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## Correspondence Course School: Correspondence Courses in Perspective

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## *Correspondence Courses in Perspective*

*Counterinsurgency is one of the most widely discussed concepts in the international arena today. To refresh his memory and to provide further insight into the counterinsurgency problem, the reader should find the excerpt which follows interesting and informative.*

*The following passages have been extracted from a solution to the Correspondence Course in Counterinsurgency submitted by Lieutenant Thomas F. Murphy, U.S. Navy. Lieutenant Murphy is a 1962 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy who spent his first tour aboard the U.S.S. Lloyd Thomas (DD-764). He is presently assigned as Aide to Commander, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard.*

*In an outstanding analysis of a comprehensive subject, Lieutenant Murphy discusses the "popular causes" which are exploited by insurgents and the compatibility of these causes to the precepts set forth in the American Declaration of Independence, and then analyzes some of the factors of instability which might be conducive to insurgent movements.*

Throughout the underdeveloped and newly emerging areas of Latin America, Asia, and Africa, governments are facing the prospect of mass popular discontent because of the regime's hostility or indifference to the people's newly aroused desire for changes in their old way of life. In these areas, insurgents are finding enormous opportunities for mobilizing these unfulfilled desires for change and directing them towards the violent overthrow of the government. Because the success of an insurgent movement is almost totally dependent upon popular support, or at least the denial of it to the government, an insurgent program is tailored to reflect these aspirations of the people. Therefore an examination of modern insurgent causes must begin with an examination of modern popular demands for change.

The conditions which have prompted this popular demand for change are not new; poverty and repression have been a way of life in these areas for generations. The new ingredient which has created this disillusionment and frustration with the status quo is the sudden awareness of the masses that these conditions are not unalterable or inevitable. Rapid advances in science and technology have helped make this an age of abundance and have given rise to the hope that man will one day be able to satisfy all his material wants.<sup>1</sup> Worldwide instantaneous communications have carried this hope to the remotest regions of the globe and have sparked the demand for a share of this abundance by these previously docile masses. The government which is unwilling or unable to respond to this demand for change leaves the people no alternative other than the support of an insurgent movement which advocates radical change.

It must be stressed that the insurgent must advocate more than just political change. An attack on a colonial regime in the name of anticolonialism, nationalism, or self-determination is not enough unless the people believe their livelihood will be improved. A revolt against a dictatorial native ruler or a corrupt, sham democracy in the name of popular suffrage or representative government must also

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stress economic and social reform as well. These people have seen "palace revolts" and coups, have exchanged one set of foreign rulers for another as a result of distant wars or upheavals, and have observed numerous government power shifts without seeing any changes in their basic way of life. The insurgent always has a political cause, but it is the emphasis on tangible improvements which gains him his vital popular support.

Since most of these target nations are for the most part rural, agrarian reform is usually a prime insurgent cause. For example, it is estimated that 90 per cent of the total land in Latin America is owned by ten per cent of the population.<sup>2</sup> A recent work on Vietnam presents figures which show that 6,300 landowners possess 45 per cent of the total land, while 183,000 small farmers share a scant 15 per cent.<sup>3</sup> Similar situations exist in most other insurgent-threatened countries as well. Usually the land is devoted to one or two exportable cash crops, thus placing the entire economy at the mercy of fluctuating world prices for that commodity.<sup>4</sup> Agricultural technology is primitive, resulting in extremely low yields per acre. Usually the tax structure has been tailored to favor the large estate owner, thereby increasing the peasant's burden. Either he ekes out a meager existence on a submarginal plot or lives under an almost feudal system as a tenant on the large estates. Thus, the insurgent is able to enlist the small farmer's support through a cause advocating "land to the tillers," the breakup of the large estates, and technological and financial assistance to agriculture combined with promises of tax relief. Most of these governments have attempted to solve this problem, but with only modest success.<sup>5</sup> Since government leadership is either drawn from or dependent upon the support of the propertied elite, attempts at far-reaching reform are stifled.

