to Stoessinger, has been responsible for localizing four crises which conceivably could have escalated into something else: the Korean war, Suez 1956, the Hungarian revolution, and the Cuban missile crisis.[99] Clearly the "threat" in these instances cannot be construed in the counterforce or countervalue or combination theories which were discussed in the preceding section. The salutary effect on four historical crises (accepting Stoessinger's premise) emanated from the vagueness of potential massive reprisal as opposed to the concrete premise of controlled response. It might therefore be suggested that a useful field of inquiry could be the examination of whether the demonstrated usefulness of total response could possibly be vitiated as a psychological deterrent to the extent that it becomes bounded by the various limitations of controlled response. However, the psychological implications of the premise should not be extended to the point where it impairs the prudent analysis of the place of balance of power concepts in the nuclear age.

CONTROL OF WAR

In a general sense, the preceding sections have been concerned with the subject matter of this section, the control of war. Considerations of a philosophical or practical nature of political conduct, the nature of violence, and the historical system of alignment either contributing to or lessening the likelihood of war tend to lead inexorably to this problem of control. It is also a source of difficulty to the student. For here, perhaps more than in any other of the required topics of commentary of this installment, does the student find the variety of approaches with the correspondingly variable degree of success which I mentioned in the Foreword. A good bit of this literature does not readily fit the overall approach which I have attempted to establish and carry forward in the first two installments, that is, to restrict whatever conclusions are arrived at to those which are both desirable and feasible. Too much of the literature of disarmament and arms control seems to bear out to a distressing degree H.L. Mencken's definition of an idealist as being one who " . . . on noticing that a rose smells better than a cabbage, concludes that it will also make better soup."[100] It is this reflection which prompted me to express a degree of appreciation in my opening statement to the *Naval War College Review*. It is difficult to isolate precisely what is the exact nature of this difference in attitude. I suggested, I think, something of it in referring to the more pragmatic orientation of actual decisionmaking and leadership. Perhaps the best way to describe the attitude is to call it more intellectually hard-nosed. It rejects the approach of so many which can best be described as extrapolation from the barely possible to the remotely possible. The approach I have chosen here in accordance with the suggestion of the syllabus will limit itself to a consideration of some manifestations of control which have proven successful and the reasons therefore, and an examination of the framework of the post-1945 dialogs. It will accept the terminology of Hedley Bull in defining the two major components of the problem as "arms control" (international restraint upon armaments policy) and "disarmament" (the reduction or abolition of armaments).[101] This distinction is implied by Hartmann in his contention that the goal of disarmament may be to mitigate the effects of whatever arms do exist rather than to disarm.[102]

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Disarmament and arms control policies historically have been, for the most part, either enforced by a conqueror on a subjugated nation or sought by nations under mutually advantageous conditions from positions of sovereign equality.[103] Although this section will treat mostly on the latter, it is useful to examine at least one instance of the former, namely the rearming of Germany after 1933. Hartmann notes quite correctly that the 12-year term of service provisions of the Versailles Treaty backfired at such time as Germany undertook rearmament since it provided Hitler with a large professional nucleus upon which to build.[104] Apart from this it is useful to consider the historical context of this rearming. Churchill points to the fact that the German demand for removal of armament restrictions, made at the 1932 Disarmament Conference, (prior to Hitler's election as Chancellor) met with considerable favorable response even in the British press. The *Times* referred to it as "the timely redress of inequality."[105] As early as 1927, upon withdrawal of the Inter-Allied Control Commission from Germany, there had been noted a German "straining" of the provisions of Versailles.[106] German production of firstline aircraft climbed at a phenomenal rate after 1933 from about 900 in 1934 to approximately 4,700 by 1939.[107]

It can be seen generally that the imposition of restrictions upon a vanquished nation in this instance was not successful. The multiplicity of reasons for this would require treatment in a separate paper. Noteworthy were the lack of effective imposition of restrictions and the absence of a successful policing mechanism. This, of course, relates to material developed in the first installment, i.e., that ultimately a sovereign nation can do what it damned well pleases. But, in addition, there was an attitude underlying public opinion at the time of seeming unwillingness to pursue a strict policy of sanction which was generally reflected by the leadership of the Western democracies. Assuming effective control and policing mechanism is available, the question must be raised as to how effective the mechanism would be in the light of public apathy.

