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FOREWORD

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College.

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The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the lecturers and authors, and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department nor of the Naval War College.

John T. Hayward

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Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
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'TOO MUCH TO ASK?'

Proposals regarding the Financial Arrangements for Next of Kin of Captured, Missing or Deceased Service Members

by

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(This article is based on a speech delivered at the Naval War College on 19 September 1966. A transcript of the speech was forwarded to BuPers for review on 17 October 1966. Ed.)

'TOO MUCH TO ASK?'

On 24 August 1966, the *Newport Daily News* featured an article entitled "Wife Faces Problems When Soldier Missing or Captured." This, obviously, is the understatment of all time as far as next of kin of captured, missing, or killed military personnel are concerned. The article concerned financial aspects of the next of kin situation. Two quotes are pertinent:

(1) The money the serviceman had been sending home stops and the pay he was getting is frozen. It takes weeks or months to unfreeze. /sic/

(2) One woman tried to get quick cash from the Air Force after her husband was shot down and an officer at the base told her to go on relief.

In his message 261930Z Aug 66, CNO stated that newspaper articles throughout the country had been extremely critical of Armed Forces treatment of dependents of personnel captured or missing. The CNO message also set forth the duties and functions of the Casualty Assistance Calls Officer for the information and guidance of Navy members. *Navy Times* confirmed CNO's concern in the 7 September 1966 issue, stating that the civilian newspapers gave extremely distorted views of service programs which are functioning effectively to provide information and assistance to the next of kin of missing and captured men. Concern was also expressed that civilian news articles would be shown to U.S. prisoners as "proof" that they had been abandoned by the government. Regarding the lady who was told to go on relief, said *Navy Times*, investigation revealed that she had written to the President and received both money and an apology from the Air Force. And Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance reported to the President that "a review of the facts indicates that the story in civilian newspapers was inaccurate in many respects and incorrect in its conclusions."

In the same article, a "reliable, unnamed" Pentagon official expressed the opinion that "there is no way for a wife to get immediate cash to tide her over until formalities are completed."

I take exception with this official and intend to illustrate that there are things that *can* and

should be done to financially aid the next of kin of captured, missing, or killed military personnel.

So much for background. I hope that these press excerpts have set the stage and have, perhaps, caused you to ponder, "what would my next of kin do?"

The purpose of this article is to set forth proposed courses of action that would provide both initial financial aid and a guaranteed, regular monthly income for the next of kin of captured, missing, or deceased military personnel.

First a review of what occurs when a serviceman is captured, missing, or killed is pertinent to the discussion at hand.

On the Scene:

> The Command forwards: the casualty report, the service records, the pay record, and the personal effects. At this point, for all intents and purposes, the Command's work is done.

At BuPers:

> The Casualty Assistance Calls Officer in the area of the next of kin is notified of the situation, the Navy Finance Office is notified, and application forms for benefits are forwarded to the next of kin.

Next of Kin:

> The Casualty Assistance Calls Officer and/or a Chaplain impart the news concerning the service member.

With this as a basis, let us discuss the case of a *captured* or *missing* member.

To what is the next of kin entitled?

> No death gratuity
> No lump sum leave payment
> No dependency and indemnity compensation
> No serviceman's group life insurance
> No social security benefits
> (after all, the next of kin is not a "survivor")

About the only thing the next of kin of captured or missing personnel can apply for is the member's unpaid pay and allowances. This could be next to nothing.

What Can Be Done? The Casualty Report message could state the value of unpaid pay and allowances and the amount and value of unused annual leave the member has on the books. BuPers could, based on the financial information contained in the Casualty Report message, authorize the Casualty Assistance Calls Officer to draw--on behalf of the next of kin--the monetary value of the unused leave from the nearest disbursing officer.

This innovation could be effected by the service member indicating--on a revised Record of Emergency Data--that he wants unused leave at the time of, and during, confinement or missing status to be paid to the next of kin. In a captured or missing status, leave on the books is of little value to the service member.

One interesting facet of next of kin financial considerations concerns itself with the present system of percentages of pay, designated by the service member on his current Record of Emergency Data, which go to the next of kin in the event the member is captured or missing. The Service Secretary has the authority to change the percentage set forth in the Record of Emergency Data if such change will assist the next of kin who is in dire financial straits.

Next let us discuss the case of a member who is *deceased*.

To what is the next of kin entitled?

Death gratuity
Lump sum leave
Unpaid pay and allowances
Serviceman's group life insurance
Eligibility for survivor's benefits
Eligibility for dependency and indemnity compensation

and

33 feet of application forms and instructions from the Casualty Branch of the Bureau of Naval Personnel!!

The emphasis on 33 feet of forms is not intended to be facetious nor to reflect adversely on the performance of the Casualty Branch of BuPers. Rather, it is presented to illustrate the impact of such forms on next of kin, such as a grieving mother of toddlers or a member's parents who possibly can't read.

Coincidentally, the 33 foot package is comprised of:

Instructions:

12 feet

Forms:

11 feet for the Navy Finance Center
4 feet for the Social Security Agency
4 feet for the Veteran's Administration
2 feet for a new Dependent's ID Card

These forms are all blank and have to be completed and forwarded to the appropriate activity by the next of kin.

What Can Be Done? The Casualty Report message could state the value of unpaid pay and allowances and the amount and value of unused annual leave the member has on the books. BuPers could authorize the Casualty Assistance Calls Officer to draw--on behalf of the next of kin--the total amount due from the nearest disbursing officer. This BuPers authorization could also allow the Casualty Assistance Calls Officer to draw the Death Gratuity for the next of kin. Based on the information contained in the member's Service Record, BuPers could complete all the forms to the maximum extent possible immediately upon receipt of the casualty report message and forward them to the applicable Casualty Assistance Calls Officer. In addition, BuPers could forward a personal letter of sympathy, signed by a military officer, to the next of kin explaining, in detail, what is being done for the next of kin and what is to be expected from the Casualty Assistance Calls Officer.

The war in Vietnam is a 7-day a week, 24-hour a day job. So too should the above functions be established.

One form currently requires not only that the next of kin sign eight copies but that two witnesses attest the next of kin's signature by signing all eight copies themselves. This can certainly be done away with by having the Casualty Assistance Calls Officer witness any and all forms for the next of kin.

All the next of kin should have to do is review the BuPers completed forms, verify them, and sign. The Casualty Assistance Calls Officer could insure they were properly submitted to the appropriate activities after his personal review.

Finally, let us discuss the Social Security and Veteran's Administration benefits of the next of kin.

What Does the Next of Kin Get from the Social Security and the Veteran's Administration? Under the current system, once the completed Social Security and Veteran's Administration forms have been completed and forwarded, the next of kin are more or less on their own until the first pension check arrives.

What Can Be Done? Perhaps BuPers could initiate a revolving fund--at the Navy Finance Center--which would start regular pension checks to the next of kin on the first day of the month following the demise of the service member. The amounts of these checks would be the same as what the Social Security Agency and Veteran's Administration would furnish eventually. Such checks would be provided with the stipulation that the next of kin's account would be liquidated as soon as the Social Security and Veteran's Administration checks were scheduled on a regular basis to the next of kin.

Procedurally, the Navy would advise both the Social Security Agency and the Veteran's Administration of how much money had been forwarded to the next of kin by the Navy, and the agencies would forward money to the Navy revolving fund until the money advanced to the next of kin was offset. The agencies would then forward all checks directly to the next of kin. By this procedure, the next of kin would have a guaranteed, regular monthly income regardless of the delay encountered in processing the pension requests through the Social Security Agency and the Veteran's Administration.

Summary. I have attempted to set forth the financial plight of many of the next of kin of

captured, missing and deceased service members and what I consider as remedial actions that could be initiated to lessen the next of kin's financial problems. Perhaps this analysis will assist in making the proposals set forth herein a reality. The discussion has been primarily concerned with what the Navy could, and should, do for the next of kin, and the proposals are equally applicable to *all* military departments. The proposals have application not only in wartime, but in peacetime as well. In conclusion, let me present this question: "If you were captured, missing, or killed would you consider the financial proposals set forth to be *too much to ask* for your next of kin?"

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Lieutenant Commander Raymond L. O'Neil, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy, holds a Bachelor's Degree in Business Administration from Siena College. He has served as Supply Officer aboard the *U.S.S. Pandemus (ARL-18)* and at Naval Air Station, Agana; as Director, Contract Administration, U.S. Navy Purchasing Office, Washington, D.C.; as Purchase Superintendent, Naval Shipyard, Philadelphia, Pa.; and as Assistant Supply Officer, *U.S.S. Enterprise (CVA(N)-65)*. During his tour aboard *Enterprise*, Lieutenant Commander O'Neil spent seven months in the Vietnam area.

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

APPLICATIONS OF RECENT SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEYS TO PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ABOARD SHIP

A Research Paper written by
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INTRODUCTION

In commenting on the highhanded, strictly authoritarian methods of the old bull-of-the-woods foreman in the machine shop, a freshly employed engineer observed to one of his colleagues, "Someday Swede will find that he is being dragged screaming into the 20th century." This incident is recognized as being typical of past happenings in the lives of all experienced managers in which resistance to progress has been displayed for the negative factor it is; but even Swede, in his sourest moments, knows that the world will progress in spite of him.

What about progress, then, in the art (or science) of personnel management? Can increased performance be gained by new management methods? What is it that social researchers have learned about people, both as individuals and as groups, which is different from past experience, and how can a knowledge of this social change be used to advantage in solving personnel problems aboard Navy ships? Or are the old methods good enough?

This paper attempts to answer these questions by studying social change as it affects both individuals and groups and by using the findings of this research to formulate recommendations which would be useful to the shipboard leader in realizing a more progressive set of techniques for better personnel management.

As a general guideline for limiting the scope of this investigation, the following definition of management set forth by Fred Korth in the *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* was used:

> Management, formalistically, is intelligent manipulation of resources, circumstances and energy to achieve a desired result . . . the military organization requires extreme precision in material and utmost attention to detail to assure victory.
>
> The accelerated progress of weapons and tactics has brought a need for equivalent readiness, responsiveness and depth in military support and for equivalent care and precision in perfecting its management.
>
> . . .I believe that, as a basic principle of good management, there must be a positive accountable leader for each substantive organization who will set clean-cut objectives and provide a clear path for those under him.

More to set the tone rather than the scope of the paper, this more liberal definition of management by Dr. Harold Koontz was considered:

> I have come to the conclusion that management is the art of getting things done through and with people in *formally organized* groups, the art of creating an

environment in such an organized group where people can perform as individuals and yet cooperate toward attainment of group goals, the art of removing blocks to such performance, the art of optimizing efficiency in effectively reaching goals.

Guided by the above definitions, this investigation begins by considering social pressures and recent changes in the social complex which contribute heavily to the formation of attitudes in potential bluejackets today. Chapter II carries the examination from the individual to the group to discover what makes a group effective, how the individual relates to the group, and what the possibilities are for stressing group leadership as opposed to individual leadership. Group and individual reactions are then outlined for job-oriented versus person-oriented supervision techniques and results with a view toward discovering progress in leadership orientation within the past few years. New information is sought on the latest methods of coping with morale and discipline problems. The emphasis here is on finding ways to remove the "blocks to performance" by using better methods to discover and correct morale and discipline problems. Chapter V seeks a way of "optimizing efficiency in effectively reaching goals" by measuring personnel performance in such a way as to be more objective while increasing the motivation of the individual.

The last chapter will analyze lessons learned in the preceding chapters, and solutions to the questions asked at the beginning of this introduction will be sought.

I—GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN THE GREAT SOCIETY

When Charles Dickens, gifted social commentator of 19th century-England, produced his fine work, *Great Expectations*, he must have had some thoughts about the applicability of his theme to societies of the future. It is doubtful, however, that such a poet of prose as Dickens could have foreseen the exponential rise of social reform, of science and technology, of population growth, and of "great expectations" that the present generation has witnessed. President Lyndon B. Johnson refers to the people of the United States as the "Great Society." The 89th Congress has passed more social legislation than any other congress before it. The struggle for social equality, for

self-determination, for equitable distribution of resources, for equal representation has never been so vigorous and vociferous. One wonders, then, what the impact of this social change will be on future leadership and manpower management problems.

First, some of the salient sociological factors which contribute to the attitudes and expectations of today's military man will be examined to see how leaders may be required to adjust their thinking, utilize new theories, and bring forth a more effective personnel management philosophy in the fleet.

A heavy contributor to personnel attitudes today is the rapid rise in the national standard of living. Over the past 20 years Americans have come knowingly to accept the luxuries of yesteryear as the necessities of the hour; however, this does not concern production of goods as the sole contributing factor. It involves tremendously improved communications, including rapid transportation; economic growth and close control of the economy; progressive legislation; and the fruits of scientific research and technological development.

A second facet of changing national attitudes can be shown by some statistics on education which show that in spite of recent reports of rising numbers of high school "drop-outs," the average educational level of today's workers is higher than ever. The actual percentage of "drop-outs" is decreasing because both the population and the government are becoming sharply attuned to the advantages of an adequate education. In 1940 workers with a high school or college education comprised 39.1 per cent of the labor force. In 1950 it was 50.3 per cent, and it rose to over 62 per cent by 1960.[1] Although these figures may contain hidden factors which may justify a somewhat guarded attitude toward them, the trend is unmistakable. It is expected that recent legislation will nurture this trend, and, since education is now listed as a national resource, future legislation of a helpful nature may be expected.

Although there is not space here to examine all of the social ramifications of automation, a third social force of importance, let it be understood that there is more involved than a mechanical transfer and layoff process, more than simple retraining and channelization of human resources. Sociologists are beginning to consider the real problems of increased

leisure time that automation is likely to afford. Unions are seeking the six-hour day. Politicians are concerned about unemployment problems, and a national attitude toward the effects of automation is developing which portends a feeling of unrest, of less security where more security is the goal. This means that mixed emotions abound in an era of utopian progress.

This latter problem is compounded by the emergence of a labor force that is spreading in age span. The proportions of both younger and older people in industry and in the military are growing. For the first time in 180 years the median age of the population is dropping. This creates attitude problems because the young people want to be educated in managerial and technical skills, and the older people want to stay on the job and take advantage of better retirement programs later in life. The increase in the average life of the individual combines with the birth rate to create security and employment problems for the future, and, in addition, specialization needs compound these problems from an educational standpoint.

Within the working force, attitudes of morale and discipline are also changing. "Supervisors and managers report in interviews that people are less willing to accept pressure and close supervision than was the case a decade ago."[2] Also, the progressive approach, both at school and in the home, has had its effect. To some it seems that people are less respectful, more inclined to be selfish, less willing to help maintain law and order. The public push toward more individual freedom for both men and women is being undertaken more aggressively and more frequently by organized groups.

In light of this burgeoning sociological change, what are the resultant attitudes of the men who are to be managed aboard ship? There are three important groups whose effects we must consider: (1) young males about to enter military service, (2) the adult civilians who are the parents and guardians of these men, and (3) the men who have been indoctrinated in Navy programs and who are currently serving aboard ship. This latter group will be discussed in some detail in the next chapter.

Beginning with the pre-Navy youngsters, a trend is developed which shows how these 16- to 20-year-old civilian males feel about the service:

> While a career in the military service as an officer is held in higher esteem as an occupation by teen-agers than by their elders, a career as an enlisted man carries little prestige with young men today.
>
> Greater opportunities to advance in civilian life, lack of adequate family life, and inadequate financial rewards are cited as the main reasons why more officers and enlisted men don't stay in the service as a life's work.
>
> Another reason frequently mentioned is that both officers and enlisted men do not find the work "sufficiently challenging"; they get bored.
>
> Young men today are overwhelmingly inclined to look upon their military service as an onerous obligation, and not one from which they can derive many advantages.
>
> Three out of four think the typical young man views military service as "something to do if he must and get it over with" and roughly four out of every ten say that if they have to serve, "they are are going to get it over as quickly as possible and get out."
>
> Only eight out of every one hundred have a fairly definite belief that they would like military service.
>
> Despite their over-all favorable attitudes toward the . . . reserve program . . . less than one in every ten . . . plans to take advantage of it.
>
> As might be expected, the influence of motion pictures in creating favorable and unfavorable impressions about military service is far greater among members of this group than on their elders.[3]

The attitudes of the adult civilian population are somewhat different, but the same structure of attitudes exists:

> A career in the military service does not carry great prestige with adults. . . .Inadequate financial rewards, dislike of service discipline and regimentation, lack of adequate family life, and less opportunity to advance than in civilian life are the greatest drawbacks of a military career in the public mind.[4]

Thus, people today have great expectations of increased material wealth, a comfortable family life, reasonable advancement opportunities, higher education, more leisure time, steady employment, less pressure and regimentation, and (if it can be avoided) freedom from the onerous burden of military service. It must be realized, however, that these attitudes are strongly dependent upon our national political and economic stability. Yet the trend continues, as with the demonstrations for peace in Vietnam, and these attitudes must be considered in arriving at a solution to better shipboard personnel management.

With this brief background it is now possible to narrow the focus of the investigation to groups and their characteristics.

II-THE GROUP

Knowing how to deal with a group requires an understanding of what a group is; what the goals of a group are; what its characteristics are in terms of attitudes, cohesiveness, communication ability, and social structure; and what makes a group highly effective. It is also necessary to know how these characteristics help determine an effective leadership policy directed toward the group instead of the individual.

A good beginning, then, would acquaint the leader with a definition of a group in relation to the leadership problem: "One useful definition of . . . internal groups is 'a collection of individuals whose existence as a collection is rewarding to the individuals.'"[1] A more general but, nevertheless, helpful dictionary definition of a group shows it to be "a number of persons . . . classified together because of common characteristics /and/ community of interests . . .. Thus, in the definition of a group one detects an implication of group satisfaction through the attainment of both group and individual goals where individuals react with one another in

face-to-face situations.[2] In everyday life, "the triumph of this . . . is the capacity of man to create orderly human relations, or a *group* out of a collection of individuals."[3]

Many leaders realize intuitively that groups have goals just as individuals have goals, but an understanding of the causes and effects of group behavior is better illuminated by recent studies. It has been found, for instance, that "group goals can push production down or up, depending upon the level at which the group sets them."[4] The sublety of this thought is not immediately apparent. It must be considered in the light of what is known to be true of group goal orientation. If the goals of the group are directed toward the satisfaction of their own self-interests, motivation to accomplish the goals of the organization may be lacking, and in order to bring about success the leader will have to insure coincidence of group goals with company goals.[5] In order to do this, supervisors must realize that:

> Every member of the organization /should/ feel that the values and goals of his work group amply reflect his own values and needs. He /should/ also feel that the values and objectives of the entire organization adequately reflect the values and needs of all members.
>
> Every member of the organization /should/ be identified with the objectives of the organization and the goals of the work group and see the accomplishment of them as the best way to meet his own needs and personal goals.[6]

If the group is faced with undefined organization goals, or if the job might be done better by individuals, then it is impossible for the group to take concerted action.[7] Yet it is common for organizations to form committees, panels, and work groups without considering the goals, the agenda, or even the projected duration of the group.

Characteristics of groups may be examined somewhat separately from goals, although it is impossible to draw a sharp line of division between them. Of interest in understanding group characteristics are the categories of behavior and attitudes, here lumped together because of their cause and effect relationship. In the usual situation "the person who

starts as a worker finds himself part of a rather close-knit group."[8] This group has already established the norms within which it is bound to exist, and the behavior of the individual must conform to the behavior of the group if he is to be considered a member of that group, although some "loners" exist without apparent dissatisfaction. The behavior standards of a group usually revolve about a solidarity which envisions the organization and its leaders as "distant and hostile."[9] Although while he is a member of a group a worker reaps all the rewards and punishments of belonging, he loses this status upon being promoted.[10] Workers consider him part of the "management hierarchy," but management does not think of him as an executive. Thus, the behavior and attitudes of the group are no longer part of his being.

