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**THE GUERRILLA
AND HIS WORLD:
Psychological
Aspects of
Guerrilla Warfare**

Photograph by the author shows a political officer of the Vietminh 308th Division taken on the day Hanoi was occupied.

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INTRODUCTION

In this age of nuclear power, advanced research, and mathematical models there has been a gradual depersonalization of warfare. It is easier and cleaner to work with figures than with a bayonet and to be once removed from the ugliness of physical combat by the clicking of a computer solution.

In an era of nuclear standoff, well-developed, modern societies tend to forget the basic realities of war and to underestimate the human and psychological factors involved.

This has often been the case in approaching the problems of guerrilla

warfare. Gaps in knowledge and understanding have too often been filled with complicated theory and a search for punchcard answers.

Attempts have been made to evaluate the guerrilla as a solid physical factor, a numerical digit to be balanced with force levels, weapons capabilities, and slightly revised classic military doctrines. Such evaluations are seldom adequate to measure guerrilla actions which often defy both logic and analysis.

The individual guerrilla may operate in a relatively limited area with a simply defined task, utilizing comparatively basic weapons. He is often isolated and

alone, with a minimum of logistic support, medical facilities, and leadership. To do his job the guerrilla must rely on a considerable amount of determination. This determination is strongly influenced by psychological factors.

Psychological factors are also important in studying the role of the counter-guerrilla. Seemingly secure in the knowledge that he has superior weaponry and adequate support in his favor, the counter-guerrilla is often surprised at the unpredictable quality of guerrilla fighting, depressed by its indecisiveness, and shocked at its bloody personal cost. Such a state of mind can delay, disrupt, and even destroy a counter-guerrilla campaign.

The guerrilla's world, with its emphasis on the individual, his motivation, morale, and physical endurance is a demanding environment. A French commando officer operating with a guerrilla force in the isolated mountains in northern Laos once described his work to the writer as "a very lonely job."

This paper is an examination of the psychological aspects of this "lonely job" covering both the guerrilla and those who fight him.

I-THE GUERRILLA AND HIS WORLD

The guerrilla should come from the area in which he will fight. This will give him personal contacts, terrain knowledge, local acclimatization and a sense of fighting for his own area.

--Ernesto Guevara¹

The Individual. The term "guerrilla" projects a certain image. The most common is that of a tough, resourceful fighter moving with fluid ease through his zone of operations, inflicting losses, and sowing fear and uneasiness in the heart of his enemy.

This superficial conception is often confused with that of the commando, so thoroughly romanticized during World War II. Add to this the usual Western predilection for the underdog,

the tradition of the Robin Hood "outs" against the "ins," and one begins to see why there is continued misunderstanding of the term "guerrilla" and a lack of insight as to what human ingredients go into the making of the individual involved in guerrilla warfare.

It is unrealistic to think of the guerrilla only as a bandoleer-hung, bearded ruffian or as the starry-eyed militiaman on a Chinese Communist poster. The guerrilla can be an emaciated Meo tribal leader suffering from tuberculosis who has just killed two Viet Cong porters with a Swedish K submachine gun; a teenage Algerian girl calmly placing a package of high explosives on the terrace of a crowded cafe, or a portly, well-dressed banker from Central America drawing money from a numbered Swiss account to buy arms.

The Meo is personally involved and motivated, because he hates the Vietnamese. He has no interest in politics. The fact that they are called Viet Cong has little bearing on his action. He wants only to keep the Vietnamese, any Vietnamese, out of his territory, because they have been a source of trouble and domination to his people for many years.

The Algerian teenager is risking her life, and taking the lives of others, for an ideal. The ideal was planted in her mind by French schoolteachers expounding on Rousseau. It was reinforced by youth's natural tendency to revolt and brought into action by the requirements of a militant nationalist movement.

The Central American banker is also risking his life, and the new automatic rifles his money will buy are to take the lives of others. But he is moved by realism and ambition. He has decided that the success of the revolution in his country is inevitable. He plans to be the Minister of Finance in the new regime.

All of these people have one thing in common. They are actively participating in guerrilla warfare and, because of the

nature of this type of struggle, each of them is filling an important role.

In few other forms of war does the success or failure of a movement, an ideal, or a military operation depend to so great a degree on the actions of the individual or small group of individuals involved.

The guerrilla can seldom depend on immediate support if he falters or a second chance if he fails. He is not inspired by supporting aircraft overhead or reassured by divisions to his rear or armor on his flanks.

His world is a tight, personal circle within which he fights or runs, wins or loses, dies or survives. Existence within this circle is often determined by the individual's psychological conditioning. This conditioning begins with environment.

The Environment. Environment is a distillation of many factors: geography; economic conditions; political atmosphere; ethnic factors; religion; cultural trends, and the first impressions registered in a child's brain added to an adult's life experience. Environment is also a changing quantity continually affected by new and unforeseen developments.

To survive, guerrillas must be flexible and ready to adapt quickly to meet these new situations. Mao Tse-tung, Vo-nguyen-Giap, the late Che Guevara, and many before them have written sound guerrilla doctrine, but the guerrilla who ties himself to a manual of procedure tends to force the application of these rules into his own environmental situation, a tendency that can lead to disaster.

Clausewitz felt that a people's war, an uprising of the population, could not be kept alive in an atmosphere "too thick with danger" and suggested that the centers of such an operation, like flames, be "at remote points where it has air, and where it cannot be extinguished by one great blow."²

This principle has been followed for many years, with considerable success, by guerrilla movements. Isolated mountains, inaccessible swamps, deep forest, and heavy jungle have provided operating bases for generations of guerrilla fighters.

The Greek resistance high in the mountains, the Italian partisan in the marshes of the Po, the Soviet partisan in the pine forests, and the Viet Cong in the jungle of the Central Highlands have all shared this legacy. And yet, this basic, practical rule must and can be changed if the situation demands it.

In Algeria the National Liberation Front (FLN), fighting in the mountains and djebels of the countryside against a well-equipped, mobile foe, found that many people in Algeria and abroad were unaware of their actions and occasional victories due to their isolation and a stiff French press censorship.

Abane Ramdane, an FLN leader later assassinated in Morocco by his compatriots, ordered a shift of operations from the isolation of the countryside to the concentration and exposure of the city.

"Is it better for our cause," he asked in one of his directives, "to kill ten of the enemy in the countryside of Telerghma, where no one will speak of it, or one in Algiers that will be mentioned the next day in the American press?"³

This logic forced the FLN to open a second front, using terrorism as its tool, in the principal cities of Algeria. This move, with its sensational and violent results making headlines in France and throughout the world, had much to do with the outcome of the Algerian conflict.

The change of environment and the readjustments it called for on the part of the individual guerrilla had far-reaching psychological repercussions both within the FLN and among the French officers and men trying to stamp out the revolt.

Within the organization, those who

disapproved of the new methods or lacked the ability to operate in a tight urban environment were removed. In the French Army a psychological-political struggle developed over the brutal measures used to fight the urban terrorists. This dispute had considerable negative effect on the army's morale, its prestige, and its place in modern French society.

The Soviets closely relate the regular soldier's psychological outlook to his environment. Col. M. Korobeinikov, a military psychiatrist, states . . . all the soldier's psyche, his whole inner world, is the result of the reflection of his brain, of the circumstances of his life, all his life experiences, the socio-historical conditions of his living, schooling, work and service . . .²⁴

This is as true for the guerrilla as it is for the regular, but the guerrilla must often draw far more on the elements of his environment to carry out his task.

Requirements. The ideal requirements for a man to perform successfully as a guerrilla are: commitment, determination, courage, basic intelligence, and physical stamina. Any man possessing all of these attributes in an equally high proportion is a rare being. But the total lack of one or more of these requirements can be seriously detrimental to the individual and his organization.

The regular soldier also performs according to a specific set of requirements. His morale climbs or falls, and his offensive spirit fluctuates depending on his psychological outlook. But the regular normally operates within the well-fed, well-armed community of his platoon, company, or battalion knowing that support of all kinds is close at hand. This military community forms a psychologically protective cushion within which he can march, fight, retreat, or advance without making important personal decisions.

The ideal guerrilla must be com-

mitted to his cause. Fascist, Communist, Democrat, or Royalist, he must feel he is right and that the sacrifices he and his comrades are making are justified.

Ranges of Motivation. The motivation of a guerrilla fighter can be varied and highly complicated. In World War II the Soviet High Command found that the age-old emotional patriotism of the Russian people far outweighed all forms of political indoctrination in providing motivation to the partisan movement.

The protection of Mother Russia became the rallying cry, and Red Army political officers, swallowing their distaste, glorified the Czarist military heroes of previous defensive wars.

Prior to modern communications, fast media diffusion, and sophisticated propaganda techniques, pure hatred of the enemy was often the prime motivating force. In the bloody peninsular campaigns against Napoleon the Spanish guerrilla leaders often found willing recruits among peasants whose sole desire it was to kill Frenchmen and revenge the rape, torture, and slaughter of family, relatives, and friends.

Today, nationalism and the desire for political independence have formed a dual motivating principle upon which many guerrilla movements have built their strength. In Communist-led movements these two factors have delivered the human raw material to the political indoctrination mill.

Social injustice, overdue land reform, government inefficiency, police brutality, traditional resentment of authority—all of these can provide supplementary cause for revolt and insurrection. Combined with political, ethnic, and cultural factors they soon find a practical and dynamic expression through guerrilla warfare.

The individual often has additional personal reasons for participation. One man may be in a guerrilla group because of a burning political idealism; another may be there only because he has had

no choice in the matter. One partisan may be nursing a secret ambition to profit from the inevitable opportunity to plunder, while another may have found his true calling and psychological fulfillment in the violence and adventure of guerrilla fighting.

