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Applications of Recent Sociological Surveys to Personnel Management Aboard Ship


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**APPLICATIONS OF RECENT SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEYS
TO PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ABOARD SHIP**

A Research Paper written by
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INTRODUCTION

In commenting on the highhanded, strictly authoritarian methods of the old bull-of-the-woods foreman in the machine shop, a freshly employed engineer observed to one of his colleagues, "Someday Swede will find that he is being dragged screaming into the 20th century." This incident is recognized as being typical of past happenings in the lives of all experienced managers in which resistance to progress has been displayed for the negative factor it is; but even Swede, in his sourest moments, knows that the world will progress in spite of him.

What about progress, then, in the art (or science) of personnel management? Can increased performance be gained by new management methods? What is it that social researchers have learned about people, both as individuals and as groups, which is different from past experience, and how can a knowledge of this social change be used to advantage in solving personnel problems aboard Navy ships? Or are the old methods good enough?

This paper attempts to answer these questions by studying social change as it affects both individuals and groups and by using the findings of this research to formulate recommendations which would be useful to the shipboard leader in realizing a more progressive set of techniques for better personnel management.

As a general guideline for limiting the scope of this investigation, the following definition of management set forth by Fred Korth in the *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* was used:

Management, formalistically, is intelligent manipulation of resources, circumstances and energy to achieve a desired result . . . the military organization requires extreme precision in material and utmost attention to detail to assure victory.

The accelerated progress of weapons and tactics has brought a need for equivalent readiness, responsiveness and depth in military support and for equivalent care and precision in perfecting its management.

. . . I believe that, as a basic principle of good management, there must be a positive accountable leader for each substantive organization who will set clean-cut objectives and provide a clear path for those under him.

More to set the tone rather than the scope of the paper, this more liberal definition of management by Dr. Harold Koontz was considered:

I have come to the conclusion that management is the art of getting things done through and with people in *formally organized* groups, the art of creating an

environment in such an organized group where people can perform as individuals and yet cooperate toward attainment of group goals, the art of removing blocks to such performance, the art of optimizing efficiency in effectively reaching goals.

Guided by the above definitions, this investigation begins by considering social pressures and recent changes in the social complex which contribute heavily to the formation of attitudes in potential blue-jackets today. Chapter II carries the examination from the individual to the group to discover what makes a group effective, how the individual relates to the group, and what the possibilities are for stressing group leadership as opposed to individual leadership. Group and individual reactions are then outlined for job-oriented versus person-oriented supervision techniques and results with a view toward discovering progress in leadership orientation within the past few years. New information is sought on the latest methods of coping with morale and discipline problems. The emphasis here is on finding ways to remove the "blocks to performance" by using better methods to discover and correct morale and discipline problems. Chapter V seeks a way of "optimizing efficiency in effectively reaching goals" by measuring personnel performance in such a way as to be more objective while increasing the motivation of the individual.

The last chapter will analyze lessons learned in the preceding chapters, and solutions to the questions asked at the beginning of this introduction will be sought.

I-GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN THE GREAT SOCIETY

When Charles Dickens, gifted social commentator of 19th century-England, produced his fine work, *Great Expectations*, he must have had some thoughts about the applicability of his theme to societies of the future. It is doubtful, however, that such a poet of prose as Dickens could have foreseen the exponential rise of social reform, of science and technology, of population growth, and of "great expectations" that the present generation has witnessed. President Lyndon B. Johnson refers to the people of the United States as the "Great Society." The 89th Congress has passed more social legislation than any other congress before it. The struggle for social equality, for

self-determination, for equitable distribution of resources, for equal representation has never been so vigorous and vociferous. One wonders, then, what the impact of this social change will be on future leadership and manpower management problems.

First, some of the salient sociological factors which contribute to the attitudes and expectations of today's military man will be examined to see how leaders may be required to adjust their thinking, utilize new theories, and bring forth a more effective personnel management philosophy in the fleet.

A heavy contributor to personnel attitudes today is the rapid rise in the national standard of living. Over the past 20 years Americans have come knowingly to accept the luxuries of yesteryear as the necessities of the hour; however, this does not concern production of goods as the sole contributing factor. It involves tremendously improved communications, including rapid transportation; economic growth and close control of the economy; progressive legislation; and the fruits of scientific research and technological development.

A second facet of changing national attitudes can be shown by some statistics on education which show that in spite of recent reports of rising numbers of high school "drop-outs," the average educational level of today's workers is higher than ever. The actual percentage of "drop-outs" is decreasing because both the population and the government are becoming sharply attuned to the advantages of an adequate education. In 1940 workers with a high school or college education comprised 39.1 per cent of the labor force. In 1950 it was 50.3 per cent, and it rose to over 62 per cent by 1960.¹ Although these figures may contain hidden factors which may justify a somewhat guarded attitude toward them, the trend is unmistakable. It is expected that recent legislation will nurture this trend, and, since education is now listed as a national resource, future legislation of a helpful nature may be expected.

Although there is not space here to examine all of the social ramifications of automation, a third social force of importance, let it be understood that there is more involved than a mechanical transfer and layoff process, more than simple retraining and channelization of human resources. Sociologists are beginning to consider the real problems of increased

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leisure time that automation is likely to afford. Unions are seeking the six-hour day. Politicians are concerned about unemployment problems, and a national attitude toward the effects of automation is developing which portends a feeling of unrest, of less security where more security is the goal. This means that mixed emotions abound in an era of utopian progress.

This latter problem is compounded by the emergence of a labor force that is spreading in age span. The proportions of both younger and older people in industry and in the military are growing. For the first time in 180 years the median age of the population is dropping. This creates attitude problems because the young people want to be educated in managerial and technical skills, and the older people want to stay on the job and take advantage of better retirement programs later in life. The increase in the average life of the individual combines with the birth rate to create security and employment problems for the future, and, in addition, specialization needs compound these problems from an educational standpoint.

Within the working force, attitudes of morale and discipline are also changing. "Supervisors and managers report in interviews that people are less willing to accept pressure and close supervision than was the case a decade ago."² Also, the progressive approach, both at school and in the home, has had its effect. To some it seems that people are less respectful, more inclined to be selfish, less willing to help maintain law and order. The public push toward more individual freedom for both men and women is being undertaken more aggressively and more frequently by organized groups.

In light of this burgeoning sociological change, what are the resultant attitudes of the men who are to be managed aboard ship? There are three important groups whose effects we must consider: (1) young males about to enter military service, (2) the adult civilians who are the parents and guardians of these men, and (3) the men who have been indoctrinated in Navy programs and who are currently serving aboard ship. This latter group will be discussed in some detail in the next chapter.