The behavior of individuals within a work group is aimed in the direction of common consent:

> /Peter/ Drucker, in discussing output restrictions, expresses the opinion that open restrictions on output provided openly under the provisions of restrictive union rules and featherbedding are "only the part of the iceberg that is above water.[11] Much more important are the invisible, unwritten, informal restrictions decreed by the custom and common law of every plant," as reflected in the tacit setting of production quotas (by the work group) which a worker would be ill-advised to exceed.[12]

The attitudes and behavior of groups are therefore good indicators. Groups make much better measurement units (by a ratio of six to one) than do individual workers;[13] and the forces operating within groups "are important not only in influencing the behavior of individual work groups with regard to productivity, waste, absence, and the like, they also affect the behavior of entire organizations."[14]

Cohesiveness, as a group characteristic, is allied to attitudes and behavior but deserves more detailed treatment. Cohesiveness is "the force acting on group members that pulls them toward the group . . . . /It is/ the degree to which the members function as a group."[15] It is a quality dependent on how much individuals are willing to work for group goals while subordinating goals of their own.

> Among the determinants of cohesiveness is the extent to which the group develops standards that are acceptable to its members. These standards include methods of communicating, treatment of deviates from majority behavior, methods of decision-making, and the acceptance of group decisions. Researchers have found that this cohesiveness affects the effectiveness of the group.[16]

The high degree of cooperation and internal discipline found in a cohesive group will, depending upon how the group is led, serve to work for or against an organization.[17] On the plus side, the benefits of favorably-oriented cohesion are more effective communication, higher levels of influence and interaction, greater decentralization, hearty acceptance of organization goals, higher motivation, better mental health, better productivity, less tension and conflict, and a feeling that supervisors are supportive rather than obstructive.[18] One must take into account, however, that effective communication and higher levels of influence and interaction are also characteristic of negatively oriented groups.[19]

Social studies show that "the greater the peer-group loyalty, the greater the influence which the goals of the group have on performance . . .. Thus, in work groups with high peer-group loyalty, the variations in production from worker to worker are less than in work groups with low peer-group loyalty."[20]

When the goals of the organization disregard the goals of a cohesive group, poor production will result. In this case, the group resorts to the influence of an informal leader.[21] It is possible, in fact, for the group to lose its cohesiveness under the low-pressure application of opposing goals, especially if there are wide variations of status within the group.[22] Thus, despite the degree of cohesiveness, little can be accomplished without a sensible awareness of goal coincidence.

It is a highly cohesive group which finds itself in command of effective communications, the efficiency of which can have a vital impact of the effectiveness of the whole organization.[23] Communications may be defined as "all the processes through which information, attitudes, ideas, or opinions are transmitted

and received, providing a basis for common understanding and/or agreement."[24]

In considering the relationship of group cohesiveness to the communications process, one should examine the problem from the points of view illuminated by the principle of *centrality* and *induction*. Centrality is the degree of "funneling of communication toward one member of a group."[25] "Induction /is/ the direction of influence toward either high or low production" and it may be considered in either a positive or negative sense.[26]

> Communications networks that provide centrality coupled with worker satisfaction would be expected to yield greater productivity. The group structure should be so arranged that communications distance will be at a minimum. Motivation, or direction of induction, of group members, is the overriding factor--high cohesiveness coupled with negative induction seems to yield least productivity--and features of the communication that enhance positive induction are, therefore, of greatest importance. Any arrangement of the group structure that produces a communications net favorable to the feeling, on the part of the group members, of participation in decisions and control of group activities is most likely, other things equal, to yield positive induction, worker satisfaction, and high productivity.[27]

One last category of group characteristics should be discussed. In the discussion on group cohesiveness the informal leader was mentioned. Whatever the group, it will have a leader. Whether this person is officially appointed by management or is the charismatic man of influence within the group itself depends solely on the leadership qualities of the appointed leader. These qualities in a leadership-by-influence situation are defined by "whatever leader behavior is found helpful by the group in working out shared objectives, setting goals and procedures, building internal group unity and discipline, exchanging much needed information, and making resources available . . . ."[28] It has been found that the appointed leader is, at the outset, in the best position to lead by influence, but he must have the "inclination and ability to do so."[29] Thus,

the appointed leader may never be aware of his "golden opportunity" and may consequently become a leader on the organization chart only.

In discussing the influential leader, Maier relates that the "authoritarian manager, relying on his power and callous to his social responsibilities, isolates himself from his group and establishes himself as a threat . . .."[30] The point is made that the influence and power that the real leader has is derived from others,[31] and "once the conflicts of the workplace become formalized, compromised, and frozen . . . the difficulty of upgrading the . . . level of morale and productivity is increased . . .."[32] In the following chapter the characteristics of autocratic and democratic leadership are examined in detail.

III—AUTOCRATS VERSUS DEMOCRATS

The Navy has traditionally presented to the general public an image of autocratic rule, of instant obedience to sharply barked orders in the heat of battle, of tight discipline in a rigidly oriented vertical organization, of the "can do" spirit in the face of possible defeat. The entertainment media of recent years (*Caine Mutiny, Mr. Roberts, Francis Joins the Navy, McHale's Navy*, etc.) has tended to distort this image somewhat. Hollywood and Broadway notwithstanding, the U.S. Navy still retains some of its former dashing image, even in the face of occasional poor reports in the press and in the national attitudes toward service life in general.[1]

Is the Navy that same autocratic, spit-and-polish organization today? If so, is this the right approach to manpower management? The public realizes that in wartime (general conflict on a worldwide basis) there always has been enough men, money, and materials to throw into the breach. A decision is made, an order is summarily issued, and response to that order takes place immediately without regard to such administrative problems as cost effectiveness, personnel shortages, career incentives, lack of operating funds, and other peacetime impedimenta. The entire nation and its warmaking machinery operate effectively in the midst of colossal waste.

In peacetime, however, the Navy is forced to pay more attention to its resources. Even in "wartime peacetime" the armed services are at the mercy of a

watchdog Congress and a diligent Bureau of Budget. Also, it is not a popular thing to be a serviceman in peacetime.[2] Thus, if money were available to man ships and shore stations fully, there might still be a shortage of willing hands. Therefore, those resources which the services do have must be used in such a way as to squeeze the most benefit out of them over an uncertainly long period. In industry this principle relates to profit motivation, waste reduction, and cost accounting.[3] The Navy also attempts to reduce waste and cut costs, but the profit motive is replaced by the effective defense motive.

In attempting to prepare for the best defense in a stringent monetary environment, how do the services get the best from their active manpower resources? How does industry look at this problem from a point of view which includes similar goals? In order to understand these questions and some possible answers to them, one must consider two prevailing leadership concepts employed by supervisors in industry today: employee-centered supervision and job-centered supervision.

Rensis Likert, Director of the Institute for Social Research and Professor of Psychology and Sociology at the University of Michigan, makes succinct points which define the job-centered supervisor:

> Many companies base their operations upon theories which state that it is management's responsibility to:
>
> 1. Break the total operation into simple, component parts or tasks.
> 2. Develop the best way to carry out each of the component parts.
> 3. Hire people with appropriate aptitudes and skills to perform each of these tasks.
> 4. Train these people to do their respective tasks in the specified way.
> 5. Provide supervision to see that they perform their designated tasks, using the specified procedure . . . .[4]

That this has strong social and organizational implications as a method of utilizing personnel is readily seen. Most will recognize that " . . . there are people with more authoritarian values who are led to feel that most employees, because of their acute need for certainty, security, and structure, wish to

participate in an absolute minimum of decision-making activities."[5] Yet, such an attitude, regardless of whether it fosters high or low producers, demands a highly vertical hierarchy of management which makes decentralization difficult to achieve. Although job-centered supervision is highly efficient where simple tasks are involved and seems to be quicker and neater, such a system lacks flexibility; it stifles innovation; and it is a fact of social documentation that "supervisors who base their activity on this concept of management are more often found to be in charge of units producing at a low . . . level."[6]

The story of an assistant manager of an industrial department which had a poor production record illustrates the above point further: "This interest-in-people approach is all right, but it's a luxury. I've got to keep pressure on for production, and when I can get production up, then I can afford to take time to show an interest in my employees and their problems!"[7] This sounds much like a frequently repeated phrase heard in jest in the Navy today: "Now all liberty is cancelled until morale improves."

The other extreme of the supervision spectrum has advantages and disadvantages which are also of interest for the shipboard supervisor. Employee-centered supervision involves some well-known leadership concepts:

> What we have in mind when we use the term "democracy" is not "permissiveness" or "laissez faire," but a system of values--a "climate of beliefs" governing behavior--which people are internally compelled to affirm by deeds as well as words. These values include:
>
> 1. Full and free *communication*, regardless of rank and power.
> 2. A reliance on *consensus*, rather than the more customary forms of coercion or compromise to manage conflict.
> 3. The idea that *influence* is based on technical competence and knowledge rather than on the vagaries of personal whims or prerogatives of power.
> 4. An atmosphere that permits and even encourages emotional *expression* as well as task-oriented acts.
> 5. A basically *human* bias, one that accepts the inevitability of conflict between the organization and the individual, but

> which is willing to cope with and mediate this conflict on rational grounds.[8]

The above method of supervision has been referred to as "participative leadership," and one can see that in the heat of battle there would be little time or sense in applying it to the life-or-death situation. However, it may be possible to use the employee-centered approach in less hectic situations aboard ship. In industry it is claimed that supervisors with the highest producing sections use the employee-oriented method or one which leans in that direction.[9] From a management point of view, this method fosters a highly decentralized organization:

> Many people who value hard work, self-improvement, the Horatio Alger tradition, group participation, and democratic progress believe that the typical employee sincerely desires a high degree of job autonomy and is eager to accept responsibility for guiding his own and his group's activities. On this premise, it has been argued that decision making should be pushed to the lowest possible rank in the organization, ideally to the machine-tender level . . .. It is believed that this exercise will not only strengthen and develop the employees, but will improve their morale as well.[10]

How do these two systems of personnel management compare in recent social research studies? The following graphs will give a comparative illustration of answers to this question:

NUMBER OF FIRST-LINE SUPERVISORS WHO ARE:



Fig. 1. "Employee-centered supervisors are higher producers than job-centered supervisors."[11]

DEPARTMENT PRODUCTIVITY



Fig. 2. "Relationship between unreasonable pressure men feel for high performance and department productivity /sic/."[12]

NUMBER OF FIRST-LINE SUPERVISORS WHO ARE:



Fig. 3. "Low-production section heads are more closely supervised than high production heads."[13]

It is manifestly important for the naval officer to have a solid understanding of both methods of supervision so that he may use them effectively in controlling his sailors through enlightened shipboard personnel management techniques. The following discussion looks at morale and discipline in relation to close and general supervision.

IV—MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

When considering morale and discipline in relation to personnel management problems aboard ship, one must examine written sources carefully. There is much emotional writing about these vital topics, and a careful evaluation of an author's personal involvement is required before his material may be classified as acceptable to support a thesis. Such areas of human interrelationships are difficult enough to categorize, isolate, and classify without the added burden of sifting out emotional shadings based upon personal experiences of the reporter. It is helpful, therefore, to set forth a scientific division of key words in order to avoid indistinct generalizations and uncertain concepts. In addition, it is important to define not only morale and discipline, but also attitudes and opinions in order to clearly separate one from another. Only then may morale and discipline be spoken of in the same context.

Morale "is akin to the common notion of team spirit."[1] It is a "moral or mental condition, with respect to courage, discipline, confidence, enthusiasm, willingness to endure hardship, etc." In the definition of morale there is an implication of group (as opposed to individual) reactions. Note that it is impossible to separate morale from discipline in this sense.

Discipline, in the same context, is "training that develops self-control, character, or orderliness and efficiency." Those negative and academic aspects have been stripped from the above dictionary definition both to simplify the issue and to direct it toward a supportive meaning. "A well-disciplined organization is one whose members work with enthusiasm, willingness, and zest as individuals and as a group to fulfill the mission of the organization with expectation of success."[2] Here again, morale and discipline are interrelated both by the character of the defining words and by the connotation of group reactions.

The term "attitude" denotes a "frame of reference that influences the individual's views or opinions on various topics."[3] Attitudes, which are formed through experience, motivate behavior and are difficult to change. Opinions are expressions "of an evaluative judgment or point of view regarding a specific topic or subject . . .. Opinions, however, typically are influenced by the more generalized attitude."[4] Both attitudes and opinions relate to the individual.

This chapter concerns itself with recent sociological findings about morale and discipline, and even though the terms have been defined, it will be necessary to provide a brief background representing commonly held views before comparing and contrasting new findings with them.

There is always an element which harks to the "old days," and although this is often the most emotional viewpoint the sense of it cannot be denied:

> Bring back the bands! Break out the swords! Increase unit and service competition; it is the breath of life. Build up the elite ranks. Restore the authority of command, the dignity of rank; give the company commander power to make and break his noncoms. Make the noncom proud of his stripes; increase his authority and prestige. The attempt to equate the technician and the leader of men, which started in World War II, has to be modified; the troop leading sergeant must have distinctive arm patches and monetary rewards.[5]

In words less inflamatory but every bit as confident, a former Chief of Naval Operations said this about morale and discipline: (1) Information--the failure to keep subordinates well informed often results in their eventual lack of interest. They lose touch with the current situation. (2) Lack of interest in juniors--one never learns their problems. (3) General slackness within the command--personnel begin to think that way. (4) Instability--personnel transfers, operating schedules, and daily routine must be stable to provide certainty and security.[6]

> There are far too many inexperienced commanders of stations and ships (some of them rather senior) who use courts martial to correct defects which should have been corrected by direct personal action of the

> division officers or by the captain himself. Direct personal action early in the game will save many a court and will greatly increase the effectiveness of any command; but it does require knowledge of incipient trouble before it occurs, and it does necessitate a lot of time spent with subordinates.[7]

These honorable concepts of morale and discipline have served the United States well over the years. Is it possible to improve upon them? Of course, the possibility of betterment always exists. Recent writings take account of both established teachings and new social trends in encouraging a fresh outlook on problems of discipline and morale:

> . . .In order to lay a solid foundation, leadership training must begin in the schools with added emphasis on patriotism and discipline. Starting from the cradle, children must again be taught that the nation depends on the people, and *is* the people. The current socialistic trend wherein the people are coming to rely on the government must be reversed. Plain, old-fashioned patriotism must be preached. The stigma attached to military service must be removed.[8]

The above quote, when purged of its emotional content, reveals an acute awareness of social change and advocates a combatant force to reverse the unwanted effects of a growing socialist state. Other less-charged sources take this national change into account in morale and discipline evaluation by recognizing the change as a fact and by defining the resulting reactions in terms of psychological realizations and commonsense recommendations. A six-year study of motivation research effort conducted at Texas Instruments effectively combines old doctrine with social change as it affects workers in the 1960's. It was found the positive morale factors were, as one would suspect, the familiar ones of responsibility, advancement opportunity, growth potential, earned recognition, the feeling of achievement which comes from doing work which one enjoys.[9] Negative factors were concentrated in agents which were mainly peripheral to the job itself, i.e., such fringe benefits as group insurance, recreation programs, and employee services; titles and seniority rights; wages; safety and work rules.[10] Workers become dissatisfied "when opportunities for meaningful

achievement are eliminated and they become sensitized to their environment and begin to find fault."[11] The job of the supervisor, then, is to provide the satisfaction of both motivation and maintenance needs. The first is concentrated in the center of the job and the second surrounds it:

> In terms of day-to-day behavior patterns, the role of the competent supervisor includes providing each individual with the requisite job information, maintaining high performance expectations, encouraging goal-setting, and he exercises independent judgment, providing recognition and rewards commensurate with achievements, and maintaining an atmosphere of approval in which failure is a basis for growth rather than recrimination.[12]

One gets the idea that the above quote is a trade restatement of Admiral Burke's views and that nothing new is learned here. However, this is not strictly true. By dispassionately segregating needs as motivational factors, the supervisor is more able to get quickly to the root of the problem whether it be one of motivation or maintenance. By examining the morale or discipline problem in the light of modern social knowledge he can better understand what is lacking and what it takes to fill the gap.

It is easy to read quite a bit about morale and discipline, and it is equally easy to understand the factors involved. The psychology of the field is not difficult to understand, and, once learned, it tends to stick. But the root of the problem for many supervisors is not in understanding that there is trouble in the morale or discipline department but that of understanding what the indicators--the danger signals--are as they are developing (and not after it is all over). There may be a general lack of appreciation on the part of the supervisor as to how much control he has over an incipient situation. Here recent social research illuminates the answer to the problem.

Where the problem may be considered more one of discipline than of morale, certain "flags" or indicators show themselves from the beginning. Trouble seems to compound trouble. Foremen might let minor slips go by even though everyone knows the rules. Then someone will want to test the situation and see just how far they can go. When the infractions build up to an annoying frequency, the foreman

gets irritated enough to discipline one of the offenders.[13] The reverberations from such a disciplinary action touch deeply upon morale. If a man is demoted, his place must be taken by a man trained to handle the job. This sort of action can cause a chain reaction of multiple job movements. If the man is suspended, his return requires him to use face-saving tactics.[14] A man fired is a resource loss in the same way that a man who quits is a resource loss. Fortunately, in the Navy there are two phrases which are not commonly used. One is, "I quit." The other is "You're fired." Nevertheless, the loss in morale over a disciplinary action which could have been withheld or neutralized, had the indicators been watched, is a very real one.

There are other indicators of impending disciplinary trouble. Since self-respect is a principle motivator of satisfactory performance, it is requisite to successful leadership. Management may rule by fear, but this usually results in anger. What the supervisor must realize is that his greatest ally, respect, is the most easy factor to control. His control over job interest is less, and in the Navy he has no personal control over a man's wages.[15]

Morale indicators are more easily seen, especially aboard ship. Such factors as a.o.l. cases, mast reports, shipping-over rate, civil cases, promotions, and performance are obvious indicators of morale and are known to even the most junior officer. However, the measurement of morale becomes an illusive art. It is possible to have outstanding morale and poor performance side by side. It has been shown that attitudes are a key to the solution of the morale problem since it is the attitudes of the individuals which go to make up the morale of the group.

Some methods of learning attitudes are informal and are well known even to the beginner: overheard remarks, behavior of individuals and groups, and "seat of the pants" evaluations by supervisors.[16] It is possible, however, to get more accurate indicators of attitude. Provided a free path of communication is allowed, and provided the identity of the individual responding is scrupulously protected, it is possible to use attitude scales and opinion surveys to obtain collective reaction (and therefore morale).[17] If it is known that opinions are indicators of attitudes and attitudes are indicators of morale, sufficient data can be taken to feel the pulse of an outfit in a scientific and detached way. Of course, the suggestion box is a valuable source, informal

though it may seem. The mechanics of the attitude scale and the opinion survey are available but will not be covered here.[18]

It has been shown in this chapter that the established ideas of morale and discipline are valid. Modern sociological research agrees completely with conventional theory as to what the elements of morale and discipline are. However, recent studies show that it is possible to take the pulse of the organization in such a way as to head off troubles before they start. With a knowledge of indicators and how to use them, the shipboard administrator may take early action for the benefit of individuals and groups as well as for the ship itself. This is what Admiral Burke was preaching when he said that an officer must get out on deck and talk to his men, to instigate direct personal action with the hope of avoiding a court martial.

One indicator of rising or falling morale and discipline is the record of man's performance over a period of time. Performance appraisal will be dealt with separately in the next chapter because it is not only connected with morale and discipline, but also with promotion, transfer, education and training, job selection, and dismissal.

V—PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL

Performance appraisal in personnel management situations is always a popular subject for discussion. Such appraisal invariably involves one human being's making a judgment about another; thus, because of a personal involvement factor, attempts at objectivity in reporting a person's on-the-job performance are undermined by everyday psychological hindrances with evocative names: goal-frustration, expectation of reward, anxiety, potential threat, self-esteem, and the like.[1] Also, most appraisal systems in use today are weakened by subjective influences which distort the true picture of a man's present capabilities and future potential. These weaknesses are easily discovered, uneasily defined, and too easily misunderstood. Many appraisers have the ability to point out a few deficiencies in systems with which they are familiar, but few understand the roots of the appraisal problem sufficiently to be able to offer effective suggestion for improvement. Thus, merit rating is vigorously discussed, yet progress in achieving greater objectivity is exasperatingly slow.

