

1968

Cold War Operations: The Politics of Communist Confrontation


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by

Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.

(A series of lectures by Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., of the Political Science Department, Brown University, given at the United States Naval War College as a part of the Electives Program. These lectures are selected from those in a course entitled *Cold War Operations* which Professor Kirkpatrick presents at Brown. The original series, which consisted of eight lectures, was given during the 1966-67 term. For the present term, Professor Kirkpatrick presents four additional lectures. Thus, the series is expanded to twelve lectures. This is the eleventh lecture; the final one will appear in the next issue.)

The most important factors affecting communism in Asia in 1968 are the conditions inside China and the war in Vietnam.

At the start of the 1960's the prestige of China was surging upward. The Chinese Communist revolution had survived a decade which had included several major mistakes such as the commune program and backyard industry as well as natural disasters in floods and

drought. But the country appeared united under the government in Peking, and the slumbering dragon seemed about to move.

Chinese emissaries traveled throughout Asia and Africa with offers of aid and trade and, of course, the request for close political alignment. They urged comparison of their surging revolution with what they alleged was a stagnating Soviet system, contrasted unfavorably

Russian revisionism with the true faith of Mao, and drew attention to their military prowess displayed in the Korean war.

Accomplishments inside China appeared to substantiate their claims. There was civil order, and foreign visitors saw signs of economic progress. The detonation of their first nuclear explosion and the development of their first intermediate-range missile seemed to give credence to Chinese claims of great power status. Then a series of disasters torpedoed Chinese foreign policy and in a period of a few years not only darkened the luster of China's reputation but isolated China both diplomatically from other nations and politically from the other Communist Parties.

The split with the Soviet Union became an open and undignified brawl damaging to both sides and to other Communist Parties who, as sometimes occurs in a family quarrel, were asked to take sides. The aid and trade was frequently inferior and unreliable. Chinese diplomats were often arrogant and transgressed even the broadest limitations in interfering in internal affairs of other nations. The attack on India chilled many of China's most ardent admirers in Asia. China's transparent role in the attempted coup in Indonesia in October 1965 brought death to hundreds of thousands of Communists. The civil strife in China itself did the greatest damage, for what started out as a rather juvenile and somewhat humorous effort of father Mao to revitalize the flagging revolution turned into an appalling (for Communists) spectacle of an uncontrolled power struggle in the Party. Obviously it has disrupted China's forward progress. The lack of civilized conduct toward the foreign diplomatic corps must have had a telling effect on even the newest and least sophisticated of nations.

China's conduct obviously affected attitudes toward the war in Vietnam. The North Vietnamese have never

wanted Chinese intervention, even though hoping for massive aid and assistance. Their move to a neutral position in the Sino-Soviet split reflected both added disenchantment with China as well as the necessity for increased shipments of Russian equipment. Both the North Korean and Japanese Communist Parties, potentially the closest of Chinese allies, especially the former with a considerable obligation remaining from the Korean war, not only moved to a neutral position but one increasingly critical of the size of Chinese aid to North Vietnam and the accepted fact of interference with Russian shipments. South Vietnam's Communists and those in Laos also moved into a neutral position. Thus China finds itself in the most unusual position of not having any Communist Party allies in its own geographical area which it jealously considers its exclusive sphere of influence. It can count on splinter groups in Japan, Burma, Thailand, and Australia and on the insignificant New Zealand Communist Party, but aside from guerrillas in Malaysia and underground operators elsewhere, its only true ally is Albania.

The continued presence of the United States in Vietnam obviously has a deterrent effect on communism in Asia. While it might be too extreme to say, as some have, that this resulted in the anti-Communist victory in Indonesia, it would be equally unwise to claim it had no effect. Until some effective regional body is developed that can supply assistance where Communist insurgency threatens, United States presence in Asia will be necessary whether it will be as a guarantee to Taiwan or South Vietnam or as a distant but real deterrent to China. It might be that this position would not be unacceptable to the Soviet Union which obviously cannot be unhappy at some deterrent on the other side of China.

A summary of the status of communism in the various countries in Asia

follows:

Australia. The Communists in Australia are split into pro-Moscow and pro-Peking parties of which the former is the larger. While they have not won any seats in either the House or the Senate, Communists are in control of some of the major labor unions and through these are able to exert pressure on the Labor Party. They are particularly active among students and immigrants.

Burma. A single party under government auspices represents overt political activity, while the White Flag (4,000 members) and Red Flag (1,000 members) Communist Parties operate illegally. Both parties are pro-Peking and have been waging guerrilla warfare against the government.

Cambodia. The Peoples Socialist Community (Sangkum) of Prince Sihanouk ran all of the candidates and won all of the seats in the election of 1966. The small Communist Peoples Revolutionary Party operates through the front of the Pracheachon Party which is also suppressed by the government. There are Communist cadres active in the Vietnamese and Chinese ethnic groups.