Beginning with the pre-Navy youngsters, a trend is developed which shows how these 16- to 20-year-old civilian males feel about the service:

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While a career in the military service as an officer is held in higher esteem as an occupation by teen-agers than by their elders, a career as an enlisted man carries little prestige with young men today.

Greater opportunities to advance in civilian life, lack of adequate family life, and inadequate financial rewards are cited as the main reasons why more officers and enlisted men don't stay in the service as a life's work.

Another reason frequently mentioned is that both officers and enlisted men do not find the work "sufficiently challenging"; they get bored.

Young men today are overwhelmingly inclined to look upon their military service as an onerous obligation, and not one from which they can derive many advantages.

Three out of four think the typical young man views military service as "something to do if he must and get it over with" and roughly four out of every ten say that if they have to serve, "they are are going to get it over as quickly as possible and get out."

Only eight out of every one hundred have a fairly definite belief that they would like military service.

Despite their over-all favorable attitudes toward the . . . reserve program . . . less than one in every ten . . . plans to take advantage of it.

As might be expected, the influence of motion pictures in creating favorable and unfavorable impressions about military service is far greater among members of this group than on their elders.³

The attitudes of the adult civilian population are somewhat different, but the same structure of attitudes exists:

A career in the military service does not carry great prestige with adults. . . . Inadequate financial rewards, dislike of service discipline and regimentation, lack of adequate family life, and less opportunity to advance than in civilian life are the greatest drawbacks of a military career in the public mind.⁴

Thus, people today have great expectations of increased material wealth, a comfortable family life, reasonable advancement opportunities, higher education, more leisure time, steady employment, less pressure and regimentation, and (if it can be avoided) freedom from the onerous burden of military service. It must be realized, however, that these attitudes are strongly dependent upon our national political and economic stability. Yet the trend continues, as with the demonstrations for peace in Vietnam, and these attitudes must be considered in arriving at a solution to better shipboard personnel management.

With this brief background it is now possible to narrow the focus of the investigation to groups and their characteristics.

II--THE GROUP

Knowing how to deal with a group requires an understanding of what a group is; what the goals of a group are; what its characteristics are in terms of attitudes, cohesiveness, communication ability, and social structure; and what makes a group highly effective. It is also necessary to know how these characteristics help determine an effective leadership policy directed toward the group instead of the individual.

A good beginning, then, would acquaint the leader with a definition of a group in relation to the leadership problem: "One useful definition of . . . internal groups is 'a collection of individuals whose existence as a collection is rewarding to the individuals.'¹ A more general but, nevertheless, helpful dictionary definition of a group shows it to be "a number of persons . . . classified together because of common characteristics /and/ community of interests . . . Thus, in the definition of a group one detects an implication of group satisfaction through the attainment of both group and individual goals where individuals react with one another in

face-to-face situations.² In everyday life, "the triumph of this . . . is the capacity of man to create orderly human relations, or a *group* out of a collection of individuals."³

Many leaders realize intuitively that groups have goals just as individuals have goals, but an understanding of the causes and effects of group behavior is better illuminated by recent studies. It has been found, for instance, that "group goals can push production down or up, depending upon the level at which the group sets them."⁴ The subtlety of this thought is not immediately apparent. It must be considered in the light of what is known to be true of group goal orientation. If the goals of the group are directed toward the satisfaction of their own self-interests, motivation to accomplish the goals of the organization may be lacking, and in order to bring about success the leader will have to insure coincidence of group goals with company goals.⁵ In order to do this, supervisors must realize that:

Every member of the organization should feel that the values and goals of his work group amply reflect his own values and needs. He should also feel that the values and objectives of the entire organization adequately reflect the values and needs of all members.

Every member of the organization should be identified with the objectives of the organization and the goals of the work group and see the accomplishment of them as the best way to meet his own needs and personal goals.⁶

If the group is faced with undefined organization goals, or if the job might be done better by individuals, then it is impossible for the group to take concerted action.⁷ Yet it is common for organizations to form committees, panels, and work groups without considering the goals, the agenda, or even the projected duration of the group.

Characteristics of groups may be examined somewhat separately from goals, although it is impossible to draw a sharp line of division between them. Of interest in understanding group characteristics are the categories of behavior and attitudes, here lumped together because of their cause and effect relationship. In the usual situation "the person who

starts as a worker finds himself part of a rather close-knit group."8 This group has already established the norms within which it is bound to exist, and the behavior of the individual must conform to the behavior of the group if he is to be considered a member of that group, although some "loners" exist without apparent dissatisfaction. The behavior standards of a group usually revolve about a solidarity which envisions the organization and its leaders as "distant and hostile."9 Although while he is a member of a group a worker reaps all the rewards and punishments of belonging, he loses this status upon being promoted.10 Workers consider him part of the "management hierarchy," but management does not think of him as an executive. Thus, the behavior and attitudes of the group are no longer part of his being.

The behavior of individuals within a work group is aimed in the direction of common consent:

/Peter/ Drucker, in discussing output restrictions, expresses the opinion that open restrictions on output provided openly under the provisions of restrictive union rules and featherbedding are "only the part of the iceberg that is above water."11 Much more important are the invisible, unwritten, informal restrictions decreed by the custom and common law of every plant," as reflected in the tacit setting of production quotas (by the work group) which a worker would be ill-advised to exceed.12

The attitudes and behavior of groups are therefore good indicators. Groups make much better measurement units (by a ratio of six to one) than do individual workers;13 and the forces operating within groups "are important not only in influencing the behavior of individual work groups with regard to productivity, waste, absence, and the like, they also affect the behavior of entire organizations."14

Cohesiveness, as a group characteristic, is allied to attitudes and behavior but deserves more detailed treatment. Cohesiveness is "the force acting on group members that pulls them toward the group . . . /It is/ the degree to which the members function as a group."15 It is a quality dependent on how much individuals are willing to work for group goals while subordinating goals of their own.