These observations are of value in turning to a consideration of the Washington Naval Conference of 1922. This attempt at arms control has been viewed as either a success or a failure depending on one's interpretation of how long an agreement must last to be successful, among other things. When viewed beside the Rush-Bagot Agreement (an executive agreement, by the way, and not a treaty),[108] with a life span stretching from 1817 to the present, it is not a notable success. Yet when viewed against other conferences with similar aims (Hague Conferences) it can be considered quite successful, especially when one considers the number of issues which were successfully resolved. The Washington Agreement made no provision for treaty enforcement, although it was expressed in treaty form.

The signatories of the Washington Naval Treaty, in order to verify each other's fulfillment of treaty obligations, relied on their own resources of military intelligence and espionage. And the sanction or enforcement which lay behind the treaty, the recourse innocent parties had in the case of a violation of the treaty, was not appeal to an international agency of enforcement, but the resumption of the naval arms race.[109]

The Washington Treaty provided for tonnage ratios of 5:5:3:1.67: 1.67 for the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, respectively, in regard to battleships and battle cruisers. It did not apply to submarines, cruisers, and destroyers on the subject of which no accord could be reached.[110] For this reason Stoessinger considers the Conference to have been unsuccessful since the ships to be discarded were obsolete

anyway, and ships considered most valuable in future wars could not be brought under the terms of the agreement. I would reject this definition of unsuccess on two grounds. One cannot consign the battleship to the boneyard of weaponry in the year 1922, bearing in mind, as has Hartmann, the arguments of the battleship admirals and carrier admirals in the early days of World War II.[111] Although the period after World War I saw many evolutionary trends in doctrine and construction which subsequently usurped the position of the battleship as the capital ship, they had not been incorporated into naval doctrine by 1922 to a degree that rendered the battleship obsolete. In addition, it might be suggested that the inclusion of all types of vessels would have created a picture of "total" disarmament which some of the signatories might have considered unacceptable from the point of view of national prestige. In the area of international agreements of this type, the usefulness of the half-a-loaf approach cannot be discarded by the "should-have-beens."

The history of disarmament and arms control proposal and counterproposal following World War II is many faceted, and this paper can only touch upon certain features and comment upon them. To begin with, I think it is necessary to differentiate the respective attitudes of the United States and the Soviet Union to the problem. The Soviet Union in particular has tended to view disarmament and arms control as only one aspect of its total fabric of ideological and pragmatic assumption. Control of violence and related problems must be viewed as a manifestation of the Soviet concept of historical development. The initial example of this was in the Soviet response to the Baruch plan. The thrust of much Soviet counterproposal leaned toward rendering the United States relatively unable to respond with nuclear capability to Soviet expansionist policy in Eastern

Europe.[112] Stoessinger tends to view Soviet policy in this period as being greatly motivated by a mistrust of the implications of inspection.[113] Thus the Soviets were forced to veto the Baruch plan due to its prohibition of veto on the question of sanctions. He suggests that, in addition, the chances for passage of the Baruch plan might have been enhanced by our permitting the U.S.S.R. to continue atomic research after 1946.[114] In light of Soviet strategic goals in Eastern Europe during this period, I tend to doubt whether these revisions would have proven adequate to Soviet needs. The political implications of the Soviet shift to a more refined position (control rather than destruction) on nuclear armaments are evident when viewed against the background of the successful explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb in 1949 and the Korean war. The Soviet Union certainly had a valid strategic purpose in attempting to undermine Western unity in time of crisis, and the propaganda potential of disarmament proposals was not neglected.