Strengths and Weaknesses. All of these motivating factors help to estimate or better understand the strengths and weaknesses of a guerrilla movement. Here again the human factor contributes its balance of uncertainty.

A guerrilla unit in Western Europe may, on the surface, have all the obvious attributes to carry out a successful operation: personal intelligence, commitment to a cause, and determination. But, because the unit's members are highly sophisticated, the range and variation of motivation may be so great that it becomes a negative factor, delaying decision, causing dispute, and forcing the unit's leader to spend much of his time as an arbiter.

In Asia, Africa, and South America the motivation of the individuals in a guerrilla unit, although sincere, may be a relatively uncomplicated process with few intellectual detours. In Asia it may be based on hard, well-organized revolutionary doctrine; in Africa, on emotionalism and tribal tradition; in South America, on a search for social justice interwoven with Hispano-Indian romanticism.

The psychological strength of a guerrilla unit depends to a great extent on certain physical advantages shared by its members. Too often what are considered weaknesses of the guerrilla by the traditional military expert become, in reality, sources of strength. A report evaluating a guerrilla unit's lack of heavy weapons, transport, boots, and uniforms as a sign of weakness ignores one of the prime psychological and tactical assets of the guerrilla—his free-wheeling mobility, his quality of "lightness."

Obviously, the guerrilla who finds himself trapped in a narrow valley surrounded by regular forces would wish for heavy weapons and the added protection of a steel helmet. The fact that he does not have them could undercut his morale and produce a psychological weakness. In such a situation, however, barring escape through the enemy encirclement, this guerrilla has ceased being a guerrilla. His war, his effectiveness, his *raison d'être* ended the moment he allowed himself to be trapped.

Most guerrilla actions require that a maximum amount of automatic fire be directed on a target in the least possible amount of time. Recoilless rifles, mortars, demolition equipment, and field radios are usually the heaviest material in the guerrilla inventory, and these are often unavailable to small units.

The average guerrilla, armed with a light automatic weapon, a minimum amount of ammunition, unencumbered with uniform, helmet, pack, or equipment and able to live off the land, usually profits from a psychological lift.

He can see his enemy roadbound or strung out in heavily burdened columns along difficult trails while he moves easily through the jungle. He sees the threatening mobility of the helicopter nullified by the overloaded regulars who stagger and stumble from under the rotors carrying heatstroke with their helmets and exhaustion with their packs.

In action he is reassured by his ability to move fast. He is often in a secondary position before enemy fire begins to search his first. In withdrawal he knows he can count on a safety margin of time before the ponderous enemy machine can gather itself together coherently to give chase. Even the simple movements of combat, crawling, crouching, and running are easy for the lightly equipped guerrilla while his burdened opponent finds it a considerable effort to rise from the ground or even to bring his weapon into a good

16 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

firing position.

The positive psychological lift afforded by this guerrilla "lightness" is infectious. Some of the best and most effective counterguerrilla forces have felt its benefits. The British Ferret Force in Malaya and the French Commando d'Indochine became more efficient as they became light and unorthodox, and their high morale reflected the psychological advantage this change produced.

It is essential to think of the guerrilla as a person to better understand his strengths and weaknesses. The human being of flesh and bone in his envelope of vulnerable skin reacts in various ways to thousands of physical influences, threats, and promises. The thermostat controlling these reactions is the mind. The technician who adjusts this thermostat is the political officer.

II--GUERRILLA METHODS AND THE MIND

A good political officer is a great help to a commander, while one who does not recognize his position is a corresponding source of anxiety and trouble.

-Col. W. C. G. Heneker¹
West African Campaign 1874

The Political Officer. Historically, the role of the political officer in normal military organizations has been ill defined and tenuous. Military leaders have often resented the presence of such official envoys and done their utmost to ignore them. This is understandable considering that many noblemen performing such a function in the 15th and 16th centuries were merely spies for their sovereign sent to report on the performance of his generals and see that the spoils of battle found their way to the Royal Treasury.

During the Napoleonic wars the equivalent of political officers was used to keep track of the non-French regiments fighting for the Empire, reporting

on their morale, fighting spirit, and the loyalty of their commanders.

Political officers were attached to British and French colonial expeditions in Africa, the Near East, and Asia. They were to assist commanders in dealing with local rulers and populations and to see that the goal of the expedition was not lost in an excess of military glory hunting. Many a general breathed a sigh of relief when he could leave his political officer behind to administer a newly pacified territory.

These forerunners of the modern political officer were seldom concerned with the individual soldier and his indoctrination. Napoleon felt that an army is a crowd which obeys. Morale problems could usually be dealt with by an appeal to the emotions: a horseback exhortation by a revered general; rewards in the form of decorations, citations, or an additional ration of brandy. If these failed there was always punishment.

Political evolution and revolution have changed this. Political theory has seeped down to the individual soldier. The revolt of entire frontline units during World War I sent a shock through the French Army. Firing squads crushed the revolt, but the romantic picture of the self-effacing, patriotic "poilu" asking only to be sent into the mouths of enemy guns was smashed forever, and the High Command was forced to insert political factors into its evaluation of troop morale.

The Chinese Nationalist soldier who deserted to the Communists in 1948 to save his own skin was, for the first time in his life, lectured on what he was fighting for and why.

He also found that his new officers actually explained their planned tactical moves. This was heady wine for a peasant soldier whose previous experience with officers had been limited to moving their luggage and receiving punishment.

Today, if the political officer or his

equivalent is a constant recognized factor in many military organizations, it is largely due to his coming of age in guerrilla movements where his function has proved indispensable to success.

From the caves of Yenan to the hills of North Korea the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of Communist China has depended on the political officer or cadre as a yeast in their leavening of purpose.

The footsore intellectual trying to lecture guerrilla bands on the complicated theory of politics has been replaced by the hardened, professional propaganda expert whose role in the PLA has grown to the point where he is burdened with specific tasks.

He is responsible not only for morale, political indoctrination, and propaganda but he must also arrange for assistance to soldiers' families; process leave, furlough, and marriage applications; allocate blame, praise, reward, or punishment; regulate relations between unit members and the civilian population; observe closely the behavior of military leaders toward their men and even their conduct of military affairs.²

This is a complex assignment for one officer no matter how dedicated or fanatic he may be. To make their task easier, the PLA political officers have evolved a system that automatically enlists the common soldier as an assistant.

Under the "morale informants system," appointed leaders within the squad—usually party members—are made responsible for daily reports on bad morale or any stubborn attitude shown by their comrades. This spiderweb network of informants facilitates the political officer's work. It also provides him with the mechanics to evaluate the soldier's psychological reaction to political and military situations and events.

A Westerner would consider this spying or informing. Care should be taken, however, not to expect such a negative reaction on the part of the

Chinese soldier. Political indoctrination emphasizing the constant threat to the unit and the nation from "reactionary elements" and the atmosphere of mutual political responsibility in the PLA facilitates the acceptability of such a system.

Despite this constant indoctrination the individual still reflects a certain amount of human independence, and the PLA political officer divides his wards into beets-red through and through, the true party members—and radishes-red on the outside only, those who lack party commitment.³

Although the PLA's political methods were developed in a time of guerrilla operations, it is now a well-established regular army and should not be taken as representative of a normal guerrilla fighting force.

In Malaya the Communist-supported guerrillas of the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) recognized the importance of political indoctrination from the very beginning of their revolt. Forced to fight in small units and under constant danger of infiltration by agents of the Colonial Police of British Intelligence, the MRLA saw to it that its political officers were equal or, in some cases, senior to their military commanders.

In Vietnam the political officer or cadre has been the backbone of the revolution. During the period prior to World War II, anti-French political groups with varying loyalties carried on a clandestine fight for leadership in the struggle for eventual independence.

Western political doctrines blended with traditional Asian intrigue to make French Indochina a perfect operating terrain for the professional paramilitary cadre. Violence, corruption, sellouts, double and triple agents, official and unofficial "special" operations built an atmosphere within which only the hard, clever professional survived.

Ho Chi Minh's agents and the French intelligence services recruited their own

18 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

cadres from these professionals. A mutual appreciation of the political cadre's importance instigated a war in the shadows as important and crucial as the field operations of the Indochina war.

Following the Geneva Accords the well-trained, covert political cadre left behind in South Vietnam became the artisans of the National Liberation Front's control apparatus. Today they, and their assistants, continue their training and indoctrination work throughout the South. At the district level approximately 50 percent of their study program is devoted to political subjects. At the village level political subjects take approximately 70 percent of the total training time, leaving only 30 percent for military instruction.

An important aspect of the Viet Cong political officer's work is the maintenance of fighting spirit among guerrilla units, particularly those isolated from base areas or under continual harassment by the enemy.

The political officer's harangue prior to an action has become a standard procedure both with the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. Generally, this proaction warmup is modeled on the Chinese Communist method, going so far as to require signed pledges promising death to the enemy, continued faith in the party, and requesting punishment in the event of failure.

The most effective political officers weave references to international events, local developments, and the enemy's alleged cowardice or brutality into their exhortations. The message is often presented in a traditional style or as a modern-day version of some ancient Vietnamese legend.

The famous commando Vandenberghe, who spread fear and insecurity deep into Vietnam territory during the Indochina war, made it a practice of seeking out these open-air exhortation meetings of the enemy. This elite group would then hold their fire until the

political officer rose and exposed his identity by going into his harangue. The first burst of fire was designed to silence him forever.