Among the determinants of cohesiveness is the extent to which the group develops standards that are acceptable to its members. These standards include methods of communicating, treatment of deviates from majority behavior, methods of decision-making, and the acceptance of group decisions. Researchers have found that this cohesiveness affects the effectiveness of the group.¹⁶

The high degree of cooperation and internal discipline found in a cohesive group will, depending upon how the group is led, serve to work for or against an organization.¹⁷ On the plus side, the benefits of favorably-oriented cohesion are more effective communication, higher levels of influence and interaction, greater decentralization, hearty acceptance of organization goals, higher motivation, better mental health, better productivity, less tension and conflict, and a feeling that supervisors are supportive rather than obstructive.¹⁸ One must take into account, however, that effective communication and higher levels of influence and interaction are also characteristic of negatively oriented groups.¹⁹

Social studies show that "the greater the peer-group loyalty, the greater the influence which the goals of the group have on performance . . . Thus, in work groups with high peer-group loyalty, the variations in production from worker to worker are less than in work groups with low peer-group loyalty."²⁰

When the goals of the organization disregard the goals of a cohesive group, poor production will result. In this case, the group resorts to the influence of an informal leader.²¹ It is possible, in fact, for the group to lose its cohesiveness under the low-pressure application of opposing goals, especially if there are wide variations of status within the group.²² Thus, despite the degree of cohesiveness, little can be accomplished without a sensible awareness of goal coincidence.

It is a highly cohesive group which finds itself in command of effective communications, the efficiency of which can have a vital impact of the effectiveness of the whole organization.²³ Communications may be defined as "all the processes through which information, attitudes, ideas, or opinions are transmitted

Sutherland: Applications of Recent Sociological Surveys to Personnel Management and received, providing a basis for common understanding and/or agreement."²⁴

In considering the relationship of group cohesiveness to the communications process, one should examine the problem from the points of view illuminated by the principle of *centrality* and *induction*. Centrality is the degree of "funneling of communication toward one member of a group."²⁵ "Induction [is] the direction of influence toward either high or low production" and it may be considered in either a positive or negative sense.²⁶

Communications networks that provide centrality coupled with worker satisfaction would be expected to yield greater productivity. The group structure should be so arranged that communications distance will be at a minimum. Motivation, or direction of induction, of group members, is the overriding factor--high cohesiveness coupled with negative induction seems to yield least productivity--and features of the communication that enhance positive induction are, therefore, of greatest importance. Any arrangement of the group structure that produces a communications net favorable to the feeling, on the part of the group members, of participation in decisions and control of group activities is most likely, other things equal, to yield positive induction, worker satisfaction, and high productivity.²⁷

One last category of group characteristics should be discussed. In the discussion on group cohesiveness the informal leader was mentioned. Whatever the group, it will have a leader. Whether this person is officially appointed by management or is the charismatic man of influence within the group itself depends solely on the leadership qualities of the appointed leader. These qualities in a leadership-by-influence situation are defined by "whatever leader behavior is found helpful by the group in working out shared objectives, setting goals and procedures, building internal group unity and discipline, exchanging much needed information, and making resources available . . ."²⁸ It has been found that the appointed leader is, at the outset, in the best position to lead by influence, but he must have the "inclination and ability to do so."²⁹ Thus,

the appointed leader may never be aware of his "golden opportunity" and may consequently become a leader on the organization chart only.

In discussing the influential leader, Maier relates that the "authoritarian manager, relying on his power and callous to his social responsibilities, isolates himself from his group and establishes himself as a threat . . ."30 The point is made that the influence and power that the real leader has is derived from others,³¹ and "once the conflicts of the workplace become formalized, compromised, and frozen . . . the difficulty of upgrading the . . . level of morale and productivity is increased . . ."32 In the following chapter the characteristics of autocratic and democratic leadership are examined in detail.

III-AUTOCRATS VERSUS DEMOCRATS

The Navy has traditionally presented to the general public an image of autocratic rule, of instant obedience to sharply barked orders in the heat of battle, of tight discipline in a rigidly oriented vertical organization, of the "can do" spirit in the face of possible defeat. The entertainment media of recent years (*Caine Mutiny*, *Mr. Roberts*, *Francis Joins the Navy*, *McHale's Navy*, etc.) has tended to distort this image somewhat. Hollywood and Broadway notwithstanding, the U.S. Navy still retains some of its former dashing image, even in the face of occasional poor reports in the press and in the national attitudes toward service life in general.¹

Is the Navy that same autocratic, spit-and-polish organization today? If so, is this the right approach to manpower management? The public realizes that in wartime (general conflict on a worldwide basis) there always has been enough men, money, and materials to throw into the breach. A decision is made, an order is summarily issued, and response to that order takes place immediately without regard to such administrative problems as cost effectiveness, personnel shortages, career incentives, lack of operating funds, and other peacetime impedimenta. The entire nation and its warmaking machinery operate effectively in the midst of colossal waste.

In peacetime, however, the Navy is forced to pay more attention to its resources. Even in "wartime peacetime" the armed services are at the mercy of a

watchdog Congress and a diligent Bureau of Budget. Also, it is not a popular thing to be a serviceman in peacetime.² Thus, if money were available to man ships and shore stations fully, there might still be a shortage of willing hands. Therefore, those resources which the services do have must be used in such a way as to squeeze the most benefit out of them over an uncertainly long period. In industry this principle relates to profit motivation, waste reduction, and cost accounting.³ The Navy also attempts to reduce waste and cut costs, but the profit motive is replaced by the effective defense motive.

In attempting to prepare for the best defense in a stringent monetary environment, how do the services get the best from their active manpower resources? How does industry look at this problem from a point of view which includes similar goals? In order to understand these questions and some possible answers to them, one must consider two prevailing leadership concepts employed by supervisors in industry today: employee-centered supervision and job-centered supervision.

Rensis Likert, Director of the Institute for Social Research and Professor of Psychology and Sociology at the University of Michigan, makes succinct points which define the job-centered supervisor:

Many companies base their operations upon theories which state that it is management's responsibility to:

1. Break the total operation into simple, component parts or tasks.
2. Develop the best way to carry out each of the component parts.
3. Hire people with appropriate aptitudes and skills to perform each of these tasks.
4. Train these people to do their respective tasks in the specified way.
5. Provide supervision to see that they perform their designated tasks, using the specified procedure⁴

That this has strong social and organizational implications as a method of utilizing personnel is readily seen. Most will recognize that " . . . there are people with more authoritarian values who are led to feel that most employees, because of their acute need for certainty, security, and structure, wish to

participate in an absolute minimum of decision-making activities."⁵ Yet, such an attitude, regardless of whether it fosters high or low producers, demands a highly vertical hierarchy of management which makes decentralization difficult to achieve. Although job-centered supervision is highly efficient where simple tasks are involved and seems to be quicker and neater, such a system lacks flexibility; it stifles innovation; and it is a fact of social documentation that "supervisors who base their activity on this concept of management are more often found to be in charge of units producing at a low . . . level."⁶

The story of an assistant manager of an industrial department which had a poor production record illustrates the above point further: "This interest-in-people approach is all right, but it's a luxury. I've got to keep pressure on for production, and when I can get production up, then I can afford to take time to show an interest in my employees and their problems!"⁷ This sounds much like a frequently repeated phrase heard in jest in the Navy today: "Now all liberty is cancelled until morale improves."