In the cities the insurgent finds additional targets for his program. Almost every major city in these areas is surrounded by ghastly slums inhabited by the disillusioned who have left the rural areas to

find new opportunities. Instead they often find unemployment, poor housing, and a stagnant economy unable to keep pace with the growing population. A typical case is Latin America, where the 1960 figures reveal a 2.8 per cent increase in population combined with a negligible 0.3 per cent increase in production.<sup>6</sup> Native industry cannot absorb this increasing mass of unskilled labor, and foreign investments are accused, with some justification, of keeping wages low and being little interested in the development of basic industrial capabilities in these areas. Unemployment is chronic, underemployment is permanent, and inflationary trends erode the real earning power of labor. The insurgent cause here advocates the nationalization of industry and the expulsion of foreign investors as solutions to the economic problems. The right of labor to organize is promoted both as a solution to end exploitation of the working class and to provide the insurgent with an organized urban base which can be used to paralyze the government and attract world attention.

Combined with this rural and urban economic reform program, the insurgent cause also promises at least a minimum standard of social justice. In many of these nations, the government has created enormous bureaucracies in which venal government and military officials form a "morally corrupt plutocracy."<sup>7</sup> The courts exist only to serve the privileged class, and bribery and graft make a mockery of justice. The basic necessities of housing, medical care, sanitation, and even decent water are unavailable or insufficient. Class hostility between the privileged class and the underprivileged majority is exploited to create new dissensions. Equality before the law and the dignity of the individual are presented as prime aims of the insurgent movement.

Finally, the insurgent creates or exploits political frustration. The government must be blamed for the nation's ills and be convicted of being unresponsive to their solutions. As long as people believe there is a legal alternative to armed revolt, a guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted.<sup>8</sup> The cause

will vary according to the nature of the government under attack, but the insurgent can adapt this cause to cover all situations. Colonies such as Indochina or Algeria, domestic dictatorships such as Batista's Cuba or Trujillo's Dominican Republic, and even native democracies such as the Philippines during the HUK revolt, have all been threatened or overthrown by insurgent movements. Whenever an insurgent movement can promote a cause based on the desires of the people for a more dignified, prosperous way of life, combined with a successful attempt to discredit the existing government, there is an excellent chance for victory.

There are, of course, many other popular causes which have been utilized in specific locations and situations. The exploitation of tribalism in Katanga, religion in the Yemen, and resentments against minority groups in Cyprus serve to show the resourcefulness of the modern insurgent in adapting a cause to gain the widest possible support. But always at the heart of the cause is the promise of a better way of life. Many of the authors in the required reading have emphasized the importance of basic human rights in any insurgent cause,<sup>9</sup> but perhaps Tad Szulc expressed it most plainly:

To the people who are often hungry and diseased, unemployed or underemployed, these revolutionary calls do not represent ideological or political concepts . . . . All that really matters is the promise of food for the children, of decent housing for the family, of full employment twelve months of the year, of human and national dignity, and of a chance for a better life in every sense.<sup>10</sup>

The United States, born in revolution almost two centuries ago, ironically finds itself in opposition to almost every insurgent program in the world today. With the exception of two ventures into the field of inspiring insurgencies (e.g. Guatemala in 1951 and the unsuccessful anti-Castro attack of 1961), this country has stood in the forefront of those

attempting to maintain international stability. The prime reason, of course, is that the Soviet Union and Communist China, thwarted by a nuclear balance of terror, have turned to what they refer to as "wars of national liberation" as their new instrument of expansion. Yet even in those cases where the movement is neither foreign-directed nor Communist-dominated, but is seeking only economic, social, or political change from within, the leadership is apt to regard the United States as a hostile force. This hostility is based upon two factors. The postwar policy of the United States, in an effort to contain communism, has been marked by an abandonment of traditional isolationist policies and the assumption of the leadership of the non-Soviet world. Unfortunately, this period also marked the twilight of the colonial era and, by allying itself with the leading western colonial powers just as a wave of anticolonial feeling was sweeping the world, the United States found itself sharing much of the anticolonial reaction. In addition, many of these insurgent causes are based upon economic reform programs which represent a reaction against capitalism and a turning towards some form of socialism. Since the United States is the leading proponent of capitalism in the modern world, and since Communist theory presents socialism as a step on the road to communism,<sup>11</sup> there has been a tendency on the part of Americans to regard most of these insurgent programs as hostile to their economic system and their leadership as tools of international communism. Thus, the insurgent often sees government troops arrayed against him armed with American weapons, industries which exploit the local populace backed by American capital, and unpopular governments maintained in power through American foreign aid programs. And yet, at its birth, this nation was looked upon by the established world powers as a radical experiment spawned by revolutionaries and as a threat to international stability. We have left to history the principles and ideals which created that revolution. How applicable then, are these ideals, for which the founders of this nation found compelling enough to risk both lives and fortunes, to the revolutionaries of today?