Guerrilla Morale. Morale is the special domain of the political officer. He must understand the men of a guerrilla unit thoroughly and know them well enough to detect individual infections of depression, fear, or fatigue and treat them before they spread to others.

Isolation can be a serious problem for guerrilla morale. A man cut off from the outside world, his family, and friends reacts differently to pain, suffering, and sickness. Political ideology must be firmly buttressed by discipline if it is to survive intact through a particularly trying situation.

The forced inaction of a guerrilla group can lead to lethargy and second thoughts, particularly if the food is low and the wounded are suffering from a lack of medicine and professional care. At such times the political officer is extremely active. He must redefine purpose, do his utmost to occupy the time of his men, and exert a strong control over unit discipline.

The antidotes for poor morale vary depending on who the guerrillas are and where they are operating, but "togetherness" seems to be a common denominator. The isolated unit draws in on itself and seeks strength from each of its members. This procedure can be compared to a form of group therapy. Self-criticism sessions, group singing, laudatory speeches, and ridicule of the enemy are stock tools of the Communist political officer for improving unit morale.

If these fail he turns to discipline and picks the weakest link of the unit as the subject for its application. The malingerer, the whiner, the troublemaker is singled out and made the focal point of criticism. This gives the unit an object toward which they can direct their frustration. The political officer pre-

sents them with a target for hate, a scapegoat, and buys precious time while disposing of a troublesome element.

Guerrilla units throughout the world seem to agree on one general rule of morale: the importance of a doctor's presence or of someone who can act as a doctor with any degree of competence. The sick and wounded can be the Achilles heel of a guerrilla unit. In very few instances can they be evacuated to hospitals or recuperate in situations of minimum comfort and care. They hamper the unit's mobility and drain its resources.

For the political officer they present an even greater problem. Their presence is a serious morale depressant. No one likes to see a man die, particularly a friend. This ordeal is compounded with the knowledge that the medical care that could save a life is being denied for operational reasons.

In addition to the sight and sound of suffering and the odors of infection, the individual guerrilla is exposed to the constant thought that he may soon be wounded and lying on the same makeshift litter with little hope of proper care or the needed drugs.

A badly wounded regular whisked away by a medical evacuation helicopter soon becomes a faint memory to his fellow soldiers. A badly wounded guerrilla becomes the mirror of one's own death in the tight community of a guerrilla unit.

Alexander Orlov, a former high official of Soviet intelligence and instructor in the NKVD schools, emphasizes the importance of a physician's presence with guerrilla bands and bluntly states that if a doctor cannot be persuaded to join the guerrillas he must be drafted against his will.⁴

Such forced drafts took place in Europe during World War II when resistance groups were operating from isolated areas. In Viet Cong units shortages of doctors are often remedied with the assignment of trained pharmacists who

perform the task of a physician to the best of their ability. Even the assignment of a competent first aid man can be considered a morale plus to a guerrilla unit, and a small consignment of modern drugs can be worth more than an issue of new weapons.⁵

Another morale problem faced by irregular troops is that of national identity and purpose. Guerrillas may fight alone in an isolated region, but they must know that others are aware of their actions and that these actions are part of an overall plan or national effort. This is particularly important if guerrillas are working in conjunction with a regular army or fighting far from the classic front in the rear of the enemy.

Poor communications and liaison, infrequent resupply, or lack of attention from a higher headquarters can cast a pall over a guerrilla organization. This may be more marked in a Western environment where the lack of strong political control and more ready access to outside information facilitates the spread of rumor and speculation. Guerrillas listening to daily radio broadcasts on the glorious advances or victories of their comrades in a regular division may be momentarily excited and pleased at the good news. Once the radio is switched off, however, they return to the grim realities of their own daily existence and the realization that their actions and even their deaths may well go unrecorded and unknown.

This problem became so serious among Soviet partisans during World War II that Moscow launched a special propaganda campaign to create an esprit de corps in the guerrilla bands and build a definite sense of "belonging" to the national defense effort. Special decorations were authorized, locally published propaganda newspapers extolling the exploits of outstanding partisans were distributed among the units, and the term "partisan" was dropped from official usage and the term "soldier of the

20 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Red Army in the rear of the enemy” substituted.⁶

The Outside World. The outside world is important to the guerrilla. It provides his hope, his eventual goal, and the environment he hopes to rejoin once his actions have changed it to his liking. This outside world can be friendly or hostile. It can provide support or opposition, and the modern guerrilla leader is aware of the need to exploit this other battleground through the use of propaganda.

Even the most isolated movements recognize the need to spread information on their actions throughout the world. In 1966 a rebel group in Angola organized a special attack on a Portuguese Army post for a camera team of the French National Television (ORTF) knowing that within days the footage of their exploit would be shown to the entire French nation and might well be picked up and used by the Eurovision network in other countries.

Guerrilla leaders do not normally have the facilities or the money to sustain international propaganda campaigns through an established network of diplomatic posts or information offices. They do know that revolt and violence in an exotic setting makes news and that discreet contacts with interested newsmen can provide them with many column inches of copy in the world press and prime-time footage on international television.

Incoming information can be just as important in its effect on the guerrilla. The Communist guerrilla is provided a steady diet of radio messages informing him of support, congratulations, and the deep admiration and friendship of party members throughout the world.

Passages of General Vo-nguyen-Giap’s “Message to the Army for the Building of the Lines of Attack and Encirclement on the Dien Bien Phu Front” are good examples of how outside events and their significance are fed

to guerrilla fighters and even to the Dan Cong, or labor units, engaged in battle:

Our enemies admit that ‘if the flag of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam comes to float over the fortifications of Dien Bien Phu, the situation in Indochina will know important changes, that will resound throughout Southeast Asia’ . . . They do not hide their uneasiness for, if France loses the battle, she will be in a bad position at the Geneva Conference . . . In France, all the leading newspapers print news of Dien Bien Phu on the front page. L’Humanite, organ of the French Communist Party warmly applauds the victory of our people . . .⁷

Bombarded with such messages from on high and with the political officer assuring continuity on a day-to-day basis, the Vietminh soldier and the coolie working along the supply routes felt the eyes of the world were upon them. They were no longer dying anonymously in an isolated mountain valley. They were being honored as the vanguard of international communism.

Target--The Enemy. Enemy troops are a prime target for guerrilla propaganda. Facing superior forces, armament, and organization, the guerrilla, like a sniper, aims at the enemy’s most vulnerable point--the brain. He knows that thoughts can be secret and hard for any authority to control.

Mao Tse-tung makes it clear that proper treatment of captured enemy soldiers is highly important to the success of a guerrilla movement. He emphasizes the need to destroy the enemy by propagandizing his troops, and caring for captured enemy wounded is part of this propagandizing. Any failure in these respects, Mao states, strengthens the solidarity of the enemy.⁸

The late Che Guevara warned his men to differentiate between traitors and those who “fought only because they were forced to.” He gave instructions that the latter category of prisoners should be released and given whatever aid was available for their

wounded.⁹

During World War II the Soviet partisans leveled their propaganda sights at non-German troops, particularly indigenous units, and did so well in their campaign that German antiguerrilla operations were visibly hampered.¹⁰

Basically there is nothing new in such tactics. The divide-and-conquer method is as old as war itself. The disintegration of the colonial empires and the eruption of Communist-inspired wars of national liberation have accelerated the development of this technique to a high point of sophistication and efficiency.

Perhaps no better example can be given than the treatment of French Union Forces captured at Dien Bien Phu by the Vietminh in the spring of 1954. The capture of Dien Bien Phu was an international propaganda victory in its own right. But the high-ranking political officers of the Vietminh realized that they had also won an inestimable propaganda asset in the prisoners they held.

Seldom have propagandists received such a windfall. These prisoners were stunned by defeat and bitter with recrimination. They came from the four corners of the world. Algerians, Moroccans, Senegalese, Frenchmen, Vietnamese, and Thai tribesmen were mixed with the Germans, Italians, Yugoslavs, Spaniards, and other nationalities of the Foreign Legion.

Well aware that the flames of nationalism were already flickering in the countries of North Africa, the Vietminh quickly separated the Algerians and Moroccans from their French officers and noncoms. Deserters and previously captured soldiers of the same nationality who had been well indoctrinated by the Vietminh were assigned as cadre for the newly formed groups.

Their first task was to identify and signal to their Communist superiors the hard cases among the prisoners who refused to accept indoctrination or gave signs of solidifying opposition around them. Once this had been accomplished

they fed their wards a diet of daily propaganda, including the latest news of the anti-French movement in the prisoner's homeland. The same technique, with slight variations, was applied to the prisoners from the Foreign Legion.

With the indoctrination came the subtle psychological pressures of combined physical need and mental compromise. The cooperative prisoners were rewarded. An extra piece of fish in the rice bowl or three cigarettes at the end of the day's march became extremely important to men under great physical strain.

Those who resisted brought punishment to their group. If one man refused to attend a political lecture his comrades were deprived of their rice for 24 hours, or badly needed drugs were suddenly unavailable for the sick and wounded.

Under such conditions defeated, starving men, undergoing exhausting marches through the jungle with little hope of surviving, found it difficult to resist the drumfire pounding of repetitive indoctrination.

The Vietminh political officers added small refinements to their technique. For example, they knew that the garrison commander was not universally respected by his fellow officers, particularly those in the parachute battalions. He was therefore treated with little respect by the Vietminh and made to eat alone and apart.¹¹

Although many prisoners died in captivity, most were eventually exchanged and returned to their homes. Some, although marked by their experiences, were able to shake off the effects of the political indoctrination with varying degrees of ease. Others had become willing carriers of the seed of rebellion planted by the political officers and continued the same work, with modifications, in their own countries.