The Soviet positions in the post-Stalin period have reflected a similar derivation from the Communist world view. Burkemper's analysis of the Vyshinsky proposal of 1954 correctly concludes that it was designed to make it appear that the West and the U.S.S.R. were quite close to agreement, even though there was little substantive change, and that Western military buildup was, to a degree, rendered unnecessary.[115] This "softening," it should be noted, occurred during the interregnum when Soviet leadership seemed to be toying with the premise of undesirability of war, which would eventually become a causal factor in the Sino-Soviet split. Malenkov wrote,

> ...[war] with the contemporary means of warfare means the destruction of world civilization.[116]

This concept had to be reversed after his removal, for obvious political reasons,

but it emerged in 1956 when Khrush-
chev reassessed the inevitability of war
at the 20th Party Congress, and has
remained a generally consistent premise
of Soviet doctrine since that time.[117]
Shifts within this framework can also be
traced to larger foreign policy considera-
tions. For instance, the emphasis on the
nonproliferation aspect of the problem
can be set against the widening Sino-
Soviet breach with its fundamental
doctrinal differences on the nature and
inevitability of war. The increased
emphasis on consumer goods as opposed
to heavy industry following Stalin's
death is correctly emphasized by Bur-
kemper.[118] The lessons to be drawn
from these instances suggest a continued
Soviet view of disarmament and related
problems as an extension of larger con-
siderations of ideology and doctrine.

Finally, there are a number of rather
fundamental observations on the results
of disarmament which bear analysis. It
was suggested above that the limited
goals of the Washington Conference
provided a greater degree of feasibility
in achieving a consensus which was
agreeable to the signatories. Wright has
suggested a corollary argument in his
idea that far-reaching regulations on
military methods and arms might do
away with many of the causes of war
but, at the same time, might also reduce
the reluctance to go to war, thereby
making wars more frequent. If the
nuclear deterrent acted in a positive
fashion in localizing the four conflicts
described by Stoessinger, what would
the result have been in its absence? In
the present era we seem to be faced
with the problem of fundamental lack
of acceptance by the Soviet Union of
the policing mechanism, specifically,
inspection of sufficient scope to justify
its value as a policing mechanism. If this
is the only point of contention, are
other means of discovery available to
warrant its exclusion from the dis-
armament package? At the present, I do
not believe so. And assuming that the

state of development of such means
reaches a point of perfectibility at
which leadership is willing to forego the
use of inspection, what are the legal
implications of their being included in
international agreements? To what
degree should their capabilities be di-
vulged? One instance of the latter was
President Eisenhower's choice in the
U-2 affair. Another less sensational
example has been the increasing use in
public briefings of photoreconnaissance
production, e.g., the Cuban missile
crisis. These examples have moved many
commentators to many conclusions, but
I think it is fairly certain that right now
much intelligence collection must be
exercised extrajuridically in the inter-
national legal sense of the word. Its
importance, however, leads one to make
some remarks on the subject, remarks, I
would suggest, which are badly needed.

SOME OBSERVATIONS

In large measure, those who have
written on the subject of the place of
intelligence as an instrument of foreign
policy have been handicapped in at least
two ways. First, there is the nature of
the beast itself and the necessity, en-
forced by legislation, of keeping a tight
rein on its content and the means
whereby it is achieved. Most profes-
sionals in the field who have written for
public consumption have recognized
this fact, and their books have reflected
a high degree of caution and are most
useful, ironically, to those least in need
of explanation; other professionals
whose background allows them to give
substance to shadow. Even those books
written from information of an "inside"
nature cannot properly be commented
upon publicly by the expert, since to
pass judgment one way or another could
indicate the direction of, or areas of
proficiency in the intelligence effort.
Secondly, there is the underlying
premise in democratic societies (so ably
phrased by, I believe, Cordell Hull:

"Gentlemen, do not read one another's mail") that there is something fundamentally sinister here. Yet, in modern foreign and defense policy, like it or not, it is a necessity.