To answer this question it is necessary to examine further these ideals and the philosophies which inspired them. The American Revolution was directed against a regime which would be considered mild indeed today. The causes were varied and complex, but one of the most basic was economic frustration. However, these were not the frustrations of grinding poverty and economic misery which are at the root of so many insurgent movements today. Rather they were the frustrations of a relatively affluent middle class which felt itself hampered and restricted by the economic policies of a distant, authoritarian government.<sup>12</sup> The 56 signers of the American Declaration of Independence included 22 lawyers, 11 merchants and 5 doctors; 33 of the total were college educated.<sup>13</sup> These men were not downtrodden revolutionaries, and their followers were certainly not, as Robert Taber describes today's insurgents, "the hungry peasants and urban slum dwellers . . . having nothing to lose but their lives."<sup>14</sup> They sought no popular support through appeals of social or economic reform for the masses. In fact they represented the very section of society against whom most modern insurgents attempt to rally support.

If the Declaration of Independence was merely a listing of the grievances of this well-to-do class against King George III, it would have little or no application to modern insurgent movements. But it was much more than just that. Its author, Thomas Jefferson, had been profoundly influenced by the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 in England and by the theories of the 17th century English philosopher, John Locke. In the preamble and first paragraph of this document, Jefferson presented a theory of the rights of man which is as vital and basic today as it was in 1776. To Jefferson, and to Locke, man had certain rights which no government could alter, abridge, or deny. These rights were man's by nature, and, since government was merely a "social contract" between men, government could have no effect upon them.<sup>15</sup> This "social contract" could be broken any time these "natural rights" were violated. Locke called these rights "life, liberty, and estate,"<sup>16</sup> while Jefferson



substituted the term "pursuit of happiness" for estate. By this all-inclusive term Jefferson included whatever man found necessary for his well-being, social welfare, and economic needs.

In the event that these rights were denied, man was free to re-create, abolish, modify, or alter his form of government, reconstructing it in whatever fashion he deemed necessary to protect these rights. Indeed, it was not even necessary that the government had, in fact, violated these rights; merely that the people believed they had been so violated.<sup>17</sup>

Thus, whatever cause promotes the desires of the people for their well-being can claim the blessings of the American Declaration of Independence. It matters not that the cause bears little resemblance to the causes of the American Revolution so long as its principles are based on individual welfare and it has the support of the people. Whether the cause be to obtain a voice in colonial tax policies, or to obtain equal representation in legislative bodies, as in our revolution, or to carry out land reform, obtain social justice, or to redistribute resources, as in modern movements, the principle of upholding the natural rights of man is the same. The Jacobin excesses of the French Revolution a few years later shocked many of those who led the American Revolution, but Jefferson was one of the first to favor recognition of the new government despite its excesses, because its principles, if not its practices, were in sympathy with our own revolution.<sup>18</sup>

The United States must remember, even though behind the noble and idealistic causes advanced by insurgents today often lurks the spectre of aggressive communism or unscrupulous domestic leadership which is quick to betray the revolution after victory, that we have left a legacy of revolution to the world. To use Jefferson as an example again, in his writings he stated the belief that the occasional threat of rebellion was a beneficial thing, in that it kept the government aware of this power of the people.<sup>19</sup> He and his fellow American revolutionists have left us a

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heritage of support for those who take up arms against authority to promote the rights of man.