The other extreme of the supervision spectrum has advantages and disadvantages which are also of interest for the shipboard supervisor. Employee-centered supervision involves some well-known leadership concepts:

What we have in mind when we use the term "democracy" is not "permissiveness" or "laissez faire," but a system of values--a "climate of beliefs" governing behavior--which people are internally compelled to affirm by deeds as well as words. These values include:

1. Full and free *communication*, regardless of rank and power.
2. A reliance on *consensus*, rather than the more customary forms of coercion or compromise to manage conflict.
3. The idea that *influence* is based on technical competence and knowledge rather than on the vagaries of personal whims or prerogatives of power.
4. An atmosphere that permits and even encourages emotional *expression* as well as task-oriented acts.
5. A basically *human* bias, one that accepts the inevitability of conflict between the organization and the individual, but

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 which is willing to cope with and
 mediate this conflict on rational
 grounds.⁸

The above method of supervision has been referred to as "participative leadership," and one can see that in the heat of battle there would be little time or sense in applying it to the life-or-death situation. However, it may be possible to use the employee-centered approach in less hectic situations aboard ship. In industry it is claimed that supervisors with the highest producing sections use the employee-oriented method or one which leans in that direction.⁹ From a management point of view, this method fosters a highly decentralized organization:

Many people who value hard work, self-improvement, the Horatio Alger tradition, group participation, and democratic progress believe that the typical employee sincerely desires a high degree of job autonomy and is eager to accept responsibility for guiding his own and his group's activities. On this premise, it has been argued that decision making should be pushed to the lowest possible rank in the organization, ideally to the machine-tender level It is believed that this exercise will not only strengthen and develop the employees, but will improve their morale as well.¹⁰

How do these two systems of personnel management compare in recent social research studies? The following graphs will give a comparative illustration of answers to this question:

NUMBER OF FIRST-LINE SUPERVISORS WHO ARE:





Fig. 1. "Employee-centered supervisors are higher producers than job-centered supervisors."¹¹

DEPARTMENT PRODUCTIVITY


Below average

Above average

The ten depts.
which feel the
least pressure



The middle 11
departments



The ten depts.
which feel the
most pressure





Fig. 2. "Relationship between unreasonable pressure men feel for high performance and department productivity 7."¹²

NUMBER OF FIRST-LINE SUPERVISORS WHO ARE:

Under close supervision

Under general supervision

High-producing



Low-producing




Fig. 3. "Low-production section heads are more closely supervised than high production heads."¹³

It is manifestly important for the naval officer to have a solid understanding of both methods of supervision so that he may use them effectively in controlling his sailors through enlightened shipboard personnel management techniques. The following discussion looks at morale and discipline in relation to close and general supervision.

IV-MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

When considering morale and discipline in relation to personnel management problems aboard ship, one must examine written sources carefully. There is much emotional writing about these vital topics, and a careful evaluation of an author's personal involvement is required before his material may be classified as acceptable to support a thesis. Such areas of human interrelationships are difficult enough to categorize, isolate, and classify without the added burden of sifting out emotional shadings based upon personal experiences of the reporter. It is helpful, therefore, to set forth a scientific division of key words in order to avoid indistinct generalizations and uncertain concepts. In addition, it is important to define not only morale and discipline, but also attitudes and opinions in order to clearly separate one from another. Only then may morale and discipline be spoken of in the same context.

Morale "is akin to the common notion of team spirit."¹ It is a "moral or mental condition, with respect to courage, discipline, confidence, enthusiasm, willingness to endure hardship, etc." In the definition of morale there is an implication of group (as opposed to individual) reactions. Note that it is impossible to separate morale from discipline in this sense.

Discipline, in the same context, is "training that develops self-control, character, or orderliness and efficiency." Those negative and academic aspects have been stripped from the above dictionary definition both to simplify the issue and to direct it toward a supportive meaning. "A well-disciplined organization is one whose members work with enthusiasm, willingness, and zest as individuals and as a group to fulfill the mission of the organization with expectation of success."² Here again, morale and discipline are interrelated both by the character of the defining words and by the connotation of group reactions.

The term "attitude" denotes a "frame of reference that influences the individual's views or opinions on various topics."³ Attitudes, which are formed through experience, motivate behavior and are difficult to change. Opinions are expressions "of an evaluative judgment or point of view regarding a specific topic or subject Opinions, however, typically are influenced by the more generalized attitude."⁴ Both attitudes and opinions relate to the individual.

This chapter concerns itself with recent sociological findings about morale and discipline, and even though the terms have been defined, it will be necessary to provide a brief background representing commonly held views before comparing and contrasting new findings with them.

There is always an element which harks to the "old days," and although this is often the most emotional viewpoint the sense of it cannot be denied:

Bring back the bands! Break out the swords! Increase unit and service competition; it is the breath of life. Build up the elite ranks. Restore the authority of command, the dignity of rank; give the company commander power to make and break his noncoms. Make the noncom proud of his stripes; increase his authority and prestige. The attempt to equate the technician and the leader of men, which started in World War II, has to be modified; the troop leading sergeant must have distinctive arm patches and monetary rewards.⁵

In words less inflammatory but every bit as confident, a former Chief of Naval Operations said this about morale and discipline: (1) Information--the failure to keep subordinates well informed often results in their eventual lack of interest. They lose touch with the current situation. (2) Lack of interest in juniors--one never learns their problems. (3) General slackness within the command--personnel begin to think that way. (4) Instability--personnel transfers, operating schedules, and daily routine must be stable to provide certainty and security.⁶

There are far too many inexperienced commanders of stations and ships (some of them rather senior) who use courts martial to correct defects which should have been corrected by direct personal action of the

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division officers or by the captain himself. Direct personal action early in the game will save many a court and will greatly increase the effectiveness of any command; but it does require knowledge of incipient trouble before it occurs, and it does necessitate a lot of time spent with subordinates.⁷

These honorable concepts of morale and discipline have served the United States well over the years. Is it possible to improve upon them? Of course, the possibility of betterment always exists. Recent writings take account of both established teachings and new social trends in encouraging a fresh outlook on problems of discipline and morale:

. . . In order to lay a solid foundation, leadership training must begin in the schools with added emphasis on patriotism and discipline. Starting from the cradle, children must again be taught that the nation depends on the people, and *is* the people. The current socialistic trend wherein the people are coming to rely on the government must be reversed. Plain, old-fashioned patriotism must be preached. The stigma attached to military service must be removed.⁸