Perhaps it is for these reasons that relatively little attention has been given to the subject. Of the required sources for this paper, only Professor Hartmann devotes space to the subject and, in his two pages, suggests that it is of "prime importance."[120] But even in his fine book, a greater appreciation of the subject might have been helpful to clarify at least one item. The second edition (1962) contains a passage from General Gavin's 1958 book, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, on the question of targeting; to wit:

Although few people realize it, there is no way today to give information to a missile in the United States that will cause it to arrive with accuracy at a specific geographic point in the Soviet Union. This is because the exact relation of specific points in the Soviet Union to the United States is not known except in the case of the few observatories that were in existence prior to the Red Revolution ...[121]

Hartmann suggests that a new radar system made public in 1960 could be helpful.[122] But certainly the implications of the U-2 flights, also made public in 1960, would be enough to warrant the exclusion of General Gavin's statement from this context.[123] The establishment of geographical coordinates for targeting purposes has always been a fundamental reason for overflight.

The use of intelligence techniques is highlighted by another problem area of the prior section. It was suggested that a further hindrance to acceptance of the principle of inspection by the U.S.S.R. was due to the belief that inspection parties and other forms of surveillance would accumulate information beyond the scope of the mission, for instance, targeting information.[124] In an atmosphere of mutual mistrust such an attitude is entirely rational, and the respective positions continue to be irreconcilable. Thus the practical aspects of gaining information would remain and would probably continue to revolve around the constant refining and development of technical collection capability in addition to the other more traditional forms of intelligence gathering.

By way of conclusion and after having given these problems a good amount of attention, I think the most usable concept of arms control has been evolved by Hedley Bull.

If arms control in its broadest sense comprises all those acts of military policy in which antagonistic states cooperate in the pursuit of common purposes even while they are struggling in the pursuit of conflicting ones, then it is likely that the United States and the Soviet Union have been practising arms control throughout the period of the cold war.[125]

In all probability, whatever forms of agreed controls are implemented in the future, they will not be significantly different from those which have proven historically feasible. They will in all likelihood be limited in scope and definable as well within the overall Soviet ideological and political goals of the time, insofar as they are acceptable to the U.S.S.R. Assuming probable Soviet refusal to incorporate satisfactory inspection procedures into any arms con-

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trol or disarmament agreements, the United States will probably not entertain any agreement of this nature until such time as an equitable substitute for inspection has evolved from the U.S. point of view. Barring the unforeseeable, this development will probably be in the evolution of a more sophisticated intelligence collection capability.

In the overall area of nuclear strategy, the process of restricting the limits of the nuclear deterrent will continue to occupy much of the strategic thinking in the United States as it has heretofore.[126] I would suggest, however, that due consideration be given to the positive contributions of the idea of massive deterrence. A contraction of the doctrinal limits of response, according to several strategic thinkers, would lessen the probability of its use. We may, as a result, ask ourselves (in addition to the question posed previously concerning the possibility of escalation of the four crises in the absence of a massive nuclear deterrent) "What would be the effect of the substitution of controlled for unlimited deterrence upon the frequency of insurgency in the present era?" This relationship is influenced by a number of factors not the least of which is the particular historical instance to which it is being applied. However, if one can draw an overall conclusion from the lessons of recent history, it is that the implications of the so-called "balance of

terror" have proven sufficiently useful in localizing potential international crises to warrant its retention as a premise within which to frame rational doctrine. This concept places great burdens on leadership and populations. To allow leadership to use the premise as a foundation of policy, populations are required in return to live out their lives under a threat of possible annihilation. The result, especially in the liberal democracies, is a degree of social instability and unrest which is difficult to mollify. The leadership, in any case, must weigh the two and establish the necessary priorities. Are the national interests best served by pursuit of one at the expense of another? The prospect of having to make this sort of decision is grim. I began with a quote from Dag Hammarskjold and I shall end with one, germane to the responsibilities of leadership and the bleakness of its environment.

> The road,
> You shall follow it.
>
> The fun,
> You shall forget it.
>
> The cup,
> You shall empty it.
>
> The pain,
> You shall conceal it.
>
> The truth,
> You shall be told it.
>
> The end,
> You shall endure it.[127]

FOOTNOTES

1. Dag Hammarskjold, *Markings* (New York: Knopf, 1965), p. 121.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

3. Frederick H. Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations* (New York: Macmillan, 1962), p. 156.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 159-164.