An insurgent movement is born in and thrives upon instability. Since the success of an insurgency is vitally dependent upon popular support, the insurgent must either create or exploit whatever unstable factors lead to popular discontent with the incumbent government. While all governments share some degree of instability, since there is always some element in opposition to the current regime, a favorable climate for an insurgent movement exists whenever that opposition is able to mobilize substantial popular support, and the government continues to be unresponsive. If the nation also has a history of political violence, or if the government's legitimacy can be questioned, or if there are sizable areas beyond the effective control of the central government because of terrain or poor communication and transportation facilities, the insurgent's prospects are further improved. Since an insurgency is so profoundly affected by instabilities such as these and others, any attempt to analyze current insurgent campaigns must begin with an analysis of the major instabilities prevalent in the world today.

The relatively stable prewar order was permanently shattered by the Second World War. When the guns of that conflict were finally silenced, only the United States and the Soviet Union retained the power to exert global influence. All of the other Great Powers had either suffered total military defeat, or had found the price of victory to be an intolerable strain on their economic and military resources. As a result, a power vacuum was created throughout much of the world at the very time that a reaction against being swept along in the tide of history by the now moribund Great Powers was making itself felt. As might have been expected, the first areas to succumb to this popular desire to alter the status quo were the colonial empires, since they suffered from the dual political instabilities of being nonrepresentative governments and under alien control. Some of the colonial powers have attempted to grant some

degree of autonomy to their possessions, notably the British through their policy of "indirect rule," but, ironically, these steps have had the effect of contributing to the downfall of foreign rule by creating the intellectual native class which assumes the leadership of most independence movements. The Asiatic colonies were subjected to the further instability of the destruction of their existing social and political structure during the Japanese occupation following that country's early victories of World War II.<sup>20</sup> The shortsighted Allied policy of support of clandestine resistance movements in these areas, with little regard for the ultimate political aspirations of the leadership of these movements, created the core around which several of the postwar insurgencies were formed. The Philippines, Malaya, Indochina, and even such Western nations as Greece and to some extent France were to suffer from internal disorder led by groups which looked upon the defeat of the Axis as merely a step along the way on the road to power. Perhaps the classic case which illustrates the effect of these colonial instabilities arising out of the war occurred in Indochina where the French spent nine years, suffering over 172,000 military casualties,<sup>21</sup> in a vain attempt to restore their power.

However, colonies are not the only form of government to be plagued by political instability. Latin America, despite well over a century of political independence, continues to be wracked by internal disorder, and many of the former colonies discovered that independence creates new instabilities as the unifying force of opposition to foreign rule fragments into numerous competing factions, each seeking to maximize its power in the new government. When a native regime is unable or unwilling to carry out the promises which gained it support, popular discontent can often be aroused against it with the very slogans that first brought it to power. This is particularly true of weak, "popular front" coalition governments which depend upon a delicate blend of various, and often competitive, interests and ideologies to maintain unity. If such a government can be hamstrung

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by internal interest groups, or be convicted of being corrupt and graft-ridden, or if it loses popular support, it becomes a prime target for insurgency. A vivid demonstration of how unstable such a government actually is was provided by events in the Congo following the Belgian withdrawal in 1960. An index of the incredible weakness of that unfortunate nation is available in the reliable estimate that there were only 16 native college graduates in a population of over 13 million when the republic was proclaimed.<sup>22</sup>

Another unstable political form, also nonrepresentative, is the dictatorship or rule by junta. The army, since it is usually the only organized force in underdeveloped areas,<sup>23</sup> is frequently in the forefront of such power grabs; indeed it has been said that the pinnacle of a successful Latin American military career is the presidency of the republic.<sup>24</sup> There is hardly a nation of Latin America that has not experienced this illegal or extralegal rule, despite constitutional guarantees of representative democracy, and they all share a history of frequent so-called revolutions which were nothing more than power struggles between small elite groups without noticeably altering the political, social, or economic structure of the country. The emergency of new "strong men" in Africa and Asia seems to indicate that this trend, complete with military involvement in internal affairs, is repeating itself in these areas as well. Although some weak, ineffective, token opposition parties are sometimes permitted to exist under this form of government, its greatest instability is a result of the complete stifling of all views contrary to that of the ruling party. There is even a growing tendency to dispense with a sham multiparty system, and such influential Africans as Julius Nyerere<sup>25</sup> of Tanganyika and Modibo Keita<sup>26</sup> of Mali have openly espoused single-party government as a solution to that continent's ills. One result of this dominance of a single party is "cultism," the overemphasis of the personality of the national leader. This may take the form of lofty titles, such as Franco's "El Caudillo," or Nkrumah's "The Redeemer," or Castro's "The Maximum Leader," or