Even the officers who had consistently resisted the Vietminh propaganda were fascinated by its efficiency and

application. Some of them tried to apply its techniques in Algeria to counter the guerrillas of the FLN. Part of their failure can be explained by the difficulty of importing guerrilla or counter-guerrilla techniques from one country, situation, or environment to another.

As Regis Debray, the intellectual albatross of Che Guevara's Bolivian fiasco, has written, "... it is dangerous to import organizational formulas, even if they are based on a known theory. Clearly, it is physically dangerous, since many military errors derive from a single political error..."¹²

When political means, pressure, or coercion prove ineffective in obtaining the desired results, guerrilla movements often turn to another tool. Its name is terror.

III-TERROR AND ITS EFFECT

He who fears he will suffer already suffers because of his fear.

--Montaigne¹

Terrorist Action. Terrorism is a powerful and dangerous weapon. The word itself has an immediate emotional and personal association lacking in most other terms of conflict. Terrorism presents a threat as unpredictable as quicksilver, and its methods can make a mockery of security, political control, and national purpose.

A person who has not been exposed to terrorist action finds it difficult to fully appreciate its true meaning. To live in an atmosphere of terror is to await the grenade arching over the garden wall, to search an automobile three or four times a day for detonators and a bomb, to realize that the whim of the enemy could result in the kidnaping or murder of one's children, to keep one's senses abnormally alert to every sound, to sleep with a revolver by the bedside, and to search the face of each passerby for a sign that he, or she, desires your ~~own death or mutilation~~

Jacques Soustelle, the former Governor General of Algeria, described terror as a psychological weapon of unbelievable power. "Before the bodies of those whose throats have been cut and the grimaicing faces of the mutilated," Soustelle states graphically, "all capacity for resistance lapses: the spring is broken."²

Breaking the spring of resistance is the goal of a guerrilla movement. The guerrilla leader knows that each spring broken within the individual adds up to facturing the giant spring of an established government or society or, at the least, rendering it useless by robbing it of support.

Terror is often the first form of action available in a guerrilla campaign. It is a stock item ready for use at little expenditure in personnel or funds. To understand terrorism one must take into account the interpretive differences inherent in this form of action.

Menachem Begin, one of the Chiefs of the Israeli Irgun organization, complained that foreign correspondents were describing his men as terrorists and suggested that they use another word: the word "patriot." Begin reasoned that as the Irgun's actions were liberating the Jewish people from fear, his men were, in reality, antiterrorists.³

The bomb thrower of the Irish Republican Army, the political assassin of the OAS⁴ in Algeria, and the Chinese gunman of the Malayan Races Liberation Army were practicing the art of terrorism. In their own context, however, they considered themselves patriots.

Advantages and Disadvantages. Whether the men involved accept the term terrorist or call themselves patriots changes in no way the fact that they are using a sensitive psychological tool with several automatic advantages. It can intimidate the enemy, particularly if the enemy's motivation is shaky or uncertain. More important, it can intimi-

date the population, erecting an invisible barrier of noncooperation between the people and their government.

Terrorism can also serve as effective publicity for a guerrilla movement announcing to a nation and to the world that a war has been declared on the existing government. Repeated acts of terrorism then reveal to the people and to international opinion that the government is impotent to stop the attacks. The people begin to doubt the government's ability to protect them, and other nations are hesitant to express support for a government that cannot keep its own house in order.

Another advantage is terrorism's efficiency as a liquidator of opposition. A respected legislator and family man, with a substantial position and economic resources, can be devoted to a political ideal or movement, but his degree of devotion may undergo an abrupt readjustment when weighed against the threat of terrorist action. Death is a very permanent state, and man is a most human animal. Dying for a cause is much easier to contemplate in the abstract than when it becomes an immediate possibility.

The disadvantages of terrorism can often stem from the manner in which it is applied. Clumsy, unplanned terrorist action can alienate a population, solidify support for an existing regime, and force an otherwise hesitant government to apply its complete resources to crush a guerrilla movement.

The unleashing of a terrorist campaign can also present a guerrilla leader with problems of control. Once the Pandora's box of terrorism is opened, it may be difficult to close. The ingredients of violence and hate present in all guerrilla movements find an easy outlet through terrorism. A leader who has ordered one or two acts of controlled terrorism may find his subordinate commanders and their men only too eager to continue such actions indiscriminately. In their eagerness based on revenge, a

desire for action, or the knowledge that terror can present an immediate return for little investment, they often lose sight of the fact that such violence can escalate beyond any measure of its practicability or profit. The competent practitioners of terrorism usually know how their actions will affect their enemies and what reactions they can expect from those not directly involved.

Reactions to Terrorism. It often comes as a surprise to find the Viet Cong so quick to claim credit for acts of terrorism that have taken many innocent lives, a majority of them Vietnamese. But the Viet Cong have had years of active experience. Their goal is that of the classic terrorist—to inspire fear resulting in a psychological paralysis that cancels the people's desire to participate in government-organized programs.

In the early 1950's a bomb of great force exploded in the heart of Saigon in front of the Opera House.⁵ It had been timed to go off at a busy hour, and its principal victims were the small shoeshine boys who made the steps of the Opera House their headquarters. The bomb also killed or mutilated a number of French and Vietnamese civilians. It was a bloody incident, and it received wide pictorial coverage in the world press.

This attack was immediately labeled as a Vietminh atrocity, and the French Information Service gave it additional publicity. The Vietminh did little to refute these charges. Several years passed before the blame for the incident was squarely placed on the leader of a Cao Dai dissident group unassociated with the Vietminh.

Up to this time the Vietminh had profited, in their own way, from the false mantle of guilt. They had falsely, but effectively, demonstrated their power to strike with force and at will in the heart of a heavily controlled symbol of colonial presence, the city of Saigon.

They had falsely, but effectively, shown that their action could be terrible and implacable. They had falsely, but effectively, embarrassed the French authorities and made their Vietnamese and Chinese collaborators highly uncomfortable.

Since the close of World War II the Vietnamese people have been bombarded with photos, pamphlets, tracts, and newspaper stories of Vietminh or Viet Cong atrocities and terrorism. Today they are close to the saturation point. The first human reaction after so many years of war is to be thankful that the viewer was not the victim. The second reaction, a bit slower but crucial in a psychological sense, is the inescapable impression of Viet Cong omnipresence and freedom of action.

Unfortunately, Americans have often failed to grasp the objective of the Viet Cong's use of indiscriminate terror and have rushed to spread the word of terrorist action throughout the country, thus acting as Madison Avenue assistants to an unwanted client—the Viet Cong.

Reactions to terrorism vary depending on environment and the people involved. In Sicily, where small-scale but effective terrorism is traditional, the people quickly "get the message." They go beyond the act itself to interpret its significance and meaning. They seldom expect or seek protection from the local authorities. Instead, they know how to read the language of violence as promulgated by the Mafia, and their reactions, though bathed in an outward show of emotion, are based on experience and hardheaded realism.

In France, during the height of OAS actions, the terms used to describe the OAS activists were simply "activist" or "terrorist" depending on the specific incident and its result.

Anglo-Saxon reactions are considerably different. In Dublin, during the winter of 1919, an attempt was made on the life of Britain's Field Marshal French by members of the IRA

led by Daniel Breen. The British characterized the attack as an "outrage" carried out by "dangerous madmen" and "murderers."⁶ In Anglo-Saxon terms terrorism is not only outside the law, it is something that is just not done. Thus, to the British, terrorists must be labeled as bandits and gunmen to place them clearly in a criminal category removed from any political validation.

Although pure fear is the first and most common reaction to terrorism, it is usually accompanied by feelings of impotence and frustration. The law of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" may be universal but, when applied to the victims of terrorism, it lacks practicability. The desire to strike back is normal, but one must first find the terrorist to lay claim to his eye or his tooth. Even a well-organized police force or special branch operates with a thin margin of probable success.

When terrorists strike, the surviving victims can seldom take weapon in hand and track them down. They must rely on the forces of order. This is an impatient reliance that demands quick results. When results are lacking, the initial hate for the terrorist is diluted with frustration and resentment. This negative mixture is often directed at the authorities.

Selective Terrorism. Selective terror can be highly effective. It was a favorite tool of the Vietminh, and it remains a standard procedure for the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. Much of the South Vietnamese Government's inability to regain control of the countryside can be laid to the success of selective terrorism.

A government official named as a hamlet chief to replace a murdered predecessor who had, in his turn, replaced another victim of terrorism, is understandably reticent about spending the night in the home or room where the previous deaths occurred.

The temptation is strong to leave the

hamlet before sundown and bed down at the district headquarters. This soon becomes a habit. The Viet Cong then fill this leadership vacuum. They enter the hamlet at will for a night of lectures, songs, and discussions, often within pistol range of the closely barricaded police post.

The people are aware that their chief is absent each night, and so are the police. Neither will normally risk a showdown with the Viet Cong under such circumstances. When the time comes, the Viet Cong assassination squad will ambush the hamlet chief on his way to the district headquarters or, if the police are sufficiently cowed, he will be shot on the street in full view of the people.

Selective terrorism is not always applied to the enemy. It is often used to "readjust" command or political differences within guerrilla organizations or between rival guerrilla bands. What appear to be indiscriminate acts of terror are often selective terror in disguise. In Yugoslavia during World War II, Soviet-supported partisans disguised as Chetniks raided Croatian villages thus turning the Croat population against the Serbian-dominated Chetnik movement led by Mihailovic.⁷

The range of targets for selective terrorism can vary greatly. Government officials, military leaders, police officers, and politicians are standard victims, but guerrilla movements invariably match their targets to their political goals.

