

1968

Book Reviews


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PROFESSIONAL READING

The evaluations of recent books listed in this section have been prepared for the use of resident students. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these books of interest in their professional reading.

The inclusion of a book in this section does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein.

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Adam, Thomas R. *Western Interests in the Pacific Realm*. New York: Random House, 1967. 246p.

Western Interests in the Pacific Realm is a study of the political, economic, and strategic interests of the major Western powers, and particularly of the United States, in the broad area of the Pacific known as Oceania. The "Pacific Realm" of this study is centered on the island bases of the West in the Western Pacific. Its importance is one of political pragmatism; it is where Western power lies; it is a power base that is decisive as far as Western interests in Asia and Australia are concerned. The author examines and assesses the effects of Western policies on the development of the peoples of this region, both during and since the time of colonial domination. By and large, the metropolises are taken to task for their policies toward their colonies and trust territories in this area. While recognizing that there are many natural obstacles to the social and economic advancement of these scattered peoples, and that few can be overcome in a manner profitable to the economies of the West--in short, more financial and technical aid is needed--the author finds the greatest long-term obstacle to be a shortsighted disunity of the West which makes a common policy toward their Pacific dependencies unattainable. Old jealousies between the former colonial powers are by no means dead; in fact, they have been invested with new life under the name of "strategic considerations." But the unilateral pursuit of

economic and military advantage, which each nation persists in following, works to the disadvantage of the West in general and of the indigenous peoples in particular.

The author's plea for Western unity and a reasonable policy for the political, economic, and social advancement of these peoples is largely unassailable. The courses of action that he advances rest on a recognition and resolution of the existing disunity. While conceding that France might prove recalcitrant in correlating her Asian and Pacific politics with those of the English-speaking nations, he emphasizes that the choice of promoting or disregarding increased Western solidarity in this region rests with the United States. Since the United States possesses most of the actual force in the area and must bear the bulk of the consequent burdens, she must determine the extent of her willingness to share responsibility with her Western allies. This book is a timely discussion of a neglected aspect of Western interests in the Pacific. It is also an interesting primer on the politics, culture, and economy of many of the island states and dependencies in that vast region.

J.D. STEVENS
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Alsop, Stewart J.O. *The Center*. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. 365p.

It's easy to agree with Stewart Alsop that *The Center* is not an *Inside Washington*. While containing some facts which may be found elsewhere (including an encyclopedia), *The Center* consists primarily of a series of entertaining stories about the people who inhabit the innermost portion of our Government. Unfortunately, not all of the stories are appearing in print for the first time. However, otherwise this book is so timely that Clark Clifford is recognized as the current Secretary of Defense. After initially brushing off the Civil Service as a "bureaucratic disaster," the

author later notes that "the conservative Republican businessman whom President Eisenhower brought into the government were uniformly surprised by the high quality of the men they found in the upper federal bureaucracy." Despite this "expert" opinion, Alsop continues to belabor the Civil Service throughout this book. Except for the Central Intelligence Agency, the Kennedys and Robert McNamara are the only "heroes" in *The Center*. If there is a real "bad guy" it is the "military bureaucracy" at whom Alsop snipes at every possible opportunity. Accusing them of obeying Parkinson's Law with "more enthusiasm than any other bureaucracy," the author assures his reader that the corridors of the Pentagon are bursting "with majors and colonels and staff sergeants and civilian female secretaries and generals . . . taking in each other's bureaucratic laundry." Overlooked are the 2,157 civilian personnel located in the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the 70,000 civilians employed in agencies directly under that office. One who has plenty of time to spare and enjoys reading gossip about governmental VIP's might enjoy *The Center*. However, it should be read before a new administration changes the personalities located there. Anyone looking for a serious evaluation of the operations of the U.S. Government should not bother with *The Center*.

S.L. BARTH
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Elliott-Bateman, Michael. *Defeat in the East*. London: Oxford University Press, 1967. 270p.