For a good understanding of a truly objective approach to performance appraisal, the rater should at least have a working knowledge of subjective and human weaknesses which plague present reporting forms and interview methods. These are (in random order):

Lack of interpersonal consistency
Halo effect
Central tendency
Unmeasurable elements
Inconsistent training of raters
Ineptness at counseling
Inadequate forms
Leniency error
Overlap in traits
Subjective judgments
Rating to reward or penalize
Lack of knowledge or logic[2]

There is not space in this chapter to devote to a detailed discussion of each of the above weaknesses, nor is it necessary to outline why we appraise one another or what a merit rating should be in terms of objective measurement. However, a few of the above terms will be briefly clarified here, and the criteria for a good rating system will be set forth.

"Halo effect" refers to the tendency of the rater to grade a person high or low in all traits on the basis of the rater's impression of the person's grade in just one trait.[3]

"Leniency error" results from the rater's belief that all personnel are performing effectively.[4]

"Central tendency" results when all personnel are grouped around an average.[5] One might facetiously say that this is the tendency which puts 90% of all naval officers in the top 10% of their group.

Since the rest of the items in the above list are self-explanatory, it would be well at this point to introduce a set of criteria for a solidly objective performance appraisal system from which all of the above weakness might be purged. The first of these is *observability*. Can the trait be observed in action? Is possession of this trait evident to the rater in the job of the person being rated? The second criterion is *universality*. Is this an important and necessary characteristic for successful performance? The third is *distinguishability*. Is this trait clearly distinguishable from the others or is there an overlap of basic characteristics?[6] One

would certainly suspect that such criteria were soundly based in that they are attainable and would clearly serve to cut across the grain of the weaknesses just discussed.

It is not enough, however, to state criteria for performance appraisal and to mold the appraisal form about them. Certain assumptions must first be made which will relate closely to a true life, real time situation aboard ship. First, it must be assumed that both leader and follower are able to clarify their individual objectives. Next, there must be a succession of specific goals without which the measurement of a person's performance in a job becomes virtually meaningless. There must be a full delegation of both authority and responsibility so that the subordinate has freedom to act. It must be assumed that the results of the man's performance are verifiable by the rater. It must also be assumed that the rater is willing to share responsibility with his subordinate; otherwise, complete feedback will not evolve. Lastly, there is an assumption of shared personal accountability and potential management ability on the part of the subordinate.[7]

With such criteria and assumptions at hand, it should be possible to devise an objective system for performance appraisal. This has not been done in the Navy.[8] However, one system which is coming into popular use in industry seems to be the most objective one yet.[9] Although it remains to be proved whether the "management by objectives" idea is the most effective, it is worthy of consideration by the shipboard leader. Sometimes referred to as "appraisal by results," this method uses the three criteria set forth above (observability, universality, distinguishability) and makes use of detailed knowledge of a man's job. It does not attempt to measure such highly subjective traits as loyalty, moral courage, and imagination. Instead, the "management by objectives" system of personnel measurement deals with mutually agreed-upon goals, formalized at the outset, which are the subject of frequent consultation and occasional revision. A man is measured upon his ability to achieve goals which he agrees are reasonable and consistent with his abilities and growth potential.

Perhaps such a measurement method is *too* objective. Certainly it does not indicate clearly many traits which are considered by most to be desirable, viz., personal cleanliness, sobriety, demeanor, and disposition. Furthermore, if either the rater or the

rated lose interest in the system if it fails. Also, there will be times when a conference between the boss and the subordinate would be patently ridiculous, such as in a tight military situation of an operational nature. Personality differences can complicate the proper administration of any rating system.

On the other hand, the advantages of "appraisal by results" are worth serious consideration. In the fields of maintenance, training, and administration, the measurement of work performed against clearly established goals yields an invaluable element of feedback. In operations, and again in the fields mentioned above, there is a valuable element of planning for the future since the organization as well as the job is periodically reviewed. The subordinate learns to appraise his subordinates in a uniform, objective manner. His opportunity to self-evaluate at frequent intervals (as opposed to the annual or semiannual "surprise") has a tonic effect. He has in front of him at all times a list of his accomplishments, and he knows that his boss is looking at this list, too. This makes criticism of his performance sound less like bitter words and gives the subordinate an opportunity to consider the boss's advice in a constructive light: and since he knows that the mutually established goals can be adjusted to absorb unforeseen operational and maintenance difficulties, his ego is preserved and his confidence in the system improves with time.

The need for such a measurement program has long been recognized. Companies are starting to study the appraisal problems with a view toward combining their present systems with an objective system such as that described above. Appraisal by results has been the subject of enlightened professional comment in the Navy.[10]

Some behavioral research throws substantiating light on the problem:

> In actual practice it is the extremely rare operating manager who will employ such a program on his own initiative. Personnel specialists report that most managers carry out performance appraisal interviews only when strong control procedures are established to ensure that they do so. This is surprising because most managers have been told repeatedly that the system is intended to help them obtain improved performance

from their subordinates . . .. It is the discussion with the man which is supposed to motivate him and improve his performance.[11]

The same report from which the quotation above was taken goes on to illustrate some points which are commonly known and some which are, at first glance, surprising. Criticism produces negative attitudes in the area of goal achievement. Depending on how it is given, praise does not have a tremendous effect one way or the other. When specifically designed goals are established, however, performance improves; this is opposed by defensiveness when bare criticism is given, and this, in turn, produces inferior results. The report stresses that coaching should be a day-to-day activity, that mutual goal-setting is far more effective than criticism in upgrading personnel performance, and participation by the employee in the goal-setting session orients him toward a favorable attitude.[12]

It is interesting to compare the high-producing and low-producing sections discussed in Chapter III with relation to their attitudes toward appraisal systems:

PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYEES WHO HOLD:



Fig. 4. "Relation between employee attitudes toward merit rating system and productivity."[13]

In Fig. 4 the merit system of the company was tied to increases in salary. Likert points out that where motivational forces other than the natural desire to be rewarded for outstanding performance are involved, the reaction to the rating system is not strictly predictable.[14]

These recent social studies show that personnel respond favorably to an objective reporting system

which involves frequent counseling in an atmosphere of mutual goal-setting. It is the objective system which tends to eliminate or reduce weaknesses found in presently used merit sheets. The criteria for an objective appraisal--observability, universality, and distinguishability--define a sensible framework within which the appraiser can work. Although a management-by-objectives system is not the complete answer to shipboard personnel appraisal, it certainly lends itself to an effective revision of existing methods, especially since job descriptions and classifications are available to all naval personnel. In addition, the ship's operating schedule, while subject to change, is roughly known in advance, and the ship's organization is set forth for all to see. Thus, mutual goal-setting, periodically revised, is possible because all of the tools are at hand. In the next chapter a recommended method of performance appraisal aboard ship is given.

VI—NEW CONCEPTS FOR SHIPBOARD PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

It has been shown that sociological change has forced upon the shipboard personnel manager a new breed of first-enlistment sailor. This man may be led by his formal or informal leader, and an understanding of group goals and characteristics is needed for effective control. The positive and negative sides of both job-oriented and person-oriented leadership have been discussed, and recent considerations in the field of morale and discipline from both the group and individual point of view have been presented. A strong motivating tool--performance appraisal--has been shown to be susceptible to misuse and open to greatly improved utilization as an instrument of productive management.

It is concluded that it is not enough to practice "tried-and-true" leadership in personnel management situations aboard ship. The exponential rise of social expectations which parallels an exponential increase in technological capability demands an equal amount of research, of understanding, of innovation. The human being has become the main battery of the ship, for without him the most sophisticated weaponry, the most modern logistical means, and the very being of the ship itself as an instrument of national power becomes sterile.

With the heavy amount of research being carried out in the personnel management field today, there are sufficient data to provide the naval leader with

indicators and measurement techniques which may be directly applied to the situation aboard ship without sacrificing traditional means. Every person in command of men should use new leadership techniques as he would use new weapons. By keeping himself informed of new developments in personnel research, he will develop a high degree of interest, learn to read, listen, discuss, and think clearly, and turn potential trouble into satisfactory advantage.

What, then, is the shipboard personnel manager to do to maximize the productive effort of his unit in such a way as to strengthen the zeal and loyalty of his men?

The first task of the shipboard leader (taken in the order in which discussed in this paper) is to keep himself abreast of sociological factors affecting his men. Too often one hears, "What was good enough for me is good enough for them," when such an attitude is anachronistic and therefore harmful to the leader's image. It brands him as an ill-informed person who is not interested in applying present concepts to present situation. It is human nature for older persons to disapprove of the actions of the "younger generation" without taking the trouble to learn the meaning of the actions and the causal relationships which induced them. A personnel manager, then, must know his public as of today. He can do this if he reads news periodicals, and he can do it more completely if he subscribes to a recognized trade journal which gives both demographic data and solutions to current personnel management problems. All that is required is an effort toward awareness. Yet, how many naval officers read other than the required leadership manuals?

A second concept for shipboard personnel management involves an understanding of the characteristics of an effective group. In Chapter II group characteristics were discussed. Now the most desirable of these characteristics will be set forth as a guide to the influential leader. It was pointed out above that knowledge of this nature must be updated periodically to remain effective:

1. The members are skilled in . . . leadership and membership roles required for interaction between leaders and members and between members and other members.

2. The group has been in existence sufficiently long to have developed a well-established, relaxed working relationship among all its members.

3. The members of the group are attracted to it and are loyal to its members, including the leader.

4. The members and leaders have a high degree of confidence and trust in each other.

5. The values and goals of the group are a satisfactory integration and expression of the relevant values and needs of its members . . ..

6. /The members/ have the values and goals of the groups which they link in harmony, one with the other.

7. The more important a value seems to the group, the greater the likelihood that the individual member will accept it.

8. The members of the group are highly motivated to abide by the major values and to achieve the important goals of the group . . ..

9. All the interaction, problem-solving, decision-making activities of the group occur in a supportive atmosphere. Suggestions, comments, ideas, information, criticisms are all offered with a helpful orientation. Similarly, these contributions are received in the same spirit. Respect is shown from the point of view of others both in the way contributions are made and in the way they are received.[1]

Although the above characteristics of an effective group are couched in technical language, their meaning is clear, and their importance is undeniable.[2] Too often one has a hazy concept of specific group characteristics without being able to enumerate them clearly and examine them individually to see how they apply to a given management situation. "The triumph of this drama is the capacity of man to create orderly human relationships, or a *group*, out of a

collection of individuals."[3] The group approach to leadership, rather than the individual approach so well known to naval leaders, is a field for fruitful study and application, and a team experiment should be instituted in the fleet under controlled conditions.

The study of wutocratic versus autocratic management in Chapter III suggests a third concept for personnel management aboard ship: Do away with the rigid application of job-oriented supervision to all aspects of shipboard work. In other words, apply the job-oriented approach only where operational necessity requires it and apply the employee-centered supervision to situations which are more administrative in nature.

This concept is radical and may provoke some disapproving comments, but it is based on sound social research by dedicated, practical people. One might speculate that it has been attempted in a naval environment, but certainly not to a wide degree. The effect desired is not a relaxing of controls but the establishment of a supportive atmosphere. It has been shown that such an atmosphere improves communications, allows for more effective criticism, fosters innovation, and promotes common goal-setting.

In considering the capabilities of the individual in a job-centered versus a man-centered method of supervision, one should review the characteristics of man and machine:

MAN

1. Has perpetual constancy.
2. Ability to predict and anticipate.
3. Ability to make decisions and reprogram.
4. Ability to salvage man-machine under conditions of machine failure.
5. Ability to change mental set or goal orientation at will.
6. Ability to reason inductively.

MACHINE

1. Freedom from fatigue.
2. Ability to resist boredom and inattention to routine tasks.
3. Unlimited power output.
4. Ability to monitor well.
5. Can be changed from present form.
6. Ability to erase previous memory traces.

7. Ability to store large amounts of information on short time basis.
8. Good integrator of disparate pieces of information.[4]

One does not have to make many comparisons to see that the supportive approach will take advantage of the characteristics of man while the machine-oriented approach has only limited application to man. The chief argument against this theory from a military point of view is that in highly tense operational situations one must not sit down and take a vote on whether to come right or left with full or standard rudder. On the other hand, a man who is encouraged to formulate or initiate a change to the maintenance requirements for a piece of machinery, or who is given the opportunity to help a group make a decision about a community aid program, will consider himself more deeply involved in carrying out the basic mission of the ship.

In further corroboration of the idea of supportive leadership is the study of morale and discipline made in Chapter IV. Both Chapters III and IV show that the failure to keep subordinates informed, the lack of interest in juniors, the lack of understanding of both motivation and maintenance needs are characteristic of the totally autocratic approach. If a key word were needed here, it would be *humanization*. This requires that the officer aboard ship be aware of opportunities to eliminate by-the-numbers routines in favor of group- and individual-supported concepts. It is a bold idea requiring fine judgment and a wise evaluation of the risks as well as the advantages. It is not a course of action one should attempt without a strong leadership capability.

Before considering a fourth concept, one concerning morale and discipline, the reader might bring himself closer to the problem by reviewing the peculiarities of shipboard life:

1. The worker finds himself in a fatiguing environment from the point of view of constant motion (physical) and cramped quarters and long deployments (psychological).

2. He is operating in a nonprofit organization.

3. His work rules are determined by two sources: routine and well-documented jobs and operations and sudden, nonroutine requirements.

4. His job offers higher security than the most union-dominated industrial plant.

5. Every employee, regardless of his job description, is salaried.

6. His financial rewards seem to be much lower than those of his civilian contemporaries, although this is not necessarily correct.

7. His employer has seemingly unlimited resources.

8. He cannot quit when he gets tired of the job.

Why, then, because of all these differences, would a look at industrial morale and discipline problems and solutions provide the key to a new concept? The answer is found in the definitions of morale and discipline previously given. Aboard ship or in an industrial plant, morale carries with it an implication of group reactions, as does discipline when one is speaking of a team effort. Inherent in both definitions is the expectation of success. So the environmental differences of shipboard life may serve to complicate the morale and discipline problem of the leader, but the basic definition and, therefore, the basic approach to a solution must be preserved if a general concept is to be stated.

The fourth concept for shipboard personnel management, then, is that the naval leader must not only understand the well-known motivation and maintenance needs of his men, but he must also learn to spot the danger flags before they are "close-hauled." This involves a knowledge of attitude indicators and a familiarity with methods of getting attitude information. Once attitudes which are damaging to the individual or the group are discovered, the leader must relate them to unfulfilled needs and see that these needs are met. Obviously, careful training is needed for all but the one-in-a-thousand "natural" leader to accomplish this.

It is conceivable that a suggestion box, for instance, could be an effective device for spotting

attitudes aboard ship. However, if such a method were mishandled, great harm could be done. Whatever device is used, it must ensure free communication to the top since in this sense both filtering and dilution are synonymously undesirable byproducts of the chain-of-command flow process.

Some senior naval officers would blanch at the idea of sending an attitude survey about the ship. But why shouldn't it be done? It is a proven scientific management tool, and, properly handled, it could reveal many paths of improvement. Once again, however, the manager should not attempt to use the tool without proper training.

A final concept for improved shipboard personnel management involves the use of a more objective system of performance appraisal. It has been pointed out that the presently used forms for officer and enlisted man evaluation contain items which must be evaluated subjectively and which do not meet the criteria for good performance evaluation, namely, observability, universality, and distinguishability. This does not mean that the Navy has not tried. "During the period 1865-1956, the U.S. Navy used 48 different fitness report formats. All the changes and revisions incorporated . . . were for the purpose of making officer evaluations more objective and more realistic."[5] Nor is it necessary or desirable to eliminate subjective evaluation completely:

> . . .The present forms allow for concrete examples of performance to justify or explain or amplify the personal characteristics marks . . .. Selection for promotion is . . . the board's considered *guess* as to who will be able to continue to perform well in the responsibilities of the next grade . . .. Because one officer is a superb, aggressive aviator does not necessarily indicate he would, for example, be a good assistant naval attaché for air.[6]

It is realized that, in addition, a sudden transition to a completely objective system of merit appraisal would produce a chaos of officer and senior petty officer disenchantment. What is proposed, then, is a system whereby a man participates in a truly objective performance analysis method during the period between regular reports. When the time comes for the regular report to be made, it is filled out by the supervisor and discussed with the man (a

mandatory requirement).[7] The man is then permitted to append remarks on adverse comment, and the report is mailed in to the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

Such a system would permit most of the advantages of appraisal by results to accrue while allowing a subjective trait evaluation to be made. Thus, although the presently used forms do not meet the criteria of a truly objective reporting system, the rater would have before him solid evidence in a chronological form to help him make a firm evaluation of a subjective trait on the annual or semiannual appraisal form. Both the rated and the rater would have identical copies of goal achievement to form a common basis for discussion of the final report. The training for both in making human value judgments would be of a practical nature and could scarcely be gained elsewhere.

Disadvantages of such a concept are that by retaining the present form many of the weaknesses mentioned in Chapter V are not completely eliminated; despite frequent counseling of the rated person by the rater, the human traits listed on present forms are still not fully observable; they are certainly not distinguishable; and it is doubted that they apply universally. The process may call for too much time away from the job for everyone.

In spite of the above disadvantages, such a system could be placed into use *now* and would provide a transition for objective correction of present forms in the future.[8]

The main thread of necessity which runs through all the concepts proposed above is that of training. Leadership training (taken in its usual context in the Navy) is not enough. Why should the Navy burden itself with yet another training requirement, that of increased emphasis on personnel management from a social and psychological point of view? To answer a question with a question, why then should one learn to program computers, maintain missiles, study communism and insurgency, use cost-effectiveness in planning? The answer to all of these questions is that to have knowledge and fail to use it is a self-defeating process. To have a resource as complex and adaptable as a human being and to fail to realize his full potential is to deny the great expectations of a great society.

FOOTNOTES

I--GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN THE GREAT SOCIETY

1. Rensis Likert, *New Patterns of Management* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), p. 2.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

3. Public Opinion Surveys, Inc., *Attitudes of 16 to 20 Year Old Males toward the Military Service as a Career.* Part II of a study for the Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, U.S. Dept. of Defense, Washington (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 2-4.

4. Public Opinion Surveys, Inc., *Attitudes of Adult Civilians toward the Military Service as a Career.* Part I of a study for the Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, U.S. Dept. of Defense, Washington (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 4-5.

II--THE GROUP

1. Bernard Bass, *Leadership, Psychology, and Organizational Behavior* (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 39, quoted in Roger Bellows, et al., *Executive Skills* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962), p. 122.

2. Bellows, p. 122.

3. A. Zaleznik, *Worker Satisfaction and Development* (Norwood, Mass.: Plimpton Press, 1956), p. 1-2.

4. Likert, p. 43.

5. Joseph Tiffen and Ernest McCormick, *Industrial Psychology* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1958), p. 369-370.

6. Likert, p. 182.

7. Bellows, p. 122.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 224.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*

11. Peter Drucker, The New Society (New York: Harper, 1950), p. 83.

12. Tiffen and McCormick, p. 369.

13. B.X. Georgopoulos, "The Normative Structure of Social Systems: A Study of Organizational Effectiveness." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor: 1957, p. 150.

14. Likert, p. 38.

15. Bellows, p. 72.

16. Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, eds., *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1953), chap. 22.

17. Norman Maier and John Hayes, *Creative Management* (New York: Wiley, 1962), p. 153.

18. Likert, p. 126.

19. *Ibid.*

20. S.E. Seashore, *Group Cohesiveness in the Industrial Work Group* (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1954)

21. Maier and Hayes, p. 154.

22. Bellows, p. 129.

23. Likert, p. 130.

24. P.E. Lull, et al., "Business and Industrial Communication from the Viewpoint of the Corporation President," Lecture, Purdue University, Lafayette, Ind.: 1954.