The above quote, when purged of its emotional content, reveals an acute awareness of social change and advocates a combatant force to reverse the unwanted effects of a growing socialist state. Other less-charged sources take this national change into account in morale and discipline evaluation by recognizing the change as a fact and by defining the resulting reactions in terms of psychological realizations and commonsense recommendations. A six-year study of motivation research effort conducted at Texas Instruments effectively combines old doctrine with social change as it affects workers in the 1960's. It was found the positive morale factors were, as one would suspect, the familiar ones of responsibility, advancement opportunity, growth potential, earned recognition, the feeling of achievement which comes from doing work which one enjoys.⁹ Negative factors were concentrated in agents which were mainly peripheral to the job itself, i.e., such fringe benefits as group insurance, recreation programs, and employee services; titles and seniority rights; wages; safety and work rules.¹⁰ Workers become dissatisfied "when opportunities for meaningful

achievement are eliminated and they become sensitized to their environment and begin to find fault."¹¹ The job of the supervisor, then, is to provide the satisfaction of both motivation and maintenance needs. The first is concentrated in the center of the job and the second surrounds it:

In terms of day-to-day behavior patterns, the role of the competent supervisor includes providing each individual with the requisite job information, maintaining high performance expectations, encouraging goal-setting, and he exercises independent judgment, providing recognition and rewards commensurate with achievements, and maintaining an atmosphere of approval in which failure is a basis for growth rather than recrimination.¹²

One gets the idea that the above quote is a trade restatement of Admiral Burke's views and that nothing new is learned here. However, this is not strictly true. By dispassionately segregating needs as motivational factors, the supervisor is more able to get quickly to the root of the problem whether it be one of motivation or maintenance. By examining the morale or discipline problem in the light of modern social knowledge he can better understand what is lacking and what it takes to fill the gap.

It is easy to read quite a bit about morale and discipline, and it is equally easy to understand the factors involved. The psychology of the field is not difficult to understand, and, once learned, it tends to stick. But the root of the problem for many supervisors is not in understanding that there is trouble in the morale or discipline department but that of understanding what the indicators--the danger signals--are as they are developing (and not after it is all over). There may be a general lack of appreciation on the part of the supervisor as to how much control he has over an incipient situation. Here recent social research illuminates the answer to the problem.

Where the problem may be considered more one of discipline than of morale, certain "flags" or indicators show themselves from the beginning. Trouble seems to compound trouble. Foremen might let minor slips go by even though everyone knows the rules. Then someone will want to test the situation and see just how far they can go. When the infractions build up to an annoying frequency, the foreman

gets substituted enough to fire one of the offenders.¹³ The reverberations from such a disciplinary action touch deeply upon morale. If a man is demoted, his place must be taken by a man trained to handle the job. This sort of action can cause a chain reaction of multiple job movements. If the man is suspended, his return requires him to use face-saving tactics.¹⁴ A man fired is a resource loss in the same way that a man who quits is a resource loss. Fortunately, in the Navy there are two phrases which are not commonly used. One is, "I quit." The other is "You're fired." Nevertheless, the loss in morale over a disciplinary action which could have been withheld or neutralized, had the indicators been watched, is a very real one.

There are other indicators of impending disciplinary trouble. Since self-respect is a principle motivator of satisfactory performance, it is requisite to successful leadership. Management may rule by fear, but this usually results in anger. What the supervisor must realize is that his greatest ally, respect, is the most easy factor to control. His control over job interest is less, and in the Navy he has no personal control over a man's wages.¹⁵

Morale indicators are more easily seen, especially aboard ship. Such factors as a.o.l. cases, mast reports, shipping-over rate, civil cases, promotions, and performance are obvious indicators of morale and are known to even the most junior officer. However, the measurement of morale becomes an illusive art. It is possible to have outstanding morale and poor performance side by side. It has been shown that attitudes are a key to the solution of the morale problem since it is the attitudes of the individuals which go to make up the morale of the group.

Some methods of learning attitudes are informal and are well known even to the beginner: overheard remarks, behavior of individuals and groups, and "seat of the pants" evaluations by supervisors.¹⁶ It is possible, however, to get more accurate indicators of attitude. Provided a free path of communication is allowed, and provided the identity of the individual responding is scrupulously protected, it is possible to use attitude scales and opinion surveys to obtain collective reaction (and therefore morale).¹⁷ If it is known that opinions are indicators of attitudes and attitudes are indicators of morale, sufficient data can be taken to feel the pulse of an outfit in a scientific and detached way. Of course, the suggestion box is a valuable source, informal

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though it may seem. The mechanics of the attitude scale and the opinion survey are available but will not be covered here.¹⁸

It has been shown in this chapter that the established ideas of morale and discipline are valid. Modern sociological research agrees completely with conventional theory as to what the elements of morale and discipline are. However, recent studies show that it is possible to take the pulse of the organization in such a way as to head off troubles before they start. With a knowledge of indicators and how to use them, the shipboard administrator may take early action for the benefit of individuals and groups as well as for the ship itself. This is what Admiral Burke was preaching when he said that an officer must get out on deck and talk to his men, to instigate direct personal action with the hope of avoiding a court martial.

One indicator of rising or falling morale and discipline is the record of man's performance over a period of time. Performance appraisal will be dealt with separately in the next chapter because it is not only connected with morale and discipline, but also with promotion, transfer, education and training, job selection, and dismissal.

V-PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL

Performance appraisal in personnel management situations is always a popular subject for discussion. Such appraisal invariably involves one human being's making a judgment about another; thus, because of a personal involvement factor, attempts at objectivity in reporting a person's on-the-job performance are undermined by everyday psychological hindrances with evocative names: goal-frustration, expectation of reward, anxiety, potential threat, self-esteem, and the like.¹ Also, most appraisal systems in use today are weakened by subjective influences which distort the true picture of a man's present capabilities and future potential. These weaknesses are easily discovered, uneasily defined, and too easily misunderstood. Many appraisers have the ability to point out a few deficiencies in systems with which they are familiar, but few understand the roots of the appraisal problem sufficiently to be able to offer effective suggestion for improvement. Thus, merit rating is vigorously discussed, yet progress in achieving greater objectivity is exasperatingly slow.