According to its publisher, this book was written by a former officer in the British Royal Artillery who recently resigned his commission in order to continue his military studies, and who is now a lecturer in the Department of Government of the University of Manchester. For this reason, probably, the author, while critical of Western mili-

tary philosophy in general, is more particularly and extremely critical of British military thinking, strategy and tactics, training methods, and, in addition, basic British defense policies. In the Introduction the author states that the primary purpose of his book is an attempt to discover a sound military doctrine for the armed forces of the free world which will prevent their headlong rush toward defeat in Eastern Asia—if, indeed, the use of military means for accomplishment of Western political aims in that area is at all feasible in the first place. He maintains that Western military leaders do not understand the significance of Mao Tse-tung's military theories and doctrine and that this has "... resulted in the French defeat in Indo-China; is resulting in the American failure in South Vietnam; and is likely to result in similar failures by British forces in the East." He approaches the study of his stated problem, therefore, through an analysis of the military philosophy of Mao Tse-tung and by a comparison of Mao's strategy and tactics with those of other successful practitioners of the art of mobile warfare, including such individuals as Marlborough, Napoleon, Stonewall Jackson, and Rommel, as well as with the forces of the German Wehrmacht in Europe and the Japanese in Malaya during the early part of World War II.

The author states that the circumstances and conditions of war have changed drastically in recent years and, therefore, the natural laws of war have changed. He argues that the old concepts of positional and linear war are no longer valid but have been replaced by the concepts of guerrilla warfare and modern mobile warfare as developed by Mao and further refined by Gen. Vo-nguyen-Giap. He concludes that unless the West adopts a military philosophy based on his concept of the current realities of war, "defeat in the East" is inevitable. His argument is weakened, however, by some serious flaws in his

own logic. For example, he fails adequately to acknowledge the necessity for positional defense of safe base areas without which mobile counter guerrilla forces would be unable to operate and, furthermore, fails to recognize the greatly increasing mobility of regular forces. In claiming that "Mao stands in time as the man with the most complete set of keys to the secrets of war in this era," the author, it is felt, overrates the "politico-military genius of Mao Tse-tung" and the universality of Mao's doctrines. By his own admission the concepts of mobile/guerrilla warfare are applicable primarily in the space and jungle environment of Africa and Eastern Asia and would be extremely difficult to pursue successfully, for instance, in Europe. He further admits the vulnerability and complete failure of the concepts of Mao against the linear war imposed by General Ridgway in Korea. In addition, the author, by claiming a special understanding of the mind of Mao, leading to a discovery of the secrets of war, also overrates the importance of his book. In spite of its shortcomings, however, this is a very interesting and thought-provoking study which does provide a fresh approach and some new ideas concerning Chairman Mao's thoughts and theories. It is recommended reading for any serious student of counterinsurgency.

J.E. ARNOLD
Commander, U.S. Navy

Falk, Richard A. *Legal Order in a Violent World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. 610p.

In 15 essays, 10 of which are revised versions of articles published since 1960, the author, Professor of International Law at Princeton University and one of the most distinguished young scholars in the field, seeks to "describe and appraise the relevance of international law to the management of international violence." By examining a series of "concrete circumstances" in-

volving recent threats or uses of violence in international affairs, he successfully demonstrates just what "international law can and cannot do in the existing international environment." His book is an eloquent plea against what he characterizes the "human inertia, bureaucratic rigidity, and vested interests" that today prevent meaningful work "toward the drastic disarmament of states at the national level and toward the evolution of security substitutes for national military power at the supranational level, whether of regional or global scope, or both."