25. Bellows, p. 71-72.

26. *Ibid.*

27. Stanley Schacter, et al., "An Experimental Study of Cohesiveness and Productivity," *Human Relations*, IV (1951), p. 225-238, quoted in Bellows, p. 72-73.

28. Maier and Hayes, p. 14-15.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

III--AUTOCRATS VERSUS DEMOCRATS

1. See Chapter I.

2. See Chapter I.

3. William Newman and Charles Summer, Jr., *The Process of Management* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1961).

4. Likert, p. 6.

5. Robert N. McMurry, "Conflicts in Human Values," *Harvard Business Review*, May-June 1963, p. 132-133.

6. Likert, p. 6.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

8. Philip Slater and Warren Bennis, "Democracy Is Inevitable," *Harvard Business Review*, March-April 1964, p. 52.

9. Likert, p. 6.

10. McMurry, p. 132.

11. Likert, p. 7.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 81.

13. Likert, p. 9.

IV--MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

1. Tiffen and McCormick, p. 303.

2. Arleigh Burke, *Discipline in the U.S. Navy*, NAVPERS 91195, Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1950.

3. Tiffen and McCormick, p. 302-303.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 303.

5. Hanson Baldwin, "What's Wrong with the Regulars," *The New York Times*, n.d.

6. Burke, p. 5.

7. Burke, p. 7.

8. L.J. Kiernan, "What's Happened to Practical Leadership?" *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, November, 1961, p. 84.

9. M. Scott Meyers, "Who Are Your Motivated Workers?" *Harvard Business Review*, (January-February, 1964), p. 73.

10. *Ibid.*

11. *Ibid.*

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15. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

16. Tiffen and McCormick, p. 304.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 305.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 305-317.

V--PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL

1. Lawrence Ferguson, "Social Scientists in the Plant," *Harvard Business Review*, May-June 1964, p. 133-143.

2. Harold Boak, "Executive Skills," Lecture, George Washington University, College of General Studies, Off-campus Extension, Annapolis: 20 April 1964.

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4. *Ibid.*

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7. *Ibid.*

8. U.S. Bureau of Naval Personnel, *Report of Enlisted Performance Evaluation*, NAVPERS 792 (Rev. 6-59) (Washington: 1959), U.S. Bureau of Naval Personnel, *Report on Fitness of Officers*, NAVPERS 310W (Rev. 4-62) (Washington: 1962).

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10. Harold L. Jones, et al., "Officer Appraisal in the Armed Forces," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 1965, p. 76-87.

11. Herbert Meyer, et al., "Split Roles in Performance Appraisal," *Harvard Business Review*, January-February, 1965, p. 123.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 124.

13. Likert, p. 15.

14. *Ibid.*

VI--NEW CONCEPTS FOR SHIPBOARD PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

1. Likert, p. 166.

2. For a more detailed study which includes fifteen additional characteristics, see Likert, p. 166-169.

3. Zaleznik, p. 1-2.

4. Rodney M. Eldon, *Ship Management* (Cambridge, Md.: Cornell Maritime Press, 1962), p. 15.

5. Jones, et al., p. 76-77.

6. Frederick Palmer, "Comment and Discussion," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, December 1965, p. 111-112.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

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BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Lieutenant Commander Terence B. Sutherland, U.S. Navy, holds a B.S. from the U.S. Naval Academy, a B.S. in Engineering Electronics from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, and an M.A. in Personnel Administration from The George Washington University. He has served as CIC Officer on the *U.S.S. Colahan* (DD-658); on the staffs of Commander, Destroyer Division 172 and Commander, Mine Squadron 11; as Executive Officer of the *U.S.S. Wilmoite* (DER-397); and as an instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy.

Lieutenant Commander Sutherland is a 1966 graduate of the School of Naval Command and Staff, Naval War College. He is presently Executive Officer, *U.S.S. Alfred A. Cunningham* (DD 752).

QUESTIONS TO AMERICANS FROM LATIN AMERICANS

Presented to the
School of Naval Command and Staff

by

Mr. Charles T. Vetter, Jr.

Inevitably the Navy will be in closer individual and collective contact with the peoples of Latin America.

With the explosion of ideas and the "transistor revolution," world dialogue takes on more and more importance. In this dialogue, Americans, in particular, require new sensitivities and new skills. A further requirement is the willingness to participate, and, hopefully, enjoy the interchange of ideas.

This is particularly true in Latin America and led to an attempt to identify some of the issues and

preoccupations that could either be the stimulus to discussion or the barrier to communication.

The following are some of the more stereotyped questions about the United States that are often in the minds of the people and are reflected in publications in Latin America. They all have a thread of logic; some are Communist-inspired, some are not. Most of them exploit facts or half-truths that are well known to the Latin American public. Out of politeness many of these questions are never directly asked, yet they represent areas where there are often sincere questioning and misconceptions. Americans going to Latin American countries should have facts on these subjects, so they will be able to discuss these questions intelligently and thereby create a perspective for both our accomplishments and our modern problems.

These questions have been collected in the process of extensive traveling in Latin America and from discussions over the past ten years with both Americans returning from Latin America and Latin American visitors to the United States.

Why do you let your businessmen get rich on our wealth by exploiting our natural resources and selling overpriced American goods to our people?

How can you have poverty and unemployment in your country when you are so rich? Couldn't this be remedied with scientific social planning?

What is the Alliance for Progress? Isn't this just another scheme to make us dependent on the Yankees--more of your aid with strings attached?

Why do you insist on our being anti-Communist? Are you really afraid of the Communists? Why can't you let us be friends with everyone?

Why don't you give the Panama Canal back to Panama? Isn't this a perfect example of American colonialism?

Why are you pressuring and starving poor little Cuba? They can't hurt you! Isn't this typical Yankee intervention?

You are supposed to be leaders of the democratic world--why do you support dictatorships (Paraguay,

Spain, etc.) and military juntas which are also dictatorships?

Why do you claim that you are helping the people of Latin America when your aid just makes the rich richer and does not help the poor people?

Why do you give us the kind of help that just makes our people more dependent and lazy? If you would just give us fair prices for the wealth that you take out of our country, we could help ourselves.

When you have a democratic Constitution, why are your people fighting for civil rights today?

Why do your people know so little about Latin America--our geography--our history? Doesn't this prove that your people are not interested in us?

What's wrong with Socialism? Poor countries cannot afford your *wasteful* Democracy!

What is the Peace Corps? Are they really political agents, or are they just young people who can't get jobs?

Is it true that the Russians are passing you in science because their educational system is better?

Is it not true that U.S. business interests determine American foreign policy in Latin America?

Why do the people from the United States who live in our countries look down on the people of Latin America? They live in capitalistic ghettoes and never mix with the people or bother to learn our local language.

Why shouldn't our government trade with Communist countries. You do!

Why don't you recognize Communist China and bring it into the United Nations? You have recognized the U.S.S.R.

What is the difference between your Democratic Party and your Republican Party? Do they each have an ideology?

What is the current interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine?

Is your intervention in the Dominican Republic a return to your "Big Stick" policies of the 1920's and before? If we have a revolution you don't approve of in our country, will the United States intervene again?

Don't these demonstrations by your students and teachers, and other groups in your big cities, show that American policy in Vietnam is unpopular with your people?

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Mr. Charles T. Vetter, Jr. holds an A.B. from Hamilton College, an LL.B. from National University Law School, and an LL.M. from The George Washington University School of Law. He was a naval aviator during World War II and has served as Research and Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of State.

Mr. Vetter was assigned to Pakistan in 1955-56 as an advisor to the Director of Public Relations of the Government of East Pakistan and later in West Pakistan as a lecturer in political science with the U.S. Information Service. On his return from Pakistan he joined the Professional Training Staff of the U.S. Information Agency in 1956, where he was responsible for the training of domestic and overseas personnel in the fields of International Communications and Communism.

In 1959 he visited Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union during a three-month assignment as a supervisor and training officer for the American Guides at the American National Exhibition in Moscow.

In July 1962 Mr. Vetter was designated as Information Coordinator for the Office of Public Information, a position which he still holds. In this position he functions as the U.S. Information Agency's principal lecturer in the fields of International Communications and Communism and participates in government and nongovernment programs throughout the world.



THE INFLUENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON NATIONAL STRATEGY AND POLICY

A lecture to the
Naval Command Course
and the
School of Naval Command and Staff
on 7 September 1966

by

Mr. Jack Raymond

The subject of my talk is "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons on National Strategy and Policy," and I would like to begin with a couple of anecdotes. In 1956 I was a correspondent in Moscow. A delegation of 21 Chinese scientists was sent to the Soviet Union to participate in a research program in the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research at Dubna, and I did a story on it at the time. It didn't stir much excitement.

China's nuclear energy program, of course, antedated that story. It actually began in earnest in 1950 when the Institute of Atomic Energy of the Chinese Academy of Science was set up in Peking. But it was in 1956, apparently, that the Communist Chinese received their big atomic assist from Moscow. That year the Soviet Government helped the Peking Government undertake a vast training program in which 39 atomic centers were to be established on mainland China.

Some months later, in this country, I accompanied a group of Russians on a tour of the United States. In those days such tours received considerable publicity. I wrote daily stories about the Soviet visitors' reactions to the places they visited. The tour included Disneyland--this was before the Khrushchev visit, and I have often wondered whether it was the report of my Russians that prompted Mr. Khrushchev's desire, later frustrated, to visit Disneyland in 1958.

Among the other fascinating entertainments of Disneyland they have an exciting planetarium. One of the members of the group I accompanied, in November 1956, was a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. As we came out of the planetarium, this academician--a man of about 60--commented on the little show we had witnessed inside, a show in which with clever use of lights and sound the visitor is made to feel he is on a missile trip to the moon.

"My son is a jet engineer," the Russian said, "and he thinks he is going to ride a rocket to the moon." The Russian shook his head. "I just can't get it into my head. Perhaps I am too old-fashioned, but my son thinks such space trips will come soon."

That conversation took place just 11 months before the Russians launched Sputnik I.

The point of these anecdotes, as we take up our lecture subject is to use them as a peg for the observation that one of the recurrent national mistakes of the United States has been to underestimate the will and capacity of other countries to outperform it in industrial, technological, and scientific fields. And even when we profess to appreciate the capacities of others--friends as well as foes--we give evidence of failing to act on that belief. Then we are shocked when Moscow launches a missile, or Peking--or even France--explodes an atomic bomb.

It is platitudinous, of course, to say that things are not always what they seem or what somebody says they are. Thucydides wrote at the beginning of his history of the Peloponnesian War that while the beginning of the war was alleged to have been based on the breaking of a treaty, "The real cause I consider to be the one which was most formally kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedeamon, made war inevitable." And the point of this quotation is to use it as a peg for an observation on the war in Vietnam.

Many analysts manage to talk of the war in Vietnam without mentioning the growing power of Mainland China. Whether that makes war with Communist China inevitable, I reserve comment to the conclusion of this talk.

In this talk, prepared as part of a broad study of seapower, I have been asked to:

a. review American strategy and foreign policy since World War II,

b. offer a personal assessment of the effects of nuclear weapons on United States doctrine,

c. note the importance of strong conventional forces in the light of the nuclear stalemate today, and

d. comment on the impact of Communist China's nuclear capability on United States foreign policy.

This is a large order, but nothing ventured, nothing gained.

Let us then, according to our given outline, review briefly certain aspects of U.S. national security policy since World War II. Despite a historical pattern of withdrawal from world affairs following war, the United States did adopt a national strategy of continued global involvement after World War II, even as it submitted to the reflex action of demobilizing its forces. The new global strategy, enunciated in rhetoric condemning past isolationism, was encouraged to a large extent by the United States' unilateral possession of the atomic bomb.

We often associate the policy of massive retaliation with John Foster Dulles and the Eisenhower Administration of the 1950's. But it was Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during

the Truman Administration, and who later stated the case for "limited war" in Korea, who said in 1949: "Our greatest strength lies in the threat of quick retaliation (with strategic bombers) in the event we are attacked." And it was Adm. Arthur Radford, Chair- of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Eisenhower Administration and a renowned advocate of massive retaliation policies, who said in 1954: "I believe that this nation could be a prisoner of its own military posture if it had no capability, other than the one to deliver a massive atomic attack."

I suppose both of these military professionals, like any other professionals, can explain how what they said was perfectly sound in the context of their basic policy positions--just as we journalists also prove ourselves consistent when old columns are read to us. (Former Pentagon Controller, Charles Hitch, when he testified on his nomination and was asked to explain some of the things he said in his book, quoted Job 31:335, "Oh . . . that mine adversary had written a book.")

The United States' reliance upon its nuclear advantage can be illustrated in many ways, but for this audience, perhaps, the most pertinent example is the virulent struggle within the Armed Forces. To justify ambitious budgets in the face of shrinking appropriations, each service sought to demonstrate its capability for delivery of the superweapon.

In 1947 a classified memorandum by Rear Adm. Daniel Gallery, a young naval aviator, recommended that the major mission of the Navy should be the delivery of atomic attack from aircraft carriers and that the mission of controlling the seas should be relegated to a secondary position. The existence of the memorandum was leaked during the Air Force-Navy controversy over roles and missions. The consequent uproar forced Admiral Gallery's superiors to disavow his position, but they nevertheless argued that carrier-borne aircraft could deliver strategic bombs with precision, whereas highflying B-36 bombers were directed to the wholesale destruction of cities.

Two decades later, as Adm. John D. Hayes points out in his seapower commentary in this year's *Naval Review*, much of the Gallery memorandum has been put in effect, only with the nuclear delivery mission assigned to the Polaris submarines rather than aircraft carriers. And it is the Air Force, with its land-based missiles and aircraft, that insists upon

precision, assailing the Polaris missiles as city destroyers.

The point of all this is that the services felt they could exist only insofar as they satisfied the requirements of nuclear weapons policy. In the characteristic American way, the B-36 controversy was waged virtually in the open, and the press could cover it blow by blow. Since then the internal documentary record has provided further evidence of the United States' early adoption of a policy of deterrence. The State Department's June 1948 policy paper, based on the famous "containment" dispatch filed from Moscow by George Kennan, noted that war with the Soviet Union was "always a possibility." The Armed Forces, it continued, must not only give support to United States diplomacy but they must be strong enough to serve as a "deterrent" to Soviet efforts to fill every available power vacuum.

Professor Samuel P. Huntington has described that paper as a "landmark in the evolution of American strategic thought from the old strategy of mobilization for general war to a new strategy of deterrence." Significantly, he adds, it was produced by the State Department, not by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The policy of deterrence and containment, in order to have any chance of being effective, required sizeable ground and naval forces as well as nuclear air power. But it is a fact of national life that policy and strategy are not always supported substantively. As noted earlier, we do not always act on our professed beliefs. We did not bolster our land and naval forces to any significant extent until the outbreak of the Korean war. Our chief deterrent force consisted of nuclear bombs, and we did not have many of these. Nor did we build as many strategic bombers as military strategists advocated. Nor did we press forward with rockets and missile development. The country learned soon enough that the nuclear advantage--and by 1949 it was no longer a monopoly--was an insufficient deterrent anyway.

The Soviet Union seized Eastern Europe and challenged the United States directly with the blockade of Berlin. Stalin, clearly, was not awed. When he *really* was afraid, of the Germans in 1934 to 1940, he behaved differently. Nor did the United States nuclear advantage deter the North Koreans from invading South Korea. There were many other incidents in the postwar years, and in many cases the aggressive forces did not have their way--as in Iran and Greece.

It is possible that fear of atomic retaliation spoiled the Communist Chinese appetite for Quemoy and Matsu. But it is also clear that even as the United States finally developed in the late 1950's a stupendous arsenal of nuclear bombers and smaller tactical nuclear weapons for ground and naval forces, aggressive acts in Europe or Asia did not cease. The United States' nuclear advantage may well have prompted Communist leaders to formulate a strategy and doctrine for wars of national liberation, consisting of ambiguous aggression through insurgency, for their already existing efforts to take over revolutionary forces around the world.

The Soviet Union stunned the world, including America, with its own missile and space feats. And this did as much as the reasoned analyses of the military strategists to reduce American self-delusion over the all-purpose qualities of the nuclear arsenal. That is not to say that the threat of a nuclear strike went entirely unheeded then or is unheeded now. United States concern over the establishment of Soviet missile bases in Cuba and nearly abject Soviet withdrawal, when faced with a direct threat of retaliation, demonstrated only too well the readiness of nations to use nuclear weapons--for blackmail or survival.

But the Cuba crisis of 1962 also exemplified the mutual nuclear deterrence that had developed between the two nuclear powers. Some have called it a balance of terror. The nuclear test-ban treaty was signed in an effort to keep that balance. The arms race goes on, of course, but it is now a qualitative one, a race being run in laboratories. A breakthrough may result that could once again panic us all. For the time being, the two major nuclear powers have been persuaded that not even a surprise attack would pay off.

Secretary McNamara has pointed out that if the Soviet Union pulled a surprise attack upon the United States a very large portion of American missiles would survive and even if one-fifth of the surprise weapons delivered their payloads, the Soviet Union would lose one-third of its population and half of its industrial capacity. Yet, lest any American hawks be tempted, Mr. McNamara also has pointed out that even if the United States were to strike an initial preemptive blow against the Soviet Union, Moscow's surviving nuclear weapons in retaliation could kill at least 90 to 95 million Americans.

Long before Mr. McNamara gave us these estimates early this year, the United States had adopted a policy based on the premise that so-called limited wars, where the threshold of aggression or its location made nuclear retaliation out of the question, were more likely to occur than wars for which nuclear retaliation was a credible threat. Yet, just because limited conflicts were more likely, and indeed were occurring with increasing frequency and danger, thermonuclear wars could not be ruled out. Nations might become too fearful or too cautious to use their ultimate weapons, but they had by no means become so wise as to eliminate those fateful situations when fear, caution, or reason did not prevail.

The current United States policy, therefore, is one of "flexible response," with each planned retaliatory action suited to the style and potential consequence of the provocation. This country has raised annual defense spending from more than $40 billion to more than $60 billion a year in order to pay for that policy. Yet there are those who claim that our forces are inadequate, nevertheless, that our resources are being stretched thin, that we are overcommitted. Once more the voice of withdrawal is being heard in our land. A prevailing attitude seems to be: "Let's pour it on, get this war in Vietnam over with, then let's not get involved anymore."

To summarize, then, the United States has had a tendency through the years to meet its international problems on a contingency basis, mobilizing and expanding its military forces only when under direct threat. This tendency, rooted deep in an American tradition that is suspicious of the influence of large military forces in peacetime, has been reinforced by a national ego that rarely credits foes with having the capacity to defeat us.

In the post-World War II period, however, the United States *did* undertake to remain involved in global affairs. But the United States possession of a nuclear advantage created a false belief in its all-purpose deterrent capacity. So-called limited aggressions continued. The United States, at the outset, was inhibited from nuclear retaliation because the provocations never seemed to justify it--they were "below the threshold," as it is said. The United States subsequently was further inhibited by the Soviet weapons advances that balanced the terror. Now, the United States having adopted a strategy of flexible response, the cost and strain are prompting popular demands for actions to put a quick end to our

troubles through a massive effort and thus permit a return to isolationism.

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We come now to some personal observations on nuclear weapons strategies. I have covered military affairs long enough to know that strategy is only a plan for doing things, and it must never become too theoretical or dogmatic. If events disprove the premises upon which the strategy was adopted, that does not mean the plan was all bad or must be retained at all costs. But there must be a plan to provide coherence to strategic action. While the United States adopted a policy of deterrence to which it gave voice in the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, its failure to support that policy adequately reduced its effectiveness. Without adequate military support at the outset, the United States began solving its problems pragmatically, "on their merits," so to speak, as one analyst put it.

Thus the United States began to distinguish among various power vacuums. It put its finger in the dike in Greece and Turkey but left Korea out of its Pacific defense perimeter. Also, when a policy allows special cases, the deterrent effect is not relevant from one case to another. The U.S. nuclear advantage was relevant to a possible Soviet attack upon Western Europe but not the suppression of Hungarian liberation. It was relevant to the crisis in Cuba in 1962 but not to insurgency in Vietnam. It might have been relevant in Korea, but widespread doubts paralyzed action.