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may even approach near idolatry such as the current emphasis of "Maoism" in Communist China. Whatever the form, it presents tremendous difficulties to any successor government in maintaining stability following the death or deposition of such a ruler. The *Peronistas* still represent a major threat to the stability of Argentina despite the fact that Peron has been out of office since 1955, and the new governments of Ghana and Indonesia (both, incidently, dependent upon army support) must carefully destroy the images of Nkrumah and Sukarno respectively to avoid similar difficulties.

While political instability is a major threat to many governments today, it is often only a byproduct of two other basic instabilities: social and economic. Some colonies, some dictatorships, and even some weak coalitions have survived insurgencies by either suppressing or satisfying the social and economic inequalities which provide insurgents their popular support. With the previously docile, impoverished masses now demanding at least a minimum acceptable way of life, it can be expected that insurgents will continue to find substantial support in those areas where these popular desires are not realized.

The basic economic instabilities are a product of stagnant economy challenged by a mushrooming population growth.<sup>27</sup> Per capita income is unbelievably low in the agrarian, emerging nations, and, because of population trends, the economies of these areas must advance at a rapid pace merely to maintain these low standards. The vast majority of the people of these regions are unskilled, unpropertied, and faced with slim prospects of economic advancement. At the other end of the national economic scale is a small, affluent elite which either operates or controls the machinery of government. The lack of a native industry precludes the existence of an influential middle class of artisans, merchants, and professionals which could challenge the power of the ruling minority or provide leadership to the underprivileged majority. Whatever intellectual class exists desires the creation of a modern, industrial state as a solution to

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the economic woes of the nation, but it is strongly opposed by the power groups who view this step, correctly, as a threat to their control, established as it is on a plantation-type agriculture and an alliance with foreign industrialists.<sup>28</sup> Another difficulty faced by the modernizers is the lack of a skilled native labor pool and a scarcity of capital. Almost all the tools of production, including capital, must be imported. This in turn leads to an unfavorable trade balance which makes these areas the debtor nations of the world market. For example, the coffee crop accounts for from 50 to 80 per cent of the exports of Brazil, El Salvador, and Columbia.<sup>29</sup> But whether the economy is based upon agricultural products, such as coffee, rice, sugar, or rubber, or upon raw materials such as oil or minerals, the results are the same. The national economy fluctuates with the prices of these commodities in international trade, and imports far exceed exports. The "Age of Colonialism" has largely passed, but its effects are perpetuated by the "Age of Neocolonialism" which still looks upon these areas, despite their political independence, as sources of raw materials and as markets for the manufactured goods of the industrial states.<sup>30</sup>

Several other instabilities in the economic field bear mention. A plantation-type agriculture depends upon an unequal distribution of land resources and creates a large class of landless tenant peasants around which an insurgent movement can be created. Also, a money-crop agriculture is a poor base upon which to build an industrial state in that it does not produce the foodstuffs necessary to support an industrial society. Both the Soviet Union and Communist China paid a heavy price for overemphasizing industry over agriculture during their modernization campaigns,<sup>31</sup> and there are few governments strong enough to resist the popular pressure certain to arise if wholesale deprivation and famine even remotely resembling the Communist examples are encountered. Another unstable condition is the tendency towards the "Balkanization" of the former colonial empires, particularly in Africa.<sup>32</sup> The creation of a host of small

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nations, having no prospect of ever achieving a viable economy, only creates chronic economic problems. The British decision to grant independence to Basutoland, a small black enclave totally surrounded by the Union of South Africa and doomed to economic dependence by a lack of every basic resource, is the most recent manifestation of this trend.