As one who has found himself "progressively alienated from that mainstream of American foreign policy which has culminated in the United States involvement in the Vietnam War," the author is naturally at odds with the low priority generally accorded international law by Government decisionmakers in recent years. Moreover, while acknowledging that "Professor McDougal has made the most significant statement of our time about the relevance of international law to the management of international violence," Falk often disagrees with the "ideological orientation of his former mentor at Yale, which he believes "confirms the auto-interpretative role of national elites so as virtually to nullify the distinction I deem crucial between the impartial application of international law and its adversary use." Although this reviewer does not agree with many of the conclusions reached in these profoundly pessimistic studies, he has used them repeatedly in their previously published forms and welcomes their collection in this convenient volume. Anyone seriously concerned with the management of international violence, both now and in the future, cannot overlook the wealth of ideas contained in this thought-provoking book.

RICHARD B. LILLICH
Charles H. Stockton Chair of
International Law

Harrison, Anthony. *The Framework of Economic Activity*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. 189p.

The British author Anthony Harrison in his book *The Framework of Economic Activity* covers basic economic theories and practices existing throughout the world since the beginning of the 20th century. He is both complimentary and critical of certain U.S. economic practices during the period. His discussion of the international gold standard and its relationship to pound sterling in the initial chapter is particularly well done. He uses the gold standard as a foundation to support many of the views that he advances throughout the book. Perhaps the best presented portions of the volume are the pre- and post-World War I and II periods and the depression of the early thirties. While Harrison's treatment of the replacement of the United Kingdom by the United States as the center of world finance appears, at times, to be exceedingly caustic, his account of the efforts of the League of Nations and the United Nations toward providing, or attempting to provide, world economic stability is excellently developed. Also, his explanation of economic progress in the Soviet Union while the countries of North America and Western Europe were in the depths of depression is successfully handled. Likewise, he offers a commendable review of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Furthermore, state-controlled or managed economies are discussed for both democratic and totalitarian countries and can generate some thought-provoking concepts for the interested reader.

This book is a comprehensive primer for students of international economics and provides, along with its well-researched charts and graphs, a valuable review for even the most knowledgeable in that field. It permits the career naval officer unfamiliar with the field to

acquire a tremendous appreciation of international economics with minimum expenditure of time and effort.

R.L. O'NEIL
Commander, SC, U.S. Navy

Laqueur, Walter Z. *The Road to Jerusalem*. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 368p.

The sudden and complete victory by the Israelis in June 1967 has overshadowed the events that preceded this unique war. In the Introduction, Mr. Laqueur establishes the focus of his book as the 3 weeks immediately prior to the Israeli-Arab war in June 1967. In dealing with the repercussions of the conflict, the impact on public opinion, and the policies of the various governments, Mr. Laqueur fashions an implied indictment of political coldbloodedness and diplomatic unreality. The intransigence and irrational actions of the Arabs, particularly Egypt and Syria, are clearly displayed. The worsening internal political strife in Israel, De Gaulle's deliberate aggrandizement, the well-intentioned fumbling of the British and American Governments, and Russia's doctrinal rigidity are logically derived from the pronouncements of senior officials of the various governments. The United Nations also acquires a few regretful, but accurately placed thumps on its body politic.

There are a number of assumptions and deductions by the author that are not fully supported by his source material. He admits freely that many of the answers he found were located in radio broadcasts and in the newspapers. This becomes a vital point. The source material for this book was—essentially—a basis for opinion makers and decision-makers the world over. Mr. Laqueur has, in his own words, "tried to the best of my ability to write a truthful history." If he had been given access to secret governmental documents, would it have changed his description of the truth? The reviewer doubts it, and so does the

author. The alternative requires a hyper-cynical approach to the world real-politik. Remember, the result of all these international maneuverings was a war in the Middle East with all of its attendant dangers to the world. Mr. Laqueur's style is easy to read, and the construction of the story he tells lends both interest and excitement. He has attached an appendix containing speeches by U Thant, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Abba Eban, and Gen. Itzhak Rabin which vividly illustrate the complex issues and emotional atmosphere. Mr. Laqueur has written a thought-provoking analysis that is both enlightening and entertaining.