If a government is weak or vacillating, the guerrillas may leave its officials in peace. They may be of more use to the guerrilla movement alive than dead. On the other hand, a segment of society under a weak government may give signs of impatience and latent action that could pose a threat to the movement.

In such a case, selective terrorism might be directed at journalists, students, or labor leaders hostile to the

guerrilla's objectives and impatient with the government's lack of efficiency. The guerrillas then carry out their attacks in a manner that will place the blame on the government while they pose as champions of the murdered progressives.

The Individual Terrorist. One of the great problems in meeting the threat of terrorism is the difficulty of identifying and isolating the terrorist as an individual. A terrorist plan may originate in the office of a locally respected physician, but the person carrying out the plan may be a 12-year-old boy who has been paid to lean a bicycle against a certain wall at a specific time. The boy is unaware that the bicycle frame is stuffed with plastic explosive. Even under brutal interrogation he will be unable to provide useful information, for the man who paid him was a complete stranger. By the time the boy is ushered into police headquarters the stranger is on his way to another city.

The members of the Viet Cong special activities cell charged with assassination and terrorism would seem to have much in common with the professional Tonkinese gunmen used by certain branches of French Intelligence during the Indochina war. The differences however are considerable. Not only is there the obvious dichotomy in motivation, there is also the manifestation of an end to an era of professional terrorism.

The black-clad, mercenary gunmen perched on their haunches outside French Intelligence offices in 1953 were practitioners of a traditional art. They followed in their fathers' footsteps, learned their trade, practiced it, and were paid accordingly. The identity of their victims meant little to them, and they considered their Vietminh counterparts as emotional amateurs.

Today, in Vietnam, the emotional amateurs have become the professionals. Terrorism has become too important to be left to the simple practitioner, and its

sensitivity as a political and psychological tool necessitates careful intelligence, planning, and control.

Most guerrilla movements have become highly selective in picking the men who are to carry out missions of targeted terror, for the psychological attitudes of the individual can mean the success or failure of a terrorist act. Nevertheless, a man devoted to a cause and demonstrating the highest motivation can be a complete failure as a terrorist, while one who has no motivation can carry out a terrorist action with extreme efficiency and success.

One person may approach terrorism with considerable mental reservations. These reservations may be dormant, dominated by the emotionalism of a cause. They may then appear suddenly, flashing into the open at a crucial moment, triggering hesitation, uncertainty, and reluctance, luxuries a terrorist cannot afford if he is to survive and carry out his mission.

On the other hand, a hired terrorist may approach the act with a mind uninhibited by either political motivation or human considerations. He may be a young tough seeking recognition, excitement, and violence or a professional approaching his task with the pride of a journeyman. The policeman or special branch operative who can analyze such psychological differences in terrorist motivation has a much better chance of countering terrorism effectively.

Counterterrorism. Terrorism often produces the related violence of counterterrorism. This controversial method of striking back at terrorists is swathed in the mystique of clandestine operations and strengthened by the normal human desire for vengeance and quick justice. It is supported by the argument that terrorists must liquidate terrorists.

Col. Roger Trinquier, a leading French expert on revolutionary war and advocate of counterterrorism, feels that

physical brutality is as important as intelligence and ruse in guerrilla war and that when the three are allied they will always triumph over what he describes as blind armament.⁸

But the cold, brutal escalation of counterterrorism can appear as a public admission that a nation's law enforcement capabilities have broken down. Frank Scotton, a U.S. Information Agency officer who recently received the President's award for outstanding field work in the Revolutionary Development Program in South Vietnam, explains that in combating terrorism the goals should be "the establishment of an equitable system of law and appropriate enforcement agencies (to include armed forces). Once this is accomplished, the elimination (arrest, trial, imprisonment, or execution) of terrorists becomes a legal operation under Police Special Branch or Army Special Operations."⁹

Fighting fire with fire in the field of terror can build wars within wars. The struggle in the fall of 1961 between the OAS terrorists fighting for a French Algeria and the "Barbouzes," or special police acting for the French Government, is a classic example of runaway terrorism. The favorite arm in this clash was plastic explosive, and its use in the crowded streets of Algiers accounted for hundreds of innocent victims. The delineation of who were the terrorists and who were the counterterrorists became progressively vague as explosion followed explosion in the stricken city. Assassinations, torture, and kidnappings marked the skirmishes of the "commandos Delta" of the OAS and the "Barbouzes." Well-organized attacks utilizing bazookas were directed against the special police, and they responded with bombings of the business establishments and homes of known OAS sympathizers. Typical of this bloody escalation was the destruction of the Radja Hotel where the "Barbouzes" had established their fortress headquarters.

A powerful bomb disguised as a case of

supplies was delivered and accepted. Its explosion completely destroyed the hotel and buried in its debris the mutilated bodies of those inside.¹⁰

In this situation the psychological and even the political results of terrorism and counterterrorism became secondary and were pushed aside in order that the blind killing could continue.

The clash of terrorist and counterterrorist oblivious to those around them can create a vacuum of reaction. Numbed and sickened by what they see, the population can lose faith in a guerrilla movement or the government's efforts to combat it.

Counterterrorism may appear to be a tempting and expedient method to fight guerrilla terrorists, but the counter-guerrilla who accepts its use is employing a tool of negative power. A tool that may well create new problems rather than solve those he already faces.

IV--THE COUNTERGUERRILLA

He who stumbles twice over the same stone deserves to break his neck.

--Spanish Proverb¹

The Problem. From the clash of Roman Legions with the wild tribes of Gaul to the quick, deadly ambushes of the Vietnam conflict, there has been one constant with few exceptions: the great difficulty experienced by regular forces in understanding and effectively reacting to guerrilla warfare.

"Revolutionary war," with its emphasis on political action and subversion, has made the modern counter-guerrilla's task even more difficult. Armies have been retrained and equipped, regulars have been lectured on the ways of the guerrilla, and special courses have been put together with all the benefits of technological data gathering. The results, unfortunately, often fall short of the desired goal. It is as if a new branch, grafted onto a weather-tested tree, gradually withers

and dies because of a natural incompatibility. Psychological attitudes have played a considerable role in this rejection process.

In Western society the professional soldier's training, tradition, and code of honor have built a wall between him and the complicated world of national and international politics. He is trained to fight, to protect his homeland, and to perform these tasks to the best of his professional ability. Even the draftee or conscript follows this code of honor once in uniform.

In modern guerrilla warfare the professional soldier finds himself up against an enemy whose every move or tactic is coordinated with political objectives and plans. The traditional procedure of winning a battle or a war against an enemy army and then turning the victory over to the politicians and diplomats has suddenly become obsolete.

The guerrilla's tactics call for constant political-military action. The counter-guerrilla commander who ignores this rule may win militarily only to find his victory annulled by the enemy's political triumph.

In such situations the counter-guerrilla's psychological attitude can be a serious obstacle to success. Tradition and modern technology can combine to do him a disservice. A man trained over a long period of time in military procedures that have proven highly effective will not forego them easily. Rather than change his viewpoint to meet a new situation, he tends to adapt what he has known and used in the past to fit the new problem. He thus achieves a hybrid result of dubious value.

The same man may have profited from the technological advances of military science during his career. He finds it particularly difficult to put aside his technological expertise and make the mental readjustment needed to return to the basics of guerrilla warfare.

British commanders in Malaya often found it more profitable to train a

conscript for counter guerrilla operations rather than attempt the reconversion of a veteran regular into a counter guerrilla fighter.

Traditionally the professional regular is faced with a constant temptation to underestimate his guerrilla enemy. There is usually a factor of contempt in such miscalculations. To him, the guerrilla is not really a soldier, and he does not fight according to the book. There are few manifestations of warfare further from the norm than those carried out by the guerrilla.

General Braddock's inbred contempt for irregulars led him to ignore George Washington's warning prior to the ambush of his column by the French and Indians. Lawrence had to fight the disdain of British professionals before he could obtain arms and supplies for his Arab irregulars. The French High Command refused to credit the Vietminh with the ability to transport and install artillery in the hills surrounding Dien Bien Phu, and the American High Command was unprepared for the well-organized attacks of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese during the Tet holiday in 1968. These were all instances of underestimation, by professionals, of an irregular or unconventional force.

It is often the man fighting the guerrilla face to face who accurately measures the enemy's true worth and the real threat he poses. Fiction often comes close to the truth. Kipling's poem "Fuzzy Wuzzy" can be used in this context as a dated but valid example of an experienced, regular soldier's assessment of his guerrilla enemies:

We took our chance among
the Kyber hills,
The Boers knocked us silly
at a mile,
The Burman gave us
Irriwaddy chills,
An' a Zulu impi dished us
up in style:

But all we ever got
from such as they
Was pop to what the Fuzzy
made us swaller;
We 'eld our bloomin' own
the papers say,
But man for man the Fuzzy
knocked us 'oller.²

During the Indochina war the term "Viet" used by the French to describe the Vietminh evolved from a term of derogation in the mouth of the Saigon staff officer to one of professional respect when used by the Legion officer in the field. Today the term "Charlie" referring to the Viet Cong undergoes much the same change in meaning depending on its user and his experience.

The professional military officer who is suddenly projected into the role of counter guerrilla commander without adequate preparation and training soon suffers the frustrations common to this type of war. His massive, powerful force, designed and trained to carry out large conventional operations, becomes a liability until it can be reorganized and trained in its new task.