5. Myres S. McDougal, "Authority to Use Force on the High Seas," *Naval War College Review*, December 1967, p. 23. Quincy Wright sees war as the legal condition which permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force. *A Study of War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), abridged ed., p. 7.

6. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York: Dutton, 1950), p. 103.

7. Presumably an extension of his "The Evolution of Soviet Naval Strategy and the Effect of the Revolution in Military Affairs," *Naval War College Review*, December 1964.

8. Herman Kahn, *Thinking About the Unthinkable* (New York: Avon, 1966), p. 34-40.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

10. Thomas H. Green, *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation* (London, 1950), p. 170-171.

11. Benedictus de Spinoza, "A Political Treatise," quoted in *The Philosophy of Spinoza* (New York: Meridian Books, 1954), p. 317.

12. Hartmann, p. 163.

13. See William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 82ff.

14. See Vladimir I. Lenin, "What Is to Be Done?" in *Collected Works*, 4th ed. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), v. V, p. 410-436.

15. Plato, "Laws," XII in *The Dialogues of Plato* (New York: Random House, 1937), v. II, p. 695.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 686.

17. Hobbes, p. 104.

18. Plato, "The Statesman," in *The Dialogues of Plato* (New York: Random House, 1937), v. II, p. 296-301.

19. Hobbes, p. 142-143.

20. Plato, p. 294.

21. Hobbes, p. 101-103.

22. "Elements of National Strategy," (Excerpts) *Selected Readings for Installments One, Two, and Three in International Relations* (Newport, R.I.: U.S. Naval War College, 1965), p. 1-A-1.

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Ibid.*, p. 1-A-2.

25. *Ibid.*

26. A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 508-510.

27. George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900-1950* (New York: New American Library, 1960), p. 9-23.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

29. Wright, p. 112-113.

30. See Sigmund Freud, *Basic Writings* (New York: Modern Library, 1938), p. 12. For an unusual treatment of Freud's ideas, i.e., the historical factors which influenced him, see Richard Schoenwald, *Freud, the Man and His Mind* (New York, 1956).

31. A good analysis of Pareto's thought is contained in Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, 2d ed. (New York: Macmillan: 1949), p. 178-300.

32. Plato, "Laws," II, in *Dialogues, op. cit.*, p. 441. See also restatement of same in "Republic," III, *Dialogues*, v. I, p. 679-680.

33. Freud, "Interpretation of Dreams," *Basic Writings*, p. 368-379.

34. Hartmann, p. 158.

35. Erich Fromm, *May Man Prevail?* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964), p. 21, 22.

36. Hartmann, p. 169-161.

37. Freud, "Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex," *Basic Writings*, p. 368.

38. Wright, p. 264, 267.

39. John G. Stoessinger, *The Might of Nations* (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 182.

40. Hartmann, p. 159.

41. Wright, p. 356-357.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 351-352.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 352-353.

44. Hartmann, p. 170-173.

45. See George M. Hagerman, "Lord of the Turtle Boats," in *Naval Institute Proceedings*, December 1967, p. 66-75.

46. Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower upon History* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1960), p. 23.

47. Wright, p. 56.

48. Kennan, p. 37-50.

49. Quoted in Hartmann, p. 171.

50. My contention that Wright's methodology cannot be too closely applied to a given situation without some distortion in no way diminishes my respect for the magnitude of his effort.

51. Wright, p. 108-114.

52. Roy Macridis, *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 4-14.

53. Wright, p. 111.

54. Karl von Clausewitz, *On War* (London: Routledge & Paul, 1962), v. I, p. 1.

55. Hobbes, p. 102.

56. Wright, p. 8-10.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 394-408.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 70-74.