For a good understanding of a truly objective approach to performance appraisal, the rater should at least have a working knowledge of subjective and human weaknesses which plague present reporting forms and interview methods. These are (in random order):

- Lack of interpersonal consistency
- Halo effect
- Central tendency
- Unmeasurable elements
- Inconsistent training of raters
- Ineptness at counseling
- Inadequate forms
- Leniency error
- Overlap in traits
- Subjective judgments
- Rating to reward or penalize
- Lack of knowledge or logic²

There is not space in this chapter to devote to a detailed discussion of each of the above weaknesses, nor is it necessary to outline why we appraise one another or what a merit rating should be in terms of objective measurement. However, a few of the above terms will be briefly clarified here, and the criteria for a good rating system will be set forth.

"Halo effect" refers to the tendency of the rater to grade a person high or low in all traits on the basis of the rater's impression of the person's grade in just one trait.³

"Leniency error" results from the rater's belief that all personnel are performing effectively.⁴

"Central tendency" results when all personnel are grouped around an average.⁵ One might facetiously say that this is the tendency which puts 90% of all naval officers in the top 10% of their group.

Since the rest of the items in the above list are self-explanatory, it would be well at this point to introduce a set of criteria for a solidly objective performance appraisal system from which all of the above weakness might be purged. The first of these is *observability*. Can the trait be observed in action? Is possession of this trait evident to the rater in the job of the person being rated? The second criterion is *universality*. Is this an important and necessary characteristic for successful performance? The third is *distinguishability*. Is this trait clearly distinguishable from the others or is there an overlap of basic characteristics?⁶ One

would certainly suspect that such criteria were soundly based in that they are attainable and would clearly serve to cut across the grain of the weaknesses just discussed.

It is not enough, however, to state criteria for performance appraisal and to mold the appraisal form about them. Certain assumptions must first be made which will relate closely to a true life, real time situation aboard ship. First, it must be assumed that both leader and follower are able to clarify their individual objectives. Next, there must be a succession of specific goals without which the measurement of a person's performance in a job becomes virtually meaningless. There must be a full delegation of both authority and responsibility so that the subordinate has freedom to act. It must be assumed that the results of the man's performance are verifiable by the rater. It must also be assumed that the rater is willing to share responsibility with his subordinate; otherwise, complete feedback will not evolve. Lastly, there is an assumption of shared personal accountability and potential management ability on the part of the subordinate.⁷

With such criteria and assumptions at hand, it should be possible to devise an objective system for performance appraisal. This has not been done in the Navy.⁸ However, one system which is coming into popular use in industry seems to be the most objective one yet.⁹ Although it remains to be proved whether the "management by objectives" idea is the most effective, it is worthy of consideration by the shipboard leader. Sometimes referred to as "appraisal by results," this method uses the three criteria set forth above (observability, universality, distinguishability) and makes use of detailed knowledge of a man's job. It does not attempt to measure such highly subjective traits as loyalty, moral courage, and imagination. Instead, the "management by objectives" system of personnel measurement deals with mutually agreed-upon goals, formalized at the outset, which are the subject of frequent consultation and occasional revision. A man is measured upon his ability to achieve goals which he agrees are reasonable and consistent with his abilities and growth potential.

Perhaps such a measurement method is *too* objective. Certainly it does not indicate clearly many traits which are considered by most to be desirable, viz., personal cleanliness, sobriety, demeanor, and disposition. Furthermore, if either the rater or the

rated lose interest in the system, it fails. Also, there will be times when a conference between the boss and the subordinate would be patently ridiculous, such as in a tight military situation of an operational nature. Personality differences can complicate the proper administration of any rating system.

On the other hand, the advantages of "appraisal by results" are worth serious consideration. In the fields of maintenance, training, and administration, the measurement of work performed against clearly established goals yields an invaluable element of feedback. In operations, and again in the fields mentioned above, there is a valuable element of planning for the future since the organization as well as the job is periodically reviewed. The subordinate learns to appraise his subordinates in a uniform, objective manner. His opportunity to self-evaluate at frequent intervals (as opposed to the annual or semiannual "surprise") has a tonic effect. He has in front of him at all times a list of his accomplishments, and he knows that his boss is looking at this list, too. This makes criticism of his performance sound less like bitter words and gives the subordinate an opportunity to consider the boss's advice in a constructive light: and since he knows that the mutually established goals can be adjusted to absorb unforeseen operational and maintenance difficulties, his ego is preserved and his confidence in the system improves with time.

The need for such a measurement program has long been recognized. Companies are starting to study the appraisal problems with a view toward combining their present systems with an objective system such as that described above. Appraisal by results has been the subject of enlightened professional comment in the Navy.¹⁰

Some behavioral research throws substantiating light on the problem:

In actual practice it is the extremely rare operating manager who will employ such a program on his own initiative. Personnel specialists report that most managers carry out performance appraisal interviews only when strong control procedures are established to ensure that they do so. This is surprising because most managers have been told repeatedly that the system is intended to help them obtain improved performance

from their subordinates It is the discussion with the man which is supposed to motivate him and improve his performance.¹¹

The same report from which the quotation above was taken goes on to illustrate some points which are commonly known and some which are, at first glance, surprising. Criticism produces negative attitudes in the area of goal achievement. Depending on how it is given, praise does not have a tremendous effect one way or the other. When specifically designed goals are established, however, performance improves; this is opposed by defensiveness when bare criticism is given, and this, in turn, produces inferior results. The report stresses that coaching should be a day-to-day activity, that mutual goal-setting is far more effective than criticism in upgrading personnel performance, and participation by the employee in the goal-setting session orients him toward a favorable attitude.¹²

It is interesting to compare the high-producing and low-producing sections discussed in Chapter III with relation to their attitudes toward appraisal systems:

PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYEES WHO HOLD:

	Unfavorable attitudes	Undecided and mixed	Favorable attitudes
High-producing	45%	9%	46%
Low-producing	18%	16%	66%

Fig. 4. "Relation between employee attitudes toward merit rating system and productivity."¹³

In Fig. 4 the merit system of the company was tied to increases in salary. Likert points out that where motivational forces other than the natural desire to be rewarded for outstanding performance are involved, the reaction to the rating system is not strictly predictable.¹⁴

These recent social studies show that personnel respond favorably to an objective reporting system

which involves frequent counseling in an atmosphere of mutual goal-setting. It is the objective system which tends to eliminate or reduce weaknesses found in presently used merit sheets. The criteria for an objective appraisal--observability, universality, and distinguishability--define a sensible framework within which the appraiser can work. Although a management-by-objectives system is not the complete answer to shipboard personnel appraisal, it certainly lends itself to an effective revision of existing methods, especially since job descriptions and classifications are available to all naval personnel. In addition, the ship's operating schedule, while subject to change, is roughly known in advance, and the ship's organization is set forth for all to see. Thus, mutual goal-setting, periodically revised, is possible because all of the tools are at hand. In the next chapter a recommended method of performance appraisal aboard ship is given.