Erratic response of this kind has a certain superficial benefit, if the aim is to keep the enemy guessing. But it is also dangerous. If a strategy is to serve as a deterrent, it must be understood and perhaps exemplified. That is why, no doubt, in contrast with the Korean war, the United States has made many efforts to warn Peking of its determination to use nuclear weapons in the event of a direct Communist Chinese intervention in the war in Vietnam. It has done this by example. It has bombed the "sanctuary" of North Vietnam. It has also conveyed this message through all conceivable diplomatic channels.

But these and other instances reflect the tendency to treat national security problems as a series of isolated crises, making move and countermove with no apparent long-range strategy in fulfillment of national interests. It is as though the existence of nuclear weapons in the world, instead of providing a

sober motivation for long-range security planning, has inhibited planning that would lend purpose and direction to foreign policy.

No doubt the failure of the United Nations to prevent or control the cold war contributed to the United States' flailing about in a series of sporadic, defensive actions. The United States could not, like some aggressive totalitarian power, map out a rigid doctrine of foreign policy aims. It should not have been impossible, however, to establish a more coherent view than is evident of where American national security requirements--in weaponry as well as geography--begin and end.

That is, it should have been possible--if it had been possible--to place greater reliance upon the nuclear weapons arsenal. One can only shake one's head in dismay upon hearing, now, of how inadequate was the early stockpile of atomic bombs; how crude and unreliable were the liquid-fuel Atlas missiles; how terrifyingly swift was the command system that could trigger a nuclear strike without opportunity for reflection. "General," said a visitor to Strategic Air Command Headquarters, "you don't have a war plan. You have some sort of horrible spasm."

The nuclear arsenal's combination of clumsy superweapons and barely controllable command system has been matched at times by a general lack of discrimination in the distribution of many of the weapons. I remember breaking the story, denied at the time, of Admiral Felt taking command of the Pacific forces in 1958, just as the Taiwan crisis broke, only to find that he had only a limited supply of conventional explosives. In war, the Fleet would either have had to remain virtually inactive or attack with nuclear bombs.

And in another incident in the early stage of the crisis in Lebanon in 1958, the Pentagon had to rush conventional ammunition to the Sixth Fleet in response to an urgent bid by its commander, Vice Admiral Brown. It was subsequently revealed that during the landing the United States had an Honest John rocket afloat off Beirut but was not allowed to land it because it could fire an atomic warhead as well as a conventional one. Although the threat of using nuclear weapons was proclaimed policy, the policy was not sustained in this instance.

One can only guess what exciting examples will be disclosed to us in the future of the crazy-quilt complications inherent in our possession of what obviously

must be too many and too many kinds of nuclear weapons. Nor should we forget that while there can be no question about the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, there is still considerable doubt about their efficiency. The debate over the nuclear test-ban treaty focused attention on these uncertainties. We only know by theory the results that might be derived from most of the warheads in the arsenal. Each series of nuclear tests has produced a considerable number of unexpected phenomena.

Secretary McNamara has said the United States possessed "tens of thousands" of nuclear warheads.

On top of all this there is evidence of too big a building in our nuclear arsenal, as each service has justified the creation of its own contribution to the deterrent. According to one estimate in an article in *NATO's 15 Nations*, June-July 1966, more than 7,000 nuclear warheads are carried by the long-range missiles and aircraft of our strategic forces. In addition there are more than 25,000 tactical nuclear warheads encased in the weaponry of Naval and Air Force planes, short-range missiles and guns--ground-to-ground, ground-to-air, air-to-air, air-to-ground. In order to refute arguments that NATO forces are being weakened, Secretary McNamara has claimed that the number of warheads in Europe have been increased.

One does not need a computer to work out the total megatonnage in nuclear explosive power that is represented by these weapons. I'll spare you the arithmetic, but according to one table in the article, U.S. Armed Forces, including close to 3,500 strategic delivery vehicles, could launch some 19,000 million tons of TNT equivalent. By comparison, with some 580 strategic nuclear weapons, the Soviets could launch some 9,000 million tons of TNT equivalent. And for my purpose the interesting thing about this comparison is not that we have outmatched the Russians, but that they, too, have more of these weapons than they can efficiently use.

If this sounds to you that I subscribe to the notion that there is such a thing as having too much nuclear weaponry, you are right. I don't want to get into the semantics of "overkill," a very dramatic word, but it seems logical to me that if Secretary McNamara's estimates of the probable casualties in a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union were only half those cited, their deterrent factor would remain unchanged. A national leadership willing to accept a toll of 50 million dead would not be dissuaded if he

were advised that in truth the toll will be 100 million. The respective costs of the difference in the nuclear forces needed would, of course, be tremendous, and the difference in complications involved in perfecting a large or *larger* nuclear establishment are beyond description in this treatise--not only in cold cash, but in manpower, technical training, diversion of industrial facilities. Every arm of the military establishment has felt the squeeze in money and talent.

Those considerations should give pause to any small country with nuclear pretensions. Not only is it expensive, it may be self-defeating. For no Big Power today will sit idly by and permit a small country to employ nuclear weapons except as it suits the Big Power. Besides inviting interference even from its ally, it may well invite inclusion in the target system of a Big Power that is not its ally. For the danger of use of nuclear weapons by small countries, regardless against whom ostensibly aimed, impairs the security of the Big Powers.

Finally, related to these nuclear questions are the concommitant questions about the military efficacy of a *hidden* deterrent. Missiles, whether aboard submarines or in underground silos, can hardly be expected to impress a foe who cannot see them. There is something tangible about the warning posed by troops on a border, warships outside a harbor, or aircraft thundering across the sky.

The strategy of "flexible response" recognizes the validity of the theory that non-nuclear wars are more likely than nuclear wars, but that the nation must be ready to meet all contingencies. Yet covering all military bets is a very complicated task, and some questions have been raised whether the nation's political leadership can cope with the ever-widening gap between the intricacy of the weaponry and the almost metaphysical nature of the strategy-making process. Professor Kissinger, who has served at the White House, reports:

> Inevitable problems of confidence and competence between the technical and political levels of domestic decision-making may make it difficult to implement a strategic doctrine. Architects of strategy need a continual awareness that their audience is not a group of colleagues of similar technical competence but of hard-pressed individuals for whom strategy can be but one of a

number of concerns. Thus excessive complexity may lead to paralysis.

> The strategists must at every stage ask of the decision-maker: Does he understand the doctrine? Does he believe in it? Will the doctrine meet emergencies or provide an excuse for inaction? Does it instill a sense of mastery or produce a feeling of impotence? What does the decision-maker really mean when he accepts a strategy? Does he accept it with the notion,'In prescribed circumstances, this is what I will do? Or does he have the arrier-pensée, If this is all I can do, I will do nothing?'

This fascinating insight into the doubts that assail a White House Adviser reinforce certain conclusions, herewith summarized, on the future effects of nuclear weapons on American strategic doctrine. We have not developed the nuclear arsenal rationally. We exaggerated the destructive potentiality and flexibility of the earlier type weapons, perhaps fooling ourselves more than our enemy. We hastened pell-mell to produce too many and too great a variety of bombs in our arsenal. We thus have overloaded our Armed Forces with the paraphernalia of nuclear weapons to the extent that at times we have been in danger of loosing a barrage before taking a chance to reconsider; other times we have been encumbered by such weapons when we did not need them.

I cannot know to what extent these observations hold true today, although I suspect that they do. It would be negligent of American security not to have a basic arsenal, probably much smaller than exists today, one which is capable of wreaking substantial damage upon an attacker. We must keep in mind, however, that our very possession of too many of these complicated weapons systems may limit rather than enhance our choices.

The oversophistication of military equipment, as a matter of fact, plagues the non-nuclear forces. Take the case of the Navy diver who was wearing some $1,000 worth of special equipment, and he was diving off the Vietnamese shore in the China Sea; walking the ocean, feeling comfortable with his artificial lungs, his oxygen tank and mask, his flippers, rubber suit--the whole bit--when he noticed just a few feet away from him on the ocean floor a man in bathing trunks. That's all. No mask, no tank. So our sailor paddled over to this other man and took out his pad and pen--

one that could write under water--about $200 worth of equipment right there--and he wrote, "How can you manage to stay under water so long?" And he handed it over and the other fellow took the pad and pencil and wrote, "I am drowning!"

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Having thus criticized overreliance upon nuclear forces--and I guess I should, for the record, distinguish between nuclear energy for propulsion which, of course, I endorse wholeheartedly--I come now to a statement on the importance of strong conventional forces, with emphasis on naval power, of course.

I will not, however, follow the stereotype. I dare say you have heard enough about the glories and effectiveness of seapower, how the United States must keep the sealanes open; must be capable of exerting pressure along troublesome coastal areas; must be capable of landing troops, if necessary; must be capable of transporting men and supplies; must be capable of mounting aerial attacks from floating airfields; must be capable of lurking beneath the seas in submarines designed to attack other submarines or add to the nuclear retaliatory force with missiles; must support great merchant fleets. These are some of the elements of modern American seapower and you have already heard much about them.

I would like, however, with a concrete example, to discuss seapower as an element of our future in Asia, relating it to the concluding portion of this talk, the problem of Communist China. For the war in Vietnam--remember my quotation from Thucydides--is only a symptom of the larger challenge to the United States (indeed all of the West) in Asia. For two centuries there was a power vacuum on the eastern portion of the Eurasian continent, and foreign powers could move in and out of it--fight over it--as though the sleeping giant did not exist. Napoleon warned not to wake that giant. He did not, Patrick Gordon Walker cogently pointed out recently, indicate how to keep it asleep.

China is awake and coming out of her lethargy and this is something that would cause a major reaction regardless of what regime was in power. That does not mean it makes no difference that the Chinese mainland is Communist, but what is significant in terms of national strategy is less the form of government than its objectives. Any Chinese regime would

seek to recapture for the proud Chinese people the dominance of Asia that China once enjoyed.

There are other considerations. Mainland China represents, even among many Asians who fear her, the resurrection of Asia against the West. To many Asians, communism in China is not a bogey but is studied as a possible panacea, in "local" form, of course. At the same time, Communist China does represent a new imperialism even for the little nations around her that secretly admire her. In many respects, the feeling is like that of the Balkan countries in Europe in their attitude toward Russia.

North Vietnam unquestionably would like to dominate all of Indochina. Thailand is afraid of a possible North Vietnamese-Laotian combination and thus is stanch in its association with the United States. Cambodia is worried about Thailand and Vietnam--North *and* South--and thus hopes by a "little brother" friendship with China to escape their threat.

Sukarno had hoped to replace Nehru as the voice of emergent nationalism. Political developments are still unclear in his regime, but one thing is clear in Pacific strategy: Indonesia is an obvious mark for China's southward extension of influence and power. The only thing left out of the jigsaw puzzle is Japan. In fact, it is precisely because Japan has conscientiously pursued a policy of extreme pacifism that it has created a power vacuum off Communist China's flank that permitted Peking to accelerate her aggressive revival.

Now where does America come in? The United States probably would be involved in Indochina even if the French had not been ousted and the British were not currently leaving the scene. The United States not only is a world power, it is a Pacific power. And we can no more remain immune to the aspirations of men and nations in the Far East than we could remain immune to them in Europe--or Africa--or Latin America--or anywhere in the world.

With that in mind, there is no question that we have a future in Asia. But there is also no question that we have no future there as a land power. We cannot stay there to keep the peace forever by force of arms--nuclear or otherwise. We cannot stay there as the supporters of one or more Asian countries against one or more other Asian countries--regardless of how we define our purposes.

The West--the United States in particular--has responsibilities in Asia, but only because there is at present no balancing force for the military power on Mainland China. We remained in Europe after the war--as a balancing force against the Soviet Union. The time is perhaps not far off--but not yet--when we will no longer need to keep sizeable military forces there. The time has not come when the other chief powers of Asia--India, Indonesia, Taiwan, Japan, Korea--are in a position to assert themselves. It is only a natural extension of our wartime obligations to preserve the equilibrium.

However, the United States, even as it carries on the fight in Vietnam, must be ready to withdraw--not suddenly, of course. Not during the struggle, to be sure. But withdraw nevertheless. There is a limit to the time allotted us in the psychology of the people of Asia between recognition as allies and branding as colonial occupiers. Not only the United States, but Britain as well, must eventually withdraw from Asia. Hong Kong is a delight to us all, but it is an anachronism and surely will be dealt with by a forceful China when the time comes--Communist China or otherwise--even if it now serves as a useful conduit for Western money. And Russia, too, will someday have to withdraw from Asian lands that were seized by the Czar in China's dormancy.

Withdrawal does not mean abandonment. The United States and other Western Powers--and the Soviet Union--must find in the local powers of Asia replacements for themselves as obstacles to Chinese aggressive domination. And, the Western Powers, while withdrawing from Asian lands, can continue to help maintain what has been aptly called a "balance of prudence" by exerting and demonstrating great military and economic power in the background. We would be the guarantors of the Asian peace, but guarantors not on land, guarantors with our powerful sea and air striking forces and with our huge economic resources. Here, in the Pacific, is the role for conventional seapower. And many of the countries we help build up to contain and "balance" China would be maritime nations.

This is not to say that we abandon Polaris submarines. Indeed the Fleet ballistic missiles may well prove the most useful of deterrents, because of their relative immunity to a first strike attack. Nor am I advocating the elimination of all nuclear weaponry. What I am saying is that we must not have too much of a good thing. Warships with guns, aircraft that can

fire at targets they can see, and swift ships that can support operations far from home are what may well spell the difference between credibility and insensibility in the crises to come.

There's a flavor of the 19th century in the military pressure I assign to the United States, but it would have no colonial objectives. On the contrary, it would be openly designed to help the countries of Asia establish their own detente. The war in Vietnam is a terrible thing, but in the perspective of world affairs it is still a small war, engaging relatively small numbers of people. It has not forced either side to make the total commitment of fighting men and equipment, of national manpower reserves and other resources that occurs when nations are forced by great hostilities to forsake all else and fight like maniacs to preserve themselves. And we must keep this war from becoming just such an all-out-war.

How? This is the point in the lecture where I remind you I am an observer, not a doer. Nevertheless let us review, as we consider the spectre of Communist China, some of the theses I have set forth: first, that nuclear weaponry is often a hindrance; second, that we must have a simple, coherent, understandable strategic policy. That policy must be projected for the long pull, not merely constitute a catch-as-catch-can defensive operation against insurgency in Vietnam, or Thailand, or elsewhere. It must recognize that China will inevitably be a Big Power. It must recognize that other countries in Asia must be helped to grow big, too. It must recognize that the United States, although it must withdraw from the mainland of Asia, can never withdraw from the environs of Asia. We cannot indulge in a big nuclear slam-bang against the North Vietnamese and go home. We must stay to trade and give aid and assist in keeping a "balance of prudence."

For the national security interests of the United States are not limited to its own shores, nor to its own survival alone. We must show the flag everywhere we can, not as a threat but as a symbol of our global interests. For that purpose, open demonstration of American naval power is ideal: but it must not depend chiefly on the threat of nuclear annihilation. And it cannot substitute for the political and economic talents of the people it is designed to protect.

The demonstration by China that she can manufacture a nuclear weapon puts us on the alert as no meeting of technicians in Moscow ten years ago could have done. Peking must be deterred. But Peking will not be deterred by threats of preemptive strikes against her nuclear installations. Like Stalin, Mao surely knows that the American temperament simply will not countenance that form of aggression by us. Insofar as the Communist Chinese threaten an attack with their nuclear weapon, there is, of course, but one answer. But most evidence points to Peking's development of the bomb not as a threat, but as a Gaullist-like symbol of China's own grandeur.

In this connection I found pertinent yesterday's column by David Lawrence, one of the conservative commentators on the American scene. He is also the publisher of *U.S. News and World Report*. Mr. Lawrence wrote (and I quote it at great length):

> To put the Vietnam war into perspective, however, it is necessary to put Red China's relationship to the conflict in Southeast Asia in perspective, too. This is the root of the matter, and until a clearer idea is formed of what contingencies any American step toward peace may bring, no progress will be made.
>
> The United States has told the world it is protecting South Vietnam at the request of its government, and obviously the protection is against a Communist takeover. Yet if the United States and Red China achieved some kind of truce, the friction in Vietnam would be regarded by Peking as hardly worth bothering about.

This is why again and again in discussions of the Vietnam problem the handwriting on the wall says that the relations of the mainland of China to the rest of the world need prime attention. In this week's issue of *U.S. News & World Report* there's a significant interview on this subject. It was conducted in Vienna between the magazine's staff reporter there--Alex Kucherov, an American citizen of Russian birth--and Dr. Hugo Portisch, editor-in-chief of the Vienna Kurier, who had just returned from a trip to Red China, where he had talked at length with the leaders there. Dr. Portisch said:

> Marshal Chen Yi, the Vice Premier and Foreign Minister, with whom I had a long talk, told me they will need at least 20 years for the whole of China--a huge country--to reach the industrial level of present-day England . . .
>
> The Chinese, by tradition, are not invaders . . . and when you bring up Vietnam, they make a point that their troops aren't there . . .. At one point he (Marshal Chen Yi) said to me:
>
> Look, everybody's afraid of China. Well, look at our Army. It's a huge Army. It's a land Army with conventional weapons. Of course, if we sent 3 million men into Southeast Asia, we certainly could kick the Americans out of there, easily. But we know perfectly well that, if we kick the Americans out of there, the Americans wouldn't take that defeat. What would they do? They would attack us with superior means.
>
> Dr. Portisch said he understood this meant nuclear weapons. He added that the Red Chinese leader also was sure the Americans wouldn't invade Red China. So the Viennese editor concluded: The Chinese Communists talk belligerently, but they act cautiously --in Vietnam and everywhere else.
>
> The foregoing puts Red China in perspective and points the way not just to diplomatic dialogues on troop withdrawal but to an international plan that could promote Asia's economic development. This offers the real hope. For if the leaders in Peking were persuaded that it is not a temporary device but a long-range formula, a solution to the internal as well as external problems of Mainland China would emerge. Once conferences on economic development and assistance are started and progress is made in this field, the Vietnam problem would naturally adjust itself.

In the final analysis, Peking will be contained only insofar as the nations around her succeed in demonstrating their will and capacity for freedom. Peking will be deterred not by Americans or Russians but by Asians who make themselves strong. China, of

course, supports the Communist insurgency in Vietnam: of course, she supports the similar insurgency in Thailand; of course she wants to subvert other governments to her power bloc. But China has been painstaking in its avoidance of any provocation that would result in a retaliatory strike by United States military forces. China cannot want to take on the United States.

Secretary McNamara has said that the full implications of the Communist Chinese threat are far from clear, and the question of what our nuclear posture in the Far East should be in the future will require continuing study. In this connection, however, since I agree with his point, I would like to quote the Secretary further as follows:

> There is one lesson that we can draw from our experience in Europe, and that is to avoid a strategy which relies almost wholly on the use of tactical nuclear weapons to cope with (China's massive ground forces.)

This statement was made after China detonated her second nuclear device.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Mr. Jack Raymond is presently Vice President and Public Relations and Management Consultant of the Thomas J. Deegan Company.

Mr. Raymond was born in Poland but raised in New York City. He was sports correspondent for the *New York World Telegram* and free-lanced for other New York papers while a student at City College from which he graduated in 1939. In 1940 he joined *The New York Times*, leaving to go into the U.S. Army in 1942. During his military service he was a combat correspondent for the *Stars and Stripes* in Italy, France, and Germany. Medals awarded during this service include the Bronze Star and the Purple Heart. Returning to *The New York Times* in 1945, Mr. Raymond served as the Berlin correspondent for six years and then as the Balkans' correspondent for an additional four years. In 1955 he was one of the first correspondents to tour the Iron Curtain countries and in 1956 he covered the 20th Congress in Moscow. In 1957 he became the Pentagon correspondent for *The New York Times* and served in that position until this year when he assumed his present position.