One final form of economic instability, which is a product rather than a cause of insurgency, is caused by underground economic warfare. The mere existence of an active insurgent movement in a nation has the effect of driving foreign capital out of the country and depriving the government of this needed finance. The national economy can be further weakened by depriving the government of tax revenues in areas under insurgent control and actual warfare against the capital-producing elements of the country. Castro's campaign of destruction of the sugar crops during the struggle against Batista and the current Cuban-directed sabotage in the Venezuelan oil fields are two recent examples of this policy.

The Charter of the Alliance for Progress, drafted for Latin America in 1961 but applicable to all the underdeveloped areas of the world, provides a hint of the instabilities which exist by listing what steps must be taken to promote a bright economic future. Among other things, it stresses the need for, as a minimum guideline, an annual 2.5 per cent rate of growth of per capita income, "a more equitable distribution of national income," the institution of "programs of comprehensive agrarian reform," and the acceleration of "the process of national industrialization."<sup>33</sup> Until these steps are taken an insurgent will be able to exploit a population that is poorly housed, fed, and clothed, plagued by inflation, and without hope other than armed revolt.

However, economic growth will have little prospect for success unless it is combined with improvements in the internal relationships between segments of the population. Here again, sociological instabilities may take various forms. One of the most subtle

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is, ironically, a product of economic advancement. The creation of a new middle class, in itself a healthy outgrowth of the transformation of an agrarian to an industrial society, can lead to a class struggle when the reactionary ruling class opposes the rising power of this new group. The middle class thus mobilizes the latent power of the underprivileged masses, not for what it can gain for these unfortunates, but for the effect that the struggle will have in the power of the aristocracy.<sup>34</sup> Thus, it is not surprising that the leadership of most revolutionary movements "from below" is provided by this new social class.

In addition to this class strife, and sometimes superimposed upon it, is the instability caused by the existence of significant social, ethnic, or linguistic groupings which do not identify themselves with the central government or are at odds with each other. The activities of the "Overseas Chinese" have played a fundamental role in the internal instability of several Asian nations. The Maylan Insurgency, put down with tremendous difficulty, was almost totally directed by a Chinese minority within the country.<sup>35</sup> In Africa, traditional tribal differences are a prime cause of discord in several nations. Nigeria, once considered the brightest hope for democracy in Black Africa, has been torn by sectionalism which has led to the assassination of one prime minister last January and the kidnapping and probable murder of his successor during an army revolt last July.<sup>36</sup> In Kenya, hostilities between the Masai and Kikuyu tribes create a constant threat of civil war in that country.<sup>37</sup> Since tribal allegiances are still, for the most part, stronger than national loyalty in Sub-Sahara Africa, it can be expected that they will continue to impair stability in that region. The racial hostility in Rhodesia, the attempts of Indian minorities to carve out separate linguistic states in that subcontinent, and the struggle between Hindu and Moslem over Kashmir are just a few further manifestations of this debilitating form of instability.



Finally, there are the classic social evils which have existed in Latin America, Asia, and Africa for decades and which have been largely ignored by the governments of these areas. Illiteracy and the lack of educational opportunities, disease and the lack of adequate social welfare programs, and injustice and the denial of individual human dignity will continue to thwart the ambitions of the underdeveloped nations and promote insurgent-producing instabilities until an adequate program of social reform can be carried out.

Perhaps the most difficult instabilities to assess are those which exist in men's minds. A French authority, Colonel Gabriel Bonnet, has presented an oversimplified but enlightening formula for a successful insurgency:  $RW = G + P$ .<sup>38</sup> The formula, simply stated, presents the hypothesis that revolutionary warfare (RW) is a combination of conventional guerrilla tactics (G) and psychological action (P). One of the most powerful types of psychological action which an insurgent may employ is a calculated campaign of restricted terrorism. Terrorism itself is a double-edged weapon; indiscriminate tactics against an entire population, if carried out indefinitely, can have the effect of turning the people against the insurgents. However, if the targets are carefully selected, such a policy can reap tremendous success. General Grivas, the leader of the independence movement in Cyprus, achieved his goals almost entirely through a program of assassination and ambush directed against police and British military units.<sup>39</sup> In Palestine, the *Ingun* and *Stern* groups executed similar tactics, although excesses such as the murder of Lord Moyne, the British Minister of State for the Middle East, aroused revulsion among even ardent Zionists.<sup>40</sup> The Viet Cong campaign against the village chiefs and minor government officials in South Vietnam, which has resulted in an estimated 13,000 slayings through 1963,<sup>41</sup> is the most recent example of such a calculated, insurgent-inspired terrorist assault. A terrorist campaign, in addition to diverting a disproportionate share of government resources and manpower from other forms of counterinsurgency, also has the

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effect of destroying the confidence of the people in the government.

