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Naval Command Course: The Influence of Nuclear Weapons on National Strategy and Policy

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
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**THE INFLUENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON
NATIONAL STRATEGY AND POLICY**

A lecture to the
Naval Command Course
and the
School of Naval Command and Staff
on 7 September 1966

by

Mr. Jack Raymond

The subject of my talk is "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons on National Strategy and Policy," and I would like to begin with a couple of anecdotes. In 1956 I was a correspondent in Moscow. A delegation of 21 Chinese scientists was sent to the Soviet Union to participate in a research program in the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research at Dubna, and I did a story on it at the time. It didn't stir much excitement.

China's nuclear energy program, of course, antedated that story. It actually began in earnest in 1950 when the Institute of Atomic Energy of the Chinese Academy of Science was set up in Peking. But it was in 1956, apparently, that the Communist Chinese received their big atomic assist from Moscow. That year the Soviet Government helped the Peking Government undertake a vast training program in which 39 atomic centers were to be established on mainland China.

Some months later, in this country, I accompanied a group of Russians on a tour of the United States. In those days such tours received considerable publicity. I wrote daily stories about the Soviet visitors' reactions to the places they visited. The tour included Disneyland--this was before the Khrushchev visit, and I have often wondered whether it was the report of my Russians that prompted Mr. Khrushchev's desire, later frustrated, to visit Disneyland in 1958.

Among the other fascinating entertainments of Disneyland they have an exciting planetarium. One of the members of the group I accompanied, in November 1956, was a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. As we came out of the planetarium, this academician--a man of about 60--commented on the little show we had witnessed inside, a show in which with clever use of lights and sound the visitor is made to feel he is on a missile trip to the moon.

"My son is a jet engineer," the Russian said, "and he thinks he is going to ride a rocket to the moon." The Russian shook his head. "I just can't get it into my head. Perhaps I am too old-fashioned, but my son thinks such space trips will come soon."

That conversation took place just 11 months before the Russians launched Sputnik I.

The point of these anecdotes, as we take up our lecture subject is to use them as a peg for the observation that one of the recurrent national mistakes of the United States has been to underestimate the will and capacity of other countries to outperform it in industrial, technological, and scientific fields. And even when we profess to appreciate the capacities of others--friends as well as foes--we give evidence of failing to act on that belief. Then we are shocked when Moscow launches a missile, or Peking--or even France--explodes an atomic bomb.

It is platitudinous, of course, to say that things are not always what they seem or what somebody says they are. Thucydides wrote at the beginning of his history of the Peloponnesian War that while the beginning of the war was alleged to have been based on the breaking of a treaty, "The real cause I consider to be the one which was most formally kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable." And the point of this quotation is to use it as a peg for an observation on the war in Vietnam.

Many analysts manage to talk of the war in Vietnam without mentioning the growing power of Mainland China. Whether that makes war with Communist China inevitable, I reserve comment to the conclusion of this talk.

In this talk, prepared as part of a broad study of seapower, I have been asked to:

- a. review American strategy and foreign policy since World War II,
- b. offer a personal assessment of the effects of nuclear weapons on United States doctrine,
- c. note the importance of strong conventional forces in the light of the nuclear stalemate today, and
- d. comment on the impact of Communist China's nuclear capability on United States foreign policy.

This is a large order, but nothing ventured, nothing gained.

Let us then, according to our given outline, review briefly certain aspects of U.S. national security policy since World War II. Despite a historical pattern of withdrawal from world affairs following war, the United States did adopt a national strategy of continued global involvement after World War II, even as it submitted to the reflex action of demobilizing its forces. The new global strategy, enunciated in rhetoric condemning past isolationism, was encouraged to a large extent by the United States' unilateral possession of the atomic bomb.

We often associate the policy of massive retaliation with John Foster Dulles and the Eisenhower Administration of the 1950's. But it was Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during

the Truman Administration, and who later stated the case for "limited war" in Korea, who said in 1949: "Our greatest strength lies in the threat of quick retaliation (with strategic bombers) in the event we are attacked." And it was Adm. Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Eisenhower Administration and a renowned advocate of massive retaliation policies, who said in 1954: "I believe that this nation could be a prisoner of its own military posture if it had no capability, other than the one to deliver a massive atomic attack."