With his unit isolated in difficult terrain, its small detachments off hunting guerrilla bands, his supply columns falling into costly ambushes, his responsibility extended to protecting nearby towns and villages, the commander becomes only too aware that he is fighting a different war. An important part of this different war is the role of the population and the counter guerrilla's relations with the people.

The People. Nationalism, tradition, ethnic ties, historical precedents, political attitudes, and the general psychological state of a people help to determine its basic conduct within or on the fringes of a guerrilla war.

T.E. Lawrence estimated, with keen insight into the Arab culture and character, that he needed only 2 percent of the population actively involved in the Arab revolt to achieve success if the

remaining 90 percent remained passively sympathetic.³

The difficulty and eventual failure experienced by the Chinese-dominated rebels in Malaya was due, in part, to the fact that the majority of the Malay population was hostile or, at the least, in passive opposition to their activities.

If, as Mao states, the people are the water in which the guerrilla fish must swim, it is no less true that the counter-guerrilla must bait and cast his line in the same water for a catch of prime importance--intelligence information.

Without intelligence information a counter-guerrilla force is a piece of machinery minus an essential part. But intelligence information must come from the people, and the counter-guerrilla must find the best mix of chum to bring them closer to his line. Sound government, civic action programs, land reform, medical assistance, and guaranteed security can all go into the mix, but the proportions must be correct.

Guerrilla experts Peter Paret and John Shy state that:

Although there may be a limited role for counter-guerrilla guerrillas, the great weakness of the mobile striking forces--imperfect tactical intelligence--is better corrected by the creation of local militia. But neither pro-government guerrillas nor militia can be effective without firm popular support. And this leads to the second concern of counter-guerrilla forces: good troops employing proper tactics cannot make up for an unsound government and political base.⁴

Troop behavior can be as important to the counter-guerrilla commander as any program of civic action in reaching the people. The more widespread the guerrilla movement, the more difficult and frustrating are the daily operations for the individual counter-guerrilla. The hunt drags on through tortuous terrain, under conditions of extreme physical hardship, with the sniper or the mine taking a daily toll of dead and wounded.

The desire to strike back at the

guerrilla becomes overwhelming, building into a form of psychosis that can explode at the slightest provocation: the refusal of a villager to respond to a question; a road blocked by an oxcart; the sight of food stocks that might be available to the enemy.

The results of such a fixation can range from the complete destruction of a village to unwarranted beatings and useless arrests. Thus the counter-guerrilla's bait becomes tainted, his chum useless, and his hook floats unheeded in an empty sea.

In January 1953 the writer landed on the central coast of South Vietnam with Franco-Vietnamese Forces whose task it was to retake the town of Tuy Hoa. The town had been under Vietminh control for several years. A major psychological warfare effort was mounted during this landing, but much of its effect was wiped out by the behavior of the troops involved. The following incident was typical of the operation at Tuy Hoa:

A dusty road leading between the huts was cluttered with woven paniers covered with tiny shrimp and red peppers drying in the sun. Old women moved among the paniers, shaking them occasionally to bring the damper shrimp or peppers to the surface. As we watched, a jeep full of government troops careened around a corner and braked to a stop a foot from the paniers. A young soldier jumped from the jeep. He strode forward kicking the paniers right and left, scattering the shrimp and peppers in the dust. When he had cleared the path the jeep followed along behind him, crushing some of the paniers under its wheels. The soldier jumped back into the jeep and it roared off. Stooping, the old women patiently began salvaging their scattered shrimp and peppers, replacing them in their battered paniers.⁵

Later, a village elder explained the arrival and behavior of the Vietminh. "They came with much rice and rare medicines. They helped us till the fields and they left our young women alone."⁶

A good civic action program can be

completely ruined by poor troop behavior, while a faltering civic action program can be saved by proper behavior on the part of counter guerrilla forces. Care must be taken, however, to insure that the hard cutting edge of a counter guerrilla force is not blunted by overconcentration on civic action projects that should be the prime responsibility of paramilitary or nonmilitary organizations.

It is easier to hand candy to children and pass blankets to civilians than it is to track the guerrilla through the jungle, and although the counter guerrilla must be aware of his role as a friend and protector of the population, he must not forget his primary role as the liquidator of a guerrilla movement.

The prime benefit an effective counter guerrilla force can offer to the population is security. With guaranteed security the people will be more willing to come forward with information. But security is much more complicated than throwing a temporary ring of riflemen around a village. Populations involved in a guerrilla war situation want true security. Not only security against raids and extortion by the guerrilla, but also against mistreatment by government forces and the armed bands that often proliferate on the fringes of an insurgency.

A counter guerrilla leader who promises security and cannot provide it will have a very difficult time obtaining support from the people, no matter how lavish his civic action program.

Simple justice and hardheaded realism are two essential attributes in the struggle for a population's support. The late President Magsaysay of the Philippines based his campaign against the Huk rebels on a well-conceived civic action program. But the measure of his success as a counter guerrilla leader was his ability to blend the open, social improvement projects with efficient clandestine countermeasures. President Magsaysay once stated that judiciously

applied bribery was "one of the most effective counterinsurgency weapons available to government."⁷

As in the purely military aspect of guerrilla operations, new methods have to be developed to meet a particular situation when working with the population. Sir Gerald Templer's use of the village questionnaire during the Malayan insurgency was such an innovation.

British troops entered a village in a zone of guerrilla operations, distributed questionnaires to each house, and asked the people to tell what they knew about guerrilla activities and the identity of those supplying the rebels with food. Each villager then had to deposit his questionnaire, completed or not, in a sealed box. The box was personally opened by General Templer in the presence of a few trusted Malayan notables. It was thus impossible for the Min Yuen assassination squads to identify those individuals who actually gave productive information. The first use of the questionnaire resulted in the arrest of 30 Chinese directly or indirectly involved with the rebels.⁸ This method broke the psychological barrier of fear that had made normal intelligence gathering all but impossible.

The diverse nature of guerrilla war calls for extreme flexibility on the part of the counter guerrilla. He must think like his enemy, have an understanding of the enemy's problems and psychological attitudes, and be gifted with an inordinate amount of patience.

The Patience Factor. Perhaps no one quality is more essential to the makeup of a competent counter guerrilla force and its leaders than patience. The counter guerrilla is an amalgam of social worker, detective, policeman, and hunter. He must be at ease in civic action, expert in sifting useful details from a bulk of irrelevant information, just and firm as an arm of the law, and skilled in tracking, outwitting, and liquidating his enemy.

In the winter of 1952, Vietminh units were pressing hard around the Catholic town of Phat Diem in the Delta of Tonkin. Regular French units, supported by Catholic Militia, had tried repeatedly but with little success to halt the infiltration of heavy weapons and ammunition. The enemy continued to crush isolated Catholic Militia units, execute village leaders, and install their own people in key positions. In desperation the local French commander, a proud, tradition-bound, Spahi officer, called for help. It came in the form of a small section from the Commando d'Indochine.

The section was made up of French and Vietnamese commandos led by a young captain of mixed blood. They were in startling contrast to the dashing Spahi officers from the local armored unit who watched the new arrivals with condescension and slight curiosity.

The commandos worked in trousers secured over canvas shoes with rubber bands. They wore wool shirts covered by one or two dark sweaters. The only items of uniform one could call regulation were the black berets pushed down on their foreheads.

For four nights they straggled out at dusk toward the deserted villages and rice paddies. Each morning they returned, uncommunicative and smeared with mud.

On the fifth night a searing rattle of distant small arms fire awoke the sleeping Spahis. Lights flashed on in sector headquarters. There was excited shouting, the revving of motors, and the grinding of gears as the Spahis and their armored cars prepared to go to the aid of the commandos.

But the commandos were safe. The infiltrators were dead. Two sampans were floating, bottom up, down a narrow river. Three others had nosed in among the bamboo. The young commando captain was examining the raft his men had swum out to retrieve and the two heavy mortars of Chinese manu-

facture that were lashed to it. The Vietminh dead sprawled over the cases of bloodstained ammunition or floated face down in the water. Later, as dawn broke, the commando section boarded their trucks and departed.⁹

Within 24 hours, making use of intuition, knowledge of the enemy, and technical expertise, they had located the most likely route of infiltration. They had then invested their great fund of patience. Lying quietly in the mud at the edge of the river, chewing on sticky rice in lieu of smoking cigarettes, they had waited. Their investment had paid off with considerable profit.

Americans, as "doers," anxious to get on with the job and eager to produce results, often find the patience factor a difficult technique to master in counter guerrilla operations.

American Attitudes. In a positive sense Americans can justifiably approach the problems of counter guerrilla action with a solid base of historical experience. The Kentucky rifleman with his own scalping knife was certainly a counter guerrilla. Roger's Rangers adopted the tactics of their elusive enemy and carried out a highly successful form of the "search and destroy" mission.¹⁰

On the other hand, Americans today stand with both feet solidly planted in an age of massive technological development where science and the computer offer challenges and solutions thought impossible a few short years ago.

Here, in a sense, lies the problem. Guerrilla movements have a way of thumbing their noses at modern technology. Computers can count votes, but they have yet to analyze a man's political sympathy or emotional involvement in a cause. Nor can modern science change, through gadgets and highly sophisticated machinery, the basic task of the counter guerrilla--to track and eliminate his enemy, often in a situation of personal confrontation.

To fight guerrillas one must know

them. This implies a deep degree of personal involvement or total immersion in an insurgency situation. In a psychological sense, most Americans seldom go beyond getting their feet wet. This is particularly true of the draftee in Vietnam, but it also applies to the professional Special Forces officer working with the Montagnards. Both men know that they are serving a limited amount of time and that their lives are not bound to the people with whom they are working.