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THE BAROMETER
READERS' COMMENTS

This section has been established to provide a forum for the useful exchange of ideas between *Naval War College Review* readers and the Naval War College.

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Correspondence Courses in Perspective

Counterinsurgency is one of the most widely discussed concepts in the international arena today. To refresh his memory and to provide further insight into the counterinsurgency problem, the reader should find the excerpt which follows interesting and informative.

The following passages have been extracted from a solution to the Correspondence Course in Counter-insurgency submitted by Lieutenant Thomas F. Murphy, U.S. Navy. Lieutenant Murphy is a 1962 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy who spent his first tour aboard the U.S.S. Lloyd Thomas (DD-764). He is presently assigned as Aide to Commander, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard.

In an outstanding analysis of a comprehensive subject, Lieutenant Murphy discusses the "popular causes" which are exploited by insurgents and the compatibility of these causes to the precepts set forth in the American Declaration of Independence, and then analyzes some of the factors of instability which might be conducive to insurgent movements.

Throughout the underdeveloped and newly emerging areas of Latin America, Asia, and Africa, governments are facing the prospect of mass popular discontent because of the regime's hostility or indifference to the people's newly aroused desire for changes in their old way of life. In these areas, insurgents are finding enormous opportunities for mobilizing these unfulfilled desires for change and directing them towards the violent overthrow of the government. Because the success of an insurgent movement is almost totally dependent upon popular support, or at least the denial of it to the government, an insurgent program is tailored to reflect these aspirations of the people. Therefore an examination of modern insurgent causes must begin with an examination of modern popular demands for change.

The conditions which have prompted this popular demand for change are not new; poverty and repression have been a way of life in these areas for generations. The new ingredient which has created this disillusionment and frustration with the status quo is the sudden awareness of the masses that these conditions are not unalterable or inevitable. Rapid advances in science and technology have helped make this an age of abundance and have given rise to the hope that man will one day be able to satisfy all his material wants.[1] Worldwide instantaneous communications have carried this hope to the remotest regions of the globe and have sparked the demand for a share of this abundance by these previously docile masses. The government which is unwilling or unable to respond to this demand for change leaves the people no alternative other than the support of an insurgent movement which advocates radical change.

It must be stressed that the insurgent must advocate more than just political change. An attack on a colonial regime in the name of anticolonialism, nationalism, or self-determination is not enough unless the people believe their livelihood will be improved. A revolt against a dictatorial native ruler or a corrupt, sham democracy in the name of popular suffrage or representative government must also

stress economic and social reform as well. These people have seen "palace revolts" and coups, have exchanged one set of foreign rulers for another as a result of distant wars or upheavals, and have observed numerous government power shifts without seeing any changes in their basic way of life. The insurgent always has a political cause, but it is the emphasis on tangible improvements which gains him his vital popular support.

Since most of these target nations are for the most part rural, agrarian reform is usually a prime insurgent cause. For example, it is estimated that 90 per cent of the total land in Latin America is owned by ten per cent of the population.[2] A recent work on Vietnam presents figures which show that 6,300 landowners possess 45 per cent of the total land, while 183,000 small farmers share a scant 15 per cent.[3] Similar situations exist in most other insurgent-threatened countries as well. Usually the land is devoted to one or two exportable cash crops, thus placing the entire economy at the mercy of fluctuating world prices for that commodity.[4] Agricultural technology is primitive, resulting in extremely low yields per acre. Usually the tax structure has been tailored to favor the large estate owner, thereby increasing the peasant's burden. Either he ekes out a meager existence on a submarginal plot or lives under an almost feudal system as a tenant on the large estates. Thus, the insurgent is able to enlist the small farmer's support through a cause advocating "land to the tillers," the breakup of the large estates, and technological and financial assistance to agriculture combined with promises of tax relief. Most of these governments have attempted to solve this problem, but with only modest success.[5] Since government leadership is either drawn from or dependent upon the support of the propertied elite, attempts at far-reaching reform are stifled.

In the cities the insurgent finds additional targets for his program. Almost every major city in these areas is surrounded by ghastly slums inhabited by the disillusioned who have left the rural areas to

find new opportunities. Instead they often find unemployment, poor housing, and a stagnant economy unable to keep pace with the growing population. A typical case is Latin America, where the 1960 figures reveal a 2.8 per cent increase in population combined with a negligible 0.3 per cent increase in production.[6] Native industry cannot absorb this increasing mass of unskilled labor, and foreign investments are accused, with some justification, of keeping wages low and being little interested in the development of basic industrial capabilities in these areas. Unemployment is chronic, underemployment is permanent, and inflationary trends erode the real earning power of labor. The insurgent cause here advocates the nationalization of industry and the expulsion of foreign investors as solutions to the economic problems. The right of labor to organize is promoted both as a solution to end exploitation of the working class and to provide the insurgent with an organized urban base which can be used to paralyze the government and attract world attention.

Combined with this rural and urban economic reform program, the insurgent cause also promises at least a minimum standard of social justice. In many of these nations, the government has created enormous bureaucracies in which venal government and military officials form a "morally corrupt plutocracy."[7] The courts exist only to serve the privileged class, and bribery and graft make a mockery of justice. The basic necessities of housing, medical care, sanitation, and even decent water are unavailable or insufficient. Class hostility between the privileged class and the underprivileged majority is exploited to create new dissensions. Equality before the law and the dignity of the individual are presented as prime aims of the insurgent movement.

Finally, the insurgent creates or exploits political frustration. The government must be blamed for the nation's ills and be convicted of being unresponsive to their solutions. As long as people believe there is a legal alternative to armed revolt, a guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted.[8] The cause

will vary according to the nature of the government under attack, but the insurgent can adapt this cause to cover all situations. Colonies such as Indochina or Algeria, domestic dictatorships such as Batista's Cuba or Trujillo's Dominican Republic, and even native domocracies such as the Philippines during the HUK revolt, have all been threatened or overthrown by insurgent movements. Whenever an insurgent movement can promote a cause based on the desires of the people for a more dignified, prosperous way of life, combined with a successful attempt to discredit the existing government, there is an excellent chance for victory.

There are, of course, many other popular causes which have been utilized in specific locations and situations. The exploitation of tribalism in Katanga, religion in the Yemen, and resentments against minority groups in Cyprus serve to show the resourcefulness of the modern insurgent in adapting a cause to gain the widest possible support. But always at the heart of the cause is the promise of a better way of life. Many of the authors in the required reading have emphasized the importance of basic human rights in any insurgent cause,[9] but perhaps Tad Szulc expressed it most plainly:

> To the people who are often hungry and diseased, unemployed or underemployed, these revolutionary calls do not represent ideological or political concepts . . .. All that really matters is the promise of food for the children, of decent housing for the family, of full employment twelve months of the year, of human and national dignity, and of a chance for a better life in every sense.[10]

The United States, born in revolution almost two centuries ago, ironically finds itself in opposition to almost every insurgent program in the world today. With the exception of two ventures into the field of inspiring insurgencies (e.g. Guatemala in 1951 and the unsuccessful anti-Castro attack of 1961), this country has stood in the forefront of those

attempting to maintain international stability. The prime reason, of course, is that the Soviet Union and Communist China, thwarted by a nuclear balance of terror, have turned to what they refer to as "wars of national liberation" as their new instrument of expansion. Yet even in those cases where the movement is neither foreign-directed nor Communist-dominated, but is seeking only economic, social, or political change from within, the leadership is apt to regard the United States as a hostile force. This hostility is based upon two factors. The postwar policy of the United States, in an effort to contain communism, has been marked by an abondonment of traditional isolationist policies and the assumption of the leadership of the non-Soviet world. Unfortunately, this period also marked the twilight of the colonial era and, by allying itself with the leading western colonial powers just as a wave of anticolonial feeling was sweeping the world, the United States found itself sharing much of the anticolonial reaction. In addition, many of these insurgent causes are based upon economic reform programs which represent a reaction against capitalism and a turning towards some form of socialism. Since the United States is the leading proponent of capitalism in the modern world, and since Communist theory presents socialism as a step on the road to communism,[11] there has been a tendency on the part of Americans to regard most of these insurgent programs as hostile to their economic system and their leadership as tools of international communism. Thus, the insurgent often sees government troops arrayed against him armed with American weapons, industries which exploit the local populace backed by American capital, and unpopular governments maintained in power through American foreign aid programs. And yet, at its birth, this nation was looked upon by the established world powers as a radical experiment spawned by revolutionaries and as a threat to international stability. We have left to history the principles and ideals which created that revolution. How applicable then, are these ideals, for which the founders of this nation found compelling enough to risk both lives and fortunes, to the revolutionaries of today?

To answer this question it is necessary to examine further these ideals and the philosophies which inspired them. The American Revolution was directed against a regime which would be considered mild indeed today. The causes were varied and complex, but one of the most basic was economic frustration. However, these were not the frustrations of grinding poverty and economic misery which are at the root of so many insurgent movements today. Rather they were the frustrations of a relatively affluent middle class which felt itself hampered and restricted by the economic policies of a distant, authoritarian government.[12] The 56 signers of the American Declaration of Independence included 22 lawyers, 11 merchants and 5 doctors; 33 of the total were college educated.[13] These men were not downtrodden revolutionaries, and their followers were certainly not, as Robert Taber describes today's insurgents, "the hungry peasants and urban slum dwellers . . . having nothing to lose but their lives."[14] They sought no popular support through appeals of social or economic reform for the masses. In fact they represented the very section of society against whom most modern insurgents attempt to rally support.

If the Declaration of Independency was merely a listing of the grievances of this well-to-do class against King George III, it would have little or no application to modern insurgent movements. But it was much more than just that. Its author, Thomas Jefferson, had been profoundly influenced by the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 in England and by the theories of the 17th century English philosopher, John Locke. In the preamble and first paragraph of this document, Jefferson presented a theory of the rights of man which is as vital and basic today as it was in 1776. To Jefferson, and to Locke, man had certain rights which no government could alter, abridge, or deny. These rights were man's by nature, and, since government was merely a "social contract" between men, government could have no effect upon them.[15] This "social contract" could be broken any time these "natural rights" were violated. Locke called these rights "life, liberty, and estate,"[16] while Jefferson

substituted the term "pursuit of happiness" for estate. By this all-inclusive term Jefferson included whatever man found necessary for his well-being, social welfare, and economic needs.

In the event that these rights were denied, man was free to re-create, abolish, modify, or alter his form of government, reconstructing it in whatever fashion he deemed necessary to protect these rights. Indeed, it was not even necessary that the government had, in fact, violated these rights; merely that the people believed they had been so violated.[17]

Thus, whatever cause promotes the desires of the people for their well-being can claim the blessings of the American Declaration of Independence. It matters not that the cause bears little resemblance to the causes of the American Revolution so long as its principles are based on individual welfare and it has the support of the people. Whether the cause be to obtain a voice in colonial tax policies, or to obtain equal representation in legislative bodies, as in our revolution, or to carry out land reform, obtain social justice, or to redistribute resources, as in modern movements, the principle of upholding the natural rights of man is the same. The Jacobin excesses of the French Revolution a few years later shocked many of those who led the American Revolution, but Jefferson was one of the first to favor recognition of the new government despite its excesses, because its principles, if not its practices, were in sympathy with our own revolution.[18]

The United States must remember, even though behind the noble and idealistic causes advanced by insurgents today often lurks the spectre of agressive communism or unscrupulous domestic leadership which is quick to betray the revolution after victory, that we have left a legacy of revolution to the world. To use Jefferson as an example again, in his writings he stated the belief that the occasional threat of rebellion was a beneficial thing, in that it kept the government aware of this power of the people.[19] He and his fellow American revolutionists have left us a

heritage of support for those who take up arms against authority to promote the rights of man.

An insurgent movement is born in and thrives upon instability. Since the success of an insurgency is vitally dependent upon popular support, the insurgent must either create or exploit whatever unstable factors lead to popular discontent with the incumbent government. While all governments share some degree of instability, since there is always some element in opposition to the current regime, a favorable climate for an insurgent movement exists whenever that opposition is able to mobilize substantial popular support, and the government continues to be unresponsive. If the nation also has a history of political violence, or if the government's legitimacy can be questioned, or if there are sizable areas beyond the effective control of the central government because of terrain or poor communication and transportation facilities, the insurgent's prospects are further improved. Since an insurgency is so profoundly affected by instabilities such as these and others, any attempt to analyze current insurgent campaigns must begin with an analysis of the major instabilities prevalent in the world today.

The relatively stable prewar order was permanently shattered by the Second World War. When the guns of that conflict were finally silenced, only the United States and the Soviet Union retained the power to exert global influence. All of the other Great Powers had either suffered total military defeat, or had found the price of victory to be an intolerable strain on their economic and military resources. As a result, a power vacuum was created throughout much of the world at the very time that a reaction against being swept along in the tide of history by the now moribund Great Powers was making itself felt. As might have been expected, the first areas to succumb to this popular desire to alter the status quo were the colonial empires, since they suffered from the dual political instabilities of being nonrepresentative governments and under alien control. Some of the colonial powers have attempted to grant some

degree of autonomy to their possessions, notably the British through their policy of "indirect rule," but, ironically, these steps have had the effect of contributing to the downfall of foreign rule by creating the intellectual native class which assumes the leadership of most independence movements. The Asiatic colonies were subjected to the further instability of the destruction of their existing social and political structure during the Japanese occupation following that country's early victories of World War II.[20] The shortsighted Allied policy of support of clandestine resistance movements in these areas, with little regard for the ultimate political aspirations of the leadership of these movements, created the core around which several of the postwar insurgencies were formed. The Philippines, Malaya, Indochina, and even such Western nations as Greece and to some extent France were to suffer from internal disorder led by groups which looked upon the defeat of the Axis as merely a step along the way on the road to power. Perhaps the classic case which illustrates the effect of these colonial instabilities arising out of the war occurred in Indochina where the French spent nine years, suffering over 172,000 military casualties,[21] in a vain attempt to restore their power.

However, colonies are not the only form of government to be plagued by political instability. Latin America, despite well over a century of political independence, continues to be wracked by internal disorder, and many of the former colonies discovered that independence creates new instabilities as the unifying force of opposition to foreign rule fragments into numerous competing factions, each seeking to maximize its power in the new government. When a native regime is unable or unwilling to carry out the promises which gained it support, popular discontent can often be aroused against it with the very slogans that first brought it to power. This is particularly true of weak, "popular front" coalition governments which depend upon a delicate blend of various, and often competitive, interests and ideologies to maintain unity. If such a government can be hamstrung

by internal interest groups, or be convicted of being corrupt and graft-ridden, or if it loses popular support, it becomes a prime target for insurgency. A vivid demonstration of how unstable such a government actually is was provided by events in the Congo following the Belgian withdrawal in 1960. An index of the incredible weakness of that unfortunate nation is available in the reliable estimate that there were only 16 native college graduates in a population of over 13 million when the republic was proclaimed.[22]

Another unstable political form, also nonrepresentative, is the dictatorship or rule by junta. The army, since it is usually the only organized force in underdeveloped areas,[23] is frequently in the forefront of such power grabs; indeed it has been said that the pinnacle of a successful Latin American military career is the presidency of the republic.[24] There is hardly a nation of Latin America that has not experienced this illegal or extralegal rule, despite constitutional guarantees of representative democracy, and they all share a history of frequent so-called revolutions which were nothing more than power struggles between small elite groups without noticably altering the political, social, or economic structure of the country. The emergency of new "strong men" in Africa and Asia seems to indicate that this trend, complete with military involvement in internal affairs, is repeating itself in these areas as well. Although some weak, ineffective, token opposition parties are sometimes permitted to exist under this form of government, its greatest instability is a result of the complete stifling of all views contrary to that of the ruling party. There is even a growing tendency to dispense with a sham multiparty system, and such influential Africans as Julius Nyerere[25] of Tanganyika and Madiera Keita[26] of Mali have openly espoused single-party government as a solution to that continent's ills. One result of this dominance of a single party is "cultism," the overemphasis of the personality of the national leader. This may take the form of lofty titles, such as Franco's "El Caudillo," or Nkrumah's "The Redeemer," or Castro's "The Maximum Leader," or

may even approach near idolatry such as the current emphasis of "Maoism" in Communist China. Whatever the form, it presents tremendous difficulties to any successor government in maintaining stability following the death or deposition of such a ruler. The *Peronistas* still represent a major threat to the stability of Argentina despite the fact that Peron has been out of office since 1955, and the new governments of Ghana and Indonesia (both, incidently, dependent upon army support) must carefully destroy the images of Nkrumah and Sukarno respectively to avoid similar difficulties.

While political instability is a major threat to many governments today, it is often only a byproduct of two other basic instabilities: social and economic. Some colonies, some dictatorships, and even some weak coalitions have survived insurgencies by either suppressing or satisfying the social and economic inequalities which provide insurgents their popular support. With the previously docile, impoverished masses now demanding at least a minimum acceptable way of life, it can be expected that insurgents will continue to find substantial support in those areas where these popular desires are not realized.

The basic economic instabilities are a product of stagnant economy challenged by a mushrooming population growth.[27] Per capita income is unbelievably low in the agrarian, emerging nations, and, because of population trends, the economies of these areas must advance at a rapid pace merely to maintain these low standards. The vast majority of the people of these regions are unskilled, unpropertied, and faced with slim prospects of economic advancement. At the other end of the national economic scale is a small, affluent elite which either operates or controls the machinery of government. The lack of a native industry precludes the existence of an influential middle class of artisans, merchants, and professionals which could challenge the power of the ruling minority or provide leadership to the underprivileged majority. Whatever intellectual class exists desires the creation of a modern, industrial state as a solution to

the economic woes of the nation, but it is strongly opposed by the power groups who view this step, correctly, as a threat to their control, established as it is on a plantation-type agriculture and an alliance with foreign industrialists.[28] Another difficulty faced by the modernizers is the lack of a skilled native labor pool and a scarcity of capital. Almost all the tools of production, including capital, must be imported. This in turn leads to an unfavorable trade balance which makes these areas the debtor nations of the world market. For example, the coffee crop accounts for from 50 to 80 per cent of the exports of Brazil, El Salvador, and Columbia.[29] But whether the economy is based upon agricultural products, such as coffee, rice, sugar, or rubber, or upon raw materials such as oil or minerals, the results are the same. The national economy fluctuates with the prices of these commodities in international trade, and imports far exceed exports. The "Age of Colonialism" has largely passed, but its effects are perpetuated by the "Age of Neocolonialism" which still looks upon these areas, despite their political independence, as sources of raw materials and as markets for the manufactured goods of the industrial states.[30]

Several other instabilities in the economic field bear mention. A plantation-type agriculture depends upon an unequal distribution of land resources and creates a large class of landless tenant peasants around which an insurgent movement can be created. Also, a money-crop agriculture is a poor base upon which to build an industrial state in that it does not produce the foodstuffs necessary to support an industrial society. Both the Soviet Union and Communist China paid a heavy price for overemphasizing industry over agriculture during their modernization campaigns,[31] and there are few governments strong enough to resist the popular pressure certain to arise if wholesale deprivation and famine even remotely resembling the Communist examples are encountered. Another unstable condition is the tendency towards the "Balkanization" of the former colonial empires, particularly in Africa.[32] The creation of a host of small

nations, having no prospect of ever achieving a viable economy, only creates chronic economic problems. The British decision to grant independence to Basutoland, a small black enclave totally surrounded by the Union of South Africa and doomed to economic dependence by a lack of every basic resource, is the most recent manifestation of this trend.

One final form of economic instability, which is a product rather than a cause of insurgency, is caused by underground economic warfare. The mere existence of an active insurgent movement in a nation has the effect of driving foreign capital out of the country and depriving the government of this needed finance. The national economy can be further weakened by depriving the government of tax revenues in areas under insurgent control and actual warfare against the capital-producing elements of the country. Castro's campaign of destruction of the sugar crops during the struggle against Batista and the current Cuban-directed sabotage in the Venezuelan oil fields are two recent examples of this policy.