I suppose both of these military professionals, like any other professionals, can explain how what they said was perfectly sound in the context of their basic policy positions--just as we journalists also prove ourselves consistent when old columns are read to us. (Former Pentagon Controller, Charles Hitch, when he testified on his nomination and was asked to explain some of the things he said in his book, quoted Job 31:335, "Oh . . . that mine adversary had written a book.")

The United States' reliance upon its nuclear advantage can be illustrated in many ways, but for this audience, perhaps, the most pertinent example is the virulent struggle within the Armed Forces. To justify ambitious budgets in the face of shrinking appropriations, each service sought to demonstrate its capability for delivery of the superweapon.

In 1947 a classified memorandum by Rear Adm. Daniel Gallery, a young naval aviator, recommended that the major mission of the Navy should be the delivery of atomic attack from aircraft carriers and that the mission of controlling the seas should be relegated to a secondary position. The existence of the memorandum was leaked during the Air Force-Navy controversy over roles and missions. The consequent uproar forced Admiral Gallery's superiors to disavow his position, but they nevertheless argued that carrier-borne aircraft could deliver strategic bombs with precision, whereas highflying B-36 bombers were directed to the wholesale destruction of cities.

Two decades later, as Adm. John D. Hayes points out in his seapower commentary in this year's *Naval Review*, much of the Gallery memorandum has been put in effect, only with the nuclear delivery mission assigned to the Polaris submarines rather than aircraft carriers. And it is the Air Force, with its land-based missiles and aircraft, that insists upon

precision as well as the Polaris missiles on Navy
destroyers.

The point of all this is that the services felt they could exist only insofar as they satisfied the requirements of nuclear weapons policy. In the characteristic American way, the B-36 controversy was waged virtually in the open, and the press could cover it blow by blow. Since then the internal documentary record has provided further evidence of the United States' early adoption of a policy of deterrence. The State Department's June 1948 policy paper, based on the famous "containment" dispatch filed from Moscow by George Kennan, noted that war with the Soviet Union was "always a possibility." The Armed Forces, it continued, must not only give support to United States diplomacy but they must be strong enough to serve as a "deterrent" to Soviet efforts to fill every available power vacuum.

Professor Samuel P. Huntington has described that paper as a "landmark in the evolution of American strategic thought from the old strategy of mobilization for general war to a new strategy of deterrence." Significantly, he adds, it was produced by the State Department, not by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The policy of deterrence and containment, in order to have any chance of being effective, required sizeable ground and naval forces as well as nuclear air power. But it is a fact of national life that policy and strategy are not always supported substantively. As noted earlier, we do not always act on our professed beliefs. We did not bolster our land and naval forces to any significant extent until the outbreak of the Korean war. Our chief deterrent force consisted of nuclear bombs, and we did not have many of these. Nor did we build as many strategic bombers as military strategists advocated. Nor did we press forward with rockets and missile development. The country learned soon enough that the nuclear advantage--and by 1949 it was no longer a monopoly--was an insufficient deterrent anyway.

The Soviet Union seized Eastern Europe and challenged the United States directly with the blockade of Berlin. Stalin, clearly, was not awed. When he *really* was afraid, of the Germans in 1934 to 1940, he behaved differently. Nor did the United States nuclear advantage deter the North Koreans from invading South Korea. There were many other incidents in the postwar years, and in many cases the aggressive forces did not have their way--as in Iran and Greece.

It is possible that fear of atomic retaliation spoiled the Communist Chinese appetite for Quemoy and Matsu. But it is also clear that even as the United States finally developed in the late 1950's a stupendous arsenal of nuclear bombers and smaller tactical nuclear weapons for ground and naval forces, aggressive acts in Europe or Asia did not cease. The United States' nuclear advantage may well have prompted Communist leaders to formulate a strategy and doctrine for wars of national liberation, consisting of ambiguous aggression through insurgency, for their already existing efforts to take over revolutionary forces around the world.

