

1968

Book Reviews


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PROFESSIONAL READING

The evaluations of recent books listed in this section have been prepared for the use of resident students. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these books of interest in their professional reading.

The inclusion of a book in this section does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein.

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Han, Suyin. *China in the Year 2001*.

New York: Basic Books, 1967. 268p.

"Not recognizing the scope and pace of this change will not prevent the future [of China] from coming into being; but will only keep the many deluded a little longer, sleep-walkers pacing the corridors of yesterday's dreams." With these words, the author of *China in the Year 2001* embarks on a crusade to glorify the leadership of Mao Tse-tung in bringing China out of the dark ages to a place in the socialistic sun. In the heat of verbal battle, few are immune to the barbs of the author's pen. The United States rates as China's enemy number one in all respects. From the Wanghia Treaty of 1844 to the present war in Vietnam, every American action has been aimed at maintaining China in a servile position--first by economic exploitation as exemplified by the open door policy; then by containment as manifested by support of Chiang Kai-shek and SEATO. Second only to the United States is the revisionist, quasi-capitalistic Soviet Union. The Khrushchev-Kennedy detente marked the end of Soviet leadership by the proletarian movement which left Red China, led by Mao, of course, with the challenge of becoming the only true communistic state. The sword of judgment does not stop here, however; the Nationalist Chinese, Great Britain, the hneaucratic Red Chinese, and even Mother Nature receive lesser, but substantial, blows. The only ones safe from the fires of damnation are the underdeveloped nations and Charles de

Gaulle. According to the author, who claims *not* to be a Marxist-Leninist but who can be construed only as a dedicated Maoist in its most religious sense, Mao and Red China have accepted the challenge and are scientifically winning the battle with capitalism. Using statistics--most of which are educated guesses or calculated opinions--China is making unbelievable strides in agriculture, industry, trade, living conditions, social welfare, population control, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. All of this has been accomplished without coercion except for maybe the few hundred thousand physically eliminated in rectification campaigns; and it has been done in a most democratic fashion--all can criticize as long as they don't criticize Mao. Although the book is heavily pro-Red Chinese in nature, one does not have to go far beneath the surface to recognize that tremendous struggles have taken, and are taking place within the major power factions of that nation. The Communist Chinese Party, the People's Liberation Army, and the bureaucratic structure are only some of the protagonists. Needless to say, the peasants and the youth have become the major pawns in the game. In spite of its almost complete lack of objectivity, the book does provide significant insight into the patterns of the Red Chinese mentality, and for that reason it is highly recommended for the military officer who is interested in how the opposition thinks.

A.J. ASHURST
Commander, U.S. Navy

Hull, Roger H. and Novogrod, John C. *Law and Vietnam*. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1968. 211p.

No one should attempt either public debate or private dialog on the Vietnam conflict without reading this book. Mr. Hull and Mr. Novogrod carefully outline "the ease with which Hanoi and Saigon can substantiate their legal positions." The authors accomplish this, in a most

analytical way, by discussing the contrary viewpoints of each side, the violations of international law (as individually interpreted), the indefinite wording (by intention) of the Geneva Accords, and the irrelevancy of trying to substantiate international law in the language of international politics. It is not that a treaty was violated, but that it was never signed by the opposing parties; it is not even that signatures would have assured compliance, for the provisions were too vague to be seriously considered; and it is not that more specific provisions would have brought peace, for there was no reasonable enforcement clause in the written contract. In short, the overly publicized and almost universally misunderstood Geneva Accords are often used, incorrectly, to substantiate points of view which can be, at best, only emotional. Few people seem to realize that the Geneva Accords were made up of two parts: a bilateral Agreement, signed by only France and North Vietnam, and a Final Declaration, signed by no one at all. (In addition, the United States and South Vietnam orally *dissented* in both cases.) Specific parts of the Agreement were technically violated--from the first--by almost everyone involved in the Vietnam partition. This book successfully outlines the degree of guilt for the many parties and the subsequent charges and countercharges which resulted. The authors also conclude that no one (especially Ho Chi Minh) ever took the Geneva Accords seriously.

W.R. THOMAS
Commander, U.S. Navy

Neu, Charles E. *An Uncertain Friendship: Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 1906-1909*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. 347p.

Professor Neu's book is a splendid one, but it has a strike against it when first confronted by one familiar with the literature of the Theodore Roosevelt period. He will probably comment:

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"But I thought Raymond Esthus had recently published *Theodore Roosevelt and Japan!*" He did—in 1966. And H.K. Beale wrote *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power* (1956), E.H. Zabriskie interpreted *American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East* (1946), T.A. Bailey published *Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crises* (1934), and Tyler Dennett started it all with *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War* in 1925. Professor Neu acknowledges this shelf of previous scholarship but believes "all of these books, while they remain immensely useful, have inevitably suffered from the passage of time. Viewpoints once unique now seem dated, and many new sources have become available since even the most recent of these books was written."

Having said that much, this reviewer must admit he thoroughly enjoyed Neu's book, but not because it outdated Esthus's highly competent and insightful volume. He has given us a new "wide-screen" approach to T.R.'s diplomacy with Japan. The book doesn't really focus on the uncertain friendship between Roosevelt and Japan; it examines the uncertainties of Anglo-American, Canadian-American, and German-American friendship against the background of shabby treatment given Japanese by Americans. Neu also reveals the uncertainties in the "friendship" between President Roosevelt and the Republican side of Congress and between the Commonwealth of California and the White House. What emerges in this new synthesis is a reexamination of these years of Japanese-American crises, with emphasis on two areas of negotiation that limited Roosevelt's freedom of movement to settle the problems with Japan.

