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Defense of the Realm

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this paper is the most rewarding of any. Schlesinger argues for the Lewis-and-Clark planning (planning that acknowledges that many alternative courses of action and forks in the road will appear) as opposed to Cook's-tour planning that "rests on the supposition that the future is sufficiently certain that we can chart a straight course years in advance." Among his many insightful comments: planning too far ahead means the forfeiting of options; the purpose of research and development is to buy options. Schlesinger believes the Department of Defense has overemphasized general purpose forces under the assumption that forces optimal for nuclear weaponry (such as the F-4 and F-111) are also adaptable to lower order conflicts such as a steady-attrition, non-nuclear war with limited air opposition (read Vietnam). Schlesinger also offers a balanced discussion of the conflict between the military and the systems analysts that will displease only partisans. Oliver Williamson of the University of Pennsylvania examines the incentives and performance in defense contracting. He recommends the "partitioning" of the task into technically separate components so that task specifications may be made more objectively and with a smaller amount of uncertainty.

In conclusion, *Issues in Defense Economics* must be taken up as one takes up a menu. Certain dishes will appeal to some diners; other dishes, to others. Since senior military officers are already in the dining room, they ought at least look over this particular menu. It doesn't promise a feast, but some of the appetizers look good.

F.R. ROOT
Chair of Economics

Rosecrance, R.N. *Defense of the Realm*.
New York: Columbia University
Press, 1968. 308 p.

Professor Rosecrance, a member of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State, has written an interesting

account of British strategy, chiefly on the period 1946-1957, with a final chapter on the post-Suez decade, 1957-1966. The book is an analysis of Britain's postwar military policies and their influence on the world balance of power. The demobilization period and the options available to the English following World War II are discussed with perspective. The events leading to the formulation of NATO, and its rapid buildup after 1950 are covered from the British standpoint. Britain's attempts to establish an effective nuclear-armed strategic force are also analyzed. The Suez debacle is viewed in detail and with acute perception. According to the author, "Eden committed himself to two conflicting principles: (1) force should be used against Nasser; and (2) the United States should be brought to accept that result. Nowhere did he realistically face the consequences of failure on the second event." Suez is considered to be a greater disaster than had been imagined at first; yet Professor Rosecrance feels that its effects are not irrevocable nor permanent. A reader of this book will also achieve a much better comprehension of what may have been, to Americans, a somewhat baffling sequence of Whitehall military policies. The development of the V-bombers, the cancellations of the TSR-2 and the Blue Streak missile, and the retrenchment of Britain's attack carrier force are explained understandably to the reader. Yet over the period covered by this book, it is the author's opinion that "Britain's military influence was greatest, paradoxically, when its military power was less than it is at the moment. Its influence was greatest when British purposes in Europe and overseas were both clear and unvacillating, and when Whitehall formed the necessary bridge linking Washington with the continent."

Finally, what of the future? The author considers that Britain will remain a "potent international factor" in the

next decade, particularly with respect to affairs on the Continent.

E.M. PORTER
Captain, U.S. Navy

Special Study Group. *Report from Iron Mountain*. New York: Dial Press, 1967. 109 p.

In August of 1963, some 15 American men who had done work of distinction in at least two different fields and collectively represented a very wide range of disciplines were contacted by Washington to serve on a commission "of highest importance." The objective was "to determine, accurately and realistically, the nature of the problems that would confront the United States if and when a condition of 'permanent peace' should arrive, and to draft a program for dealing with this contingency." For two and a half years the members met in secret session on an average of once a month, usually for a 2-day period, and, with the exception of the first and last meetings at Iron Mountain, in a different location about the country--hotels, universities, summer camps, and a private estate--but at no time on Government property. Informality and unanimity were the ground rules. The report has been suppressed by both the Government inter-agency committee to which it was submitted and by the members of this Study Group until this publication. Many readers with the application of common sense will be outraged with the report, its treatment of life and death, war and peace, and the survival of the species; however, it does represent a significant and important effort to define a complex problem. If war is synonymous with nation hood, war is the major function upon which all modern societies are built. Does the elimination of war mean the inevitable elimination of the traditional nation-state or national sovereignty? What, then, are substitute institutions that society will adopt to maintain a lasting

peace? Such surrogates must be politically acceptable, technically feasible, and credible to the members of world societies.

The slightly curious will be rewarded by a quick perusal of this report. It will stimulate the reader's thinking, for to date no program or combination of programs has ever been proposed to meet the requirements of a world without war. But does the *Report from Iron Mountain* propose such a solution? Would you believe that there is a credibility gap? Is this *Report from Iron Mountain* fact or fiction?

R.W. NIESZ
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard

Stone, Jeremy J. *Strategic Persuasion*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. 176 p.

Mr. Stone's title, *Strategic Persuasion*, may be meaningless to the reader who chooses this book at random. His subtitle, *Arms Limitations through Dialogue*, may indeed be misleading, since this interesting little book deals with only one small facet of the truly immense problems of arms control. The author proposes that even though the dangers of war are great enough to encourage hope for arms reductions among the powers of the world, such a course of events is highly unlikely and that it is in the area of communications about arms and war that truly significant gains can be made. He chooses to identify this communication procedure as "strategic dialogue." Strategic dialogue as a general concept is dissected and defined in the first section. The first chapter deals with the concept of dialogue from the viewpoint of Schopenhauer, while the second chapter relates these general concepts to the current strategic debates and ideological principles which play a role in internal and external exchanges of dialogue. Parts Two and Three deal with the direct and indirect approaches to intercourse between the opposing sides in the present