The Soviet Union stunned the world, including America, with its own missile and space feats. And this did as much as the reasoned analyses of the military strategists to reduce American self-delusion over the all-purpose qualities of the nuclear arsenal. That is not to say that the threat of a nuclear strike went entirely unheeded then or is unheeded now. United States concern over the establishment of Soviet missile bases in Cuba and nearly abject Soviet withdrawal, when faced with a direct threat of retaliation, demonstrated only too well the readiness of nations to use nuclear weapons--for blackmail or survival.

But the Cuba crisis of 1962 also exemplified the mutual nuclear deterrence that had developed between the two nuclear powers. Some have called it a balance of terror. The nuclear test-ban treaty was signed in an effort to keep that balance. The arms race goes on, of course, but it is now a qualitative one, a race being run in laboratories. A breakthrough may result that could once again panic us all. For the time being, the two major nuclear powers have been persuaded that not even a surprise attack would pay off.

Secretary McNamara has pointed out that if the Soviet Union pulled a surprise attack upon the United States a very large portion of American missiles would survive and even if one-fifth of the surprise weapons delivered their payloads, the Soviet Union would lose one-third of its population and half of its industrial capacity. Yet, lest any American hawks be tempted, Mr. McNamara also has pointed out that even if the United States were to strike an initial preemptive blow against the Soviet Union, Moscow's surviving nuclear weapons in retaliation could kill at least 90 to 95 million Americans.

Long before Mr. McNamara gave us those estimates early this year, the United States had adopted a policy based on the premise that so-called limited wars, where the threshold of aggression or its location made nuclear retaliation out of the question, were more likely to occur than wars for which nuclear retaliation was a credible threat. Yet, just because limited conflicts were more likely, and indeed were occurring with increasing frequency and danger, thermonuclear wars could not be ruled out. Nations might become too fearful or too cautious to use their ultimate weapons, but they had by no means become so wise as to eliminate those fateful situations when fear, caution, or reason did not prevail.

The current United States policy, therefore, is one of "flexible response," with each planned retaliatory action suited to the style and potential consequence of the provocation. This country has raised annual defense spending from more than \$40 billion to more than \$60 billion a year in order to pay for that policy. Yet there are those who claim that our forces are inadequate, nevertheless, that our resources are being stretched thin, that we are overcommitted. Once more the voice of withdrawal is being heard in our land. A prevailing attitude seems to be: "Let's pour it on, get this war in Vietnam over with, then let's not get involved anymore."

To summarize, then, the United States has had a tendency through the years to meet its international problems on a contingency basis, mobilizing and expanding its military forces only when under direct threat. This tendency, rooted deep in an American tradition that is suspicious of the influence of large military forces in peacetime, has been reinforced by a national ego that rarely credits foes with having the capacity to defeat us.

In the post-World War II period, however, the United States *did* undertake to remain involved in global affairs. But the United States possession of a nuclear advantage created a false belief in its all-purpose deterrent capacity. So-called limited aggressions continued. The United States, at the outset, was inhibited from nuclear retaliation because the provocations never seemed to justify it--they were "below the threshold," as it is said. The United States subsequently was further inhibited by the Soviet weapons advances that balanced the terror. Now, the United States having adopted a strategy of flexible response, the cost and strain are prompting popular demands for actions to put a quick end to our

troubles through a massive effort and thus permit a return to isolationism.

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We come now to some personal observations on nuclear weapons strategies. I have covered military affairs long enough to know that strategy is only a plan for doing things, and it must never become too theoretical or dogmatic. If events disprove the premises upon which the strategy was adopted, that does not mean the plan was all bad or must be retained at all costs. But there must be a plan to provide coherence to strategic action. While the United States adopted a policy of deterrence to which it gave voice in the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, its failure to support that policy adequately reduced its effectiveness. Without adequate military support at the outset, the United States began solving its problems pragmatically, "on their merits," so to speak, as one analyst put it.

Thus the United States began to distinguish among various power vacuums. It put its finger in the dike in Greece and Turkey but left Korea out of its Pacific defense perimeter. Also, when a policy allows special cases, the deterrent effect is not relevant from one case to another. The U.S. nuclear advantage was relevant to a possible Soviet attack upon Western Europe but not the suppression of Hungarian liberation. It was relevant to the crisis in Cuba in 1962 but not to insurgency in Vietnam. It might have been relevant in Korea, but widespread doubts paralyzed action.