China: Communist: China has been in the throes of a power struggle since 1966 that may drastically change the party and the governmental structure. Started originally by Mao Tse-tung as an effort to combat the apathy of the public, corruption in the government, and administrative incompetence, the so-called Cultural Revolution quickly turned into a battle for control of the party that still threatens to return the country to anarchy and chaos. As an initial effort to purge the country of antiparty elements, particularly among the intellectuals, Mao closed the schools and colleges and organized the youth into a Red Guard. This got out of hand, and the chanting masses of youth

mouthed quotations from Mao intervened in all areas of national life, including party affairs, and had to be returned to their homes and schools with some difficulty. More and more the principal stabilizing element has been the Peoples Liberation Army which is now in control in more than half of the provinces of China. There is little question but that this struggle in China, now in its third year and still continuing, has cost the country considerably in economic development, political control, and international prestige.

China: Nationalist: The Communist Party is illegal and there is no evidence of any underground activity or, for that matter, of much opposition to the dominant Kuomintang Party.

Hong Kong. The Emergency Regulations make illegal any group affiliated with a political organization outside the Crown Colony, but this does not prevent extensive Communist activity directed by the party in Peking. The Communists are powerful in labor unions, business establishments, and the public media and use Hong Kong as a transit point and base for propaganda.

Indonesia. The abortive coup of 1 October 1965 destroyed the second largest (after China) Communist Party in Asia after several hundred thousand of its members were killed and millions of its supporters turned elsewhere. There may be as many as 150,000 members still left, but as long as the military control the government any activity will be promptly crushed.

Japan. Communists total about 250,000, but the Japanese Communist Party can poll close to 10 times that number in elections for the House of Representatives. Even this number is sufficient to win only about five seats in the House of Representatives (486 seats) or three in the House of Councillors (127 seats). The Communists are

60 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

fragmented by the Sino-Soviet split. The largest body is the Japanese Communist Party which tries to follow an independent line and opposes both "modern revisionism" (Soviet Union) and "left wing dogmatism" (China). There are several dissident groups that are pro-Soviet: the Socialist Reform Movement, United Socialism League, and Voice of Japan. The pro-Peking groups include the "Liberation Front" and the Chosho Shimibun faction which are supported by the Chinese Communist Party. The electoral effectiveness of the Communists is seriously reduced both by the fragmentation and the fact that much of the appeal is absorbed by the non-Communist left of the Japanese Socialist Party and by the center Komeito Party of the Soka Gakkai Buddhist sect. However, the Communists receive considerable support from these parties in public demonstrations against nuclear arms, the security treaty with the United States, and American bases in Japan. The Communists have an extensive number of front organizations.

Laos. The Government of National Union technically consists of three elements: the rightists, neutralists, and the Communist-dominated Laotian Patriotic Front (Neo Lao Hak Yat-Nihx). In effect, the Nihx ignores the national government and controls those portions of the country in the north and east held by the Laotian Peoples Liberation Army which was formerly known as the Pathet Lao. The Nihx tries to follow an independent line and maintain good relations with Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi, but inasmuch as its principal support comes from the latter two, and principally North Vietnam, one should assume its influence is strongest especially in view of the not inconsiderable numbers of North Vietnamese troops in the country.

Malaysia. The Communist Party is illegal, but there is infiltration into the Socialist Front Party in Malaya and the

United Peoples Party in Sarawak. There are several thousand Communists in the underground Communist organizations in Malaya and Sarawak. The Communist

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., was born in Rochester, N.Y., educated in public schools there and at Deerfield Academy, Deerfield, Mass., and graduated from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and

International Affairs of Princeton University in 1938.

After graduation he worked for the U.S. News Publishing Corporation in Washington, D.C., as an editor and personnel director. In 1942 he joined the Office of Strategic Services and served in Europe with that organization and as a military intelligence officer on the staff of Gen. Omar Bradley's 12th U.S. Army Group where he was the G-2 briefing officer. He left the military service with the rank of major, and for his service received the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, French and Belgian Croix de Guerre, and the European Theater Ribbon with five battle stars.

After the war he returned to the U.S. News as an editor of *World Report Magazine*. In 1947 he went to work for the Central Intelligence Agency where he served in a variety of positions, including Division Chief, Assistant to the Director, Assistant Director, Inspector General, and from 1962 to 1965 was Executive Director-Comptroller. In September 1965 he resigned from CIA to accept an appointment on the faculty of Brown University in Providence, R.I., as Professor of Political Science and University Professor. His courses at Brown University include one on *Communist Cold War Operations* and one on *American Security Policy*.

In 1960 he received the National Civil Service League annual award as one of the 10 outstanding career employees of the Federal Government. In 1964 he received the President's Award for Distinguished Service, the highest award that can be given a civilian in the Federal Service.