R.L. DODD
Commander, U.S. Navy

LeMay, Curtis E. *America Is in Danger*. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968. 346p.

This book is a mirror of its author, gruff and blunt but honest. Underneath the words one feels the frustrations of a senior career military man who has been confronted by the "whiz kids" of the Pentagon. General LeMay provides the reader with the broad military issues that face the decisionmakers in the U.S. Government today. He punches to the gut point of these issues, criticizing past decisions with which he has disagreed. Most importantly, he does not stop with criticism, but offers solutions. Typical of his pungent approach is this statement on Vietnam: "the way to fight the war in North Vietnam is to fight it. Pussy footing with bombing pauses and exempting the vital targets is the way to lose it." He then follows with an eight-step campaign that "aspires to decisive victory." There are times when General LeMay becomes extremely parochial (Air Force) in his proposed solutions of the issues raised, but this does not detract from the value of the book. Rather, it provokes the military reader into thinking of alternatives. Public airing of *military* points of view of

military strategy is overdue. *America Is in Danger* is strongly recommended for reading by any American interested in the security of his country.

D.L. WARD
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

McKee, Alexander. *Farming the Sea*. London: Souvenir Press, 1967. 314p.

Farming the Sea was not written by the ordinary author who comes strolling down the pike. Alexander McKee is both an author of note and an experienced diver. This book displays a marvelous depth of research on a subject about which little was recorded prior to the 1960's. It is an interesting account of man's progress toward large-scale farming of tributaries, bays, and the open oceans. Although notable advance has been made in underwater diving since an Englishman, John Deane, invented the first really efficient diving dress in 1828, it was not until Jacques Yves Cousteau and Emile Gagnan invented the aqualung in 1940 that man's underwater capability was enhanced by several magnitudes. In 1962 undersea exploration began to perk; by 1966 interest began to boil; today the discussion of the ocean wonders is a routine household pastime.

The initial setting of this book is in the Portsmouth, Southsea area of England, but the author has focused on many parts of the world as he traces man's progress in fish farming. One immediately learns that trout farming in Europe is an old vocation; that the 1953 artificial reefs composed of ear bodies that were laid off the coast of Alabama were so successful that sportsmen and commercial fishermen alike have promoted the building of many more; that the North Sea has been used as a fish-farming laboratory. The reader will be impressed by the extent to which research, theory, and practice have quietly advanced for years in the North Sea. This book is recommended not only for the casual reader but also for

the student who wishes to become versed in man's progress in harvesting the oceans.

R.W. NIESZ
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard

Sheldon, Walter J. *Hell or High Water*. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 340p.

The title of this book would lead one to believe that it is solely an account of the Inchon landing of 15 September 1950. In reality it is an account of the first 90 days of the Korean war. Approximately one-third of the book is devoted to the invasion of South Korea by the North Koreans and the stand at the Pusan perimeter by the United Nations forces under Gen. Walton H. Walker. One-third deals with the planning for, and the conduct of, the landing itself. The remaining third covers the period from the landing up through the fall of Seoul. Sheldon is objective and fairly thorough in his presentation and has been particularly successful in making his book very readable rather than just a dull recitation of the facts. Included is some fine insight into Gen. Douglas MacArthur's character and personality. His insistence on the operation's being held at the time and place which he specified despite the skepticism of almost all concerned (including the Joint Chiefs of Staff) is a real tribute to his genius. Many lessons are to be learned from the Inchon landing, not the least of which is that luck goes with boldness. At any number of points during the entire operation, extreme good fortune turned what could have been a disaster into a brilliant success. However, one should never forget that "good luck" is often the natural outcome of intelligence and hard work. The author covers the friction between Gen. Edward M. Almond, the corps commander of the invasion force, and his two division commanders (one Army and one Marine). He attempts to give an accurate account of the causes of this friction and concludes that it was pri-