Erratic response of this kind has a certain superficial benefit, if the aim is to keep the enemy guessing. But it is also dangerous. If a strategy is to serve as a deterrent, it must be understood and perhaps exemplified. That is why, no doubt, in contrast with the Korean war, the United States has made many efforts to warn Peking of its determination to use nuclear weapons in the event of a direct Communist Chinese intervention in the war in Vietnam. It has done this by example. It has bombed the "sanctuary" of North Vietnam. It has also conveyed this message through all conceivable diplomatic channels.

But these and other instances reflect the tendency to treat national security problems as a series of isolated crises, making move and countermove with no apparent long-range strategy in fulfillment of national interests. It is as though the existence of nuclear weapons in the world, instead of providing a

sober motivation for long-range security planning has inhibited planning that would lend purpose and direction to foreign policy.

No doubt the failure of the United Nations to prevent or control the cold war contributed to the United States' flailing about in a series of sporadic, defensive actions. The United States could not, like some aggressive totalitarian power, map out a rigid doctrine of foreign policy aims. It should not have been impossible, however, to establish a more coherent view than is evident of where American national security requirements--in weaponry as well as geography--begin and end.

That is, it should have been possible--if it had been possible--to place greater reliance upon the nuclear weapons arsenal. One can only shake one's head in dismay upon hearing, now, of how inadequate was the early stockpile of atomic bombs; how crude and unreliable were the liquid-fuel Atlas missiles; how terrifyingly swift was the command system that could trigger a nuclear strike without opportunity for reflection. "General," said a visitor to Strategic Air Command Headquarters, "you don't have a war plan. You have some sort of horrible spasm."

The nuclear arsenal's combination of clumsy super-weapons and barely controllable command system has been matched at times by a general lack of discrimination in the distribution of many of the weapons. I remember breaking the story, denied at the time, of Admiral Felt taking command of the Pacific forces in 1958, just as the Taiwan crisis broke, only to find that he had only a limited supply of conventional explosives. In war, the Fleet would either have had to remain virtually inactive or attack with nuclear bombs.

And in another incident in the early stage of the crisis in Lebanon in 1958, the Pentagon had to rush conventional ammunition to the Sixth Fleet in response to an urgent bid by its commander, Vice Admiral Brown. It was subsequently revealed that during the landing the United States had an Honest John rocket afloat off Beirut but was not allowed to land it because it could fire an atomic warhead as well as a conventional one. Although the threat of using nuclear weapons was proclaimed policy, the policy was not sustained in this instance.

One can only guess what exciting examples will be disclosed to us in the future of the crazy-quilt complications inherent in our possession of what obviously

many weapons and too many kinds of nuclear weapons. Nor should we forget that while there can be no question about the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, there is still considerable doubt about their efficiency. The debate over the nuclear test-ban treaty focused attention on these uncertainties. We only know by theory the results that might be derived from most of the warheads in the arsenal. Each series of nuclear tests has produced a considerable number of unexpected phenomena.

Secretary McNamara has said the United States possessed "tens of thousands" of nuclear warheads.

On top of all this there is evidence of too big a building in our nuclear arsenal, as each service has justified the creation of its own contribution to the deterrent. According to one estimate in an article in *NATO's 15 Nations*, June-July 1966, more than 7,000 nuclear warheads are carried by the long-range missiles and aircraft of our strategic forces. In addition there are more than 25,000 tactical nuclear warheads encased in the weaponry of Naval and Air Force planes, short-range missiles and guns--ground-to-ground, ground-to-air, air-to-air, air-to-ground. In order to refute arguments that NATO forces are being weakened, Secretary McNamara has claimed that the number of warheads in Europe have been increased.

One does not need a computer to work out the total megatonnage in nuclear explosive power that is represented by these weapons. I'll spare you the arithmetic, but according to one table in the article, U.S. Armed Forces, including close to 3,500 strategic delivery vehicles, could launch some 19,000 million tons of TNT equivalent. By comparison, with some 580 strategic nuclear weapons, the Soviets could launch some 9,000 million tons of TNT equivalent. And for my purpose the interesting thing about this comparison is not that we have outmatched the Russians, but that they, too, have more of these weapons than they can efficiently use.