VI--NEW CONCEPTS FOR SHIPBOARD PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

It has been shown that sociological change has forced upon the shipboard personnel manager a new breed of first-enlistment sailor. This man may be led by his formal or informal leader, and an understanding of group goals and characteristics is needed for effective control. The positive and negative sides of both job-oriented and person-oriented leadership have been discussed, and recent considerations in the field of morale and discipline from both the group and individual point of view have been presented. A strong motivating tool--performance appraisal--has been shown to be susceptible to misuse and open to greatly improved utilization as an instrument of productive management.

It is concluded that it is not enough to practice "tried-and-true" leadership in personnel management situations aboard ship. The exponential rise of social expectations which parallels an exponential increase in technological capability demands an equal amount of research, of understanding, of innovation. The human being has become the main battery of the ship, for without him the most sophisticated weaponry, the most modern logistical means, and the very being of the ship itself as an instrument of national power becomes sterile.

With the heavy amount of research being carried out in the personnel management field today, there are sufficient data to provide the naval leader with

indicators and measurement techniques which may be directly applied to the situation aboard ship without sacrificing traditional means. Every person in command of men should use new leadership techniques as he would use new weapons. By keeping himself informed of new developments in personnel research, he will develop a high degree of interest, learn to read, listen, discuss, and think clearly, and turn potential trouble into satisfactory advantage.

What, then, is the shipboard personnel manager to do to maximize the productive effort of his unit in such a way as to strengthen the zeal and loyalty of his men?

The first task of the shipboard leader (taken in the order in which discussed in this paper) is to keep himself abreast of sociological factors affecting his men. Too often one hears, "What was good enough for me is good enough for them," when such an attitude is anachronistic and therefore harmful to the leader's image. It brands him as an ill-informed person who is not interested in applying present concepts to present situation. It is human nature for older persons to disapprove of the actions of the "younger generation" without taking the trouble to learn the meaning of the actions and the causal relationships which induced them. A personnel manager, then, must know his public as of today. He can do this if he reads news periodicals, and he can do it more completely if he subscribes to a recognized trade journal which gives both demographic data and solutions to current personnel management problems. All that is required is an effort toward awareness. Yet, how many naval officers read other than the required leadership manuals?

A second concept for shipboard personnel management involves an understanding of the characteristics of an effective group. In Chapter II group characteristics were discussed. Now the most desirable of these characteristics will be set forth as a guide to the influential leader. It was pointed out above that knowledge of this nature must be updated periodically to remain effective:

1. The members are skilled in . . . leadership and membership roles required for interaction between leaders and members and between members and other members.

2. The group has been in existence sufficiently long to have developed a well-established, relaxed working relationship among all its members.
3. The members of the group are attracted to it and are loyal to its members, including the leader.
4. The members and leaders have a high degree of confidence and trust in each other.
5. The values and goals of the group are a satisfactory integration and expression of the relevant values and needs of its members
6. The members have the values and goals of the groups which they link in harmony, one with the other.
7. The more important a value seems to the group, the greater the likelihood that the individual member will accept it.
8. The members of the group are highly motivated to abide by the major values and to achieve the important goals of the group
9. All the interaction, problem-solving, decision-making activities of the group occur in a supportive atmosphere. Suggestions, comments, ideas, information, criticisms are all offered with a helpful orientation. Similarly, these contributions are received in the same spirit. Respect is shown from the point of view of others both in the way contributions are made and in the way they are received.¹

Although the above characteristics of an effective group are couched in technical language, their meaning is clear, and their importance is undeniable.² Too often one has a hazy concept of specific group characteristics without being able to enumerate them clearly and examine them individually to see how they apply to a given management situation. "The triumph of this drama is the capacity of man to create orderly human relationships, or a *group*, out of a

collection of individuals."³ The group approach to leadership, rather than the individual approach so well known to naval leaders, is a field for fruitful study and application, and a team experiment should be instituted in the fleet under controlled conditions.

The study of wutocratic versus autocratic management in Chapter III suggests a third concept for personnel management aboard ship: Do away with the rigid application of job-oriented supervision to all aspects of shipboard work. In other words, apply the job-oriented approach only where operational necessity requires it and apply the employee-centered supervision to situations which are more administrative in nature.

This concept is radical and may provoke some disapproving comments, but it is based on sound social research by dedicated, practical people. One might speculate that it has been attempted in a naval environment, but certainly not to a wide degree. The effect desired is not a relaxing of controls but the establishment of a supportive atmosphere. It has been shown that such an atmosphere improves communications, allows for more effective criticism, fosters innovation, and promotes common goal-setting.

In considering the capabilities of the individual in a job-centered versus a man-centered method of supervision, one should review the characteristics of man and machine:

MAN

1. Has perpetual constancy.
2. Ability to predict and anticipate.
3. Ability to make decisions and reprogram.
4. Ability to salvage man-machine under conditions of machine failure.
5. Ability to change mental set or goal orientation at will.
6. Ability to reason inductively.

MACHINE

1. Freedom from fatigue.
2. Ability to resist boredom and inattention to routine tasks.
3. Unlimited power output.
4. Ability to monitor well.
5. Can be changed from present form.
6. Ability to erase previous memory traces.

7. Ability to store large amounts of information on short time basis.
8. Good integrator of disparate pieces of information.⁴

One does not have to make many comparisons to see that the supportive approach will take advantage of the characteristics of man while the machine-oriented approach has only limited application to man. The chief argument against this theory from a military point of view is that in highly tense operational situations one must not sit down and take a vote on whether to come right or left with full or standard rudder. On the other hand, a man who is encouraged to formulate or initiate a change to the maintenance requirements for a piece of machinery, or who is given the opportunity to help a group make a decision about a community aid program, will consider himself more deeply involved in carrying out the basic mission of the ship.

In further corroboration of the idea of supportive leadership is the study of morale and discipline made in Chapter IV. Both Chapters III and IV show that the failure to keep subordinates informed, the lack of interest in juniors, the lack of understanding of both motivation and maintenance needs are characteristic of the totally autocratic approach. If a key word were needed here, it would be *humanization*. This requires that the officer aboard ship be aware of opportunities to eliminate by-the-numbers routines in favor of group- and individual-supported concepts. It is a bold idea requiring fine judgment and a wise evaluation of the risks as well as the advantages. It is not a course of action one should attempt without a strong leadership capability.