Another vital psychological factor which introduces internal instability is caused by the export of ideologies across national boundaries. The current policy of using partition as an instrument of arbitration, which has made certain parallels of latitude a part of modern political terminology, has proven to be psychologically unstable to the populations of the affected areas from the time of the Irish settlement following World War I down to the present difficulties involving North and South Vietnam. National desires to regain lost, or supposedly lost, territories, demonstrated by Arab hostility against Israel or Indonesian ambitions towards Malayasia, create another form of this type of instability which can be used to promote insurgencies. Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism, despite fundamental differences among the spokesmen for each cause, are still powerful motivations among the populations of Africa and the Middle East.

However, the most powerful of these instability-creating ideologies remains militant communism. The Chinese, abandoning the "peaceful coexistence" policy which followed the 1955 Bandung Conference, have been particularly active in promoting revolutionary ideals in the underdeveloped world. Believing that they have evolved a particularly effective form of communism for these areas, based upon the peasantry rather than the working class, the Chinese Communists have announced their overt support of all revolutions directed against what they consider reactionary governments. Included in this Chinese definition of "reactionary" are those governments which have already won political independence under "bourgeois national leadership."<sup>42</sup> The current Chinese-Soviet rift is due in large measure to the Soviet belief that this blanket endorsement of all revolutionaries does the Communist cause more harm than good and, since the death of Stalin, the Soviets have generally avoided direct involvement in insurgent movements. However, while the Soviets become less active in this field,

the Chinese have been joined by an extremely vocal ally in the field of exporting revolutions since the establishment of an announced Communist regime in Cuba. Cuban Communists have been in the forefront of most insurgent assaults on Latin American governments, and it can be expected that Castro's attempts to spread his particular brand of revolution will continue to impair stability in this hemisphere.

Unless a counterinsurgent program is able to cope with all these instabilities--political, economic, sociological, and psychological--it will be doomed to failure. Treating an insurgent threat as merely a military problem, albeit one requiring unusual tactics and organization, is a pitifully inadequate response to the problem. An insurgency can only be overcome by destroying its popular support. To destroy this support a government must actually accede to those parts of the insurgent program which reflect the desires of the people. The insurgents in Venezuela have suffered serious setbacks, not because of substantial military defeats, but because, as one unidentified insurgent leader speaking of the government put it to an American newspaperman recently, "They stole our revolution."<sup>43</sup> The revolution was stolen through a successful program of economic betterment for the masses, just as the Huks revolution was "stolen" once the Philippine Government instituted an effective land reform program. Once the British announced a date for Malayan independence, they "stole" a large part of the cause of the MRLA. If a government can offer its inhabitants a peaceful, prosperous way of life in accordance with the reasonable demands of the people, an insurgent will not find the instabilities so vital to his success. "The nation is the target of the guerrilla; it must be the target of the counter guerrilla as well."<sup>44</sup>

FOOTNOTES

1. Cyril Black and Thomas P. Thornton, eds., et. al., *Communism and Revolution* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, N.J., 1964), p. 10.
2. Tad Szulac, *The Winds of Revolution* (Praeger: New York, 1965), p. 54.
3. Bernard Fall, *The Two Viet-Nams* (Praeger: New York, 1964), p. 308.
4. John A. Kautsky, ed., *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries* (Wiley: New York, 1962), p. 130 f.
5. Thomas P. Thornton, quoted in Black and Thornton, p. 258.
6. Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea* (Lyle Stuart: New York, 1965), p. 185.
7. James M. Daniels, quoted in Black and Thornton, p. 358.
8. Ernesto "Che" Guevara, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (Praeger: New York, 1961), p. 5.
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10. Szulac, p. 6.
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