If this sounds to you that I subscribe to the notion that there is such a thing as having too much nuclear weaponry, you are right. I don't want to get into the semantics of "overkill," a very dramatic word, but it seems logical to me that if Secretary McNamara's estimates of the probable casualties in a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union were only half those cited, their deterrent factor would remain unchanged. A national leadership willing to accept a toll of 50 million dead would not be dissuaded if he

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were advised that, in truth, the toll will be 100 million. The respective costs of the difference in the nuclear forces needed would, of course, be tremendous, and the difference in complications involved in perfecting a large or *larger* nuclear establishment are beyond description in this treatise--not only in cold cash, but in manpower, technical training, diversion of industrial facilities. Every arm of the military establishment has felt the squeeze in money and talent.

Those considerations should give pause to any small country with nuclear pretensions. Not only is it expensive, it may be self-defeating. For no Big Power today will sit idly by and permit a small country to employ nuclear weapons except as it suits the Big Power. Besides inviting interference even from its ally, it may well invite inclusion in the target system of a Big Power that is not its ally. For the danger of use of nuclear weapons by small countries, regardless against whom ostensibly aimed, impairs the security of the Big Powers.

Finally, related to these nuclear questions are the concomitant questions about the military efficacy of a *hidden* deterrent. Missiles, whether aboard submarines or in underground silos, can hardly be expected to impress a foe who cannot see them. There is something tangible about the warning posed by troops on a border, warships outside a harbor, or aircraft thundering across the sky.

The strategy of "flexible response" recognizes the validity of the theory that non-nuclear wars are more likely than nuclear wars, but that the nation must be ready to meet all contingencies. Yet covering all military bets is a very complicated task, and some questions have been raised whether the nation's political leadership can cope with the ever-widening gap between the intricacy of the weaponry and the almost metaphysical nature of the strategy-making process. Professor Kissinger, who has served at the White House, reports:

Inevitable problems of confidence and competence between the technical and political levels of domestic decision-making may make it difficult to implement a strategic doctrine. Architects of strategy need a continual awareness that their audience is not a group of colleagues of similar technical competence but of hard-pressed individuals for whom strategy can be but one of a

number of concerns. Thus excessive complexity may lead to paralysis.

The strategists must at every stage ask of the decision-maker: Does he understand the doctrine? Does he believe in it? Will the doctrine meet emergencies or provide an excuse for inaction? Does it instill a sense of mastery or produce a feeling of impotence? What does the decision-maker really mean when he accepts a strategy? Does he accept it with the notion, 'In prescribed circumstances, this is what I will do? Or does he have the arrier-pensée, 'If this is all I can do, I will do nothing?'

This fascinating insight into the doubts that assail a White House Adviser reinforce certain conclusions, herewith summarized, on the future effects of nuclear weapons on American strategic doctrine. We have not developed the nuclear arsenal rationally. We exaggerated the destructive potentiality and flexibility of the earlier type weapons, perhaps fooling ourselves more than our enemy. We hastened pell-mell to produce too many and too great a variety of bombs in our arsenal. We thus have overloaded our Armed Forces with the paraphernalia of nuclear weapons to the extent that at times we have been in danger of loosing a barrage before taking a chance to reconsider; other times we have been encumbered by such weapons when we did not need them.

I cannot know to what extent these observations hold true today, although I suspect that they do. It would be negligent of American security not to have a basic arsenal, probably much smaller than exists today, one which is capable of wreaking substantial damage upon an attacker. We must keep in mind, however, that our very possession of too many of these complicated weapons systems may limit rather than enhance our choices.

The oversophistication of military equipment, as a matter of fact, plagues the non-nuclear forces. Take the case of the Navy diver who was wearing some \$1,000 worth of special equipment, and he was diving off the Vietnamese shore in the China Sea; walking the ocean, feeling comfortable with his artificial lungs, his oxygen tank and mask, his flippers, rubber suit--the whole bit--when he noticed just a few feet away from him on the ocean floor a man in bathing trunks. That's all. No mask, no tank. So our sailor paddled over to this other man and took out his pad and pen--

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one that could write under water--about \$200 worth of equipment right there--and he wrote, "How can you manage to stay under water so long?" And he handed it over and the other fellow took the pad and pencil and wrote, "I am drowning!"