During the most dangerous and trying actions there is the mental reassurance of another life and another land that constitutes a form of psychological escape hatch. This can be positive as a morale factor but negative to total commitment. Although this was true of the British soldier in Malaya and the French parachutist in North Vietnam, it is particularly applicable to the American serving for 1 short year in Vietnam.

For every American commander who understands the guerrilla and guerrilla warfare there are still those who complain that the enemy will not "stand and fight" a posture that anyone with a basic understanding of the guerrilla would hardly find unusual. Raids against American military installations and airfields carried out by Viet Cong commandos are often described as sneak attacks or terror raids. Such catch phrases may be useful for propaganda purposes. They become dangerous when, through repetition, the user begins to believe them himself.

Thus a highly successful, well-planned commando action is labeled a "sneak attack" with the implication that only through stealth and treachery was such a raid possible and the counter-guerrilla, if not alert, falls once again into the psychological trap of underestimating his enemy.

The Myth of Malaya. In the hurried search for a key to success in counter-

guerrilla action during the early 1950's, the myth of Malaya was born. American officials, watching the slow disintegration of the French position in Indochina, flew to Malaya to see how a successful counterinsurgency campaign was being handled and rushed back to Saigon to urge the French to adopt the British methods.

While certain procedures were appropriate for adoption, counter-guerrilla techniques, like certain wines, do not travel well.

The British in Malaya had some prime assets: independence was around the corner, and the government could develop a firm national policy on the future of the country; the Malay majority of the population was opposed to the Chinese-dominated rebels; the rebels were isolated from any significant outside aid, and their sources of food supply were comparatively easy to control.¹¹

In addition, the British psychological warfare effort concentrated on explaining to the Malay population that the fight was not between Malayan Communists and the security forces but between the Malayan people and Chinese Communists. Thus the traditional Malayan antagonism toward the Chinese and distrust of Chinese motives played into the hands of the government.¹²

Transplanting the techniques that were successful in Malaya and expecting them to thrive in Indochina proved to be a delusion. Moving Chinese squatters from their makeshift shacks on the edge of the Malayan jungle and placing them in an efficiently operated resettlement village was considerably different from uprooting Vietnamese from their ancestral village and relocating them in a makeshift, inefficiently run refugee camp.

Even more important, psychologically, was the fact that the Communist-dominated Vietminh were, to the average Vietnamese, a liberation army made up of Vietnamese fighting colo-

nialism. No amount of propaganda or imported techniques could convince them that independence was just around the corner as long as the French Expeditionary Force remained in Indochina.

Tribal Groups and Ethnic Minorities. Working with another people in combatting an insurgency within their own territory brings new responsibilities and problems for the counter guerrilla. This is especially true where Western cadres work with tribal groups and ethnic minorities. As guerrillas often operate from an isolated jungle or mountain environment or, in more advanced phases of an uprising, move large units through the cover of jungle or mountains, the inhabitants of such areas become important actors in the insurgency drama.

This has often been true in guerrilla war, and it was emphasized again during World War II when mountain people—the Dyaks in Borneo, the Kachins in Burma, and the Meo in Indochina—worked with Allied special forces against the Japanese.

The effectiveness of these small ethnic groups in guerrilla and counter guerrilla operations is based on their knowledge of terrain, endurance, tracking ability, courage, and determination to eliminate unwelcome trespassers. In Malaya the Senoi Pra'ak, a small aboriginal force numbering not more than 300, killed more MRLA guerrillas during the last 2 years of the insurgency than the total accounted for by all other security forces.¹³

The local partisan groups in upper Tonkin and Laos organized by French officers of the GCMA¹⁴ during the Indochina war reached a total strength of 20,000. The operations of these units permitted the evacuation without losses of the fortified camp of Nasan, the reconquest by Laos of the provinces of Phong Saly and San Neua without the help of regular troops, as well as the interdiction of an important road run-

ning directly from Lao Kay, near the Chinese border, to Dien Bien Phu. They also immobilized 14 battalions of Vietminh regulars by their actions and were of invaluable assistance in locating and recovering hundreds of French prisoners.¹⁵

Despite their loyal service, these local partisans were abandoned at the close of the Indochina war. An unrealistic radio message went out to these groups when the French and the Vietminh reached an agreement in 1954. They were to surrender to the nearest authorities of the People's Army of North Vietnam. They would then, supposedly, be treated as prisoners of war. A minority of these men led by their French officers managed to fight their way out of the jungles of North Vietnam and Laos. The remainder were not heard from again.

Caught up in a struggle of sophisticated political theories and international intrigue, minority groups are often used by both sides without understanding the issues at stake. Their service and loyalty as counter guerrillas are often based on a highly personal relationship with the Western officers who may be acting directly or indirectly as their commanders. Much of this attitude is linked with a recent colonial past.

When the 3rd Thai Battalion began to disintegrate at Dien Bien Phu, one whole company deserted when its commander, Captain Guillemillot, was wounded. The Thais felt their bond of fidelity to the French had been severed. They had been fighting for Guillemillot and not for a vague government in Saigon or the abstraction of the world battle between the "free world" and "communism."¹⁶

The brutal but real dictates of political necessity that force a counter guerrilla leader to abandon those he has led to the doubtful mercies of the enemy or the vague promises of an unfriendly government can have a serious effect on the man involved both as a person and as a soldier.

The officers of the French Army who revolted against their government in April of 1961 were products of such a psychological shock. An officer of the SAS¹⁷ expressed the feeling of his comrades when he stated: "I think of all those who were massacred in Indochina for having believed in France, after having won them to France's side, after promising not to abandon them . . . of those in Tunisia, true to the end, of those in Morocco . . ."18

Although the revolt of French officers in 1961 was an extreme manifestation of military discontent and political uncertainty at the end of a colonial era, much of the individual motivation was based on the personal feeling of having abandoned or deserted those friends with whom one had lived and fought.

No matter what nationalities are involved or what political situation exists, the counterguerrilla leader must maintain a realistic understanding of his responsibilities in working with tribal groups and ethnic minorities and an awareness of the psychological and human consequences brought on by any sudden change in policy or political accommodation.

V--THE FUTURE

It is time to realize that most modern war is guerrilla in character.

--Maj. Gen. Orde C. Wingate¹

During World War II active guerrilla warfare became the immediate concern of field commanders on both sides of the conflict. It was no longer the sole domain of a small group of experts nor was it limited to a specific geographic location.

Since World War II guerrilla warfare has remained a constant in a world undergoing rapid political change. In a period of nuclear deterrence, guerrillas have been active in Greece, Morocco, Israel, Egypt, Algeria, Angola, Laos, Vietnam, Bolivia, and Venezuela. This

list is merely a sampling of guerrilla action in an era of relative international peace.

While it is difficult to predict exactly what direction future guerrilla fighting may take, the lessons of Algiers and, more recently, Saigon, indicate the extent of the real problem posed by the urban guerrilla.

The Urban Guerrilla. There is perhaps no entity quite so vulnerable to guerrilla action as the modern city. It is easy to imagine what a well-coordinated, violent guerrilla action could mean in terms of utilities destroyed, communications disrupted, administrative services paralyzed, and civilians terrorized, wounded, and killed.

General Nemo, a leading French theorist of revolutionary war, has accurately described the "fragility" of a modern city:

In Europe the complex social life renders the different elements dependent on one another. The Administrative machine and the economic organization are cogs in a complex system which it is relatively easy to block. The higher degree to which a country has evolved, and the more complex its structure, the more opportunities it offers for subversive action . . . the European countries are fragile.²

In an urban atmosphere the guerrilla, like a chameleon, must undergo changes to fit his new environment. He is so closely integrated with the people that his enemy will have a difficult time isolating him from support and information. On the other hand, his proximity to the authorities and his unavoidable exposure to many individuals will make him extremely vulnerable to detection and betrayal.

The urban guerrilla may also face a more subtle and complicated set of psychological pressures than the guerrilla operating from a mountain base. His presence in a city may put him in close touch with his family, tempting him to carry out repetitive personal contacts of great danger. Involvement in

terrorist activities may force him to be a continual witness of the suffering caused by his action.

If his campaign drags on, the controls and severe measures applied by the authorities may tend to irritate the people and eventually draw the population away from the guerrilla as he becomes the cause of their discomfort and privation.

The work of the counter guerrilla also becomes highly complicated in urban operations. He moves and fights in a jungle of property. Restrictions multiply, many of his weapons become unusable because of political or humanitarian reasons, and his prerogatives are limited.

Street and house-to-house fighting in time of war in an evacuated city is difficult. The same type of fighting in a civilian-occupied city is not only difficult, it multiplies the strain and frustration experienced by the counter guerrilla.

Troops called into a city can constitute an element that is psychologically divorced from the population and outside the context of a city's life. Their presence tends to exaggerate the importance of a guerrilla movement, and it can trigger fear, if the population is against the movement, or hate, if they support it.

The counter guerrilla is also faced with the possibility that the guerrilla who is captured or killed in full view of the population has a much better chance of becoming the movement's martyr than he would have had if his capture or death had occurred in a jungle ambush.

Because an urban guerrilla's action requires precise planning, split second timing, and dependable liaison, the elimination of the movement's command element within a city can be a decisive factor in the eventual disintegration of a guerrilla campaign. Quick, accurate intelligence information is essential, and the psychological atti-

tude of the people, as mentioned previously, is the key to intelligence procurement.

Coastal, Delta, and Riverine War. Guerrilla movements have often been closely tied to the sea and inland waterways. They have depended on the sea as a supply route and liaison channel and on the swamps and rivers to assure an unobtrusive, sure method of transport and internal communication.