The Charter of the Alliance for Progress, drafted for Latin America in 1961 but applicable to all the underdeveloped areas of the world, provides a hint of the instabilities which exist by listing what steps must be taken to promote a bright economic future. Among other things, it stresses the need for, as a minimum guideline, an annual 2.5 per cent rate of growth of per capita income, "a more equitable distribution of national income," the institution of "programs of comprehensive agrarian reform," and the acceleration of "the process of national industrialization."[33] Until these steps are taken an insurgent will be able to exploit a population that is poorly housed, fed, and clothed, plagued by inflation, and without hope other than armed revolt.

However, economic growth will have little prospect for success unless it is combined with improvements in the internal relationships between segments of the population. Here again, sociological instabilities may take various forms. One of the most subtle

is, ironically, a product of economic advancement. The creation of a new middle class, in itself a healthy outgrowth of the transformation of an agrarian to an industrial society, can lead to a class struggle when the reactionary ruling class opposes the rising power of this new group. The middle class thus mobilizes the latent power of the underprivileged masses, not for what it can gain for these unfortunates, but for the effect that the struggle will have in the power of the aristocracy.[34] Thus, it is not surprising that the leadership of most revolutionary movements "from below" is provided by this new social class.

In addition to this class strife, and sometimes superimposed upon it, is the instability caused by the existence of significant social, ethnic, or linguistic groupings which do not identify themselves with the central government or are at odds with each other. The activities of the "Overseas Chinese" have played a fundamental role in the internal instability of several Asian nations. The Maylan Insurgency, put down with tremendous difficulty, was almost totally directed by a Chinese minority within the country.[35] In Africa, traditional tribal differences are a prime cause of discord in several nations. Nigeria, once considered the brightest hope for democracy in Black Africa, has been torn by sectionalism which has led to the assassination of one prime minister last January and the kidnapping and probable murder of his successor during an army revolt last July.[36] In Kenya, hostilities between the Masai and Kikuyu tribes create a constant threat of civil war in that country.[37] Since tribal allegiances are still, for the most part, stronger than national loyalty in Sub-Sahara Africa, it can be expected that they will continue to impair stability in that region. The racial hostility in Rhodesia, the attempts of Indian minorities to carve out separate linguistic states in that subcontinent, and the struggle between Hindu and Moslem over Kashmir are just a few further manifestations of this debilitating form of instability.

Finally, there are the classic social evils which have existed in Latin America, Asia, and Africa for decades and which have been largely ignored by the governments of these areas. Illiteracy and the lack of educational opportunities, disease and the lack of adequate social welfare programs, and injustice and the denial of individual human dignity will continue to thwart the ambitions of the underdeveloped nations and promote insurgent-producing instabilities until an adequate program of social reform can be carried out.

Perhaps the most difficult instabilities to assess are those which exist in men's minds. A French authority, Colonel Gabriel Bonnet, has presented an oversimplified but enlightening formula for a successful insurgency: RW = G + P.[38] The formula, simply stated, presents the hypothesis that revolutionary warfare (RW) is a combination of conventional guerrilla tactics (G) and psychological action (P). One of the most powerful types of psychological action which an insurgent may employ is a calculated campaign of restricted terrorism. Terrorism itself is a double-edged weapon; indiscriminate tactics against an entire population, if carried out indefinitely, can have the effect of turning the people against the insurgents. However, if the targets are carefully selected, such a policy can reap tremendous success. General Grivas, the leader of the independence movement in Cyprus, achieved his goals almost entirely through a program of assassination and ambush directed against police and British military units.[39] In Palestine, the *Ingun* and *Stern* groups executed similar tactics, although excesses such as the murder of Lord Moyne, the British Minister of State for the Middle East, aroused revulsion among even ardent Zionists.[40] The Viet Cong campaign against the village chiefs and minor government officials in South Vietnam, which has resulted in an estimated 13,000 slayings through 1963,[41] is the most recent example of such a calculated, insurgent-inspired terrorist assault. A terrorist campaign, in addition to diverting a disproportionate share of government resources and manpower from other forms of counterinsurgency, also has the

effect of destroying the confidence of the people in the government.

Another vital psychological factor which introduces internal instability is caused by the export of ideologies across national boundaries. The current policy of using partition as an instrument of arbitration, which has made certain parallels of latitude a part of modern political terminology, has proven to be psychologically unstable to the populations of the affected areas from the time of the Irish settlement following World War I down to the present difficulties involving North and South Vietnam. National desires to regain lost, or supposedly lost, territories, demonstrated by Arab hostility against Israel or Indonesian ambitions towards Malayasia, create another form of this type of instability which can be used to promote insurgencies. Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism, despite fundamental differences among the spokesmen for each cause, are still powerful motivations among the populations of Africa and the Middle East.

However, the most powerful of these instability-creating ideologies remains militant communism. The Chinese, abandoning the "peaceful coexistence" policy which followed the 1955 Bandung Conference, have been particularly active in promoting revolutionary ideals in the underdeveloped world. Believing that they have evolved a particularly effective form of communism for these areas, based upon the peasantry rather than the working class, the Chinese Communists have announced their overt support of all revolutions directed against what they consider reactionary governments. Included in this Chinese definition of "reactionary" are those governments which have already won political independence under "bourgeois national leadership."[42] The current Chinese-Soviet rift is due in large measure to the Soviet belief that this blanket endorsement of all revolutionaries does the Communist cause more harm than good and, since the death of Stalin, the Soviets have generally avoided direct involvement in insurgent movements. However, while the Soviets become less active in this field,

the Chinese have been joined by an extremely vocal ally in the field of exporting revolutions since the establishment of an announced Communist regime in Cuba. Cuban Communists have been in the forefront of most insurgent assaults on Latin American governments, and it can be expected that Castro's attempts to spread his particular brand of revolution will continue to impair stability in this hemisphere.

Unless a counterinsurgent program is able to cope with all these instabilities--political, economic, sociological, and psychological--it will be doomed to failure. Treating an insurgent threat as merely a military problem, albeit one requiring unusual tactics and organization, is a pitifully inadequate response to the problem. An insurgency can only be overcome by destroying its popular support. To destroy this support a government must actually accede to those parts of the insurgent program which reflect the desires of the people. The insurgents in Venezuela have suffered serious setbacks, not because of substantial military defeats, but because, as one unidentified insurgent leader speaking of the government put it to an American newspaperman recently, "They stole our revolution."[43] The revolution was stolen through a successful program of economic betterment for the masses, just as the Huks revolution was "stolen" once the Philippine Government instituted an effective land reform program. Once the British announced a date for Malayan independence, they "stole" a large part of the cause of the MRLA. If a government can offer its inhabitants a peaceful, prosperous way of life in accordance with the reasonable demands of the people, an insurgent will not find the instabilities so vital to his success. "The nation is the target of the guerrilla; it must be the target of the counterguerrilla as well."[44]

FOOTNOTES

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

WESTERN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

A lecture delivered
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by

Professor David D. Warren

The idea of democracy has exerted a magnetic pull upon the minds and actions of men during the past 300 years. While it had arisen much earlier in the small Greek world and had flourished under the Athenians particularly, it had flickered out for many centuries before it was revived in post-Renaissance Europe. Yet the paradox is that, despite democracy's universal appeal today, only a minority of the world's population lives under democratic systems of

government. At least this is the view held in those countries of Western Europe and America where democracy first emerged and took shape in its modern form. But there are rival claimants in the Communist countries who challenge the validity of Western liberal democracy and give to this magical word a quite different substantive content.

What then does democracy mean? In its broadest sense, democracy is government by the people. Only if it can be demonstrated that the people themselves control and direct affairs in their society can that society be called democratic. Rarely in man's history has this criterion been met. For it is clear from the past--just as continues to be true now--that most men have lived and are living under governments beyond their influence and subject to directives they had no voice in making. Most governments, after all, have been dominated and manipulated by a privileged few to further their own interests at the expense of the many. Though, ideally, it follows from our definition that democracy should provide for the direct participation of all adult members of a community in the making and carrying out of decisions, the reality of large societies calls for something more modest and limited.

In actuality, what modern democracy has come to mean is a system wherein the people govern themselves indirectly through their continuing capacity to choose the kind of government they themselves want. For all practical purposes, democratic government has become synonymous with representative government; the people choose those who will serve as their representatives and delegate to them the power to act. Though it may well be true that in all governmental systems there are the governing few and the governed many, the fundamental, the all-important distinction between democratic and nondemocratic governments lies in this: in a democracy the governing few are held responsible to those on whose behalf and at whose behest they exercise authority. The few are answerable to the people who select them; should the people be dissatisfied with the performance of the leaders, they can dismiss them and turn to others vying for the opportunity to lead, vested with the people's authority.

Simply put, the great virtue of democracy inheres in this very characteristic--that it does offer some real choice between alternatives. The great operating principle of any democracy, then, is government based upon popular consent, government amenable to majority will or rule.

Yet majority rule, essential as it is in democratic government, would not alone be enough. All too easily, unchecked majority rule could degenerate into majority tyranny, pressing upon all in society the prevailing majoritarian stamp and crushing unpopular minority opinion. This would be to deny the characteristic lying at the core of democracy--the right to choose among alternatives. It is the veneration for and protection of this right that has imparted to ongoing democratic governments perhaps their outstanding merit--their capacity for experimentation. For only where there is freedom to express ideas, freedom to differ from the current majority, freedom to be critical of that majority in its handling of public issues, will democracy remain healthy. While there obviously exists an inevitable conflict between majority rule and freedom of expression, each operating principle is equally essential to the practice of democracy. The majority of the moment must respect the right of individuals and groups to dissent not merely on inconsequential things, but also on the things that really count.

Underlying these operating principles of majority rule and freedom of expression is a cluster of ideas, beliefs, and presumptions upon which the democratic structure is built. A central idea certainly is that of equality, the notion, as the Declaration of Independence asserts, that all men are equal and are entitled to rights of life and freedom which no government, however constituted, should destroy. It is the individual who is important, so much so that, as the Declaration so eloquently sets forth, the very purpose of government is to protect all men, equal in their individual worth, in the enjoyment of these basic rights. Here truly was a revolutionary concept, put into effect by the Colonies in their break with England, a radical departure from the prevalent norm--an instrumental view of government, seeing government

as a creature of men-in-society, bent to their needs and aims, their servant and not their master, as had been and was then almost everywhere true. Moreover, should government fail to advance their needs and aims or threaten their fundamental rights, men could alter or abolish what they had made and bring into being something closer to their desires.

Implicit in these bedrock ideas is a great faith in man's reason, his capacity to make intelligent decisions, to select discriminatingly courses of action that will most conduce to the furtherance of his own best interests. An unprovable assumption in the democratic creed is that man's rational nature has a moral dimension enabling him to distinguish between good and evil. He is not so suffused with narrow self-interest, so driven to prostitute his rationality in the service of his own selfish drives, that he cannot perceive and make allowance for the ends of others. He is capable of a larger vision of the general good, living as he does in a society of men from which he gains marked advantages. And his awareness of this enables him to postpone, reduce or even sacrifice his own immediate claims to meet community needs whose realization confers benefits upon all. Thus, democracy is an optimistic faith, believing that men can make meaningful choices and that these choices can bring about real differences in society. That is, man is, within fairly broad limits, a free agent; his free will at work in the world permits him to engage in purposeful social engineering. He cannot merely do, but undo; his ideas, spilling over into actions, do have consequences.

Yet democracy does not so emphasize man's potential for good as to be blind to the overwhelming historical evidence of that darker side of man's nature, his irrationality and tendency toward injustice. Ignored and uncurbed, these characteristics would snuff out any democratic experiment. Therefore, any democratic system must provide some minimal safeguards against the possible abuse of power by those who wield it. Here is where a *free* electoral process becomes an essential institution as an external check upon the people's representatives, holding them accountable periodically for their actions and

offering the chance to bring their tenure to an end. No group of men, as the provisions of our Constitution show, was more alive to the perils of unrestrained power than the Founding Fathers. For they were realists, familiar with man's behavior both in the past and in the contemporary world. The lesson they drew from history was that unchecked power in the hands of a ruling elite had always been used in that elite's behalf. The drafters of the Constitution had the delicate task of establishing a stronger government that would be effective, yet at the same time not so strong as to enable those at the levers of power to make the system an instrument of their irresponsible will. While giving broad, positive, but specifically delegated powers to the various governmental branches, they created an elaborate system of countervailing power. Their objective was to rule out, as much as human ingenuity could contrive, the possibility that power might be concentrated in a single center. A range of provisions--the separation of power among three branches; checks and balances making these branches interdependent; staggered elections by differing constituencies for Congress and the Presidency; a federal system dividing political power between two levels of government, national and state; the early establishment of the doctrine of judicial review; constitutional prohibitions regarding certain actions upon both national and state governments; and the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights incorporated into the Constitution in 1791--all these were designed to fragmentize power, impel cooperation among the multiple power centers if the machinery was to work, and guard against that ineradicable bent men have to misuse power if they can. Hence the necessity of what Madison called those "auxiliary precautions," the externally imposed limitations upon officeholders' actions.

Nowhere has the relationship between the duality of man's nature and democracy been better stated than in Reinhold Niebuhr's great aphorism: "Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary." Here there is expressed sufficient confidence that man can govern himself, balanced by a clear-eyed recognition that, since it is always men who do the governing,

they, because of personal ambition and the desire for aggrandizement, must be subject to restraints. And democracy means limited government, just as limited government can be equated with constitutional government. At the very least, any constitutional government will possess some, if not all, democratic features. Constitutionalism, intimately tied in with the growth of democracy, has served to define and impose limits upon governmental power, to assure that such power shall be employed only in conformity with established procedures, and to put certain individual and group rights beyond governmental intervention.

But how, the question arises, can these essential distinguishing characteristics of democracy, majority rule, and freedom of expression be assured? Put another way, by what means do we discover their presence in any political order? For if they are to operate, they require certain institutions which serve as vehicles for their realization. To find out what the majority want, for example, some way of assessing opinion, of counting heads, is necessary. In large communities, this calls for elaborate machinery to provide for genuinely free elections. Indeed, as we have already emphasized, democratic government in anything beyond quite small social groups is representative government, the election by the many of the few designated to act for them. Thus majority rule manifests itself in unfettered, fair elections, giving the electorate an opportunity to choose among those who offer themselves as candidates for office. Such a choice would, however, be extremely difficult to make were it not for another institution, the political party. The function of the party is to simplify the decision the voter must make by presenting candidates bearing the party's label, educating the electorate on the party's position with respect to the issues, and undertaking an organized effort to stimulate interest. Since democracy calls for a choice between alternatives, there must be at least two political parties. Through parties, whether two or more, the alternatives are sharpened and made more meaningful for the citizen.

The second core feature of democracy, freedom of expression, also requires institutional support. If

the people are to choose wisely, their powers of reasoning must be trained through a broad educational program that will insure an enlightened, discriminating electorate. Yet they will not be well informed unless they are exposed to the full range of ideas, unpopular and abrasive though some of these may be. Without a free press, without untrammeled media of communications, the circulating currency of ideas will be debased and the people themselves shortchanged in their search for solution to urgent public problems. Further, the right of the people to form groups in order to achieve the purposes that brought them together and to take group action by bringing their concerted influence to bear upon political parties and governmental agencies must be recognized. A pluralistic society, made up of many groups, largely self-governing, and free, within broad limits, to seek their ends, helps prevent the abuse of public power. For in a real sense, these influence groups, themselves wielders of private power--economic, social and political--constitute multiple competing centers to offset the power of government, which itself, in turn, exerts a restraining influence upon them. With regard to freedom of expression, these organized groups are the most effective conveyers of ideas for the consideration of the people. What should be especially noted is the close link between the institutions requisite for both majority rule and freedom of expression. Neither the conduct of free elections nor the existence of political parties is conceivable without that freedom of expression prevalent only when there are an educated electorate, a free press, and a multiplicity of active interest groups.

What we have been discussing up to this point has been a model, a theoretical framework of democracy. To what extent do countries calling themselves democratic meet the standards of this framework? A look at the experience of a few of the big Western nation-states may help us answer this question. Like many models, the one we have set forth represents the ideal. In those countries now regarded as democratic, democracy has evolved gradually, just as views about what democracy should entail have been broadened from time to time. Its modern content would include

universal adult suffrage, effective guarantees of personal and political rights, a general educational system available to all, healthy political parties, communications media free to present the truth as they see it, and interest groups actively engaged in efforts to convince the rest of society of the virtue of their objectives. In these terms, only as recently as the 20th century could a handful of countries qualify, while many of the newly independent countries, ostensibly seeking to put into motion democratic governments, have a long way to go before anything approaching democracy in its present-day connotation is in sight. There are clearly stages or phases along the tortuous route to that goal.

That the process by which democratic practices and institutions emerge is a piecemeal one is well illustrated by England, reaching centuries back into its long past. There cannot be even a start toward democratic government without some limitation upon government itself. Once the English kings had succeeded in centralizing control, the problem arose for those who still kept some measure of power--the gentry and upper commercial class--of how to curtail the royal authority. The growth of the common law in the 12th century; the wresting of the Magna Carta from the king; the rise of Parliament, representing the influential interests of the realm and its gradual accretion of power as against that of the king; the long, violent struggle in the 17th century between the king, asserting divine right to absolute rule, and Parliament, stubbornly intent on subordinating his role to its own; the triumph of Parliament, reflected in the Bill of Rights of 1689; the acceptance of the great principle of the rule of law, by which government is denied arbitrary and capricious action and governing officials are themselves subject to the law and not above it; the enlargement of the concept of due process of law with assurance of individual procedural rights, such as the writ of habeas corpus and the right of every man to his day in court and to a fair, impartial trial--all these are great landmarks in the history of political liberty in England. And with parliamentary supremacy, a two-party system took shape, at first loosely organized around particular leaders in Parliament, but then

building up a machinery to marshal support among the electorate for the parties' candidates. That electorate was successively enlarged by the three great reform acts of the 19th century and, finally, through the extension of the suffrage to women in the 1920's, all the more necessitating development of party apparatus to appeal to these new voters.

England's remarkable political stability is due mainly to the political and social cohesion of her society. At least since the Glorious Revolution of the late 17th century, England has been spared the conflict flowing from deep cleavages among a people, for such cleavages have not marred her life. She had her political revolution earlier than any of the other nation-states, and the happy outcome of that revolution had been foreshadowed in the earlier advances toward constitutional government. A national consensus emerged, a consensus involving general accord on the ends and means of government. That is, most of the English people agreed on the fundamental rules of the game, the constitutional order by which decisions were made. This constitutional order functioned through such deeply respected political institutions as the Monarchy, Parliament, parties, free elections, and civil liberties.

Given the high degree of national and social homogeneity which the English possess, their parliamentary system has responded admirably to the demands imposed upon it. The outstanding merit of British parliamentary government is its capacity for positive action, since it assures a strong executive. Under it the executive and legislature are fused, the elected legislature choosing from its own members the cabinet and prime minister, who are collectively responsible to the House of Commons. With a strong, disciplined, two-party system, made possible by the existence of a broad consensus, the majority party members can be counted on to support faithfully the legislative program of the cabinet, really the most important committee in the House. While a vote of nonconfidence can bring the cabinet down, this is unlikely because of party discipline. The prime minister, however, can whip reluctant party members into line with the threat of calling for dissolution of

the House and new elections. Undoubtedly contributing to England's political success was her island position, the consequent security against invasion and relief from the burden of having to maintain a garrison state, and the freedom afforded to devote the energies and genius of her people to the art of government. The result has been that England's constitution is an unwritten one, consisting of important documents and statutes, conventions, traditions, and precedents. Legally, Parliament is omnipotent; but the moderation, good sense, and ingrained respect of the English people for fundamental procedures and rights stand as a bar to the abuse of parliamentary power.