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Having thus criticized overreliance upon nuclear forces--and I guess I should, for the record, distinguish between nuclear energy for propulsion which, of course, I endorse wholeheartedly--I come now to a statement on the importance of strong conventional forces, with emphasis on naval power, of course.

I will not, however, follow the stereotype. I dare say you have heard enough about the glories and effectiveness of seapower, how the United States must keep the sealanes open; must be capable of exerting pressure along troublesome coastal areas; must be capable of landing troops, if necessary; must be capable of transporting men and supplies; must be capable of mounting aerial attacks from floating airfields; must be capable of lurking beneath the seas in submarines designed to attack other submarines or add to the nuclear retaliatory force with missiles; must support great merchant fleets. These are some of the elements of modern American seapower and you have already heard much about them.

I would like, however, with a concrete example, to discuss seapower as an element of our future in Asia, relating it to the concluding portion of this talk, the problem of Communist China. For the war in Vietnam--remember my quotation from Thucydides--is only a symptom of the larger challenge to the United States (indeed all of the West) in Asia. For two centuries there was a power vacuum on the eastern portion of the Eurasian continent, and foreign powers could move in and out of it--fight over it--as though the sleeping giant did not exist. Napoleon warned not to wake that giant. He did not, Patrick Gordon Walker cogently pointed out recently, indicate how to keep it asleep.

China is awake and coming out of her lethargy and this is something that would cause a major reaction regardless of what regime was in power. That does not mean it makes no difference that the Chinese mainland is Communist, but what is significant in terms of national strategy is less the form of government than its objectives. Any Chinese regime would

seek to recapture for the proud Chinese people the dominance of Asia that China once enjoyed.

There are other considerations. Mainland China represents, even among many Asians who fear her, the resurrection of Asia against the West. To many Asians, communism in China is not a bogey but is studied as a possible panacea, in "local" form, of course. At the same time, Communist China does represent a new imperialism even for the little nations around her that secretly admire her. In many respects, the feeling is like that of the Balkan countries in Europe in their attitude toward Russia.

North Vietnam unquestionably would like to dominate all of Indochina. Thailand is afraid of a possible North Vietnamese-Laotian combination and thus is stanch in its association with the United States. Cambodia is worried about Thailand and Vietnam--North and South--and thus hopes by a "little brother" friendship with China to escape their threat.

Sukarno had hoped to replace Nehru as the voice of emergent nationalism. Political developments are still unclear in his regime, but one thing is clear in Pacific strategy: Indonesia is an obvious mark for China's southward extension of influence and power. The only thing left out of the jigsaw puzzle is Japan. In fact, it is precisely because Japan has conscientiously pursued a policy of extreme pacifism that it has created a power vacuum off Communist China's flank that permitted Peking to accelerate her aggressive revival.

Now where does America come in? The United States probably would be involved in Indochina even if the French had not been ousted and the British were not currently leaving the scene. The United States not only is a world power, it is a Pacific power. And we can no more remain immune to the aspirations of men and nations in the Far East than we could remain immune to them in Europe--or Africa--or Latin America--or anywhere in the world.

With that in mind, there is no question that we have a future in Asia. But there is also no question that we have no future there as a land power. We cannot stay there to keep the peace forever by force of arms--nuclear or otherwise. We cannot stay there as the supporters of one or more Asian countries against one or more other Asian countries--regardless of how we define our purposes.

The West--the United States in particular--has responsibilities in Asia, but only because there is at present no balancing force for the military power on Mainland China. We remained in Europe after the war--as a balancing force against the Soviet Union. The time is perhaps not far off--but not yet--when we will no longer need to keep sizeable military forces there. The time has not come when the other chief powers of Asia--India, Indonesia, Taiwan, Japan, Korea--are in a position to assert themselves. It is only a natural extension of our wartime obligations to preserve the equilibrium.