He is the author of *The Real CIA*, published by Macmillan in January 1968, of numerous articles, and has contributed to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica Yearbook*.

Party of Malaya operates from a headquarters in Thailand, is predominantly Chinese and pro-Peking. In Sarawak the party is also largely Chinese and operates primarily from Indonesian territory even though suppressed in that territory. During the Malaysia-Indonesian War, the Indonesians trained several hundred Sarawak Communists.

Mongolia. The Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party (Communist) has a membership of about 50,000 and directs all economic, political, and social activity of the country. It has consistently supported Moscow in the Sino-Soviet split and in 1966 purged the Central Committee of all Chinese elements. The same year the country signed a 20-year treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union.

New Zealand. The Communist Party is pro-Peking, but there is a small Socialist Unity Party which is pro-Moscow. The party has only a few hundred members with the usual ratio of about 10 times that number of sympathizers, but it is ineffectual politically and polled only 1,207 votes (one-tenth of 1 percent) in the November 1966 elections.

North Korea. The Korean Workers Party (Communist) with a membership of 1,600,000 dominates all political activity even though two other so-called parties, the Democratic and Religious Ch'ongu, are allowed to exist. The Korean Workers Party has moved from a pro-Peking alignment to a more independent position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. It is critical of Chinese assistance to North Vietnam with which it has close relations.

North Vietnam. The Workers Party (Lao Dong) founded in 1951 is the successor to the Indochinese Communist Party and despite a membership of less than 3 percent of the population (760,000) tightly controls the country. In 1965 it shifted from a pro-Peking

position in the Sino-Soviet dispute to neutrality that has succeeded in obtaining considerable assistance from the Soviet Union, including increasingly sophisticated weaponry, as well as continued Chinese support in the way of small arms, food, and consumer goods.

Philippines. The Communist Party was outlawed by the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957, and its clandestine activity is primarily the remnants of the Huk-balabap guerrillas in central and southern Luzon which number several hundred but also include some dissident farmers and bandits. The Communists are also active in labor, youth, and peasant groups.

Singapore. The government of Lee Kuan Yew, both before the separation from Malaysia in 1965 and since, has attempted to suppress all Communist activity. The underground Communist Party, almost exclusively Chinese, acts as an arm of the Malaysia party and is pro-Peking. There is some Communist infiltration into labor unions and youth groups.

South Korea. Under the Constitution any political party can be ordered disbanded if its activities are considered subversive. The National Security Act of 1948 restricted Communist activities. The South Korean Labor Party (Communist) was ordered dissolved in 1949. The Anti-Communist Law of 1961 prohibits all Communist activity. There is a small underground apparatus directed and maintained by North Korea.

South Vietnam. The Communist Party was outlawed in 1955 and has operated underground since that time developing a shadow government throughout the country with a military cadre of more than 100,000 guerrilla fighters, another 40,000 in the political cadres, and 20,000 in the administrative units.

Thailand. Political parties are prohibited, and all Communist activity is

	COMMUNISM IN ASIA							Members
	Active				Attitude			
	Legal	Youth	Labor	Rural	Pro-China	Pro-Soviet	Independent	
Australia	Yes	Yes	Yes	--	Some	Larger	--	5,000
Burma	No	--	--	Yes	Yes	--	--	5,000
Cambodia	No	--	--	--	--	--	--	100
China, Communist	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	21,000,000
China, Nationalist	No	No	No	No	--	--	--	Nil
Hong Kong	No	Yes	Yes	--	Yes	No	No	?
Indonesia	No	--	--	--	?	?	--	150,000
Japan	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Some	Some	Yes	250,000
Laos	Yes	Yes	--	Yes	--	--	Yes	?
Malaysia	No	--	--	Yes	Yes	--	--	3,000
Mongolia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	--	50,000
New Zealand	Yes	--	--	--	Yes	Some	--	400
North Korea	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	--	--	Yes	1,600,000
North Vietnam	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	--	--	Yes	760,000
Philippines	No	--	--	Yes	--	--	Yes	1,750
Singapore	No	--	--	--	Yes	--	--	200
South Korea	No	--	--	--	--	--	--	Nil
South Vietnam	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	--	--	Yes	250,000
Thailand	No	--	--	Yes	Yes	--	--	3,000

underground. In the northeast an insurgency movement sponsored by North Vietnam is trying to terrorize the villages and is especially active among the 40,000 Vietnamese refugees. Along the

border with Malaysia there are several hundred terrorists who operate in both countries. The Thai Communist Party is pro-Peking.

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With many calculations, one can win; with few one cannot. How much less chance of victory has one who makes none at all! By this means I examine the situation and the outcome will be clearly apparent.

Sun Tzu, 400-320 B.C., The Art of War, i

THE BAROMETER



Readers' Comments

This section has been established to provide a forum for the useful exchange of ideas between *Naval War College Review* readers and the Naval War College.

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