Before considering a fourth concept, one concerning morale and discipline, the reader might bring himself closer to the problem by reviewing the peculiarities of shipboard life:

1. The worker finds himself in a fatiguing environment from the point of view of constant motion (physical) and cramped quarters and long deployments (psychological).
2. He is operating in a nonprofit organization.

3. His work rules are determined by two sources: routine and well-documented jobs and operations and sudden, nonroutine requirements.
4. His job offers higher security than the most union-dominated industrial plant.
5. Every employee, regardless of his job description, is salaried.
6. His financial rewards seem to be much lower than those of his civilian contemporaries, although this is not necessarily correct.
7. His employer has seemingly unlimited resources.
8. He cannot quit when he gets tired of the job.

Why, then, because of all these differences, would a look at industrial morale and discipline problems and solutions provide the key to a new concept? The answer is found in the definitions of morale and discipline previously given. Aboard ship or in an industrial plant, morale carries with it an implication of group reactions, as does discipline when one is speaking of a team effort. Inherent in both definitions is the expectation of success. So the environmental differences of shipboard life may serve to complicate the morale and discipline problem of the leader, but the basic definition and, therefore, the basic approach to a solution must be preserved if a general concept is to be stated.

The fourth concept for shipboard personnel management, then, is that the naval leader must not only understand the well-known motivation and maintenance needs of his men, but he must also learn to spot the danger flags before they are "close-hauled." This involves a knowledge of attitude indicators and a familiarity with methods of getting attitude information. Once attitudes which are damaging to the individual or the group are discovered, the leader must relate them to unfulfilled needs and see that these needs are met. Obviously, careful training is needed for all but the one-in-a-thousand "natural" leader to accomplish this.

It is conceivable that a suggestion box, for instance, could be an effective device for spotting

attitudes aboard ship. However, if such a method were mishandled, great harm could be done. Whatever device is used, it must ensure free communication to the top since in this sense both filtering and dilution are synonymously undesirable byproducts of the chain-of-command flow process.

Some senior naval officers would blanch at the idea of sending an attitude survey about the ship. But why shouldn't it be done? It is a proven scientific management tool, and, properly handled, it could reveal many paths of improvement. Once again, however, the manager should not attempt to use the tool without proper training.

A final concept for improved shipboard personnel management involves the use of a more objective system of performance appraisal. It has been pointed out that the presently used forms for officer and enlisted man evaluation contain items which must be evaluated subjectively and which do not meet the criteria for good performance evaluation, namely, observability, universality, and distinguishability. This does not mean that the Navy has not tried. "During the period 1865-1956, the U.S. Navy used 48 different fitness report formats. All the changes and revisions incorporated . . . were for the purpose of making officer evaluations more objective and more realistic."⁵ Nor is it necessary or desirable to eliminate subjective evaluation completely:

. . . The present forms allow for concrete examples of performance to justify or explain or amplify the personal characteristics marks Selection for promotion is . . . the board's considered *guess* as to who will be able to continue to perform well in the responsibilities of the next grade Because one officer is a superb, aggressive aviator does not necessarily indicate he would, for example, be a good assistant naval attaché for air.⁶

It is realized that, in addition, a sudden transition to a completely objective system of merit appraisal would produce a chaos of officer and senior petty officer disenchantment. What is proposed, then, is a system whereby a man participates in a truly objective performance analysis method during the period between regular reports. When the time comes for the regular report to be made, it is filled out by the supervisor and discussed with the man (a

mandatory requirement).⁷ The man is then permitted to append remarks on adverse comment, and the report is mailed in to the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

Such a system would permit most of the advantages of appraisal by results to accrue while allowing a subjective trait evaluation to be made. Thus, although the presently used forms do not meet the criteria of a truly objective reporting system, the rater would have before him solid evidence in a chronological form to help him make a firm evaluation of a subjective trait on the annual or semiannual appraisal form. Both the rated and the rater would have identical copies of goal achievement to form a common basis for discussion of the final report. The training for both in making human value judgments would be of a practical nature and could scarcely be gained elsewhere.

Disadvantages of such a concept are that by retaining the present form many of the weaknesses mentioned in Chapter V are not completely eliminated; despite frequent counseling of the rated person by the rater, the human traits listed on present forms are still not fully observable; they are certainly not distinguishable; and it is doubted that they apply universally. The process may call for too much time away from the job for everyone.

In spite of the above disadvantages, such a system could be placed into use *now* and would provide a transition for objective correction of present forms in the future.⁸

The main thread of necessity which runs through all the concepts proposed above is that of training. Leadership training (taken in its usual context in the Navy) is not enough. Why should the Navy burden itself with yet another training requirement, that of increased emphasis on personnel management from a social and psychological point of view? To answer a question with a question, why then should one learn to program computers, maintain missiles, study communism and insurgency, use cost-effectiveness in planning? The answer to all of these questions is that to have knowledge and fail to use it is a self-defeating process. To have a resource as complex and adaptable as a human being and to fail to realize his full potential is to deny the great expectations of a great society.

FOOTNOTES

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12. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
13. John Huberman, "Discipline without Punishment," *Harvard Business Review*, July-August, 1964, p. 63.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
16. Tiffen and McCormick, p. 304.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 305.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 305-317.

V--PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL

1. Lawrence Ferguson, "Social Scientists in the Plant," *Harvard Business Review*, May-June 1964, p. 133-143.
2. Harold Boak, "Executive Skills," Lecture, George Washington University, College of General Studies, Off-campus Extension, Annapolis: 20 April 1964.
3. Tiffen and McCormick, p. 204-250.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. Boak.

8. U.S. Bureau of Naval Personnel, *Report of Enlisted Performance Evaluation*, NAVPERS 792 (Rev. 6-59) (Washington: 1959), U.S. Bureau of Naval Personnel, *Report on Fitness of Officers*, NAVPERS 310W (Rev. 4-62) (Washington: 1962).

9. Boak.

10. Harold L. Jones, et al., "Officer Appraisal in the Armed Forces," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 1965, p. 76-87.

11. Herbert Meyer, et al., "Split Roles in Performance Appraisal," *Harvard Business Review*, January-February, 1965, p. 123.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 124.

13. Likert, p. 15.

14. *Ibid.*

VI--NEW CONCEPTS FOR SHIPBOARD PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

1. Likert, p. 166.

2. For a more detailed study which includes fifteen additional characteristics, see Likert, p. 166-169.

3. Zaleznik, p. 1-2.

4. Rodney M. Eldon, *Ship Management* (Cambridge, Md.: Cornell Maritime Press, 1962), p. 15.

5. Jones, et al., p. 76-77.

6. Frederick Palmer, "Comment and Discussion," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, December 1965, p. 111-112.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

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