However, the United States, even as it carries on the fight in Vietnam, must be ready to withdraw--not suddenly, of course. Not during the struggle, to be sure. But withdraw nevertheless. There is a limit to the time allotted us in the psychology of the people of Asia between recognition as allies and branding as colonial occupiers. Not only the United States, but Britain as well, must eventually withdraw from Asia. Hong Kong is a delight to us all, but it is an anachronism and surely will be dealt with by a forceful China when the time comes--Communist China or otherwise--even if it now serves as a useful conduit for Western money. And Russia, too, will someday have to withdraw from Asian lands that were seized by the Czar in China's dormancy.

Withdrawal does not mean abandonment. The United States and other Western Powers--and the Soviet Union--must find in the local powers of Asia replacements for themselves as obstacles to Chinese aggressive domination. And, the Western Powers, while withdrawing from Asian lands, can continue to help maintain what has been aptly called a "balance of prudence" by exerting and demonstrating great military and economic power in the background. We would be the guarantors of the Asian peace, but guarantors not on land, guarantors with our powerful sea and air striking forces and with our huge economic resources. Here, in the Pacific, is the role for conventional seapower. And many of the countries we help build up to contain and "balance" China would be maritime nations.

This is not to say that we abandon Polaris submarines. Indeed the Fleet ballistic missiles may well prove the most useful of deterrents, because of their relative immunity to a first strike attack. Nor am I advocating the elimination of all nuclear weaponry. What I am saying is that we must not have too much of a good thing. Warships with guns, aircraft that can

fire at targets they can see, and swift ships that can support operations far from home are what may well spell the difference between credibility and insensibility in the crises to come.

There's a flavor of the 19th century in the military pressure I assign to the United States, but it would have no colonial objectives. On the contrary, it would be openly designed to help the countries of Asia establish their own detente. The war in Vietnam is a terrible thing, but in the perspective of world affairs it is still a small war, engaging relatively small numbers of people. It has not forced either side to make the total commitment of fighting men and equipment, of national manpower reserves and other resources that occurs when nations are forced by great hostilities to forsake all else and fight like maniacs to preserve themselves. And we must keep this war from becoming just such an all-out-war.

How? This is the point in the lecture where I remind you I am an observer, not a doer. Nevertheless let us review, as we consider the spectre of Communist China, some of the theses I have set forth: first, that nuclear weaponry is often a hindrance; second, that we must have a simple, coherent, understandable strategic policy. That policy must be projected for the long pull, not merely constitute a catch-as-catch-can defensive operation against insurgency in Vietnam, or Thailand, or elsewhere. It must recognize that China will inevitably be a Big Power. It must recognize that other countries in Asia must be helped to grow big, too. It must recognize that the United States, although it must withdraw from the mainland of Asia, can never withdraw from the environs of Asia. We cannot indulge in a big nuclear slam-bang against the North Vietnamese and go home. We must stay to trade and give aid and assist in keeping a "balance of prudence."

For the national security interests of the United States are not limited to its own shores, nor to its own survival alone. We must show the flag everywhere we can, not as a threat but as a symbol of our global interests. For that purpose, open demonstration of American naval power is ideal: but it must not depend chiefly on the threat of nuclear annihilation. And it cannot substitute for the political and economic talents of the people it is designed to protect.

The demonstration by China that she can manufacture a nuclear weapon puts us on the alert as no meeting of technicians in Moscow ten years ago could have done. Peking must be deterred. But Peking will not be deterred by threats of preemptive strikes against her nuclear installations. Like Stalin, Mao surely knows that the American temperament simply will not countenance that form of aggression by us. Insofar as the Communist Chinese threaten an attack with their nuclear weapon, there is, of course, but one answer. But most evidence points to Peking's development of the bomb not as a threat, but as a Gaullist-like symbol of China's own grandeur.

In this connection I found pertinent yesterday's column by David Lawrence, one of the conservative commentators on the American scene. He is also the publisher of *U.S. News and World Report*. Mr. Lawrence wrote (and I quote it at great length):

To put the Vietnam war into perspective, however, it is necessary to put Red China's relationship to the conflict in Southeast Asia in perspective, too. This is the root of the matter, and until a clearer idea is formed of what contingencies any American step toward peace may bring, no progress will be made.