Arms and supplies landed clandestinely over beaches or in hidden inlets have supplied guerrilla forces in the Spain of 1808 and in today's Vietnam. Control of the waterways has always been an important objective for both guerrilla and counter guerrilla.

When one examines the coastal, delta, and river systems on a world map it is not difficult to see how future guerrilla campaigns may be concentrated in coastal or fluvial zones. From the mangrove swamps of the West African coast to the Chonos Archipelago of Chile, to the island maze of Indonesia, waterways provide certain advantages over the classic mountain or jungle base.

Isolation is reduced because the lines of communication are improved. The guerrilla can use the water as a roadway. The multiplicity of supply points will work to his advantage. He no longer has to depend on a hazardous, easily interdicted mountain trail or the telltale airdrop. His supplies, orders, and equipment can come in a swift patrol boat or an innocent-looking pirogue.

Coastal swamps, jungled inlets, and multiple river systems provide him with as much cover as a mountain stronghold with the added advantage that escape routes are more easily available. In this new location he avoids some of the physical and psychological detriments he had faced hidden in the mountains. Food becomes a question of simple fishtraps and not one of mule-delivered rations. Medical supplies arrive directly from outside the country, and their

transit is from supplier to user with no need of a long, clandestine, cross-country transit.

The riverine guerrilla may also be able to maintain his influence more readily on a greater number of people as population centers are often in lowland locations in close proximity to river mouths and seafronts.

Riverine operations pose new problems and requirements for the counter-guerrilla. Small patrol craft, no matter how well armed or armored, are extremely vulnerable as they move along a waterway past banks thick with jungle growth or hidden in high swamp grass.

"Reconnaissances up narrow creeks in launches or boats are fraught with danger," a British commander stated, referring to the West African campaigns of the late 1800's, "and the best way to carry these out is to scout the bush on each side in advance of the boat."³ Such scouting may not be possible or practical, but it is true that constant liaison with the shore is essential to insure up-to-date intelligence and adequate security.

If naval forces are carrying out riverine counter-guerrilla action, it is a practical as well as psychological necessity that their link with the land be firmly established. The waterborne counter-guerrilla's understanding of the man he is fighting must extend beyond the boundaries of shoreline or riverbank.

A river winds through a countryside like an artery through a human body. To treat an artery the physician must know the body, sense its reactions, and watch closely for changes. The riverine counter-guerrilla must be alert in the same manner if his particular cure is to work.

The people ashore can be as important to him as the picture on a radar scope. A knowledge of their ethnic background, culture, and tradition blended with an understanding of their position in regard to a guerrilla movement form the indispensable back-

ground against which day-to-day developments can be measured, psychological attitudes weighed, and operational decisions made.

Villages suddenly deserted along a specific stretch of river; unexpected sullenness on the part of normally friendly fishermen; elaborate delays in the formalities of greeting by elders of a coastal hamlet; a sudden increase in the number of women fishing off a specific village; all of the small signals that might otherwise go unnoticed become important when interpreted from such a base of knowledge.

During the Indochina war French authorities organized the 5th Mobile Security Brigade. This small unit, officered by Eurasians and with a number of ex-Vietminh in their ranks, patrolled the inlets and small streams leading in and out of the Saigon River. They operated at night in pirogues without

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Mr. Howard R. Simpson holds a bachelor's degree from San Francisco College and is a graduate of the U.S. Naval War College. He has had considerable experience as an observer of guerrilla action. In the

French-Indochina conflict he served as a war correspondent for the U.S. Information Agency covering seven major campaigns in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos, including Nason and Dien Bien Phu. He accompanied Thai partisans on operations near Lai Chan, observed the work of Commando, d'Indochine in the Tonkin Delta, and was with the Catholic Militia during heavy Vietminh attacks on Phat Diem in November 1952. He closely observed the Algerian insurgency and subsequent French withdrawal when acting as Director of the USIA office in Marseilles from 1959 to 1961. In 1964 he returned to Vietnam as an adviser to the Prime Minister and to the Political Warfare Section of the Vietnamese Army. Mr. Simpson is currently serving as a Faculty Advisor and Consultant (USIA) to the President, Naval War College.

motors. In two and one half years this unit killed or captured 420 Vietminh officials and messengers without losing a man dead or captured. Much of their success was due to a deep knowledge of their enemy and his character.⁴

A substantial contribution to the success of future riverine operations involving the guerrilla can come from a thorough understanding of the psychological aspects active within a particular environment. Such a base of knowledge, coupled with bold, simple, commando-type action may accomplish more than any impressive array of new boats and technological equipment.

Conclusion. In examining guerrilla movements, both past and present, this study has concentrated on the psychological influences affecting the guerrilla and the importance of such influences as factors in guerrilla action. Because he is equally affected by psychological

pressures and attitudes, a chapter was devoted to the counterguerrilla.

As this page is being written, a front page dispatch in *The New York Times* describes the fighting in Saigon in these words: "The tenacity of the enemy continues to surprise top military spokesmen . . . It also baffles the American and South Vietnamese ground troops." The dispatch quotes an American infantryman fighting through the rubble and dust on the outskirts of the city. "Every day we think we got him this time, and he keeps coming back."⁵

It would be too facile to explain such "tenacity" as a product of psychological conditioning alone. The writer does conclude that a recognition of the psychological aspects of guerrilla warfare is not only essential to an understanding of the problem but is often the key to success or failure in both guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations.

FOOTNOTES

I-THE GUERRILLA AND HIS WORLD

1. Ernesto Guevara, *Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 32.
2. Karl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1953), p. 461.
3. Jacques Duchemin, quoted in Roland Gaucher, *Les Terrorists* (Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1965), p. 262.
4. M. Korobeinikov, "Soviet Military Psychology," *Soviet Military Review*, April 1967, p. 39.

II-GUERRILLA METHODS AND THE MIND

1. William C.G. Heneker, *Bush Warfare* (London: Rees, 1907), p. 196.
2. Alexander L. George, *The Chinese Communist Army in Action* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 56-57.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
4. Alexander Orlov, *Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), p. 169.
5. Viet Cong attacks or raids directed at hospitals are often carried out for the sole reason of seizing drugs or kidnaping trained medical personnel.
6. Edgar M. Howell, *The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-44* (Washington: U.S. Dept. of the Army, 1956), p. 83.
7. Vo-nguyen-Giap, *Dien Bien Phu* (Hanoi: Editions en Langues Etrangeres, 1964), p. 224-225.
8. Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 93.
9. Guevara, p. 19.
10. Howell, p. 145.
11. Author's interview with returned French prisoners, Saigon, February 1955.
12. Regis Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution?* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), p. 67.

III--TERROR AND ITS EFFECT

1. Michel F. de Montaigne, *Essays* (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952), p. 26.
2. Jacques Soustelle, quoted in Brian Crozier, *The Rebels* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 176.
3. Menachem Begin, quoted in Gaucher, p. 234-235.
4. Secret Army Organization, a clandestine action movement dedicated to maintaining a French Algeria.
5. Now the National Assembly.
6. Gaucher, p. 209.
7. American University, Special Operations Research Office, *Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare* (Washington: 1963), p. 233.
8. Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare, a French View of Counterinsurgency* (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 114.
9. Letter from Frank Scotton to the author, 2 October 1967.
10. Gaucher, p. 297.

IV--THE COUNTERGUERRILLA

1. Paul Rosenzweig, *The Book of Proverbs: Maxims from East and West* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1965), p. 43.
2. Louis Untermeyer, ed. *Modern British Poetry*, 5th ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942), p. 135.
3. James E. Cross, *Conflict in the Shadows, the Nature and Politics of Guerrilla War* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), p. 35.
4. Peter Paret and John W. Shy, *Guerrillas in the 1960's* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 44.
5. Howard R. Simpson, "A Dirty, Dangerous Business," *Foreign Service Journal*, April 1963, p. 49.
6. *Ibid.*
7. Cross, p. 34.
8. Edgar O'Ballance, *Malaya: the Communist Insurgent War, 1948-1960* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1966), p. 122.
9. Howard R. Simpson, "A Combat Correspondent's View," *The National Observer*, 13 May 1963, p. 14:1.
10. An unorthodox force, recruited from American colonists with Indian fighting experience, that carried out effective raids in enemy territory during the French and Indian wars.
11. John J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: the Strategy of Counter-Insurgency* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1966), p. 319.
12. Robert Taher, *The War of the Flea: a Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice* (New York: Stuart, 1965), p. 172.
13. Sir Robert G.K. Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 153.
14. Groupements de Commandos Mixtes Aeroporte.
15. Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare, a French View of Counterinsurgency* (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 109.
16. Bernard Fall, *Hell in a Very Small Place* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966), p. 228.
17. Special Administrative Section.
18. Jean Yves Alquer, quoted in Orville D. Menard, *The Army and the Fifth Republic* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967), p. 48.


V--THE FUTURE

1. Orde C. Wingate quoted in Charlton Ogburn, Jr., *The Marauders* (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 4.
2. J.M. Nemo, "The Place of Guerrilla Action in War," *Military Review*, November 1957, p. 104-105.
3. Hencker, p. 182.
4. Simon Mays, "Brigade Fluviale," *Indochina Sud Est Asiatique*, October 1953, p. 54.
5. Gene Roberts, "Last Enemy Stronghold in Saigon Is Hammered," *The New York Times*, 11 May 1968, p. 1:4.

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It is customary in democratic countries to deplore expenditures on armaments as conflicting with the requirements of the social services. There is a tendency to forget that the most important social service that a government can do for its people is to keep them alive and free.

Sir John Slessor: Strategy for the West, 1954