60. Winston Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston: Houghton, 1953), p. 639.

61. Qnoted in Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking, 1951), p. 70.

62. Churchill, p. 642-645.

63. Homer C. Hockett, *Political and Social Growth of the American People* (New York: 1940), p. 433-437.

64. Michael T. Florinsky, *Russia: A History and an Interpretation* (New York: Macmillan, 1953), v. II, p. 676-678.

65. Kahn, p. 64.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 67-68.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 70-71.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

70. Fromm, p. 19-20.

71. Compton E. Ward, "Subversive Insurgency: An Analytical Model," *Naval War College Review*, September 1967, p. 3-25.

72. *Ibid.*

73. *Ibid.*

74. The same comment is applicable here as at footnote 50.

75. 1 cannot consider questions of U.S. deployment doctrine or larger strategic issnes due to the nature of information to which 1 have had access over the past years and which is not properly includable in a paper of this type. If this paper were submitted under different cirumstances, the "War at Sea" concepts developed by two senior staff members of CINCLANT and delivered to the Naval War College last year would be applicable.

76. Quoted in Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper, 1957), p. 26-27.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 27-28.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 235-238.

79. James M. Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age* (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 12.

80. U.S. Bureau of Naval Personnel. *Financial Management in the Navy,* NAVPERS 10792-B (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1956), p. 1-15.

81. Thomas E. McGovern, *Report to Ad Hoc Committee on Fiscal Organization and Functions of the War Department* (Washington, 1944), p. 28-30.

82. Stoessinger, p. 175-180.

83. Hartmann, p. 323-324.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 346.

85. *Ibid.*, p. 359-372.

86. Wright, p. 125.

87. Hartmann, p. 359.

88. Taylor, p. 151-155.

89. Hartmann, p. 359-360.

90. See Taylor, p. 398-414.

91. Hartmann, p. 344-345.

92. *Ibid.*, p. 337.

93. *Ibid.*, p. 341-342.

94. George F. Kennan, "Polycentrism and Western Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1964, p. 171-183.

95. See Wright, p. 170-171.

96. *Ibid.*, p. 397.

97. *Ibid.*, p. 386ff.

98. Victor H. Cohen, "Power Politics and International Relations," *Selected Readings*, p. II-A-13—II-A-15.

99. Stoessinger, p. 183.

100. Henry L. Mencken, *The Vintage Mencken* (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), p. 231.

101. Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. vii.

102. Hartmann, p. 276.

103. *Ibid.*, p. 277.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 277-278.

105. Winston S. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (Boston, Houghton, 1948), p. 72.

106. *Ibid.*, p. 47, 48-51.

107. *Ibid.*, table at p. 688.

108. Daniel Cheever and H. Field Haviland, *American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 46.

109. Bull, p. ix.

110. Hartmann, p. 282.

111. *Ibid.*, p. 176.

112. Raymond G. Burkemper, "Soviet Disarmament Policy—What Lies Ahead?" *Naval War College Review*, November 1967, p. 29-59.

113. Stoessinger, p. 346.

114. *Ibid.*, p. 344.

115. Burkemper, p. 35.

116. Quoted in Robert V. Daniels, "The Soviet Attitude on Disarmament," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1961, p. 33.

117. See various speeches by Khrushchev on this question from 1956-1963, usefully gathered into one volume entitled *To Avert War, Our Prime Task* (Moscow, 1963). See also A.N. Kosygin, "Report on the Five Year Plan 1966-1970," *Documents of the 23rd Party Congress* (Moscow, 1966), p. 269.

118. Burkemper, p. 40.

119. Wright, p. 364.

120. Hartmann, p. 179-181.

121. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 174.

122. *Ibid.*, p. 174-175.

123. Footnote 50 again applies, with renewed vigor.

124. Quoted in Burkemper, p. 43.

125. Bull, p. xiv.

126. As mentioned previously, Soviet concepts of war will receive full treatment in Installment Five.

127. Hammarskjold, p. 201.

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
You are well aware that it is not numbers or strength that bring victories in war. No, it is when one side goes against the enemy with the gods' gift of a stronger morale that their adversaries, as a rule, cannot withstand them.

Xenophon: Speech to the Greek officers
after the defeat of Cyrus at Cunaxa, 401 B.C.

THE BAROMETER

READERS' COMMENTS

This section has been established to provide a forum for the useful exchange of ideas between *Naval War College Review* readers and the Naval War College.

Unofficial comments by the readers on articles which appear in the *Review* are encouraged and will be considered for publication in subsequent issues.

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