The United States has told the world it is protecting South Vietnam at the request of its government, and obviously the protection is against a Communist takeover. Yet if the United States and Red China achieved some kind of truce, the friction in Vietnam would be regarded by Peking as hardly worth bothering about.

This is why again and again in discussions of the Vietnam problem the handwriting on the wall says that the relations of the mainland of China to the rest of the world need prime attention. In this week's issue of *U.S. News & World Report* there's a significant interview on this subject. It was conducted in Vienna between the magazine's staff reporter there-- Alex Kucherov, an American citizen of Russian birth-- and Dr. Hugo Portisch, editor-in-chief of the Vienna *Kurier*, who had just returned from a trip to Red China, where he had talked at length with the leaders there. Dr. Portisch said:

Marshal Chen Yi, the Vice Premier and Foreign Minister, with whom I had a long talk, told me they will need at least 20 years for the whole of China--a huge country--to reach the industrial level of present-day England . . .

The Chinese, by tradition, are not invaders . . . and when you bring up Vietnam, they make a point that their troops aren't there . . . At one point he (Marshal Chen Yi) said to me:

Look, everybody's afraid of China. Well, look at our Army. It's a huge Army. It's a land Army with conventional weapons. Of course, if we sent 3 million men into Southeast Asia, we certainly could kick the Americans out of there, easily. But we know perfectly well that, if we kick the Americans out of there, the Americans wouldn't take that defeat. What would they do? They would attack us with superior means.

Dr. Portisch said he understood this meant nuclear weapons. He added that the Red Chinese leader also was sure the Americans wouldn't invade Red China. So the Viennese editor concluded: The Chinese Communists talk belligerently, but they act cautiously --in Vietnam and everywhere else.

The foregoing puts Red China in perspective and points the way not just to diplomatic dialogues on troop withdrawal but to an international plan that could promote Asia's economic development. This offers the real hope. For if the leaders in Peking were persuaded that it is not a temporary device but a long-range formula, a solution to the internal as well as external problems of Mainland China would emerge. Once conferences on economic development and assistance are started and progress is made in this field, the Vietnam problem would naturally adjust itself.

In the final analysis, Peking will be contained only insofar as the nations around her succeed in demonstrating their will and capacity for freedom. Peking will be deterred not by Americans or Russians but by Asians who make themselves strong. China, of

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course, supports the Communist insurgency in Vietnam; of course, she supports the similar insurgency in Thailand; of course she wants to subvert other governments to her power bloc. But China has been painstaking in its avoidance of any provocation that would result in a retaliatory strike by United States military forces. China cannot want to take on the United States.

Secretary McNamara has said that the full implications of the Communist Chinese threat are far from clear, and the question of what our nuclear posture in the Far East should be in the future will require continuing study. In this connection, however, since I agree with his point, I would like to quote the Secretary further as follows:

There is one lesson that we can draw from our experience in Europe, and that is to avoid a strategy which relies almost wholly on the use of tactical nuclear weapons to cope with (China's massive ground forces.)

This statement was made after China detonated her second nuclear device.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Mr. Jack Raymond is presently Vice President and Public Relations and Management Consultant of the Thomas J. Deegan Company.

Mr. Raymond was born in Poland but raised in New York City. He was sports correspondent for the *New York World Telegram* and free-lanced for other New York papers while a student at City College from which he graduated in 1939. In 1940 he joined *The New York Times*, leaving to go into the U.S. Army in 1942. During his military service he was a combat correspondent for the *Stars and Stripes* in Italy, France, and Germany. Medals awarded during this service include the Bronze Star and the Purple Heart. Returning to *The New York Times* in 1945, Mr. Raymond served as the Berlin correspondent for six years and then as the Balkans' correspondent for an additional four years. In 1955 he was one of the first correspondents to tour the Iron Curtain countries and in 1956 he covered the 20th Congress in Moscow. In 1957 he became the Pentagon correspondent for *The New York Times* and served in that position until this year when he assumed his present position.

Mr. Raymond is the author of *Your Military Obligations and Opportunities; Power at the Pentagon*; and numerous articles published in national magazines.