The Constitution of the United States, by contrast, is written. It has the distinction of being the oldest such constitution extant, having been continuously in effect since 1789. Its drafters, as we noted earlier, went to extraordinary lengths to limit the exercise of public power and yet still provide for adequate government. Through various devices--federalism, three separate branches and an intricate arrangement of checks and balances among them, staggered elections by different constituencies, etc.--they sought to render difficult too hasty or imprudent effectuation of the popular will. Yet, as the record attests, these restraints have not proven to be straitjackets preventing response to emergencies. The enlarged role of the President, to whom, in times of trouble, the other branches tend to defer, has overcome their inhibiting effects. Not for nothing has the term "presidential government" been applied to the American political system. As with the British, so too with the Americans, a prevailing political and social consensus has made their governmental mechanism work as well as it has. Even before they began their experiment in complete self-government, the American colonists had for long partially run their own affairs through their participation in the colonial legislatures. Except for the slavery question, the United States has never been riven by divisive issues that would impair the relatively smooth operation of government. Notwithstanding the continental size of these United States and their great diversity--sectional, economic, ethnic, and religious--that overarching consensus, that harmony on fundamentals,

has allowed the two great political parties, Democratic and Republican, to encompass such diversity under their broadly unifying umbrellas. Unlike the British, American party organization has been loose, decentralized, and without tight discipline. American national political leaders have had to be diplomats, accommodating and adjusting the demands of powerful groups in conflict and building shifting majorities in favor of particular public policies.

Less successful practitioners of limited, democratic government than England and the United States have been France and Germany. France, for example, went through a convulsive revolution in 1789, overturning all at once an absolute monarchy. She was denied the kind of experience the British had in slowly curbing the royal power and fashioning institutions of representative government. By breaking so sharply with the past, France ever since has been harried by internal squabbles; she has never been able to weave the cohesive social fabric so requisite for the democratic process. The result has been political instability--five republics and two empires in 175 years attesting to the absence of agreement on fundamentals among the French people--for they have never been able to strike a balance between liberty and authority. Too often there has been an excess of one or the other. France is a classic illustration of the nation lacking integration, not only ideological, but social and economic as well. Her various major groups have entertained clashing aims, leading often to a kind of paralysis, a condition of immobilism.

Mirroring the heterogeneity of French life, a multiparty system took form, ranging over the full political spectrum. On the Right were elements hostile to the democratic republic and favorable to authoritarian rule. The forces of the Center, most committed to democracy, quarreled with each other over economic and religious matters. And the forces on the Left, alienated by failure to resolve pressing social and economic problems, also opposed democratic government. Nor did certain features of the successive political systems contribute to stability. Both the Third Republic (1871-1939) and the Fourth

Republic (1946-1958) were essentially governments by assembly. In contrast to the British parliamentary system, there was no real fusion of executive and legislature; the French executive was weak because he had very little power to control the Assembly through dissolution to offset the Assembly's frequently exercised power of changing premiers and cabinets. Besides, it was difficult to impose discipline on a coalition government of suspicious, uncooperative partners-by-necessity.

Such a government understandably was ineffectual in grappling with controversial issues. And when a major crisis like Algeria's struggle for independence struck the Fourth Republic, it collapsed. France turned, as she had done before, to the authoritative leader, this time to avoid violent civil war. She was fortunate at least in having a man, Gen. Charles de Gaulle, who, for all his impatience with parties and assembly government, was not an enemy of democracy. The Constitution of the Fifth Republic, drafted to his specifications, made the President rather than the Premier the key figure and gave him the whip hand over the Assembly, with the power to dissolve it and call for new elections. Further, under Article 16, the President could take on wide powers during a national emergency.

There is no question but that France has prospered since De Gaulle assumed command in 1958. Political stability has facilitated, if it has not been responsible for, the great advances France has made economically and the considerable changes in her social structure. Conceivable their impact may have been so great that, even should the Fifth Republic fail to survive De Gaulle's passing, a new constitution giving a larger voice to parties and their representatives in the Assembly might well work much better than its predecessors. But this will only occur if a greater consensus has evolved on means and ends, and those wide differences separating the numerous groupings of French society have been narrowed.

Democracy came very late to the German people under circumstances decidedly unfavorable to its

prospects. Germany, for centuries, had been a congeries of rival states and principalities, varying in size and power and characterized by economic, social, and religious diversity. It was Bismarck and Prussia who imposed unity on these many political entities by force from above rather than having that unity achieved by uprisings of the people against their autocratic rulers. Not unnatural, then, was the association in the German mind between authoritarian direction and the amazing strides made by the new state from its formation in 1871 until the eve of World War I, reaching preeminence as a military and industrial power. With defeat and collapse of the German Empire, democracy was given its chance in the postwar Weimar Republic, but, unfortunately, the handicaps to be overcome were too much. Part of the middle class, the most active champions of liberal democracy, defected under the hammer blows of wartime and postwar inflation. The new government was hampered from the start by a peace treaty imposing territorial losses and requiring reparations and demilitarization. The victorious democratic governments, though it would have been in their interests to insure that Germany's experiment in democracy prosper, did little to assist it in those early formative years. France, in fact, took punitive steps to enforce collection of reparations in the 1920's. For too many Germans, the Weimar Republic came to be equated with failure and disgrace.

Moreover, antidemocratic forces on both the extreme Left and Right waxed stronger as Weimar coped less and less effectively with depression and social conflict. Control of the moderates in Parliament weakened. The Constitution abetted this trend by its provision for proportional representation in national elections, thereby encouraging the growth of parties and splinter groups and leading to unstable coalitions in Parliament. A further weakness arose from the power of the Reichstag to dismiss cabinets by a simple vote of nonconfidence. The Chancellor had no comparable countervailing power against the Legislature. In addition, he shared the executive power with, and in fact was overshadowed by, a popularly elected president, authorized to exercise power in emergencies and able to give the chancellorship to almost anyone he might select. All these opened the way to Hitler

whom the old, reactionary President, General Von Hindenburg, appointed Chancellor in March, 1933. With Hitler's subsequent assumption of total power, the German people attained a unity that, as before, came from above through the use of coercion. For a brief hour, aggressive leadership gave them an empire by conquest and a sense of national greatness, but it finally brought them to national ruin in the fires of World War II.

The government of postwar West Germany has had a strikingly different experience from that of Weimar. After failing to arrive at a disposition of the German question with the Soviet Union, the Western democracies pushed for the setting up of a separate West German regime, removing or relaxing the numerous limitations placed on the defeated nation. They gave it every assistance, so much so that West Germany staged an almost miraculous recovery. Blessed with economic health, the new regime thrived politically as well. In contrast to the interwar period, the West German Federal Republic has had stable government, with essentially a two-party rather than a multiparty system (though minor parties exist). The Basic Law adopted in 1949 has added something to this stability by reducing the powers of both the President and the Legislature and strengthening the hand of the Chancellor. He can ask for a vote of confidence and apply real pressure to get it because of his authority to dissolve the Legislature which, in turn, can only vote no confidence if it is able to agree on an alternative Chancellor and Cabinet. Konrad Adenauer, in the dominant post of Chancellor for most of West Germany's short life, had enormous impact on the new government because of his strong personality.

Since Adenauer's resignation, the German political scene has been far less placid. Recently, his successor, Chancellor Ludwig Erhardt, was compelled by internal party pressures to step down. Kurt Kiessinger has replaced him, and for the first time the main opposition party, the Social Democratic, is participating in a "grand coalition" with the Christian Democrats. Though Germany appears to have constructed over the past 17 years more social and political unity, some observers have been disturbed by the substantial

gains of the rightist National Democratic Party in the Bavarian elections. Before this, neither the radical Right nor Left had expanded its power base very much. Such movements faced a constitutional block in Article 9 of the Basic Law, which forbids associations opposed to the constitutional order or to the concept of international understanding.

Just how hardy the plant of democracy is in Germany no one can say at this point with any real assurance. Thus far, circumstances affecting its growth have been propitious. A more wintry environment of economic reverses or internal political discord could, however, put its survival capacity to a severe test. It will be interesting to see whether or not the test comes in the years ahead, for Germany may well take an increasingly independent line from that of her Western allies.

Great though the achievements of Western democratic government have been, the prospects for democracy in the world at large are somewhat clouded. The record shows that the power of the example set by the successful democracies, England and the United States, has stimulated many others to launch experiments in democratic government. While some of these have been successful, many have failed. In the postwar years alone, the attrition rate among regimes striving to pursue a democratic course, especially in the newly independent countries, has been high. But the array of problems they struggle with are so immense that this is understandable. So often they are torn apart by internal conflict, without even a sense of nationhood to bind tribal groups together. They are passing through the disruptive process of modernization, telescoped into a much shorter period of time than was true for the Western liberal democracies. They do not have the administrative skills, the middle class, and the literate citizenry so helpful to the conduct of democratic affairs. The habits of cooperativeness and moderation are yet to be widely instilled. In other words, that essential underlying consensus remains to be established. Still, however gray the outlook may be for the near future, the longer view is more encouraging. There is some reason to believe that once modernity and all that it connotes

has been achieved in these societies--industrialization, urbanization, the development of skills in a widely educated populace, the social, economic, and political integration likely to accompany this whole process--the conditions will be created to make democratic government more feasible. Then the demonstrated qualities of life in the established democracies may bring more states to embrace the democratic form of government as the one most likely to secure their enjoyment.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor David D. Warren holds an A.B. from Brown University, and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Professor Warren has served with the U.S. Department of State, he has been a member of several governmental commissions for the State of Rhode Island, and he has served as Moderator for a Public Affairs Program presented on a Providence, Rhode Island, television station.

In 1961 Professor Warren was Consultant for International Relations at the Naval War College. He is presently Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Rhode Island and First Vice Chairman of the Rhode Island Constitutional Convention.

Professor Warren has previously published two articles in the *Naval War College Review:* "The Nature of the Nation-State System," in March 1963, and "International Organizations in International Relations," in November 1964.



Professional Reading

The evaluations of recent books listed in this section have been prepared for the use of resident students. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these books of interest in their professional reading.

The inclusion of a book in this section does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections.

Chief of Naval Personnel (G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20370

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Guam)
Library (ALSC), Box 174
San Francisco, Calif. 96630

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Pearl Harbor)
Library (ALSC), Box 20
San Francisco, Calif. 96610

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC), Bldg. C-9
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC)
San Diego, Calif. 92136

PROFESSIONAL READING

BOOKS

Benes, Vaclav, et al. *Eastern European Government and Politics*. New York: Harper & Row, 1966. 247p.

Eastern European Government and Politics contains a broad survey of six Communist states representing ideological variations of the Communist political structure. They are Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. A significant feature of the book is that each of the co-authors is a native of the region, a specialist in its political development, and a practicing professor and scholar. The six countries are described as having been caught in two gigantic power struggles: the Communist Chinese-Soviet dispute and the United States-Soviet cold war. Because of their fear of being trapped, as so often in the past, by their hopeless buffer location between struggling giants, they enthusiastically endorse the "peaceful coexistence" theory espoused by the Soviet Union, and they vastly prefer it to Mao's assumption that almost all forms of war are desirable and inevitable. After the Hitler and Stalin years, there is a deep-seated desire to be left alone. The governmental and political structure and the meanderings of the leadership through such traumatic experiences as the denunciation of the "cult of the individual" and the East German, Polish, and Hungarian revolts are chronologically depicted through 1965. Professor Gyorgy sees a growing spirit of defiance and independence among the area's future elite, based on attitudes of ideological indifference, combined with trends of economic unreliability and political instability as far as the U.S.S.R. is concerned. He believes that the current search for autonomy will continue unabated, and that the Eastern European peoples will be able to bolster their national positions vis-a-vis a Soviet Union of declining power and hegemony. Unfortunately, the gains in liberalization and humanization are seen as short-term, for the goals of the U.S.S.R. have an aspect of permanence and constancy for the ex-satellites, and there are set and tangible boundaries beyond which existing and future leaderships of Eastern European states will be incapable of progressing.

This book is a boon to the student of comparative government and should be particularly valuable to those who have studied the political and governmental

structures of Western states, and principally those of Western Europe. It is read with ease, the structure is orderly, and the contents are concise and scholarly. An excellent and variegated bibliography is offered at the end of each country's treatment. The short period required to peruse *Eastern European Government and Politics* makes it extremely profitable reading for those unable to devote time to a more detailed study of the states depicted.

D.J. MORGIEWICZ
Commander, U.S. Navy

Brinkley, George A. *The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South Russia, 1917-1921.* Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966. 446p.

In the turbulent years which immediately followed the Russian Revolution, the Bolsheviks' tenuous grasp on the reins of national authority was challenged from all sides by internal and external forces. Within Russia, such diverse entities as the Ukranians, Cossacks, Czarists, and Mensheviks, all vied with one another to seize political opportunities created by the revolution. Externally, Imperial Russia's former World War I allies, often working at cross purposes, backed first one, then the other, of these counter-revolutionary groups in a vain attempt to patch together a winning combination. In the midst of this international maelstrom stood the Volunteer Army of General Denikin, a self-styled national army, dedicated to the overthrow of Lenin's regime. The author has chosen to trace the short life-span of the Volunteer Army from it sanguine inception in the south of Russia to its ignominious evacuation and flight into exile in 1920. Although the army represents the thread that lends continuity to the tale, it is treated as a political rather than a military instrument. The book has all of the virtues and vices of a paper written in fulfillment of an advanced degree requirement. The torrents of detail and explanatory footnotes which course through the text indicate a research effort of significant depth. The 36-page bibliography and index should also prove to be an excellent point of departure for any student interested in scouting the subject. Unfortunately, Mr. Brinkley seems reluctant to discard any of his carefully acquired research items. As a result, the reader is forced to climb ridge after ridge of unsynthesized

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facts and side-step rockslides of Slavic place-names. No maps--descriptive or graphic--are furnished. The journey is wearisome.

W.J. WHITE
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Burchett, Wilfred G. *Vietnam North.* New York: International Publishers, 1966. 191p.

Written following a seven-week visit to North Vietnam by author Burchett in the early summer of 1966, *Vietnam North*, like his other recent books, has a definite anti-United States slant. It is laced with quotations from North Vietnamese leaders, all of which set the theme for the book: "All is well in North Vietnam." The publication is dedicated to proving by firsthand observation and high-level interview that except for "the daily indiscriminate air raids on hospitals, schools and densely populated areas," the bombing is not bothering the North. Author Burchett claims that he found all types of surface transport normal and that "more traffic was moving than before (1963) and goods and equipment are arriving on time." He quotes Doan Trong Truyen, State Planning Commissioner, as saying, "We ought to be grateful to the Americans. Their bombs forced us to jump ahead and do things that otherwise would have taken years." Everyone with whom Mr. Burchett talked seemed full of enthusiasm and confidence, whether they were from the civil or military side. The author interviewed all of the cabinet-level leaders and those above, including President Ho Chi Minh. All denounced the United States for her "cruel and ruthless aggression against Vietnam." The book loses much of its plausibility because of the compulsive manner in which the author tries to paint a pastoral picture of the Northern countryside. He has too many "peaceful" scenes of quiet rural living that do not match up with the admission of the numbers of people required to repair the interdicted transportation lines. It would appear that Mr. Burchett has tried to sell his story so hard that he leaves a wide "credibility gap."

F.C. GILMORE
Commander, U.S. Navy

Gardner, Richard N., ed. *Blueprint for Peace.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. 404p.

As a part of the 1965 International Cooperation Year, President Johnson called a White House Conference on International Cooperation, which met in Washington from 29 November through 1 December 1965. The conference, attended by 5,000 leaders of American society, was called to search, explore, and thoroughly discuss every conceivable approach and avenue of cooperation that could lead to peace. A National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation was convened under the leadership of Mr. Robert S. Benjamin, Chairman of the Board of the United Nations Association, to coordinate private participation in the ICY and the White House Conference. This Commission was composed of 230 prominent Americans, constituting 30 working committees that investigated almost every area that could affect international cooperation. Their work culminated in 30 reports presented to the White House Conference in Washington. *Blueprint for Peace* publishes the 30 presentations, 17 in complete form and 13 in summary presentations. Its value rests primarily in recording the ideas developed by the conference and making them available to the general public, since an official report of the conference has not been published by the federal government or the United Nations Association. Mr. Gardner purports to have maintained the substance of the original proposals, but has regrouped the material to make it more readable. His original contribution is confined to a rather lengthy introduction, which describes the conference and the resulting action taken by the government to implement some of the recommendations made by the various committees. He expresses his feelings about the importance of the committee reports in this manner:

> Collectively, these committee reports form the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of studies ever assembled on the ways in which international cooperation can promote the peace and general welfare of mankind.

The student of International Affairs may find *Blueprint for Peace* helpful in researching any of the areas explored by the 30 committees.

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PROFESSIONAL READING

Kolodziej, Edward A. *The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945-1963*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966. 630p. (MA 23 .K74)

This well-written book develops the author's thesis that there is a pressing need to reevaluate and reformulate, in terms of the contemporary conditions of international life, the role of the United States governmental institutions in strategic and foreign policy. The institution examined is the United States Congress, and the analysis focuses on its use of the power of the purse to raise and support the nation's armed forces since World War II. By way of background, the Constitutional authority granted to Congress for the creation and control of military force is examined in depth through consideration of the intent expressed in "The Federalist Papers." The author then considers Congress' use of its power of the purse to influence and shape military strategic policy during the periods separated by such historic milestones as the end of World War II, the Korean War, Sputnik, and the Kennedy Administration. The significant aspects of Congressional action on each year's military appropriations bill are considered to determine the extent of Congress' concern with national strategic policy. Although the analysis is somewhat tenuous in treating the reasons for certain budget actions, it competently establishes the general trend of Congressional consent to military policies, force levels, and weapons systems that could not support the nation's policy objectives, interests, and commitments. The author does explore the defense policy innovations inaugurated by the Kennedy Administration during 1961, but concludes that the Congressional machinery for dealing with the requirements of security and foreign policy remain outmoded. In the third and final part of the work, Mr. Kolodziej discusses his concept of the role that Congress should play in forming strategic policy through its budgetary power. From the previously mentioned analysis of the part played since World War II, the range of Congress' potential contribution is defined within the framework of the constraints on Congress and its relationship to the President and the public. In conclusion, the author offers his recommendation for the establishment of a National Policy Committee in each house of Congress as a model or guide for Congressional reform.

To the military reader, this book provides a clear, analytical insight into the performance of the

legislative body which provides the limited resources that the decision maker must allocate among many competing requirements. The scope of the analysis and the extent of the time frame considered are large enough to offer adequate support to the conclusions. For anyone interested in future expansion of the planning, programming, and budgeting system into other than executive branches of the government, this work provides valuable and authentic background material.

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Tavares de Sa, Hernane. *The Play within the Play.* New York: Knopf, 1966. 309p.

"An institution which is at one and the same time intimately immersed in world events and yet primarily self-contained--truly a play within the play," is the way Hernane Tavares de Sa describes the United Nations, and he terms *The Play within the Play* "the inside story of the UN." A Brazilian journalist and editor, Mr. Tavares de Sa came to the UN in 1960 at the invitation of Dag Hammarskjold to head the UN Information Services and remained until 1965. The author has organized his material as if it actually were a play. In his *plot* he reviews the internal organization and examines key issues that were of past and are of continuing interest to the UN. His *cast* includes the *"angels"* who support the UN financially and who, as a result, wield considerable power inside the organization, and the *players* who include all others directly or indirectly associated with the organization, from the Secretary General to wives and UN visitors. His *stage* is the "Glass House on East River" and the other UN capital in Geneva. The *rehearsals* describe certain aspirations of the UN as well as specialized agencies functioning within the organization. In the *world premier*, Mr. Tavares de Sa critically analyzes, from the standpoint of the UN, the Hungarian revolt, the Congo and Cuban situations, and Vietnam.

Because of its highly critical nature, from the standpoint of individuals, groups, and procedures, the book may well have received a cool official reception in the UN. However, it probably still is being avidly discussed in the delegates' lounges and coffee bars. It does afford Americans the rare opportunity of

viewing themselves through the eyes of a representative of another country. Throughout his orientation, he has focused attention on the influence of the United States in the UN, thus establishing an additional "play" within the play. In observing this more specific performance, the reader does not always feel pride in the decisions made or the positions taken; however, he should experience a strong desire to understand better the intricacies of this complicated organization.

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