Bailey in his articles and monograph explored the labyrinth of California politics and marked the way for those who wanted to understand how state

politics could almost destroy friendly relations with a foreign power. Other writers have fleshed out the political story as more sources became available after 1934 and as new perspectives on race relations have been accepted. Because of the breadth of his work, Esthus skimmed over politics in the Golden State. Neu describes the infighting of California politicians. He concludes that while the splenetic T.R. might consider the California Legislature a pack of jackasses (he used the same term for Wilhelm II of Germany), enough of them were Republicans to require careful care and feeding if other interests of the President were to prosper.

Neu is exceptionally competent at tracing the connection between naval power and the settling of this era of crises. Rather than a "big-sticking" ex-Rough Rider, one gets a picture of a worried President who understood the weakness of American seapower: underdeveloped bases overseas and a technologically obsolescent fleet. Roosevelt wanted to use this period of crisis to enlarge and modernize the Navy, at a reasonable rate; yet he did not want to stampede Congress and the nation, or Japan for that matter, by jingo talk. His skill as a leader was never better manifested than in this period. Sending the Great White Fleet around the world, as Neu interprets it, became more than a spectacular gambit. It assured the Pacific Coast that Teddy still loved it; it showed the Antipodes that Americans shared their interests; it demonstrated to Japan that the United States was a friend—a reasonably well-armed one; and it paraded American naval competence before Europeans who might have wondered if the U.S. Navy could still maneuver outside its Caribbean drill field. The public pride generated by this voyage almost guaranteed that Congress would continue the program of capital ship construction that the Navy so desperately needed.

In describing Roosevelt's efforts to enlarge and modernize the Navy, Neu also pays close attention to the problem of establishing a defensible naval base in the Far East. Relying on General Board records plus previous scholarship, particularly that of W.R. Braisted and Louis Morton who dealt with the Philippine base question in the "war scare" years of 1907-1909, Professor Neu illustrates the interrelationship of foreign policy and seapower. Along the way he also airs a little soiled linen when describing the Army-Navy conflict over the proper site for the Philippine base.

When tracing out the diplomacy of Roosevelt and Secretary of State Elihu Root, Professor Neu displays the admirable range of his research endeavors. The American, English, Canadian, and Japanese (on microfilm) diplomatic archives were intelligently mined. Through his research, Neu corrects details here and there that others had missed and gives yet another interpretation to the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908. He does demonstrate, without too much stress, that the new Anglo-American rapprochement of this period, along with California politics and naval weakness, did set limits to American diplomacy with Japan. The book is competently researched, well-written--even suspenseful, and presents a fresh view of a fascinating President in action.

GERALD E. WHEELER
Ernest J. King Chair

Rogers, William D. *The Twilight Struggle*. New York: Random House, 1967. 289p.

The title of this book refers to the struggle for freedom and economic growth of the underdeveloped nations of the world. Mr. Rogers, who was active in the administration of the Alliance for Progress in its early years, states that the near-fatal trip of Vice President Nixon to South America in 1958 and the Communist capture of the Castro revolution in Cuba dramatically

pointed out the need for a change in United States-Latin American policy. It was not until 1961 and the new Democratic administration, however, that a bold new approach in the form of the Alliance for Progress was formulated. This major change in American policy was only the first of many changes necessary to place the nations of Latin America on the road to meaningful development. Severe problems, such as population growth, land reform, housing, education, food production and distribution, transportation, economic policies, and political systems had to be attacked, not simply with finances, but with American leadership and talent as well.

While describing many of the problems and successes of the Alliance for Progress in economic terms, the author states that the problem of development is at heart a political problem. The Alliance planners recognized this fact and tied most assistance to self-help and reform. Though the program has achieved some notable successes, particularly in such projects as roads, schools, power plants, and housing, large-scale progress is dependent on basic institutional changes which have not been rapidly forthcoming. Thus, after 6 years and the commitment of \$7 billion, poverty is still widespread, trade deficits are high, and progress toward industrialization agonizingly slow. Mr. Rogers, nevertheless, remains optimistic as to the long-range success of the Alliance program if the United States continues to increase her participation in the Alliance. His optimism is based on the spirit of cooperation, increase in the number of progressive Latin-American leaders, and the impetus for change and reform which have been generated since the Alliance began. Except for some parochialism in describing Republican efforts and the contributions of the U.S. Foreign Service, the author has presented a thorough and objective study of the Alliance for Progress.

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The book gives the reader cause for considerable thought and concern. If, as the author states, "It is the developing world which is the major matter of business for U.S. foreign policy," then this volume is a valuable contribution to the study of American foreign policy. In

any case, it is an interesting and informative study of the revolution that is occurring in Latin America and the part that the United States is playing in that revolution.

D.J. KERSHAW
Commander, U.S. Navy



All men are frightened. The more intelligent they are, the more they are frightened. The courageous man is the man who forces himself, in spite of his fear, to carry on. Discipline, pride, self-respect, self-confidence, and love of glory are attributes which will make a man courageous even when he is afraid.

George S. Patton, Jr.: War As I Knew It, 1947



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A commander must accustom his staff to a high tempo from the outset, and continuously keep them up to it. If he once allows himself to be satisfied with norms, or anything less than an all-out effort, he gives up the race from the starting post, and will sooner or later be taught a bitter lesson.

Erwin Rommel, 1891-1944